Poland

Historical memory looms over politics in Poland. The precarious history of Polish statehood from the partitions, World War II and as a satellite state of the Soviet Union has left a traumatic legacy, often weaponized by politicians through nationalist sentiments, references to the Communist regime and reparation requests. More recent developments also influence dynamics in the country today. Accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004 spurred a dual sense of national and European identity in over half of the population. Support for EU membership amongst the public remains above 90 per cent, despite governmental-level disputes with the EU over Poland’s democratic backsliding. A second significant development is the rapid economic liberalization that accompanied democratization in the 1990s, which brought inequality and pronounced regional disparities. This reflects itself today in voting patterns, which are spatially divided between the western/northern areas of the country and the eastern/southern. Relatedly, an urban-rural cleavage appears in Poland, with poorer rural communities having greater tendencies for the combination of economic paternalism and social conservatism promoted by PiS and urban voters tending to support Civic Platform (PO), Poland’s other dominant party. Social conservatism is largely present in the political landscape due to the lasting influence of the Catholic Church. Whilst around 9/10 Poles identify as Catholic, a plurality believe in a degree of separation between Church and politics. This debate over secularity forms another cleavage in Polish society, as right-wing parties tend to align themselves to the Catholic Church, using religion to justify further restrictions on abortion rights and promote ‘family values’ at the expense of LGBTQIA+ community rights.

Poland’s recent course of democratic backsliding may not be an entrenched trajectory for three reasons. Firstly, Poland is re-positioning itself in Europe after several years at the periphery in an ‘illiberal alliance’ with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, a partnership which has fractured due to the two countries’ differing geopolitical positions on Russia. Secondly, the EU, criticized thus far for a lack of action, could be a significant actor in leveraging this changing relationship. An effective use of its Rule-of-Law Conditionality Regulation, which connects EU funds (of which Poland is a net recipient) to respect for the rule of law, could bring improvements to the attributes of Checks on Government and Fundamental Rights. Lastly, the Polish party system has a relatively volatile nature, with new and splinter parties transferring votes away from the two main party blocs, and the governing alliance between PiS and its junior parties is already fragile. It is therefore possible that the democratic backsliding may be reversed electorally, through a shift in power. Prior to this possibility however, Media Integrity and Social Rights and Equality are sub-attributes to watch for a worsening decline.