Hungary

The unpopularity of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the global financial crisis of 2008-2009  provided the opportunity for Fidesz and its nationalist orientation to return to power (dominantly this time) in 2010. While the economy is significantly reliant on trade with and transfers from the EU (which account themselves for 6-7% of GDP), a nationalistic economic policy has been central to Fidesz’s political strategy.

The evolution of the Fidesz party over the past three decades provides a window into Hungarian politics more generally. The party began as a youth movement in opposition to the communist dictatorship and evolved over time to become  increasingly right-wing in ideology. One of the main cleavages in Hungarian politics today is between the urban and rural areas, but this geographical polarization is in part a function of the ways in which the political parties have developed and the sources of support that they have decided to court. Rural voters already tended to be more conservative, but government media dominance and the (sometimes corrupt) distribution of EU-sourced public works funding have solidified Fidesz’s dominance in rural areas. 

Relative to other parts of Europe, a larger share of the Hungarian population lives in rural areas and small villages. Beginning with a legal change in 2012, Fidesz has also gained electoral support among ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries who may vote by post in Hungarian elections. This provided an opportunity for Fidesz to build a sufficient electoral base outside the major cities – a strategy that has worked well in Hungary’s electoral system that includes both single-member districts and seats allocated by proportional representation. Since 2014, gerrymandering of the electoral districts has packed opposition supporters into large urban districts, thus giving Fidesz’s rural base disproportionate electoral clout. This has enabled the party to turn pluralities (or slim majorities) of the popular vote into supermajorities in the parliament (thus allowing for unilateral constitutional changes).

Fidesz’s several terms in government  under Viktor Orbán have coincided with significant declines in Hungary’s performance across a wide range of indicators of democracy and human rights tracked by the Global State of Democracy Indices. Since 2010, there have been notable declines in Civil Liberties, most notably in Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Expression, though there has been an improvement in Personal Integrity and Security. Performance in Representative Government maintained a high level longer, but Clean Elections and Free Political Parties began to decline in 2013. Checks on Government have also suffered in recent years, with short and sharp declines in Effective Parliament and Judicial Independence accompanied by a steady decline in Media Integrity.  

Hungary has been a backsliding democracy for more than a decade, but its performance may be stabilizing at a middling level on many indicators. The reelection of the Fidesz government for a fifth term starting in 2022 suggests that democratic backsliding will continue, but probably not to the extent that Hungary ceases to maintain the procedural aspects of electoral democracy. The most important areas to watch in the coming years are Media Integrity and Freedom of Expression. At this point, the horizontal checks on power from the judiciary and the legislature are severely weakened, and the media, though weak, are the most important remaining source of accountability for the government.