On 7 March, the government announced its decision to withdraw its declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which previously allowed individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to bring cases directly before the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. This move means that, starting in March 2026, individuals and NGOs will no longer have the right to file cases against the state before the Court, limiting their available avenues for seeking justice for human rights violations. The government did not provide an official rationale for this decision, which has been met with criticism from human rights and civil society groups. In recent years, the Court had ruled on several cases involving Tunisia, including a 2023 case in which it ordered provisional measures for medical care and legal representation for four detained opposition figures. The ruling, however, is yet to be implemented by the government. 

Sources: Tunisia’s Permanent Mission to the African Union, Centre pour le Respect des Libertes et des Droits de l’Homme en Tunisie, Human Rights Watch, African Court on Human and People’s Rights, Temple Garden Chambers

In November, a court of first instance in Tunis sentenced several Tunisian social media influencers, with terms ranging from 18 months to four and a half years. They were convicted of public indecency for content posted online. These convictions followed a directive issued by the Ministry of Justice on 27 October, informally known as the ‘TikTok Law,’ which authorizes prosecutors to use existing criminal law to prosecute individuals who create or share social media content that conflicts with ‘social values.’ While authorities have said the directive is designed to limit the spread of vulgar language and explicit imagery online, critics warn its vague terms may result in it being applied more broadly and that it could further undermine freedom of expression on digital platforms. These convictions did not relate to political content.

Sources: Business News, The New Arab, Le Monde

Incumbent President Kais Saied won the presidential election on 6 October, securing a second term with 90.69 per cent of the vote in the first round. He faced only two male opponents: Ayachi Zammel, the imprisoned Azimoun party leader, who received 7.35 per cent of the vote, and Zouhair Maghzaoui of the People's Movement, who garnered 1.97 per cent. The Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) barred three other candidates from running, despite a ruling from the Administrative Court that they be reinstated. The election was boycotted by several opposition parties, including the National Salvation Front coalition, driven by concerns over the absence of conditions for fair elections. While election observers noted that the election was well-organized, they raised concerns about the limited number of approved candidates, the legal framework governing ISIE, and the denial of accreditation to some local civil society observation groups. Notably, two of Tunisia's most well-established observer organizations, I Watch and Mourakiboun, were denied accreditation. Voter turnout was 28.80 per cent of registered voters, down from 48.98 per cent in the 2019 presidential election.

Sources: Independent High Authority for Elections, Al Jazeera, Human Rights Watch, RFI, Le Monde, African Union, Human Rights Watch

The presidential election on 6 October saw a dramatic decline in voter turnout, with only 28.80 per cent of registered voters casting ballots. While it still surpasses the record-low 11.40 per cent seen in the 2023 parliamentary elections, this is the lowest turnout in Tunisia’s presidential history and represents a significant drop from the 48.98 per cent turnout in the first round of the 2019 election, and an even steeper decline from the 55.02 per cent turnout that was registered in the second round in 2019. Voter turnout was particularly low among the youth, with just 6 per cent casting their votes. Observers have pointed out several factors contributing to the reduced participation, such as increased presidential control over the electoral process, the repression of opposition groups, and restrictions on media and civil society. The detention of opposition figures, including presidential candidate Ayachi Zammel, alongside the limited number of candidates approved by the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE), intensified public discontent. Opposition groups called for a boycott, citing concerns over the absence of conditions for fair elections.

Sources: Al Jazeera, Middle East Monitor, RFI, Independent High Authority for Elections (1), Independent High Authority for Elections (2), International IDEA (1), International IDEA (2)

On 27 September, Tunisia's parliament passed a bill transferring authority over resolving electoral disputes from the Administrative Court to general appellate courts. The bill, aimed at "unifying the judicial framework," was adopted with 116 votes in favor, 12 against, and 8 abstentions. It was promulgated on 28 September, ahead of the 6 October presidential elections. The move follows growing tensions between the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) and the Administrative Court. ISIE refused an August court ruling to reinstate three presidential candidates, citing failure to communicate the ruling within the legally required timeframe. The Administrative Court rejected this claim, demanding reinstatement, but ISIE has yet to comply with the ruling. Prior to the bill’s passing, the Administrative Court was the primary authority on election disputes, in the absence of a constitutional court. Protests took place throughout September, demanding the reinstatement of rejected candidates and opposing the amendments to the electoral law.

Sources: Parliament of Tunisia, Associated Press, Al Jazeera, Reuters, La Presse, International IDEA