The Global State of Democracy 2025

The findings of the 2025 Global State of Democracy (GSoD) report underscore the current global climate of radical uncertainty, exemplified by political developments in the United States that are shaking long-held assumptions about democratic resilience and multilateralism.

The events in the United States are not happening in a vacuum, as global patterns show that democracy around the world continues to weaken. In 2024, 94 countries—representing 54 per cent of all countries assessed—suffered a decline in at least one factor of democratic performance compared with their own performance five years earlier. In contrast, only 55 countries (32 per cent) advanced in at least one factor over that period.

The GSoD Indices are organized around four core categories of democratic performance—Representation, Rights, Rule of Law and Participation. Each of the four categories includes several factors, such as Credible Elections or Judicial Independence. Among the four categories, performance was strongest overall in Representation, with 47 countries (27 per cent) achieving high scores in 2024. However, in the 2024 electoral super-cycle year, the global score for Representation fell to its lowest level since 2001, with seven times more countries declining than advancing. These declines occurred around the world in both low- and high-performing democracies. Rule of Law continues to be the category with the weakest performance. In 2024, 71 countries (41 per cent) were categorized as low-performing. The highest number of aggregate-level declines also occurred in the Rule of Law category; 32 countries (19 per cent of those assessed, and most low- or mid-range-performing) registered downturns in this category in 2024. European countries accounted for 38 per cent of these downturns, followed by countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and West Asia. Declines within the Rule of Law category were most concentrated in the factor of Judicial Independence.

Within the Rights category, the most extensive global decline occurred in Freedom of the Press, followed by Freedom of Expression, Economic Equality and Access to Justice. Performance in Freedom of the Press declined in 43 countries, nearly one quarter (24.9 per cent) of those covered. This marks the broadest decline in this factor since the beginning of our data set (1975), signalling a serious threat to public accountability and informed political participation.

Participation remained relatively stable, with only 11 countries experiencing notable changes when comparing 2024 to 2019. Declines (9 countries) outweighed advances (2 countries), with most of the declines occurring in countries that were already low-performing, including Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Kuwait, Myanmar, Nicaragua and Russia. The two countries that improved were Brazil and Fiji, both high performers in this category.

The second part of this document discusses the intersection of global migration flows and their relationship to democracy and democratic institutions. Migration now affects a growing share of the world’s population, with 304 million people (or 3.7 per cent of the global population) living outside their country of birth in 2025. Contrary to some popular narratives, most of the people who leave their country of birth move to a neighbouring country or stay within their region.Global migration has emerged as a key factor contributing to the current climate of uncertainty, raising complex questions about citizenship, belonging, the universality and equality of rights, and what it means to be an inclusive democracy today.

Building on trends identified in the GSoD Indices and in the Democracy Tracker, this report focuses on the technical, legal and institutional dimensions of voting rights for citizens residing abroad. We find that expanding political participation contributes to democratic resilience, and that out-of-country voting (OCV) contributes to the sense of belonging that fosters this resilience. Benefits can accrue to both home and host countries, including by spreading democratic norms across borders. However, data collected for this report show that diaspora turnout rates are relatively low, and the information that is publicly available about eligible diaspora voters is limited and uneven. While there is no one-size-fits-all OCV model, we know that the legal and administrative design of OCV systems strongly affects participation rates, and broad-based enfranchisement requires carefully designed policies—for both registration and encouraging turnout. To persevere, democracy requires patience, maintenance and, at times, reinvention. The work of democracy is never finished: as the scale and patterns of migration evolve, democracies will have to maintain and regularly re-evaluate institutional frameworks, including, as noted here, the meaning, boundaries and mechanisms of involving non-resident citizens in political decision making.

Data sources

The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) report, the flagship publication of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), provides annual analysis of democratization across the globe.

Version 9 of the GSoD Indices, a quantitative data set, provides the majority of the data on which this report is based (unless otherwise stated). The Indices measure national performance across discrete areas of democracy, broadly understood as a system in which there is public control over decision making and decision makers, and in which there is equality in the exercise of that control. While this report refers to the five-year period from 2019 through December 2024, the complete data set covers the years 1975–2024 (International IDEA n.d.e).

The Indices employ a hierarchical conceptual framework oriented around four core categories of democratic performance: Representation, Rights, Rule of Law and Participation (see Figure 0.1). Each category is subdivided into factors (such as Credible Elections or Judicial Independence) and subfactors (such as Freedom of Expression or Social Group Equality).

The GSoD Indices aggregate indicators from 22 data sources (see Box 0.1), which include observational data from United Nations agencies, expert-coded data from academic programmes and some data collected directly by International IDEA. The Indices are based on a total of 154 indicators. The result is a collection of 1,676,362 data points collected on 174 countries¹ over 50 years.

A complementary source of evidence for this report is International IDEA’s Democracy Tracker, a qualitative data set that provides event-centric information on democracy developments in 173 countries, with a data series beginning in August 2022 and updated every month after that. The Tracker reports democracy-related developments that may signal significant advances or declines in a country’s democratic performance in a particular month, and monitors developing events that could signal that such a change is very likely in the next year (International IDEA 2025h). The Tracker has enabled this edition of the GSoD report to reflect key democratic trends through June 2025, offering additional depth to country-specific discussions, including cases where notable developments occurred after the December 2024 cut-off for the GSoD Indices data.

Some country examples featured in the report, such as those from the USA, are included based on the relevance of their democratic developments to broader regional or global patterns. The Tracker ensures that these examples are evidence-based and grounded in recent developments.

In addition to data, the report also draws on the subject matter and regional expertise of International IDEA’s staff at the Institute’s headquarters in Sweden, as well as the work of staff at regional and country offices across Africa and West Asia, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe. The insights of International IDEA staff who are closely involved in democracy-building efforts help to contextualize the data and identify critical trends as they unfold.

Structure and approach of the report

This year’s report begins with a broad overview of trends at the global level, shining a light on the aspects of democracy that experienced the most change—positive and negative—comparing 2024 to 2019. Specifically, Part 1 of the report provides a description of what has changed within each category of democratic performance—Representation, Rights, Rule of Law and Participation. It uses country cases² to draw out illustrative examples and highlight noticeable patterns. These descriptions are meant to serve not as exhaustive lists of the events that are driving change but as illustrations of the kinds of developments that explain what the data reflect. In most cases, the analysis illustrates advances and declines by referencing statistically significant changes that have occurred in comparison with five years earlier. When that is not the case, the specific interval is referenced.

Quantitative scores from the GSoD Indices for each category, factor and subfactor are also categorized into levels of performance. All the indices at the different levels have been normalized to range from 0 (lowest achievement) to 1 (highest achievement). If a country’s score exceeds 0.7, its performance is labelled ‘high’. Scores below 0.4 correspond to ‘low’ performance. Scores between 0.4 and 0.7 classify a country’s performance as ‘mid-range’.

Several countries currently experiencing armed conflict or war—such as Haiti, Palestine³, Sudan and Ukraine—have suffered declines in their democratic performance. These declines are closely linked to institutional disruption, political instability and deteriorating security conditions. The complexity and fluidity of such conflict-affected environments mean that existing democratic indices may not fully capture the on-the-ground realities. Further research is warranted to better understand how armed-conflict dynamics interact with democratic resilience or declines, and to assess the methodological limits of measuring democracy in such contexts.

In response to growing global migration and a resurgence of inward-looking policies, Part 2 of the report focuses on demonstrating why and how democracies can lead the way in responding to a world on the move. It explains how democracies and countries with democratic aspirations can foster inclusion by helping to facilitate political participation for non-resident nationals. This section of the report also includes a set of guiding questions for policymakers who are considering how to craft out-of-country voting policies in line with democratic values.

The first half of 2025 underscored the extent to which radical uncertainty remains a defining feature of the global context. The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency reflects this volatility, contributing to the erosion of long-held assumptions across multiple domains—from the economic impacts of tariffs, to the authority of supranational institutions responsible for protecting global peace and stability, to the inviolability of international borders among liberal democracies.

For actors genuinely concerned about democratic principles, recent developments have raised serious concerns about the state of global democracy. The USA—a country long regarded as a leading advocate for democracy worldwide—has, in 2025, significantly reduced both its diplomatic engagement and its financial support for international democracy assistance. These developments have contributed to a weakening of international democratization efforts. In less than six months, US domestic political institutions have also lost much of their symbolic sheen, increasingly serving as a reference point for executive overreach and offering more encouragement to populist strongman leaders than to pro-democracy hopefuls.

Between January and April 2025, International IDEA issued 20 alerts (twice as many as in any of the previous two full years), documenting instances in which the US Government has eroded and abolished the rules, institutions and norms that have shaped US democracy (International IDEA n.d.c). Examples include efforts to restrict academic freedom, criminalize protest activity, question the legitimacy of certified elections, selectively restrict media access to the executive and circumvent due process norms.

These developments have not yet been captured in full by the GSoD Indices due to the time lag, but they are well documented in the Democracy Tracker and illustrate a rapid rate of change. Some observers have described these developments as a ‘presidential coup’ in the USA, warning that the country lies at the ‘cusp of autocracy’ (Center for Systemic Peace n.d.).

While these recent developments have raised alarms in many quarters, some academic analysts and civil society actors see the US case as a reminder of the danger inherent in assuming that the work of democracy is ever done. The political scientist Adam Przeworski (2025), for example, noted that, in apparent contradiction to decades of accepted wisdom, the combination of wealth and a history of peaceful political transitions may foster a false perception of democratic consolidation. This, in turn, can lead to reduced vigilance against authoritarianism and weaker societal resistance to democratic erosion.

Perspectives outside the Western democratic tradition have often been more measured, with some observers identifying the current moment as an opportunity for new voices, perspectives and influences on the shape of democracy—perhaps even the chance for a post-liberal model with resonance in regions beyond the West (Koelble and Lipuma 2008; Schmitter 2018). The domino effect of US developments—particularly the deprioritization of democracy promotion in parts of Europe (Carothers and Stuenkel 2025; Farinha 2025; Youngs 2025)—has also elicited renewed interest in democratic resilience (Raad van State 2024; Council of the European Union 2025)—the idea that democratic systems are uniquely equipped to weather crises, uncertainty and change.

1.1. Migration, inclusion and democracy

Global migration has emerged as a key factor contributing to the current climate of uncertainty (Casas Zamora 2024), raising complex questions about citizenship, belonging, the universality and equality of rights, and what it means to be an inclusive, resilient democracy today. The scale of migration continues to grow, with the latest data showing that 304 million people are international migrants—three times the estimate in 1970. Today, this figure represents 3.7 per cent of the world’s population (UNDESA 2025).

Figure 1.1 uses 2024 data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) to illustrate global migration patterns, with regions defined according to the GSoD framework. Contrary to many commonly held assumptions, the data show that most migration happens within, not between, regions. This pattern is particularly evident in the strong inward and outward flows (originating from the base), within each region, shown as wide colour-coded bands anchored at the regional bases. For example, the flow from Africa to Europe includes a purple band marked with blue on the outer rim of the circle, indicating migrants moving from Africa to Europe—yet this is just a fraction compared with the populations migrating within either region. Neighbouring bars at the European base show migrants arriving from the Americas (green), Asia and the Pacific (red), West Asia (gold) and Europe itself (purple).

Data from the International Organization for Migration listing the world’s top five country-to-country migration corridors (as of 2024) confirm this trend. All five corridors are intraregional or between neighbouring countries: (a) Mexico to the USA; (b) Syria to Turkey; (c) Ukraine to Russia; (d) India to the United Arab Emirates; and (e) Russia to Ukraine (McAuliffe and Oucho 2024; note that the data reflect total numbers of migrants regardless of the cause of movement).

Although migration has significant implications for democracy, some of the most well-known democracy assessment frameworks (such as those by Freedom House, International IDEA and V-Dem) do not have specific indicators that systematically measure how institutions include or exclude immigrants and emigrants (as distinct from resident citizens). As a result, migration-related problems are not reflected in quantitative measures of democracy such as the GSoD Indices. However, these issues are conceptually part of the broader GSoD Indices’ Social Group Equality subfactor, which measures inequality across social class and identity group, especially in terms of civil liberties and access to political power. It also tracks socio-economic and urban–rural exclusion. Since many migrants face more than one kind of disadvantage, looking at how countries perform on broader inclusion measures—like Social Group Equality—can help us understand how migration and democracy are connected. This link is explored further in Part 2 of this year’s report.

There was very little overall change in global terms in the Social Group Equality factor (comparing scores in 2024 to 2019). Where shifts did occur, they were predominantly negative. Only two countries (Moldova and Montenegro) registered improvements, while 16 countries experienced declines over the same period. The most severe deterioration occurred in Afghanistan, though five high-performing countries also saw negative changes (Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Uruguay).

Part 2 of this report examines the intersection of migration and democracy, and we ask how democracies can facilitate inclusive participation in a context where individuals increasingly maintain multiple identities and affiliations, often across national borders (Schlenker and Blatter 2013). The specific focus is on the question of emigrants’ participation, particularly through out-of-country voting.

While there are many drivers of migration⁴ and several categories of migrants that are based on those drivers, such classifications are generally more relevant to analysis that focuses on migrants’ rights in destination countries, where they are immigrants. In contrast, the analysis in Part 2 focuses on participation in migrants’ countries of origin, where the reasons for and contexts of their departure have less impact on the laws and mechanisms their home countries design (or fail to design) to facilitate their continued political participation. Accordingly, the analysis does not differentiate between various kinds of emigrants; instead, it focuses only on whether or not these emigrants can vote from abroad.

Global patterns show that democracy around the world continues to weaken. In 2024, 94 countries—representing 54 per cent of all countries assessed—suffered a decline in at least one factor of democratic performance, compared with their own performance five years earlier. In contrast, only 55 countries (32 per cent) advanced in at least one factor over that period. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, this represents an almost 8-percentage-point increase in the number of declines and a 2-point increase in advances compared with the previous year’s patterns (changes between 2018 and 2023).

All regions experienced some degree of change in democratic performance (see Figure 2.2). African countries accounted for the largest share of global declines, with 33 per cent, followed by Europe, with 25 per cent. Asia and the Pacific and the Americas accounted for a smaller share of overall deterioration (20 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively), with West Asia, already the lowest-performing region globally, comprising the smallest portion (6 per cent).

These regional patterns of decline, however, were not all unidirectional. Countries in Africa and the Americas recorded the highest share of advances (24 per cent each of all advances), while Europe and Asia and the Pacific saw smaller shares of global progress (23 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively). West Asian countries accounted for 8 per cent of all improvements (see Figure 2.2 for a breakdown of changes at the factor level in each region).

Beneath the global shifts in democratic performance lies a more subtle but important trend—stability. Comparing 2024 to 2019, every country in the data set maintained stable performance in at least one factor of democratic quality.

Among the four categories, country performance was strongest in Representation, with 47 countries (27 per cent) achieving high scores in 2024. Performance was weakest in Rule of Law, with 71 countries (41 per cent) falling into the low-performance band (see Figure 2.3 for a breakdown of the number of countries in each performance band at the category level).

2.1. Global declines and advances

Declines at the factor level have been most concentrated in the categories of Representation, Rights and Rule of Law (see Figure 0.1 for an overview of how we measure democratic performance). Despite countries’ relatively strong overall performance in Representation, numerous declines were seen in Credible Elections and Effective Parliament (see Figure 2.4 for an overview of advances and declines at the factor level).

Within Rights, Civil Liberties was one of the factors that saw the broadest declines, with the most significant impacts seen in Freedom of the Press, followed by Freedom of Expression, Economic Equality and Access to Justice. Performance in Freedom of the Press declined in 43 countries, nearly one quarter (24.9 per cent) of those covered, marking the broadest decline in this factor since the beginning of our data set (1975) (see Box 2.1 for more details). Declines within the Rule of Law category were most concentrated in Judicial Independence, though Predictable Enforcement and Personal Integrity and Security were almost equally affected.

The three largest declines in Freedom of the Press were seen in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso and Myanmar, all low-performing contexts that have been marked by violence and undemocratic transfers of power. The fourth-largest decline took place in South Korea, a country that fell from high to mid-range performance in this subfactor between 2019 and 2024. There, the media has faced multiple challenges over the past several years. Examples include the cancellation of a well-known investigative journalist’s daily political programme, a spike in defamation cases initiated by the government and its political allies against journalists, and raids on journalists’ residences (Civicus 2024). Such incidents continued in 2024, with the establishment of a special investigative prosecutorial team targeting journalists for defamation (Lee, Cho and Jo 2023; Jang 2024). After a tumultuous year that included the now-former president’s declaration of martial law and his subsequent impeachment, a snap election in June 2025 brought a new administration to power. It remains to be seen how this transition may affect the country’s media landscape in the coming months.

Although advances were less frequent overall within the Rights category, Freedom of Expression stood out as a notable exception. Comparing 2024 to 2019, 20 countries (12 per cent of those assessed) registered improvements in this factor, and they were fairly evenly distributed across the regions. Still, declines in Freedom of Expression were also notable, impacting 39 countries around the world.

Chile recorded the largest improvement in Freedom of Expression (comparing 2024 scores to 2019), due in part to landmark draft legislation aimed at enhancing the safety of journalists and others in the field of communications, as well as their families. If approved by the legislature, the bill would introduce several novel features, including a broad definition of ‘aggression’ that goes beyond physical aggression to include digital harassment and surveillance (Pagola 2023; Gobierno de Chile 2024).

Progress was also observed in other areas of democratic performance worldwide, particularly in Absence of Corruption, Access to Justice and Credible Elections. Botswana recorded the largest improvement in Credible Elections (comparing 2024 scores to 2019), with observers noting an increased number of polling stations both in the country and abroad, the official designation of two public holidays (on the day of and day after polling) to enable the maximum number of voters to participate and pre-election debates organized by the media. While observers also cited challenges—for example, with communication and the appointment of election authorities—they commended Botswana for holding transparent elections. The 2024 election was a landmark in the country’s post-independence history, marking the end of the Botswana Democratic Party’s 58-year tenure in power (ECF–SADC 2024a; International IDEA 2024af).

2.2. Representation

In the GSoD Indices, Representation is an aggregate measure of the extent of representative democracy, building from component measures of credible elections, inclusive suffrage, freedom to organize through political parties, the effectiveness of the legislature and the practice of democracy at the local level.

Representation symbolizes what is often considered to be the core of democracy, including the mechanisms through which the people choose their leaders and representatives (elections and political parties), and the institutions (legislatures) responsible for translating the expression of public will into actionable policy.

Table 2.1 highlights the top 10 countries in Representation performance for 2024, showing both regional diversity and year-on-year movement in the rankings. Germany, Denmark and Norway continue to lead globally. It is also noteworthy that Mauritius’s performance in Representation experienced a notable improvement, climbing 23 places in the rankings.

These top performers stand in contrast to broader global trends in 2024, which point to the lowest global performance in Representation since 2001. Category-level declines were recorded in 21 countries, outnumbering advances by a ratio of 7 to 1, with deterioration observed in all regions. Most declines impacted low-performing countries, but mid-range- and high-performing countries were also affected.

Comparing 2024 to 2019, improvements in Representation were recorded in just three countries—mid-range-performing Honduras and Montenegro and high-performing Latvia. Some of the advances in Honduras were associated with the 2021 elections, which European Union observers described as competitive and calm. Other markers of improvement included a more reliable voter register and high turnout (European Union Election Observation Mission 2022).

At the factor level, Credible Elections and Effective Parliament continued to see the broadest declines, impacting 35 countries (20 per cent) and 32 countries (19 per cent), respectively. These declines occurred across all levels of performance and in every region of the world. Africa experienced the highest concentration of declines in these two factors, with nearly one in four countries (23 per cent) exhibiting a significant drop in either Credible Elections or Effective Parliament. In no region did the number of advances outweigh the number of declines in any factor of Representation. Figure 2.5 illustrates the trends over time for advances and declines in the factors of Representation.

Despite widespread declines in related factors, elections continue to hold unique power and promise as a means of democratic renewal. Comparing 2024 to 2019, 24 countries around the world (14 per cent) experienced improvements in Credible Elections or Effective Parliament.

Notable examples include Brazil and Poland, where the election of new governments (in 2022 in Brazil and 2023 in Poland) brought an end to years of consistent democratic deterioration that included executive aggrandizement, the undermining of the rule of law and the independence of the courts, constraints on the media and restrictions in the space for civil society. In Poland’s case, this period was also characterized by a strained relationship with the EU, which withheld millions of euros in funding over concerns regarding the deliberate weakening of the rule of law (Carothers and Carrier 2025).

Since the most recent elections, both countries have recorded measurable improvements. Brazil recorded advances in 10 factors related to the quality of democracy between 2022 and 2024, while Poland improved in 6 factors between 2023 and 2024. Although both contexts remain challenging, due in part to the divided government in both countries, there has been progress in reversing several non-democratic policies of the past. For example, both countries have taken steps to seek accountability for previous rule-of-law violations and to expand civic space (International IDEA 2024s, 2025j). In Poland, a key development to monitor will be the role of the newly elected president, aligned with the opposition, whose veto power may shape the reform trajectory going forward.

Credible Elections

The Credible Elections index aggregates indicators that measure the extent to which elections for national representative political office are free from irregularities, such as flaws and biases in the voter registration and campaign processes, voter intimidation and fraudulent counting.

As of the end of 2024, data from the GSoD Indices showed that 35 countries (20 per cent of those covered) had recorded declines in Credible Elections compared with 2019. Countries with declines were found at all levels of performance, from higher performers, such as Georgia and South Korea, to low-performing contexts, such as Mozambique and Pakistan.

Following the 2024 elections super-cycle year, a few countries stand out for sharp declines between 2022 and 2024. Georgia’s 2024 legislative elections were marked by controversy, with election observers pointing to irregularities that included alleged intimidation, ballot-box stuffing and vote buying. The former president, alongside civil society and members of the opposition, rejected the results, and opposition lawmakers boycotted the legislature’s inaugural session. Mass protests continued throughout the year (International IDEA n.d.c; Megrelidze 2024).

Mozambique also experienced a significant decline, falling from mid-range to low performance in this factor between 2022 and 2024. The country’s October 2024 election was controversial, with observers raising concerns about an inflated voter roll, ballot-box stuffing, irregularities in vote counting and tabulation, and the management of complaints and appeals. The post-election period was marred by violence; police used live ammunition on protesters, and hundreds perished. Talks between the government and opposition leaders were initiated in March 2025 to resolve the impasse, with an agreement reached in April 2025 (Budoo-Scholtz 2025; International IDEA 2025o).

These disputes are emblematic of a broader trend identified in previous editions of this report, and they signal both danger and promise (International IDEA 2024a). The people remain the ultimate check on power, but the connection between their voice and authorities’ actions, especially when elites are unwilling to let go of power, can often be tenuous. In the wake of the 2024 super-cycle year of elections, four countries experienced improvements in indicators of Credible Elections. All of these were in Africa: Botswana, Chad, Mauritius and South Africa. In Mauritius, observers noted the credible work of the EMB, a peaceful electoral environment and smooth and timely operations at most polling stations (ECF–SADC 2024b).

Effective Parliament

The Effective Parliament index aggregates indicators that measure the presence of opposition parties, legislative investigations and questioning of officials, as well as broader measures of executive oversight and executive constraints.

Nearly one in five countries has experienced a decline in Effective Parliament, signalling problems with legislative checks on executive power. Comparing 2019 to 2024, 32 countries (19 per cent) registered declines, while only 9 (5 per cent) showed improvements. Among the countries with declining performance, Japan was the only high-performing country; the remainder were split almost evenly between low-performing and mid-performing contexts (for two examples, see Box 2.2). Several of the lowest performers experienced a coup d’état or other undemocratic transfer of power, while others continued to be affected by ongoing violent conflicts: examples include Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Mali, Niger, Myanmar and Syria. Others, such as El Salvador, Kuwait, Russia and Venezuela, do not have effective legislatures because they have been co-opted by executives or abolished. Mid-range performers with deteriorating parliamentary effectiveness are found across all regions and include countries as diverse as Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mauritius, Paraguay and Slovakia. These declines often coincide with setbacks in other areas of their democratic performance, including in varied factors of Representation, Rights and Rule of Law.

Nine countries experienced improvements in their performance with regard to the Effective Parliament factor (comparing 2024 scores to 2019). These include high-performing Brazil, Czechia, France and Poland, as well as mid-range-performing Fiji, Jordan, Montenegro, Papua New Guinea and Thailand.

Brazil, whose score in Effective Parliament increased the most between 2019 and 2024, is a notable example of how the legislature can assert its role in holding the executive to account. In October 2023, a legislative committee accused former President Jair Bolsonaro and his allies of crimes in connection with January 2023 riots. The committee characterized the events as a premeditated coup attempt and recommended that the attorney general pursue charges against Bolsonaro that included political violence, criminal association, abolition of the rule of law and an attempted coup. While the legislative committee lacks prosecutorial authority, its recommendations contributed to formal police charges and the Supreme Court’s unanimous vote to accept the charges. Bolsonaro and his allies are now due to stand trial (International IDEA 2023e, 2024ag).

2.3. Rights

In the GSoD Indices, the Rights category is made up of liberal and social rights that support both fair representation and accountability. It is built upon four component measures of Access to Justice, Civil Liberties (including Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Association and Assembly, Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Movement), Basic Welfare and Political Equality (including Gender Equality, Social Group Equality and Economic Equality).

A small group of countries continues to lead on rights protections. As illustrated in Table 2.2, Denmark, Switzerland and Germany held the top three positions in 2024, maintaining stable performance, while countries such as Norway, Ireland and Sweden registered notable improvements. These top performers represent the global high-water mark in safeguarding rights and freedoms.

Nevertheless, these countries remain exceptions to a broader pattern of decline. Comparing 2024 scores to 2019, significant erosion was seen in the Rights category, with category-level declines outnumbering advances by a ratio of 9 to 1; the sole advance was in Vanuatu. The steepest declines took place in low-performing Belarus and Myanmar, which are among the countries with the largest number of declines across many factors (in all categories) from 2019 to 2024. Declines have also been recorded, however, in mid-range contexts like Greece and Burkina Faso. Greece dropped from high to mid-range performance in Rights between 2023 and 2024 (though it remains close to the threshold for high-range status).

Declines were most common in Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Expression, Economic Equality and Access to Justice. The decline in Freedom of the Press, impacting nearly 25 per cent of countries, is the most widespread drop since the beginning of the data set in 1975. Approximately one in five countries also saw declines in Freedom of Expression (22 per cent of countries), Economic Equality (21 per cent) and Access to Justice (20 per cent) (see Figure 2.6). This deterioration was reflected across all regions, with Africa and Europe accounting for the largest share of declines in each of these factors.

At the same time, however, a smaller number of countries made notable gains, demonstrating that positive trajectories are still possible, particularly in mid-range- and high-performing contexts. Advances were most common in Freedom of Expression, where 20 countries (12 per cent) saw progress. With the exception of two low-performing countries (Bangladesh and Thailand), all improvements were observed in countries with mid-range or high performance in this factor. Countries in the Americas and Asia and the Pacific account for 60 per cent of all advances, and no such improvements were observed in West Asia.

Some of these country-level advances may prove fragile. This is the case in Thailand, where struggles for control over the direction of political reforms are ongoing between the older, more traditional leadership and newer, more progressive parties (Simpson 2024). For example, events in 2025—especially plans to indict members of parliament from the now-dissolved Move Forward Party for sponsoring a bill in parliament to reform Thailand’s lèse-majesté law—cast doubts on the sustainability of recent gains (International IDEA 2025l).

Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Expression

The Freedom of the Press subfactor measures the extent to which the news media are diverse, honest, critical of the government and free from censorship (on the part of the government or self-imposed); it also measures independence of the media.

The Freedom of Expression subfactor refers to the right to openly discuss political issues and express political opinions outside the mass media and to considerations of the broader information environment.

Freedom of the Press was the factor that saw the broadest declines in 2024, impacting 43 countries at all levels of performance and in all regions. Similar downturns took place in Freedom of Expression, seen in 39 countries globally. Some of the steepest declines in both factors between 2019 and 2024 occurred in countries marked by closed and insecure contexts, including Afghanistan, Belarus, Burkina Faso and Myanmar. However, even relatively higher-performing countries such as Argentina, Austria, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Senegal, Taiwan and the United Kingdom saw mounting pressure on the exercise of one or both of these freedoms.

The office of the UN’s special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression emphasized the threats to media and expression in a report published in June 2025. The document detailed attacks on independent media and called attention to campaigns, organized by vested political interests in a diverse array of contexts, to ‘undermine the credibility of independent media outlets and journalists who speak truth to power’ (Khan 2025: 7). The report also raised concerns about attacks on journalists, both in person and online, with women journalists facing particular risks (Khan 2025).

Recent developments in Georgia underscore the mounting pressure on media freedom and freedom of expression. In April 2025, the Georgian Parliament adopted several laws restricting civil society and media, including a so-called ‘foreign agents’ law that imposes expansive registration requirements and sanctions on independent organizations and media outlets. The April 2025 law is a harsher version of a law originally passed in 2024. The 2025 version tightens regulation on broadcasters, including new state-imposed coverage standards, and includes prohibitions on foreign funding, which journalists have criticized as mechanisms of state control and censorship (International IDEA 2025x).

Despite widespread declines in Rights-related indicators, there has also been some progress, most notably in Freedom of Expression, which shows the highest number of improvements among all factors in the Rights category. Low-performing Bangladesh and high-performing Spain illustrate how such advances can take place in highly divergent contexts.

In Bangladesh, one example of progress is the interim government’s annulment of the Cyber Security Act in November 2024, which had been widely criticized for suppressing free speech, press freedom and political dissent. The repeal of the act created space for a new law that omitted several of the most controversial provisions of the previous version (International IDEA 2024ah). In Spain, the government’s new Action Plan for Democracy includes measures meant to enhance both media independence and the right to information. Key initiatives include the drafting of an Open Administration Law to enhance the quality and accessibility of public information, the establishment of an independent whistleblower protection authority in public administration, measures for the disclosure of assets and interests by ministers and political parties, and legal safeguards to protect journalists’ sources. The plan also envisages the creation of a media register to improve transparency around media ownership and funding, to be maintained by an independent regulatory body (International IDEA 2024y).

Economic Equality

The Economic Equality index aggregates expert-coded measures of the extent to which people are excluded from political processes on the basis of economic factors, along with observational data about economic inequality.

Comparing 2024 to 2019, the number of countries experiencing declines (37) in Economic Equality was nearly triple the number registering advances (13) around the world (see Figure 2.6). Although the largest number of declining countries were in Africa, the regions were all fairly equally impacted, with the exception of West Asia, which saw only three such declines. The declines were largely concentrated in low or mid-range performers, with Singapore the only high performer to register a drop. Some of the steepest declines occurred in low-performing contexts (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Nicaragua and Qatar), but mid-range performers were also impacted (Canada, Iceland, Mauritius, Niger, Portugal, Romania and the USA).

The USA, which is among the 10 countries with the largest drops (its score fell from 0.69 in 2019 to 0.59 in 2024), has long struggled with high rates of inequality, illustrating how persistent economic disparities continue to challenge even long-established democracies. According to the latest data, the top 10 per cent of families in the USA hold 60 per cent of all wealth in the country, while the bottom 50 per cent hold just 6 per cent (Congressional Budget Office 2024). This disparity is reinforced by tax laws that apply lower rates to investment income—a major source of wealth for higher-income groups—than those applied to income earned from wages and salaries (Inequality.org 2025). In the first half of 2025, a series of policy decisions by the government raised concerns about deepening inequality. These decisions included the revocation of a prior executive order that had raised the minimum wage for federal contract workers and the elimination of collective bargaining rights for federal workers (Anderson 2025). The administration’s plans to cut Medicaid funding and change the rules that determine who qualifies for food subsidies also threaten to worsen inequality, particularly impacting lower-income groups (Luhby 2025).

Although the number of countries showing advances in Economic Equality was relatively small, gains were recorded across the full spectrum of performance. These included low-performing Bangladesh, Sudan and Timor-Leste; mid-range-performing Fiji, Jordan, Moldova, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Togo and Zambia; and high-performing Malta and Slovenia.

Access to Justice

The Access to Justice factor denotes the extent to which the legal system is fair (i.e. citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and have the right to be under the jurisdiction of and to seek redress from competent, independent and impartial tribunals without undue delay).

Comparing 2024 to 2019, performance in Access to Justice declined in 35 countries, which is more than twice the number of countries (15) that recorded advances. The majority of these declines occurred in mid-range-performing contexts, but two countries with much higher baseline performance also experienced notable deterioration in this area—France and South Korea. At the regional level, Africa and Asia and the Pacific accounted for the majority (57 per cent) of all the declines in Access to Justice.

Three of the five steepest drops worldwide occurred in low-performing Mauritania and Myanmar and in mid-range-performing Greece. Other mid-range-performing countries that experienced setbacks in this factor represent diverse contexts, including Ethiopia and Lebanon (both on the lower end of the mid-range spectrum).

In Greece, persistent concerns about impunity have hampered the pursuit of justice, especially for crimes related to media and journalists. Two high-profile cases in 2024 exemplify these challenges. The first involves the murder of a crime journalist, Giorgos Karaivaz, in 2021. Critics raised concerns about irregularities during the trial, including damaged evidence, and the eventual acquittal of the two men accused of the murder. The second case concerns the so-called Predatorgate scandal, in which state agencies were alleged to have used Predator spyware against multiple prominent individuals. Despite documented evidence of the National Intelligence Service’s role, the Supreme Court prosecutor cleared all state agencies of involvement (Human Rights Watch 2025). The decision was depicted by some observers as part of a pattern of impunity, especially in light of other longer-standing problems with the Predatorgate investigation. These include accusations against independent watchdog agencies that warned targets about the spyware and allegations that prosecutors were attempting to intentionally delay the investigations (Reporters without Borders 2023).

While declines in Access to Justice have been more prevalent, several countries across all levels of performance have also registered improvements. A particularly notable example is The Gambia, where steady improvement has been noted since 2017, when the country transitioned from low to mid-range performance. One of the most significant recent developments is the backing by the Economic Community of West African States of the establishment of a special tribunal for The Gambia to prosecute crimes committed under former President Yahya Jammeh’s rule (1994–2017). That period was marked by widespread repression, serious human rights violations, and control over the government and media. In 2022, the government accepted nearly all of the Gambian Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission’s recommendations, and there is strong public support for the prosecution of former Jammeh officials (International IDEA n.d.b). The coming years will be critical in assessing the extent to which these commitments are implemented and whether they translate into lasting institutional reform and justice for victims.

2.4. Rule of Law

In the GSoD Indices, Rule of Law is an aggregate measure that includes assessments of the independence of the judiciary from government influence, the extent to which public administrators use their offices for personal gain, how predictable enforcement of the law is and the degree to which people are free from political violence.

Despite widespread challenges to the Rule of Law globally, a number of countries continue to set high standards in this area. These top performers demonstrate consistent strengths in judicial independence, low levels of corruption, predictable legal enforcement and strong protections against political violence. See Table 2.3 for the top 10 countries in 2024 in this category.

Yet these positive examples stand in contrast to broader global trends. Out of all democratic performance categories, the highest number of aggregate-level declines occurred in the Rule of Law category. Comparing 2024 to 2019, 32 countries (19 per cent of those assessed) registered downturns in this category; most of these countries were either low- or mid-range-performing. European countries accounted for 38 per cent of the downturns, followed by countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and West Asia. The declines were evenly distributed across three factors—Judicial Independence, Personal Integrity and Security, and Predictable Enforcement—each representing between 28 and 29 per cent of the total. Absence of Corruption accounted for a smaller (16 per cent) portion of the total number of downturns. Nevertheless, corruption remains a salient political issue even when significant downturns are not present. In Serbia, for example, anger over entrenched political corruption fuelled months of massive nationwide protests instigated by the deadly collapse of the railway station in Novi Sad (Stojanovic 2024; International IDEA 2025b). Other cases are more mixed. India, for example, experienced a small decline in Judicial Independence (comparing its 2024 score to 2019). At the same time, however, it also saw the Supreme Court successfully order the first elections in Jammu and Kashmir in a decade, in October 2024, as well as issue a landmark ruling in November restricting the ability of state and local governments to conduct arbitrary demolitions of private property (International IDEA 2024ad, 2024ak).

See Figure 2.7 for an overview of how these trends changed between 2019 and 2024.

The rule of law has come under intensified pressure under the second Trump administration in the USA. Since Trump took office in January 2025, his administration has issued a series of executive orders attempting to overhaul key aspects of governance, including the day-to-day functioning of the federal civil service, the country’s migration and asylum systems, and the balance of power between federal and state-level governments (International IDEA n.d.c). In response, the federal district and circuit courts largely fulfilled their constitutional roles, staying or rejecting the policies and practices deemed arbitrary or capricious, compelling the executive to meet due diligence requirements, and upholding fundamental protections such as habeas corpus. In one notable instance, a court went so far as to threaten contempt proceedings against the government for non-compliance.⁸ Despite these interventions, the administration has at times disregarded or circumvented court rulings, prompting concerns about a potential constitutional crisis (Levy 2025). The degree to which the balance of powers is respected in the months and years to come will be a key determinant of whether Rule of Law indicators in the USA remain resilient or continue to deteriorate.

Advances in the Rule of Law were limited, impacting four countries in the Americas (Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Suriname), three in Europe (Czechia, Latvia and Poland) and two each in Africa (Malawi and South Sudan) and Asia and the Pacific (Bangladesh and Fiji). These gains were largely concentrated in mid-range-performing countries. Bangladesh and South Sudan remain low-performing, and Czechia and Latvia are high-performing. No advances were recorded in West Asia.

Absence of Corruption

The Absence of Corruption factor denotes the extent to which the executive and the public administration more broadly do not abuse their office for personal gain. It is based on four indicators that measure corruption in the executive and public administration, and does not address courts and parliaments.

Gains in Absence of Corruption were recorded in 18 countries (10 per cent) across all regions (see Figure 2.7), marking the 15th consecutive year in which more countries improved than declined in this key area. While many of these gains were modest and should be interpreted with caution, they might signal growing attention to efforts to curb corruption.

Still, half of the countries showing progress remain in the low range of performance in this factor. The Americas accounted for one third of all advances in Absence of Corruption, with Guatemala standing out as an illustrative case of both progress and challenges. President Bernardo Arévalo, elected on an anti-corruption platform, assumed office in a context marked by entrenched corruption (International IDEA 2024w). Arévalo has undertaken initial steps towards reforms, including the removal of approximately 1,300 people from government positions on the basis of insufficient qualifications or a lack of merit-based recruitment. He has also led efforts to take complaints to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and has sought accountability from the attorney general—an official who has publicly opposed his presidency. At the same time, Arévalo faces significant resistance from actors who continue to challenge the legitimacy of his electoral victory and who have vested interests in maintaining the status quo (García 2024; Maldonado 2024).

Judicial Independence and Predictable Enforcement

The Judicial Independence factor denotes the extent to which the courts are not subject to undue influence from the other branches of government, especially the executive.

The Predictable Enforcement factor denotes the extent to which the executive and public officials enforce laws in a predictable manner.

Judicial Independence deteriorated (when comparing 2019 to 2024) across countries at all levels of democratic performance. Declines were evenly distributed between low- and mid-range-performing countries (10 countries each), and 2 high-performing countries—Norway and Spain—also experienced setbacks. The most severe declines were observed in contexts facing significant instability and violence, including Afghanistan, Chad, Myanmar, Palestine, as well as in El Salvador and Tunisia.

In other contexts as well, concerns emerged about judges’ ability to deliver impartial rulings. In Mexico, for example, a package of judicial reforms enacted in 2024 sparked intense debate. The reforms introduced the election by popular vote of all federal judges (including Supreme Court justices and Electoral Tribunal magistrates) and state judges, raising concerns about the possible impact on judicial independence. The reforms also created a Judicial Discipline Tribunal and an administrative organ of the judiciary to replace the Judiciary Council (formerly in charge of discipline and administration of the federal judiciary). The reforms reduced the experience and eligibility requirements for judgeships and amended judges’ length of tenure. While proponents of the reform argued that it was necessary to address judicial corruption and nepotism (International IDEA 2024aa), critics have warned of serious threats to judicial independence. The first judicial elections in Mexico took place on 1 June 2025, with low voter turnout and a significant share of spoiled ballots. The Organization of American States, of which Mexico is a member, has warned that these changes pose potentially far-reaching risks to the quality and independence of Mexico’s democratic institutions (Organization of American States 2024, 2025).

Additional mid-range countries experiencing declines in this factor include countries such as Argentina, Armenia, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Slovenia.

There was also notable deterioration in Predictable Enforcement, with declines recorded in 21 countries—three times the number of advances (7). The distribution of declines was similar to that of Judicial Independence, with 9 low performers and 10 mid-range-performing countries. Two high-performing countries—the Netherlands and Spain—also registered declines in this factor. Regionally, African and European countries accounted for 62 per cent of the global declines in this factor, followed by Asia and the Pacific, the Americas and West Asia (see Figure 2.7).

Two mid-range-performing countries illustrate different dimensions of this decline. In Burkina Faso, the Transitional Legislative Assembly adopted a law granting amnesty for individuals convicted of participating in the failed coup attempt of September 2015. To qualify, applicants had to acknowledge their involvement in the coup attempt, demonstrate their commitment to national defence efforts, display good conduct during detention and agree to be deployed in military operations. While analysts suggest that the law aims to leverage the military and diplomatic expertise of certain figures in the fight against militant groups linked to the Islamic State group and al-Qaeda, critics warn that the move undermines accountability and the rule of law in the country, potentially entrenching impunity and weakening governance institutions (International IDEA 2024al).

In Ecuador, declines occurred in a very different context. Despite the outcome of a 2023 national referendum to end oil drilling in the Yasuní National Park, the government had not ceased operations as of mid-2024. A high court decision had given authorities a one-year period to stop oil exploration and comply with the results of the referendum. In August 2024, environmental activists and Indigenous leaders and groups asked the court to hold an urgent hearing on the matter (International IDEA 2024u).

Personal Integrity and Security

In the GSoD Indices, Personal Integrity and Security is a measure of the extent to which individuals’ bodily integrity is respected and people are free from state and non-state political violence. This factor includes measures of torture, political and extrajudicial disappearances and killings.

Comparing 2019 to 2024, more countries experienced declines than advances in Personal Integrity and Security. Over half (52 per cent) of these declines occurred in low-performing contexts, including countries such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, El Salvador (see Box 2.3), Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Myanmar and Russia. People’s security also faced threats in higher-performing contexts like Portugal and Uruguay, the only high-performing countries that experienced drops in this factor.

Belarus saw some of the steepest declines in this factor compared with 2019. In April 2025, the UN and independent human rights experts raised concerns over a report that Belarusian authorities had sentenced at least 33 people to punitive psychiatric confinement since 2020, in retaliation for government criticism or participation in public protests. The trials were conducted in secret, and the resulting psychiatric confinement was typically of indefinite duration. Twenty-five people remained in confinement as of June 2025, with no publicly available information concerning their whereabouts. Political prisoners held in psychiatric institutions may be subject to forced medication or electric shocks. The opaque nature of the process means it is not possible to determine with certainty whether these transfers to closed medical facilities were made for political or medical reasons. Belarus has used psychiatric confinement as a punishment for political activism in the past, but the practice appears to have accelerated since the 2020 uprisings against President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (International IDEA 2025w).

Portugal has experienced different challenges, particularly in relation to police brutality. In October 2024, a police officer fatally shot 43-year-old Odair Moniz, originally from Cabo Verde, triggering large protests in Lisbon against police violence, organized by the rights organization Just Life (Vida Justa). In parallel, riots broke out around Lisbon, resulting in injuries, torched vehicles and 16 arrests. According to police reports, Moniz fled and resisted arrest on the night of the shooting; officers initially claimed that he was armed with a knife. The officer involved has since been charged with manslaughter, and both the General Inspectorate of Internal Administration and the police have opened investigations into the incident. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination had previously expressed concern over the excessive use of force by Portuguese police, particularly against people of African descent (International IDEA 2024ae).

Scores for Personal Integrity and Security are improving in 10 countries across all levels of performance—Bangladesh, Burundi, Chile, Egypt, The Gambia, Iraq, Montenegro, Singapore, Syria and Tanzania. Chile’s recent efforts provide one example. Following a surge in violent crime, including a rise in firearm-related homicides and an increase in organized crime activity, President Gabriel Boric announced new measures to address insecurity. The government’s proposals include a push for an immediate congressional debate on two draft laws that have been stalled in Congress for several years. One of these drafts focuses on economic intelligence and aims to improve the traceability of illicit money, while the other seeks to strengthen and modernize the state’s intelligence system. Additional measures include the construction of a high-security prison, expansion of the current maximum-security prison’s capacity and the creation of a special task force on security in Santiago. While some of the measures are promising, civil society groups allege that they are insufficient; it remains to be seen what impact they will have (International IDEA 2024r).

2.5. Participation

In the GSoD Indices, Participation is an aggregate measure of the extent to which people are actively involved in all levels of government. It is comprised of three factors that measure the space for civil society to freely operate (Civil Society), the extent to which people engage in political and non-political associations and trade unions (Civic Engagement) and voter turnout (Electoral Participation).

While overall change in this category has been limited in recent years, a number of countries continue to demonstrate exemplary levels of public participation. These top performers excel in various subdimensions of Participation, from high voter turnout to robust civil society activity. See Table 2.4 for the top 10 countries in Participation.

At the same time, however, Participation remained relatively stable from 2019 to 2024, with only 11 countries experiencing notable changes. Declines (nine countries) outweigh advances (two), and most of the declines occurred in countries that were already low-performing, including Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Kuwait, Myanmar, Nicaragua and Russia. The two countries that experienced improvement were Brazil and Fiji, both high performers.

There were setbacks in Civic Engagement and Civil Society, with 22 total declines recorded across these two factors, compared with only 5 advances. Deterioration in Civic Engagement was observed in low-performing and mid-range-performing countries, with African countries accounting for 58 per cent of all declines. At the same time, the region continues to perform relatively well on this measure overall: 6 of the 20 highest scores in Civic Engagement are found in African countries (Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa).

Compared to 2019, declines in Civil Society were limited to 10 countries and were more evenly distributed across all regions, with the exception of the Americas. The latter saw no declines in this factor and only one in Civic Engagement (Nicaragua). At the same time, the five-year window from 2019 to 2024 belies the actual situation, as there are more deep-seated concerns about shrinking civic space in the region. A longer view of 10 years reveals significant declines in civil society’s ability to operate freely in mid-range-performing Argentina, Bolivia and El Salvador, as well as in low-performing Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Advances at the factor level were rather limited (see Figure 2.8). Civic Engagement improved only in France, and Brazil, Fiji, Malawi and Zambia experienced improvements in Civil Society. The latter four countries are all relatively high-performing contexts with respect to these factors.

Civil Society and Civic Engagement

The Civil Society index aggregates indicators that measure the extent to which organized, voluntary, self-generating and autonomous social life is institutionally possible.

The Civic Engagement index measures the extent to which people engage in political and non-political associations and trade unions, as well as mobilization for democracy. We also include an indicator of civil society traditions.

Public participation at all levels of government and in local communities is a key aspect of any thriving democracy. Civil society is often the backbone of this participation, acting as a channel through which local communities and individuals can express shared priorities and ensure that local needs are not neglected at higher levels of decision making. Alongside the indices of Free Political Parties and Freedom of Association and Assembly, the Civil Society index captures the quality of the environment in which civil society organizations (CSOs) operate. Although there were fewer declines in this index than in many other factors, they largely occurred in contexts that were already challenging and where authoritarian practices had become further entrenched. Comparing 2024 scores to 2019, the countries whose performance declined were Afghanistan, Armenia, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Kuwait, Myanmar, Palestine, Philippines, Russia and Tunisia.

At the same time, there are encouraging examples that underscore how strong civic infrastructure and political will can help reverse participation declines and revitalize inclusive governance. Brazil has long been recognized as a global leader in public participation; its participatory budgeting processes, for example, have been cited as a model since the late 1980s (Cabannes 2004). After a period of decline in the 2000s, there are signals that suggest a renewed commitment to participatory governance. Since taking office in 2023, the new administration has pledged to revitalize participatory budgeting and has introduced additional measures to strengthen citizens’ engagement. In 2023, Brazil launched Participatory Brazil (Brasil Participativo), a digital channel designed to facilitate public input into federal policymaking. The initiative integrates both digital and in-person modalities to mitigate barriers to equal participation. Users can take part in voting processes, deliberations and in-person events. Public participation in the development of the country’s 2024–2027 Multi-Year Plan garnered 8,254 citizen proposals, 76 per cent of which were incorporated into the Plan (Open Government Partnership n.d.).

This chapter presents regional trends in the GSoD Indices data in four broad regions of the world as defined by International IDEA—Africa and West Asia, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe. Unless otherwise stated, all data in these sections come from the GSoD Indices. Each regional section is organized in three parts: (a) an overview of the statistically significant changes comparing 2024 to 2019; (b) a snapshot of the current state of democracy in the region; and (c) an exploration of how migration dynamics intersect with democracy in the region, with a focus on the democratic factors most likely to experience change in the near future.

3.1. Africa and West Asia

Net changes in Africa and West Asia

In Africa and West Asia, advances and declines at the factor level were most concentrated in the category of Representation, which accounted for 64 of 157 changes (41 per cent) when comparing 2019 and 2024. As illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the overarching pattern is one of decline, especially with regard to Credible Elections, Effective Parliament and Elected Government, all within the Representation category, as well as Access to Justice, under Rights.

Twenty-three countries (35 per cent) experienced significant declines (comparing 2024 scores to 2019) in at least one of three measures—Elected Government, Credible Elections and Effective Parliament—with 20 of these countries affected by armed conflict, coups d’état or other forms of political instability. This trend is particularly pronounced in West Africa, the subregion with the greatest number of declines in these three factors (20 of 43). In Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger, juntas delayed promised elections and extended transition periods, thereby preserving the unelected legislative and executive bodies they have established (International IDEA 2024h, 2024n, 2024am, 2025u). Freedom of the Press has declined in almost one in four countries in the region. While such declines (comparing 2024 scores to 2019) are often a consequence of political instability—as in Burkina Faso and Mali—they can also reflect other dynamics, like regulatory crackdowns in Senegal (Media Foundation for West Africa 2025).

The downward trend, however, is not universal. Botswana and South Africa have both experienced consistent advances over the past five years in Credible Elections and, in 2024, held polls that resulted in historic changes. In South Africa, the long-governing African National Congress lost its absolute majority, leading to the country’s first national coalition government since 1994 (International IDEA 2024l). Botswana witnessed its first transition of power between parties since independence in 1966 (International IDEA 2024af).

In West Asia, Jordan advanced in Effective Parliament comparing 2019 to 2024. A large part of this advance occurred in 2024, when legislative elections resulted in political parties significantly increasing their share of seats in the country’s parliament, marking a shift away from the historical dominance of independent and tribal candidates (International IDEA 2024ab).

Performance at the category level, 2024

While Representation is the weakest category in West Asia and the second-weakest in Africa, regional performance remains poor in most areas, with a majority of countries in the low-performing range with regard to almost every category (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). The only exception is Participation, in which mid-performing African countries outnumber low performers 38 to 11.

In many countries across Africa and West Asia, a key driver of weak performance has been armed conflict, which undermines social cohesion, destroys infrastructure and erodes fundamental rights (Peace Research Institute Oslo 2024). In Sudan, for example, the prospects of a democratic transition have grown increasingly remote, as civil war has fractured the country and stoked extreme ethnic and gender-based violence (International IDEA 2024ac, 2025k).

What to watch

Conflict has driven up regional migration levels, forcibly displacing communities both within and across national borders, although the vast majority remain displaced within the region (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2024; IOM 2025). Those displaced externally are often marginalized in host countries and vulnerable to mistreatment by both the government and the populace. Recent events illustrate this dynamic, including the mass arrest and deportation of Sudanese refugees in Egypt (International IDEA 2024q) and violent attacks on their compatriots living in South Sudan during anti-Sudanese riots (International IDEA 2025d).

A key development to watch is the rising political tension in South Sudan, which threatens to return the country to civil war and imperil its first post-independence elections, scheduled for 2026 (International IDEA 2025m). Also noteworthy is the indefinite suspension of Kuwait’s Parliament by Sheikh Meshal al-Ahmad in May 2024 (International IDEA 2024m; Al Jasser and Brown 2025). Taken together, these events indicate that Representation is likely to remain an area of performance change in Africa and West Asia, especially as intraregional migration continues to rise. How both origin and host countries address the issues of citizenship, identity, political participation and rights protections will be important in shaping the region’s democratic outlook (Williams 2025).

3.2. The Americas

Net changes in the Americas

Comparing 2024 to 2019, more countries in the Americas experienced a decline in at least one factor of democratic performance than those with an advance (15 versus 11, respectively; see also Figure 3.5).

Countries whose performance declined include El Salvador (declined in 10 factors), Nicaragua (declined in 8 factors) and Haiti (declined in 5 factors). Despite the disparate histories of these three countries’ democratic deterioration, there is significant overlap among the deteriorating factors: all three experienced significant declines in Access to Justice, Credible Elections, Elected Government and Free Political Parties.

A plurality of the 45 declines at the factor level (comparing 2019 and 2024) occurred in the category of Representation: five countries declined in Credible Elections; six, in Free Political Parties; four, in Elected Government; and five, in Effective Parliament. The largest declines in these measures—in El Salvador, Haiti and Nicaragua—occurred in cases of democratic backsliding and state collapse (Martinez 2024; Fatton Jr 2025; McConnell 2025). El Salvador and Nicaragua account for two of the region’s three largest declines in Freedom of the Press. Peru also saw a decline in this measure, in part due to persistent violence against and intimidation of journalists (Duchiade 2025; Li 2025).

At the same time, several countries experienced multiple advances at the factor level: Honduras advanced in five factors (Absence of Corruption, Access to Justice, Credible Elections, Judicial Independence and Predictable Enforcement); Brazil, in four (Civil Liberties, Civil Society, Effective Parliament and Judicial Independence); Chile, in three (Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Personal Integrity and Security); and the Dominican Republic, in three (Absence of Corruption, Free Political Parties and Judicial Independence). These advancements were more varied in nature than the declines seen in El Salvador, Haiti and Nicaragua. There is no single factor in which all four countries made advances, and only one factor—Judicial Independence—is shared by more than two of the four countries.

There were also some improvements distributed widely across the region, including in Credible Elections (Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras and the USA) and Absence of Corruption (Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Suriname and the USA).

Performance at the category level, 2024

At the same time, these downward trends should not obscure the fact that the baseline level of democratic performance across much of the region remains relatively stable (see Figure 3.6). The majority of countries in the Americas continue to perform in the mid-range across most categories and factors of democracy, as they have in recent years. Eleven countries perform in the high range in the category of Representation (only four have low-range performance), and 20 of 27 perform in the high range in the Elected Government factor, reflecting the region’s prevailing commitment to holding periodic elections.

What to watch

Migration is a key issue for the entire region. Intraregional migration has long been substantial, with recent surges in insecurity and ongoing political and economic crises prompting significant migration from countries such as Colombia, Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela (Selee et al. 2023). Anti-migrant sentiment has also been a long-standing challenge, triggered by the perception that insecurity is linked to the transnationalism of organized crime (Asmann and Shuldiner 2024; Lebow et al. 2024). The US Government’s increased restrictions on migrants and asylum seekers (including pushing the boundaries of what is constitutionally permissible) have added to these pre-existing issues and have contributed to more anti-migrant sentiment within the USA (The Economist 2025; International IDEA 2025s).

Political debates on migration in the region are closely linked to long-standing debates over equality, or lack thereof, between different ethnic and racial groups. The GSoD Social Group Equality index measures the extent of such equality in each country. Eighteen of 27 countries in the region score in the mid-range; only Canada, Costa Rica and Uruguay are high-performing. The remaining six countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela—are all among the bottom 25 per cent globally. This lagging performance reflects the profound economic inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in the USA (IDB 2024).

The intersection of ethnic, racial, gender and income inequalities—particularly as they affect educational and job opportunities—continues to widen the gap between social groups throughout the Americas (Telles et al. 2023; Pan American Health Organization 2024). These inequalities are compounded by pervasive structural discrimination against Indigenous, Afro-descendant and migrant people, which in turn undermines countries’ democratic performance (Washington Office on Latin America 2024).

At the same time, some Latin American countries—including Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay—have introduced positive practices for the regularization and inclusion of migrants, asylum seekers and returning emigrants. These practices offer a potential paradigm shift in the region’s approach to migration, one that could gradually reshape patterns of labour, capital and inclusion. If sustained, such reforms could lead to tangible improvements in Social Group Equality and Basic Welfare in the years ahead.

3.3. Asia and the Pacific

Net changes in Asia and the Pacific

When comparing 2024 to 2019, significant declines at the factor level outnumbered advances 60 to 23 across the whole region, with the average magnitude of decline exceeding that of the average advance. The factors that saw the most change across the region were Access to Justice (changes in 13 countries), Credible Elections (9 countries) and Effective Parliament (9 countries) (see Figure 3.7).

The majority of factor-level changes occurred in the subregions of South and South-East Asia, which accounted for 55 of 83 changes. Excluding the outliers of Afghanistan and Myanmar, Bangladesh is among the countries that saw the most changes in these subregions, with large declines in Credible Elections, Elected Government and Effective Parliament as well as advances in Predictable Enforcement and Personal Integrity and Security. The reasons for the declines are multifaceted: some can be credited to the repressive policies of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government, and others, such as Elected Government, are a result of the temporary replacement of an elected, if authoritarian, government with an interim unelected one (International IDEA 2024v). The ongoing reform processes this government is carrying out to reset Bangladeshi democracy following Hasina’s resignation and flight from the country, as well as a general election due to be held by early 2026, may reverse or reinforce some of these trends.

Fiji had 11 positive changes at the factor and subfactor levels, the most in the entire region, including in Civil Society, Credible Elections, Effective Parliament, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press. Most of the changes occurred in 2023, reflecting the relative consolidation of democratic institutions following the electoral defeat and political sidelining of former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama (International IDEA 2024k).

Kyrgyzstan is among the countries with the highest number of declines in the region. Under Sadyr Japarov’s presidency, there have been declines in Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, Credible Elections, Political Equality, Predictable Enforcement, and Personal Integrity and Security, reflecting the centralization of power in the presidency and restrictions on civil society and independent media (International IDEA 2025i, 2025p).

India declined in five measures (comparing its 2024 scores to 2019). These declines included Free Political Parties and Judicial Independence, reflecting, among other things, repeated federal investigations into members of the opposition Indian National Congress Party in the run-up to the 2024 general election (International IDEA 2024d, 2024e). Contrary to pre-election concerns, independent observers considered the election to have been well-organized and fair, and all political actors involved immediately accepted the results. Despite warnings that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party would mobilize state resources to suppress the opposition, it instead secured 63 fewer seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, and lost the absolute majority it had held in the chamber since 2014 (International IDEA 2024p).

Declines were not limited to mid- and low-performing countries. South Korea recorded six declines, including in Civil Liberties, Political Equality and Predictable Enforcement. While these developments coincided with the political crisis surrounding former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law and his subsequent impeachment, they also reflect longer-term trends and earlier events in Yoon’s administration, such as labour disputes that escalated into nationwide strikes for truckers and doctors, and efforts by the presidential administration to restrict press freedom (International IDEA 2022a, 2024f, 2025t).

Performance at the category level, 2024

Despite the prevailing trend of democratic decline, the overall quality of democracy in the region remains moderate to high. As seen in Figure 3.8, most countries in Asia and the Pacific are high- or mid-range-performing across all categories. Regional averages for all four categories remain close to their all-time high, with no category average falling more than 0.03 points (on a scale from 0.00 to 1.00) below its peak performance. Sri Lanka’s 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections—marked by relative peace and the surprise victory of the former revolutionary Anura Kumara Dissanayake—account for gains in Predictable Enforcement and Personal Integrity and Security (DeVotta 2025). Further advances in other measures of democracy will depend on whether Dissanayake’s government delivers on its promise of anti-corruption and stability.

However, these averages do not reflect disparities between categories and across countries. The region’s strong performance in Participation is partly driven by very high Electoral Participation scores reported in several authoritarian states, including Laos, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Vietnam—figures that are widely understood to be inflated or misreported (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2012; OSCE/ODIHR 2021; Sochua 2021; Tuoi Tre News 2021). A plurality of countries in the region are also low-performing in Rights and Rule of Law, which continue to be the weakest categories.

What to watch

South and South-East Asia are likely to remain in democratic flux. In addition to Bangladesh’s complex reform processes and the high-stakes trial of former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte at the International Criminal Court, the region must also contend with challenges as varied as the aftermath of the worst fighting between India and Pakistan in a generation and concerns over the increasing role of the military in civilian politics under Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto (International Crisis Group 2024; International IDEA 2025g, 2025n). The region and its relationship with the broader world are also rapidly changing, and democratic institutions may have to adapt to keep pace—for example, the significant global growth in South–South migration over the last 30 years is largely attributable to a migration pipeline from South Asia to the Middle East that barely existed in 1990 (Schewel and Debray 2024). Given the significant population of intraregional migrants (many of whom are internally displaced or are refugees from within the region), electoral processes will need to be adapted to ensure that an increasingly mobile population is not disenfranchised (Spinelli forthcoming).

3.4. Europe

Net changes in Europe, 2024

Europe saw 63 declines and 23 advances at the factor level when comparing 2024 to 2019 (see Figure 3.9). The factors of Civil Liberties and Credible Elections accounted for the most declines (10 and 9, respectively). Nearly half of all declines (28 of 63) occurred in Eastern Europe, with the majority driven by crackdowns on civil society and political opposition in Belarus, Georgia and Russia (International IDEA 2024i). In Georgia, curbs on impartial public administration and the media have precipitated declines in Predictable Enforcement and Civil Liberties (International IDEA 2024an, 2025e).

In contrast, Czechia and Montenegro experienced the highest numbers of improvements among European countries (five and four, respectively). In Czechia, the advance in Absence of Corruption can be credited in part to new and expanded whistleblower protections (International IDEA 2023c). Poland saw advances in Civil Liberties, Effective Parliament and Predictable Enforcement, which can be attributed to a new government that has implemented more robust parliamentary oversight and other rule-of-law reforms (International IDEA 2023d).

Another notable trend is that one in three countries in Europe saw a decline in Freedom of the Press from 2019 to 2024. This includes countries where Civil Liberties have been negatively affected by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—Belarus, Ukraine and Russia itself. However, declines were also observed in EU member states, including Italy, whose intelligence agencies used spyware against migrant rights activists and journalists (International IDEA 2025r), and Slovakia, where the 2024 closure of the public broadcaster was decried as political interference in independent media (International IDEA 2024o).

Performance at the category level, 2024

While some recent declines have been observed in Civil Liberties, Freedom of the Press and other areas, Europe remains the highest-performing region in the GSoD Indices. An overwhelming majority of all 45 European countries remain high- or mid-range-performing in all categories of democratic performance: the weakest performance is in the category of Rule of Law, where 11 per cent of countries are low-performing (see Figure 3.10).

What to watch

As documented in International IDEA’s Democracy Tracker, issues such as the equitable treatment of migrants and minority communities and the state’s adherence to principles of non-discrimination pose a challenge to democratic resilience. Because such issues often concern non-citizens or marginalized groups, they are difficult to capture in standard quantitative indices of democracy, which tend to focus largely or solely on the rights of legal citizens (Cheesman et al. 2024).

These measurement gaps are particularly relevant in the context of evolving migration policies. For example, European governments have increasingly turned to methods such as outsourcing migration management. Italian-funded migration centres in Albania have raised human rights concerns and fuelled tensions between Italy’s Government and judiciary (International IDEA 2024c, 2024ao). A legal challenge to parts of Denmark’s Law on Public Housing—commonly referred to as the ‘ghetto law’—is currently awaiting a final ruling by the European Court of Justice, which will determine whether it constitutes ethnic discrimination under the EU’s Race Equality Directive (Court of Justice of the European Union 2025; Ganty and de Vries 2025). Finland, Poland and several other countries have adopted emergency legislation that permits the temporary suspension of the right to asylum (International IDEA 2024t, 2025q). In 2025, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Greece had carried out systematic pushbacks in violation of human rights standards (International IDEA 2025a).

By contrast, Spain has led efforts to regularize the status of undocumented immigrants, recognizing migration’s economic and cultural contributions (International IDEA 2024aj). France has also approved access to legal aid for undocumented immigrants (International IDEA 2024j).

Looking ahead, Poland may be a country to watch, particularly in terms of how the reformist government of Donald Tusk navigates its relationship with the new opposition-aligned President, Karol Nawrocki (Easton 2025). In the Western Balkans, the forthcoming publication of a European Court of Human Rights ruling will be significant for ongoing debates about the role of ethnic identity in the way political rights are conferred in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The court’s conclusions, announced in June, overturned a 2023 judgment⁹ that found discriminatory treatment in state-level elections based on ethnic and territorial requirements (International IDEA 2023b). Also relevant to the region’s Social Group Equality scores are upcoming rulings by the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights regarding alleged pushbacks in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland at their borders with Belarus—cases that may set important legal precedents regarding the human rights implications of instrumentalized migration.

4.1. Introduction

Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, this chapter of the report examines the relationship between migration and democratic participation, addressing a core question that democracies face in an age of large-scale migration—how to extend the franchise to citizens residing outside the physical territory of their country of origin or nationality. As rates of international migration grow, democracies may increasingly contend with questions about whether and how to design and implement systems for out-of-country voting (OCV). Indirectly, the report explores whether resilience in democracies is better served by expanding the demos or safeguarding its internal coherence.

The issue of migration is only set to grow in importance, as global migration flows are almost certain to increase in the coming decades—driven by conflict, climate change, inequality and digital mobility. Given the ever-increasing numbers of people living outside their home countries, the inclusion of non-resident citizens in political processes is a pressing democratic question, not a peripheral one. Electoral management bodies (EMBs) and legislators must act now to ensure that systems are fit for purpose, as enfranchisement across borders becomes a defining issue for the future of democratic legitimacy. This report intends to help them navigate that challenge.

The report focuses on the technical, legal and institutional dimensions of voting rights for citizens residing abroad (for a note on terminology, please see Box 4.1). It provides an overview of where OCV exists, explains how it works in practice and examines levels of participation. It also provides a set of policy recommendations for legislatures that may consider adopting or amending OCV systems, for EMBs and other agencies that are responsible for implementing and overseeing OCV, and for civil society organizations (CSOs) that advocate for OCV reforms.

International migration raises political debates around citizenship and identity that are complex and often contentious. Although International IDEA has examined the ways in which immigrants can and cannot participate in the political processes of host countries—for example, in a context of resident non-citizen voting (International IDEA 2025c) or recent US deportation policies (International IDEA 2025s), these are topics that are beyond the scope of this report. Instead, the analysis is confined to the institutional mechanisms for electoral inclusion of citizens living abroad, not addressing the broader political or normative considerations surrounding citizenship and the political inclusion of immigrants in host countries. It also examines some of the key debates related to extending the franchise across borders, including questions around what may and may not justify inclusion, as well as the financial, administrative and logistical challenges to implementing OCV procedures.

While migration intersects with many political and social dynamics, this report remains anchored in three decades of International IDEA’s core area of expertise—the institutional and procedural dimensions of democratic participation, especially in relation to electoral enfranchisement for citizens abroad. The report builds on International IDEA’s data resources, including trends identified in the GSoD Indices and in the Democracy Tracker, especially related to metrics of Social Group Equality, and data on electoral processes and OCV, including the design of OCV modalities, diaspora voter turnout data and context-specific OCV experiences (Ellis et al. 2007; Aman and Bakken 2021; International IDEA 2022b). International IDEA’s most recent work on this topic includes case studies on the challenges to enfranchisement in the context of mobility in South Asia (International IDEA n.d.a) and a report on the practice of out-of-country campaigning by political parties in Europe (Otiashvili et al. 2025). In addition to the above, the report uses international migration data primarily from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). A to track long-term trends in migrant stock by region, income group and over time. It also relies on International IDEA’s Voting from Abroad Database, which includes legal provisions and practices regarding OCV across 216 countries, including data on voting methods, eligibility criteria and regulatory gaps, as available. Additional data from the GSoD Indices, particularly regarding performance in the category of Representation, compare migrant stocks with democratic quality in origin and destination countries. Turnout data collected by International IDEA from 210 national elections between 2002 and 2025 are analysed to assess levels of diaspora participation. The empirical findings are supported by references to academic literature and country case examples to contextualize the data and explore normative implications.

While international data sets and electoral reports provide valuable comparative insights, data availability and quality remain uneven. Turnout and registration figures for OCV are inconsistently collected and reported, with limited disaggregation by voting method or eligibility category. Legal provisions do not always translate into meaningful access, and implementation gaps, particularly in lower-capacity or conflict-affected settings, are often poorly documented. Widely used migrant stock figures include non-voting populations and do not capture variations in citizenship retention or political engagement. These limitations point to the need for more comprehensive and policy-relevant research, including on the credibility and accessibility of OCV mechanisms, perceived barriers among diasporas, the role of political parties and campaigning across borders, and host-country responses to extraterritorial representation. Expanding and standardizing data in these areas would enable more informed policy decisions and help ensure that diaspora enfranchisement supports democratic resilience in both sending and receiving countries.

The remainder of this section provides an empirical overview of migration flows, regime characteristics of origin and destination countries, and comparative experiences with OCV. The report concludes with a set of recommendations to support context-appropriate OCV system design.

The boundary problem

As people traverse state boundaries and forge transnational identities, the so-called boundary problem, first raised by Robert Dahl (1970: 60) more than half a century ago, is again relevant. What determines who ‘the people’ of a state are? Answering this question is pivotal, largely because it determines who does and does not ‘belong’ and who can legitimately claim rights to equal participation—an issue at the heart of democratic systems (Dahl 1998: 65; Song 2012: 41). Today, this question is no longer abstract: countries must now define electoral and participatory rights for growing numbers of non-resident citizens in diasporas around the world.

Even though the borders of many modern-day countries were not democratically drawn, the assumption has long been that these borders define the citizenry. The resulting tautology, however, presents a problem: if the people determine the boundaries of a country, then the boundaries cannot, in turn, define the people (Zilla 2022: 1524). International migration and the transnational identities and relationships it generates pose a further challenge—determining how democracies conceptualize ‘the people’ and their rights to participation and representation when identities and affiliations stretch across borders. For countries of origin, international migration raises practical questions. For example, how can non-resident citizens—whether long-term emigrants, temporary workers, students, exiles or leisure travellers—continue to participate in national elections? What legal and institutional frameworks exist to ensure this participation, and how does such participation affect both emigrants and those who remain?

While there are many drivers of migration and several categories of migrants that are based on those drivers, such classifications are primarily relevant to analysis that focuses on migrants’ rights in destination countries, where they are immigrants. In contrast, the present analysis focuses on participation in migrants’ countries of origin, where the reasons for and contexts of their departure have less impact on the laws and mechanisms established by origin-country authorities to ensure their continued political participation.

4.2. Global trends in migration

The human experience with migration encompasses two superficially contradictory truths. First, our species has always engaged in migration, often at a significant scale (Manning and Trimmer 2020). Second, most humans throughout history have never travelled very far from the place where they were born—a pattern that remains true today. This reality is reflected in 2024 data: while international migration is an important political issue in many countries (both sending and receiving ones), the number of international migrants worldwide in 2024 was estimated at 304 million people, or 3.7 per cent of the global population (UNDESA 2025). In other words, 26 of every 27 people alive today still make their home in the country of their birth. Moreover, when people do migrate internationally, the majority stay within the continent of their birth (see Figure 4.1).

However, the trend over the past three decades has been towards ever higher levels of international migration (see Figure 4.2), and this trend is expected to continue (Azose and Raftery 2015; Dao et al. 2021). In 1970, the share of the global population who had migrated internationally was only 2.3 per cent (McAuliffe and Oucho 2024). The change in terms of the percentage of the global population is modest compared with the absolute increase, growing to 2.9 per cent in 1990 and 3.7 per cent in 2024 (McAuliffe and Oucho 2024; UNDESA 2025). However, as Figure 4.2 illustrates, the total number of people who have migrated internationally grew from just over 150 million in 1990 to more than 300 million in 2024.

Domestic migration has also been a key demographic phenomenon in the 21st century, as patterns of urbanization continue apace, and this trend is particularly notable in developing countries (UNDESA 2018). However, the focus of this report is on international migration, given its distinct implications for participation and enfranchisement across borders.

Drivers of migration

Those who migrate internationally do so for a variety of reasons—many by choice, but many others do so owing to factors outside their control. The International Organization for Migration, for example, describes a continuum between voluntary and forced migration (IOM n.d.b). Factors that drive the decision to migrate are commonly grouped into five categories—political, demographic, economic, social and environmental (IOM n.d.b).

It is important to note that the data on migration presented here are estimates of migrant stock from UNDESA in both sending and receiving countries (country dyads).¹⁰ This means that long-term migrants are counted alongside recent movers, without distinction. Still, stock data can reveal patterns that have important economic and democratic implications. First, migration from low-income countries to high-income countries is much rarer than commonly perceived and accounted for only a small portion (5 per cent) of the total migrant stock in high-income countries in 2024. While high-income countries are the destination for the majority of migrants, a large proportion come from other high-income countries, and the majority come from middle-income, not low-income, countries (see Figure 4.3). This dynamic is consistent with long-standing empirical research on migration, dating back to the 19th century (Ravenstein 1889) but especially formalized in the second half of the 20th century (Zelinsky 1971).

Second, economic opportunities remain the most significant driver of migration decisions, but politics and political regimes have also become important factors over the last half century (Breunig, Cao and Luedtke 2012). One economic concern that has received growing attention is the departure of skilled professionals from middle-income countries (Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk 2007). Migration has different impacts on the labour market in high-income and low-income countries. For example, rising inequality has been shown to lead to more restrictive immigration laws in low-income countries but less restrictive ones in high-income countries (Peters and Shin 2023).

4.3. Migration and democracies

There is a well-established, strong and positive correlation between national wealth and democratic performance (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000). It follows, then, that the patterns of international migration also reflect this relationship, as the majority of migrants have settled in countries with both higher levels of development and higher levels of democratic performance. Figure 4.4 illustrates this relationship by connecting migration stocks to performance in the category of Representation, which includes indicators commonly associated with many core attributes of representative government (such as credible elections, free political parties, effective parliaments and other aspects of representative government) in both the country of birth and the country of residence for migrants in 1990 and 2024. Tens of millions of people have migrated between high-performing countries, but relatively few people have migrated from high-performing countries to mid-range-performing (4.5 million people) or low-performing ones (1.7 million people) (see Figure 4.4).

This aspect of the relationship between migration and democracy raises two important issues that merit closer examination. First, since high-performing countries host relatively larger numbers of immigrants, the major challenge they face concerns the scale and meaningfulness of the inclusion of non-citizen residents in their democratic institutions and processes. In Australia, for example, immigrants from non-democratic contexts may struggle to understand how to meaningfully exercise their rights and express their preferences (Cultural & Indigenous Research Centre Australia 2006; Yim 2025). Second, as mid-range- and low-performing countries are the countries of origin of a relatively larger number of emigrants, their primary challenge concerns the inclusion of their non-resident citizens in domestic democratic institutions and processes. The first issue involves questions around the expansion of the franchise and the conditions under which immigrants can gain citizenship through naturalization. This is an area with important normative considerations, and for which there is less empirical basis for policy recommendations.

The second issue is more straightforward for many countries. If a polity decides (as many have) that non-resident citizens should retain the right to vote, the issue shifts from one with normative burdens to an essentially logistical problem. As we discuss in this report, there are multiple methods by which non-resident citizens can vote, and countries across a broad range of economic and political contexts have found ways to make this possible.

While economic factors are far more important to most immigrants than democracy (Breunig, Cao and Luedtke 2012), the correlation between wealth and democratic performance implies that many people want to immigrate to democracies. However, given the large number of people who have migrated internationally, there are also tens of millions of people who have migrated to a country with worse democratic performance than the country of their birth. This often occurs in the context of what has been called ‘South–South migration’ (Schewel and Debray 2024).

Migration, democracy and resilience

Regardless of how ‘the people’ are defined, empirical research has found that voting rights contribute to a sense of belonging, referred to here as both knowing the rules and being involved in their creation (Mijić 2022: 1111–12). Some research links this sense of belonging to greater support for democracy and finds that the possession of the right to vote confers social standing and dignity (Shklar 1991, as cited in Song 2009: 607). Voting rights have also been found to reinforce loyalty to diaspora groups’ home countries (See Box 4.2) (Wucker 2004).

This connection between enfranchisement and civic belonging can be particularly evident in the case of countries experiencing large-scale displacement due to conflict. In Ukraine, for example, many of those forced to flee following the Russian invasion have maintained a strong sense of national identity and a desire to remain engaged in the country’s democratic and recovery processes. However, surveys consistently find that a majority of those who have left the country would prefer to stay abroad permanently (IOM 2024; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2024; Mykhailyshyna et al. 2025). Ensuring meaningful voting rights for citizens abroad can thus serve as both a symbol of and a mechanism for inclusion, ensuring that they remain integral members of the national community as well as supporting post-war recovery and long-term social cohesion.

Belonging has also been linked to democratic resilience, with some studies suggesting that people who feel a stronger sense of belonging are more likely to promote ‘principled support’ for democracy (Fitzgerald et al. 2023: 237 and 248). In this way, a sense of inclusion promotes resilience, defined by International IDEA as the ability to ‘cope, survive and recover from complex challenges and crises that represent stresses or pressures that can lead to a systemic failure’ (International IDEA 2017; Sisk 2017: 5). The properties that make up this resilience are flexibility, recovery, adaptation and innovation. A resilient democracy is one that can leverage these properties to effectively navigate complex challenges and overcome crises, ensuring its survival and continuity without compromising performance (Sisk 2017). The resilience of democratic systems can be exhibited in two overarching ways: (a) through robust institutions and through mass demand, in the form of CSOs and free media; and, when these avenues fail, (b) through the public exercise of the right to associate, speak and protest. Previous GSoD reports referred to this network of institutions as ‘countervailing institutions’ (International IDEA 2023a).

Members of diaspora communities may feel a transnational sense of belonging, characterized by attachment to both their countries of origin and their host countries (Schlenker and Blatter 2013). However, questions remain about the extent to which they should participate in national decision making in their countries of origin—particularly when emigrant populations are large or unlikely to return.

Regardless of countries’ motivations to extend the franchise to diasporas, it is important to consider how this expansion may impact resilience. Given that large diasporas can skew electoral outcomes as well as deepen or soften domestic divides, does resilience come from expanding the demos or from protecting social cohesion through territorial coherence?

4.4. Diaspora enfranchisement: Normative and political dimensions

Why countries extend voting rights to diasporas

Countries extend voting rights to their diasporas for a range of historical, symbolic, economic and strategic reasons. While the legal frameworks vary, a comparative view reveals several recurrent motivations.

In some cases, these extensions reflect recognition of changes in national borders that have excluded co-ethnics who now live outside the current boundaries. In other cases, transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy have prompted the enfranchisement of exiles who remained committed to democracy in their homelands. Some countries have extended voting rights to citizens abroad in recognition of wartime sacrifice, while others have linked diaspora voting to tax obligations of citizens residing abroad. In some cases, countries may have multiple motivations for extending the franchise, including the hope that expatriates will support a specific political party (Baubӧck 2005: 684).

First, diaspora enfranchisement can be a nation-building tool, reinforcing symbolic ties between a country and its citizens abroad. For countries that have undergone conflict, authoritarian rule or colonialism, extending the franchise can be part of a broader project of inclusive citizenship. For example, Tunisia’s extension of voting rights to non-resident citizens followed the 2011 revolution and was framed as an act of democratic renewal and unity. Similarly, France has long treated its expatriates as integral members of the nation, granting them representation in the legislature and creating the Assembly of French Citizens Abroad—highlighting the symbolic inclusion of its global citizenry.

Second, economic motivations play a role in the extension of voting rights to diasporas. In addition to the argument that non-resident citizens’ tax obligations justify their continued voting rights, remittances can be a vital source of revenue for countries of origin. Some countries have granted enfranchisement specifically because they understood the benefits of remittances and wanted to cultivate a continued sense of membership among those non-resident citizens (Bauböck 2005; Gamlen 2006). Evidence shows also that there is a significant correlation between dual citizenship and financial inflows to the country of origin (Cisterino 2012). In Samoa, for example, most citizens (both migrants and foreign-born citizens) live abroad and have historically been engaged in politics through campaigning for and donating to candidates and political parties (Godfrey 2021). The country is also heavily dependent on remittances, which make up about 20 per cent of its gross domestic product in most years (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2024). Whether or not to extend the franchise is a subject of contentious debate, both domestically and in the diaspora (Fonua 2024). This debate can raise a question of democratic legitimacy: if political systems continue to benefit economically or symbolically from their emigrants, do they not also have an obligation to meaningfully enfranchise them?

Third, transitional-justice contexts provide a distinct rationale. For countries recovering from conflict or repression, granting voting rights to exiles and refugees can help repair broken ties and support legitimacy. For example, South Africa’s first democratic election, in 1994, included provisions for overseas voting as a way to reconnect with citizens forced into exile during apartheid.

Finally, some governments have extended voting rights strategically to strengthen their electoral base. Hungary’s decision to enfranchise ethnic Hungarians abroad—many of whom are strong supporters of the ruling party—demonstrates how diaspora enfranchisement can be shaped by partisan calculations. Similarly, Turkey’s Government has benefited electorally from the votes of citizens abroad, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands.

These motivations often overlap, and they manifest differently depending on national histories, migration patterns and political incentives. Recognizing this diversity is essential to understanding the complexity of diaspora enfranchisement policies.

Normative debates on diaspora voting

There are no definitive answers to the questions of whether and in what ways non-resident citizens should participate in elections in their countries of origin. Several debates illustrate the challenges involved.

First, while many emigrants may maintain strong ties with their home countries, some experts argue that they do not directly experience the consequences of domestic political decisions and are insufficiently affected to have the right to participate.

Second, while it is true that remittances may play pivotal roles in national economies, poverty reduction and development, diasporas contribute these funds voluntarily without necessarily reflecting a sense of civic obligation or entitling the diaspora to electoral participation.

Third, while proponents of diaspora voting argue that it helps strengthen national unity, critics contend that large overseas communities may distort electoral outcomes and influence policies in ways that may favour overseas voters’ interests over those of the domestic population.

Fourth, some supporters argue that enabling diaspora voting can help counter globally declining turnout trends and broaden political engagement. Opponents claim that historically low turnout rates among overseas communities make it hard to justify the financial and administrative costs of these mechanisms (Song 2009; Abizadeh 2010; Spinelli forthcoming). OCV systems may be resource-intensive, in terms of both administrative and operational burdens as well as financial costs. Factors that contribute to these costs include the design, delivery and retrieval of election materials, the development and execution of voter education campaigns, training, transportation and other costs related to preparing staff, the development and maintenance of IT systems, the development and implementation of security arrangements, the processing of registration applications and votes, and the planning and coordination of strategies and monitoring of OCV as well as interactions with other agencies (both domestically and in host countries).

The costs can also be thought of in terms of risk. Proxy voting, which is one of the lowest-cost options, is often considered inadvisable because it may create substantial opportunities for vote buying, coercion and misuse of authority. Online voting, on the other hand, is costly to establish but may be one of the most user-friendly options in the long run (Ehin et al. 2022). At the same time, it can be difficult to balance transparency and security requirements in an online environment (Aman and Bakken 2021).

Mitigation strategies may include a threshold requirement for the implementation of OCV. For example, Senegal requires that at least 500 citizens resident in a foreign country register to vote from abroad before polling stations are established in that country. This decision reflects evaluations of the costs and benefits of facilitating OCV for small communities residing overseas (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network n.d.a). Another mitigation strategy is providing for OCV through postal voting, which is a low-cost option, in terms of both financial and administrative burdens.

These tensions reflect deeper normative questions over who constitutes ‘the people’ in an age of transnational belonging. Still, enabling diaspora participation may serve as a tool for democratic resilience, extending norms of inclusion and accountability beyond borders.

5.1. Legal provision of voting methods

Types of out-of-country voting

The provision of opportunities for emigrants to vote from abroad has a long history. For example, Australia introduced postal voting for its citizens living abroad more than a century ago (Aman and Bakken 2021). Today, there are many ways in which countries can facilitate out-of-country voting (OCV), including in-person voting (often at consulates or embassies abroad), postal voting, proxy voting and online voting (International IDEA n.d.d; Ellis et al. 2007). As communications technology has rapidly improved over the past century, electoral management bodies (EMBs) have introduced new methods for voting from abroad. Nonetheless, in-person voting at a polling station abroad remains the most common method of OCV (Pearce Laanela 2021).

International IDEA’s Voting from Abroad Database collects data on the forms of OCV provided by 216 countries (International IDEA n.d.d). As illustrated in Figure 5.1, only 52 (approximately one quarter) of these countries do not provide any means of voting from abroad (13 in Africa, 17 in the Americas, 14 in Asia and the Pacific, 4 in Europe and 4 in West Asia). The majority of countries that do provide for voting from abroad allow only for in-person voting (for example, at diplomatic missions), while a large number provide for multiple methods. Electronic means of voting (e-voting) are more common than Figure 5.1 would seem to indicate: while only 3 countries provide e-voting as their sole method (Armenia, Namibia and Oman), 18 others provide for it along with other options. However, these figures may overstate effective access: in some jurisdictions, access to OCV is limited to non-resident citizens in particular circumstances (such as being an employee of the government or a member of an employee’s family, a military service member or a student studying abroad).

Methods of voting from abroad have been relatively stable since International IDEA began collecting such data in 2007 (see Figure 5.2). Note that, unlike in Figure 5.1, each form of voting is treated separately in Figure 5.2, so some countries appear, for example, in both the ‘Personal’ and ‘Postal’ lines.

Proxy voting has become somewhat less common in 2025 than it was in 2007. However, the share of countries with no provision for OCV has remained fairly steady. Likewise, despite the interest that online voting attracts, its use in OCV has increased very little over the past two decades, and it has actually declined in domestic voting (Darmawan 2021). At present, only about 7 per cent of countries provide for some form of e-voting in OCV (not necessarily using the Internet). E-voting in the context of OCV may take place in an essentially in-person format through the use of an electronic voting machine at a polling place abroad. However, online voting, which would be the most accessible option, poses significant challenges relating to cybersecurity, inequities in access and technical challenges, as well as the potential for coercion, undue influence and breaches of the secrecy of the vote, including by people present with voters (Gibson et al. 2016).

In addition, many countries that have OCV allow for more than one method. For example, the combination of in-person and postal voting is quite common.

The breadth of access to out-of-country voting

The distinction between legal availability and meaningful access to OCV is important in assessing its democratic inclusiveness. For example, even if a country allows for OCV via post, it may be the case that only citizens in special circumstances (as noted above) are permitted, in practice, to vote from abroad. This approach creates unequal tiers of citizenship, where access to the franchise depends not only on where citizens live but also on their professional or legal status or their economic means. Equal attention must thus be given to the extent to which access to OCV meaningfully extends to all non-resident citizens.

Figure 5.3 illustrates the trends and status of this part of the regulation of OCV. Since 2007, there has been a slow increase in the share of countries that allow all non-resident citizens (and sometimes even those temporarily outside the country, such as tourists) to utilize OCV. This expansion corresponds to a decline in the share of countries that do not have a legal provision for OCV. Notably, however, the proportion of countries that allow only citizens in special circumstances to use OCV has remained steady.

It is possible to assess how these legal regulations governing the external exercise of voting rights affect people by connecting migrant stocks with the usage of these various methods. Figure 5.4 connects methods of OCV with the extent to which access to these methods is restricted across the out-of-country population. This figure also includes UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) estimates of the size of the emigrant population. It should be stressed that the emigrant population and the number of people eligible to vote are not the same. In addition to the fact that children are included in the emigrant population, some emigrants will have given up their citizenship in the years since they left their countries of origin. However, the size of the emigrant population is a cross-nationally available measure that helps to visualize and compare the number of people who are potentially affected by these laws.

When these data are compared, several insights emerge. First, there are many emigrants who come from countries that enable all citizens living abroad (sometimes even those on holiday) to access multiple methods of OCV. Second, the practical applicability of provisions for postal voting is lower than one might expect, as postal voting is restricted to a small subset of citizens abroad (often government employees, as in India and Ireland), suggesting a gap between the legal availability and functional accessibility of certain voting modalities. Third, there remain a large number of people who are affected by a situation in which an electoral law has provided for in-person OCV, but OCV is not possible in practice due to a lack of action to facilitate such voting (for example, in Bangladesh and Ghana) or due to political crises that have affected electoral processes domestically as well (for example, in Niger, Sudan, Syria and Yemen). Such cases underscore the importance of implementation capacity and political stability in realizing the promise of extraterritorial enfranchisement.

The Ukrainian case highlights the need for alternative or complementary approaches to ensure meaningful access to OCV. While Ukraine currently provides for OCV at diplomatic missions, the displacement of millions of citizens across Europe and beyond has placed new demands on the electoral system. Relying solely on embassy-based voting may no longer be sufficient to ensure inclusive participation. This situation illustrates the potential value of additional modalities, such as temporary polling stations in host countries. Implementing such options requires early planning, legal authorization, cross-border cooperation and significant logistical coordination.

5.2. Allocation and counting of diaspora votes

Electoral districting options

Countries may also choose how to allocate or count diaspora votes, including through external electoral districts, reserved legislative seats for diaspora communities or the integration of diaspora votes into home constituencies.

When using external electoral districts, non-resident citizens vote within separate constituencies, and winning representatives advocate for this community in the national legislature. Countries such as Colombia, France and Italy use this model.

In a reserved-seats system, a fixed number of parliamentary seats are reserved for diaspora representatives. These representatives may be elected by non-resident citizens or appointed through alternative mechanisms. Countries such as Cabo Verde, Portugal and Tunisia use this system.

When diaspora votes are integrated into home constituencies, non-resident citizens do not have separate representation. Instead, they are included as voters within their last place of residence in their home country, and their votes are counted within those home constituencies. Countries such as India, the UK and the USA use this approach (Spinelli forthcoming). In some cases, the votes of non-resident citizens are counted as part of specific constituencies, regardless of the voter’s last place of residence. In Poland, for example, diaspora votes are added to the electoral district of Central Warsaw. Dutch citizens residing abroad may vote for representatives to the non-residents’ electoral college for the upper house of parliament. Their votes count in the Municipality of The Hague (Umpierrez de Reguero, Baubӧck and Wegschaider 2025).

5.3. Gaps between law and access

The legal provision of OCV has little meaning if practical access to the ballot is limited. Figure 5.5 maps GSoD Indices data on performance levels in the Representation category for the origin countries of emigrants against the number of people with access to the various methods of OCV. For example, we can see that, while seven countries allow only proxy voting, the number of people affected by this type of provision is very small. High-performing countries account for the smallest share of emigrants (as also shown in Figure 4.4), and these countries often offer multiple methods for OCV. Only five high-performing countries offer no means for OCV (Jamaica, Malta, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay).

In countries with a mid-range level of performance in Representation, large numbers of people either have access to multiple methods or are confined to only personal voting (meaning voting in person abroad, most often at a diplomatic mission) (Ellis et al. 2007). Twenty-nine mid-range-performing countries provide only personal voting options for emigrants. While some scholars have excluded countries that limit opportunities for OCV to government employees (such as diplomats and military service members) from their data sets (Umpierrez de Reguero, Yener-Roderburg and Cartagena 2021), the International IDEA data set used here does not take this approach.

For countries with low levels of Representation, the most common approach is to offer only personal voting. The combination of this method and the larger political context of some of these countries suggests that this option is of little practical value—for example, for emigrants who may not be willing to vote at a diplomatic mission of a country that may have engaged in repression. Further research could assess the perceived credibility and safety of such voting options among diaspora communities from authoritarian or conflict-affected contexts.

A good example of the challenge inherent in the exercise of the franchise in these contexts is the situation of migrant workers in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. For example, the only chance for the 3.4 million Indian citizens who live and work in Saudi Arabia to vote in 2024 was to travel back to their home constituency in India in time to vote in person (Yeung, Gupta and Tikekar 2024). These migrant workers constituted the largest group of potential voters in Saudi Arabia last year, but their access to the means of voting was difficult and expensive (for most, prohibitively so). In this way, the decision to emigrate negatively impacted their ability to participate in democracy. Worldwide, only 2,958 non-resident Indian citizens travelled back to India to vote in the 2024 Lok Sabha election (Press Trust of India 2024). Bangladeshi emigrants also face limited options; while there is legislation for OCV in place, it has never been implemented. This situation also has implications for democratic representation, as limited participation by diaspora communities makes electoral outcomes less representative.

The complex interactions between migration and democracy demand closer scrutiny. The possibility that the liminal status of migrants might leave them in a position where they are unable to fully participate in democratic practices in either their country of origin or their country of destination presents a transnational challenge for democracy. While it is outside the scope of this report, a related challenge is intranational. In many countries, voters who are outside of their home constituencies also cannot vote (Spinelli forthcoming).

6.1. Levels of participation in practice

Once legislation has been passed that provides for mechanisms through which citizens living abroad (or temporarily out of the country for other reasons) can vote, the question of how many of those eligible will actually participate in an election takes on both practical and political importance. Data on turnout from abroad is difficult to collect systematically. In both its 2022 data project (International IDEA 2022b) and in this updated effort, International IDEA has sought to collect as much data as possible on the number of votes cast from abroad in national elections. The Institute’s data presently cover 210 elections that took place between January 2002 and June 2025. Data coverage appears to have improved over time (possibly due to improved EMB publications) and includes 12 elections from the first six months of 2025 and 38 (out of 74 total) from 2024. These data complement the coverage of enfranchisement and legal barriers to participation that are included in International IDEA’s Voting from Abroad Database (International IDEA n.d.d).

The analysis of participation rates among non-resident citizens faces significant data limitations. Most notably, turnout and registration data from abroad are incomplete, and the potential bias introduced by this missing information remains unclear. In many cases, the availability of data depends on the capacity of EMBs and whether they systematically publish disaggregated figures. Moreover, differences in how EMBs categorize and handle out-of-country voting (OCV)—often grouped with other special voting arrangements like domestic absentee voting—can hinder cross-national comparability and obscure structural inequalities in access.

Despite these limitations, the data collected provide valuable insights into the contemporary experience of OCV. To better understand participation levels, this report compares the number of votes cast from abroad with three reference points:

1. Votes from abroad as a share of the total emigrant population, compared with domestic turnout as a share of the voting-age population. This comparison illustrates the broader relationship between emigration and electoral participation. While not all emigrants are eligible to vote (due to age or legal exclusions), this method helps reveal the extent to which national laws and procedures limit OCV access to certain types of non-resident citizens.
2. Votes from abroad as a share of registered OCV voters, compared with domestic turnout as a share of registered voters. Because registration for OCV typically requires active steps by the voter—unlike domestic registration, which is automatic in roughly half of countries (James and Garnett 2024)—this comparison highlights participation among those already enfranchised but may overstate engagement among diaspora voters due to self-selection effects in the registration process.
3. Votes from abroad as a share of the total national vote. This measure indicates the overall electoral weight of OCV participation and helps assess its potential impact on election outcomes, particularly in contexts where non-resident citizens may influence results in close contests.

The first point of reference is presented in Figure 6.1 for each of the 38 elections for which 2024 data are available. The average level of participation from abroad was only 13.2 per cent of the emigrant population. By contrast, the average level of turnout as a share of the voting-age population was 61.5 per cent. The two measures are not directly comparable, but the difference still helps us to contextualize the extent to which those who have left their country of birth continue to participate in politics in that country.

For many countries, the diaspora represents a significant economic and social asset, evidenced in the flow of remittances and the upskilling that can take place when citizens work or study abroad. The diaspora could contribute to democratic resilience, provided they remain connected to democratic practices in their country of origin. Yet persistently low rates of participation through OCV suggest that this potential remains underutilized. These low rates may stem from contextually diverse factors such as the accessibility of OCV, diaspora political engagement strategies, the salience of elections or trust in electoral institutions—factors that vary considerably across contexts. Understanding and addressing these challenges would not just ensure more inclusive representation but would also make it possible to harness diaspora communities as a meaningful force for democratic resilience.

As Figure 6.1 shows, these measures reveal no correlation between domestic and overseas participation rates. This finding invites further inquiry into whether low diaspora turnout reflects systemic barriers to participation, a weaker sense of political connection or simply differing priorities among emigrant populations.

Data on the number of voters registered to vote from abroad, the second measure, are somewhat less readily available than data on turnout, due to a range of reporting and classification challenges. In some instances, published registration data are not disaggregated by voting method; in others, out-of-country registration is not published at all. However, both registration and turnout data were compiled for 29 out of 74 elections held in 2024. As shown in International IDEA’s earlier research on OCV, most countries require emigrants to complete an administrative step to register to vote from abroad (International IDEA 2022b). This registration must often be completed well in advance of election day, suggesting a relatively high level of intentionality among out-of-country voters who do participate. In some cases, registration is not necessary to vote in person at a polling station set up abroad but only to receive a postal ballot. However, any of these requirements can also impose additional procedural burdens that unintentionally limit participation.

The data that are available provide a useful basis for comparison with domestic voter registration and turnout.

Figure 6.2 compares total voter turnout (including domestic and overseas votes) as a percentage of all registered voters with overseas turnout as a percentage of those registered to vote from abroad. While the latter does not account for eligible voters who have not registered—including those who might be able to vote without formal registration—it remains an important measure of the extent to which registration requirements influence effective participation by non-resident citizens.

Although notable outliers exist—such as Belgium and Indonesia, where domestic and overseas participation rates differ significantly—there is a weak but positive correlation between the two measures of participation. The average domestic turnout for these 29 elections was 60.4 per cent, while the average turnout for registered voters abroad was 55.3 per cent. In contrast with the low rate of voting as a share of the total emigrant population, most people who register to vote from abroad do follow through and cast a ballot. This suggests that where registration hurdles have already been cleared, emigrant voters are relatively likely to follow through and vote. Turnout was higher abroad than at home in almost half of the countries (14 of 29), with significantly higher out-of-country turnout in Bulgaria (Republic of Bulgaria 2024) and Romania (Republic of Romania 2024).

However, these findings also raise important questions. High turnout among registered overseas voters contrasts with the generally low overall participation rate when viewed against the full emigrant population. This discrepancy suggests that a large number of potential voters are either legally excluded or administratively deterred from registering. Where registration is a necessary precondition for voting, especially when required well in advance of an election, it may disproportionately restrict access to emigrants with sufficient time, information or connection to the electoral process. Interestingly, low turnout among registered voters does not always correspond to the type of voting method offered. Of the five countries with the lowest level of OCV turnout, two provide for in-person voting only (Croatia and Tunisia), while three provide for multiple methods (Algeria: in-person and proxy; Japan: in-person and postal; and Portugal: in-person and postal). There is also a connection with the mechanism for representation for the lowest-turnout (as a share of those registered to vote from abroad) countries. Of the bottom 10 countries, 5 have special representation (designated constituencies) for non-resident citizens—Algeria, Croatia, France, Portugal and Tunisia (Umpierrez de Reguero, Bauböck and Wegschaider 2025). The low level of participation in these diaspora constituencies could raise a question about democratic legitimacy: when systems provide representation for diaspora populations, but few actually vote, does such limited engagement risk distorting democratic accountability or undermining the intent behind these mechanisms?

Assessing the relationship between available voting methods and turnout rates among non-resident citizens is complex, as outcomes may also be shaped by other factors such as registration requirements and the presence of the special representation mechanisms noted above. Figure 6.3 presents three different ways of contextualizing the level of out-of-country electoral participation discussed above, with data for the three most common legal regimes—only postal voting, only in-person voting and a mix of methods (usually both of the first two) across all the elections for which data are available. When the OCV turnout is measured as a share of the estimated emigrant population, countries providing multiple voting methods tend to show higher participation, with an average turnout rate of 15.0 per cent. In contrast, when OCV turnout is assessed as the share of those registered to vote from abroad, postal voting far outperforms the other methods, with an average participation rate of 81.2 per cent. This high figure can be largely attributed to the fact that, while in some countries one can vote in person without prior registration, receiving a postal ballot will almost always require advance registration.

While data on OCV turnout over time remain limited, longitudinal information is available for at least 6 elections in 10 countries (see Figure 6.4). Although this sample is relatively small and covers diverse political and administrative contexts—with time spans ranging from two years in Ecuador to over two decades in France—it still offers valuable insight into participation trends. Notable increases in OCV participation, measured as a share of the emigrant population, are observed in countries such as Ecuador, France, Moldova and Portugal. This measure enables broad comparison across cases but should be interpreted in light of methodological differences in data collection, definitions of emigrant populations and registration procedures. Despite these variations, the patterns suggest that sustained efforts to expand access, improve administrative procedures and strengthen diaspora engagement may contribute to gradual improvements in participation from abroad.

Just as with domestic turnout, OCV turnout rates can be influenced by both practical and political matters. For example, turnout may be higher when an election is understood to present an opportunity for an important turning point, or when new voting procedures make it easier for people to vote (for example, through expanded early voting or postal voting). Just as the actions of political parties can influence turnout rates domestically, political party engagement with emigrants has also been shown to increase turnout abroad (Burgess and Tyburski 2020). There is currently limited evidence regarding the effects of the introduction of Internet-based voting. However, trials of this method of voting in eight Swiss cantons have demonstrated that, at least in some circumstances, it can increase turnout among those living abroad (Germann 2021).

6.2. Political implications of diaspora votes

There is variation in how the votes of emigrant citizens are counted, as discussed above. In most countries, votes from abroad in legislative elections are counted as if they were cast by resident citizens—for example, in contributing to the vote totals of a large district in proportional representation systems or to the votes for individual candidates in single-member district plurality systems. This approach reflects an assumption of parity between resident and non-resident citizens in their representational role, but it may obscure distinct diaspora interests or geographic dispersion. Also, this method of facilitating OCV can have political implications that have been exploited by governing parties to extend their electoral advantages, as has been the case, for example, in Hungary and Turkey (Pogonyi 2014). The decision to expand access to OCV has at times appeared motivated by political self-interest and has generally benefited governing parties—though, in some cases, diaspora voters have shown stronger support for opposition parties (Turcu and Urbatsch 2020).

Hungary presents a notable example of how OCV arrangements can serve partisan interests. In 2010, legislation sponsored by the ruling Fidesz party granted citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, followed by the extension of voting rights in 2011. These new non-resident citizens—most of whom had no prior residence in Hungary—are allowed to vote by mail and overwhelmingly support Fidesz (Bodnár 2015; Molnar 2024). In contrast, Hungarian citizens living abroad who were born in Hungary must vote in person, either at designated polling stations abroad or in Hungary itself (Waterbury 2025). This distinction in voting modalities effectively makes participation easier for a group that favours the ruling party, raising concerns about the use of OCV design for political advantage.

However, the extent to which the enfranchisement of diasporas has an influence on electoral outcomes is dictated to some extent by the share of the total votes that are cast from abroad. Across the 210 elections for which OCV turnout data are available, the highest share of the total votes cast by out-of-country voters was 19.5 per cent, in Moldova’s second round of the presidential election in 2024. Only six countries (Bulgaria, El Salvador, Hungary, Moldova, Portugal and Romania) have had elections in which the vote from abroad accounted for at least 5 per cent of the total vote. As shown in Figure 6.3, the average percentage of votes from abroad remains very low.

6.3. Representation and legitimacy

While the average percentage of votes from abroad remains low, OCV can, in a few countries, have a significant influence on electoral outcomes. This influence—particularly when the diaspora vote sways results in tightly contested elections—raises questions about how best to integrate or manage non-resident representation in democratic systems. One institutional response to this potential impact is to establish special constituencies for overseas voters, thereby channelling diaspora participation into designated forms of representation.

At least 21 countries have created special constituencies to represent overseas voters (Umpierrez de Reguero, Bauböck and Wegschaider 2025). In these cases, there are seats in the legislature that are assigned to represent emigrants either as a global class or differentiated by region of residence (such as in Cabo Verde and Italy). Such special representation may allow for the different interests of non-resident citizens to be effectively represented in the legislature, sometimes in a highly differentiated way. It may also be preferable in cases in which the share of the total votes from abroad is significant enough to have an outsize influence if not channelled in this way (Umpierrez de Reguero, Bauböck and Wegschaider 2025).

In addition to the issues of belonging and citizenship that arise regarding OCV in general, the existence of such overseas constituencies raises more fundamental questions about the connection between national territory and the definition of the polity (Collyer 2014). The countries in which such voters live may also object to having people living in their territory explicitly represented in foreign political institutions (as, for example, Canada objected to Canadian citizens with dual citizenship having special representation in the legislatures of France and Tunisia) (Umpierrez de Reguero, Bauböck and Wegschaider 2025). These concerns speak to broader normative debates about democratic legitimacy, consent and jurisdiction. At the same time, such mechanisms illustrate evolving conceptions of political community in an era of transnational mobility. Rather than converging towards a single model, countries continue to develop varied legal and institutional responses to OCV that reflect distinct histories, migration trajectories and political priorities.

7.1. Key takeaways for policymakers

Intraregional migration rates dwarf interregional migration. Policymakers may wish to consider that, while international migration rates between regions are increasing, the majority of migration occurs within regions. While evidence indicates that migration rates will continue to increase in the coming years, ways of addressing migration and the challenges it poses should reflect its geographic characteristics.

Political participation contributes to democratic resilience. A range of factors (such as the size of the diaspora population, the cost of designing and maintaining out-of-country voting (OCV) systems, diaspora communities’ economic contributions to origin countries, etc.) will result in different decisions across contexts, but evidence indicates that OCV helps promote a continued sense of belonging, which can contribute to long-term democratic resilience.

The legal and administrative design of OCV systems—including registration requirements and voting methods—strongly affects participation rates. Broad-based enfranchisement requires attention to both turnout and registration inclusion. Simplified procedures and accessible voting modalities can reduce structural barriers and enhance inclusion.

OCV offers potential benefits for countries of origin. These include the spread of democratic norms across borders, a greater sense of belonging among diaspora communities and lower barriers to reintegration for those migrants who return to their countries of origin. Research has shown that migrants’ participation in both formal and informal political processes in their host countries can help transfer democratic norms from their host country to their country of origin through return migration, contact between emigrants and their home country, or the creation of political or civic associations while migrants are living abroad (Docquier et al. 2016). This participation can also strengthen ties between expatriate community members—increasing their sense of belonging in their new home—and facilitate integration (Bekaj et al. 2018).

Despite the benefits, diaspora turnout rates are relatively low. While there are gaps in the available data, turnout as a share of all registered voters for those 29 elections in 2024 for which we do have data was on average 60.4 per cent, while the average turnout for registered voters abroad was 55.3 per cent. However, when calculated as a share of the emigrant population, the average turnout rate was 13.2 per cent.

Disparities in diaspora representation and procedural access reflect broader questions about equality and legitimacy in democratic systems. Equity in enfranchisement should be a guiding principle for OCV reform.

Data on OCV remain limited and uneven. More disaggregated data are needed, particularly on the number of eligible diaspora voters, the number who are registered to vote from abroad and the number who vote. The varied approaches of electoral management bodies (EMBs) to categorizing overseas voting data make cross-national comparisons challenging. Improved data collection and standardization are essential for evidence-based OCV policy design.

OCV design can be influenced by political incentives. Safeguards are needed to ensure that enfranchisement does not become a tool for partisan gain.

OCV systems can be expensive, though detailed data on the cost of existing systems are not widely available. It is difficult to compare available data, given countries’ differing administrative capacities, the varying size and composition of their respective diasporas, and numerous other factors. However, postal voting is a relatively low-cost option, as the main costs are associated with the delivery and retrieval of election materials. Other systems require expenditures related to security, training, education materials and staff.

7.2. Responding to these trends

How can policymakers—especially legislators, EMBs and civil society—respond? While there is no one set of ready-made policy choices, it is critical to approach both the opportunities and challenges posed by migration through a democratic lens. The following recommendations provide actionable steps for policymakers, EMBs and civil society groups considering, implementing or advocating for OCV options.

Recommendations for policymakers

1. View OCV as a tool for democratic resilience. OCV can strengthen democratic legitimacy by reinforcing migrants’ sense of civic belonging and sustaining their political engagement with their country of origin. Policymakers should recognize OCV not as a peripheral policy but as an investment in long-term democratic resilience—especially in contexts of displacement, conflict and structural emigration.
2. Consider the broader integration benefits of diaspora engagement. Facilitating diaspora participation in elections may also generate benefits for host societies by promoting transnational democratic norms and reducing barriers to reintegration upon return. These dynamics contribute to social cohesion and democratic development across borders.
3. Ensure diaspora inclusion in the national political community. Legal frameworks should be guided by inclusive understandings of citizenship that recognize the legitimate stake non-resident citizens have in the political future of their countries of origin (Bauböck 2007). Policymakers should anticipate the growing importance of transnational political membership in the context of global migration, climate change and digital connectivity.
4. Balance political representation with electoral equity. Where diaspora populations are large, special mechanisms such as reserved parliamentary seats may help channel their votes without distorting domestic electoral outcomes. Weighting mechanisms or capped seat allocations—as used in countries like Cabo Verde (see Box 7.1)—may provide models for balancing diaspora representation and legitimacy.

1. Prioritize legal clarity, cross-border coordination and long-term planning. Effective OCV systems require early legislative action, legal clarity on eligibility and procedures, and coordination with host countries. Policymakers should explore mechanisms such as bilateral agreements and regional frameworks to support operational delivery of OCV.
2. Adopt a cost-effective and inclusive approach to OCV modalities. Postal voting and multiple voting methods (e.g. postal and in-person) are both effective and relatively affordable, especially when supported by sustained investment in electoral infrastructure and diaspora outreach. New approaches—such as online voting—should be explored with attention to integrity, accessibility, digital literacy, security and reliability.
3. Invest in better data for better decisions. Sound policymaking requires more systematic and disaggregated data on eligible voters, registration and participation abroad. Standardized reporting obligations for EMBs should be considered to improve cross-country comparability and evidence-based electoral reform.

Recommendations for electoral management bodies

1. Recognize OCV as a core electoral function, not a technical add-on. Designing and delivering OCV is not merely a logistical task; it is central to ensuring that democratic processes remain inclusive in an era of transnational mobility. EMBs should integrate OCV into standard electoral planning cycles, with dedicated budget lines, personnel and long-term capacity development.
2. Simplify registration procedures to lower participation barriers. Evidence shows that requiring in-person or overly burdensome registration procedures significantly reduces participation. EMBs should streamline diaspora voter registration—for example, via online platforms, embassies and consulates, or automatic enrolment where feasible—while ensuring security and accessibility.
3. Diversify voting methods to improve access. Offering multiple voting options (postal, in-person and, where appropriate, electronic) has been associated with higher participation. EMBs should assess which combinations are most suitable based on diaspora size, geographic dispersion, administrative capacity and the integrity risks of each method. Kosovo’s recent reforms provide an example of how more and simpler options can motivate turnout (see Box 7.2).

1. Strengthen integrity through transparency and communication. Clear information on registration, deadlines, voting options and eligibility is essential for building trust in OCV. EMBs should develop targeted communication strategies—using diaspora media, civil society partnerships and multilingual materials—to ensure that voters abroad are informed about and confident in the process.
2. Institutionalize cooperation with consular services and other agencies. Effective OCV delivery depends on interagency collaboration. EMBs should establish formal agreements with foreign ministries, postal services and diaspora affairs agencies to define roles, share resources and avoid duplication. Examples from countries like the Philippines illustrate how multi-institutional coordination supports implementation (see Box 7.3).

1. Anticipate and mitigate political and logistical risks. Diaspora voting can become politicized, especially where it is seen to benefit one party. EMBs should ensure that procedural rules are applied impartially and that logistical risks—such as ballot delivery failures or ambiguous eligibility rules—are proactively addressed, with contingency plans in place.
2. Improve data quality and reporting standards. Currently, data on OCV registration and turnout are often incomplete, inconsistently categorized or not disaggregated. EMBs should publish standardized data on registration, ballot distribution, turnout and invalid ballots to support transparency, policy learning and international comparability.

Recommendations for civil society actors

1. Advocate for equitable access to OCV. Civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a key role in ensuring that the expansion of OCV is inclusive—not limited to certain groups or geographies. Advocacy efforts should focus on removing discriminatory barriers in laws or procedures and promoting enfranchisement for all eligible non-resident citizens.
2. Monitor OCV implementation and support electoral integrity. Diaspora-focused CSOs and independent observers should be engaged in monitoring the implementation of OCV, from registration to vote counting. Their oversight helps enhance trust and transparency, especially where governments or EMBs lack credibility or where diaspora votes may significantly affect outcomes.
3. Build awareness and civic education among diaspora communities. Low turnout among registered diaspora voters points to a need for more active engagement. CSOs should develop non-partisan voter education initiatives—using diaspora media, digital outreach and community events—to raise awareness of registration processes, voting options and election timelines.
4. Facilitate inclusive participation by addressing practical barriers. Partnering with diaspora networks, CSOs can identify and mitigate logistical and informational barriers to participation, especially for migrants with limited digital access, insecure legal status or lower literacy. Tailored outreach can help ensure that OCV is not only available but meaningfully accessible.
5. Encourage inclusive policy debate on diaspora enfranchisement. OCV raises important questions about belonging, accountability and representation. Civil society can create space for inclusive public debate—within both origin and host countries—on the role of diaspora voters, their rights and responsibilities, and how democratic systems can evolve in response to transnational citizenship.
6. Forge alliances across borders. Many challenges related to OCV—such as legal harmonization, voter education or postal logistics—span multiple jurisdictions. Civil society actors should connect across borders to share lessons learned, coordinate advocacy and build regional or global coalitions to support diaspora political rights.

Areas for continued and further research

There are several pending normative and practical questions related to OCV.

1. Further research is needed to understand what drives participation or abstention among different diaspora groups. Research should include an examination of how factors such as time since emigration, generation, legal status, security concerns, access to information, prior experience with voting or the perceived relevance of home-country elections influence voter behaviour.
2. More comparative research and more data could clarify how voting method design affects both participation rates and electoral integrity. While some evidence suggests that postal voting often shows higher turnout among registered voters, cross-country comparisons are limited by variations in registration requirements and implementation.
3. There is a need to assess how diaspora participation influences close races, party platforms or governance outcomes—particularly in countries where OCV turnout constitutes a meaningful share of the electorate or where diaspora preferences diverge from domestic voters. These issues may take on more salience as candidates and parties increasingly utilize digital modes of outreach and campaigning, including to diaspora communities.
4. Host-country cooperation in the implementation of OCV is crucial but understudied. Further research could examine how legal frameworks, diplomatic relations and administrative arrangements shape host-state roles in supporting or obstructing OCV, including through bilateral agreements or regional coordination mechanisms.
5. There are pending questions on the role of online OCV systems. With some countries experimenting with online and hybrid systems, more comparative studies are needed that illustrate what similarities and differences exist between OCV and domestic online voting security, accessibility and trustworthiness. This angle could add important new data to the already rich literature on online participation mechanisms.
6. More time-series data on diaspora turnout, registration and political attitudes may help clarify whether OCV fosters sustained political engagement across migration waves or whether participation declines over time or across generations. It will also be important to conduct long-term studies on the turnout and political attitudes of circular migrants and other individuals who choose to spend regular periods of time outside of their countries of origin.
7. Despite the fundamental importance of the costs of implementing different types of OCV systems—postal, in-person, online or hybrid—comprehensive, updated and accessible data are unavailable. The absence of data is especially important in light of the relatively low rates of participation among non-resident citizens in many countries. Future studies could benefit from in-depth case comparisons or cost assessments drawn from EMBs, which were beyond the scope and timeframe of this report.

The question of migration is ultimately a question of the meaning of belonging in a democratic society. It challenges democracies not because human migration itself is inherently destabilizing but because it compels challenging questions about if and how to reconsider the boundaries of the polity. As migration rates continue to increase, democracies are increasingly confronted with questions of whether and how to include their non-resident citizens in political processes. Resilient democracies are inclusive, but what considerations should be made to determine whether or not non-resident citizens may continue to influence political decisions in their countries of origin? If out-of-country voting (OCV) systems are implemented, which mechanisms are best suited to particular contexts?

Key questions arise—how to quickly and effectively adapt to an environment that is increasingly marked by immigration and emigration, even as amending legal frameworks and equipping agencies and voters with the information and resources they may need takes time and negotiation; whether and how to use new voting modalities to facilitate turnout, which is persistently low; how to balance the availability of new technology with old infrastructure; and how to include diaspora communities while protecting domestic democratic legitimacy.

Some of the considerations are technical. OCV requires significant planning and administration, and can be resource-intensive. Other considerations are political, especially when diaspora communities are large or when one political party stands to disproportionately benefit from the use of OCV. Countries must also consider the ways in which OCV can contribute to democratic resilience. Embracing a transnational conception of belonging may help people feel like they have a stake in the future of their countries of origin, thus incentivizing them to stay connected and committed. At the same time, however, it is important not to lose sight of the views and priorities of resident citizens.

Democracy requires patience, maintenance and, at times, reinvention in order to persevere. The work of democracy is also never finished: as the scale and shape of migration evolve, democracies will have to maintain and regularly re-evaluate institutional frameworks—including, as discussed in this report, the meaning, boundaries and mechanisms of involving non-resident citizens in political decision making. There is no single right answer; the best approaches will reflect local histories and contexts. What remains universally true is that the long-term resilience of democratic institutions will depend on deliberate, inclusive and regular reflection and solutions that are tailored to context-specific problems and priorities.