Review of the 2024 Super-Cycle Year of Elections

Ever since the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) was founded three decades ago, elections have been a central part of our work and identity. But never have elections globally faced such a complex and daunting set of challenges as today—from disinformation campaigns to disruption from extreme climate events to outright denial of electoral results, to name just a few.

The cumulative impact of all these challenges to elections cannot be overstated. Credible, high-integrity elections play a foundational role in democracy, not least because they offer the best opportunity to stem the tide of democratic deterioration. In case after case, from Guatemala to Poland to Zambia, it is through elections that democratic forces have changed the trajectory of receding democracies. Moreover, elections are one of the most visible and public events in democratic life; if people lose trust in elections, it is very hard to retain or regain their trust in other aspects of democracy. Democracy is much more than elections, but there can be no democracy without elections.

With this in mind, and as countries with half the world’s population went to the polls in 2024, International IDEA redoubled its focus on elections as pillars of democracy. Through this global campaign last year, we helped develop the capacity of election authorities to manage risk, convened dialogues to exchange lessons learned and practices among our Member States, leveraged our institutional voice through media and advocacy, and generated and disseminated knowledge about the trends we were seeing and the lessons to be drawn.

This report is a culminating piece of that effort to ensure that lessons from the super cycle are both learned and used. As a multimethod and multidisciplinary analysis, it draws on knowledge from practitioners and academics alike, embodying the ‘think and do’ nature of our Institute. It is the product of collaboration with peers in the Electoral Integrity Project, reflecting the importance of partnerships in addressing the myriad overlapping challenges to electoral integrity. And in addition to providing a definitive summary of key themes and trends emerging from the ‘Year of Elections’, it offers policy recommendations for election management bodies and other authorities to strengthen elections for an uncertain future. In particular, the report highlights the importance of contextual conditions for elections, inter-agency and whole-of-society coordination, and the use of foresight to imagine possibilities and plan accordingly.

Building on International IDEA’s strong record of leadership in defining and developing the field of electoral assistance, I am confident that this report will become a key reference for the next generation of election managers, policymakers and stakeholders seeking to strengthen electoral integrity worldwide.

Dr Kevin Casas-Zamora
Secretary-General, International IDEA

The 2024 super-cycle year of elections sparked unprecedented interest in electoral processes. Indeed, the sheer number of elections and voters was impressive. An estimated 1.6 billion cast ballots in 74 national elections throughout the world. The year saw many well-run elections worldwide, bringing meaningful political change for many citizens. These elections were moments of citizen empowerment—opportunities for voters to express themselves, removing their representatives from office or renewing their mandates for another electoral cycle. However, there were also cases of electoral backsliding, where the quality of elections was much lower than in previous years.

Data from the Electoral Integrity Project shows that, across countries, the greatest problems in the 2024 elections were related to the media and the role of money in elections. These problems are not entirely new. The media landscape should be free, open and fair so that citizens can make informed choices at the ballot box. However, there have always been biases in news and media coverage. Likewise, regulating campaigns so that the candidates and parties with the greatest financial resources do not have a significant advantage has been a long-term challenge.

The interest in the super-cycle year marked a profound and growing concern—a sense that we are at a historical juncture where we must revisit and reassess the strength of our democratic culture and institutions. Many of the challenges that emerged in this super cycle will shape the global democratic landscape in 2025 and beyond.

Technological and political developments are combining to create problems of a new magnitude. Major platforms have taken a deregulated—or actively partisan—approach to content management. Facebook and Instagram have removed fact-checkers from their platforms. The owner of X has actively sought to intervene in overseas elections. The aggressive use of disinformation in the online information space, the deregulated approach of social media platforms and the challenges involved in tracing financial flows worldwide make it difficult to ensure a level playing field for election candidates.

For the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), the diversity of the 2024 election slate provided an opportune entry point to revisit assumptions and track evolving challenges in electoral management and policy. In this publication, a team of academics and experts tied to the EIP and International IDEA reviews the 2024 elections through lenses ranging from the administration of elections, the context in which they were held and the rising interest in electoral trust. Each chapter is underpinned by data from a series of key International IDEA and EIP trackers and data sets: the Global Elections Super Cycle, the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity data set, the Global Election Monitor, the Global State of Democracy and its Democracy Tracker, the Election Emergency and Crisis Monitor, the Electoral Management Survey as well as specialized data sets.

This review illustrates profound changes underway in how elections are conducted and the increasingly complex contexts in which elections are held. Many of these challenges directly affected the work of electoral management bodies (EMBs), as they had to navigate inclement weather, a radically changed information environment, the politicization of their mandate and aggression towards their officials, alongside their already complex portfolios. Institutions, regulatory frameworks and global norms established in previous generations to ensure a level playing field are being sorely tested by the egregious use of money in politics and the manipulation of social media algorithms to influence elections, exacerbated by the explicit willingness of domestic, foreign and non-state actors to engage in such activities.

This report, divided into eight main chapters, highlights the following findings:

1. In 2024, electoral reform arose as a topic of concern because of its links to democratic backsliding—that is, the risk and reality of legislative change designed to entrench incumbent power and diminish safeguards for democratic checks and balances, whether aimed at the media, civil society, the political opposition or the international community. Electoral reform laws were passed with minimal support, such as in Georgia, or at the last minute, as in Tunisia. In response, a coalition of global actors developed updated global norms for electoral reform, emphasizing the importance of transparency, appropriate timelines, evidence-based political consensus building and the involvement of those most affected by potential changes.
2. Election-related malpractice, often at the local level, remains a perennial problem in elections; allegations of fraud, including vote buying and financial irregularities were recorded in at least 17 national elections in 2024, from Mauritania to Pakistan. The standout example of electoral malpractice at scale occurred in Venezuela, where, at the moment the polls closed on election day, the meticulously designed voting system was thwarted through blatant irregularities and a lack of transparency during the vote count, leading to highly questionable results that were not supported by the official vote count.
3. The year 2024 saw historic peaceful transfers of power, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Election-related violence continues to occur, nonetheless, with patterns and degrees of violence varying between countries. Notable examples of targeted attacks against political candidates in 2024 were seen in Mongolia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States. Violence by illicit armed groups was seen in Mexico and Pakistan, and government-sponsored violence took place during the election period in Mozambique. Clashes between party supporters were reported in India, the Maldives and South Africa, with violence and the threat of violence against election workers recorded in Ghana, Madagascar and the USA.
4. In 2024 instances of gender-based violence during election periods were recorded in 28 national elections across public, private and online spaces. While the degree of violence varied, what was clear was that it disproportionately affected marginalized groups. Addressing identity-based violence requires legal and institutional reforms as well as transformative, intersectional strategies that challenge harmful norms and strengthen protection, prevention and response capabilities across all levels of society. Examples of such measures were seen with media outreach and education campaigns in Moldova and legal and institutional measures introduced in Mexico for their respective 2024 national elections.
5. Forty-three national elections in 2024 involved instances of mis- and disinformation that undermined the credibility of political actors or the electoral process itself. The information environment around elections remains a strategic target for hybrid threat actors, as part of their non-conventional warfare strategies to accomplish geopolitical ends. In 2024 cases of hybrid threats against elections—through operations run by actors in China, Iran and Russia—were noted in EU countries as well as Georgia, Moldova, the Solomon Islands, Taiwan and the USA. In 2024 artificial intelligence was used during campaigns primarily for satirical purposes rather than explicit manipulation, proving less disruptive to elections than feared.
6. The record number of elections meant a record number of voters served. However, this achievement was accompanied by instances of technology malfunctions, procedural mistakes, negligence and human error in at least 14 national elections held in 2024. In El Salvador, the electronic result management system broke down on election day, while in Scotland, ahead of the UK general election, a production breakdown led to delayed postal packs. Cybersecurity incidents and breaches of voter and other confidential data were reported in Indonesia and South Korea during the electoral cycle.
7. In 2024, 20 elections were affected by natural hazards such as floods, heatwaves and tropical storms during primary, subnational, national or supranational elections in 15 countries, with climate change and the 2023–2024 El Niño event as contributing factors. Natural hazards affected more than one election in Austria, Indonesia and the USA. An example of resilience building was seen during the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka, with close inter-agency collaboration between the Election Commission and Disaster Management Centre through joint planning and the establishment of a Joint Election Emergencies Operation Unit.
8. The unpredictable environment, plethora of snap elections, difficulty introducing needed reforms under fraught circumstances and the ease with which elections were undermined in the online space highlighted the need to incorporate trust building into election planning. The year 2024 saw a rise in EMBs making concerted efforts to explain their processes, changes and decisions, and to collaborate with other societal actors to reassure concerned stakeholders about the integrity of electoral processes.

For those who design and manage electoral processes, the lessons learned from 2024 highlight the following priorities:

1. Safeguarding electoral reform. Changes to electoral processes and institutions can be used instrumentally to entrench power by incumbents, exclude the opposition and disenfranchise citizens. These risks of misuse point to the importance of the design of electoral reform processes, including the guardrails against political opportunism. A well-designed electoral process has transparent and well-defined processes and milestones that encourage political consensus building and that involve multiple voices, including those of the most politically vulnerable in society.
2. Excellent and trustworthy election delivery through investment in EMB capabilities and accountability measures. Election results tend to be accepted when an EMB performs well and is recognized as doing its best even in the most challenging circumstances, and when political actors agree not to undermine the EMB’s reputation for short-term gain. Fulfilling the core functions of an electoral process and addressing ongoing and evolving challenges requires adequate and sustainable funding that is insulated from political manoeuvring, which can undermine impartiality.
3. Attentiveness to the information environment around elections. EMBs can be more attentive to the information environment by taking proactive and pre-emptive measures, such as instituting early-detection systems, exercising situational awareness and engaging in enhanced cooperation across sectors. Credible institutions, when seen as reliable sources of information, play a critical role in mitigating the impact of mis- and disinformation.
4. Security and duty of care. The rise of in-person and online aggression against election workers and electoral institutions has implications for recruitment, training and security measures. Support mechanisms for EMB staff, legal provisions and interparty codes of conduct are examples of initiatives that make elections safer—for both election workers and voters.
5. Preparing for the unexpected. From the pandemic onwards, preparing for the unexpected has become the new reality for election administrators. This environment has created an imperative for policymakers and election officials to incorporate risk management, resilience building and crisis management into their work and to ensure that they are sufficiently resourced to hold elections during challenging weather or security-related conditions.
6. Inter-agency cooperation. Electoral integrity challenges are multifaceted and complex, often going beyond any EMB’s mandate or capacity to manage. A whole-of-government approach enables close working relationships between EMBs and other state agencies, such as those tasked with responding to cyberattacks, ensuring citizens’ safety during elections and preparing for extreme weather events. Appropriate protection of electoral processes also requires the formal and informal engagement of a broad range of stakeholders (whole-of-society approach), each bringing relevant mandates, expertise and resources to the effort.

Toby S. James and Holly Ann Garnett

In 2024, 1.6 billion people across 74 national elections cast ballots, with an average voter turnout of 61 per cent (International IDEA n.d.a). In late 2023, Time declared that ‘2024 is not just an election year. It’s perhaps the election year’ (Ewe 2023). In the end, even more elections were held in 2024 than expected, as governments fell, dissolved their parliaments and called snap elections.

While elections are always significant and should be viewed as a process which includes events before, during and after the polls open on election day, the sheer number of national elections taking place and the number of voters casting ballots in a relatively short time frame made 2024 a landmark year for elections. The so-called electoral super cycle resulted from the convergence—which occurs every 20 years—of national electoral calendars that require elections to take place every 4 or 5 years.

These elections were also significant because they took place at a time of global concern about democratic backsliding. International IDEA (2024: 3, 13) reported that 82 countries saw a decline in at least one of their indicators of democratic performance compared with five years prior and that one in three voters were living in a country where the quality of elections had declined.

This report examines the elections that took place in 2024 to identify lessons and both established and emerging trends applicable to the broad task of protecting and strengthening electoral processes. This is a pivotal time, with multiple threats to electoral integrity around the world. The report maps out some of these challenges and encourages global conversations about them.

The remainder of this Introduction defines some key terms relating to electoral integrity and democratic backsliding, maps the overall quality of elections in 2024 against longer-term trends and introduces electoral integrity challenges to be further explored.

What is electoral integrity?

Elections are an indispensable part of the democratic process and can offer opportunities for empowerment. They provide a chance for voters to remove their representatives from office—or renew their mandate for another electoral cycle. They enable the electorate to express their views about the future of their families, their communities and their country. They provide a platform for citizens, civil society and representatives to discuss and deliberate about the political issues facing them and their society.

Elections can also result in disempowerment, however. The rules governing elections can be manipulated to limit choice and favour an incumbent. Electoral violence can be used against candidates, citizens and electoral officials to intimidate them and shape the outcome of an election. Disinformation can spread across social media platforms to misinform citizens, cause conflicts and sow distrust of public institutions.

We therefore define electoral integrity as a set of principles to be upheld in elections which empower citizens and help to realize the ideals of democracy (James and Garnett 2025a forthcoming, 2025b). Democracy is defined as a societal system where preconditions exist to fully empower all citizens to realize their individual potential, and where political power is distributed equitably (James 2024). Elections fully empower citizens when the following principles are upheld (James and Garnett 2025a forthcoming, 2025b):

1. Contestation. Elections empower citizens by allowing a wide range of groups, individuals and parties to compete. They empower all citizens to have the opportunity to run for office themselves. Those elected can then represent the interests of their fellow citizens and implement the general will of the wider electorate. Effective contestation therefore requires that there should be no bans on the formation of political parties and that candidates should not be prevented from contesting an election. All candidates and parties should also be permitted to campaign and use the media to inform the public and attract support for their views.
2. Participation. Although there might be a variety of candidates in an election, citizens will not be empowered if participation is constrained across the electorate. Wide and even participation is needed to ensure that the whole population is part of the electorate and can therefore choose their representatives and influence policy directly.
3. Deliberation. Deliberation makes it possible to base decisions on evidence, discussion and consensus rather than the influence of powerful actors such as incumbent leaders, state-owned media outlets or the owners of social media companies.
4. Adjudication. Adjudication refers to the institutional governance processes in place to uphold the above principles. Elections should be conducted in line with the electoral laws, codes and constitutions of each country. The rule of law means that everyone is aware of the rules of the game in advance and can have confidence that these rules are followed. There should be broad opportunities for involvement and consensus about the design of the electoral rules. Finally, there should be clear processes for raising and dealing with electoral complaints.

All electoral bodies work together to uphold these principles. For example, electoral management bodies—the critical state bodies responsible for implementing elections—ideally work to ensure that citizens are empowered to participate in elections and to enable candidates to contest elections. They may facilitate wider deliberation by providing electoral information.

These principles of electoral integrity are embedded widely in international standards on elections. Hence, International IDEA and the Kofi Annan Foundation (2012) define an election with integrity as:

any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, and is professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle.

International standards are therefore an essential tool for empowering people around the world. Charting the degree to which those standards were upheld in elections in 2024 is indispensable for measuring the empowerment of voters.

The electoral cycle

Both the news media and ordinary citizens often assume that elections are events which take place over the course of a few days, every few years. The reality is that elections are months, years and decades in the making. This reality gave rise to the concept of an ‘electoral cycle’, which was developed as a planning tool for practitioners to embed the idea that elections involve lengthy preparations (ACE Project 2017).

The electoral cycle refers to the stages involved in organizing, conducting and managing elections. It includes everything from the preparation phase before an election to activities carried out after the results are declared (see Figure I.1).

Decisions and activities made at all stages of an election have important consequences for the overall quality of the election. Constitutions, for example, can be designed decades or centuries before an election and are often difficult to change. However, elections have to be conducted in line with the formal codified constitution—if there is one. Voter registration can take place years ahead of polls. Campaigning (whether formal or informal) may begin well before an election is called. It therefore follows that the quality of elections in 2024 was partially the result of work that was carried out earlier.

What is electoral backsliding?

Global democracy has developed unevenly over time, in waves—sometimes advancing, sometimes retreating (Huntington 1991). Countries have undertaken political, economic and social transformations which, in many cases, have meant a move from autocracy to democracy. However, the confidence about the future of democracy that existed in the 1990s and early 2000s has receded. There is evidence of a ‘third wave of autocratization’ in which many countries have seen the quality of their democracy undermined (International IDEA n.d.a; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Nord et al. 2024).

Autocratization, which is defined as a ‘substantial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy’ (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019: 1096), can take many forms. With respect to elections, electoral backsliding refers to a decline in the quality of electoral integrity over a period of time (Garnett and James 2023). This decline could occur in any area of the electoral cycle, as a result of a number of actions which undermine the four principles of electoral integrity outlined above.

Evidence of electoral backsliding might include (a) electoral reforms which consolidate power in an autocrat; (b) crackdowns on political opponents; (c) vote buying and manipulation; (d) the spreading of disinformation; (e) violence against candidates, citizens, electoral officials or other stakeholders; (f) a reduction in the capacity of the electoral authorities; (g) the exclusion of opposition candidates; (h) or reduced freedom of movement, freedom of assembly or participation in elections as a result of a state of emergency.

Overall trends, 2012–2024

Prior to 2024 evidence of electoral backsliding around the world was mixed (Garnett and James 2023). There were undoubtedly countries where election quality had improved over the longer term. Since 1991, for example, there had been major improvements in the quality of elections in Bhutan, Croatia, Ghana, Kuwait and Timor-Leste. However, there had also been major declines, in countries including Belarus, Honduras, Nicaragua, Türkiye and Venezuela (Garnett and James 2023). The situation is often more nuanced, however. Election quality can improve in one part of the electoral process but decline in others within the same country.

The main factors leading to electoral backsliding at the aggregate level were the erosion of civil liberties and the growing personalization of power on the part of political leaders. Electoral integrity can also be undermined by other changes in citizens’ freedoms to mobilize, debate and express their opinions. Power grabs by incumbents seeking to consolidate their power and erode individual liberties were therefore crucial (Garnett and James 2023: 10).

There is evidence of both electoral backsliding and electoral strengthening in 2024. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) data set, compiled by the Electoral Integrity Project, provides a comprehensive analysis of how well countries’ elections uphold the principles of electoral integrity set out earlier (Norris, Frank and Martínez i Coma 2014; Garnett, James and Caal-Lam 2024b). Based on a survey of election experts, the PEI data set provides an overall score for each election, ranging from 0 to 100, as well as comparative rankings of countries based on these scores. Given that data is released each summer for contests held in the previous year, complete data for all elections held in 2024 is not available at the time of writing. Therefore, this report’s comparison of the quality of elections held in 2024 with that of previous elections is provisional.

A comparison of trends in several countries can be seen in Figure I.2, which paints a complex picture, where election quality declines in some cases, increases in others and remains stable in others.

Media and finance: The weak spot for electoral integrity

The Electoral Integrity Project has previously reported that elections tend to be stronger when it comes to technical aspects—procedures, the counting process, results tabulation and the work of electoral authorities. By contrast, the weaker parts of the electoral process are media and campaign finance (Garnett, James and Caal-Lam 2024a: 8, 2024b). An examination of 2024 elections suggests that no major change took place in this respect. Figure I.3 shows that media and finance remain the weakest part of the electoral process, while the counting process is the strongest.

The connection between media-related challenges and the influence of money is a central problem facing elections around the world, as this report clearly illustrates. The media landscape should be free, open and fair so that citizens can make informed choices at the ballot box. However, there have always been biases in news and media coverage, possibly because of state management and ownership of the press or because the owners and proprietors of private newspapers, TV stations, radio stations and social media platforms are keen to push a particular political message or support certain candidates.

The resources of any society are unevenly distributed. Private media will always be owned by wealthy individuals, which gives them the means to influence the electoral process. This influence increases when media platforms grow and cross continents.

Large media conglomerates have often played a role in elections everywhere in the world. Newspapers have endorsed parties and candidates; news channels have partisan and ideological slants. However, the influence of Elon Musk, the richest man in the world and owner of the social media platform X, is unique in history. His social media platform has an estimated 650 million active users around the world (SEO.AI 2025). Musk has used his platform to express support for far-right politicians, parties and activists across the globe, including Alternative for Germany and the far-right activist Tommy Robinson in the United Kingdom, claiming that ‘traditional parties have failed’ (Hayden 2024). Musk was also the de facto head of the Department of Government Efficiency inside the US Government for just over four months.

Since the owners of social media platforms have the power to tip the balance of the media coverage of elections around the world, their active influence presents an existential challenge to democracy (Broughton Micova and Schnurr 2024). Firstly, they can use algorithms not only to spread information but also to target specific people. Secondly, their platforms can be used to spread misinformation and disinformation, which can undermine the information environment, deliberation and even participation in elections. Moreover, there is an increasing lack of willingness on the part of global media platforms to address this threat. Facebook and Instagram have even removed fact-checkers from their platforms (McMahon, Kleinman and Subramanian 2025).

Eight key challenges to electoral integrity

Eight key electoral integrity issues are introduced here. The remainder of this publication evaluates lessons learned in light of the eight key, overlapping challenges to election integrity.

Each chapter is based on research that used a mixture of methods, including analysis of election observation reports, news reports, data relating to election quality and other relevant documents, as well as case studies focusing on Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada (British Columbia), El Salvador, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden, the UK, the United States and Venezuela.

The chapters also draw on the Global Election Monitor (Asplund and Tucker 2025), a tool designed to illustrate challenges to electoral integrity in national elections (see Figure I.4). The Global Election Monitor consists of 54 election briefs covering 50 countries based on reliable open-source information, compiled by International IDEA during the 2024 super-cycle year, using a variety of keyword searches and fully referenced media monitoring. These briefs are organized around challenges to electoral integrity adapted from International IDEA’s work on protecting elections (International IDEA n.d.b) and are accessible through the Global Election Monitor dashboard.

In addition, Chapters 4 and 7 use the findings from the Electoral Integrity Project’s 2024 Election Management Survey, which included 54 questions and received responses from 50 electoral management bodies around the world (Electoral Integrity Project n.d.).

Chapter 1: Electoral reform

Changing the electoral rules can be an act of autocratization by incumbents in an effort to reduce the scope for electoral competition and give themselves a greater chance of winning elections. There is also a paradox, however, in that electoral reform may also provide the gateway needed to improve election quality. Those seeking to make genuine attempts to improve elections will usually need to amend primary and secondary legislation to strengthen electoral integrity.

Ultimately, the motives of those proposing electoral reform are often unclear. In Chapter 1, Toby James reviews some of the key electoral reform debates and changes that took place in 2024. He also notes the development of new international best practices guiding electoral reform, including the idea that stakeholders should seek to reach consensus when designing reforms. Sadly, reforms that were made in 2024 were more likely to be characterized by a breakdown in consensus. The chapter includes a case study of Mozambique.

Chapter 2: Electoral malpractice

Electoral integrity can be directly undermined by electoral malpractice. As Vasil Vashchanka sets out in Chapter 2, drawing from the work of Sarah Birch (2011), electoral malpractice comes in various forms, including the manipulation of rules, such as changing the legal framework for elections to favour incumbents in order to reduce fair competition. The manipulation of voters involves altering the free expression of the electorate through methods such as bribery or coercion. Meanwhile, the manipulation of votes takes place at the ballot box—and during the subsequent aggregation of voting results. There were plenty of examples of each of these forms of manipulation around the world in 2024, many of which involved old tactics long deployed by those seeking to centralize power. The chapter includes cases studies of Pakistan and Venezuela.

Chapter 3: Election-related violence

Violence in elections can be perpetrated by different actors towards a variety of ends. Electoral violence includes coercive actions aiming to influence the process or outcome of an election. As Gudlaug Olafsdottir sets out in Chapter 3, violence is not only a serious humanitarian concern but also undermines all of the principles of electoral integrity. She demonstrates how many of the national elections held in 2024 were marked by some form of election-related violence. The chapter includes a case study of Bangladesh.

Chapter 4: Gender-based discrimination and violence

Electoral integrity depends on universal suffrage and political equality, yet gender-based discrimination and violence remain significant barriers to women’s full and equal participation and representation. Rooted in gendered power structures, violence against women in elections takes many forms—including physical, psychological and digital—that target women in various political roles. While the motives and forms may differ, the impact is often the same—discouraging women’s participation, distorting public discourse, ultimately undermining electoral integrity and weakening democratic processes. In Chapter 4, Julia Thalin explores how violence against women in elections undermines electoral integrity, tracing its manifestations throughout 2024 with examples from Bangladesh, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, the USA and beyond. The chapter also highlights effective responses—such as legislative reforms, training and awareness-raising initiatives—including through case studies of Mexico and Moldova.

Chapter 5: The information environment around elections

Chapter 5 includes a description of harmful online actions and unprecedented threats to the information environment surrounding elections. Electoral integrity faces increasing threats from malicious foreign and domestic actors who use online spaces to exploit electoral vulnerabilities and destabilize democratically elected governments without resorting to physical violence. Ingrid Bicu maps developments from 2024 in Chapter 5. The tactics being used include cyberattacks as well as misinformation and disinformation campaigns. In 2024 these attacks and campaigns focused on influencing voting patterns and undermining trust in election results. The chapter includes case studies of Romania and Sweden.

Chapter 6: Electoral management hurdles and malfunctions

Electoral management refers to the delivery and implementation of elections. Electoral laws might be designed with a specific (ill) intention through the courts, legislatures and executives. However, it is in the implementation of electoral rules that the voter actually experiences electoral integrity or malpractices most directly. In Chapter 6, Sonali Campion reviews the lessons of running elections around the world in 2024. Elections held during the year faced growing pressures because of stretched resources, cybersecurity breaches and technological malfunctions and challenges with the enforcement of complex rules. The chapter includes case studies of El Salvador and the UK.

Chapter 7: The impact of natural hazards on 2024 elections

Hazards—both human-made and natural—can damage or destroy critical infrastructure, impacting various aspects of the administration of elections throughout the electoral cycle. In this context, climate adaptation, which is built around responding to extreme weather events, plays a major role in safeguarding electoral integrity. In Chapter 7, Erik Asplund and Madeline Harty chart developments related to natural hazards in 2024. Fifteen countries were impacted by disasters during the electoral cycle last year. These events caused a significant disruption to many electoral activities. The chapter includes case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the USA.

Chapter 8: Trust and public perception in elections

Ensuring broad public trust in the electoral process and its outcome is critical to maintaining electoral integrity. It is essential that stakeholders trust the electoral process and outcome, as negative perceptions can undermine the credibility of the process and weaken institutions. In Chapter 8, Therese Pearce Laanela provides an overview of some of the ways in which trust was undermined or at stake in 2024, as well as a description of how many electoral authorities developed new initiatives to strengthen trust among stakeholders. The chapter includes a case study of British Columbia, Canada.

Conclusion

The conclusion draws together the lessons from the report, arguing that the lessons learned from the 2024 super cycle need to be situated in the context of broader election-related trends and transformations. There are a variety of ongoing mega-trends which are affecting all aspects of the electoral cycle around the world, such as interconnectivity in online communication, climate change resulting from global warming and increased political polarization. The transition to an age of complexity demands that a wider response should be taken, which would involve pre-emptive action, the development of collaborative cross-boundary solutions and broad, evidence-based conversations about solutions. This publication aims to contribute to these conversations.

References and further reading

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Barrat, J., Ellis, A., Orr, G., Vashchanka, V. and Wolf, P., Special Voting Arrangements: The International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2023), <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2023.84>

Birch, S., Electoral Malpractice (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606160.001.0001>

Broughton Micova, S. and Schnurr, D., ‘Systemic Risk in Digital Services: Benchmarks for Evaluating the Management of Risks to Electoral Processes’, Centre for Regulation in Europe, May 2024, <https://cerre.eu/publications/systemic-risk-in-digital-services-benchmarks-for-evaluating-the-management-of-risks-to-electoral-processes/>, accessed 27 March 2025

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Ewe, K., ‘The ultimate election year: All the elections around the world in 2024’, Time, 28 December 2023, <https://time.com/6550920/world-elections-2024/>, accessed 27 March 2025

Garnett, H. A. and James, T. S., ‘Electoral backsliding? Democratic divergence and trajectories in the quality of elections worldwide’, Electoral Studies, 86 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102696>

Garnett, H. A., James, T. S. and Caal-Lam, S., ‘Electoral Integrity Global Report 2024’, Electoral Integrity Project, July 2024a, <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/eip-blog/2024/7/24/the-global-electoral-integrity-report-2024>, accessed 27 March 2025

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—, Codebook – The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Release 11.0, Electoral Integrity Project, forthcoming 2025

Hayden, J., ‘Musk calls AfD “last spark of hope” for Germany in op-ed in Welt’, POLITICO, 28 December 2024, <https://www.politico.eu/article/musk-calls-far-right-afd-last-spark-hope-for-germany-op-ed-rightwing-scholz-merz-welt-am-sonntag/>, accessed 27 March 2025

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Toby S. James

1.1. Introduction: Why electoral reform matters

Electoral rules vary enormously around the world. Constitutional designs and rule-makers can pick from a range of different electoral systems, campaign regulations and voting arrangements, for example. The choices that are made about electoral rules matter. They can determine the winner of an election, the size of the majority or the outcome of contests for specific seats. Incumbent governments may therefore be tempted to revise electoral laws to increase their chances of victory at future elections and consolidate their power. Therefore, these kinds of electoral reforms can sometimes be acts of autocratization, which centralize power and undermine electoral integrity.

In fact, such changes can have an impact on all four principles of electoral integrity discussed in this report. An incumbent’s manipulation of electoral laws to give themselves an electoral advantage will have an impact on the equality of contestation, and rules that deliberately demobilize voters will limit participation. Laws aimed at restricting access to public spaces can limit deliberation, and the neutrality of adjudication processes can be undermined when loyal, partisan officials are hand-picked to serve on the bodies that decide election disputes.

At the same time, electoral reforms may be undertaken to strengthen electoral integrity and democracy. If stakeholders have identified weaknesses in the electoral process—for example, by using the data set out in this report—then primary legislation or constitutional amendments are often needed to address those weaknesses. Electoral finance laws may be needed to ensure equal contestation. Measures such as special voting arrangements could boost participation. Online spaces may require regulation to enable deliberation. Electoral authorities may need to be empowered through new rules enshrining their independence from incumbent governments.

It can be difficult to distinguish between reforms introduced by incumbents to increase their chances of winning future elections and those which are genuinely aimed at improving elections. While reformers will always claim that their motivations were positive, their political opponents may criticize the reforms to gain political capital—whatever the intention of the reform. The real intentions of lawmakers are difficult to know, and the future consequences of reforms are often uncertain. Moreover, electoral laws could be enacted both to increase an incumbent’s chances of winning and to improve the quality of elections.

The process of making changes to electoral rules—in addition to the substance of reform—also matters for electoral integrity. Given the uncertainty about intentions and effects, it is vitally important not to sow distrust unnecessarily. Evidence-based decision making can generate better public policy, and a variety of stakeholders should have an opportunity to provide input into the rule-making process (James and Garnett 2025).

This chapter maps some of the prominent electoral reforms which were proposed, adopted and rejected around the world in 2024—and considers whether consensus was achieved. Problems experienced last year included electoral laws being passed unilaterally, incumbents ignoring carefully crafted agreements and legislation being passed at the last minute, which put pressure on electoral management bodies (EMBs).

1.2. Electoral reforms in 2024

Electoral reforms take time to progress from initiation to implementation. The underlying principles for electoral reforms are often set out in draft or consultation form ahead of being introduced into the legislature. The legislative process can be long and subject to delay. Once reforms have received formal approval, they may then take several years to be implemented. As a result, some of the elections held in 2024 took place under new rules that were often the result of rule-making processes from several years prior.

For example, the US presidential election was subject to the Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022, which followed the insurrection of 6 January 2021. The insurrection involved an attempt to prevent the certification of Electoral College votes, which was possible because of a loophole in the Electoral Count Act of 1887. In response, the new Act of 2022 changed the process for casting and counting Electoral College votes in Congress—a process used for presidential elections. It set a deadline for electors to cast their vote and required that Electoral College votes tallied by Congress accurately reflect the public vote on election day (United States Congress 2022). It thereby sought to avert a repeat of the insurrection and improved the country’s electoral dispute mechanisms.

Elsewhere, Jordan held general elections in 2024 under new rules brought about by reforms instigated in 2021, when King Abdullah II established a committee to ‘propose changes aimed at enhancing public participation, developing political life, and broadening participation’ (Sharawi 2024). The 92-member Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System proposed 30 reforms, 26 of which were approved in 2022 (Sharawi 2024).

The reforms included a new Election Law for the House of Representatives, a new Political Parties Law, as well as a set of constitutional amendments to be implemented across three electoral cycles (EU EOM 2024: 7). One of the key reforms encourages the development of political parties by requiring that 41 parliamentary seats be reserved for members of political parties (increasing to 90 in future years) (Sharawi 2024). Previously, only independents contested elections, which was thought to hinder the development of multi-party parliamentary democracy (Choucair 2006).

Elsewhere, in Georgia, parliamentary elections were held for the first time under full proportional representation, following constitutional amendments passed in 2020 (Fremer 2020).

For an overview of the key electoral reforms that were passed (but not necessarily implemented) around the world in 2024, see Table 1.1.¹

1.3. Kickstarting (and banning) elections

Elections require laws to enable them to take place. Somalia is one of few countries that does not hold direct national elections, having not done so since 1969 (Freedom House 2024). In one of the most significant developments in 2024, Somalia’s Federal Parliament passed several laws in quick succession in November to establish an independent electoral and boundaries commission and regulate political parties (Abdullahi 2024; Hiiraan Online 2024).

At the same time, laws and rules were also enacted to suspend or annul certain elections. A notable clash occurred between the federal government and the state of Jubaland, which had long sought autonomy. The dispute arose when Jubaland appointed its own seven-member commission to organize and then hold a subnational presidential election (Horn Observer 2024). The Somali Parliament responded by passing a law to invalidate elections that did not comply with national law (Tuuryare 2024), and the federal government declared the presidential election in Jubaland ‘illegal’ (Shabelle Media Network 2024).

A similar sequence of events took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Constitutional Court annulled an electoral law passed in Republika Srpska, a region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, earlier in 2024 (Sarajevo Times 2024b). The Government of Republika Srpska had developed the law to enable it to conduct its own local elections, independent of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It had also called on electoral officials inside of Republika Srpska to resign (Sarajevo Times 2024a).

The European Union had warned of ‘serious consequences’ if Republika Srpska passed its own electoral law, as it would threaten the ‘sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Baccini 2025).

Members of both the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina had called on the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of the law (Sarajevo Times 2024a). The Court’s ruling therefore addressed a central question in the governance of the country.

1.4. Electoral finance disputes

Electoral finance has often been one of the weakest aspects of the electoral cycle globally (Garnett and James 2023; Garnett et al. 2023). Although measures to regulate electoral finance could improve electoral integrity, debates are often deeply polarized and partisan, and reforms have been criticized.

In Japan, electoral finance laws were revised in 2024 following a slush fund scandal in which politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were accused of pocketing funds raised at party fundraising events (Kyodo News 2024). An LDP task force on political reform was established to make recommendations in response to the scandal. The recommendations received broad support from LDP lawmakers (NHK World 2024), and reforms were passed in June 2024 (The Mainichi 2024). The scandal remained a key issue in the October 2024 parliamentary elections, and opposition parties were critical of the proposed reforms, calling for more drastic finance reform instead (Matsui and Okubo 2024).

In South Africa, the National Assembly and the president approved amendments to the Political Party Funding Act, enabling independent candidates to contest elections for seats in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures. The Act also regulated the funding of independent candidates and granted them access to the Multi-Party Democracy Fund (Parliament of South Africa 2024b). However, the amended Act was criticized for creating a temporary gap in the law by removing caps on how much parties could receive and not requiring declarations ahead of South Africa’s 2024 elections. Under the amended Act, the president would be given the authority to establish limits on donations following a resolution from the National Assembly (Thorne 2024).

In Tanzania, new legislation included timelines for the reporting of election offences by candidates and their parties; however, it was criticized for not requiring full public disclosure of election expenses (Center for Strategic Litigation 2024: 33).

In India, tighter restrictions were put in place following a legal ruling. In February, the Supreme Court scrapped the seven-year-old electoral bonds system, which had allowed individuals and companies to make anonymous donations to political parties.² The system, introduced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the Finance Act 2017, had allowed donors to buy bonds from the government-run State Bank of India which could then be transferred to a political party and redeemed for cash (Rajagopal 2024).

The role of money in politics was also raised in Canada. The Electoral Participation Act (Bill C-65) was introduced to delay the 2025 general election by one week (Canada 2024). The Liberal government said that the purpose of the delay was to avoid a clash with Diwali and local elections in Alberta. Opposition parties pointed out, however, that the change would have enabled 80 members of parliament who were first elected in 2019 to receive pensions they would not otherwise have been eligible for (Aiello 2024).

1.5. Electoral disputes and management

Amendments to electoral laws in several countries in 2024 changed who has power to validate election results. In Tunisia, for example, shortly before the presidential election on 6 October, legislators proposed and adopted an amendment to remove the Administrative Court’s prerogative to validate the election on 27 September. In anticipation of the Administrative Court’s invalidation of the result, power was granted to the Court of Appeal instead, a body considered to favour the president (France 24 2024). Amid reports of arrests of the president’s political opponents, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said that, ‘The rejection of a legally binding court decision is at odds with basic respect for the rule of law’ (OHCHR 2024).

The question of who should have the power to validate election results was also at the centre of electoral reform disputes in Mozambique (see Box 1.1).

The independence of electoral management bodies (EMBs) is widely seen as important for securing electoral integrity (James et al. 2019). Some reforms to electoral management arrangements in 2024 called this independence into question. In Georgia, for example, amendments to the electoral code changed the procedure for appointing the chair of the Central Election Commission (CEC), authorizing the speaker of parliament (rather than the president) to nominate the chair and seven members of the CEC (Civil Georgia 2024; ODIHR 2024: 5–6). These changes were made without broad support and were criticized for centralizing power in the governing party (ODIHR 2024: 7). The reforms were passed amid political turmoil and despite criticism from civil society about the adoption of the Transparency of Foreign Influence Bill, which would require many civil society groups and media outlets to register as agents of foreign governments (ODIHR 2024: 1).

In Tanzania, the National Electoral Commission Act 2024 established a dedicated law to direct the operation of the EMB. While the Act was proclaimed as a law to establish independence, the Center for Strategic Litigation noted that it also gave the president the power to remove commissioners from office. Moreover, the Act also stipulated that appointments to the EMB would be made by a committee consisting of presidential appointees (Center for Strategic Litigation 2024).

Reforms in other countries reconfigured bodies involved in delivering and overseeing elections. In Nigeria, for example, a bill was introduced in the Senate to establish a National Independent Local Government Electoral Commission, which would be responsible for conducting elections for local government chairpersons and councillors (Omogbolagun 2024). The bill followed a Supreme Court decision stipulating that state governors could not retain funds meant for local government administrators (Ukanwa 2024). However, the Inter-Party Advisory Council, an umbrella group representing all registered political parties, criticized the bill as an ‘unacceptable, ill-conceived ... electoral jamboree’ (Murey 2024). The Council also challenged a new electoral law in the state of Anambra, which created an independent electoral commission in the state, a move the Council called ‘a blatant attack on democracy’ (Nwachukwu 2024). The State House of Assembly passed the law in its first, second and third readings on the same day, shortly before the 28 September 2024 local elections (Nwachukwu 2024).

In Wales, the Elections and Elected Bodies (Wales) Act 2024 created a new Democracy and Boundary Commission to coordinate the administration of parliamentary and local elections in Wales, along with any devolved referendums in the country.

1.6. Building inclusive elections

A variety of legislative measures were adopted in 2024 to make elections more inclusive. Tanzania, for example, passed a new act that requires political parties to have a gender and social inclusion policy (Center for Strategic Litigation 2024: 32). Wales made progress towards automatic voter registration, with pilot projects getting under way following changes to the law (Welsh Government 2024). Problems with voter registration in the United Kingdom extend beyond Wales, with an estimated 7–8 million people incorrectly registered or missing entirely from the voter rolls across the UK. Moreover, registration rates are lower among some socio-demographic groups (United Kingdom n.d.). In Canada, the Electoral Participation Act (Bill C-65) was introduced in Parliament in March 2024, providing for two additional days of advance voting and introducing other inclusive voting measures to make voting easier—such as for citizens with disabilities or those living in care institutions (Canada 2024).

1.7. Blocked or delayed reforms

Not all attempted electoral reforms were passed in 2024, as various barriers emerged. In Mexico, for example, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador sought to undertake major electoral reforms while in office (2018–2024). In February 2024 he announced a package of 20 proposed reforms (18 constitutional and 2 legal), which included plans to elect electoral judges and members of the National Electoral Institute (INE) by popular vote; to restructure the INE by reducing the size of its General Council, changing its functions and eliminating local electoral bodies; and to change the electoral system by removing seats allocated by proportional representation and reducing the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (López 2024).

In response to these reform proposals, tens of thousands of demonstrators protested in cities across Mexico and abroad in a ‘march for democracy’ (Marentes 2024). The legislature was also strongly opposed to the proposed amendments, and the president was unable to implement them before the June 2024 elections.

However, the Morena party and its allies secured a supermajority in Congress after the elections, which enabled the approval of constitutional amendments that introduced the election of judges (including electoral magistrates) by popular vote and changes to term limits for the Federal Electoral Tribunal to coincide with presidential elections (Ballesteros and O’Donohue 2024). These changes were adopted as part of a broader judicial reform (included in the package announced in February 2024), which was promulgated in September 2024 by then-President López Obrador, weeks before he was succeeded by President Claudia Sheinbaum.

In India, the High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections, chaired by a former president, published a high-profile report on the ‘One Nation, One Election’ approach to Indian elections. The report recommended aligning the electoral cycles of the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the national parliament) and state legislative assemblies in India. Prime Minister Modi has been a proponent of the idea, and there has been support from the Election Commission of India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (Yadav 2024) argued that synchronized elections would result in reduced costs and potential savings through the economies of scale that could be achieved. Critics of the proposal argued that the move would give more power to the prime minister, weaken the federal government structure and limit states’ rights in the country. However, implementation would require constitutional amendments, a two-thirds majority in parliament and ratification by at least half of India’s states (The Economic Times 2024).

Some proposed changes were blocked by courts in 2024. In Germany, for example, the electoral law for Bundestag elections passed by the so-called traffic light coalition in 2023, introduced without opposition support, was challenged in the Constitutional Court in 2024 (Breton 2024). The Court ruled in June that the reform was partly unconstitutional, as the requirement of the law that a party must meet an electoral threshold of 5 per cent of the votes in parliament breached the principles of electoral equality and equal opportunity for parties (Bleckmann 2024).

Elsewhere, proposed legislative changes were blocked by a lack of technical capacity. In South Sudan, for example, elections scheduled for December 2024 were postponed for two years. The government said that more time was needed to develop the legal framework for a permanent constitution, undertake a census and register political parties (Al Jazeera 2024). Meanwhile, the bicameral parliament passed a new electoral law that includes a provision (article 82, section 2) to declare any election invalid if it is not in line with the law.

1.8. Lessons learned and recommendations

The year 2024 saw a flurry of electoral reforms around the world which are likely to have lasting effects on future elections. Inevitably, the reforms will have a mixture of outcomes. These reforms rarely enjoyed broad consensus, however. Problems included electoral laws being passed unilaterally, incumbents ignoring carefully crafted agreements and legislation being passed at the last minute, which put pressure on electoral management.

Fault often lay with those proposing the reforms. In several contexts, there was strong evidence that reforms were introduced to consolidate the power of incumbents. One tactic that autocrats used in an effort to win elections was to gain control of the courts responsible for adjudicating on electoral petitions. In such cases, consensus was not the aim; the goal was, rather, to eliminate opportunities for electoral justice.

Consensus is also difficult to achieve in contexts where there are existing societal conflicts. In those contexts, debates about electoral law reflect wider debates about the jurisdiction of different levels of government, as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia.

Despite these challenges, several examples of good practices could be identified. In the early stages of 2024, for example, electoral law reform in Mozambique (see Box 1.1) was marked by political consensus, as opposing political factions came together to develop a shared agenda for reform. Cross-party working committees within parliamentary institutions provided a key forum for this collaboration. These proposals were ultimately rejected, however, setting in motion a series of events involving a disputed election, violence and loss of life.

Two general lessons can be taken from 2024:

1. The media, civil society, political opposition and the international community should focus their attention on electoral reform, as reforms can have important consequences for the conduct of elections and, in some cases, serve as a means of autocratization.
2. Finding ways to develop political consensus remains a key challenge. In 2024 an international initiative offered a step forward. After wide consultation, the Global Network for Securing Electoral Integrity (2024) published some key principles for how electoral reform can be undertaken. These principles state that (a) political consensus building is foundational to any electoral reform process; (b) electoral reform processes should be transparent, inclusive, and informed by evidence and a long-term vision; (c) adequate time frames and resources are essential for a viable and democratic electoral reform process; and (d) clear accountability structures are essential for electoral reform processes.

These principles could serve as useful guidelines for electoral reform stakeholders in 2025 and beyond.

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Vasil Vashchanka

2.1. Introduction

Electoral malpractice is essentially the antithesis of electoral integrity. If we define electoral integrity as a set of principles that elections must abide by in order to uphold democratic ideals (see the Introduction; James and Garnett 2025), electoral malpractice can be described as a set of actions which flout these principles. In other words, malpractice refers to acts which aim to secure an electoral advantage by means that are incompatible with electoral integrity.

While the term ‘electoral malpractice’ readily evokes images of stuffed ballot boxes and falsified tally sheets, elections can be manipulated in a number of ways. Sarah Birch (2011) offered an authoritative typology, distinguishing between three kinds of manipulation: (a) manipulation of rules, which targets the legal framework for elections by introducing regulatory obstacles that get in the way of fair competition; (b) manipulation of voters, which seeks to alter the free expression of the electors’ will by illicit means—such as bribery or coercion; and, last but not least, (c) manipulation of votes, which takes place at the ballot box—and during the subsequent aggregation of voting results. The different kinds of malpractice are, of course, not mutually exclusive, and some manipulative actions involve elements of more than one kind of foul play.

By definition, electoral malpractice affects one or more elements of electoral integrity. It can undermine the competitive nature of elections by crafting eligibility criteria to exclude opposition candidates or by rejecting nominations on spurious grounds. Opposition supporters may be disenfranchised through manipulation of the voter register or a failure to supply sufficient numbers of ballots to selected polling stations, diminishing participation. Partisan bias and other manipulation of the media undercuts deliberation. By colluding in the fraudulent tabulation of voting results, electoral authorities abrogate adjudication.

Electoral malpractice is usually a covert activity, and allegations of electoral malpractice are difficult to prove. This makes it an even more troubling problem for democracy because those seeking to manipulate elections may be able to use such tactics undetected. False claims of electoral malpractice may also be made by opponents to discredit the result of an election. Nonetheless, it is essential for electoral stakeholders, policymakers and international organizations to be vigilant concerning possible cases of electoral malpractice.

This chapter will highlight examples of allegations of electoral malpractice from 2024, using the analytical framework mentioned above. It will flag potential trends and conclude with several lessons from what was an eventful year for elections. These observations are aimed at enriching the conversation rather than reaching any final conclusions. Large as it is, a one-year sample is still only a snapshot of processes unfolding over longer timespans. As with other topics taken up in this volume, the elections super cycle of 2024 has provided a powerful impetus for further reflection and analysis.

2.2. Electoral malpractice in 2024

The electoral super cycle demonstrated that electoral malpractice remains a problem requiring vigilance and scrutiny. When it comes to manifestations of malpractice, most issues that came to the fore in 2024 are hardly new. As we show below, the toolbox of electoral malpractice—and the corresponding threat to electoral integrity—is abundant and continues to expand. Since this report focuses on countries whose democratic practice exceeds a certain threshold, we make very few references to elections in autocratic environments. Needless to say, in the absence of meaningful safeguards for electoral integrity, the repertoire of electoral malpractice in autocracies is naturally broad.

2.3. Changes in institutions raised concerns about electoral integrity

In 2024 several governments were accused of making self-serving changes to electoral laws ahead of upcoming elections. In the United Kingdom, the 2024 general election was held using a compulsory photographic identification system. This was the first time that this system had been implemented, following the introduction of the 2022 Elections Act. Critics argued that the associated changes to electoral laws would lead to lower turnout among some sections of the population, particularly young people, who were less likely to vote for the incumbent government. Academic studies showed that many people were unable to vote as a result (James and Clark 2025 forthcoming) and indicated that voters for the incumbent party were more likely to hold valid photo identification than supporters of other parties (Fieldhouse et al. 2024).

In India, a new law adopted in 2023 altered the three-member committee responsible for appointing election commissioners to include the union home minister instead of the chief justice. Opposition parties criticized the committee’s appointments, claiming that they were closely aligned with the government (Al Jazeera 2024; The Economic Times 2024; International IDEA 2024a; Rajagopal 2024). The president of the Indian National Congress accused the government of the ‘systematic decimation of independent institutions’ after a senior official resigned ahead of the general election (Al Jazeera 2024). Two new election commissioners were appointed by a three-member committee comprising Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Union Minister Amit Shah and the leader of the Indian National Congress in the Lok Sabha, Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury (International IDEA 2024a). However, concerns continued to be raised about subsequent appointments (International IDEA 2024a). Opposition parties also claimed that non-contested elections were facilitated under pressure in some constituencies, where opposition nominations were rejected or withdrawn (Sharma 2024).

A proposed overhaul of Mexico’s National Electoral Institute (INE) in 2023 brought protesters into the streets and challenges to the Supreme Court (Al Jazeera 2023). These ‘Plan B’ reforms were eventually blocked (International IDEA 2023; Reuters 2023). However, ‘Plan C’ reforms were proposed in 2024 which, it was argued, would reduce the capacity of the INE and introduce the popular election of judges. The governing party, Morena, responded that the reforms were motivated by a concern about the costs to the Mexican people of institutions such as the INE and denied that the reforms threatened democracy (Deslandes 2024).

In Georgia, the ruling party was accused of consolidating control over the appointment of the Central Election Commission (CEC) (ODIHR 2024). Reforms passed included a new decision-making process, the removal of the position of the opposition-nominated deputy CEC chairperson and a modified selection procedure for CEC members (ODIHR 2024: 5–6). This effectively undercut the independence of the electoral body, which has multiple levers of influence on the process.

The effects of institutional tweaks may not be visible in the short term, but they may threaten electoral integrity in the longer run. The manipulation of rules can also relate to other aspects of elections. In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele spearheaded efforts to reduce the number of seats in the legislature and proposed the consolidation of municipalities into larger districts, a move which, according to the opposition, was designed to reduce smaller parties’ political participation (Renteria 2023). In Mozambique, amendments promulgated less than seven weeks before election day stripped district courts of their power to order recounts of ballots or annual election results (see Chapter 1: Electoral reform). These rules were changed after the 2023 municipal elections, when several district court decisions to rerun elections were overturned by the Constitutional Council. Observers claimed that this diminished the role of the courts in addressing potential violations (IRI 2024).

2.4. Voter manipulation was often present—in both new and traditional forms—but not always effective

All electoral campaigns seek to sway voters, but some forms of manipulation are deemed undue influence, which stands in the way of the free formation or expression of voters’ preferences (Birch 2011). With respect to the expression of preferences, voters can be prevented from casting a ballot for the candidate or party of their choice by coercion or inducement. The former is more characteristic of authoritarian environments, occurring less frequently in democracies, but international observers noted this issue in Georgia (ODIHR 2024). Inducement, on the other hand, frequently takes place in democratic elections, in the form of vote buying (Cruz, Keefer and Labonne 2015).

As one of the most common forms of electoral malpractice, vote buying is available to both incumbents and challengers. In the toolbox of electoral mischief, it is arguably one of the more ‘benign’ instruments—particularly compared with intimidation and electoral violence. It also serves a distributive function for communities which may otherwise be neglected in resource distribution. But its long-term effects are far from positive, and its corrosive influence on electoral integrity and accountability is rightfully noted by researchers and observers alike (Stokes 2007; Joseph and Vashchanka 2022).

In 2024, vote-buying accusations again surfaced in a variety of contexts: International IDEA’s Global Election Monitor recorded 17 elections that saw allegations of fraud, including vote buying and financial irregularities (Asplund and Tucker 2025).³ In Indonesia, citizen observers expressed concerns about candidates’ ‘unethical conduct’ and ‘money politics’ (ANFREL 2024: 12). Prior research in Indonesia showed that, in a crowded field with narrow winning margins, where access to the media is challenging and the electoral system promotes intraparty competition, many candidates see vote buying as a viable campaign strategy (Muhtadi 2019). The lack of accountability for such practices created a further incentive for inducements (ANFREL 2024: 12). Observers also questioned the distribution of social assistance (bansos) by the outgoing President, Joko Widodo, whose son was a vice-presidential candidate, noting that during the campaign period the President handed out bansos personally in closely contested areas (ANFREL 2024: 7).

Widespread vote buying also reportedly played a role in the ruling party’s resounding victory in the Maldives. Allegations of large cash handouts proliferated, and there were claims that state resources may have also been channelled to buy votes (Daily Mirror 2024). In the Dominican Republic, political and civil society actors alleged that the governing party used public resources for electoral purposes, including social plans and bonuses, the distribution of food rations and other goods, and the irregular allocation of pensions (OAS 2024b: 26).

Vote buying frequently indicates the presence of systemic issues, such as clientelist politics, where electoral loyalties are won by the provision of individual or community goods and favours, rather than programmatic policy considerations (Birch 2011: 93–95). A vexing question posed by such contexts is, How is change possible? For example, what circumstances could lead to a shift in voters’ attitudes and a rejection of patronage politics? Ghana supplied an example where, despite alleged vote buying (Asima 2024), the ruling party suffered a heavy electoral defeat (Adom 2024).

Another country which stood out for change in the 2024 super cycle was Sri Lanka. In both the presidential and the parliamentary elections, Sri Lanka’s voters largely abandoned the established political parties associated with political patronage and corruption (Peiris 2022) and gave a chance to a political force which had not yet been tested in government. Vote buying and ‘treating’ electors to food and drinks were still reported by observers (PAFFREL 2024), albeit on a smaller scale than previously, but the outcome was a resounding victory for the candidates who promised a different kind of politics. These elections were the first after the popular uprising of 2022, which ousted the previous president (EU EOM 2024a). It remains to be seen whether they will mark a paradigm shift.

When it comes to the formation of voters’ preferences, social media and online platforms have opened up new possibilities for the manipulation of election-related information. Birch (2011: 91) argued that manipulation of preference formation is primarily a ‘wholesale’ activity that takes place in the media and public spaces with a broad reach, in contrast to manipulation of preference expression, which is ‘retail’ and targets voters individually. This distinction no longer holds in the online information space, where voters can be targeted individually. Importantly, this form of malpractice is available not only to incumbents and opposition parties but also to foreign actors. In 2024 an election was annulled for the first time—in Romania—principally due to concerns about this kind of manipulation (Financial Times 2024; see also Chapter 5: The information environment around elections).

2.5. Fraud at the ballot box captured headlines and led to public outcries

Manipulation of votes—either when ballots are cast or when they are counted and tabulated—carries the greatest risks, since it can be detected more easily than other kinds of malpractice, and exposing it can deal a heavy blow to electoral legitimacy (Birch 2011). Still, reports of this malfeasance of ‘last resort’ repeatedly emerged in 2024, capturing news headlines. In Venezuela, the opposition claimed that the country’s unpopular president was able to cling to power through the wholesale falsification of election results (Buschschlüter 2024a). With the independence of the electoral management body (EMB) long written off, the official election result handing the victory to President Nicolás Maduro was not backed by polling station data, which was never released, and which the opposition said confirmed its decisive win (Euronews 2024a). There were also strong concerns raised in Pakistan (see Box 2.1).

Electoral legitimacy was very much at stake in highly disputed elections, such as Georgia’s, where the opposition cried foul (Euronews 2024b). Allegations of massive malfeasance at the ballot box in Georgia, however, could not be confirmed by international observers, who rather emphasized the uneven playing field in the lead-up to the elections (Agenda.ge 2024; NDI 2024; ODIHR 2024). The Election Commission rejected claims of meddling with the results (Sauer and Agence France-Presse 2024). Allegations of rigging were also not corroborated by observers in Mauritania (Mohamed 2024). In Mozambique, on the other hand, problems with the transparency of ballot counts and potential irregularities with vote tabulation were flagged already in the preliminary observer statements (EU EOM 2024b; IRI 2024).

Alleged or real, electoral fraud is a potent trigger of public discontent. In Mauritania, the opposition accused the EMB of deception and called for peaceful demonstrations, which turned violent in some areas (Mohamed 2024). Post-election protests also engulfed Mozambique and were met with a heavy-handed response by the government (Schwikowski 2024). In Venezuela, the crackdown against protesters was extensive and brutal (Human Rights Watch 2024; see also Box 2.2). In Georgia, post-election demonstrations subsided, only to be reignited again by the government’s inept reversal of policy direction (Fouda 2024).

2.6. Conclusions

Addressing malpractice should remain a high priority for election practitioners. This task is arguably becoming more challenging due not only to the inherently clandestine nature of malfeasance but also to its sophistication as well as competing (and vocal) claims about its prevalence. On the one hand, the existence of space for such claims is already a marker of democratic contestation. In authoritarian regimes, where electoral malpractice is rampant, bringing it to public attention is often impossible, and international observers doing so may find themselves uninvited (see Box 2.2). On the other hand, it is hardly a cause for celebration when political actors publicly question electoral integrity as a matter of partisan strategy, without evidence and with scant regard for the consequences. A strategy that claims that a loss can only be due to fraud damages electoral integrity and deepens polarization.

Impunity for electoral malpractice erodes democratic institutions. When revelations of electoral malpractice trigger legal consequences, this could potentially wipe out the gains obtained through malpractice and serve as a deterrent (e.g. when an election is annulled due to the winning candidate’s conviction for vote buying). The absence of accountability creates a false sense of security and encourages wrongdoing while systemic crises are brewing. The loss of electoral legitimacy in Bangladesh due to the opposition’s boycott did not trigger the protests which ultimately led to the ousting of the prime minister, but it certainly contributed to the public’s frustration with the entire political system (Sajjad 2024). Among other factors, anti-government protests in Mozambique were exacerbated by the lack of response to allegations of electoral fraud (ICG 2024).

At the same time, adjudicating elections tainted by electoral malpractice will continue to be challenging. The extent of mischief will always be contested, as, for example, in Georgia (Kirby 2024), and its effect on the outcome of an election may be difficult to gauge, particularly when it comes to manipulation of rules and voters. Annulment of an election is a drastic measure, which should not be taken lightly. The decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania to cancel the first round of the presidential election was criticized by both candidates who made it to the second round (Ross and Popoviciu 2024) and may have set an awkward precedent. Should it be assumed that all voters exposed to disinformation online no longer have agency to freely form their preferences? What is the threshold for such manipulation to be deemed to have had a decisive impact on the election outcome? Dealing with the consequences of electoral malpractice poses difficult dilemmas.

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Gudlaug Olafsdottir

3.1. Introduction

A significant number of the national elections held in 2024 were marked by some form of election-related violence (Asplund and Tucker 2025).⁴ Election-related violence hence poses a substantial threat to democracy worldwide. It can come in many forms and take place at varying points in the electoral process.

Electoral violence is generally understood as coercive actions aiming to influence the process or outcome of an election (Birch, Daxecker and Höglund 2020: 4). The types of coercive actions vary, ranging from physical attacks to intimidation. Election-related violence—and the threat thereof—is not only a serious humanitarian concern and an inherent breach of the democratic principle of peaceful electoral contestation; it also risks severely undermining the integrity of elections. While it is difficult to assess from available data whether election-related violence is increasing year-on-year, the threat of violence remains a salient challenge to the integrity of elections. The Global Election Monitor identified election-related violence resulting in bodily harm in 22 of 54 national elections but does not measure the severity, extent or number of instances of election-related violence (Asplund and Tucker 2025).

In summarizing the various forms of electoral violence that were witnessed in 2024, this chapter traces the links between violence and electoral integrity and provides an overview of actions that can be taken to mitigate its occurrence.

3.2. Why electoral violence matters

Election-related violence causes severe harm. The humanitarian implications of such violence are noteworthy in their own right, with election-related deaths, injuries and psychological harm affecting individuals across the globe. Besides contradicting one of the core principles of democracy—peaceful electoral competition (Dahl 1989: 233)—election-related violence is also detrimental to electoral integrity, through multiple mechanisms.

First, electoral violence undermines the competitive nature of elections. Violence against politicians risks skewing the electoral playing field by limiting the pool of candidates that stand for election. Violence—or the threat thereof—risks hindering targeted electoral candidates from running for elections (Shortell 2024; Duque-Salazar 2025). At its extreme, violence can remove candidates from the electoral process through outright murder (Gutiérrez-Romero and Iturbe 2024).

Second, violence hinders participation. Violence targeting voters prevents electoral results from reflecting the true preferences of the population. Electoral violence reduces turnout (van Baalen 2024). It is often used to demobilize or displace voters (Laakso 2007: 228; Rauschenbach and Paula 2019), resulting in skewed participation. Moreover, widespread violence can lead governments to curtail electoral liberties, limiting the freedom to campaign or organize rallies. At times, governments employ such restrictions as a political tool to suppress the opposition (Birch, Daxecker and Höglund 2020).

Third, violence impedes deliberation. For example, violence carried out by political parties can polarize the populace (LeBas 2006). Violence and threats targeting politicians, voters, campaigners or others engaged in political debate can hamper free dialogue and the exchange of ideas. Such violence can induce fear and anger, hindering citizens’ likelihood of seeking out political information and forming political opinions (Söderström 2018). It risks silencing certain voices and amplifying others. Political discourse focusing on security issues around elections also risks shifting the focus away from electoral malpractices and impeding constructive debate (Jenkins 2020). Moreover, the fear of electoral violence risks eroding the public’s belief in democracy as a desirable form of governance (von Borzyskowski, Daxecker and Khun 2022; Fjelde and Olafsdottir 2024).

Fourth, violence hampers adjudication. It can impede the implementation of electoral law as well as demands for electoral justice. Violence against election workers or electoral institutions risks preventing them from upholding electoral law consistently. Moreover, violence sometimes follows as a response to mobilization against incumbents following reports about electoral malpractices (von Borzyskowski 2019). Hence, protests against overt breaches of electoral law can spur repression by heavy-handed leaders against opponents demanding electoral justice. In turn, such violence limits the ability of citizens, parties and civil society organizations to seek electoral justice following serious violations of electoral integrity.

Moreover, violence towards election workers and electoral institutions risks deterring individuals from participating as election workers (Anderman 2024), posing challenges to the administration of elections. As such, electoral violence has a multitude of detrimental effects on democratic development and electoral integrity.

3.3. Patterns of election-related violence in 2024

Electoral violence took many different forms in 2024. Below, I summarize the main trends by describing five categories of violence based on the perpetrators and the targets. These are not mutually exclusive, and, as the examples illustrate, there is some overlap between them.

Targeted attacks against political candidates

Elections in 2024 were marked by varied types and degrees of violence, including a surge in targeted attacks. For example, there were several high-profile assassination attempts against political candidates. Notably, Donald Trump was targeted twice while campaigning for the presidency in the United States (Pilkington 2024). In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico survived an assassination attempt in May, following the presidential election (Simon and Schmitz 2024). In South Korea, Lee Jae-Myung, the head of the main opposition party, was stabbed in the neck prior to the parliamentary election, in April (Park and Shin 2024). In Mongolia, one of the district party heads of the opposition Democratic Party, B. Bayanmunkh, was beaten to death (AFP 2024). Moreover, 12 councillors in South Africa were killed in the run-up to the national and provincial elections (Small 2024: 71).

There were isolated incidents of violence—less severe in nature—in France and Germany against politicians and party members. For example, Prisca Thevenot, spokeswoman for the French Government and candidate for the Ensemble alliance, was attacked by a group while putting up campaign posters with a party activist and a deputy, who both ended up in hospital (Jeantet 2024). In Germany, there was a surge in assaults on political candidates and campaigners leading up to the elections for the European Parliament (Marsh and Abnett 2024).

Attacks on politicians—even if they are thwarted—pose a great threat to the integrity of an election by inciting fear among current and prospective candidates, potentially discouraging individuals from running for office, which, in turn, affects which groups are represented. Attacks on politicians undermine the principle of free and fair contestation, and politically motivated violence negatively affects the climate for constructive deliberation (Birch, Daxecker and Höglund 2020). Where there is a well-functioning judicial system and democratic government, violent incidents against politicians are prosecuted, with the legal system serving as a deterrent to possible future offences.

Violence by illicit armed groups

Electoral violence frequently involves criminal groups or non-state armed actors seeking to bolster their political influence, develop mutually beneficial relationships with politicians or disrupt elections (Turnbull 2021; Fjelde and Höglund 2022; Gutiérrez-Romero and Iturbe 2024). In Mexico, for instance, drug cartels regularly target political candidates, aiming to exert power over local politicians (Gutiérrez-Romero and Iturbe 2024). The targeting of candidates was prominent during Mexico’s 2024 general election, which CNN called the country’s ‘bloodiest election in history’, with at least 34 political candidates assassinated by criminal groups (Stephen Hu et al. 2024). In addition to the assassination or attempted assassination of candidates, these groups also carried out kidnappings and attacked politicians’ family members, campaign staff and electoral infrastructure (Asmann 2024). In total, 749 victims of violence—including 231 who were assassinated—were recorded in the months leading up to the election (Gonzalez 2024: 6). The violence caused some candidates to drop out of the race due to fear for their lives (Animal Político n.d.; Shortell 2024).

In Pakistan, some political parties collaborate with violent actors to influence the outcome of elections (Siddiqui 2022). Moreover, there are armed groups active in parts of the country that use violence to disrupt elections. In Balochistan, for instance, a separatist militant group carried out more than two dozen attacks during the week leading up to the 2024 general election, causing the caretaker minister to declare 5,028 polling stations ‘sensitive’ (Baloch 2024). In two other incidents in the same region, explosions targeting candidate offices killed at least 30 people (Tyab 2024). In another incident, in the Nushki district, a grenade was launched at the election commission’s office (Akhtar and Khan 2024). Moreover, multiple bombs were set off on election day, killing at least nine people (Hussain 2024). The presence of illicit armed groups implies a significant security threat around elections, as these groups often take advantage of the high profile of elections to strengthen their own standing locally (Matanock and Staniland 2018). Unless the government regains a monopoly on the use of force, the risk of electoral violence remains, negatively affecting both contestation and participation.

Government-sponsored violence

When it comes to electoral violence, governments are sometimes the perpetrators rather than the victims. For example, governments have frequently been implicated in the perpetration of electoral violence in an effort to maintain their hold on power (Straus and Taylor 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus 2017). This type of violence may take place prior to an election to limit the ability of the opposition to mobilize or in response to anti-government mobilization spurred by claims of fraudulent elections.

Examples in 2024 were seen in both Mozambique and Indonesia. In Mozambique, anti-government activists, international and national observer groups, national democracy watchdog groups and other civil society bodies criticized the general elections, held in October. Two important opposition members, Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe, were murdered while the opposition was preparing to challenge the electoral results (Mangwiro 2024). The ensuing protests were met with mass arrests of protesters as well as the use of both live ammunition and tear gas by police, with the death toll over the course of the post-election protests reaching 358 between 21 October 2024 and 16 March 2025 (Amnesty International 2024b; International IDEA 2024a; Platforma Electoral Decide 2025).

In Indonesia, there were allegations of security agencies using excessive force in response to demonstrations organized in opposition to incumbents and proposed changes to regional election laws in the summer of 2024. A report by Amnesty International (2025) claimed that there had been 344 arrests, which included approximately 150 physical injuries and cases of incommunicado detention. In at least one case, a video circulated of excessive police force against unarmed protesters in Badung, West Java (Amnesty International 2024c).

Government repression also took place before the general election in Bangladesh, in January 2024. Leading up to the election, the electoral commission and police targeted the opposition, limiting campaign activities and arresting 27,507 opposition members on questionable grounds (IRI and NDI 2024: 9). Similarly, in Georgia, opposition supporters and anti-government activists faced intimidation, harassment and crackdowns by the government around the parliamentary and presidential elections (AP 2024b; France 24 2024).

These examples illustrate the ways that governments misuse their power to crack down on the opposition. Government repression of the opposition hinders fair contestation and participation, and it prevents opponents from demanding electoral justice. These dynamics highlight the danger that governments can use judicial tools and the state security apparatus to undermine electoral integrity.

Clashes between partisans

At times, heightened tensions around elections lead members and supporters of different political parties to clash with one another due to the high stakes of winning or losing the elections or holding seats in parliament. In the Maldives, for example, a fight broke out between rival party members in parliament over the approval of four new proposed cabinet ministers. One of the parliamentarians went to hospital because of a head wound (Rahaman Sarkar 2024). While the South African general election in 2024 was largely non-violent, isolated clashes between rival party supporters took place, leading to the death of two supporters of the uMkhonto we Sizwe party (European Union Election Expert Mission 2024: 25).

In countries where political parties mobilize voters along ethnic or religious lines, there is a risk that increased intergroup antagonism and polarization could lead to violence (Wilkinson 2004; Mueller 2011; ACLED 2024). In India, for instance, there were indications of increased sectarian violence following the release of the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections, as the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party failed to gain a majority (The Hindu 2024). In Maharashtra, candidates’ vehicles were attacked, polling stations were vandalized, political workers attacked each other, and death threats were made against rival candidates (The Economic Times 2024; Human Rights Watch 2024).Where partisan identity is salient, parties sometimes pit their supporters against each other. For example, rival party supporters clashed both before and after the elections in Bangladesh (IRI and NDI 2024: 11, 22). A leader of the governing party called upon his supporters to attack supporters of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party if the former saw the latter engaging in boycotts (IRI and NDI 2024: 11). Heightened tensions between groups, leading to outbreaks of violence, undermine participation and deliberation, as the political sides cease to engage in respectful dialogue. In addition, security threats risk deterring voters—particularly from marginalized groups—from turning out to vote.

Violence against election workers and electoral institutions

At times, electoral bodies are targeted by enraged protesters amid allegations of electoral misconduct. In Madagascar, for example, the opposition mobilized post-election protests over electoral irregularities. The protests turned violent, and two buildings of the electoral commission were burned down (Amnesty International 2024a). Similarly, in Ghana, supporters of President-elect John Mahama attacked public property, including setting fire to two buildings of the electoral commission in protest over delays in declaring the results for some parliamentary seats (Naadi and Rukanga 2024). Polling stations are also frequently targeted, such as in Manipur, India, where armed mobs tried to take over polling stations in the midst of interethnic violence (Reuters 2024). Such events pose a threat to those working in electoral administration, as well as to electoral integrity.

Violence—or even threats of violence—risks influencing electoral administration. In the USA, threats of violence against election workers have led to high turnover in election personnel, posing challenges to the administration of elections (Anderman 2024) (see Chapter 6: Electoral management hurdles and malfunctions). Over time, there is a risk that the impact of such threats will be compounded. In the case of the USA, the number of people bringing weapons to polling stations has increased. Although these weapons have generally not been used, their presence poses a threat which in itself can be a powerful driver of fear (Anderman 2024).

3.4. Lessons learned and policy recommendations

This section discusses prevention strategies adapted to each of the five types of electoral violence. To mitigate election-related violence, it is essential to get at the root causes of each type of violence.

1. Strengthening the rule of law and providing security are essential to combating violence by illicit groups and targeted violence against politicians.

Targeted violence against politicians or election workers may require efforts by security forces to seek out better intelligence on threats and provide more protection to individuals and institutions that are at risk. For violence by illicit armed groups, however, the core issue is the existence and strength of criminal groups and militias. Where strong illicit armed groups remain in place, there remains a risk that these actors could engage in election-related violence (Mueller 2011: 103).

Electoral violence is frequently a symptom of weak rule of law, where a proliferation of armed actors and a lack of accountability establishes fertile ground for violence to take root (Höglund 2009). Addressing this weakness requires investments to bolster the rule of law and the security system more generally and to ensure neutrality.

1. Institutional constraints, domestic watchdogs and international judicial processes can address the risk of violence by political elites

The issues of politicized security forces and impunity are central to the occurrence of government-perpetrated violence. An independent judiciary, strong constraints on the executive and a vibrant civil society are important factors that can mitigate this type of violence (Mueller 2011; Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014). Given that this type of violence is carried out by those in power, who can operate with impunity within their own borders, international actors can contribute by enhancing pressure and accountability (Bjork and Goebertus 2011). For example, after the widespread electoral violence in Kenya following the 2007 elections, the International Criminal Court—alongside domestic efforts—played a role in mitigating further violence spurred by politicians (Coradetti 2015).

1. Strong and autonomous electoral management bodies reduce the risk of violence

Many instances of electoral violence, particularly between supporters of opposing parties or against electoral institutions, stem from allegations of electoral fraud. According to Tanja Hollstein (2024) at the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the relatively peaceful dynamics around the 2024 elections in South Africa, despite numerous risk factors for severe violence, was attributable to the independence of the electoral commission. The presence of autonomous electoral authorities induces greater trust in elections, which is also likely to limit the use of violence towards electoral bodies and their employees. The importance of autonomous electoral management bodies for reducing the risk of violence is corroborated by empirical research (Ruiz-Rufino and Birch 2020). Moreover, technical assistance ‘which actively tries to improve election quality through financial, technical, and logistical help, hiring and training of election officials, voter registration, and voter education long before election-day’ has been shown to reduce the risk of election-related violence (von Borzyskowski 2019: 124), further emphasizing the importance of the international community’s provision of broad technical support to strengthen the capacity and credibility of electoral management bodies.

1. Addressing polarization reduces the incentives for violence

Since stark polarization increases the threat of violence, addressing polarization should diminish that threat. In the USA, for example, civil society actors took action to prevent electoral violence by reducing polarization. They collaborated with community leaders to reduce the spread of disinformation and hostile intergroup narratives, focusing instead on maintaining unity (Yousef 2024). While reducing polarization is a long-term task, ensuring that community leaders have the tools to identify and rebuff polarizing messages enhances their ability to address escalating polarization around elections.

1. Interparty codes of conduct attempt to mitigate parties’ fomentation of violence

Breaking cycles of violence is difficult, although progress has been made in some cases. For example, several countries that have previously been affected by significant electoral violence experienced relatively calm elections in 2024. The elections in the Dominican Republic, for instance, were relatively peaceful compared with previous elections despite a prior propensity for violence, with all elections between 1990 and 2004 marked by violence that resulted in civilian fatalities (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The reduction in violence can, in part, be attributed to political candidates’ signing of an electoral ethics pact in 2000, where they promised to refrain from violence and exercise mutual respect (Pichardo 2024). While there have still been fatalities related to elections in the country since then, suggesting that such a pact may be insufficient when it comes to eliminating election-related violence altogether, there is less electoral violence overall than in the past (Pichardo 2024).

Other countries have implemented similar pacts and maintained peaceful conduct. Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary election in Uzbekistan and the 2024 general election in Namibia, for example, all parties formally committed to abide by a code of conduct that called on them to refrain from intimidation and coercion (OSCE 2024; Petersen 2024). This was also the case ahead of the European Parliamentary elections, when supranational European political parties signed a commitment which explicitly rejected the dissemination of narratives promoting violence (International IDEA 2024b). Such commitments may help prevent electoral violence between political parties and their supporters.⁵

3.5. Conclusions

The year 2024 stood out from previous years in terms of the amount and severity of violence targeting political candidates, not least in more established democracies (Keating 2024). This category of violence has been less prominent in recent decades, and the levels of violence in more consolidated democracies in 2024 coincided with rising concerns of democratic backsliding and deep-seated polarization within the contexts where the violence occurred (Dhabhai 2024). This rising threat requires a shift in prevention strategies and focus, which instead of primarily focusing on intergroup clashes, violence by illicit groups and government repression—areas that have traditionally received much more attention within academic literature and democracy promotion circles—builds on insights regarding prevention of targeted attacks on politicians, including in more democratic contexts. It is difficult to assess the wider trends in election-related violence in 2024, but it nevertheless remained an issue in a variety of electoral contexts and continues to pose a tangible challenge to electoral integrity.

However, the elections of 2024 are also noteworthy for providing examples of historically significant peaceful electoral turnover. Botswana, for example, saw the first turnover of power since its independence in 1966, and it was entirely peaceful (Onyango-Obbo 2024). Similarly, the voters in Mauritius rejected the governing Alliance Lepep in a landslide, with the opposition Alliance of Change winning 60 out of the 62 elected seats, with no violence (Journal of Democracy n.d.). Sri Lanka also experienced a peaceful transition of power, which Weerakoon (2024) suggested was thanks in part to the fact that the opposition candidate who won refrained from using inflammatory language during the campaign. Onyango-Obbo (2024) attributes the positive trends in sub-Saharan Africa to a reduction in political pessimism and radicalization, as well as generational shifts, where young people are more focused on programmatic issues than their elders. As such, the locations, threats and dynamics of electoral violence might be changing; in turn, the strategies for preventing it must evolve accordingly.

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Julia Thalin

4.1. Introduction

Gender equality and women’s political participation are fundamental human rights and preconditions for inclusive and sustainable democracy. However, despite women’s increased engagement in political life over the past 30 years, progress remains uneven and alarmingly slow. The gender gap persists across all levels and spheres of decision making, and, at the current pace, it is estimated that it will take 134 years to close this gap (World Economic Forum 2024).

Although the 2024 super-cycle election year offered a unique opportunity to advance women’s political participation and representation globally (World Economic Forum 2024), the overall developments appear predominantly negative. While 22 countries made progress in increasing women’s legislative representation, 27 experienced a decline (IPU 2025a). Globally, the share of female members of parliament changed only slightly, from 26.8 per cent to 27.2 per cent, indicating overall stagnation in women’s representation (IPU 2025b). Similarly, only 5 of the 33 countries that held presidential elections in 2024 elected female presidents. The reasons for this are complex and contextual, involving formal barriers such as inadequate legal frameworks and informal ones like harmful norms and stereotypes. However, violence against women in elections (VAWE) stands out as a particularly significant and widespread challenge.

4.2. Defining violence against women in elections

Electoral violence can be understood as a subtype of political violence, distinguished by its timing (occurring during the electoral cycle) and often by its motive (to influence an electoral outcome) (Höglund 2009).⁶ However, it is increasingly recognized that gender matters to our understanding of the specific motives, forms and impacts of violence against women in elections. While electoral violence affects both men and women, violence against female election officials, candidates and elected leaders, among others, often stems from efforts to reinforce traditional gender roles, typically manifests in sexist or sexualized forms, and frequently deters women from participating in political life (see, for example, Bardall 2011; NDI 2018; Schneider and Carroll 2019; Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo 2020). Women who face discrimination on grounds other than gender—such as ethnicity, disability or sexual orientation—are often disproportionately affected. Recognizing intersectionality is thus crucial to understanding how women’s intersecting identities can lead to overlapping forms of discrimination that amplify the risk and impact of violence (ODIHR 2022). Moreover, understanding VAWE as an intersection of electoral violence and gender-based violence means that any individual transgressing dominant gender roles, norms or expectations of behaviour may be targeted. While this includes all actors outside the hegemonic male group (i.e. women, but also non-dominant men and gay, queer, non-binary and trans individuals), this chapter focuses specifically on women in all their diversity (Schneider and Carroll 2019; Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo 2020).

Moreover, the forms of violence against women in elections exist on a continuum, encompassing physical, sexual, psychological and digital violence, occurring across private, public and political spaces. The digital dimension of VAWE—encompassing a broad range of technology-facilitated acts and online activities—has become a prevalent and legitimate form of violence, often as harmful as offline manifestations. Technology amplifies and accelerates VAWE, enabling widespread abuse and harassment that can significantly impact women’s electoral participation (NDI 2021; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2023). (For more details on digital aggression targeting women in elections, see Chapter 5: The information environment around elections.)

4.3. Impacts on electoral integrity

VAWE undermines electoral integrity by constituting serious obstacles for women’s equal and meaningful participation, contestation and deliberation. When women are threatened, harassed or attacked for participating in electoral processes, it risks creating chilling effects that deter women collectively from engaging in political roles or contributing to elections as administrators, observers and voters (NDI 2018). The effects are broad and systemic, creating a skewed political playing field where women in all their diversity, already underrepresented in politics, are further disadvantaged. This is true also in cases where violence is not motivated by gender. Violence—which women may experience differently than men—can cause women to disproportionately retreat from public life or refrain from addressing ‘controversial’ issues such as human rights (Bardall, Bjarnegård and Piscopo 2020). Consequently, rather than fostering evidence-informed, rational public debate, hate and intimidation create uneven discourse, silencing voices and undermining deliberation.

4.4. Violence against women in elections in 2024

With systematic data collection on VAWE virtually non-existent and much of this violence going unreported, accurately assessing its true scale and impact remains challenging. Nonetheless, according to International IDEA’s Global Election Monitor, 28 out of 54 elections in 2024 saw instances of gender-based violence, underscoring the persistence of this challenge globally (Asplund and Tucker 2025). Observation reports and media coverage further reveal widespread violence against women in various roles.

Gendered motives

When violence targets women in elections for being women or to enforce traditional gender roles, the motive is inherently gendered. This pattern can be seen worldwide, with violence oftentimes acting as a backlash against women’s growing presence in political life. Although men still constitute the majority of victims of political violence in Mexico (México Evalúa 2024), the 2024 election cycle saw an unprecedented surge in VAWE, coinciding with a record number of women running for office (Calderón 2024; International IDEA 2024). Women in various roles faced targeted threats and attacks designed to delegitimize, silence and exclude them from public and political spaces (International IDEA 2024). While male candidates were more likely to be assassinated, VAWE also escalated to murder, as seen in the killing of Yolanda Sánchez, the first female mayor of Cotija (Buschschlüter 2024).

In the United States, female candidates and election workers also faced rising violence aimed at undermining their participation. A Brennan Center for Justice report found that, among 43 per cent of state legislators who experienced threats, women, people of colour and LGBTQIA+ office holders were disproportionately targeted (Ramachandran et al. 2024). Women of colour and African American candidates faced significantly more hate speech than other candidates (Thakur and Finkel 2024).

Similarly, in Bangladesh, El Salvador, Indonesia and Iran, patriarchal norms and misogynistic beliefs fuelled violence aimed at disrupting women’s participation in politics. In Bangladesh, women candidates faced public insults and threats from male supporters of the ruling party and independent candidates (NDI and IRI 2024). In El Salvador, 135 acts of violence—including physical, psychological, emotional, symbolic and sexual violence—against politically active women were recorded during the presidential and legislative elections, with an additional 96 incidents documented on municipal and council election day. Notably, 20 per cent of these attacks targeted female election workers (ANDRYSAS 2024a, 2024b). During election campaigns in Indonesia, politically active women experienced intensified cyberbullying, often orchestrated by male candidates and so-called cyber-mercenaries (Harsianti 2024).

Meanwhile, in the lead-up to Iran’s presidential elections, the government intensified its crackdown on women activists, systematically targeting those advocating for gender equality and human rights (Center for Human Rights in Iran 2024). In response, feminist advocates like the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Narges Mohammadi, along with reformists and other marginalized groups, called for a boycott of the elections, leading to a historically low voter turnout of just 40.6 per cent (Tajali 2024).

Gendered forms of violence

Incidents that took place in 2024 also highlighted the gendered nature of violence against women in electoral processes, both offline and online. In Mexico, women were disproportionately subjected to threats and armed attacks (México Evalúa 2024), with violence frequently extending to their children and families (International IDEA 2024). Public discourse was rife with sexism and gender stereotypes (De La Fuente and Tawfik 2024). Claudia Sheinbaum, elected President, faced misogynistic and anti-Semitic insults and was often dismissed as former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s ‘puppet’ despite her credentials (Calderón 2024). Social media further fuelled hostility, with sexist hashtags and harassment targeting women’s appearance, families and personal lives, while generative artificial intelligence amplified these threats by spreading deepfakes and other harmful content (International IDEA 2024; Klepper 2024).

Similarly, in the USA, presidential candidate Kamala Harris faced attacks like those targeting Sheinbaum, with her opponent, Donald Trump, calling her ‘morally, physically, and emotionally weak’ (Bindel 2024). At the local level, women and people of colour experienced more severe threats and abuse targeting their families, gender and race, and women were nearly four times more likely than men to face sexual abuse (Brennan Center for Justice 2024). Online harassment against women included misogynistic comments, rape threats and sexual violence (Thakur and Finkel 2024). Among election officials—80 per cent of whom are women—38 per cent reported threats and sexual intimidation (Wynn, Fried and Eisen 2023). Seven out of 10 local election officials said threats had increased since 2020, nearly half of which went unreported (Brennan Center for Justice 2024).

Meanwhile, election observers in El Salvador reported widespread instances of psychological, emotional, physical and sexual violence targeting female voters, candidates and election workers. Psychological and emotional violence were the most prevalent forms, including sexist insults, threats and gender-based defamation. Sexual violence and technology-facilitated abuse, such as the publication of personal and intimate information, were also alarmingly common. Online platforms amplified the sexist nature of this violence, perpetuating narratives of women’s suggested biological, moral and intellectual inferiority through hashtags, emojis and memes (ANDRYSAS 2024a, 2024b).

Gendered impacts

Overall, VAWE had gendered impacts in 2024, directly affecting women’s participation, representation and deliberation. In Mexico, female candidates dropped out of races due to threats (Breda and Pellegrini 2024), and in the USA abuse discouraged female officeholders from seeking re-election or higher office; leading on key issues such as reproductive rights, gun regulation, criminal justice reform and LGBTQIA+ rights; and engaging with constituents online and at public events (Ramachandran et al. 2024).

Equally concerning is the impact of false fraud claims in the USA, which incited violence and unsafe working conditions, leading to an exodus of election officials. Women, who make up 80 per cent of the US election workforce, were disproportionately affected by threats and harassment, even when not explicitly gender-motivated. In 11 states alone, this led to the loss of over 1,800 years of experience, weakening the security, safety and effectiveness of the electoral process (Beckel et al. 2023).

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, electoral violence seemingly unrelated to gender produced gendered outcomes in 2024. While 43 per cent of candidates in local elections in May faced some form of abuse, safety concerns led 56 per cent of female candidates to avoid campaigning alone, compared with 19 per cent of their male counterparts. In addition, 47 per cent of female candidates avoided discussing controversial topics for fear of violence, versus 20 per cent of men (Al-Othman 2024; United Kingdom 2024). These statistics show that, even without explicit gendered motives, electoral violence can disproportionately restrict women’s participation, representation and deliberation at all levels.

4.5. Protecting elections against gender-based violence: Findings from 2024

Effectively addressing the complexity, scope and scale of VAWE requires a comprehensive, intersectional and multi-stakeholder approach that incorporates a gendered lens into prevention, protection, prosecution, policy coordination and support efforts (NDI 2018; ODIHR 2022). This section outlines some measures taken in 2024, focusing on six key areas of action for identifying and preventing VAWE, as defined by a United Nations programming guide aimed at preventing violence against women in elections (Ballington, Bardall and Borovsky 2017). Although these actions alone are insufficient and their long-term impacts are yet to be assessed, they represent important good practices.

1. Mapping and measuring. VAWE is often invisible due to poor documentation, but growing recognition highlights the need for data collection. For example, country-level mapping exercises, such as UN Women’s 2024 assessment of VAWE in Somalia, reveal the scope of violence and enable evidence-based interventions (UN Women Somalia 2024). Integrating VAWE considerations into existing monitoring tools is also important, as demonstrated by the Moldovan Audiovisual Council’s recently updated media monitoring methodology, which now incorporates indicators for sexist language (Council of Europe Office in Chisinau 2023). Similarly, the gender-sensitive news monitoring methodology developed by Mexico’s National Electoral Institute for the 2023–2024 local elections included key variables on political violence against women (INE n.d.c).
2. Election observation. Election observation missions play a crucial role in collecting information on VAWE. While organizations like the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe traditionally have focused on women’s participation and representation, recent frameworks have begun to assess the prevalence of VAWE. For example, OSCE observation missions now commonly make use of the organization’s updated Handbook on Observing and Promoting Women’s Electoral Participation (ODIHR 2023), which includes targeted inquiries into VAWE (see, for example, ODIHR 2024a, 2024b). Moreover, there are specific gender-focused observation efforts such as the gender election observation mission (Gender Concerns International 2024) that monitored the 2024 European Parliament elections and the mission in El Salvador run by the National Association of Salvadoran Women Councillors, Trustees and Mayors (ANDRYSAS) and supported by the National Democratic Institute and UN Women. The ANDRYSAS (2024a, 2024b) mission documented 231 cases of electoral violence against women during the 2024 elections, highlighting the need for a unified registry and stronger victim support systems.
3. Legal and policy reform. Progressive and robust legal and policy frameworks are key components in driving transformational change. In April 2024 the European Parliament approved its first EU-wide rules on combating violence against women, setting standards for criminalization, victim support and accountability (European Parliament 2024). Other positive examples from 2024 include Chile’s new law on violence against women, which measures prevention, protection and accountability (Republic of Chile 2024), as well as Spain’s Organic Law on Parity Representation, which promotes gender equality in politics and protection against gender-based violence (Kingdom of Spain 2024). Moreover, 11 US states have passed laws to protect election officials. Some states have also included confidentiality provisions in this broader legislation, aiming to safeguard female officials by protecting their personal information and penalizing improper disclosure (Wynn, Fried and Eisen 2023). To date, only California has signed this bill into law (California 2022).
   Legal frameworks and guidelines are also being increasingly adopted to combat digital VAWE. One example from 2024 is the Principles and Guidelines for the Use of Digital and Social Media in Elections in Africa, adopted by the Association of African Election Authorities and supported by the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (n.d.). These guidelines aim to combat gendered digital violence and promote a safer online environment for women in elections.
4. Electoral arrangements. Electoral management bodies (EMBs) can play a key role in preventing and addressing VAWE through gender-sensitive training, voter education, safety measures for staff and voters, and logistical measures like gender-segregated polling stations and special voting arrangements. According to the 2024 Electoral Management Survey (James, Garnett and Campion 2025), 29 out of 50 surveyed EMBs included gender equality in staff training programmes, while 24 provided stakeholder training on the topic. Additionally, 42 EMBs implemented measures to improve accessibility for disadvantaged groups, including women, people with disabilities, the elderly and LGBTQIA+ individuals. However, with the exception of Fiji, which referenced procedures to ensure a safe working environment for staff, none of the surveyed EMBs highlighted efforts specifically targeting violence. Examples of proactive measures were, however, observed in Pakistan, where the Election Commission implemented initiatives such as deploying a maximum number of female polling workers at women-only polling stations, aiming to foster a safer environment for female voters and election officials (ECP n.d.). Similarly, in Mexico, the National Electoral Institute (INE)—with its long history of addressing VAWE—used its National Registry of Persons Sanctioned for Gender-Based Political Violence against Women to enhance accountability by barring offenders from running for election (INE n.d.b). The INE also partnered with Meta to identify and remove harmful content related to VAWE on social media (Calderón 2024; International IDEA 2024).
5. Working with political parties. Political parties are the most common perpetrators of VAWE, which is why their engagement in prevention efforts is key. In response, some positive practices were showcased in 2024. In Mexico, the INE (n.d.a) and national political parties signed commitments to ensure elections free from violence against women. The Election Commission of India (2024) urged political parties to use social media ethically to prevent VAWE. Ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, International IDEA and the European Commission (2024) developed a code of conduct for political parties to address gender-based violence and promote inclusive practices. Additionally, in the UK, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy hosted a conference to explore strategies for political parties to support female candidates and create a safer, more inclusive political environment (Poskitt 2024).
6. Raising awareness and changing norms. Because VAWE is often underreported and normalized, raising awareness and transforming social norms are critical (ODIHR 2022). Good practices from 2024 were observed in Moldova, where the Central Election Commission, in collaboration with the EU, the Council of Europe and the Audiovisual Council, launched awareness-raising initiatives like media campaigns and round-table discussions to counter hate speech and sexism ahead of the 2024 presidential election (Council of Europe Office in Chisinau 2023; see also Box 4.1). Moreover, civil society groups in Bangladesh implemented awareness-raising efforts around VAWE, targeting authorities such as the Election Commission and the police (NDI and IRI 2024).

4.6. Conclusion and lessons learned

Examples from 2024 demonstrate that VAWE remains a persistent global problem, manifesting in diverse ways across public, private and online spaces, targeting women in roles ranging from candidates to poll workers, with marginalized groups disproportionately affected. The impacts are profound, discouraging women’s participation, representation and deliberation at all levels of the electoral process, thus undermining the integrity of elections.

The global surge in VAWE, coupled with the evolving electoral landscape increasingly shaped by online dynamics, underscores the urgent need for more comprehensive, collaborative and innovative approaches. Robust data collection and coordinated efforts across society are vital to understanding and effectively addressing VAWE. While legal and policy frameworks play a foundational role, they must be reinforced with adequate funding, accountability mechanisms and protective support systems. Achieving transformative change also requires tackling deep-rooted socio-cultural norms that perpetuate gender-based violence and discrimination globally as well as adopting an intersectional approach to ensure that no one is left behind.

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Ingrid Bicu

5.1. Introduction

High-profile elections in 2024 raised interest in the effectiveness of protective measures against the use of information—in both new and old ways—to harm electoral integrity. Numerous countries saw attempts to manipulate the information environment in an effort to undermine the credibility of political actors or the electoral process itself. Instances of disinformation narratives during elections were recorded in at least 43 (80 per cent) of 54 national elections monitored by the Global Election Monitor (Asplund and Tucker 2025). For this reason, electoral management bodies (EMBs) were—and continue to be—concerned about an information environment in which discourse around minor problems or normal issues in the electoral process can rapidly escalate into something controversial or politicized through the virality of social media posts.

Concerns about systemic and malign information operations targeting elections extended to the security sector, in recognition of the grave risks to social or regional stability caused by elections that fail because of attacks or that descend into chaos because of public discontent. Attempts to counter these serious threats have bolstered cooperation and intensified dialogue between the security sector and those responsible for electoral processes in countries that are potential targets.

Notable developments that influenced the discourse around electoral processes included hybrid threats, oversight of the media and digital platforms, the instrumentalization of influencers, aggression and violence against women in elections, the targeting of local communities and interest in the role of artificial intelligence.

5.2. Media capture, biased reporting and censorship

Media capture refers to situations where the media are controlled either directly by governments or by powerful groups with close ties to political entities, which significantly impacts the independence and integrity of media institutions (Schiffrin 2017). Captured media are increasingly exposed to pressures from both state and non-state actors around elections, especially in contexts where public service media are vulnerable to external influences (Dragomir and Horowitz 2021).

The phenomenon of media capture is not new and has been widely documented, but its impact was amplified by compounding attacks in the information environment around elections in 2024. Foreign actors have been identified as very active in their attempts to influence the information space, as seen in the United States (Becket and Quinn 2024; Martin 2024), where multiple pro-Kremlin bots were detected on the social media platform X, spreading disinformation about Kamala Harris ahead of the 2024 presidential elections in an effort to undermine her and support Donald Trump (AFP 2024).

Biases in media coverage, a lack of neutrality and the instrumentalization of media for political purposes emerged as recurring issues in the reports of electoral observation missions during 2024 elections, and similar concerns were raised in investigations across the globe—in countries such as Austria, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ireland, Romania and Sri Lanka—with implications for voters’ information consumption (Mulugeta 2024; ODIHR 2024b). In countries such and Hungary and Serbia (International IDEA 2023), state-owned or government-influenced media were used to shape public opinion by controlling the narrative, suppressing the opposition and promoting the ruling party’s or incumbent’s interests (Nemeth 2024).

In countries such as Bangladesh, Belarus, Pakistan and Venezuela, online and offline censorship was used to prevent opposition messages from reaching voters (Freedom House 2024: 1–2, 7–9). Additionally, Internet shutdowns around elections were documented in countries including Azerbaijan, Comoros, India, Mauritania and Mozambique (Access Now n.d.).

5.3. The role of digital platforms

Digital platforms and private messaging apps played a central role in the execution of malign actions during elections in 2024 (Clegg 2024). These technologies gave actors powerful tools to disseminate disinformation, amplify divisive narratives and coordinate covert operations at scale. Social media platforms, particularly Meta, TikTok, X and YouTube, enabled widespread public outreach, while private messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram facilitated targeted and often untraceable communication, as part of malign operations in the information space around elections (Kern 2024; Mozur et al. 2024).

The transformation of Twitter into X, under Elon Musk’s ownership, has had notable implications for its user base and the type of discourse it fosters. Since Musk’s acquisition, the platform has undergone structural and content moderation changes that have shifted user demographics, with a noticeable increase in right-wing and conservative voices (Davies 2024). The cause of this shift was the combination of Musk’s personal engagement and incentives, rather than an algorithm (Ingram 2024).

Additionally, video-based platforms such as Instagram and TikTok are progressively becoming preferred sources of information, to the detriment of news articles. While both platforms were used during 2024 elections, TikTok gained particularly high traction for political content across the European Union, the USA, and in countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Moldova, South Africa and the United Kingdom, and it was banned in India (Burn-Murdoch 2024).

Algorithms are another impactful aspect of the information environment, with both political actors and regular citizens using them to their advantage to promote or hide certain information. For example, during Indonesian President Prabowo S. Djojohadikusumo’s campaign, observers noted that Tik Tok not only allowed Prabowo to create a new, ‘cuddlier’ persona but also made it possible to flood the platform with material which drowned out information about the candidate’s record which did not align with the narrative being promoted (Widianto 2024). The pro-democracy Bluebird movement in Taiwan specifically chose a non-political word as its name to avoid being censored by Facebook’s algorithms (Gargiulo 2024).

5.4. The instrumentalization of influencers

Influencers played a significant role in manipulating elections around the world in 2024, in countries from Indonesia and Taiwan in Asia to France, Moldova and Romania in Europe. Analysis by Freedom House (2024) revealed how influencers acted as superspreaders of messages favourable to pro-Russian candidates or, in the case of Taiwan, of narratives aimed at discouraging voting.

In the case of Romania, some influencers were aware of their role, while others claimed that they had been misled into participating in campaigns where the true objectives were concealed behind seemingly positive civic messages (see Box 5.1). Russia has used similar tactics, both ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in 2022, and in the presidential elections in Moldova, in 2024 (Neag et al. 2024).

5.5. Local communities increasingly targeted with divisive narratives

During various elections in 2024, local communities and diaspora groups were targets of disinformation and divisive narratives, reflecting a strategic shift likely driven by their specific vulnerabilities aligned with the objectives of malign actors. These vulnerabilities included a lack of or delays in situational awareness, insufficient interventions by central state institutions, a lack of local media and limited access to reliable information, low levels of media literacy, widespread dissatisfaction with the government, and socio-economic challenges such as poverty and social segregation (Noordin 2024).

Strategies designed to exploit these vulnerabilities included leveraging individuals as propagation agents, as seen in the USA, or antagonizing people against one another and against other vulnerable or traditionally marginalized groups, such as women, ethnic minorities, sexual minorities and religious minorities. In other words, many of the strategies used focused on identity (Suriani 2024), leading to a high level of digital violence that dominated significant parts of the information environment, effectively silencing other voices.

5.6. Hybrid threats

The definition of hybrid threats is continuously evolving to keep pace with the continuous and compounding challenges that emerge within specific environments.

NATO (2024) provides one example of a definition:

Hybrid threats combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces. Hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations. They aim to destabilise and undermine societies.

The information environment around elections has been a strategic target for hybrid threat actors (Kovalčíková and Spatafora 2024), as part of their non-conventional warfare strategies to achieve geopolitical objectives (Latschan 2024). In 2024 cases involving hybrid threats against elections—through operations run by actors such as China, Iran and Russia—were seen all over the world, from EU countries (FIMI-ISAC 2024) to Georgia, Moldova, the Solomon Islands, Taiwan (von Sydow 2024) and the USA (MTAC 2024).

These operations have become increasingly complex, with domestic actors such as influencers, incumbents or electoral competitors, media outlets, civil society organizations and even clergy members serving the agendas of foreign states with malign intentions—or even their own personal agendas. Hybrid threat actors exploit these domestic actors to further geopolitical and economic objectives, often capitalizing on the intermediaries’ personal agendas or vulnerabilities within their respective countries (Bay 2024).

5.7. Aggression and violence against women in elections

Mexico, Moldova, North Macedonia, Romania and the USA share the distinction of having had a woman run among the top two contenders for the highest office in the country in the 2024 elections cycle, with the first four ultimately electing female leaders. These countries also share the troubling commonality of extreme levels of aggression in digital communication spaces targeting women candidates, illustrating the pervasive challenge of gendered online violence in political contexts (see Chapter 4: Gender-based discrimination and violence).

5.8. The role of artificial intelligence

A literature review shows that in 2024 AI was used in political campaigns (Bhattacharya 2024), voter outreach (Bhattacharya 2024) and some administrative processes (Juneja 2024) as well as for foreign electoral interference (Stockwell 2024).

AI was used in numerous electoral campaigns to serve satirical purposes rather than for explicit manipulation, suggesting, at first glance, a less disruptive application than initially anticipated. Upon closer analysis, malign intent is frequently evident, even in AI-altered content that may initially seem harmless (Bicu 2024b). For example, Donald Trump shared AI-generated images portraying Kamala Harris as a communist dictator (Trump 2024). While some uses are clearly malicious, others blur the line between satire and influence, as seen in a widely circulated Spanish video depicting political rivals engaging in festive reconciliation through AI-generated scenes (United Unknown 2024).

One consequence of AI’s contribution to a crisis of trust (see Chapter 8: Trust and public perception in elections) is that voters often struggle to determine the authenticity of the content they encounter amid a flood of AI-generated material, including deepfakes, fabricated audio and manipulated images on digital communication platforms. An erosion of trust in information sources has exacerbated ongoing declines in the credibility of democratic processes and institutions (Emmons, Vickery and Shein n.d.) and contributed to the capture of the information environment.

EMBs approached the use of AI in their operations with caution in 2024. Most avoided relying on AI-powered technology in an extensive way due to concerns about fairness, accountability and transparency. This approach is beneficial, as it enables EMBs to take the time they need to understand, assess and mitigate the risks associated with the wider use of AI in electoral administration.

Panditharatne (2024) warned at the beginning of 2024 that AI could significantly disrupt elections by amplifying and refining existing harmful practices while also introducing new ones, hence destabilizing democratic processes. Overall, while there were instances where AI was misused in elections in 2024, assessments indicate that it had little impact on the results (Chow 2024; Stockwell 2024).

However, given the wide availability and variety of AI tools and the lack of research and access to data, it is still too early to fully understand the extent of the implications for elections. At the end of the electoral year, some experts even claimed that AI’s impact on the information environment around elections was being overblown and had distracted from other, more pressing threats to democracy, such as the use of AI for surveillance, intimidation and repression targeting democratic actors (McBride, Simon and Altay 2024).

5.9. Conclusions

Following patterns from previous years, malign actors continued exploiting societal vulnerabilities such as disruptions in democratic systems, political instability, and economic and social inequalities during the 2024 elections super cycle. These weaknesses provided fertile ground for manipulation by both domestic and foreign actors deploying hybrid tactics to undermine trust in institutions and democratic processes and alter electoral outcomes.

Addressing these challenges requires moving beyond reactive responses and adopting proactive, pre-emptive measures. Interventions should focus on building resilience before threats materialize. Proactive strategies demand sustained attention, long-term commitment and the application of lessons learned from global examples. Efforts to implement these strategies include early-detection systems and situational-awareness mechanisms, such as social media monitoring, intelligence sharing and early-warning systems at the local, national, regional and global levels, with enhanced cooperation across sectors to pre-empt disinformation before it takes root.

Building and maintaining high levels of trust in institutions play a critical role in mitigating the impact of disinformation, as credible institutions can serve as reliable sources of information, countering false narratives effectively.

Building resilience against malign actors in the information space requires a coordinated, multi-stakeholder approach and efforts to address the root causes of societal and systemic vulnerabilities. Involving civil society, academia and experts in addressing disinformation can foster innovation and impartiality in combating these threats. The perfect mix of protective measures will vary depending on the context. Still, it will likely include some combination of codes of conduct, proactive public communication, carefully designed regulation, media literacy campaigns, protections and support for independent journalism and citizen monitoring.

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Sonali Campion

6.1. Introduction

Electoral integrity requires effective election management, but credible elections are difficult to deliver. They are major administrative undertakings involving complex logistics, substantial resources, tight time frames and charged political dynamics. This means they are prone to electoral malfunctions, such as mistakes or administrative deficiencies. Malfunctions are distinct from malpractices, where processes are deliberately manipulated (Birch 2011; see also Chapter 2: Electoral malpractice). Nevertheless, they have the potential to compromise all four principles of electoral integrity and cannot be overlooked (see the Introduction to this report).

As the institutions responsible for organizing, monitoring and certifying electoral processes, election management bodies (EMBs) are primarily responsible for minimizing errors and ensuring that any problems that arise do not materially impact results (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). Although many EMBs around the world have become more proficient in core aspects of election delivery (International IDEA 2024b), malfunctions continued to undermine voter confidence in electoral processes and outcomes in the super-cycle year. This chapter considers why electoral management continues to be fraught with difficulty, before discussing key administrative challenges identified in 2024. It concludes with lessons and recommendations for EMBs and other stakeholders.

6.2. Growing pressures and expanded remits

The global election management landscape has shifted significantly since it was first documented in the late 1990s (López-Pintor 2015). Today, both the number of countries holding elections and the number of nominally independent EMBs has grown.¹² EMB leaders, supported by governments and development partners, have significantly enhanced the capacity and professionalism of many of these newer organizations (Lührmann 2016; Asplund 2023). Even in democracies that might be thought of as ‘established’, there have been concerted efforts to raise standards and strengthen systems and processes (see, for example, Australian Electoral Commission 2023). Electoral Integrity Project data also highlights that, on average, scores are higher for stages of the electoral cycle where EMBs exercise more overall control, such as counting, results tabulation and election procedures (Garnett, James and Caal-Lam 2024). However, election management is a balancing act requiring EMBs to adapt and solve problems on an ongoing basis. Tasks such as maintaining accurate voter registers and recruiting and training enough temporary staff to administer polling continue to present challenges at every election. Laws and regulations change, so EMBs must constantly review their procedures to ensure that they are fit for purpose.

Furthermore, the environments in which EMBs operate have changed. As is discussed elsewhere in this report, EMBs have to adapt their operations to minimize the impact of increasingly disruptive climate emergencies (see Chapter 7: The impact of natural hazards on 2024 elections) and combat unprecedented levels of election mis- and disinformation (see Chapter 5: The information environment around elections). It is also increasingly clear that the erosion of institutions associated with democratic backsliding (Bermeo 2016) is directly impacting the real and perceived autonomy of EMBs (International IDEA 2024b). This can have serious operational implications. For example, a former Mexican president made multiple attempts to overhaul the widely respected National Electoral Institute and drastically cut its staff, budgets and oversight powers in the run-up to the June 2024 election (OAS 2024b). Although the substantive reforms were overturned by the Supreme Court, both federal and local electoral bodies experienced an ‘internal crisis’ due to unprecedented staff attrition and insufficient budgets during the election period (Acuerdo Nacional por la Integridad Electoral 2024: 5).

As their operating environments become more unpredictable, EMBs have also seen their remits expand. Over the past three decades, populations globally have both grown and aged, leading to a corresponding increase in the number of eligible voters (United Nations 2019; World Bank 2023). In 2024 around two thirds of the countries that held elections had to cater to more registered voters than ever before.¹³ Technology, ranging from databases to assistive devices, is now widely used throughout the electoral cycle and has contributed to greater accuracy, efficiency and transparency in EMB operations. However, the transition to increased technological dependence has introduced new cybersecurity vulnerabilities at a time when foreign digital interference is pervasive and technology failures can be highly disruptive (Tenove et al. 2018). The use of special voting arrangements (SVAs), such as early, mobile and proxy voting, accelerated during the Covid-19 pandemic (Barrat et al. 2023; James, Clark and Asplund 2023). These alternative modes make voting more accessible but entail a whole range of separate processes, communications and safeguards that must be applied to avoid compromising the integrity of the wider election.

Navigating the pressures and demands associated with contemporary election management involves working with others. Election delivery has always been a highly collaborative undertaking; while an EMB may have overall responsibility for directing and coordinating electoral cycle activities,¹⁴ there can be no election without voters, candidates, the media, the police, the judiciary and so on (Catt et al. 2014). Civil society plays a critical role in offering civic education, monitoring elections and promoting integrity, while government departments provide financial resources and other critical forms of support. Today, these ‘electoral management governance networks’ (James 2020: 100–02) have become more complex. EMB operations require more specialized expertise—for example, in cybersecurity—which may not be possible or desirable to cultivate in-house (van der Staak and Wolf 2019). An EMB’s performance can depend as much on the effectiveness of their relationships with other members of the network as it does on their organizational capabilities. In this context, challenges around resourcing are not limited to the EMB: electoral integrity can also be jeopardized if other critical actors in the network lack the funds or personnel to undertake their electoral responsibilities.

6.3. Challenges in 2024

In 2024, malfunctions were identified in several national elections reviewed by the Global Election Monitor.¹⁵ There were also numerous scenarios where EMBs faced significant pressures but were able to navigate them and deliver credible processes.

Strained human resources

The knowledge and dedication of election staff were critical to the successful conclusion of many of 2024’s polls. However, finding enough temporary workers to administer elections proved to be a real challenge for EMBs during the super cycle. Ninety per cent of local election officials surveyed in the United Kingdom reported that they struggled to recruit and retain temporary polling staff, citing the increased complexity of the work in the wake of legal changes and low remuneration (United Kingdom 2024b: 45; see also Box 6.2). In Georgia, the pool of non-partisan candidates willing to run polling stations was limited, and political parties had difficulty meeting their quotas of partisan staff because people proved reluctant to represent parties in a highly polarized election, especially for so little pay (ODIHR 2024c: 7). Even when staff were appointed, there was high turnover, and replacements were not always trained in time for election day—a problem that also arose in North Macedonia (ODIHR 2024a: 10). This trend is concerning, as front-line staff play a pivotal role in election day procedures and the voter experience.

Both permanent and temporary EMB staff often had to navigate difficult working conditions. Heavy workloads contributed to the deaths of over 100 election officials in Indonesia, while missing materials in El Salvador delayed the count, so front-line staff had to work continuously for up to 24 hours on election day (BBC News Mundo 2024; Salim 2024; see also Box 6.1). Workers in India (Mitra 2024), the Maldives (International IDEA 2024a) and Mexico (Sosa 2024) were required to deliver polling during extreme heatwaves, and at least 30 Indian officials died as a result. In South Africa, presiding officers were in some places required to manage polling stations with up to 20,000 registered voters because the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) did not implement its own cap of 3,000 voters per station in metropolitan areas (EU EEM 2024b: 14). Disinformation about electoral irregularities ahead of the US election fuelled the harassment of election officials, which necessitated new security measures, closer coordination with law enforcement and specialized safety training (Leingang 2024). Elections work is by its nature often demanding, but these cases indicate that more needs to be done to improve conditions so that staff are safe and able to perform to the best of their ability.

It is also clear that increased scrutiny and low public confidence in elections inflated EMB workloads. For example, the accelerated collapse of trust in US elections since 2020 prompted many officials to do more public and media engagement—for instance, promoting electoral integrity safeguards (Wang 2024; see also Chapter 8: Trust and public perception in elections). Overburdened staff also had to respond to unprecedented mass challenges to voter eligibility and ‘zombie lawsuits’, both of which made false claims about the integrity of voter registers (Raderstorf 2024; Swift et al. 2024). These factors, combined with an aging elections workforce, are contributing to a spike in staff attrition (Ferrer, Thompson and Orey 2024). As with the case of Mexico, the loss of institutional knowledge and pressure on remaining staff and new recruits is concerning. It also raises questions about the sustainability of human resources at a time when election delivery is growing more complex.

Cybersecurity breaches and technology malfunctions

Technology contributed positively to many elections in 2024. For example, despite periodic criticism and challenges, India’s electronic voting machines once again helped to simplify the task of administering elections with almost a billion registered voters by eliminating the need to produce ballot papers and accelerating the count (Gopalakrishnan 2024). However, technology-related problems also disrupted several 2024 elections to varying degrees. Issues with voter verification devices slowed voting at multiple polling stations in Georgia (ODIHR 2024c: 20), Namibia (ECF-SADC 2024: 10) and South Africa (EU EEM 2024b: 13), while online voting for advance and overseas voters in Panama was briefly suspended due to a discrepancy between the order of the candidates on the virtual and physical ballots (OAS 2024c: 11). The electronic results management system in El Salvador broke down due to a combination of logistical failures, inadequate training, connectivity issues and faulty equipment (see Box 6.1). These incidents underscore that all technology deployed in elections requires rigorous testing and strict quality controls. However, they also highlight that certain prerequisites need to be in place for systems to function, and that backup procedures should be agreed and communicated to staff as part of their training.

Furthermore, technology is often viewed with suspicion, particularly by those who see it as vulnerable to manipulation or hacking. Cultivating trust in new systems therefore requires stakeholder engagement at every stage of decision making, testing and auditing. South Africa’s IEC provides an example of good practice in this regard, as it emphasizes transparency and data sharing in its security approach and routinely invites stakeholders to independently audit its systems (Commonwealth Secretariat 2020: 72, 105). Moreover, timely communications when issues do arise are critical to maintaining citizen and stakeholder confidence. When the ballot paper discrepancy arose in Panama, the EMB undertook technical checks and consulted with political parties before resuming online voting (OAS 2024c: 11). These measures ensured that advance and overseas voters could still participate and deflected challenges to the process that might otherwise have emerged. Communications regarding the failure of results management systems in El Salvador and Pakistan were less forthcoming, leading to confusion, allegations of rigging and opposition challenges (Dawn 2024; see also Box 6.1).

Security is also a concern as EMBs routinely utilize the Internet and a range of software and devices to conduct their operations. Cyberoperations targeting election infrastructure intensified in the lead-up to the 2024 cycle (Asplund and Tucker 2025).¹⁶ In November 2023 a hacker gained access to the personal data of 204 million registered voters via the Indonesian Electoral Commission website. This was one of a series of alleged leaks, with other incidents reported in 2020 and 2022 (BBC News Indonesia 2023). Breaches of voter data and other confidential EMB information have also been identified in South Korea (Nam 2023), the UK (see Box 6.2) and the United States (Florida and Washington, DC) since 2021 (Bowen 2023; Hope 2023). Just days before the October 2024 general elections in Mozambique, the EMB reported that it had been targeted by a cyberattack, although it was quick to emphasize that its data had not been compromised (360 Mozambique 2024). Incidents such as these offer an urgent reminder to all EMBs to regularly review and strengthen cybersecurity safeguards.

Voter exclusion and campaign regulation challenges

Administrative shortcomings are particularly problematic when they exclude groups of voters. Despite efforts by many EMBs, provisions for people with disabilities were often deficient during the super cycle. In North Macedonia, voter information was provided in a range of formats, a helpline was set up for voters with hearing difficulties, and various assistive tools were also made available at polling stations. However, not all key information was available in accessible formats, and there were gaps in staff training, which meant polling staff rarely knew how to use tools such as tactile ballot papers (ODIHR 2024a: 11). Inaccessible polling stations remained a common challenge, with observers in Bangladesh (EU EEM 2024a: 17), Georgia (ODIHR 2024c: 28), Indonesia (Rosales, Antiquerra and Rana 2024: 60), Mongolia (ODIHR 2024d: 16) and North Macedonia (ODIHR 2024a: 28) reporting that 50 per cent or more of polling stations visited were not fully accessible for those with mobility issues.

SVAs were widely used, facilitating participation where they were effectively implemented. For example, eligible voters in South Korea were able to vote early or by post, at home or even aboard ships. The National Election Commission also successfully coordinated overseas voting in 115 countries, enabling the highest overseas turnout ever (Spinelli 2024). Deficiencies elsewhere resulted in cases of disenfranchisement. South Africa offered people with disabilities the option to vote at home. However, those who registered for this service were informed that electoral staff would come during a two-day window. As no specific time was provided, many would-be voters missed the visit (EU EEM 2024b: 17). In the UK, arrangements for overseas voters to participate by post proved inadequate. The timeline to apply for and return postal votes set out in the law was so short that it was difficult for many voters to get their ballots back in time to be counted (see Box 6.2). Postal delays similarly impacted overseas voters in Palau’s general election (Ngirudelsang 2024), while the Electoral Commission of Namibia’s efforts to allow citizens to vote at any polling station were stymied by technical and logistical problems (Links 2024; see also Chapter 8: Trust and public perception in elections). These examples offer insight into how SVAs can fail to ensure inclusion in practice due to a combination of legal constraints and administrative deficiencies.

Electoral Integrity Project data has consistently identified campaign finance and campaign media as the lowest-scoring aspects of the electoral cycle (Garnett, James and Caal-Lam 2024), and it is clear that EMBs and other regulators struggled to guarantee a level playing field in 2024. Some countries did strengthen their legal frameworks: Sri Lanka introduced campaign finance limits for the first time (EU EOM 2024a: 2), and the Maldives tightened its regulations and gave the Election Commission more powers to punish violations (Transparency Maldives 2024: 23).

Significant gaps remain, however, and EMBs are often unable to fulfil their legal obligations in practice. Sri Lanka’s new campaign finance rules lack an effective oversight mechanism, and, in 2024, the Election Commission did not have the resources to exercise the powers it did have (ANFREL 2024: 10). Moldova’s Central Election Commission similarly struggled to implement campaign finance regulations due to resource constraints (ODIHR 2024b: 18). Incumbents’ abuse of state resources remains a widespread challenge that went largely unchecked last year. El Salvador’s Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) was described as ‘passive’ in the face of complaints about the use of public resources in campaigning (OAS 2024a: 6). The Indonesian president personally distributed social assistance in contested areas, which civil society organizations and academics saw as an attempt to bolster his son’s candidacy for vice president (Rosales, Antiquerra and Rana 2024: 2), while in Mozambique civil servants and teachers were summoned to participate in the ruling party’s rallies (EU EOM 2024b: 6).

Lessons learned and recommendations

Election management experiences in the super-cycle year illustrate how long-standing challenges associated with election delivery are being compounded by growing pressures and expanding responsibilities. Resourcing is a critical issue. EMBs need funds to implement electoral activities, but they must also invest in risk management and organizational capacity to navigate unpredictable environments and deliver genuinely inclusive elections. It is also clear that more needs to be done to support and reward election officials. Electoral staff were rightly described as heroes by several commentators in 2024, but current workloads and pressures are not sustainable. Working conditions, training and compensation for permanent and temporary staff need to be improved to attract and retain skilled candidates.

To maintain public confidence in electoral processes, EMBs need to be proactive in their communications and promote transparency throughout the electoral cycle. It is no longer enough for EMBs to perform to a high standard; they also need to be seen to be doing so (see Chapter 8: Trust and public perception in elections). When things do go wrong, it is critical that there is accurate and timely information available so that stakeholders do not turn to other, less reliable sources. The same goes for technology: wide stakeholder consultation and engagement are not just nice to have; they are key to ensuring confidence and buy-in. Robust quality and security protocols are also necessary to manage the risks associated with technology.

Finally, more consideration should be given to building the broader capacity of the other players in the electoral governance network, such as political parties, the media, civil society and the judiciary. EMBs are invariably in the spotlight when malfunctions occur. However, it is important to recognize that both the causes and solutions may lie elsewhere in the network (see Box 7.2). Ensuring that other actors have the knowledge, capacity and incentives to perform their electoral roles consistently would both reduce the pressure on EMBs and facilitate the realization of electoral integrity.

References and further reading

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Acuerdo Nacional por la Integridad Electoral, ‘Cuarto Informe Sobre Integridad Electoral para el Proceso Electoral 2023-2024’ [Fourth Report on Electoral Integrity for the 2023–2024 Electoral Process], 2024, <https://www.anie.mx/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/20240531_Cuarto_Informe_ANIE_vf.pdf>, accessed 27 March 2025

Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), International Election Observation Mission, 2024 Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections, ‘Interim Report’, 17 November 2024, <https://anfrel.org/interim-report-of-the-anfrel-international-election-observation-mission-ieom-to-the-2024-sri-lanka-parliamentary-elections/>, accessed 27 March 2025

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BBC News Mundo, ‘Bukele y elecciones en El Salvador: Caos en el recuento de votos de los comicios en los que el mandatario se proclamó ganador mientras la oposición pide anularlas’ [Bukele and elections in El Salvador: Chaos in the vote count as the president declares victory and the opposition calls for annulment], 8 February 2024

Bermeo, N., ‘On democratic backsliding’, Journal of Democracy, 27/1 (2016), pp. 5–19, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012>

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Bowen, C. T., ‘Florida county election breach exposes 58K voters’ data’, GovTech, 1 June 2023

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Erik Asplund and Madeline Harty

Extreme weather events—tropical storms, floods, heatwaves and wildfires—and other disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic activity have the potential to severely disrupt electoral processes (Asplund 2022). When natural hazards turn into disasters, they have the potential to harm local populations, causing injuries—or even fatalities—and destroying critical infrastructure, including electoral facilities and materials. Disasters can also displace voters and disrupt electoral timetables. In turn, these impacts threaten key principles of electoral integrity, particularly equality in terms of participation and contestation.

As the number of disasters has grown by a factor of five over a 50-year period (WMO 2021)—driven by climate change, combined with a lack of climate adaptation efforts (Hill 2025)—it is a statistical certainty that natural hazards will increasingly turn into disasters and disrupt electoral processes in the foreseeable future or until climate mitigation efforts are prioritized by the 196 parties that signed the Paris Agreement in 2015.

In 2024, 15 countries were affected by meteorological, hydrological, climatological or geophysical disasters during election periods (see Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.3). This number includes both high-income and low-income countries, showing that all countries, regardless of their income level, can be affected by extreme weather events. Moreover, many of these countries expressed concern over extreme weather as identified in the World Economic Forum’s 2024 and 2025 global risk reports (WEF 2024, 2025).

The impact of disasters on elections in 2024 was varied and depended on the type of hazard, exposure to the hazard and the vulnerability of the exposed population (WHO 2021).¹⁷ Beyond climate change, the 2023–2024 El Niño event was also a contributing factor in certain elections that were affected by extreme weather (WMO 2023).

This chapter begins with a broad overview of the countries that were affected by different types of disasters during elections in 2024, using the Election Emergency and Crisis Monitor (EECM) as the main frame of reference (Asplund 2024g). The country briefs that make up the EECM were prepared based on media monitoring and desk research. Each brief provides an overview of the type of natural hazard, its general impact on the jurisdiction and the electoral process, as well as measures taken to protect elections. The chapter then provides a brief introduction to the science of weather attribution and cites recent studies of extreme weather events, linked to climate change, that have coincided with elections in some countries.

The main part of the chapter analyses the impact that extreme weather events had on elections in 2024, with a focus on the electoral cycle, providing comparative analyses of the timing of extreme weather events on the respective electoral period, the impact on electoral processes (in terms of electoral integrity), and the response of the election authorities to the stresses and shocks that the respective event triggered.

The analysis throughout the chapter also draws on findings from an election management survey completed in 2024 by 50 election jurisdictions (James, Garnett and Campion 2025).

The chapter concludes with findings and lessons learned on what election stakeholders can do to overcome disaster-related challenges, including adaptation through contingency planning, increased cooperation and flexible administrative voting procedures. Climate adaptation in electoral planning and decision making and the designation of elections as part of critical infrastructure are two policy-oriented recommendations highlighted in the chapter.

7.1. Natural hazards and climate change

In 2024, 15 countries were impacted by natural hazards during primary, subnational, national and supranational elections (see Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.3). Floods (44 per cent), heatwaves (22 per cent) and tropical storms (17 per cent) were the most common types of hazards to affect election periods in 2024 (see Figure 7.2). In some cases, natural hazards affected multiple elections in one country. In the United States, for example, disasters impacted primary elections in Iowa, Florida and Texas as well as the presidential election (see Box 7.1). In Indonesia, floods resulted in the postponement of polls in several villages in Demak and North Jakarta during the February 2024 general election (Asplund 2024b). Floods and landslides also affected voting during the 2024 Indonesian regional elections held in November, in addition to a volcanic eruption that triggered a geophysical disaster in the East Nusa Tenggara province (Asplund 2024g; Gunawan 2024). Flooding also impacted Austria’s voting operations during the 2024 EU elections in June (NL Times 2024) and the 2024 general election in September (Murphy 2024). In total, 23 disasters affected 20 elections in 15 countries in 2024, impacting millions of voters around the world.

Moreover, there is quantifiable proof that many of these natural hazards were made worse because of climate change. Climate change attribution science, which uses observations, computer models and statistical methods, has created an evidence base that focuses on ‘whether, and to what extent, human caused climate change altered the likelihood of specific weather events’ (Florini and Hill 2024).

According to reports from World Weather Attribution, an international scientific consortium, on Hurricane Helene and Hurricane Milton (which affected the US presidential election), the heatwaves in North and Central America as well as Asia (which affected elections in India, the Maldives and Mexico) and the heavy rainfall that caused floods in a large part of Europe (affecting elections in Austria and Czechia) clearly illustrate the impact of climate change on electoral processes (WWA 2024a, 2024b, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e).

Highlighted countries include Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Czechia, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, the Maldives, Mexico, Mozambique, Romania, Senegal, Tuvalu and the USA. Note that the respective natural hazard may not have affected the whole country, as many disasters that affected elections were more regional or local in character.

How does this 2024 snapshot look in comparison with recent years? According to the EECM, 33 countries were affected by natural hazards during election periods between 2019 and 2024 (Asplund 2024g), meaning 17 per cent of 195 globally recognized countries have struggled with disasters during elections. This number is further supported by survey results from the Electoral Management Survey: out of 50 respondents, 13 (26 per cent) indicated that elections in the previous five years had been adversely affected by natural hazards other than Covid-19 (see Table A.1 in Annex A).

7.2. How extreme weather disrupted 2024 elections during different periods in the electoral cycle

Disasters can be national, regional or local in scale and can take place at any time within the electoral cycle, including the pre-election period, the election period and the post-election period. In 2024 extreme weather affected voter registration, campaign events, voting operations, counting and tabulation, and results announcements.

In March 2024, torrential rain over southern Mozambique resulted in severe floods, forcing 96 registration offices to close due to inadequate working conditions for election officials (see Chapter 6: Election management hurdles and malfunctions). Moreover, many registration centres were used by local residents as shelters. Also, Tropical Storm Filipo, which hit the country in March 2024, damaged roads and prevented election officials from delivering election materials to school buildings used for voter registration in Manica province (Asplund 2024e).

In Czechia, Storm Boris disrupted the September 2024 Senate elections by forcing election officials in several towns to move polling stations to tents and shipping containers, as many of the buildings originally designated as polling stations were flooded (AP News 2024).

During India’s general election, which was held in stages between 9 April and 1 June, much of the country experienced extreme heat, with temperatures between 45 and 50 degrees Celsius. To bolster participation among voters, the electoral management body (EMB) introduced health and safety measures, including the provision of tents, water and medical kits at polling stations. Despite these measures, there were incidents of citizens queuing to vote who lost consciousness or poll workers who died because of heat-related illness. On the last day of voting in Uttar Pradesh, for instance, at least 33 election officials died because of heatstroke. According to the minister of defence, the heatwave may have had an impact on voter turnout, which was 65.79 per cent, compared with 67.4 per cent for the previous general election, in 2019 (Asplund 2024c; Pradhan 2024).

In Iceland, the tabulation of votes was delayed on the day of the 2024 parliamentary election because of a blizzard (Ólafsson 2024).

A storm and high tides delayed the vote for the new prime minister in the Pacific Island nation of Tuvalu, as newly elected members of parliament from outer islands were unable to travel to the capital for several weeks (TOI World Desk 2024).

In some cases, electoral stakeholders are not able to effectively withstand or respond to disasters. In these situations, humanitarian and relief efforts take priority, and elections can be postponed altogether or in part, depending on the scale of destruction. This was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which postponed local elections in five municipalities severely affected by floods and landslides (Vulovic 2025). The Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina held elections in all affected municipalities 14–28 days after the scheduled election. This example highlights how natural hazards can disrupt the electoral process, testing the resilience of electoral management bodies and communication with national disaster agencies in times of crisis (see Box 7.2).

When electoral management bodies were asked, as part of the Electoral Management Survey, whether natural environmental factors such as extreme weather events were impacting their work, 4 (12 per cent) out of the 33 respondents that answered the question stated that their work was affected on a regular basis or often, and 16 (48 per cent) answered that their work was occasionally affected (see Table A.2 in Annex A). This clearly suggests that natural hazards are a concern shared by many election officials around the globe.

7.3. How were elections protected against extreme weather in 2024?

The response to extreme weather events during election periods in 2024 depended, to a great extent, on the type of hazards, the likelihood and the scale of the resulting disaster, and the time in which the disaster occurred in the jurisdiction’s election calendar. Moreover, existing election-related legal, institutional and management safeguards were all significant factors which contributed to response efforts aimed at preventing, withstanding or recovering from the respective threat or crisis (Alihodžić 2023).

Several of the 15 countries with elections impacted by natural hazards in 2024 had a legal framework in place to protect their elections during extreme weather events. For example, four US states affected by Hurricane Helene—Florida, Georgia, Tennessee and Virginia—all have state laws relating to election emergencies that permit the respective EMBs to reschedule elections or relocate polling stations (NCSL 2024).

In response to floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2024, the Central Election Commission invoked the election law (Chapter 14, article 14.2), which gives the EMB the power to postpone voting at a particular polling station or within a specific constituency (for no more than 30 days) if there is evidence that the election cannot be conducted in accordance with legal provisions (Bosnia and Herzegovina n.d.).

The impact of external factors like extreme weather on electoral integrity also depends on the capacity of other state institutions, such as national disaster and health agencies, and first responders to respond to emergencies, given that disaster recovery and relief efforts are not part of the EMB’s mandate. What is crucial is that election stakeholders are able to coordinate with state agencies to better protect electoral integrity.

In 2024, there were several instances where EMBs collaborated with state agencies during extreme weather events for risk reduction, response or recovery. In Czechia, for example, local authorities navigated humanitarian efforts following intense flooding, and the Interior Ministry took over election organization in the affected towns (AP News 2024). During the parliamentary election in Senegal, the National Fire Brigade, the Directorate of Civil Protection, the General Directorate for Elections and local electoral committees worked together to transport voters and poll workers and to install informational signage (Asplund 2024h).

Lastly, all stakeholders should have contingency plans in place to guide their response in a crisis. Such plans may include identifying staff, conducting tabletop training exercises and drafting standard operating procedures. For example, Sri Lanka’s Election Commission and Disaster Management Centre prepared operational plans ahead of the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections to mitigate the negative effects of natural hazards, in particular floods and landslides. The plans included guidelines for the three coordinating agencies—the Election Commission, the Disaster Management Centre and the Ministry of Healthcare and Indigenous Medical Services—and 20 implementing ministries, departments and institutions. To improve coordination and planning during both elections, a Joint Election Emergencies Operation Unit—operating 24 hours a day for the five-day electoral period—was set up at the headquarters of the Disaster Management Centre (DMC 2024a, 2024b).

How then did election stakeholders, in particular EMBs, mitigate the impact of natural hazards on electoral integrity? According to the 2024 Electoral Management Survey, 29 out of 50 respondents (58 per cent) adopted contingency plans, 22 out of 50 engaged in inter-agency cooperation (44 per cent), 12 out of 50 (24 per cent) embraced a specific risk management framework, and 8 out of 50 (16 per cent) used special voting arrangements, among other measures (see Figure 7.4). In only two cases (Cameroon and Canada) did the respondents say that a dedicated lead person was responsible for environmental issues (see Table A.3 in Annex A).

7.4. Lessons learned and policy recommendations

This chapter illustrates how natural hazards impacted voters, political parties and election officials in 2024. It also shows that these natural hazards—whether tropical storms, floods or heatwaves—disrupted critical activities before, during and after elections, thereby undermining electoral integrity.

In 2024 many of the 15 countries that held elections amid natural hazards exhibited resilience by adapting flexible administrative voting procedures or by activating contingency plans to recover from emergencies and crises. In addition, several EMBs collaborated with government agencies—in particular emergency services and national disaster agencies—to reduce health risks.

With the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, made worse by climate change, policymakers and election officials will need to consider climate adaptation in their electoral planning and decision making—for example, designating the electoral process as critical infrastructure essential for the functioning of democratic societies.

Further investment and whole-of-government support for EMBs will help guarantee that elections can be held in challenging conditions. Meanwhile, EMBs should continue to build capacity to implement risk management, build resilience and develop crisis management protocols in collaboration with all electoral stakeholders. Providing operational training and opportunities for professional development on how to protect elections during emergencies and crises is an essential step in this process.

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Therese Pearce Laanela

This chapter explores the dynamics of electoral trust and trust building within electoral management bodies (EMBs) through the lens of elections held in 2024. The unpredictable environment, the difficulty of introducing needed reforms under fraught circumstances and the ease with which elections were undermined through online activity put this topic front and centre for EMBs in their strategic planning.

Trust is intrinsically linked to stability, reliability, familiarity and predictability (Rousseau et al. 1998; Sztompka 1999). For EMBs, delivering reliable voting services is difficult even in the best of circumstances, for various reasons, such as complex logistics, tight timelines, reliance on an army of temporary workers, and changes in technology, regulations, and voting or candidate requirements. With elections held in a global atmosphere of ‘radical uncertainty’ (Casas-Zamora 2024) and facing a panoply of context-related challenges in 2024 (as described in companion chapters and in Nord and Lindberg 2024), the predictability needed to build electoral trust was in short supply for those tasked with delivering them.

The large number of snap elections held in 2024 is just one vivid illustration of the political space’s volatility and fragility.¹⁸ Extreme weather, foreign interference and geopolitical turmoil create a sense of ‘normal rules interrupted’, providing an opening for discourse on how, or even if, elections should be held or the results accepted. This discourse, in turn, can be civil and constructive—or the opposite—depending on the inclination of the political actors involved. In Romania, the Constitutional Court annulled the results of the first round of the presidential election due to allegations of Russian-backed interference (France 24 2024); ostensibly, North Korean interference in South Korean elections was cited as the reason why the latter’s president invoked martial law, which was quickly overturned (Kim and Tong-Hyung 2024). The question of Ukraine’s election timing has become a topic for geopolitical posturing, beyond the legal and operational realities on the ground. The distinct contexts of Georgia, Moldova and Venezuela contributed to questions about how to interpret (and respond to) the legitimacy of processes, institutions and results.

8.1. Voting arrangements and public narratives

The trend towards EMBs’ accelerated adoption of special voting arrangements—such as advance and postal voting—and their use by voters continued in 2024. Technology at polling stations has driven this trend. Electronic voter lists, or e-poll books, often on laptops connected to a nation- or jurisdiction-wide voter register, are increasingly replacing the previously ubiquitous and standard printed voter registers specific to individual polling stations. In addition, in-station tabulators and touch-screen voting are replacing manual vote counting and delivering rapid results. In-station printers and touchscreen voting also make it possible to print out-of-jurisdiction ballot papers on demand, which, in combination with tabulators, are replacing the slower and more cumbersome ‘tendered’ ballot system. In combination, these technologies make voting more convenient, accommodate voting anywhere, and ensure faster and arguably more accurate results.

However, these technological advances and the global move towards special voting arrangements to accommodate voters for convenience and necessity have introduced new areas of contestation alongside the palpable benefits (Barrat et al. 2023). Whether warranted or not, postal, advance and out-of-country voting are frequently a source of concern for domestic actors. Anecdotal evidence supporting such concerns can be quickly amplified and disseminated in the current information environment, particularly when aligned with conspiracy theories or political interests. In the United States, for example, pre-election polling shows that confidence in the accuracy of election results among Republican voters dropped from 55 per cent to 28 per cent between 2016 and 2024, while 84 per cent of Democratic voters expressed confidence in the results (Saad 2024). The difference is remarkable and mirrors the narratives about the trustworthiness of electoral processes that each side is exposed to, particularly the concerted ‘stop the steal’ campaign on the Republican side, focusing on the vulnerabilities of postal votes.

For EMBs, the trust-building challenge is to mitigate the genuine vulnerabilities inherent in special voting arrangements and new technologies, while also anticipating the critical or misleading narratives about those vulnerabilities. This challenge is particularly difficult for under-resourced or under-prepared EMBs, where delays or weak capacity on the ground can compound the problems in expanding operations and rolling out reforms. Relentless and often personalized online criticism (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) can impact an EMB’s reputation and affect staff morale. The unpredictability of the context in which EMBs work and the vitriol about their work present new and profound trust challenges for EMBs: they are expected to ensure electoral stability in an unstable world and familiarity when electoral processes are changing. Regardless of the justifiable and underlying reasons for any reform, changes in electoral procedures will be seen through a political lens, shaped by the particular national context, how the change is presented and how the changes are rolled out. Distrust can be compounded by operational problems that are seen to affect voters or candidates disproportionately or unfairly.

Changes in voting technologies are closely tied to trust, in that a successful and smooth rollout is more straightforward in a high-trust environment. Conversely, technological reforms can spark controversy or undermine trust, underlining how the technical and the political are inseparable in electoral reform processes; that is, trust can be the deciding factor when determining whether a reform is perceived as a success or a failure. For example, electronic voting machines (EVMs)—widely used and accepted in India—were nearly introduced in Botswana in 2019 but were ultimately rejected because of the public’s ‘mixed feelings’ and vocal assertions about their vulnerabilities and claims that certain rights could not be guaranteed (Afrobarometer 2017). Namibia was the first African country to introduce EVMs in 2014 but reverted to paper ballots for similar reasons, following a constitutional court decision (Electoral Commission of Namibia 2023). Similarly, the failure of a pilot Internet voting system (iVote) in three local government elections in New South Wales, Australia, in 2022 has made other states less willing to embark on similar schemes (Kwan 2022; James, Clark and Asplund 2023: 94). Vote-anywhere systems underwent a smooth introduction in British Columbia, Canada (see Box 8.2), in 2024, and a bumpy one in Namibia (Links 2024).

The Election Commission of Namibia is known as one of the most stable and experienced EMBs in Africa (Siegle and Cook 2024), accustomed to serving the country’s voting population of just under 1.4 million. Their experience of preparing for the 27 November 2024 elections, however, illustrates well the twin logistical and reputational difficulties of rolling out complex electoral reform in a moment of political change. Trust building among political parties and stakeholders was tested again and again—in respect of the vote-anywhere reform, the procurement of suppliers for ballot papers, the decision to announce the results of early voting before election day and the decision to extend voting by two additional days to accommodate the problems that had arisen on polling day.

The Namibian experience illustrates the interlinked virtual or vicious spiral between logistics and trust that is typical for electoral management. Steps introduced in the voting process, such as manually entering voters’ details and recording the details on ballot stubs, contributed to delays that plagued the election. The election was marred by the overheating and malfunctioning of the voter verification technology, delays in ballot distribution, long queues that explained the emergency decision to extend voting by several days and the delayed announcement of the results (Al Jazeera 2024; Links 2024; Muyeghu 2024). These logistical issues were interpreted by some observers as evidence of unfairness (‘voter suppression’) (Groenewald 2024) or incompetence (Groenewald 2024; Links 2024).

Whether warranted or not, these narratives of unfairness or incompetence are examples of typical challenges to morale and reputation caused by electoral reforms or mishaps as discussed in earlier chapters. A story about an election can linger longer than the explanation of what happened or explanations of the steps that have been taken to avoid future incidents. In 2024 a commission of inquiry into postal elections in Poland declared that introducing an ‘envelope voting’ experiment during the pandemic was an abuse of power and outside the limits of the law (Polish News 2024). Because of the controversy and resulting lack of trust in how it was handled, any possibility of introducing mail-in ballots in the future was set back (Polish News 2024).

The case of British Columbia (see Box 8.2) provides a hopeful story of incorporating trust building into the introduction of vote-anywhere technology and tabulators. The reform was introduced with few issues and no pushback from voters or political stakeholders, meaning that these practices can be smoothly incorporated as standard practice from now on.

8.2. Trust building as an explicit agenda item

Declining trust in electoral processes is fuelled and exacerbated by narratives spread through digital platforms. When narratives alleging fraud are coordinated or amplified by algorithms, they can disrupt the orderly transfer of power and incite violence. Given the potential threats to societal stability and regional security, regulating or mitigating the potential harms stemming from the online environment is at the top of the policy agenda. EMBs worldwide are experiencing unprecedented public scrutiny that is pushing previously under-the-radar election operations into the spotlight. A viral image can trigger a disproportionate narrative—or one that is entirely disconnected from reality. For example, an image of someone carrying a ballot box or of a truck approaching a counting centre can be shared and reshared on social media as alleged evidence of wrongdoing—when the reality may be innocuous; after all, ballot boxes need to be moved at some point, and trucks do pass counting centres.¹⁹

In response to these contextual challenges, EMBs are intentionally prioritizing trust building and seeking ways to quantify, monitor and reinforce public trust. The closed-door, EMB-led Canberra to Stockholm Exchange²⁰ involved candid discussions about security, cybersecurity and misinformation, highlighting community trust building as an antidote to pressing concerns (Australian Electoral Commission 2024a).

Elections Canada’s electoral integrity framework (see Figure 8.2) is an example of an approach that places trust building at the forefront, emphasizing core values of independence from political pressure, operational reliability and transparency of processes (Elections Canada n.d.). By putting security and fairness on an equal footing, the framework signals to staff and stakeholders that the ‘softer’ dimensions of election management are taken seriously.

In British Columbia, the introduction of a wide range of new technologies for the 2024 provincial elections prompted a focus on messaging that emphasized the values of non-partisanship and the processes and procedures in place to ensure integrity (Elections BC n.d.a). This focus on explaining the integrity of the process aligns with an approach that is often used in the justice sector: people are more likely to accept an outcome (e.g. of a court case)—even if it is unfavourable—if they believe that the process that led to the outcome was trustworthy (Tyler 2003).

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) is managing its reputation by improving its public communication to monitor and rapidly respond to narratives that undermine trust. In addition, it is piloting innovative programmes to strengthen front-line operations, such as its Operational Leaders Programme, which is investing heavily in ongoing skills development for outpost staff through hands-on training opportunities and peer support, upgrading training facilities and experimenting with readiness exercises for temporary election workers (Australian Electoral Commission 2023, 2024b, 2025).

The AEC writes the following in its corporate plan ‘Maintaining citizen faith in the electoral process, and trust in electoral outcomes, is the overarching aim of all election management bodies. Failure to achieve this can lead to disputed elections, mistrust and democratic instability. The AEC must continuously adapt to an increasingly unpredictable environment to deliver successful electoral events into the future’ (Australian Electoral Commission 2024c).

Fiji’s newly adopted strategic plan puts trust at the centre of its mission to ‘deliver electoral services that have the trust and confidence of our stakeholders’ (Fijian Elections Office 2023). To heal previous rifts in stakeholder relationships, multi-stakeholder community trust building was introduced as an intrinsic part of the strategic plan and ongoing work programme (see ‘Collaboration’ and ‘Stakeholder Engagement’ as one of the strategic pillars in Figure 8.3). In practice, this type of trust building involves systematic and formalized cooperation with organizations that have established positions that are deeply rooted in Fiji’s communities and that are able to reinforce accurate information about the electoral process in language and ways that resonate locally (Chand 2024).

The lessons learned from the Swedish Election Authority’s performance during the European Parliament elections in 2024 highlighted concerns about how confusion surrounding party registration and the ballot system could be politicized or misinterpreted as partisan (Valmyndigheten 2024). These concerns built on the findings of a commissioned report that focused specifically on how and why Swedish elections are trusted, in light of criticism of the ballot paper system and fears that American-style attacks on electoral integrity could spread to an otherwise highly trusted Swedish agency and process (Cederholm Lager, Oscarsson and Solevid 2023).

The examples from highly trusted EMBs show that even the most stable electoral democracies are no longer complacent when it comes to electoral trust or assumptions that the results of an election will be accepted. Since many of the threats facing elections, such as foreign interference and extreme weather events, are beyond the scope or mandate of EMBs, we are also seeing greater inter-agency cooperation to address potential threats. Responding effectively under the pressures of an election requires trust between agencies and officials. To this end, we are seeing an increase in joint training and risk-management programming, as well as the appointment of liaison officers across security, civil contingency, intelligence and infrastructure work. Finland, for example, has an election security cooperation group that includes the Ministry of Justice (which serves as the EMB), the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Cyber Security Office and the secretary of the Security Committee.

8.3. Conclusion

The year 2024 was marked by a generalized sense of flux, characterized by a plethora of snap elections, dramatic weather events, profound geopolitical shifts and polarizing politics. The super-cycle framing and the high-profile elections held in 2024 focused the attention of both the media and the public on issues that impact trust in electoral management and EMBs. This focus amplified concerns about foreign interference, propelled political interest, and highlighted the need for investments in electoral integrity and other measures.

EMBs are acutely aware of these dynamics and, at best, are incorporating trust building into their strategies and working modalities. They are making an effort to explain their processes, changes and decisions, to collaborate with other societal actors to counter disinformation, and are working closely with those at the front lines of electoral trust—temporary election workers and community-level political and civil society actors.

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By the end of 2024, 1.6 billion people across 74 national elections in 62 countries²¹ had cast ballots. The outcome was accepted in the vast majority of these national elections. While people were allowed to vote freely for their preferred candidate—and many did so, with an average global voter turnout of 61 per cent—others were not. Indeed, there were elections held in 2024 where every effort was made to mimic free elections but no intention of tolerating a result other than an incumbent win, whether by controlling the slate of candidates or hindering the publication of results, as in Venezuela.

Institutions, regulatory frameworks and global norms established in previous generations to ensure a level playing field for elections were sorely tested. Domestic, foreign and non-state actors used money and media to influence or undermine elections unduly on every inhabited continent, including high-profile cases in Georgia, Romania and the USA. Setbacks seen in 2024 also included problems that are neither new nor unique, such as instances of vote buying, electoral violence, the circumvention of political consensus on electoral reform and the undermining of the independence of electoral management bodies (EMBs).

Technological shifts, societal tensions, migration and climate change are altering how voting is arranged and how EMBs prepare for elections and engage with stakeholders. There was no room for complacency in even the most established democracies in 2024, with elections held in the face of extreme temperatures or technology failures, from India to Namibia.

The resilience and leadership shown by those working to deliver the many elections held in 2024 when confronted with such challenging circumstances point to key lessons and implications for the future.

9.1. Trustworthy delivery of elections

Delivery challenges in the elections covered by this review included maintaining accurate voter registers; recruiting, training and retaining enough temporary staff to administer polling; addressing technology-related problems; and enforcing campaign finance regulations. Those responding to these challenges focused on improving working conditions and training, communicating proactively with the public throughout the electoral cycle, and bolstering organizational capacity to identify risks and navigate unforeseen situations and narratives as they arose. Delivering the core functions of an electoral process while addressing these ongoing and evolving challenges requires adequate and sustainable funding.

This report has highlighted the dangers of impunity for electoral malpractice and shown that the annulment of an election is a drastic measure that should not be taken lightly. Election results are more likely to be accepted when an EMB delivers on its mandate and is recognized as doing its best even in the most difficult circumstances, and when political actors refrain from undermining the EMB’s reputation for short-term gain.

9.2. Safeguarding electoral reform

In a world shaped by shifting demographics and technological advances, electoral reforms can drive efficiency gains and innovation to bolster election delivery and voter participation. As this report warns, however, incumbents can use changes to electoral processes and institutions to entrench power, exclude the opposition and disenfranchise citizens. These threats highlight the importance of electoral reform processes and safeguards.

The well-designed electoral reform processes showcased in this review involved transparent and well-defined procedures and milestones that encouraged political consensus building and carefully explained rollout steps.

9.3. Security and duty of care

The review points to in-person and online aggression against election workers and electoral institutions, with implications for recruitment, training and security measures. Women in various electoral roles, whether candidates or electoral officials, and those known as members of particular societal groups are disproportionately affected as targets in that they are subjected to cruel, disparaging attacks that are directly related to their identity. More broadly, incidents of government-sponsored violence, clashes between political actors and violent attacks on election workers, as described in this report, are anathema to the idea of elections as a celebration of democracy and citizen engagement.

Measures outlined in the report to mitigate or address aggressive behaviour include strengthening legal protections, empowering domestic watchdogs, enforcing interparty codes of conduct and supporting international judicial processes. Improving data collection through mapping, observation reports and assessments builds an evidence base for effective interventions, while coordinating efforts across sectors with relevant mandates and expertise, such as EMBs, security agencies, civil society and technology companies, is critical for prompt, responsive action when emergencies arise.

9.4. Preparing for the unexpected

From the pandemic onwards, preparing for the unexpected has become the new reality for election administrators. This report illustrates this reality through a step-by-step examination of how natural hazards are disrupting electoral processes at levels unimaginable in the recent past, making it imperative for policymakers and election officials to consider climate adaptation in their planning and decision making and to incorporate risk management, resilience building and crisis management into their work.

While operational training and professional development aimed at protecting elections during emergencies and crises are essential, EMBs cannot do this work alone, and future-proofing electoral processes comes with a cost. This cost requires timely and impartial funding. Further investment and whole-of-government support for EMBs will help guarantee that elections can be held in challenging weather or security-related conditions. Such investment can be supported by policy-oriented conversations about the designation of elections as part of critical infrastructure.

9.5. Attentiveness to the information environment surrounding elections

Addressing harmful online actions and threats requires moving beyond reactive responses and adopting proactive, pre-emptive measures through well-structured inter-agency cooperation. Building resilience to misinformation and disinformation requires a coordinated, multi-stakeholder approach. Early detection, situational-awareness systems and enhanced cooperation across sectors help pre-empt the escalation of misleading information. Credible institutions play a critical role in mitigating the impact of misinformation and disinformation when they are seen as reliable sources of information.

9.6. Increased inter-agency cooperation

Electoral integrity challenges are multifaceted and complex, often going beyond what an electoral management body can prevent, withstand or recover from. Managing challenges often requires a whole-of-government or whole-of-society approach in the face of cyberthreats, misinformation and disinformation, extreme weather events or election-related violence. Effective election protection requires the formal engagement of a broad range of stakeholders, each bringing relevant mandates, expertise and resources to the effort. EMBs will benefit from regular coordination with other government agencies, civil society organizations and media throughout the electoral cycle while upholding their independence.

The sheer number of elections in 2024 provided an opportunity to assess the profound changes in how elections are conducted and the increasingly complex contexts in which they are held. The challenges visible in 2024 are shaping the global democratic landscape in 2025 and beyond. Already in 2025 we see electoral management bodies leading inter-agency cooperation, multi-stakeholder dialogue and transnational conversations to address existing and future threats to electoral integrity. It is incumbent on democracy actors to support them in these efforts.