A Sigh of Relief for Democracies: The Adoption of the WSIS+20 Outcome Document

For democracies around the world, the adoption of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+20) outcome document feels like a collective sigh of relief. At a time when competing visions for the Internet are gaining traction, this agreement reaffirms the multistakeholder model of governance, strengthens commitments to gender equality and human rights, and makes the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) a permanent institution. Yet, the process could have unfolded very differently. What it ultimately revealed are two starkly contrasting models for the future of the global Internet. Although the WSIS embraces a multistakeholder approach to Internet governance, involving stakeholders such as academics, digital experts, youth, and the private sector, it remains fundamentally intergovernmental. Its political declarations and action lines are negotiated and endorsed by states, and their implementation largely depends on national governments. Nevertheless, non-state actors play an increasingly  influential, albeit non-decisional role in the process. Given the structure of the process, the perspectives of state actors play a crucial role in the final decision-making stages and ultimately in the document’s adoption.

Throughout the review process, it has become apparent that, compared to the WSIS+10 — the 10-year review cycle of the WSIS outcome document — positions held by states have grown increasingly fragmented. The global consensus that once seemingly existed on how to secure an open, secure, and inclusive Internet, has gradually shifted into a contested battlefield. Some maintain that the Internet should champion multistakeholderism and be grounded in existing human rights frameworks, while others aim to advance a narrative that digital governance should be state-centric and respect the digital sovereignty of states. This narrative leaves the space for states to weaponize the Internet, and use digital technologies as a tool for control, repression, and surveillance. The latter narrative is maintained mostly by a bloc that consists of China, Russia, and other authoritarian regimes whilst the former is posited by the like-minded democracies.

The deepening of this divide jeopardizes the universality of the open Internet model, one governed by shared democratic norms and principles online. Instead, the Internet risks losing its democratic foundation and turning into a state-led order, managed independently. This fragmentation illustrates what was at stake at the WSIS+20. It was not merely a periodic review; it was bound to determine whether the fault lines between the two blocks can be bridged and whether the democratic integrity of the process can be safeguarded.  

China and other authoritarian regimes present the Internet as an indispensable tool for advancing sustainable development. This narrative may sound constructive but conceals deeper motives. Their calls for scaling up investment, infrastructure development, training, scientific cooperation, and digital literacy in developing states appear innocent on the surface. Yet this language serves as a diplomatic cover for an Internet governance model that prioritizes state-control over openness. The bloc also maintains that digital technologies must be people-centered. Unlike a truly human-centered approach, a people-centered approach allows governments to privilege groups that affiliate with the regime while sidelining dissenting voices and marginalized peoples. Similarly, this narrative insists that the sovereignty of other countries and their national legislation ought to be respected. Digital sovereignty is not solely about technological autonomy; it is also about centralizing control, avoiding global norms, and enabling unilateral decision-making over national digital infrastructure. This approach raises serious concerns about the enjoyment of democratic rights online, including freedom of expression and privacy.

China is the primary advocate for the digital sovereignty narrative and has worked to advance global alignment with these ideas. This concept has gained traction, particularly among developing states, as China promotes digital sovereignty as a means of strengthening national ownership of digital technologies and infrastructure. This allows them to escape economic dependencies and foster their own technological market. Despite being promoted as a means to foster national ownership, digital sovereignty increasingly serves as a façade for state-controlled technologies that sidestep global norms. Thus, creating unchecked environments where governments can weaponize digital tools for surveillance and repression.

Although Russia projected a seemingly more collaborative posture during the WSIS+20 review process, its approach was calculated and strategic. Moscow remained firm in rejecting parallel UN processes, such as the Global Digital Compact (GDC), which seeks to guide digital cooperation alongside WSIS. While most member states advocated for alignment between WSIS and the GDC to avoid duplication and inefficiency, Russia opposed this consensus. Russia portrays the GDC, as a non-consensual, non-binding framework dominated by Western priorities. Russia argued that WSIS should remain the sole foundation of ICT governance. This stance reflects a broader goal of preserving its influence in a process where Russia has established influence, while resisting frameworks perceived as diluting its control or imposing liberal norms.

With regards to the human rights, Russia’s language was deliberate. By insisting on the need for international legal obligations to take precedence over, often more ambitious, national interpretations it sought to constrain commitments that could challenge its domestic practices. Similarly, Russia critiques the multistakeholder model of Internet governance as unjust and geopolitically vulnerable. This rhetoric, framed as respect for national legislation, masks an effort to legitimize unilateral control over digital governance while escaping external scrutiny. Russia’s diplomatic language serves to promote a governance model that prioritizes regime scrutiny over openness, accountability, and democratic rights online.  

Meanwhile, democratic countries advocate the multistakeholder model as an indispensable principle of Internet governance. The multistakeholder model is more than a mere technical principle; it embodies the vision of an open, inclusive, and collaborative digital ecosystem. This model ensures that governance is distributed among governments and stakeholders, ensuring that no single state can monopolize control over Internet governance. One of the most visible expressions of this vision is the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The IGF is a cornerstone of dialogue, where diverse stakeholders come together to discuss Internet governance issues. For democratic countries, strengthening the IGF means ensuring the meaningful participation of all stakeholders in the process, regardless of their size or influence. Safeguarding the multistakeholder model allows democracies to maintain a rules-based order online, and secure a digital space conducive to transparency, accountability, and inclusivity. Democratic states envision a digital ecosystem anchored in international human rights law, while fortifying collaboration with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to align governance with universal principles. This is a strategic effort to prevent the Internet from fragmenting into isolated, state-controlled islands that undermine the openness and integrity of the information society. By rejecting sovereignty-based governance frameworks, they aim to preserve a global Internet that remains a space for collaboration, innovation, and empowerment rather than control. Preserving the multistakeholder model guarantees that the Internet will continue to act as a driver of democratic values globally.

The adoption of the WSIS+20 outcome document marks a significant moment for global Internet governance. On the one hand, the adoption is a temporary reassurance for democracies and advocates of the multistakeholder model. Yet, the process reflected the deepening competition between two opposing visions of Internet governance: one rooted in openness, inclusivity, and shared responsibility, and another anchored in state control and sovereignty. This divide will not diminish in the near future. As digital fragmentation grows, driven by geopolitical tensions, competing governance frameworks, and technological autonomy, the struggle between these blocs will continue to shape the future of the Internet. This leaves us questioning how the international community will navigate this increasingly polarized landscape while safeguarding the principles that made the Internet a catalyst of innovation, connectivity, and collaboration.