Presidential Elections, 12 May and 1 June 2025

Poland held its 2025 presidential election in two rounds, on 12 May and 1 June 2025, under a two-round majoritarian system. If no candidate surpasses 50 per cent in the first round, a runoff is held between the top two contenders. Poland is a semi-presidential republic with a directly elected president who serves as head of state; s/he has the right of legislative initiative as well as the power to veto and refer bills to the Sejm, the lower house of the parliament (OSCE/ODIHR 2025c).

Elections are administered by the National Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, PKW), which is composed of nine judges drawn from the Supreme Court, Constitutional Tribunal, and Supreme Administrative Court (Poland 2025). The National Election Office (KBW) was supported the PKW with operational planning, including personnel training and technical logistics (OSCE/ODIHR 2025). The incumbent, Andrzej Duda, did not seek reelection. There were 13 candidates, only two of whom were women. The runoff was contested between Karol Nawrocki, backed by the Law and Justice Party (PiS), and Rafał Trzaskowski, the Civic Platform (PO) candidate (IFES).

A range of Special Voting Arrangements (SVAs) were available to the electorate. Voters could, in person, request absentee voting certificates to cast a ballot at any polling station. Voters with certified disabilities could apply for proxy and postal voting or request assignment to accessible polling stations (OSCE/ODIHR 2025a). Out-of-country voting was held in 511 polling stations across 92 countries and required prior registration online, by email, or submitted in writing (OSCE/ODIHR 2025a). 

Both rounds of the election took place in a highly polarized media environment (OSCE/ODIHR 20254a; 2025b) with ‘pronounced editorial biases’ amplifying the ‘confrontational’ campaign, which in turn reflected societal divides on gender, reproductive rights and Ukraine, among others. Women’s full and equal participation in politics continues to be constrained by demeaning language in public discourse and disproportionate exposure to harassment online, including threatening comments on social media in response to political activity or public positions (Rogowska 2025OSCE/ODIHR 2025a). Inflammatory and derogatory rhetoric declined in the second-round campaign, but far-right narratives targeting migrants and other minorities continued to feature, including online (OECD/ODIHR 2025b). 

Recent funding suspensions to public media (Television Poland, Polskie Radio and Polish Press Agency) had meant ad hoc government financing instead. Combined with lack of safeguards, this undermined editorial freedom and financial sustainability. (OSCE/ODIHR 2025a). Poland’s National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) holds a formal mandate to enforce media impartiality, but KRRiT’s own impartiality was questioned, including by the Supreme Audit Office (in May 2025) and by observers during the campaign (OSCE/ODIHR 20254a; 2025b).

Authorities deployed monitoring and cybersecurity measures to counter digital disinformation and cyberattacks attempted during the first round, including those linked to Russian sources (OSCE/ODIHR 20254a). Despite proactive efforts to counter disinformation and cyber threats, the lack of a fully implemented national framework under the EU Digital Services Act left regulatory gaps, with content moderation uneven across platforms and limited transparency in interactions between the state and large digital platforms (OSCE/ODIHR 2025a). 

Election day was peaceful and well administered in the areas observed by the OSCE/ODIHR. Voting began on time and followed regular procedures, though ballot secrecy was often compromised due to polling station layout or voter behaviour (OSCE/ODIHR 2025b). Limited issues included group voting and accessibility shortcomings in some locations. Vote counting and early tabulation were assessed as transparent and efficient (OSCE/ODIHR 2025a).

Supreme Court hearings relating to pre-election cases were closed to the public and did not allow appellants to be heard, raising transparency concerns (OSCE/ODIHR 2025a). On the two election days police recorded a total of over 665 offences and misdemeanours, including disturbances of public order, damage to campaign materials, illegal transfer of data, attempts by voters to remove ballots, and breaches of campaign silence regulations (OSCE/ODIHR 20254a; 2025b)

Voter turnout was 67.31 per cent in the first round and 71.63 per cent in the second (International IDEA n.d.), the highest of any presidential election since Poland regained independence in 1989. Karol Nawrocki was elected with 50.89 per cent of the vote, defeating Rafał Trzaskowski on 49.11 per cent (IFES 2025). The close result reflected high electoral engagement and marked a change in presidential leadership.

Innovations

In the lead-up to the 2025 presidential election, Poland implemented targeted amendments to its Electoral Code passed in early 2023. These reforms expanded state obligations to support voters with disabilities and residents of rural areas, including subsidized transport to polling stations (EPDE 2023). The 2023 reforms also increased the number of overseas voting locations, contributing to a high turnout of 89.21 per cent in the Polish diaspora (Polskie Radio 2025). 

Amendments passed by the Sejm to expand protections against hate speech to include sexual orientation, gender, age, and disability. The amendments were referred by President Duda the Constitutional Tribunal for review in April 2025, citing concerns that they could infringe on freedom of speech (OSCE/ODIHR 2025a; International IDEA n.d.b). 

A centralized national voter register was introduced, allowing for passive registration of all eligible domestic voters based on national civil records, thereby reducing duplication and improving accuracy (OSCE/ODIHR 2025c). In parallel, the PKW introduced an online voter information platform offering guidance on polling‑station locators, verification of registration, and candidate lists (PKW n.d.).