Democratic decline and conflict: a spurious correlation or a cause for concern?

A quick scan of the newspapers leaves one with the distinct impression that democracy is down and war is up. The most recent Global State of Democracy report highlights this same confluence of trends. It is easy to leap to conclusions about how these fit together. But, as we all know, correlation does not imply causation. In a world full of data, spurious correlations are everywhere. Amusing examples include those between the number of movies Nicolas Cage appears in per year and the number of security screeners in North Dakota, and butter consumption and movie theatre ticket prices. However, once in a while, we find a correlation that is ripe with possibilities and potential importance, and the twin trends of increasing conflict and broadening democratic decline is clearly in this category. 

Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program have recorded a steady increase in the number of conflicts around the world since 2010. As illustrated in the graph below, over the same period, the number of countries that are experiencing at least a low level of democratic backsliding has steadily increased. The picture gets more complicated (but also more interesting) when we note that the increase in conflicts in the 1990s happened at the same time as the increase in the number of countries experiencing democratic growth. The apparent connection between significant changes in democracy and conflict cannot be easily dismissed as a spurious correlation.

Figure 1: Comparison between trends in conflict and democracy

Sources: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organized violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046 ; International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices, 1975–2025, v. 10, 2026. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-indices 

We dug into this in some depth in the Global State of Democracy report, revisiting a well-established area of scholarly enquiry with a new motivation. As documented in the first part of this year’s Global State of Democracy report—and many reports like it—democracy has been in decline for at least a decade. What does that mean for the risk of conflict around the world, both for countries experiencing declines and for their neighbours? The scholarly literature provides some indications based on what has been observed in history, while the most recent data from the UCDP and International IDEA help us to understand how those lessons apply today.

First, while democracies are not less prone to engage in warfare than non-democracies, they almost never engage in warfare with each other. Prolonged democratic decline has left the world in a situation in which this ‘democratic peace’ applies in fewer places than it once did. Put simply: there are fewer pairs of countries that are almost certain not to go to war. In recent years, both democracies and autocracies have started interstate conflicts, but democracies have not attacked other democracies. Democratic breakdowns in foreign countries are therefore a long-term national security risk for democracies.

Figure 2: Regime type pairs as share of all pairs (dyads) over time

Source: Skaaning, S.-E., Gerring, J. and Bartusevičius, H., 'A lexical index of electoral democracy', Comparative Political Studies, 48/12 (2015), pp. 1491–1525. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015581050 

Second, there is a specific semi-democratic condition that scholars have often found to be associated with higher levels of conflict, and it is increasingly widespread. Sometimes called a hybrid regime, some countries have established the formal institutions and procedures of democracy (such as constitutions, elections, legislatures, and courts), but the country’s political elites are not committed to the substantive practices of democracy. The classic symptoms of this political context are parties that never lose elections and courts that never rule against the government. In the 1990s, there was concern that failure to consolidate full democracy would leave many countries in a political context in which political leaders would use conflict as a tool to establish their authority or rally support. Today, as democracy deteriorates, there is a risk that those conflict-risk conditions will develop again, this time through a decline from weak democracy to hybridity.

Figure 3: Number of conflicts per year by type of conflict

Sources: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organized violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046 .

Third, as the globalization deepened the connections between countries, the number of conflicts classified as internationalized intrastate conflicts has grown. In such conflicts, third party governments have intervened in an ostensibly domestic conflict to support one side or the other. In many cases, wealthy countries with high levels of democracy have participated in conflicts far from their national territory, often seeking to establish stability under an internationally recognized government. This dynamic contributes to one of the surprising findings from the UCDP data: the number of conflicts and conflict-participating states has grown, while the number of countries with conflict on their territory has not. 

As the full analysis in the report shows, the correlation between the number of countries with declines in democracy and the number of conflicts over the past decade is not spurious, but there is no simple causal connection. Rather, the contemporary international environment is increasingly characterized by the concentration of power domestically and by uncertainty in international relations. The long historical record shows that democracy contributes to peace, and peace contributes to democracy. Today, there are far too many countries that lack both. 

What should be done then? The report limits itself to three recommendations. First, without denying the importance of developing robust military capabilities, we argue that there is a strongly positive cost-benefit ratio for democracy support and that this should be understood to be part of a holistic national security strategy. Expanding the scope of the democratic peace is much cheaper than preparing to fight a war. Second, social cohesion can make a powerful contribution to both democratic quality and a reduction in the risk of violent conflict. Since this quality of a healthy society has leverage in both areas of vital interest, it should be a key point for further support. Third, as we look abroad, our focus should be on the countries where declines in democracy raise the risk of conflict. Many internationally engaged actors, including business, donors, and governments, should develop strategies to act quickly wherever it is in the scope of their competence and authority to support democracy in contexts where democratic breakdown carries an increased risk of conflict.