General Election 17 August 2025

Bolivia held elections on 17 August 2025, followed by the 2nd round on 19 October 2025. The aim of the elections was to elect the president, vice-president and members of the legislature (International IDEA n.d.). The elections were organized by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral – TSE) divided into nine Departmental Electoral Tribunals, one for each Bolivian departmental region. TSE consists of seven members – one of them is chosen by the president, while the rest – by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly. According to the law, TSE must consist of at least three women and 2 Indigenous persons. Departmental Electoral Tribunals consists of five members, where at least 2 must be women and one – a person with indigenous background (OEP 2025).

International observers reported that the elections were generally orderly and peaceful, nonetheless the occurrence of disinformation and unequal media access for candidates during the campaign period were pointed out (International IDEA n.d.). Further challenges include the weak political and campaign finance system, the need for stronger enforcement mechanisms to address political violence against women, and inconsistencies regarding the candidate registration process (EEAS 2025a).

Instances of misinformation like fraud allegations, conspiracy theories targeting the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and calls to invalidate votes during the campaign were observed, especially in regard to social media platforms. During the run-off campaign, there were smear campaigns, defamatory accusations, and personal attacks that increased and expanded from social media to traditional media outlets, worsening the tone of political debate. Fake AI videos and audio recordings circulating online that misattributed crimes or statements to politicians were also observed (EEAS 2025b). 

When it comes to media coverage, paid electoral advertising among presidential candidates on major television and radio outlets was unevenly distributed. During the first round, media coverage was strongly polarized between pro-government and pro-opposition outlets, and equity in candidate coverage was not respected. It has been stated that most monitored broadcasters provided balanced airtime, however, the highest-rated private television channels qualitatively favored one presidential ticket throughout the campaign. Despite a ban on government advertising during most of the campaign period, there was a number of advertisements promoting the outgoing president and government achievements, as well as extensive use of official social media to showcase public works observed. Moreover, the campaign finances could not be effectively controlled due to lack of auditors and the financing rules changing. There have been cases of office holders misusing state resources to support campaigns, as well as unequal access to public spaces for candidates depending on which political authority controlled the municipality (EEAS 2025b).

When it comes to challenges regarding the candidate registration, it was observed that final candidate lists were published only one day before election day, after ballots had already been printed. Late withdrawals of candidates and entire lists, including Nueva Generación Patriótica (NGP) and Movimiento Renovador Nacionalista (Morena), contributed to voter confusion. Moreover, following the first round, several parliamentary and supranational seats were allocated despite the corresponding lists being vacant or including disqualified candidates (EEAS 2025b). It has been stated that criteria used in various registration cases were inconsistent, leading to late registrations or exclusion of candidates (OAS 2025).

In the absence of clear legal frameworks, the TSE relied on ad hoc decisions to address issues such as vacant supranational seats, updates to the voter register, observer accreditation, and mandate extensions across different levels of election administration. The TSE also failed to consistently publish regulations and instructions in a timely manner, with key rules including those governing constituency delimitation and the preliminary results system that were made public several weeks after their adoption. Plenary sessions were mostly conducted behind closed doors, and meeting minutes were not released. Over the course of the electoral process, 16 constitutional challenges were brought against electoral decisions. Contradictory rulings on presidential term limits, along with the continued service of five of nine Constitutional Court magistrates beyond the expiration of their mandates, further undermined confidence in the impartiality of state institutions (EEAS 2025b).

Election day proceeded peacefully and in an orderly manner. Overall, the procedures were rated as good or very good in 53 out of 55 polling stations observed by the EU EOM during opening. However, some procedural issues were noted, particularly the inconsistent enforcement of mobile phone restrictions. During the counting process, observers reported several irregularities: in 11 of 53 observations, unused ballots were not annulled; in 19 cases, votes were not cross-checked against voter signatures; and in 10 instances, polling staff faced difficulties completing the results protocols. Additionally, the regulations for the preliminary results transmission system were only agreed upon one month before election day, which limited the time available for preparation (EEAS 2025b). Isolated incidents of electoral violence were reported against three presidential candidates, including incidents in Yapacaní, Cochabamba, Batallas, Caranavi, and Sacaba between 12 July and 13 August (EEAS 2025b).

After the elections women are expected to hold 52.4% of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. In the Chamber of Deputies, 66 of 130 seats (50.7%) will be occupied by women, up from 46.2% previously. In the Senate, women will hold 21 of 36 seats (58.3%), an increase from the earlier 55.6% (International IDEA n.d.). 

There were cases of women candidates at the national level being targets of online violence, including systematic campaigns of hate speech, coordinated misogynistic insults, threats, intimidation, disinformation, and delegitimization on social and traditional media, as well as sexualized harassment, racist and classist abuse, humiliation, ridicule, incitement to violence, and even calls for candidates to “disappear,” placing some candidacies at risk. In the second round, hateful content resurged and intensified — including racist, sexist, and homophobic attacks — even though no women, LGBTIQ+ or Indigenous candidates were competing (Bolivia Verifica Elecciones 2025; SOS Digital 2025; EUEOM 2025; Observatorio de Género 2025). There were also patterns of intimidation, public shaming, stigmatization, delegitimization, and coercion, including pressure to withdraw candidacies, which led at least one woman to resign (Observatorio de Género 2025).  

Voting in Bolivia is mandatory. The voter turnout in the first round was 86.9 per cent, and 85.3 per cent in the second round. The PDC obtained the most seats in the Chamber of Deputies at 49 out of 130 seats, while Libre won 39 seats and Unidad won 26 seats. In the Senate, 16 seats went to PDC, 12 to Libre, 7 to Unidad, and one to APB Súmate (IFES 2026). Rodrigo Paz of the Christian Democrat Party was elected President with 55.0 per cent of the vote compared to 45 per cent of the votes for Jorge Tuto Quiroga of LIBRE (International IDEA n.d.).