General Elections, January-February 2026

In the weeks leading up to the 2026 election, Portugal was hit by a series of deadly storms that raged across the Iberian Peninsula, including Storm Leonardo, which hit just a couple of days before election day. The storms brought heavy rain, strong winds and rising river levels, causing the destruction of homes, businesses and equipment, fallen trees and structures, landslides, road closures, the closing of schools and transport services, and power and water cutoffs. Several people were killed during the Leonardo and Kristin Storms, which also caused hundreds of injuries and forced more than 200 people to evacuate their homes (Bruxo, 2026; DN/Lusa, 2026; The Guardian, 2026).

The Portuguese Government declared a state of calamity on 28 January until 1 February, [EA1] which was later extended until 8 February, and then again until 15 February for 69 municipalities (JN/Agências, 2026; Jones, 2026). Impacts were especially strong in the municipalities of Alcácer do Sal and Leiria due to the overflowing of the Sado and Lis rivers. Alcácer do Sal saw downtown areas flooded and water levels reaching 2 metres in some locations (De Ruiter, 2026). The Douro River in Porto, the second-biggest city, also overflowed, causing minor flooding (Jones, 2026).

Impact on the electoral process

Due to the state of calamity and the severe impact of the storms, calls were made to postpone the second round of the presidential election set to be held on 8 February 2026. André Ventura, leader of the far-right Chega party and runner-up candidate in this deciding round was especially vocal, arguing that a large part of the country was still in a state of calamity and not capable of holding elections due to the impact of the weather conditions, therefore the vote should be delayed by a week.  However, under Portuguese electoral law, there is no legal mechanism to postpone the nationwide vote in these circumstances. The national electoral authority therefore confirmed on 5 February that the election would proceed as scheduled, noting that ‘a state of emergency, weather alerts or overall unfavorable situations are not in themselves a sufficient reason to postpone voting’ (CNE 2026; Holland & Hernández-Morales, 2026; Jones, 2026).  

The law does, on the other hand, allow for municipal mayors to postpone polling in specific polling stations as a last resort, on the basis of local, exceptional, and concrete circumstances, for example, when safety, access to polling stations, or the functioning of the voting assembly cannot be guaranteed (CNE 2026). On these grounds, 19 especially hard-hit municipalities, home to more than 31,000 registered voters in total, were given permission to delay the vote by one week (Holland & Hernández-Morales, 2026). The affected areas include Alcácer do Sal, Arruda dos Vinhos, Golegã, and two parishes in Santarém, where local officials cited safety risks, inaccessible polling stations, and states of calamity as reasons for the postponement (Pinheiro, 2026). The municipality of Pombal was also among those that had requested to postpone the election, but in the end, it decided to proceed with the elections after all. Even though the area was still suffering from power outages, communication failures, and extensive storm damage, and the Municipality acknowledged that not all residents could make a ‘calm, conscious and informed choice’ because of this, it also argued that postponing the vote for a week would not meaningfully improve these conditions (DN/Lusa, 2026). 

Author: Siri Björgengen