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Published: 22/03/2023
Votar no es elegir: el 26 de marzo en Cuba
Tal parece que desde la consolidación en el poder de la Revolución de 1959 y después de los tensos años de Guerra Fría (especialmente en la década de los sesenta con la invasión a Bahía de Cochinos y la Crisis de los Misiles), el mundo ha dado por sentado que el sistema político de Cuba—y el país mismo—son estáticos. Sin embargo, desarrollos recientes apuntan a un mayor dinamismo. Las protestas en decenas de ciudades en 2021 (las más grandes en el país desde el Maleconazo de 1994), las manifestaciones cada vez más cotidianas en 2022 y el aumento en el abstencionismo son ejemplos de ello.
El 26 de marzo, más de 8 millones de cubanas y cubanos podrán votar para renovar los 470 escaños de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular (ANPP). Esta Asamblea es el ‘órgano supremo del poder del Estado’ y a ella se subordinan las funciones legislativas, ejecutivas y judiciales. La Asamblea se encarga de elegir al presidente de la República, al Consejo de Estado, al Tribunal Supremo y a la Fiscalía General de la República, entre otros. La importancia de esta elección es clara: un cambio aquí decididamente debería influir en las políticas públicas y la vida en la isla. Ahora bien, ¿serán estas elecciones una oportunidad para que el pueblo cubano exprese su descontento, inquietudes e intereses?
En Cuba la ley establece el derecho a la participación, incluso ‘con independencia de la opinión política que se tenga’. Sin embargo, en la práctica el pueblo no puede participar ni elegir libremente a sus representantes. Sólo existe un partido político—el Partido Comunista Cubano (PCC)—quien controla los procesos electorales, al órgano electoral y las candidaturas, entre muchos otros sectores e instituciones. La oposición está penalizada. Tampoco se pueden realizar campañas electorales donde se contrasten ideas y planes de gobierno y no existe competencia entre candidatas y candidatos. Esto, de acuerdo al discurso oficial, resulta en una democracia auténtica donde el pueblo puede elegir directamente y donde se evita que oscuros intereses privados entren en la política. Desafortunadamente, esta afirmación se encuentra muy alejada de la realidad.
Dos casos ejemplifican bien el control monolítico del PCC, único elector real. Primero, aunque en teoría es el electorado quien postula candidatos ‘en asambleas públicas en acto libre’, el PCC controla el proceso. Las Comisiones de Candidaturas se integran por representantes de diversas organizaciones, entre las que se encuentran la Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución y la Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños, entre otras. Todas estas son controladas por el PCC. Segundo, aunque los miembros del Consejo Nacional Electoral (21 en total) son ratificados por la ANPP, es el PCC quien detenta todos los escaños de esta.
Para muestra un botón. Este domingo se “elegirán” 470 escaños y para ellos habrá nada más y nada menos que 470 candidatos, el mismo número que escaños disponibles. Esto -la inexistencia de partidos y competencia- se denomina voto unido o voto de la unidad y se ha utilizado, desde tiempos de Fidel Castro, como excusa soberana para mantener al país en dictadura. Así, en Cuba ‘acudir a las urnas’ no es sinónimo de libertad, sino que en este caso el verbo se reduce a su acepción mínima de asistir.
Los datos de los índices globales del Estado de la Democracia de IDEA Internacional confirman lo anterior. Para ser democracia se requiere, cuando menos, de elecciones libres y competitivas donde participe más de un partido político y haya la posibilidad de ganar, pero también (y especialmente) de perder. Esto se traduce en cuatro indicadores: elecciones limpias, partidos políticos libres, sufragio universal y gobierno electo. En Cuba, como lo muestra la gráfica, todos estos indicadores se encuentran en niveles bajos. Esto, con la excepción de sufragio universal que desafortunadamente pierde todo su contenido ante la falta de competencia en el país.
Gráfica 1. Gobierno Representativo en Cuba, 2021.
Es precisamente por esta falta de opciones, que la ciudadanía crecientemente se ha abstenido. En las elecciones municipales de 2021, 31.5% de los cubanos optó por no votar. Muy distantes quedan las tasas de participación superiores al 95% en tiempos de Fidel Castro. Cuando votar no es lo mismo que elegir y cuando las papeletas son sólo papeles sin contenido, se acaba votando con los pies o absteniéndose. Esperamos que se mantenga la presión sobre el régimen, y que en estas “elecciones”, el pueblo vuelva a quedarse en casa. Este 26 de marzo, abstenerse es votar.
Como bien refiere Transparencia Electoral en su estudio sobre las elecciones a la ANPP, en Cuba se vota, pero no se elige.
Democracy Notes
Published: 22/12/2022
Where do Western Balkan countries really stand on democratic performance?
The “one-size-fits-all” approach doesn’t work in the Western Balkans anymore. The region is often perceived as a homogenous microcosm of countries expressing the same grievances for years, rather inept at producing any fundamental changes, and stuck in purgatory. Using the catch-all term “Western Balkans” becomes increasingly challenging when discussing democratic trends in the region, because Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are each uniquely situated. These nations have gradually taken different trajectories. Recognizing these differences is pivotal to successful democratization, which is important not just for the countries’ prosperity but also protection against Russian influence and authoritarianism. Acknowledging this unrecognized diversity could help the international community not only approach security-related issues in the region but also reassess the level of assistance and attention each country requires.
For starters, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has spotlighted the region’s differences. Serbia, unlike much of Europe, is one of Russia’s only allies, with high levels of support for President Vladimir Putin displayed by both the leaders and the public, influenced by years of propaganda and state-captured media. This is despite the European Union being Serbia’s largest donor in support of reforms and despite other leaders’ calls for Serbia to align with the EU’s foreign policy. In the tripartite presidency of BiH, Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik has backed the illegal Russian referendums in occupied Ukraine and suggested the same could be applied in BiH following secession plans. Meanwhile, in Albania—a pro-EU country supporting Ukraine, Prime Minister Edi Rama has been criticized that his close ties with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić are seen to be benefiting Serbia’s hegemonic inclinations. Kosovo, North Macedonia and Montenegro have been mostly in line with Western democracies. International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy (GSoD) data also confirm these countries’ unique trajectories.
Figure 1. Democratic performance over time in the Western Balkan countries
While no country in the region exhibits high democratic performance in any of the five GSoD attributes, Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Montenegro recorded significant progress in certain areas over a ten-year period, as opposed to BiH and Serbia, which did not show any significant improvement. Kosovo has the highest share of significant increases (in three indicators), while Serbia has experienced the highest share of declines (in all indicators).
Notably, GSoD data reveals the region’s common struggle with corruption—the only attribute of democracy with low-performers.
Figure 2. Performance of the Western Balkan countries in the attribute of Impartial Administration
Figure 3. Global State of Democracy’s attribute of Impartial Administration
The 2022 Balkan Public Barometer polling results show that the economy, unemployment and corruption are citizens’ key concerns. Despite clear evidence that citizens want action on corruption, leaders in the region are still exploiting narratives about ethnic conflicts and populism. This is a sign of a broken social contract, indicating the growing gap between political elites and the citizens as well as the lack of political representation and responsiveness. To demonstrate better democratic performance, countries must take steps to challenge the status quo and reduce disparities between social expectations and governmental priorities.
People in the region—particularly in countries that are seeing better democratic performance, have made it clear that they want a drastic shift. And changes have started taking place. North Macedonia, for instance, had its Colorful Revolution to fight state capture. It also improved minority rights following the Ohrid Agreement and even committed to unpopular concessions like changing its name to resolve disputes with Greece to open the way for EU accession talks. Kosovo made sweeping changes to the political scene, shifting to a younger generation of leaders which triggered reforms in all political parties. Montenegro defied Russia to join NATO in 2017 regardless of the close economic ties. Its pro-Western forces are still fighting against Serbo-Russian influence in the country. Regardless of the difficulty of predicting the sustainability of these efforts, it is indisputable that fighting stagnation requires a new social contract.
One could argue that the developed democracies of today took hundreds of years to get where they are and still deal with corruption. Sceptics might also doubt that Balkans’ citizens are not ready for a new future as they are still haunted by unresolved ethnic conflicts. However, the big donor support, which has been offered following the post-war transition, provides these countries with the possibility of achieving progress at a much faster pace. If nothing else, public opinion, high migration numbers and brain drain reflect the people’s desperation for change. Without urgent action on a renewed social contract, the region risks further stagnation and widening the gap in democratic performance between countries.
Democracy Notes
Published: 22/12/2022
Defining moments for democracy in Europe in 2022
War, nuclear threat, an energy crisis, inflation, mounting far-right populism and a pandemic—all issues Europe would be better off having left behind in the last century. Yet these challenges all converged on the continent in 2022, stirring discontent. With January around the corner, the month’s namesake, Janus, the Roman two-headed god capable of looking both backwards and forwards, can provide inspiration as old problems rise anew.
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine
The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has shone a spotlight on the practice of democracy in the region and around the world. The Russian invasion, which has been marked by evidence of war crimes, is a clear attack on democracy as well as a sign of how democratization on Russian borders threatens the Putin regime. Deepening autocratization in Russia is widely evident, particularly through media censorship, the suppression of protests, forced conscription disproportionately affecting poorer regions and ethnic minorities, and deepening repression of the opposition, including pre-election pressure faced by opposition candidates in the September regional elections. Sham referenda were used to illegally annex Ukrainian territories. Many Russians have left the country as a result of the mobilisation, as discontent in Russia grows.
Yet Ukraine’s democracy, which was already on a positive trajectory since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, has shown remarkable resilience. The reliance on robust institutions and a government that brought the country together have yielded creative solutions in a time of extraordinary conditions. Apart from the government’s actions to protect institutions and democratic processes, civil society and the media have been powerful drivers of accountability and respect for human rights as vital factors in not only winning the war but in protecting democracy as well. The fight to preserve democracy is nevertheless set to continue and requires support from international partners.
Freedom of expression under attack
Reliable and impartial information becomes all the more essential in the context of armed conflict and looming economic crisis. The Media Freedom Rapid Response, which tracks press and media freedoms in EU Member States and candidate countries, reported cases of makeshift explosives targeting reporters in Greece and incidents of police brutality against journalists. In Türkiye, journalists were arrested while covering protests, including the Istanbul Pride Parade and a Gezi Park memorial demonstration organized over the summer. There are hopes that the Media Freedom Act, an initiative meant to safeguard media independence and pluralism in the EU, will bolster free speech and press freedoms going forward. The EU Council has completed its first review of the Act amid calls for further improvement.
Repression of gender equality undermines Europe’s common moral ground
While 2022 was, in many ways, a period marked by the defence of shared values, countries across Europe—and debates within countries—pulled in starkly different directions over issues related to gender equality and sexual orientation. These issues may represent a chink in Europe’s moral armour. Hungary and Poland have further restricted abortion rights. In contrast, the Finnish Parliament has updated a legislation allowing women to obtain the opinion of only one doctor before getting access to an abortion (formerly two). Spain passed affirmative-consent legislation, a broad package which, among other things, offers income support to women affected by sexual violence and criminalises street harassment. At the same time, the passage of the law has led to sexist attacks by opposition parties against its main champion, equality minister Irene Montero. Threats against LGBTQIA+ rights have also afflicted both Europe’s high-performing democracies and non-democracies. Hate crimes were committed against LGBTQIA+ communities from Slovakia to Serbia, and discriminatory rhetoric has been heard from the new leadership in Italy.
Far-right populism gets boost in elections across Europe
Many parties gaining ground display xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and nationalist tendencies. In Hungary’s elections in May, the Fidesz party won by a wide margin and the ethno-nationalist Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement) party is represented in the Parliament for the first time. The Fratelli d’Italia won Italy’s elections and established the country’s farthest right government since Mussolini. Other far-right parties gained seats in legislatures in Portugal, France, and Bulgaria and Sweden. Finally, far-right political groups are becoming increasingly influential at the European Parliament level, making them more difficult for mainstream groups to ignore. Combined, they could become the third-biggest contingent in European Parliament, yet ideological differences—including approaches to issues from Russia to the politics of religion—have so far kept them apart.
The support for these parties comes partially from their promise to radically transform outdated systems and from the convergence of the political centre with the far-right. Migration has proven to be a hot-button issue, sparking debate across the region (and the world). Since the migrant crisis in 2015, the far-right has been able to capitalise on unresolved concerns related to how migration impacts domestic economies, job opportunities, and social welfare systems. Russia has taken advantage of insecurities and concerns, actively attempting to manipulate public opinion on Ukrainian migrants in Europe through targeted misinformation campaigns.
At the same time, the outpouring of support and welcome for Ukrainian refugees in early 2022 stood in sharp contrast to the resistance with which refugees from other parts of the world have been met over the years. The sharp contrasts have led to a serious questioning of long unresolved problems related to racism and discrimination in Europe and around the world.
Slovenia halts democratic erosion
Data from the Global State for Democracy Indices show that Slovenia saw declines in seven indicators in 2021 compared to five years ago. In 2022, however, the nation showed that recovery from democratic backsliding is possible: Since Janez Janša, three-time Premier and Viktor Orbán copy-cat, was voted out of office in April, Slovenia’s new centre-left government has moved to lift tight immigration restrictions, legalise same-sex marriage and adoption, and protect media freedoms.
To watch in 2023
Polish parliamentary elections scheduled for autumn will be decisive in terms of whether a change in direction can be brought about electorally. It will be important to watch whether Slovenia can keep up the momentum. Recent referenda have affirmed public support for the government’s legislative agenda. At the supranational level, the status of the landmark European Media Freedom Act should be followed closely in 2023, as the law attempts to harmonise and support freedom of expression across the bloc. Finally, attention should be paid to safeguarding minority rights from the fallout of divisions related to gender equality, and the growing predominance of far-right ideologies in political decision-making. European democracy braces for whether these developments can insulate it from Europe’s grim déjà vu.
Democracy Notes
Published: 19/12/2022
The new model of coups d'état in Africa: Younger, less violent, more popular
There have been nine attempted or successful coups d’état in Africa since 2020. A stereotypical coup d'état involves the most senior members of the military (i.e., generals) overthrowing the government in a short, but potentially violent, incident that causes mass panic in the population. The most recent coups in Africa differ in some key aspects from the coups that were seen on the continent in the past, especially during the immediate post-independence period. What are these differences, and what do they mean for democracy?
It seems that a new model of coup is being established, which differs in key ways compared to what has gone before. Coup leaders have been slightly younger, the coups have been less violent, and in some cases they have occurred (with popular support) against a background of political stagnation and intense security challenges. The type of foreign involvement in these coups also appear to be changing (but this is more difficult to confirm).
Younger leaders
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The age of the coup leaders has been a remarkably consistent element of these most recent coups. With the exception of Sudan, the coup leaders have ranged in age from 34 to 41. They have also been lower in rank than most coup leaders (and have come mostly from special forces units), including two colonels, a lieutenant-Colonel, and a captain. This growing dynamic is certainly not completely unprecedented: Jerry Rawlings was a 31-year old flight-lieutenant when he led his first coup attempt in Ghana, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was a 37-year old lieutenant-colonel when he seized power in Equatorial Guinea. The latter example also highlights a potential negative implication of this element of the current wave of coups: the leaders may try to stay in power for a very long time.
Minimal violence, popular support
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The next two changed coup dynamics we highlighted are interrelated: their relatively non-violent nature, and the support (or at least lack of opposition) they have had among the general public. So called “bloodless coups” are a well established concept, but this is a notable commonality among the recent coups in Africa where, unlike before, incumbents have not been brutally assassinated and the ensuing death toll pales in comparison to previous coups (compare for example, the many people killed in the coups in Ghana in 1966, Equatorial Guinea in 1979, or Guinea-Bissau in 1998). Most of the recent coups have taken place in contexts where political violence (particularly in the form of long-running conflicts with jihadist insurgents) has been common. The non-violence of the coups thus stands in some contrast to the broader political context and may also relate to the level of popular support that some of these coups appear to have enjoyed. For example, some analysts have suggested that the coup in Mali in 2020 came as a relief to many people (82% according to Afrobarometer), who had lost faith in the leadership of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. Others have argued that the sanctions imposed after the 2021 coup in Mali actually increased support for the coup leaders. Similarly, the January 2022 coup in Burkina Faso (the fifth in a decade) which saw the ousting of President Roch Kabore, was also hailed by large and mostly youthful crowds as “what we want.”
Changing foreign connections
At the same time, while many coups throughout history have involved foreign involvement (real or alleged), the complex relationships between governments, coup leaders, and foreign mercenaries give the foreign element in recent coups a different significance. The growing involvement of the Russian mercenary organization Wagner in North and West Africa has been well documented. The realignment of countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali, shifting from France to Russia as a source of military support, is certainly significant at least for the prospects of a return to civilian rule. While France could be expected to exert some pressure for democratic governance, Russia has no such interests.
Near term outlook
None of this suggests that coups are becoming more acceptable. The African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have both been firm in their responses to coups. International organizations have also condemned these anti-democratic interventions in the political system. For the first time in history, the AU had four countries simultaneously suspended for Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs) and is currently reviewing its sanctions regime and enforcement mechanisms to deter UCGs. Furthermore, unlike before, the AU now has a more predictable post-coup transition pathway which often culminates in the conduct of democratic elections. However, the involvement of military leaders, in some cases (Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso etc.), as interim transition leaders, generates controversy regarding the AU/regional bodies’ firmly established “zero tolerance” policy for coup or military involvement in politics. While pragmatic, this type of transitional power can be seen to legitimize the actions of the coup leaders.
Overall, the changing nature of the coups that we have identified here also suggests that the demonstration effects of “successful” coups in the region may increase the likelihood of further coups in the near term, unless coups are seen and addressed as part of a much deeper systemic crisis - leadership and governance deficit- that continues to plague the continent. Without a holistic approach, democratic performance will likely continue to plummet, with varying manifestations, as it has for the past four consecutive years.