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Democracy Notes
Published: 31/05/2023
Courts, power politics and parallels: Can Imran Khan hold on in Pakistan?
The high-stakes contest between former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the Pakistani government and its powerful military establishment has become one of the most serious political crises in Pakistan's recent memory—not a small feat for a country known for its tumultuous politics. Every day comes with a new twist or turn: civilians to be tried in military courts, Khan himself being dragged from an Islamabad courtroom, rumours of assassination plots, and threats to ban the party of the most popular politician in the country outright.
The road to the current deadlock began in November 2022, when Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) opposition party moved to force snap regional elections in two key provinces it was certain to win. In violation of the constitution and a direct order from Umar Ata Bandial, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, the government repeatedly delayed elections far beyond the constitutionally-mandated 90-day window, and the PTI and its allies attempted further unconstitutional steps to force the government to comply. As has too often been the case in Pakistani history, the military has fostered the political chaos in order to expand its power.
While it seems like a minor part of the story, it was arguably Chief Justice Bandial’s intervention—done via a suo motu decision, a procedure allowing a chief justice to intervene in a matter without an outside party bringing a case to the court – that epitomizes the conflict. Bandial attempted to short-circuit the conflict, but in bypassing more deliberative and inclusive forms of adjudication, his decision did little to move the governing Pakistani Democratic Movement (PDM) and only set the stage for further escalation of the crisis.
Both Khan’s convention-bucking arc and Bandial’s suo motu move call to mind the actions of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, whose three tumultuous terms as Pakistan’s chief justice between 2005 and 2013 offer a useful frame through which to consider the current tensions. Long a supine institution that provided post-facto legal justifications for undemocratic transitions of power, the Supreme Court underwent a drastic change under Chaudhry, who—like Khan—owed his rise to national power to elite-military establishment. Also like Khan, Chaudhry was able to leverage tangible mass popularity into an escape from establishment control.
Parallels in Pakistan’s recent past
The arc of Chaudhry’s rise to power has parallels with Khan’s. Both men rose to the heights of the Pakistani elite with the active backing of the military elite. In Khan's case, the military tilted the 2018 election in his favor when they saw in him an amenable civilian leader. Before him, Chaudhry had the support of then-President and Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. Once in power, Chaudhry instead became known for bold, public-interest judicial activism, largely carried out through the liberal and controversial use of his own suo motu decisions. In 2007 and 2008, when Musharraf’s political career came to an end after an attempt to force Chaudhry’s removal backfired, Chaudhry was able to mobilize popular and political support to force Musharraf’s successor to reinstate him to the Court. Similarly, Khan cooperated closely with the military for the first few years as prime minister, before a fight over the balance of civilian-military power in the early 2020s led him to openly challenge the military leadership. Khan has continued his criticism since being removed from power in a no-confidence vote on 10 April 2022, a process he has directly accused then-Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa of orchestrating.
The drivers for Chaudhry’s judicial activism—which is commonly referred to by legal scholars as the “judicialization” of politics—were rooted in popular discontent with Musharaff’s “economic liberalization coupled with political illiberalism”, providing a base of popular support for aggressive public interest litigation. But it was also personality-driven: especially towards the end of his term, Chaudhry’s growing number of critics accused him of being driven primarily by self-aggrandizement. To make matters worse, his headline-grabbing efforts to strengthen the judiciary’s power over parliament had the unfortunate consequence of weakening both before the military. Khan, whose 2018 rise to power followed decades of folk hero status, has been dogged by similar allegations of entering politics “out of a misplaced sense of entitlement, searching for a post-retirement purpose in life.”
Populism or power politics?
Whatever both men's motivations, together they represent a point of departure in Pakistani political history, where shifts in the balance of power were rooted in some semblance of popular demand, rather than purely a result of elite-military machinations.
As commentators have extensively documented, Pakistan’s current crisis lacks clear-cut heroes. Despite the judicial focus on Khan’s case, for most Pakistanis the courts remain slow, overburdened, and nonresponsive institutions that neither deliver justice nor check private or executive power. And while Khan has publicly challenged the military establishment more directly than any politician in recent memory, his campaign has become elite brinksmanship in populist clothing as Khan seeks to regain the military’s grudging support, not remove it from politics.
While a military-supported return to power would certainly be good for Khan—just as his far more likely military-assisted removal from the political sphere would benefit the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)—it is only through a removal of the military from politics that Pakistan can address its overlapping crises. As Indonesia’s post-Suharto marginalization of its long-dominant military shows, a united civilian political class is necessary for dislodging the military from politics. This is a long shot, as at the time of writing the military is successfully forcing key PTI leaders out of the party and even the Supreme Court is divided against itself. Despite the upheavals of the last year, the Pakistani elite and military are likely to muddle through. But it is uncertain at what cost to the people of Pakistan.
Democracy Notes
Published: 07/03/2023
The Transformational Potential of Putting Gender Equality at the Centre of Democracy
Consider this: If we were to increase the weight of gender equality scores in our overall evaluations of the state of democracy, the global snapshot of democracy would be a faded version of itself.
Using International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD) data makes it clear that when we adjust for women’s access to power, the state of democracies is generally weaker. In fact, multiplying our measure of Representative Government by Gender Equality allows us to create a gender-aware measure of the quality of representative democracy.
Putting gender equality front and centre paints a bleak picture, moving several countries from mid-range to weak performance levels. Democracy washes out, with the darkest purples and reds of ostensibly strong democracies fading to lighter pinks and oranges.
Figure 1: The current state of democracy (top) versus the state of democracy with larger weights for gender equality (bottom)
In many ways, this is no surprise. Experts have long worried about the decline of democracy around the world, but calls to address gender inequality have rarely been urgently prioritized, especially compared to recommendations focused on strengthening institutions, empowering public participation, supporting civil society and funding media, amongst others.
One reason for this gap is that gender equality is not necessarily part of well-known conceptions of democracy. Credible elections, independent courts and healthy legislatures are more easily associated with democracy. At International IDEA, however, equality in the exercise of public control over decision-makers is a core part of the definition of democracy. A heightened focus on just how accessible the levers of power are to everyone could shift our focus to the multiple intersectional inequalities that stand in the way of sustainable, thriving democracies.
Data limitations
The reality is that even this account may be under-representing the problems. It is exceedingly difficult to collect data on the most meaningful indicators of an issue like gender equality. Cross-national measures of people’s biases in daily life, which could help us understand the extent of discrimination and exclusion that impacts women, are expensive and challenging to collect. Even the best extant sources, including public polls that ask people about their attitudes and beliefs, are beleaguered by well-known problems like response bias and do not cover the same countries or all countries every year. Measuring rates of gender-based violence, which reveals the unique harms women face, may also be misleading because of the problem of under-reporting such occurrences.
In many cases, the Global State of Democracy Indices (and others like them) rely on more accessible data, which track things like the proportion of women in elected office. Unfortunately, women serving at the highest echelons of society do not reflect broader gender equality. Even in countries that rank highly in terms of gender equality scores, the data belie significant challenges. In Denmark, which has maintained a near-perfect score for more than a decade in the GSoD Indices, some scholars point to a politics of denialism that makes male violence invisible. And there are multiple examples of countries with weaker gender equality scores but where women have served as presidents and prime ministers.
The way ahead
This is not to say that there aren’t encouraging signs. In contexts as diverse as Sierra Leone, Spain, Switzerland, India, Finland, and Colombia, there have been recent notable advances in aspects of gender equality like respect for reproductive rights and strong consent laws. These are important, especially in the face of significant regression in places like the United States, Poland, and Hungary. This week, my colleagues Gentiana Gola and Emily Bloom examined this balance of progress, setbacks and representation for women in Europe.
Unsurprisingly, it is hard to definitively say that things are better or worse on International Women's Day 2023. There are shades of grey everywhere. Finding ways to better integrate these nuances into our definitions, descriptions and understandings of democracy could be a pivotal first step in transforming democracy assessment as we know it.
Democracy Notes
Published: 07/03/2023
Map: Analysing progress and setbacks for gender equality in Europe
According to the Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoDI), Europe is by far the world’s best performing region when it comes to gender equality. But is the best good enough? Analysing Europe’s latest developments reveals signs of progress and evidence of setbacks, reminding us that the fight for gender equality is far from over.
Figure 1. Recent notable developments in gender equality and women’s representation in parliament in Europe
Progress prevails
Gender equality enjoys widespread popular support in Europe and has demonstrated a positive trajectory on average in the past 10 years, according to GSoDI data. In particular, the role of the European Union (EU) as a driver of progress in women’s rights is of great importance. Although not all European countries are part of the Union, its founding values have led to increased awareness and action over the years—starting from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the principle of equal pay, to setting gender equality targets to be met by countries aspiring to membership. The European Commission now requires higher education and research organizations to have a gender equality plan in order to receive funding, and new gender balance targets have been set for corporate boards. Women have almost achieved gender parity among doctoral graduates in Europe.
Figure 2. GSoDI gender equality scores (regional averages)
Gender equality is not a finished business
However, women remain underrepresented in technical professions such as science, technology, engineering and math. Additionally, women still earn less than men, mostly due to unpaid care work. Countries that have experienced democratic backsliding, as well as Russia (which shifted to an authoritarian regime in the latest edition of GSoDI data), are taking measures that undermine equality. For instance, populist governing elites in Hungary and Poland are threatening women’s sexual reproductive health rights, whether motivated by reinvigorating old social contracts dictating gender roles, or introducing new forms of anti-democratic values.
Several problems remain. First, similar anti-feminist trends have emerged elsewhere in Europe, including in democracies such as Croatia and Italy. Sexist, homophobic and xenophobic speech has been used even by leaders coming from EU member states such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda and Giorgia Meloni to justify attacks on women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to achieve progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Second, factors such as traditional family values and the role of religion continue to influence European countries, and are often manipulated by various political parties to bolster their resistance to a range of issues, including abortion and LGBTQIA+ rights. Meloni engineered a winning campaign in 2022 based on identity politics, saying, “I am Giorgia, I’m a woman, I’m a mother… I’m Christian.” Finally, gender equality is still not an internalized value, and to many, including young men, is seen as a threatening zero-sum game.
Moving forward
Recent backtracking proves that gender equality should not be taken for granted; consistency and persistence are vital to achieving parity and an inclusive environment. Building upon progress in gender equality—as well as addressing its setbacks—requires commitment on many fronts and is highly dependent on the resilience of democratic values. The EU can lead these commitments by taking concrete actions in response to countries (especially member states) that regress on equality measures and policies. All leaders should be reminded that rhetoric endangering women’s rights doesn’t fly anymore and that it threatens the leaders’ seats at the table. The gender pay gap and the unpaid care work burden can be narrowed by providing improved and equal access to education, and by taking stock of models that have already proven successful, such as Sweden’s parental leave legislation.
Map sources:
Armenia - Republic Armenia Newspaper and News Armenia
Belgium
Bulgaria
Finland
France - a) British Broadcasting Corporation b) Official Journal of the French Republic
Georgia GREVIO’s (Baseline) Evaluation Report and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Greece
Hungary
Malta
Poland
Russian Federation
Slovenia
Spain - El Pais, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, National Public Radio, Voa News
Switzerland
Ukraine - Council of Europe and Amnesty International
Women in parliament: International IDEA’s Democracy Tracker country profiles
Democracy Notes
Published: 20/02/2023
Q&A: Olufunto Akinduro on Nigeria's 2023 Elections—and Democracy as the Future
On 25 February, Nigerians will go to the polls to elect the members of the National Assembly (House of Representatives and Senate), and a new president. Two weeks later, they will vote again, for members of the state Houses of Assembly, and in 26 of the states for governors. These will be the seventh elections since the end of military rule in Nigeria in 1999. The presidential election is notable this year because the current president, Muhammadu Buhari, has completed the second of two constitutionally permitted terms, and will leave office to make way for the winner of the election.
Nigeria’s important economic and political role in West Africa, and indeed across the continent, gives this election relevance to larger trends in democracy in Africa and globally. The absence of an incumbent on the ballot makes the election both less predictable, and potentially more important in reinforcing positive examples of constitutional transfers of power in the region. The political context differs considerably from the last national elections in 2019, but while some old problems have been addressed, others persist alongside new challenges. Chief among these are continuing challenges relating to infrastructure and security, and more recent challenges like the transition to a new design for the national currency.
To better understand what is happening in Nigeria, I spoke with Olufunto Akinduro, Senior Programme Officer in the Africa and West Asia Regional Programme (based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), and thematic lead on Electoral Processes in the Africa and West Asia region.
How critical is this election for Nigeria's democratic development?
It's quite important, because these will be the seventh consecutive elections in the Fourth Republic. That's the longest Nigeria has been a democracy as a nation. So, if Nigeria can scale this, it will give us hope that democracy can indeed be the future for Nigeria. It would also be the second test of whether Nigeria can have a change of government in a peaceful atmosphere. It happened in 2015; it was relatively peaceful, and the results were widely accepted. Are we going to see the same thing in 2023? And even if we do not have a change of government, if we retain the same party, is it going to be a peaceful transition? Because this is now the second test of an actual transition where an incumbent’s tenure is over and he has no influence over the transition. So, certainly they are critical elections.
What is on the ballot for Nigerians in the upcoming elections?
Nigeria has what we call General Elections, and they will happen over two days. Nigeria is a federation, and the national level elections happen on 25 February. On that day, Nigerians will elect the president and the National Assembly. The President is elected on a joint ballot with the vice president. Nigerians will also elect 109 members of the Senate; each of the 36 states has three senators. While the Federal Capital Territory is not a state, it does have one senator. Voters also choose the members of the House of Representatives, which has 360 members.
Then, on 11 March, all state Houses of Assembly will be elected, as well as 28 of the state governors. Eight states are now on different schedules due to past court rulings and postponements in the governors’ taking office.
Is the presidential election expected to be settled on 25 February, or is there a possibility for a second round?
There is a legal provision for a runoff, but in Nigeria's history it has never happened. The threshold for winning a presidential election is quite high. The winner of the presidential elections will have to win a majority of the votes, but not just that; they also need to receive at least 25 per cent of the vote in each of at least two-thirds of the 36 states (meaning 24 out of 36 states) and the Federal Capital Territory. It is possible for there to be a candidate that would have a majority of the votes across the country but may not have won enough votes in two-thirds of the states. In that case, a runoff would be required.
What is the possibility of a runoff this time?
[It has usually been true that] if voting will be along ethnic lines, it is on religious lines as well. It is not that straightforward this time around. So, there is a possibility that you may not have a candidate emerging with the required spread of votes across the country. It is really interesting.
Nigerian politics is quite ethno-religiously based, and for the first time we have a ballot that will have three major contestants from the three major ethnic groups. There is a Yoruba man, an Igbo man, and a Hausa man. Nigeria has not [had this kind of ethnic diversity among presidential candidates] since 1999 when it returned to democracy. So, this time around there is a possibility that one candidate could win enough votes nationally but may not have the required spread of votes across two-thirds of the 36 states. And that would be a first in Nigeria.
Could you tell us more about aspects of the political participation of marginalized people in the elections?
In terms of women's participation, 2019 was the worst outing for women in politics in Nigeria, with [less than 4 per cent] of the National Assembly being women [Editor’s note: Across sub-Saharan Africa, 26 per cent of the members of parliaments are women]. And we have not seen much improvement. If we count the number of women on the ballot this time around for the elections, none of the three parties have a female [candidate] at the presidential level. For governorship, [10 governor candidates are women and 24] deputy governor candidates are women. But what is the possibility of them getting there? So again, that will be another strike against Nigeria by the time we end these elections.
For youth representation [considering those under 35], 2023 will now be a second test of the “Not too young to run bill” [Editor’s note: This is the colloquial name for Nigeria’s Age Reduction Bill]. Are we going to see younger candidates, especially at the federal level? There have been younger candidates at the state House of Assembly level, but are we going to see younger people getting into the National Assembly and becoming governors? That remains to be seen. [Editor’s note: Twenty-nine per cent of the candidates in the 2023 elections (across all offices) are under 35 years of age. This is down from 34 per cent in 2019.]
Historically, what have been some of the challenges in organizing elections in Nigeria?
The greatest challenge over the years is the question of public trust. Do people really believe their votes count? Will the electoral result really reflect the will of the people? That is the biggest question.
And after that, has been a struggle for different institutions to put measures in place to strengthen public trust in processes, starting with the Independent National Electoral Commission [INEC] itself, the police, and even the executive to an extent. The Electoral Commission is appointed by the President in consultation with the Senate. Different presidents have tried to show that they have given the Electoral Commission the space to do their work as it should be done. There has been a lot of effort in this regard, from changing procedural issues, advocating for legal reforms that will strengthen the independence of the Commission itself, introducing technology and just being more open for dialogue and discussion, and improved communication.
What about logistical challenges?
It was recently reported that the chair of the Commission had to meet with the governor of the Central Bank, because there's just a huge cash shortage at this point. How is the Commission going to pay its suppliers if it cannot access cash at this point? And it is less than two weeks to a major election.
We have [approximately 90 million] voters. Consider the number of ballot papers. How do you deploy the ballot across the country? All hands usually are on deck, from the Navy to the Air Force to the Army. Everyone steps in just to support INEC with deployment of materials.
In addition to the fight against Boko Haram, there have been many incidents of kidnappings, inter-group conflicts, and other forms of violence in the last few years. What are the security considerations for elections in Nigeria?
Right now, we are proceeding into an election that is considered the least secure in the country. In 2015 the elections were postponed on grounds of security. INEC has documented the growing trend of attacks on its facilities across the country. In 2011, to an extent, the delays were also security-related, though more on an operational basis. Then in 2019 the election was postponed for operational reasons. The [current vulnerabilities] are no longer determined by the kind of religious extremism we had seen between 2015 and 2019, which was largely restricted to the northeast of the country. Now, insecurity is spread across the entire country. And the ability of INEC to conduct a secure election is greatly impacted by that. So, the question is this: Even if INEC has prepared and has all the technical capacities, how does it work effectively with the security agencies to ensure that the election can proceed?
What is the current role of the military in politics in Nigeria?
I don't know if the Nigerian military is sufficiently disciplined to listen to a president that has no links to them. This is the first time Nigeria is having an election where out of the three major candidates, nobody has military antecedents. There is no ex-military man. So, these elections might be Nigeria’s best actual step away from the military. The question is, is the Nigerian military satisfied enough within the democratic space to say: “We stay in our barracks. We do only security. We protect the national borders. We have no business with what is happening in the executive”? There are a lot of questions about whether the national government is actually protecting the soldiers in the North, equipping them enough [in the fight against Boko Haram]. There have been corruption scandals where monies that are supposed to go to the war front were staying with the army chiefs and things of this nature.
What factors should we be watching in terms of electoral credibility in 2023?
I think the first will be INEC’s technical competence. How quickly will we get results of the elections? Are citizen observers going to get access to the online reporting portal where they as well can broadcast results and also do their analysis for the parallel vote tabulation? Will INEC be able to surmount the challenge of insecurity? We haven't seen a lot of violence compared with previous elections. Candidates were killed before the elections in the past. But the trend this time around has been targeted attacks against INEC infrastructure. One [might] imagine this is about destroying sensitive materials ahead of Election Day. And of course, if sensitive materials are destroyed and the Commission cannot get backups quickly, it means some elections will be postponed.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not candidates accept the outcome. If we had the elections—no violence, everything went well—and the Commission comes up three days later to say Mr. X is the winner or Ms. Y is the winner, are we done? That's the million-dollar question in the room.
CORRECTION - 23 February 2023: An earlier version of this post inaccurately described the ballot printing process as occuring outside Nigeria. While this was the case for previous elections, the ballots for this year's elections are printed inside the country.