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Democracy Notes
Published: 31/05/2023
Courts, power politics and parallels: Can Imran Khan hold on in Pakistan?
The high-stakes contest between former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the Pakistani government and its powerful military establishment has become one of the most serious political crises in Pakistan's recent memory—not a small feat for a country known for its tumultuous politics. Every day comes with a new twist or turn: civilians to be tried in military courts, Khan himself being dragged from an Islamabad courtroom, rumours of assassination plots, and threats to ban the party of the most popular politician in the country outright.
The road to the current deadlock began in November 2022, when Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) opposition party moved to force snap regional elections in two key provinces it was certain to win. In violation of the constitution and a direct order from Umar Ata Bandial, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, the government repeatedly delayed elections far beyond the constitutionally-mandated 90-day window, and the PTI and its allies attempted further unconstitutional steps to force the government to comply. As has too often been the case in Pakistani history, the military has fostered the political chaos in order to expand its power.
While it seems like a minor part of the story, it was arguably Chief Justice Bandial’s intervention—done via a suo motu decision, a procedure allowing a chief justice to intervene in a matter without an outside party bringing a case to the court – that epitomizes the conflict. Bandial attempted to short-circuit the conflict, but in bypassing more deliberative and inclusive forms of adjudication, his decision did little to move the governing Pakistani Democratic Movement (PDM) and only set the stage for further escalation of the crisis.
Both Khan’s convention-bucking arc and Bandial’s suo motu move call to mind the actions of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, whose three tumultuous terms as Pakistan’s chief justice between 2005 and 2013 offer a useful frame through which to consider the current tensions. Long a supine institution that provided post-facto legal justifications for undemocratic transitions of power, the Supreme Court underwent a drastic change under Chaudhry, who—like Khan—owed his rise to national power to elite-military establishment. Also like Khan, Chaudhry was able to leverage tangible mass popularity into an escape from establishment control.
Parallels in Pakistan’s recent past
The arc of Chaudhry’s rise to power has parallels with Khan’s. Both men rose to the heights of the Pakistani elite with the active backing of the military elite. In Khan's case, the military tilted the 2018 election in his favor when they saw in him an amenable civilian leader. Before him, Chaudhry had the support of then-President and Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. Once in power, Chaudhry instead became known for bold, public-interest judicial activism, largely carried out through the liberal and controversial use of his own suo motu decisions. In 2007 and 2008, when Musharraf’s political career came to an end after an attempt to force Chaudhry’s removal backfired, Chaudhry was able to mobilize popular and political support to force Musharraf’s successor to reinstate him to the Court. Similarly, Khan cooperated closely with the military for the first few years as prime minister, before a fight over the balance of civilian-military power in the early 2020s led him to openly challenge the military leadership. Khan has continued his criticism since being removed from power in a no-confidence vote on 10 April 2022, a process he has directly accused then-Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa of orchestrating.
The drivers for Chaudhry’s judicial activism—which is commonly referred to by legal scholars as the “judicialization” of politics—were rooted in popular discontent with Musharaff’s “economic liberalization coupled with political illiberalism”, providing a base of popular support for aggressive public interest litigation. But it was also personality-driven: especially towards the end of his term, Chaudhry’s growing number of critics accused him of being driven primarily by self-aggrandizement. To make matters worse, his headline-grabbing efforts to strengthen the judiciary’s power over parliament had the unfortunate consequence of weakening both before the military. Khan, whose 2018 rise to power followed decades of folk hero status, has been dogged by similar allegations of entering politics “out of a misplaced sense of entitlement, searching for a post-retirement purpose in life.”
Populism or power politics?
Whatever both men's motivations, together they represent a point of departure in Pakistani political history, where shifts in the balance of power were rooted in some semblance of popular demand, rather than purely a result of elite-military machinations.
As commentators have extensively documented, Pakistan’s current crisis lacks clear-cut heroes. Despite the judicial focus on Khan’s case, for most Pakistanis the courts remain slow, overburdened, and nonresponsive institutions that neither deliver justice nor check private or executive power. And while Khan has publicly challenged the military establishment more directly than any politician in recent memory, his campaign has become elite brinksmanship in populist clothing as Khan seeks to regain the military’s grudging support, not remove it from politics.
While a military-supported return to power would certainly be good for Khan—just as his far more likely military-assisted removal from the political sphere would benefit the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)—it is only through a removal of the military from politics that Pakistan can address its overlapping crises. As Indonesia’s post-Suharto marginalization of its long-dominant military shows, a united civilian political class is necessary for dislodging the military from politics. This is a long shot, as at the time of writing the military is successfully forcing key PTI leaders out of the party and even the Supreme Court is divided against itself. Despite the upheavals of the last year, the Pakistani elite and military are likely to muddle through. But it is uncertain at what cost to the people of Pakistan.
Democracy Notes
Published: 20/03/2023
Why restricting the right to strike can make governments less responsive
Currently working its way through the Parliament of the United Kingdom is a piece of legislation entitled the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill. Touted by the government as a means of protecting the public from the disruptive impact of strikes on essential services, it empowers ministers to set the minimum service level that workers in the relevant sectors must guarantee during industrial action.
Debates on such restrictions tend to narrowly conceive of strike action as a tool with which workers can improve their working conditions, set against the importance of the public being able to go about their daily lives unhindered. Framed in this way, these debates miss the broader governance implications of curtailing the right to strike. For a government to be able to respond to the needs of its people, it must first be aware of what those needs are, and public discussion, including through strikes and protest, has a big part to play in this.
The UK is not alone in tightening restrictions on the right to strike. According to data from the International Trade Union Confederation’s Global Rights Index, in 2022 strikes were severely restricted or banned in 129 of the 148 countries it measures. While minimum service level requirements are not uncommon, commentators have pointed out that the way in which these levels would be set under the UK legislation (they would not need to be agreed by the trade unions) is unusual and that if set too high, they could significantly weaken the effectiveness of strikes in these sectors.
When governments weaken recourse to this highly visible form of industrial action, they constrain workers’ ability to draw attention to their social and economic needs and, in so doing, risk making their governance less responsive. Such responsiveness runs to the heart of what International IDEA understands democracy to mean; that is, popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers, and equality between citizens in the exercise of that control.
As an awareness raising method, strike action enjoys two important advantages. The first is its disruptiveness. When workers withdraw their labour, the service interruptions that result can impose high economic and social costs that reach well beyond the industry directly affected. And, as climate change activists have underscored recently, disruptive tactics can be very effective in spotlighting a cause.
Secondly, strike action is generally regarded by workers as a measure of last resort that directs attention to urgent social and economic needs. It is carried out only when negotiations with an employer fail to bring about improved working conditions and when the urgency of their grievances outweigh the financial and reputational risks associated with inflicting the aforementioned costs. Importantly, the grievances that reach such a threshold often reveal broader issues requiring government action. For example, strikes carried out recently by nurses in the UK have served to highlight the impacts of a complex set of problems currently plaguing the country, including a shortage of healthcare staff, an ageing population and surging living costs.
However, strike action does more than simply raise awareness of pressing needs. The potency of the economic threat it carries means that it can be instrumental in generating pressure on governments (and employers) to address these needs. This can be the case even in political contexts in which the government is otherwise unresponsive to popular demands; the workplace reforms secured by black South African workers through strike action at the height of apartheid are a good illustration of this.
Indeed, the power of the right to strike is such that even when it goes unexercised, it plays a critical role in equalising workers’ relationships with their employer and government. This is important because where these relationships are based on a healthy balance of power, it can result in workers playing a constructive part in the development of policy that addresses their needs. The International Labour Organization has reported that in a majority of its member states dialogue between workers, employers and governments has played a pivotal role in shaping national policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.
This is not to say the right to strike should not be unfettered. It is clear that under international law it is not an absolute right and that in certain exceptional circumstances it may be restricted and even prohibited. However, when legislating for such circumstances, due consideration must be given to the governance implications of its curtailment. The capacity of strike action to enhance government responsiveness is needed now more than ever as countries face the social and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Giving in to the temptation to quieten or silence the disruptive voices of striking workers risks allowing healthcare waiting times to lengthen, classrooms to grow more crowded or vital transport services to shrink. British parliamentarians would do well to reflect on this as they shape the legal framework for strike action in some of the most important and beleaguered sectors of the country’s economy.
Democracy Notes
Published: 09/03/2023
Explicamos: El impacto del ‘Plan B’ en las elecciones mexicanas
El 26 de febrero, cientos de miles de mexicanas y mexicanos se reunieron en al menos 80 ciudades (en el país y el extranjero) para protestar la reforma electoral denominada “Plan B”, recientemente aprobada por el Senado, argumentando un ataque frontal al Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) y la democracia. Esto incluyó la participación en una “megamarcha” en el zócalo de la Ciudad de México, la plaza pública más grande del país, rebasando por mucho su capacidad de 200,000 personas.
¿Qué es el INE? ¿Es necesario reformarlo? ¿De qué trata el Plan B? Para entender mejor su impacto en la democracia mexicana y sus instituciones electorales, estas y otras preguntas ameritan una mirada más cercana.
¿Qué es el INE?
El Instituto Nacional Electoral (antes Instituto Federal Electoral) fue creado en 1990 para otorgar certeza a los procesos electorales en México, hasta entonces controlados y organizados por el gobierno. Ello ocurrió como consecuencia de la cuestionada elección presidencial de 1988, donde muchos argumentaron un fraude que llevó una vez más al Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) a la presidencia. A través de sucesivas reformas electorales, se fue otorgando autonomía al Instituto, hasta que en 1996 se eliminó la participación de la Secretaría de Gobernación y sólo las y los Consejeros Electorales (y ya no el gobierno) tuvieron voz y voto en el Consejo General, y por lo tanto poder de decisión dentro del Instituto.
Como consecuencia de esta autonomía, y como podemos ver en la gráfica a continuación, con datos de los Índices del Estado Global de la Democracia, desde la creación del INE el puntaje de México en el indicador “Elecciones Limpias” ha aumentado significativamente (por encima de la media regional y global). Dicho indicador refleja aspectos como la autonomía y capacidad del órgano electoral y el nivel de competencia electoral.
Gráfica 1. Elecciones limpias en México, América y el mundo, 1975-2021
Fuente: Índices del Estado Global de la Democracia, IDEA Internacional
¿De qué trata el Plan B?
El recientemente aprobado Plan B incluye modificaciones alrededor de cuatro temas fundamentales: ejercicio de derechos político-electorales; equidad y regulación de la contienda; cambios a la estructura y funciones del INE; y rediseño de la justicia electoral. Entre estos, podemos encontrar aciertos como facilitar el voto de personas con discapacidad y de residentes en el extranjero (aunque con la necesidad de garantizar la seguridad en el listado de electores); garantizar el voto de personas en prisión preventiva, la simplificación del número de medios de impugnación en materia electoral y la implementación del juicio en línea. (En este espacio analizaremos sólo aquellos cambios con impacto directo en el INE, cuya defensa fue la parte toral de las protestas del mes pasado.)
El Plan B reduce la estructura del INE así como sus facultades de regulación y sanción. En cuanto a su estructura, se reducen el número de Comisiones, Direcciones y Unidades Técnicas de la institución, en ocasiones fusionando algunas con funciones diferentes, lo que puede dificultar la gestión interna del instituto. El principal recorte a la estructura tiene que ver con sus órganos desconcentrados, reduciendo la estructura de sus 32 Juntas Locales y de sus 300 juntas distritales, que ahora pasan a ser oficinas auxiliares. Estas son las bases que a lo largo y ancho del país permiten la instalación de casillas (centros de votación), la capacitación de ciudadanos, la educación cívica, la actualización del registro electoral y el cómputo de resultados. Desde la óptica de administración electoral, preocupa que se tenga menor personal para cumplir las mismas funciones esenciales para lograr elecciones profesionales.
Las leyes electorales en México incluyen disposiciones para nivelar el terreno de juego entre partidos políticos, y entre partidos políticos y gobierno. Así, para asegurar que haya competencia: se otorga financiamiento público a partidos, se fiscaliza el uso de recursos ordinarios y en campaña, se brinda acceso gratuito a radio y televisión, y se establecen límites a la propaganda gubernamental y al uso de recursos públicos. El Plan B también reduce algunas facultades de regulación y sanción del INE directamente relacionadas con la equidad de la contienda electoral.
Embed from Getty Images
¿Qué motivó el Plan B?
Desde el inicio de su administración, el presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador ha planteado una “austeridad republicana” que, entre otras cosas, implica reducir costos en la administración pública y otros órganos del Estado, incluido el INE. Esto incluyó una nueva Ley de Salarios que entre otras disposiciones incluía que ningún funcionario público podría ganar más que el presidente de la República. Aunado a estas medidas, las tensiones con el INE han aumentado, llegando en ocasiones a acusaciones de “corrupción” del INE desde el Poder Ejecutivo. Es en este contexto que el partido gobernante planteó una reforma constitucional con el objetivo de “quitar el INE a corruptos y oligarcas”. En contraste, miembros de la sociedad civil, especialistas en la materia y la oposición catalogaron esta iniciativa de reforma como regresiva, al buscar reducir las condiciones de competencia electoral y desmantelar la autonomía del INE.
¿Qué pasó con la reforma constitucional?
Dicha reforma constitucional en materia electoral fue propuesta a finales del 2022. Sin embargo, esta reforma fue rechazada en la Cámara de Diputados al no conseguir una mayoría calificada de dos terceras partes. En respuesta, el partido gobernante y sus aliados optaron por el “Plan B” descrito, que con cambios a leyes secundarias buscaría acercarse a cumplir el plan original. Estos cambios fueron aprobados con mayor facilidad al sólo requerir una mayoría simple, que el partido en el poder sí reunía. Así, entre otras cosas, el Plan B modificó la Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales, La Ley General de Partidos Políticos y la Ley General de Comunicación Social. Esta es la primera reforma electoral desde 1977 que se aprueba sin el consenso de todas las fuerzas políticas.
¿Es necesario reformar al INE?
Si bien el INE es un órgano sólido y profesional y con reconocimiento regional e internacional, existen posibles áreas de reforma. Una reflexión general tiene que ver con la necesidad de descargar al Instituto de ciertas funciones. A través de muchas reformas electorales (1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2003, 2005, 2007 y 2014) el INE ha ido adquiriendo un número creciente de funciones. Un ejemplo es la reforma 2007-08 que otorgó al instituto 53 nuevas atribuciones en áreas como acceso de partidos a radio y televisión, fiscalización y recuentos. Hoy, el INE es de los órganos electorales con mayores competencias en el mundo. Aligerar la carga del Instituto es una buena opción, especialmente en áreas no directamente relacionadas con la organización de elecciones.
Sin embargo, la reducción de funciones no debe ir acompañada de una reducción de capacidad o de profesionalismo, por lo que el legislador debe ser preciso y siempre tener presente la importancia de la integridad electoral, entendida como el cumplimiento de estándares internacionales de calidad, durante todo el ciclo electoral (Es decir antes, durante y después de la jornada electoral).
¿Qué sigue?
La aprobación del Plan B por el Senado de la República y su entrada en vigor el 3 de marzo surtió efectos inmediatos en el INE con despidos y recortes. El primero consiste en la salida del Secretario Ejecutivo, quien representa legalmente al instituto, actúa como secretario del Consejo General, y coordina la Junta General Ejecutiva, principal órgano ejecutivo del INE (y que también desaparecerá con la reforma).
Con ello también han iniciado las impugnaciones legales y constitucionales. El 1 de marzo la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación admitió la controversia constitucional promovida por el INE, quien considera se vulneran sus funciones e independencia. Asimismo, se recibieron las primeras impugnaciones por la remoción del Secretario Ejecutivo, (y en una de ellas un tribunal federal ordenó su restitución, en virtud de que su designación se había hecho para el periodo 2020 y 2026, que debe garantizarse, además de no advertirse una razón por la que el cambio de facultades justifique terminar anticipadamente con ese nombramiento). Se prevé que otras autoridades, poderes y partidos presentarán controversias constitucionales y acciones de inconstitucionalidad adicionales. Así, el futuro del plan B y del INE están en manos de la Corte, que deberá resolver antes de este 2 de junio, tres meses previos al inicio del proceso electoral 2023-24.
Democracy Notes
Published: 08/03/2023
Democracies can’t afford to exclude women from the fight against climate change
It is no secret that women are disproportionately exposed and vulnerable to the risks of climate change, given the role(s) they assume in many of our societies. And yet, they remain dramatically underrepresented in climate negotiations, policymaking, and climate action. Last year’s COP27 made for a somber example: No more than 7 of the 110 heads of states present at the inauguration were women, and with less than 34 % women negotiators, the meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh was in fact the least gender-equal UN climate summit in years.
That´s unacceptable. Women’s inclusion must be central on the climate change agenda not only because many of them are so strongly affected. Women need to be involved in the discussion not only because they represent roughly half of the world’s population. Advocating for the meaningful participation of women in climate policy and negotiation, from local to global level, is not only a moral duty or matter of fairness in democratic societies: it’s also imperative because their exclusion stands in the way of finding solutions to a challenge of historic dimensions where every idea counts, every voice is needed, every contribution essential. Women are essential in the fight against the climate crisis, for a number of reasons.
Firstly, because of the roles women often assume, reducing gender inequality can contribute to reducing emissions. A simple example: equal access to education and other resources can allow women to change their agricultural practices and increase efficiency which, in turn, reduces the need for more farmable land and, thus, deforestation.
Secondly, in the face of a changing climate, governments and institutions must build resilience against food insecurity, resource scarcity, and economic volatility that will likely rise with global temperatures, as well as against the risks natural disasters pose for democratic processes and freedoms. In large parts of the world, women are key managers of food systems and natural resources, conducting work which is largely unpaid but crucially must be accounted for in order to prevent famines and instability. Here, women’s and girls’ sustainability education is central, not the least in technology and innovation, as highlighted by this year’s UN International Women’s Day theme.
Finally, equal inclusion of women in deliberation and decision-making processes can be a gamechanger for democracies’ ability to effectively address climate change. Too many democracies’ climate action has been constrained by short-termism, narrowly national focus, and policy capture through vested interests in the past. This is not new, it’s not entirely surprising, but it’s also not inevitable. As it turns out, women are particularly likely to make decisions in the interest of the planet and its future generations. Women politicians and voters – in high-income countries in particular – are frequently found to have a higher concern for climate and environmental matters, as a product of gendered socialization and societal roles. Moreover, socialization is likely why women tend to be less corrupt and have more democratic leadership styles than their male counterparts. Studies from national parliaments to local policy interventions consistently demonstrate how climate action improves when women are involved. And research has shown, time and again, strong correlations between gender equality indices and measures of environmental and climate performance.
As we see, achieving gender equality (SDG 5) is essential to effectively address climate change and its impacts (SDG 13). At the same time, it is important to stay clear of assuming women’s empowerment a panacea for climate change; both because it would put them under disproportionate responsibility, and because this discussion is less about assuming women to take certain roles, but rather about fostering cultures and values of diversity and sustainability. As a recent feminist publication on the topic put it: “Female parliamentarians should not be expected to make a difference, rather political systems allowing gender diverse representation can be expected to support equalitarian social values that are paramount to achieving sustainable societies“.
If diversity and inclusion are fundamental to sustainable societies, then the photo of 103 men and 7 women heads of states at COP27 is a worrying sign of failure. The 8th of March reminds us of how much women’s movements have achieved in the past – and is a call to action for continuing the fight in the Anthropocene.