Russian Federation
Russia performs in the low range across all Global State of Democracy (GSoD) categories of democracy. It falls in the bottom 25 per cent of the world with regard to several factors of Representation, Rights, Rule of Law and Participation. In the last five years, it has experienced notable declines in Effective Parliament, Civil Liberties, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of the Press, as well as Freedom of Movement and Freedom of Association and Assembly. Russia is an upper middle income country, heavily dependent on hydrocarbon and mineral exports. The early 2000s commodities boom funded the country’s recovery from the catastrophic post-Soviet transition to a market economy in the 1990s. The rapid economic growth of the early 2000s provided President Vladimir Putin with sufficient public legitimacy to entrench his hold on power, and his increasingly authoritarian rule has been marked by the concentration of powers in the executive branch, emasculation of institutions of representative democracy, electoral manipulation, and pressure on independent media.
In 2014, Russia responded to the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity by launching a proxy war in the country’s east and illegally annexing Crimea. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Western nations responded with wide-ranging sanctions that seriously damaged the Russian economy, and Russia responded by cracking down on any and all independent civil society activity, antiwar protest, and remaining media freedom.
Russia is the largest country on earth by land area and a complex multi-confessional and multi-ethnic society, composing roughly four broad socioeconomic groups: Westernized and wealthy urban centers, mid-sized towns and cities dependent on state or major industrial employment, isolated and economically precarious villages, and “ethnic republics” that are a mix of the previous two groupings. In President Putin’s two decades in power, these “four Russias” were controlled through what the Kremlin euphemistically referred to as “managed democracy,” which in turn produced an increasingly personalized leadership system and the progressive depoliticization of various parts of Russian society. The persistence of the current political system lies in its ability to provide sufficient economic spoils to loyal elites while alternatively rewarding and disciplining various parts of Russian society through the provision of adequate economic stability, the stoking of nationalist-conservative sentiment, the maintenance of an encompassing propaganda apparatus, and repressive and deadly violence. In recent years, the sticks of repression and more overt control and censorship of the media and internet have crowded out the carrots of economic growth and personal autonomy as the main tools of governance, culminating in the wide-ranging crackdown on activism and even mild dissent in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
While the GSoD Indices data show that Russia’s performance on gender quality has been static (at mid-range) for the past several decades, the increasing repression has likely impacted the state of equality. Despite equality guaranteed by law, studies indicate an increase in gender inequality in recent years due to lack of a clear state policy and propaganda that reinforces patriarchal attitudes, making women more vulnerable to violence, discrimination, and lack of political opportunities.
Russia’s political trajectory in the years to come will be determined by the progress of its war on Ukraine. The country is currently undertaking a defensive authoritarian consolidation, but potential elite fractures and the slowly increasing cost of international sanctions may lead to a chaotic breakdown of the current government system. However, the closing-off of public information spaces makes ascertaining the course of public opinion nearly impossible. All feasible outcomes point towards significant declines across measures of democracy as the country continues to depart further from the rule of law in order to maintain its war effort.
Monthly Event Reports
March 2024 | Vladimir Putin secures fifth term in office
Russia held presidential elections from 15 to 17 March in which President Vladimir Putin secured a fifth term in office against no meaningful opposition. According to the Central Election Commission, Putin secured 87.3 per cent of the vote on 77.44 per cent turnout, up from 77.5 per cent on 67.5 per cent turnout in 2018. There were no women on the ballot and no credible election observers. Boris Nadezhdin, the sole presidential hopeful to oppose Russia’s war on Ukraine, was not permitted to run. Elections were also held in occupied Ukraine, which was condemned by Ukraine, United Nations officials, other world leaders and International IDEA. No women were among the candidates.
February 2024 | Alexei Navalny dies unexpectedly in prison at 47
Alexei Navalny, political prisoner and Russia’s highest profile and most effective political opponent of President Vladimir Putin, died on 16 February in a maximum security prison in the Russian Arctic. He was 47 years old and serving essentially a life sentence on numerous fabricated charges. The causes of Navalny’s death remain unclear, with Russian authorities maintaining he died of ‘natural causes’, but he had previously been hospitalized for malnourishment and former inmates at the same prison colony told Holod Media of systemic torture and an absence of basic medical care. Navalny’s family blamed Russian president Vladimir Putin for his death, as did numerous Western countries and international institutions, directly and indirectly.
January 2024 | Confiscation a new punishment for “fake news”
Russia’s lower house of parliament approved a law that would allow the state to confiscate the property of anyone convicted of disseminating “fake news” about the Russian army, making public calls for extremism or against the security of the state, calling for sanctions against Russia or Russian citizens, and several other offenses. While vague and broad, the bill is widely understood to be aimed at discouraging and punishing anti-war activism. Although Russian law only allows for nonpunitive confiscation of property that was obtained as a result of the underlying crime, experts say its application is likely to be broader, as the burden of proof in such cases is very low and courts routinely fail to hold police to procedural requirements. The bill was drafted by Russian law enforcement bodies, supported by all but one political faction, has the backing of the Cabinet, and is expected to progress quickly through the remaining procedural steps to become law.
December 2023 | Court rules election information laws to cover private individuals
Russia’s Supreme Court ruled on 12 December that electoral laws that bar media organizations from campaigning for or creating materials in support of political candidates also apply to private individuals. The ruling means that producing or disseminating any campaign materials, in person or online, that were not produced by the official campaign can be found illegal and those responsible can be fined up to 2500 RUB (about 30 USD) for each instance. The ruling was intended to ensure that bloggers and social media users would be adequately covered by the legislation in advance of 2024 elections. Speaking to trade publication Advokatskaya Gazeta said the ruling suggests Russia’s upcoming elections will be strictly controlled by the judiciary and other relevant authorities.
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