Chapter 7

Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism
Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism

Fuelled by globalization, climate change and state failure, and due to its transnational nature, migration poses fundamental challenges to democratic societies on both the national and local levels, particularly in cities. It challenges the nation state and, by extension, policy areas that represent core components of state sovereignty, including citizenship. Large migration flows strain democratic institutions’ capacity to effectively integrate migrants into society, and call into question the extent to which governments should enable migrants’ political participation and integration. Migration affects governments’ ability to deliver public services. Public debate and concerns about migration, including whether multiculturalism ‘works’, showcase the polarization of societies and policymakers’ dilemmas in the search for adequate responses. Migration also affects democratic institutions and processes in migrants’ countries of origin, as citizens abroad seek to influence politics at home. This chapter assesses the democratic dividend of migration for destination and origin countries, and how policymakers can effectively address public concerns on migration while also reaping the benefits of inclusive and multicultural integration policies. It features case studies on Canada, Chile, Germany, Myanmar, South Africa, Tunisia and the United Kingdom.

Written by
Nathalie Ebead and Paul McDonough

One significant litmus test of the strength and resilience of the democratic system as we know it—meaning open and responsible government founded on tolerance, respect for human rights and the rule of law—is how global people movement will be managed.


7.1. Introduction
Migration is often at the centre of public debate, especially during election campaigns. In some countries, party platforms increasingly promise to expel migrants or to restrict their entry. In others, a perceived government failure to address concerns over migration has led to xenophobic violence or civil unrest. Yet many countries acknowledge the economic benefits of migration and the increasing need for skilled migrants to support their economies.

Migration presents a long-standing challenge that has escalated into a global crisis and serves as a main driver of public debate. The Syrian crisis has driven an unprecedented number of refugees to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey as...
well as European Union countries, sparking global and regional debates about fair burden sharing and how countries can cope with increasing migration flows. Other countries, such as Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia and South Africa, have been long-term hosts to economic migrants as well as refugees fleeing war and conflict in Africa.

In Europe, governments and political parties across the spectrum have increasingly resorted to restrictive migration policies in a bid to curb increased migration flows. Migration has played a fundamental role in elections and referendums, as showcased by the electoral success of populist parties and leaders, particularly in Europe and the United States. In Australia, migration policy has focused on facilitating skilled and unskilled migration, but has restricted the arrival of significant numbers of asylum seekers. Canada has adopted a multicultural immigration policy, traditionally accepting many migrants and refugees.

BOX 7.1

Migration terms

**Asylum seeker:** A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on an application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.

**Diaspora:** A community of individuals living together on the same territory and sharing the conviction or belief of belonging (themselves or their families) to another territory with which they maintain regular relations. They are not tourists or short-term visitors.

**Emigration:** The act of departing or exiting from one state with a view to settling in another.

**First- and second-generation migrant:** Any person who has immigrated to a new country and been naturalized, or the children of such an immigrant. The term second generation may refer to either the children or the grandchildren of such an immigrant.

**Immigrant policies:** Government policies regulating pathways to social, economic and political integration.

**Immigration:** The process by which non-nationals move into a country for settlement.

**Immigration policies:** Government policies that aim to regulate entry into and permission to remain in a country, including border control.

**Internally displaced person:** A person or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular because of (or in order to avoid) the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.).

**Irregular migrant:** A foreign national with no legal resident status in the country in which they reside, a person violating the terms of their status so that their stay may be terminated, or a foreign national working in the shadow economy, including those with a regular residence status who work without registering to avoid taxes and regulations.

**Migrant:** Any person who has moved across an international border away from their place of birth or habitual residence other than for short-term travel.

**Migrant background:** All persons with one migrant parent. Alternatively, migrant background may refer to persons with one parent born outside the country of current long-term residence.

**Migrant flows:** The number of people migrating within a specific time frame.

**Migrant stocks:** The total number of persons born in a country other than that in which they reside, or a country’s foreign-born population.

**Refugee:** A person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (article 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; article 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, article 1(2) of the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country ‘owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality’. Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country ‘because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’.
Migration affects governments’ ability to deliver public services, which poses challenges to democratic accountability and highlights the need for a combined local, national and global governance response.

Due to its transnational nature, migration poses fundamental questions to democracy. Discussions about migration, and by association about multiculturalism, illustrate the polarization of societies and the dilemmas policymakers face in the search for adequate responses. Migration can also affect democratic institutions and processes in countries of origin, as citizens abroad seek to influence politics at home. Box 7.1 defines some of the terms used in discussions about migration.

Migrants are increasingly becoming political actors who can influence the quality of democracy in both destination and origin countries. The upsurge in migration flows has strained the capacities of democratic institutions to effectively integrate migrants into society, and has generated calls to examine how governments can enable and encourage migrants’ political participation. Migration affects governments’ ability to deliver public services, which poses challenges to democratic accountability and highlights the need for a combined local, national and global governance response.

Migration affects many economic and political aspects of democracy. This chapter focuses on the democratic dividend from migration and the enabling factors that support democracy (see Box 7.2). It argues that democratic institutions can approach migration challenges to democracy by enacting policies that do not solely rely on traditional formal political structures and the notion of the nation state. The key principle for migration policy is inclusiveness—creating resilience in the democratic system by allowing different voices to be heard, and harnessing different ways to manage discontent and the need for change. Democratic institutions can be enhanced by local initiatives that have successfully included migrants in political life, and link these lessons to international and regional governance frameworks. This can open space for new approaches to political advocacy, and in the long run enable democratic institutions and processes to respond to migration challenges in a sustainable and resilient manner.

This chapter analyses the challenges posed by migration to democracy, focusing on the political integration of legal immigrants and the political engagement of the diaspora. It does not address the impact of irregular or undocumented migrants, due to the lack of reliable data. The economic and social impact of immigration and emigration, as well as an analysis of push and pull factors in relation to migration, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Section 7.2 provides an overview of global migration patterns and trends. Section 7.3 focuses on how migration challenges and affects democracy by assessing how politically inclusive countries are of immigrants; it provides insights based on the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices and Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) data. Section 7.4 discusses the role that emigrants play as...
agents of democracy and the potential gains to democracy from emigration, with a focus on enabling the engagement of the diaspora in political life.

Section 7.5 highlights policy dilemmas resulting from migration, and Section 7.6 analyses the policy implications of (and possible approaches to) tackling migration challenges to democracy—that is, how political party systems and governments in destination and origin countries can address problems related to migration. Section 7.8 provides a set of conclusions and policy recommendations. The chapter discusses how democracies respond to migration challenges using case studies chosen to showcase regional examples as well as good practices in relation to policy approaches. For additional information on the issues discussed in this chapter see Migration, Multiculturalism and Democracy: A Resource Guide (Sisk 2017).

7.2. Migration patterns and global trends

Migration is not a new phenomenon, but its scale has increased with the rising global population. Push factors that make people leave their home country include limited job opportunities, political instability, human rights violations, conflicts and wars, state failure, and climate change or natural disasters. Important pull factors that influence their choice of destination include family migration and co-ethnic immigrant groups, prospects for an increased standard of living in terms of job opportunities and public service delivery, as well as politically stable countries that guarantee fundamental freedoms and encourage individual choice in education, career, gender roles and sexual orientation, and place of residence.

By late 2015, migrants accounted for over 3 per cent of the world’s population. Over the last 45 years, the number of people living outside their country of origin has almost tripled from 76 million to 244 million (IOM 2015a). However, the proportion of migrants as a share of the world’s population has remained relatively stable since 1990 (UN 2016).

Migration flows have increased since 1990 in all regions, particularly from developing countries to developed countries. While most of this is voluntary migration, forced migration has risen dramatically: over 20 million persons are now recognized as refugees, the majority having fled persecution or conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria (UNHCR 2015).

Over the last 45 years, the number of people living outside their country of origin has almost tripled from 76 million to 244 million

BOX 7.3

The gender dimensions of migration

As of 2015, women and girls made up 48 per cent of the global migrant population (UNHCR 2015). Female migrants face different challenges than their male counterparts. They are often confronted with multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination on the grounds of sex, ethnicity, nationality, class and other bias, in addition to their status as migrants. This can significantly undermine their human rights as well as their ability to participate effectively in the host country’s social, economic and political life.

In this context, migration systems should consider the vulnerabilities and specific needs of migrant women. This requires adopting gender-sensitive policies that facilitate their access to information, employment and public services such as healthcare and education as a key part of the integration process. Furthermore, language learning programmes and information campaigns are essential for empowering migrant women and making them aware of their human, civic and political rights. Targeted policies and programmes that encourage the active participation of migrant women in civic and political life, including voting and standing as candidates in national and local elections, are also crucial for their integration into the host society and to ensure that the interests of their communities are effectively represented (European Women’s Lobby 2007).

Civil society and grassroots organizations can play an important role in empowering migrant women through capacity-building initiatives and mentorship programmes that help them develop leadership skills and realize their potential as decision-makers and agents of change (OSCE 2014). For example, the New American Leaders Project trains first- and second-generation migrants living in the USA in political leadership at the state and local levels, recognizing that ‘democracy is stronger when everyone is represented and everyone participates’ (Dyogi and Bhojwani 2016).
Migration patterns

Europe hosts about 76 million migrants, Asia 75 million, Africa 21 million, the USA and Canada 54 million, Latin America and the Caribbean 9 million and Oceania 8 million. Some democracies, such as Mexico, are transit and emigration countries simultaneously.

Countries of origin
Among voluntary migrants, the largest numbers come from India, Mexico and Russia. Most tend to stay close to their countries of origin (except for significant intra-Asia flows of labourers).

Refugees and asylum seekers
In the first half of 2016, there were 1.5 million new refugees and asylum seekers worldwide, raising the total number of refugees under the UNHCR mandate to 16.5 million, the largest total since 1992. The greatest concentrations were in or near the Middle East, with Turkey hosting the most refugees, nearly 2.8 million.

Migrants and refugees
- 80% of migrants are between the ages of 15 and 64
- Approximately 50% of voluntary migrants are women
- Approximately 50% of refugees are women and 51% are children
- More than 1/3 of migrants have completed tertiary education
- Almost 1/5 live in established gateway cities
- One out of every three people living in London, New York and Sydney is a migrant
- More than half of the people living in Brussels and Dubai are migrants
Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, there have been more refugees than at any time since World War II, tragically highlighted by the high number of people risking and losing their lives. In 2016, more than 5,000 persons died crossing the Mediterranean Sea, the highest annual total ever reported (UNHCR 2016b). About 1.5 million persons were recognized as refugees worldwide or applied for asylum in the first half of 2016; the majority had fled Syria (UNHCR 2016a: 3–4). The greatest concentrations were in or near the Middle East; Turkey hosted the most refugees (2.8 million) under its temporary protection regime (UNHCR 2016a: 8).

7.3. The impact of migration on democracy

Recent studies of the impact of migration on democracy have examined three areas:
(a) public concerns about immigration, (b) migration levels and (c) the quality of governance and migrant integration policies (McLaren 2010). First, public perceptions of migration challenge notions of national identity and shared societal values when public policies divide the population into native-born inhabitants and newcomers (Huysmans 1995: 60). This affects how well democracies integrate newcomers and create social cohesion or multicultural societies. Such perceptions may affect the public’s willingness to support policymakers, depending on whether citizens trust that politicians and political institutions are able to handle the migration challenge (Miller and Listhaug 1990: 358). Indeed, many studies have concluded that immigration disrupts political and social cohesion and identities (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2006; Gibson 2002; Fetzer 2000; Espenhane and Calhoun 1993), and that migrant integration policies in turn affect public attitudes towards migrants, and thus political trust (Weldon 2006). Second, migration levels may affect citizens’ attitudes towards migrants and their trust in political institutions, and citizens’ belief that political institutions can handle the migration challenge. Third, how well political institutions handle migration may affect citizens’ levels of trust in these institutions.

Inclusion—that is, how well societies politically integrate immigrants—is a key factor when assessing how migration affects democracies, as well as the conditions under which democratic systems can respond to these challenges in a resilient manner. How well countries integrate immigrants into the political system depends on a number of factors, including (a) the ease with which countries enable immigrants and subsequent generations of immigrants to naturalize or become citizens; (b) whether countries allow migrants to vote or stand as a candidate in national or local elections; (c) immigrants’ voter turnout; (d) whether a country’s policies facilitate political integration (i.e., how inclusive a country’s policies are of immigrants); (e) how well immigrants are represented in a country’s key political institutions such as the parliament, political parties and local councils, and whether other consultative bodies exist; and (f) the challenge that anti-immigrant parties pose to democracy. This section analyses each of these factors in turn.

Immigrants and the pathway to citizenship

Citizenship is an important incentive for integration and removes barriers for immigrants to participate in political life. It provides full civic and political rights and protection against discrimination, which can help increase immigrants’ sense of belonging and willingness to participate. A 2012 study comparing the political participation of foreign-born and native-born residents of European countries, and citizens versus non-citizens, found that native-born and foreign-born citizens demonstrated similar overall levels of participation in political activities (Just and Anderson 2012). Among the foreign born, citizenship significantly increased political participation, especially with regard to ‘less institutionalized political acts’ (Just and Anderson 2012: 496). This effect was greatest among immigrants who grew up in relatively undemocratic countries (Just...
and Anderson 2012). For this reason, it is important to assess whether countries enable immigrant naturalization, given that the path to citizenship can include many obstacles, from lack of documentation to highly discretionary decision-making procedures. Citizenship can be acquired automatically (mainly at birth) or upon application. Naturalization is defined here as the non-automatic acquisition of citizenship by an individual who was not a citizen of a particular country by birth, requiring an application by the immigrant and an act of granting by the host country (OECD 2011).

The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship vary widely: countries have the exclusive authority to regulate the terms under which immigrants can obtain citizenship. Citizenship rules regulate eligibility criteria such as residence requirements or whether citizenship is acquired based on parental heritage or ‘blood’ (ius sanqunis) or the country of birth (ius soli). They also regulate the conditions under which citizenship is granted, including language proficiency, citizenship or integration tests, economic and criminal record requirements, costs, as well as legal guarantees and discretionary decision-making powers. Lastly, these rules regulate whether countries allow dual citizenship (see Section 7.4).

Many countries require citizenship tests as part of the naturalization process, including Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA (OECD 2011). The introduction of these tests has decreased the number of citizenship applicants, however their impact on immigrants’ integration remains unclear (OECD 2011). Similarly, most countries have language requirements, which indicate an applicant’s willingness to integrate; Sweden does not have such a requirement (OECD 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Citizenship based on ius soli (e.g. birthplace)</th>
<th>Citizenship based on ius sangunis (e.g. parental heritage)</th>
<th>Ease of naturalization for adults</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (with restrictions)</td>
<td>Automatically granted</td>
<td>Transparent, accessible procedures; 32 states (all EU member states, Croatia, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>More than half the countries with restrictions; absolute ius soli in Chad, Lesotho and Tanzania</td>
<td>Automatically granted</td>
<td>Procedures exist, however effective implementation is lacking. Chad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda (requires 15–20 years), Central African Republic (35 years), Democratic Republic of the Congo and Egypt (presidential decrees are required).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>Automatically granted</td>
<td>Transparent, accessible procedures; short legal residency required (Chile, Colombia, Venezuela 5 years; Brazil 4 years; Peru, Argentina and Bolivia 2 years), with some form of citizenship test. Many countries also allow a fast-track process if the applicant comes from a Spanish, Portuguese, Latin American or Caribbean state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>Uncommon (Cambodia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand)</td>
<td>Main form of acquiring citizenship</td>
<td>Procedures generally exist, however are often difficult, and subject to several restrictions and obligations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bauböck and Goodman (2010); Feere (2010); Davidson and Weekley (1999); Manby (2010).
In countries with inclusive citizenship policies, immigrants are more likely to opt for citizenship (Huddleston et al. 2015). For example, Ireland, Portugal, the UK, the Nordic States and the Benelux countries have more inclusive citizenship policies than Austria, Switzerland or the Baltic States (Huddleston et al. 2015). While Bulgaria and Hungary have very high naturalization rates, these are not related to immigrants but to co-ethnics living abroad who benefit from special naturalization privileges (Huddleston et al. 2015). In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA—all countries with high naturalization rates—immigrants obtain residence permits upon entry and are encouraged to naturalize at the end of an initial settlement period (OECD 2011). This policy approach towards immigrants encourages them from the outset to think of themselves as ‘future citizens’, compared to the (European) approach that requires ‘proof of integration’ before naturalization takes place.

The change in naturalization trends is linked to migration flows; however there is a time lag, which means that countries should focus on long-term residents if they wish to encourage naturalization. Naturalization rates based on long-term residence nevertheless vary: Canada (89 per cent of men and 90 per cent of women), Sweden (79 and 80 per cent, respectively), and the Netherlands (72 and 73 per cent, respectively) have relatively high naturalization rates. In Luxembourg (12 per cent of men and 13 per cent of women), Switzerland (28 and 40 per cent, respectively) and Germany (35 and 36 per cent, respectively) fewer immigrants naturalize (OECD 2011). Given the increased migration flows, there is nevertheless a rising trend towards restricting the acquisition of citizenship, including in countries such as Australia, Canada and the USA (OECD 2011). While naturalization does not necessarily impose an identity or promote homogeneity or exclusivity (especially if multiple nationalities are possible), in practice it may do so, due for example to requirements to renounce previous nationalities or attend integration courses and exams (Joppke 2010; Pedroza 2015). Naturalization policies alone may not be able to redress the disenfranchisement of migrants when migrations tend to be temporary.

Since international law says little about the impact of migration on the composition of the population that enjoys voting rights, it is important to analyse this aspect.

Immigrants and voting rights
A core principle of democracy is universal suffrage. Since the 18th century, barriers to the right to vote and to stand as candidates have been removed or lowered. At the same time, the idea of representative democracy was based on the congruence of territory, citizenry and government. Globalization has challenged the requirements of citizenship and residence: citizens may be disenfranchised
due to migration. Notwithstanding academic controversies on the relationship between naturalization policies and immigrant integration (Huddleston and Vink 2013), key obstacles to immigrants’ political participation include their lack of electoral participation and country approaches to naturalization.

Host countries permit immigrants to participate in elections to varying degrees. In the last 50 years more than 50 countries have held parliamentary debates at different levels (local, provincial and national) about extending voting rights to migrants after a certain period of residence. More than 30 countries have reformed their electoral laws and even constitutions to enable non-citizen residents to vote (Pedroza 2015). Non-citizen voting rights exist, or are provided for in constitutions without having been applied or implemented, in 64 democracies (Blais et al. 2001; Earnest 2004; Waldrauch 2005). The largest group of countries to allow non-citizens to vote is the EU. After 3–5 years of residence, non-citizen residents may stand as candidates in local elections in 11 EU countries, vote locally in 15, regionally in five and nationally in three (certain groups in Portugal and the UK). Outside the EU, Norway, Iceland and eight Central and South American countries including Belize, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela have the same purely residence-based local franchise (Bauböck 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck 2016). However, almost 10 million non-EU adults are disenfranchised in 13 EU countries (Huddleston et al. 2015). The same is true for resident non-citizens in Canada, Japan, Turkey and USA. According to 2013 MIPEX data, in the USA this affects 21.9 million people or 7 per cent of the population, and 4.8 million people in Canada or 10 per cent of the population (Huddleston et al. 2015).

The Nordic countries and Ireland grant the most inclusive local voting rights in Europe, while outside the EU the most democratically inclusive country granting national voting rights is New Zealand (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEX 2015). Malawi grants national franchise after seven years. In Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay the residence requirements for national franchise are five and 15 years, respectively (Bauböck 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck 2016).

Granting voting rights to immigrants is controversial, given that voting is traditionally seen as a feature of citizenship. Whether citizenship is defined as the compilation of civil, social and political rights or as a status of full membership in a polity, there is a trend in an increasing number of countries to link immigrants’ local voting rights to residency, while national voting rights are rarely granted to immigrants before naturalization (Bauböck 2005). In some regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, democratization has been linked to the extension of voting rights to non-citizens, although it remains a politically sensitive issue. With the exception of Chile and Uruguay, democratization in South America has indirectly contributed to immigrant voting rights because government policies were sympathetic to migrants’ rights and allowed immigrants to mobilize for suffrage, often having previously been prevented by authoritarian regimes (Escobar 2015, 2017). In Myanmar, non-citizens, such as Rohyngya Muslims, were ‘white card holders’ who had the right to vote until the November 2015 elections, when that right was withdrawn, preventing them from taking part in the country’s first democratic elections. In Japan, foreigners are only allowed to participate in some local referendums, but are not granted local voting rights (Huddleston et al. 2015).

Whether extending voting rights to resident non-citizens improves democracy remains empirically unproven. Electoral systems and the socio-political context influence the implementation of more inclusive voting rights. Some argue that the political inclusion of residents improves governance through more genuine representation and is an obligation of democratic governments, as laws and policies apply to both citizens and residents (Munro 2008). Conversely, concerns surround the granting of voting rights to...
migrants at the national level due to fears that this will negatively affect national identity and loyalty, potentially endangering the order of the state. A third position in this debate is that access to national voting rights should be given to immigrants through naturalization, and thus pathways to their citizenship should be facilitated. Box 7.4 describes migrants’ involvement in local elections in Chile.

At the local level, a different picture emerges: even when the ratio of resident non-citizens to citizens is high, local enfranchisement does not risk a national government of newcomers (Bauböck 2004; Walzer 1997). The right to vote locally may lead to a sense of belonging, as it recognizes residents’ equal capacity to participate in the formation of governments, while also instilling trust between newcomers and others, thus improving legitimacy (Pedroza 2015). Policies that extend voting rights universally, even if limited to the local level, offer non-citizen residents the chance to equally integrate into politics and achieve a new sense of belonging (Offe and Fuchs 2002). For example, the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level includes the right to vote as one of its standards. Likewise, the EU’s Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy highlight that “the participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration” (European Commission 2004: 10). The European Agenda for Integration recognizes that integration is a local process, and that integration policies should include granting migrants voting rights in local elections (European Commission 2011).

Extending voting rights to migrants is more than a policy issue that may enhance democracy. It also affects which principles a country applies when it grants citizenship, and influences its political definition of citizenship. Migration policy must therefore consider citizenship policy when democratic institutions define approaches to include migrants in political life.

Immigrants and the influence of voter turnout—willingness to politically engage?

Voter turnout gauges the level of civic engagement. Thus whether immigrant citizens vote is an important consideration for political party and government strategies to engage with immigrants and the native population.

In Europe, voter turnout among the native population strongly influences immigrants’ participation: the more native citizens vote, the more immigrant citizens vote (Voicu 2014). Some argue that their length of stay in the host country does not seem to affect whether immigrants who have voting rights make use of them (Voicu 2014). Other evidence shows that the longer immigrants stay in the host country, the more politically active they become, regardless of whether they obtain citizenship (Just and Anderson 2012). Immigrants who moved to Canada in 2001 or later were less likely to vote in 2011 than more established immigrants or those born in the country (Uppal and LaRochelle-Côté 2012).

Thus, immigrants with voting rights do not necessarily vote, and current studies show that immigrant turnout in national elections is generally lower than in local elections. Even in local elections, immigrants have a lower voter

## BOX 7.4

The decisive role of migrants in Chile’s municipal elections

Migrants residing in Chile for at least five years are entitled to vote. In the 2016 municipal elections, migrants represented 1.4 per cent of total voters on the electoral roll, and 8.9 per cent of the voting population in Santiago (El Mercurio 2016). According to the Ministry of Interior, voter turnout tends to be much higher among migrants than among Chilean citizens (Gonzalez 2016). As a result, migrant voters can play a decisive role in the outcome of local and municipal elections, especially in municipalities with high concentrations of migrants. In addition, as stated by the Jesuit Migration Service, data from the 2013 legislative elections show that candidates who directly appealed to migrant voters were more successful than those who did not (La Segunda 2014). As the country’s migrant population is continuously growing, political parties and candidates increasingly need to adapt their programmes to address migrants’ concerns and propose measures to include them at the local level (El Mercurio 2016).
turnout compared to natives. The exception is Canada (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016). This is true regardless of whether a country is politically inclusive of immigrants, has an open citizenship regime or allows immigrants to vote in local elections. Examples include the Netherlands, which strongly encourages immigrant voting rights at the local level (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016: 33); Sweden, which has a large immigrant population (13 per cent), an immigrant-friendly citizenship regime and policies to further immigrant political inclusion (Bird, Saalfeld and Würst 2016: 39); and Norway, which also facilitates immigrant political inclusion and has an open citizenship regime (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016: 44).

Different factors influence voter turnout, including the political socialization of immigrants and their socio-economic status. Immigrants’ willingness to engage politically in their host societies requires a genuine interest in doing so. If political parties and governments aim to engage with as large a segment of the electorate as possible, their strategies need to address general voter scepticism that political parties and governments can tackle challenges such as migration regardless of whether a voter is a migrant or a native.

Political integration of immigrants

In addition to facilitating naturalization and granting voting rights, a country’s legislative and political system must be open to immigrant political integration in order to facilitate immigrants’ inclusion and ability to engage in the political life of their host countries.

To assess whether there is a correlation between a political system’s openness to immigrants’ political integration and the quality of its democracy, three International IDEA GSoD indices attributes (Representative Government, Checks on Government and Fundamental Rights) were compared to the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality scores.
The GSoD indices score in relation to representative government measures the extent to which a country has clean elections, inclusive suffrage, free political parties and an elected government (vertical axis Figure 7.1). The score in relation to checks on government measures the effectiveness of parliaments, judicial independence and the existence of a critical media (vertical axis Figure 7.2). Fundamental Rights (vertical axis Figure 7.3) measures equal and fair access to justice, respect for civil liberties, and the extent of social and political equality. The GSoD indices and MIPEX both score 35 countries, the majority of which score very high on the GSoD indices. This means that even the lower-scoring countries in the GSoD indices and MIPEX sample score higher relative to the global sample.

The MIPEX political participation and access to nationality scores (horizontal axis on Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) measure 167 indicators over the time period 2004–14, including countries’ migration policies in relation to electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies as well as eligibility for naturalization, conditions for acquisition of citizenship status, security of citizenship status and acceptance of dual nationality. All EU member states are included, as well as Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA.

Political participation policies focus on migrants’ right to vote and stand in national, local and regional elections; their right of association and membership in political parties; the existence, powers, composition and representativeness of migrant consultative bodies at the regional, national and local levels; and whether public funding enables active political participation by migrants and their associations.

Access-to-nationality policies focus on eligibility criteria for naturalization such as residence and permit requirements for legal residents, and conditions for the naturalization of spouses and second- and third-generation migrants. They also focus on conditions for the acquisition of citizenship such as language, economic and criminal record requirements, good character clauses and costs. Other factors include the security of citizenship status based on the length of procedures, grounds of citizenship refusal and discretionary powers of refusal, legal guarantees and redress in the case of citizenship refusal, protection against the withdrawal of citizenship, and whether dual nationality is granted to second- and third-generation migrants. The 2014 data from the MIPEX and GSoD indices show that political systems that are open or inclusive in terms of their political integration of immigrants tend to score high in key attributes of democracy quality.

Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show that in Europe, the high scores for immigrant-friendly countries such as Finland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden reflect policies that focus on ensuring that immigrants have equal legal rights to citizens and a high level of integration.
Data show that political systems that are open or inclusive in terms of their political integration of immigrants tend to score high in key attributes of democracy quality.
candidates in local elections. For example, the total number of councillors of immigrant origin in Norway and the Netherlands was under 1 per cent (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010) and 3 per cent, respectively, in 2011 (Vermeulen 2011). In New Zealand, immigrant Indians formed their own political party to compete in local elections on a pro-immigration rights platform in 2016; while Asians and Indians represent 13 per cent of the country’s current population, they are not proportionally represented in Parliament (Lynch 2016). In Australia’s current Parliament of 226 senators and members, only 26 were born overseas (13 per cent) (Parliament of Australia 2015), despite the fact that 28 per cent of Australians are born overseas (Hasham 2016).

Adding to the representation deficit is the challenge immigrants face in joining political parties. In some regions, such as Europe, this is comparatively easy, since few parties prevent immigrants from becoming members beyond residence requirements (Dähnke et al. 2014: 14). However, except for Poland, non-citizen immigrants cannot vote in or stand for elections.

Immigrants face challenges related to the opening up of traditional party cultures to accept and further their effective participation. These include the lack of a welcoming culture that adapts to the diversity of its members, and the need for personal contacts with the (local) party leadership to be encouraged to join a party and be included on a candidate list. In addition, immigrants often lack access to historical and established party networks, particularly youth organizations that in European countries such as the Nordics, Austria and Germany often provide the entry point for a political career. Immigrants who do become successful party members often take on the role of mediator with immigrant communities, and can thus influence how a party contributes to the migration debate and migration policy. Conversely, if immigrant representatives in political parties are perceived to be mere ‘tokens’ with no real influence on programmes and policy, this can limit their ability to influence party structures.

Political parties have applied different strategies to increase minority representation, including bolstering their profile within ethnic communities, implementing recruitment drives to encourage ethnic minority representatives to stand for election, and adopting numerical targets for minority candidates. In a very few cases, political parties have established ethnic candidate lists (Bird 2003). Other political parties have used targets, intraparty minority networks and quotas to increase minority representation. Examples include the Ontario New Democratic Party and the Welsh Labour Party as well as the Swedish Social Democratic Party, which introduced quotas for candidates of immigrant background at the local level. In Stockholm municipality, a quota for candidates targeting migrants from non-Nordic countries has been set in proportion to the district’s immigrant population (25 per cent) (Dähnke et al. 2014: 22). While political institutions and parties have often successfully used quotas to increase the share of women (Wängerud 2009), they have not always worked for minority groups (Ruedin 2013; Lubbers and Van der Zwan 2016). Reserved seats in legislatures are more often used to ensure the representation of minority groups (Htun 2004).
Many political parties allow immigrants to hold positions within their party structure, including on candidate lists (Htun 2004), and some have created incentives for immigrants to politically engage with them through special forums or campaigns. Many of these structures are informal and weak, and depend on individual interactions rather than institutional structures. Overall, political parties could be more effective at attracting people from immigrant backgrounds (Dähnke et al. 2014).

Electoral systems and the cultural context affect the level of minority representation in political institutions (Ruedin 2013; Togeby 2008; Dancygier et al. 2015; Sobolewska 2013). The size of an electoral district affects the likelihood that under-represented groups will be elected, as this defines how many candidates parties can field in an election. Similarly, a low formal threshold (or no threshold) can increase the representation of under-represented groups, particularly in proportional representation systems (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005; Larsen and Taphorn 2007). In countries with proportional representation electoral systems, such as the Netherlands, candidate selection methods influence the representativeness of the candidate list, including candidates’ relative positions on the list, which can increase their chances of being elected. Parties that have more positive views on migration and integration tend to have to higher shares of ethnic minorities, and place them higher on candidate lists (Lubbers and Van der Zwan 2016). In addition, if a party’s candidate selection system is more inclusive, the relative position of ethnic minority groups is higher. Parties that have strong internal support systems for ethnic minorities tend to have a higher share of ethnic minorities, and place them higher on candidate lists (Lubbers and Van der Zwan 2016). In majority systems such as in Colombia, Hungary, India, Jordan, New Zealand, Niger and Pakistan, seats are set aside in the legislature for under-represented groups (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005). Box 7.6 examines the inclusiveness of political parties in Germany.

In the context of tackling the migration challenge, a party’s agenda and views on migration—regardless of where it stands on the political spectrum—seem to influence whether immigrants are represented in political party structures, whether they can stand for election

**BOX 7.6**

**Case study on inclusive political parties in Germany**

Although foreign permanent residents constitute almost 50 per cent of Germany’s immigrant population, only citizens have the right to vote in federal elections (Basic Law, article 20(2)). In a series of decisions in 1990, Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled that enfranchising foreigners would require revising the citizenship law to facilitate naturalization. German reunification, along with the migratory consequences of the democratization processes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, presented an opportunity for reform. In 1992, the citizenship law was revised to introduce naturalization as a right for foreigners who had lived in Germany for 15 years, but fell short of introducing the territorial principle: immigrant children born in Germany still had to apply for German citizenship. In 1999, the Citizenship Act introduced ius soli for children born in Germany to immigrant parents with eight years of residency and entitled immigrants to citizenship after eight years if they complied with two key integration requirements—adhering to the laws of the German state and learning its language; this resulted in 905,000 naturalizations from 2000 to 2005.

There was the potential for a significant increase in the number of naturalized citizens, since 68.6 per cent of the German immigrant electorate had been in the country for more than eight years and thus qualified for citizenship under the 1999 law. Thus political parties in Germany revised their strategies to mobilize immigrant support to appeal to immigrant voters’ interests, and by increasingly nominating immigrant candidates on party lists or preventing their defection (Claro da Fonseca 2011).

The 1999 Citizenship Act did not go far enough to increase the representation of one of Germany’s key minorities, the Turks, in the Bundestag. The Turkish minority in Germany had been affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) since the 1960s, with support for the Greens rising in the 1980s. Turkish candidates in the Left Party were successful in the 2005 elections, followed by the further diversification of German political parties fielding Turkish candidates in the 2009 elections, including the SPD, the Greens, the Left and the Free Democratic Party. Even though the Turkish minority remains under-represented in the Bundestag, it has a higher political representation than Muslims in Britain or France (Aktürk 2010).

Despite a general understanding among traditional German political parties, particularly since the 2000s, that immigration has had a positive impact on Germany, in particular for the economy as a result of gaining skilled labour, the idea of increasing inclusiveness and multiculturalism has been controversial. Particularly after reunification, EU expansion and the recent refugee crisis in Europe, there has been a rise in xenophobic violence, nationalism and the establishment of anti-immigrant political parties such as the AfD (see Box 4.3) and movements such as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, Pegida), and the passage of restrictive asylum legislation.
and whether they have a realistic chance of winning due to their relative position on a party’s candidate list. The level of support that a party provides to immigrants also matters. Political parties’ inclusiveness thus affects the representation of immigrants. Parties that have positive views on migration should therefore evaluate the inclusiveness of their candidate selection processes and strengthen their internal party support structures to ensure migrants are appropriately represented.

Countries may include immigrants in decision-making processes through consultative bodies, even if they do not grant them formal voting rights or facilitate their inclusion in political parties. In the EU, ten countries (Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) have established formal consultative bodies between immigrants and government bodies (EU FRA 2017).

Consultations with immigrants can take many different forms and operate on different levels. For example local government authorities, including cities and municipalities in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy Latvia, Luxembourg and Sweden have established dialogue platforms among citizens and immigrant or ethnic minority associations, consultative bodies, and elected representatives from each municipality and research institutions focusing on immigration-related issues to enhance integration at the local level. These dialogue sessions (called Strengthening Integration Dialogue Platforms) have addressed topics such as voting in the general elections and the challenges and opportunities to improve facilities and living conditions in their municipalities (EU FRA 2017). In Italy, 14 regional councils, 48 municipal councils and 19 provincial councils have immigrant consultative bodies (EU FRA 2017).

The composition and selection modalities of these consultative bodies varies: typically, the largest immigrant groups are represented, depending on their self-organization and the extent of their networking abilities. Immigrant representatives can be elected by immigrants or other organizations or be publicly appointed (EU FRA 2017).

**The challenge of anti-immigrant parties**

Concerns over immigration have reinvigorated right-wing populist parties and leaders in countries such as Germany (Otto and Steinhardt 2014), Denmark (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2008), Austria (Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2013), Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia and the USA (Mayda, Peri and Steingress 2016). Many parties across the political spectrum increasingly use the media to communicate the narrative of an out-of-touch political elite versus the people, and an ‘us versus them’ mentality based on ethnocentric identities and xenophobia (Greven 2016).

Fuelled by the refugee crisis resulting from the ongoing Syrian civil war, Europe has experienced increased support for the revitalization of nationalist, anti-immigrant political parties that promote Islamophobia. These parties have been on the rise in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, as well as in the traditionally liberal Netherlands and the Nordic states, and have secured significant parliamentary blocs in several countries. Other nations have seen the rise of nationalist street movements such as the English Defence League or France’s Muslim-baiting Bloc Indentitaire. Nationalist and right-wing parties gained significantly at the ballot box in 2015 in Austria, Denmark, Finland and Switzerland (Recknagl 2015). In 2016, far-right Freedom Party candidate Norbert Hofer received strong support in the first round of the Austrian presidential elections, while the right-wing populist parties Law and Justice, and Fidesz, govern in Poland and Hungary, respectively. In France, National Front candidate Marine Le Pen has gained support from the white working class and the unemployed to reach the second round of the presidential election in May 2017, in which she was defeated.

In addition, mainstream parties increasingly accommodate the rhetoric of anti-immigrant parties during election campaigns, adding
Whether it is the size of the foreign population in a country or the size and speed of migration flows that leads to a rise in populist parties is still debated. Migration fuelled by globalization thus affects democracy by increasing public support for (particularly right-wing) populist parties and their anti-immigrant agendas. Whether it is the size of the foreign population in a country or the size and speed of migration flows that leads to a rise in populist parties is still debated. A controversial 2016 study suggests that there is a tipping point of immigration that leads to electoral support for right-wing populist parties in Europe: as the percentage of immigrants approaches approximately 22 per cent of the general population, the percentage of right-wing populist voters exceeds 50 per cent—the threshold for forming a government (Podobnik, Jusup and Stanley 2016). The data furthermore suggest that the greater the percentage of voters in favour of right-wing populist parties compared to the percentage of immigrants, the lower their tolerance of immigrants (Podobnik, Jusup and Stanley 2016). By contrast, other studies show that it is not the percentage of the foreign population in a country that invigorates right-wing populism, but rather the speed and size of immigration flows (Demos 2017; Guibernau 2010).

There have been positive examples of the public voting for pro-immigrant political parties or leaders who advocate inclusive and fair migration policies, such as the election of Sadiq Khan as mayor of London in 2016 (see Box 7.8).

A European study from 2010 found that public concern about immigration is one cause of citizens’ lack of trust in political institutions. 

BOX 7.7

The influence of migration perceptions on the ‘Brexit’ referendum

A slim majority of UK voters chose to leave the EU in June 2016 in what has become known as the ‘Brexit’ referendum. The three most decisive issues for voters were the economy (21 per cent), sovereignty (17 per cent) and immigration (20 per cent) (Swales 2016). These issues had a strong impact on voting behavior: the majority of those who said immigration (88 per cent) or sovereignty (90 per cent) were the most important issues voted to leave, compared to a small minority who said the economy was more important (Prosser, Mellon and Green 2016). Almost 50 per cent of the British population believed in 2016 that immigration negatively affects the economy, according to the British Social Attitudes survey (Versi 2016). ‘Leave’ voters believed that immigration had negatively affected Britain, and felt that Brexit would lower immigration, positively influence the economy and strengthen security (Swales 2016).

Before the referendum, polls indicated that immigration had become voters’ top priority, which prompted the Leave campaign to adopt more anti-immigrant rhetoric (Taylor 2016). Several leading Conservatives made anti-immigrant statements; then-Prime Minister David Cameron referred to refugees as a ‘swarm’ (BBC News 2015). Boris Johnson, who was then mayor of London, portrayed Turkish people as a threat to the UK due to their geographic proximity to Syria and Iraq. The leader of the nationalist UK Independence Party (UKIP), Nigel Farage, alleged during his campaign that immigrants would overwhelm Britain. One of UKIP’s posters featured the image of a mass of migrants traveling by foot with the header ‘breaking point’ (Versi 2016). Both parties found strong support among their members for a Leave vote: 98 per cent of UKIP voters and 58 per cent of Conservatives voted to leave (Swales 2016).

The Leave campaign attracted voters concerned about migration who were unaware of its long-term positive effects on the economy: 95 per cent of those who voted Leave were anti-immigrant and economically not well off. The Leave campaign better tapped into public concerns, providing more clarity about the potential impact of Brexit on immigration and independence.
and politicians, and not simply the result of far-right rhetoric or pessimism, or migration levels (McLaren 2010). Specifically, if citizens’ perceptions of the effects of immigration are negative, they are less trusting of the political system. The study concluded that levels of immigration were unrelated (or negatively related) to public concerns about immigration. In European countries with high-quality governance and policies that make it easier for immigrants to participate in political life and integrate, public concern about immigration and political distrust was high, while concerns about immigration had a weaker effect on trust in political institutions in countries with poor governance. In relation to immigrant-friendly migration policies, those with less negative views of immigrants were less distrustful of their political systems and politicians than those who were very concerned about immigration. This relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust exists regardless of the presence of far-right parties. Reducing the disconnect between citizens and political institutions and governments, and increasing trust between them, can help public attitudes towards immigration produce better governance (McLaren 2010).

Therefore a key policy implication for governments—in addition to considering state capacities in relation to migration policymaking—is that countries with high immigration rates and immigrant-friendly or multicultural policies must work to reduce the potential backlash from citizens who have negative perceptions of immigration. This is particularly true in Europe, Latin America and the USA, which have experienced a rise in populist leaders and parties as a result of voter dissatisfaction, which has often been linked to anti-immigrant sentiments. This seems to be corroborated by recent explanations that the rise of authoritarian populists in Western societies has caused a strong cultural backlash against long-term social change and liberal values (Norris 2016).

**BOX 7.8**

The mayor of London

In May 2016, the month before the Brexit referendum, London voters elected Sadiq Khan, the son of Pakistani immigrants and an observant Muslim, as their new mayor by a greater margin than any London mayor since it became an elected office in 2000. His Conservative opponent sought to link Khan’s faith with violent extremism (Krol 2016), to which Khan responded (on Twitter), ‘There’s no need to keep pointing at me & shouting “he’s a Muslim”. I put it on my own leaflets’ (Sullivan and Pickard 2016). He described himself to one of Europe’s largest and oldest cities as a native: ‘I am a Londoner, I am European, I am British, I am English, I am of Islamic faith, of Asian origin, of Pakistani heritage, a dad, a husband’ (Sullivan and Pickard 2016).

At a time of rising pan-European Islamophobia, in the midst of the campaign that led to the UK vote to leave the EU, and in the context of electoral losses by Khan’s Labour Party, this represents a dramatic success for an inclusive political vision. One commentator referred to his victory as ‘a stinging rebuke to the peddlers of prejudice’ (Hasan 2016). With Muslims representing about one-eighth of the city’s population, Khan attracted a broad base of voters. His working-class roots, his record as an MP and minister in the previous Labour government, and his focus on quality-of-life issues such as housing and transport proved an attractive political package (Booth 2016). Arguably the UK’s acceptance of multiculturalism, rather than the ‘assimilationist’ model of integration practiced in other countries, enabled his victory (Hasan 2016).

### 7.4. Emigrants as agents of democracy: how can democracies gain from emigration?

Notwithstanding the important contributions of emigrant remittances to the economies of their home countries, the most important effect of emigration for origin countries may be on political institutions and social attitudes through democratic norm diffusion. Diaspora communities influence their home countries through the transfer of social remittances. The definition of diaspora used here is Gerard-Francois Dumont’s: ‘a community of individuals living together on the same territory and having in common the conviction or belief of belonging, themselves or their families to another territory with which they maintain regular relations; they are not tourists or short-term visitors. They transfer information, innovative ideas, intellectual capacities, new technological skills, business and trade practices, and democratic political habits and practices when they return to their home countries, when they visit relatives and via social media, TV and telecommunications. Globalization,
in particular the spread of the internet and communication technology, has made it easier for migrants to stay informed and connected to politics in their home countries. This has transformed their ability to participate in their home countries’ political life and influence their democratic institutions and political leadership.

Diaspora and reintegrating emigrants may thus act as a bridge between origin and destination countries, and in their home countries as ‘agents of democracy’ and a reconciling force to overcome political trauma. Their actions and views can affect society’s attitudes regarding the perception of freedom, tolerance of differences, human rights, governance and political practices in their countries of origin (see Box 7.9).

The evidence suggests that there is a democratic dividend from emigration (Rapoport 2016; Lodigiani 2016); migrants act as agents of democracy, which has important policy implications. For instance, a study conducted in Cabo Verde showed that returnees demand greater accountability from their government if their host country had high-quality governance, and that returnees were able to influence their home countries more than emigrants can from host countries (Batista and Vincente 2011). A study conducted in Mexico found evidence that migration to the USA contributed to democratization in Mexico by significantly increasing the probability of an opposition party winning a municipal election (Pfutze 2014). In Mali, returnees increased electoral participation and helped spread the idea of the need for increased political participation among non-migrants in Mali, which enhanced democracy (Chauvet and Mercier 2014). In Moldova, emigration to Western countries decreased support for the Communist Party, which contributed to the establishment of new and more democratic political parties (Mahmoud et al. 2014). In Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania, returning members of the diaspora joined the national political leadership. In India, returnees have influenced political elites by reshaping political understandings, norms and expectations, and have contributed to political stability and the resilience of the country’s democracy by encouraging political elites to accept marginalized social groups into political life (Kapur 2010).

Home countries can greatly benefit from reintegrating emigrants, especially those who were forced to leave but can return post-conflict. While abroad, if host societies allowed them the opportunity, migrants may have increased their skills, wealth, and political interest and capacities. They may have been able to stand as candidates in municipal elections and have gained significant political experience that they can apply to their home country. The diaspora may have formed civic associations or even political groups preparing to reintroduce democracy in the event that their home country begins a democratic transition. In some cases, the diaspora plays a key role in raising awareness about the political situation in their home countries, and mobilizing foreign governments

BOX 7.9

The Myanmar diaspora as agents of democratization

With approximately 5 million migrants, Myanmar’s diaspora is among the most diverse and populous in South East Asia, comprising economic migrants, refugees and political exiles (Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012). It has played an active role in promoting democratic reforms from their host countries.

For instance, in 1999 migrant women from different ethnic and religious backgrounds founded the Women’s League of Burma (WLB), an umbrella organization based in Thailand that aims to raise awareness on gender issues and enhance the participation of women in the peace and democracy-building processes. The WLB has been engaged in advocacy and capacity-building activities to politically empower Myanmar’s women (Hedström 2013). Following the historic 2015 general elections, the WLB joined with other civil society organizations focusing on women’s issues to establish the Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process, a Myanmar-based organization that works to advance the role of women in the ongoing peace process.

In a similar way, many migrants who had fled the country for political reasons remained politically active in their host countries and decided to return home after the country’s democratic opening. For example, Aung Moe Zaw is the founder and editor of a media outlet (The Irrawaddy) that covers news in Myanmar and other South East Asian countries. Founded in 1993 by Myanmar migrants residing in Thailand, The Irrawaddy opened an office in Myanmar in 2012 (The Irrawaddy n.d.). Aung Moe Zaw, chair of the Democratic Party for a New Society, returned to Myanmar in 2012 and reregistered the party in the run-up to the 2015 general elections. Although the party did not win any seats, it remains active in the political scene (Long 2015).
and the international community to advocate democratic reforms there (Koinova 2009; Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012).

Given the potential influence of the diaspora on the political life of their home countries, the following section analyses how countries encourage or facilitate their political engagement. It explores (a) whether countries allow emigrants to retain citizenship and accept dual citizenship, (b) whether countries allow emigrants to vote in national elections, (c) voter turnout of emigrants and (d) how well emigrants are represented in key political institutions such as parliaments and political parties or other consultative bodies.

**Citizenship and emigrants**

An important consideration for many emigrants is whether they can retain their original citizenship when they naturalize as immigrants in their host countries. Many countries accept dual nationality, especially if giving up the origin country nationality has negative consequences for emigrants who have maintained ties to their host countries (OECD 2011). Dual nationality can exist from birth or be acquired. Dual nationality by birth is generally accepted by countries, often with an obligation to choose upon reaching the age of majority, whereas the acquisition of another nationality usually entails a requirement to make a choice or the automatic loss of one. Numerous international conventions (such as the 1930 Hague Convention, the Council of Europe Convention of 6 May 1963 on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations, the Council of Europe Convention on Nationality, of 6 November 1997) regulate the issue of dual nationality, with a preference expressed in initial documents for the principle of having one nationality only. This principle, however, did not take into account the reality of the existence of multiple nationalities between countries, leading to the stipulation that any person who acquires the nationality of a signatory state will automatically lose his/her former nationality. This automatic clause posed problems of application, and led to a prevailing position in law and in practice that allows multiple nationalities as long as the following principles are respected: the right

**FIGURE 7.4**

**Percentage of countries allowing dual citizenship, 1975–2015**

Notes: This graph shows the percentage of countries with a population over 1 million that allow dual citizenship by region for the period 1975–2015.

Source: MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Database 2015.
Since 1975 every region of the world has seen a substantial increase in the share of countries offering dual citizenship. This 40-year trend shows that dual citizenship is becoming the norm.

Expanding external voting for emigrants?
Migrants from democracies as diverse as Cabo Verde, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico and the Philippines are influencing electoral politics, civic engagement and patterns of governance by remaining involved in political institutions and democratic processes in their home countries. Returning emigrants can play a key role in democratic transitions, such as in Myanmar or during the independence era of South Sudan.

As with voting rights for immigrants, allowing emigrants to vote is controversial, as it lets citizens influence politics in their origin countries without necessarily being affected by the election results or government policies (Lopez-Guerra 2005; Rubio-Marin 2006). Some argue that allowing dual citizens to vote in two countries weakens the ‘one person one vote’ principle. Others assert that globalization has led to overlapping jurisdictions, and that expatriate voters have a sufficient stake in their home country to justify the right to participate politically (Spiro 2006). Modern democracies thus tolerate many loyalties and affiliations (local, regional, religious, civic, political, etc.) that are not incompatible with loyalty to the nation state (Martin 2003). Box 7.10 explores the issue of voting from abroad in the context of Tunisia.

Voting from abroad: the Tunisian diaspora

Although Tunisian migrants were granted the right to vote in 1989, after the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, Tunisian civil society and migrant organizations actively advocated reforms to the regulation of out-of-country voting (Lafleur 2015). The 2011 electoral law stipulates that Tunisian citizens residing abroad have the right to vote in and stand for national elections. According to the law, the diaspora is represented by 18 MPs in the form of reserved seats, or approximately 8 per cent of seats in Parliament. Given that France hosts approximately 54 per cent of the Tunisian diaspora, 10 out of 18 diaspora MPs are elected to represent Tunisian migrants residing in France. Three MPs are elected from Italy, one from Germany, two from the Arab world, and the remaining two are from the Americas and the rest of Europe. Out-of-country voting takes place over three days, during which registered voters can cast their ballots in Tunisian embassies and consulates. Diaspora MPs are to return to Tunisia for one week per month in order to represent their constituents.

Although generally low, the turnout of diaspora voters for the 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly was 29.2 per cent, which was considered remarkably high, given that voter turnout within Tunisia was 51.2 (Jaulin 2013a, 2013b). Hence, out-of-country constituencies represent an important electoral stake, and election campaigns abroad involve all the main political parties, as well as migrants’ associations, civil rights and religious organizations (Jaulin 2016).
conflict situations, diaspora networks and civic organizations are key to enabling expatriate political engagement. The effect is magnified when diaspora organizations also maintain a presence in the country of origin (Brinkerhoff 2008).

Granting emigrants the right to vote is a discretionary act, as no international law legally obligates states to maintain voting rights for emigrants. Many countries extend voting rights to non-resident citizens, although technical and administrative constraints can pose barriers to actual voting. Laws in 146 out of 206 democracies allow non-resident citizens to vote from abroad (International IDEA Voting from Abroad Database 2015). Of these, 48 apply expatriate voting to only one type of election, while most allow it for two or more types. The most common practice—in 43 countries—is to allow external voting for three or more types of elections; 43 countries allow external voting in presidential and legislative elections (International IDEA Voting from Abroad Database 2015).

In Europe and Asia emigrant voting is more commonly allowed than elsewhere (86 per cent and 77 per cent, respectively). Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania are the most restrictive, with just over half (53 per cent each) of countries allowing emigrants the right to vote in some type of election. Globally, the right to vote is predominantly granted for elections at the national level, with more countries allowing expats to vote for the legislature (33 per cent) than at the presidential level (22 per cent). In Oceania, Europe and North America it is more common to allow emigrants to vote in a referendum. Emigrants are rarely granted the right to vote in subnational elections. Only 29 countries grant expats this right. This practice is most common in Europe (24 countries) and Oceania (four countries) (International IDEA Voting from Abroad Database 2015).

The EU is the largest group of countries that allows emigrant voting (except for Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Malta). The USA, Canada and several European states (Austria, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) have increased accessibility through ballots sent by mail. Central and South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Peru and Venezuela) require their citizens to vote at a consulate or embassy in their country of residence. Some countries, such as Israel, require emigrants to travel to their country of citizenship to vote on election day (Bauböck 2005). The Philippines requires a planned return in the foreseeable future as a condition for absentee voting.

Seventeen countries—including six in Europe (Croatia, Estonia, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania), six in Africa (Algeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Tunisia) and five in Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti and Panama)—allow their citizens abroad to participate in some electoral processes and to elect their own representatives to Parliament. This reinforces external voters’ links with the national political community, enabling the promotion of their own legislative agenda and intervention in political decisions from an overseas viewpoint (Collyer 2014).

Refugees have traditionally been among the last marginalized groups to become enfranchised. There is no standard international practice on promoting the political rights of refugees; there are regional variations in resource allocation, practice and institutional leadership. For example, refugee enfranchisement was written into the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement), and subsequent 1996 balloting for Bosnia Herzegovina covered refugees in 55 countries, while in Liberia in 1997 there were no out-of-country enfranchisement opportunities or organized repatriation (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). Nevertheless, refugees and the
Refugees have traditionally been among the last marginalized groups to become enfranchised. There is no standard international practice on promoting the political rights of refugees. International organizations charged with their protection face obstacles to their ability to realize full political participation rights, including intimidation, physical obstacles, and a lack of access to election and civic information pertaining to their home country. In other cases, refugees' disenfranchisement may stem from financial, transparency and logistical constraints that prevent the electoral authorities from reaching out to the refugee population or ensuring ballot secrecy and transparency (Grace and Fischer 2003).

A non-territorial conceptualization of the 'nation' is one of the reasons countries facilitate expatriate voting, but often extensions of voting rights to citizens abroad have occurred in the context of democratic transitions, most notably in South America and Southern Europe, where authoritarian governments had caused an exodus of citizens who remained away for decades and would not immediately return. When political participation in these countries was newly defined, citizens abroad were often granted full rights. Furthermore, colonial state traditions affect legislation on external voting in Africa; former French and Portuguese colonies have enfranchised expatriate citizens, while former British colonies have been reluctant to do so. Studies have found a correlation between the size and nature of the emigrant population and the extent to which countries restrict voting rights for expatriates. The larger the population abroad, the more political elites worry that external voters can influence election results (Caramani and Grotz 2015). For this reason, some African states with comparatively large numbers of emigrants, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Uganda, prohibit it. When the opposition parties in Zimbabwe proposed allowing the diaspora to vote, the Electoral Commission stated that it was not opposed to the proposal, but lacked 'funding for the necessary logistical arrangements' (News24 2016). If migration involves refugees, external voting rights are granted when their support is needed, often following a change of regime. Conversely, some governments encourage emigrant voting when they expect voters will support the incumbent. Examples include Turkey and Hungary, where both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Victor Orbán strongly targeted emigrant voters in the 2017 and 2014 elections, respectively.

Nevertheless, there is no clear correlation between external voting provisions and countries' political or socio-economic features. While the third wave of democratization has generally spread expatriate suffrage since the 1990s, the evidence is mixed. New democracies in South America enfranchised emigrants, while African countries did not, often because expatriates supported opposition parties. Countries that have granted voting rights to expatriates include well-established democracies as well as emerging or restored ones, and even countries that cannot be classified as democratic (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007).

Does granting voting rights to emigrants strengthen democracies in origin countries? Some argue that it represents a step towards enhanced democracy because it removes residence requirements, while others argue that franchise expansion can rupture the long-term democratization process (Caramani and Grotz 2015). A recent study focused on Europe and the Americas concluded that expatriate voting rights depend on citizenship of the respective state at the national level, and on residency at the local level. This means that there are patterns of franchise expansion, however they are 'contained' by the level at which emigrant voting is permitted (Arrighi and Bauböck 2016).

The effects of voting rights on democracies depend on many factors, including the socio-political context and the electoral systems through which these rights are implemented, as well as the proportion of citizens among expatriates, and accessibility and participation rates.

**Voter turnout of emigrants**

When emigrants are granted voting rights, they have the potential to influence closely fought
elections. In the 2017 French presidential election, 2.6 per cent of French nationals living overseas were registered to vote. In the first round of the polls, Emmanuel Macron won 24 per cent of the vote, while Marine Le Pen received 21.3 per cent of the vote. Macron won the first round by about 1 million votes, giving the 1.3 million French nationals eligible to vote overseas powerbroker potential (Lui 2017). Other examples include the close first round of the 2016 presidential elections in Austria, during which Austrian expatriates made up 1 per cent of registered voters. While these numbers are low, postal ballots, which include expatriate voters, had the potential to decide the first round of Austria’s presidential elections (The Guardian 2016). During the 2017 Constitutional Referendum in Turkey, voter turnout of Turkish citizens living abroad in countries such as Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands increased compared to Turkey’s 2014 presidential election. In Germany, voter turnout reached 48.7 per cent among eligible Turkish voters (YeniSafak 2017). In Cabo Verde (2006) and Romania (2009), emigrant votes overturned the challenger’s majority in presidential elections. In Italy (2006), emigrant votes were the decisive factor that led to the centre-left coalition’s defeat of the incumbent government (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015).

Nevertheless, where emigrant voting is permitted, rates of registration and turnout are usually lower than they are in country. For example, although the absolute number of registered external voters is dropping as citizens return, their turnout has remained at approximately 80 per cent since the early 2000s (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007).

There are some factors that particularly influence low voter turnout among external voters. Emigration voting is costly and reduces the benefits of the act of voting. In addition, the ease with which emigration voting can take place influences turnout (Kostelka 2017), such as legislation governing external voting, or the location of polling stations, ease of access to information and voter registration logistics (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). These factors speak to states’ ability to organize elections and voters’ ability to make use of them. In Southern Africa, low literacy levels among migrants, poor consular and postal facilities, and basic communication and transportation infrastructures hinder the effectiveness of external voting rights and reduce turnout rates among emigrants (Caramani and Grotz 2015).

Although emigrant voting rates are normally lower than those of natives due to the costs involved, the size of the diaspora also affects emigrant voter turnout, as large diasporas can motivate political parties to mobilize emigrants. Thus, if the size of the diaspora increases, the emigrant voting rate is likely to rise as well. At the same time, the overall origin country voter turnout decreases (Kostelka 2017).

To support democracy, origin country policymakers need to consider the potential of emigrant political participation in their home countries given general trends of declining voter turnout.

Political representation of emigrants in key political institutions and consultative bodies

Most countries (67 per cent) allow and facilitate emigrant voting in national elections by assigning votes to an electoral district, for example from their previous residence (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). However, only 13 countries have reserved seats or ‘special representation’ for non-resident citizens in their parliaments—Algeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Mozambique, Panama, Portugal, Romania and Tunisia. Angola and Panama, however, do not implement this legislation.
There is evidence that migration to countries with higher levels of female political empowerment increases the share of women in parliaments in origin countries (Sundberg 2007; EUDO Citizenship National Elections Database 2017). Some argue that special representation is a good way to include emigrants because it facilitates their voting but limits their influence by weighting their votes differently than those of the native population (Collyer 2014); others argue that such systems violate the principle of treating votes equally (Bauböck 2007). When compared to registered votes, emigrant votes may count more. At the same time, special representation can contribute to the stability of electoral systems (Venice Commission 2011).

There is evidence that migration to countries with higher levels of female political empowerment increases the share of women in parliaments in origin countries (Lodigiani and Salomone 2012). Women’s diaspora organizations and activists have played a significant role in capacity building and furthering female political empowerment to increase women’s political participation in their home countries. Examples include the successful advocacy efforts of the South Sudan Women’s Empowerment Network created by US-based Sudanese migrants and the Liberian peace activist Leymah Roberta Gbowee.

Most countries do not allow emigrants to vote in mayoral or local council elections. Exceptions include Australia, Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand and Uruguay, although local non-resident citizen voting rights are among those tied to additional varying residence requirements, a requirement to return to the origin country to vote or civil servant status (EUDO Citizenship Database 2015).

Many origin countries wish to retain ties to their citizens abroad, given that they can be a valuable source of remittances or political influence in the destination country (Izísgohn 2000; Bauböck 2003). At the same time, many origin countries want to retain some political control over the diaspora. For instance, the Moroccan diaspora is dispersed to more than 100 countries and has developed a robust financial bridge between these countries and Morocco, with Moroccan remittances among the most important in the world (Cesari 2013). In 1990, under the patronage of King Hassan II, Morocco created the Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad to promote economic and cultural cooperation with the diaspora. This foundation, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration, established an Observatory of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad to provide information for the government on migration management issues. In 2010 the flow of international remittances to Africa was USD 18 billion, which represents 5 per cent of global remittances (UNDP 2011). Fourteen other African countries—including Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda—have set up diaspora-related institutions and ministries. The African Union Commission has created the African Citizens Directorate to deal with overarching issues in the relationship between overseas diaspora and origin-country governments (Mohamoud 2009).

Another example is the work of the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) (Gutierrez 1997, 1999). The PCME was established in 1990 to increase communication between US citizens of Mexican origin, resident non-citizen Mexicans and the government of Mexico; promote Mexican identity and group cohesion among Mexicans living in the USA; and strengthen the Mexican community abroad as a political agent in the USA. As a result, the Mexican community in the USA has become more cohesive and active in the last decade (DeSipio 1996). Migrants in the USA have mobilized around the same issues as those of the PCME, especially since 1994, and have responded to issues in Mexico, including policies related to dual citizenship, and the right to vote in Mexican elections from abroad (DeSipio 1996).

India connects with its diaspora communities through annual meetings such as the Pravasi Bharatya Divas, which marks the contribution...
of the diaspora to India’s development and is sponsored by the Ministry of External Affairs of the government of India, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Confederation of Indian Industry, and the Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region of India.

Armenia, which has one of the largest diaspora communities (7.5 million diaspora population, versus 2.5 million living in Armenia) spread over more than 100 countries, has an established model policy system coordinated by the Ministry of Diaspora. Mechanisms include the ‘Hayastan’ All-Armenian Fund, headed by the president of the republic, which coordinates the diaspora’s financial assistance to Armenia. Once every three years the ministry organizes the Armenia-Diaspora Conferences to discuss issues of national concern (President of the Republic of Armenia n.d.).

7.5. The migration debate: dilemmas for policymakers

Migration is a controversial topic that poses fundamental and difficult dilemmas for policymakers in democratic institutions. It has become increasingly politicized, as it involves a country’s national identity and therefore evokes nationalist sentiments, which are combined with political parties’ tendencies to define their identity by taking tough stances towards migration and multiculturalism (Kivisto 2002). Migration can raise economic concerns, as particularly during times of relatively high unemployment, citizens may see immigrants as unfairly obtaining scarce social benefits, or competing with natives for jobs. Lastly, migration has increased citizens’ worries about security and safety, especially when immigrants are alleged to be perpetrators of (or to have links to) terrorism. All three of these factors—security, culture, and social welfare or jobs—shape attitudes towards migrants.

According to 2015 World Gallup poll data, in the top ten migration destination countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, United Arab Emirates, UK and USA), opinions about migration are divided (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015). In seven of these countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the USA), majorities believe immigration should be increased or stay the same, while more than half of the respondents in the remaining three (Russia, Spain and the UK) say immigration levels should decrease. In Europe, people have more negative attitudes towards migration compared to other world regions, although there are marked differences in attitudes between countries. People under 44 are more aware of immigration and more likely to favour increasing immigration levels: about one in four (24 per cent) favour increasing immigration levels, compared to 17 per cent of those aged 65 and older. This ‘youth effect’ exists in most receiving regions and countries, except Russia (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015; IOM 2015a). According to data from the Gallup World Poll from more than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014, younger and more-educated people tend to view migration more favourably, with the exception of Russia (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015), where government policy aimed to increase immigration, despite 70 per cent of survey respondents saying they desired lower levels. Poorer and less-educated people generally tend to have more negative views about immigration than younger, well-educated, financially secure and ethnically mixed people (Ford 2012). A comparison of attitudes in four Asian countries found greater public knowledge and high levels of tolerance of migrant workers in the Republic of Korea and Singapore than in Malaysia and Thailand. The former two offer jobs with higher pay and prestige to citizens, while in the latter two citizens are more likely to work alongside immigrants in manual labour; Malaysia and Thailand have longer land borders and are thus more accessible to unauthorized immigrants (Tunon and Baruah 2012).
Attitudes towards migration

Top ten migration destination countries

The top 10 migration countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In seven of these countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the USA) the majority believe that immigration should be increased or stay the same.

In Russia, Spain and the UK, more than half say immigration levels should decrease.

Negative attitudes

In Europe, people have more negative attitudes towards migration compared to other world regions, although there are marked differences in attitudes between countries.

Attitudes towards migration

Poorer and less-educated people generally tend to have more negative views about immigration than younger, well-educated, financially secure and ethnically mixed people.

The youth effect

People under 44 are more aware of immigration and more likely to favour increasing immigration levels: about one in four (24 per cent) favour increasing immigration levels, compared to 17 per cent of those aged 65 and older. This ‘youth effect’ exists in most receiving regions and countries, except Russia. Globally, younger and more-educated people tend to view migration more favourably and, except in Russia, government policy reflects public attitudes towards migration.
Hostility towards immigrants and anti-immigrant discourse tend to increase ahead of elections. For example, nearly 46 per cent of news articles, from both tabloids and broadsheets, framed migration as a threat and migrants as actual or potential ‘villains’ in the months leading up to the 2015 general election in the UK (Crawley, McMahon and Jones 2016) and the 2017 presidential election in France. This risks a feedback loop in which politicians—such as US President Donald Trump—use anti-immigrant rhetoric to drum up hostility (often with the help of some media outlets) and gain votes. Once elected, they use their office to further institutionalize this hostility. Whitaker and Giersch (2015) analysed attitudes towards immigration in 11 African states, and found that ‘opposition to immigration is more likely in more democratic countries in Africa which have high immigration rates and are more ethnically diverse, in countries with dominant party systems, and when individuals are surveyed close to a national election’. Threats to the smooth functioning of democratic institutions and processes arise out of political and social polarization, securitization, exclusion, and marginalization or discrimination by narrowly defining ‘the nation’. Media coverage of migration also influences national and local voting behaviour. In many destination countries, public concerns and attitudes towards migration significantly influence government policies, party agendas and electoral campaigns. Native populations react negatively to an influx of immigrants through anti-immigrant protests, vigilante groups and mainstream parties’ adoption of restrictive policies. For example, the immigration ban ordered by US President Trump in January 2017 attempted to bar Syrian refugees indefinitely and to block entry into the USA for 90 days for citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

The rise of terrorist organizations claiming to be motivated by Islamic beliefs has contributed to Islamophobia in many countries; migrants and refugees, particularly Muslims, often become an easy target of public scapegoating. In both absolute and percentage terms, very few immigrants have perpetrated terror attacks in Europe or North America, compared to those committed by native-born citizens (Belgioioso 2017).

In response to public concerns, many countries are increasing their border control capacities and have stepped up their security screening of refugees admitted via asylum or resettlement programmes. In contrast to their counterparts in Europe and the USA, South American politicians and civil servants stress the inefficacy of restrictive responses to migration and the universality of migrants’ rights based on the principles of support for open borders, an understanding of migration as a fundamental right and the non-criminalization of irregular migration (Acosta 2016). Argentina’s 2004 Migration Law and Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution go so far as to stipulate a ‘human right to migrate’ (Aracazo and Freier 2015). However it must be noted that these countries are migrant-origin countries and not traditional migrant-destination countries. In Argentina, cultural perceptions and underlying power structures effectively limit the political integration of immigrants.

In some countries, arguments against admitting immigrants focus on the need to preserve the national culture. Concerns over cultural threats rarely address the fact that some states thrive when embracing multiculturalism as a basic principle, as is the case with Canada and Australia. Other states, such as France and Germany, instead espouse integration based on assimilation and equality. Countries with lower population densities, such as Australia, Canada and the USA, that place greater emphasis on openness to (and the integration of) newcomers appear to be able to develop resilience and the ability to absorb more immigrants as a proportion of total inhabitants (Alsenia, Harnoss and Rapoport 2013; Legrain 2006; IOM 2004). Box 7.11 discusses South Africa’s approach to asylum seekers.
South Africa’s migration management efforts

South Africa, a multicultural society with progressive asylum laws, received the highest number of asylum applications in the world between 2006 and 2012. Its generous refugee admission policy, coupled with inefficient implementation and a lack of legal channels for economic migrants, led asylum seekers to remain in the country for years with work permits but without a resolution of their asylum claims (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). A 2016 green paper that presented the government’s strategy for integrating the newly established Border Management Agency into an overall migration management plan cited the EU’s Dublin system as a model regional approach to assigning responsibilities for refugees (Department of Home Affairs of the Republic of South Africa 2016). Notwithstanding this initiative, there have been ongoing controversies related to political attitudes towards immigration in 2017.

Although the government’s efforts have sought to manage migration while maintaining South Africa’s high standards of human rights, some politicians have aligned with their native-born constituents and against immigrants. For example, in December 2016 the mayor of Johannesburg categorized all irregular immigrants as ‘criminals’ who would not be tolerated. In addition, he stated that once in power, his Democratic Alliance Party would make sure that immigrants could not enter the country without permission (Mashengo and Malefane 2016). While not explicitly linking his remarks to the mayor’s, the home affairs minister assured the public that the new Border Management Agency aimed to prevent irregular entry, rather than keep foreigners out (Herman 2016). In 2008 and 2015 South Africa experienced xenophobic violence, with a wave of lootings, killings and displacement (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). Violence broke out during an anti-immigrant march in Pretoria in February 2017; the next month a civil society coalition (the Coalition of Civics Against Xenophobia) staged a peaceful countermarch (Mohapi 2017; De Villiers 2017). The organizers stated that, with the support of local residents, as well as immigrants, embassies and neighbouring countries, the march was the start of a series of civil society events to combat xenophobia (Sakhile 2017).

FIGURE 7.5

Attitudes towards immigration in South Africa, 2015

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Managing immigration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very/Fairly Well</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Haven’t Heard</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very/Fairly Badly</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitudes Towards Immigration in South Africa (SA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration policies should favour exceptionally skilled foreigners/foreign investors</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners should not be allowed to live in SA because they take jobs and benefits</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically persecuted foreigners deserve protection in SA</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The Afrobarometer in South Africa measures attitudes for South African citizens over the age of 18. Fielding occurred from 13 August to 21 September 2015 with the survey being available in SeSotho, SePedi, Afrikaans, SeTswana, Tshivenda, Xhosa, Zulu and English. n = 2,400, MoE +/- 3%.

Public attitudes towards immigration in South Africa in 2015 show an almost even split of positive and negative attitudes towards migration. An overall majority of the public believe that the government is managing migration unsatisfactorily. While International IDEA’s GSoD indices data show that South Africa’s scores on representative government, fundamental rights, checks on government and impartial administration have remained relatively stable since the end of apartheid in 1995, impartial administration and checks on government have seen a decline since 2008 and 2011, respectively.

People’s attitudes towards immigration are not necessarily related to their perceptions of their country’s economic conditions. According to 2015 Gallup World polling data, adults who live in countries with the highest unemployment rates are the most negative towards immigration. Nearly half of adults in countries with unemployment rates over 15 per cent believe immigration should decrease. However, in several countries in Africa and elsewhere around the world, there is no (or very little) difference in attitudes towards immigration based on the state of the national economy, such as Bangladesh, Belgium, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Malta, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Uzbekistan and Venezuela (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015).

Economic concerns over immigration often focus on immigrants taking scarce jobs or requiring public support. However, it is not clear that such concerns are warranted. Assuming that jobs occupied by immigrants would otherwise go to natives depends on the ‘lump of labour fallacy’—the idea that an economy contains a fixed number of jobs and that workers are interchangeable from one job to the next. Empirical studies show that increased immigration has only small net effects on overall employment and wages. The relative mix of skills in the immigrant versus native labour forces is a key factor. In Europe, low-skilled migrant labour tends to increase opportunities for local workers, since the availability of low-cost child care, for example, enables parents to join the labour force (UNDP 2009: 85). Studies of Thailand and Hong Kong found that even large increases in immigration have very little effect on overall wages or employment.

Similarly, the net fiscal effects of migration are not large—an estimated +/- 1 per cent of GDP (UNDP 2009: 88). While some immigrants, particularly refugees, require short-term public support in the form of housing, health care, education and administrative processing, there is no conclusive evidence that, on average, either refugees or voluntary migrants consume more in social services than they pay in taxes. Initial costs include administrative overheads and integration programmes. First-generation economic migrants and refugees who are not admitted into immigration programmes tend to need support, while subsequent generations become significant net contributors to the public treasury if they are well integrated into the labour market. Since many of the initial costs fall on local authorities, undercounting of

**FIGURE 7.6**

South Africa—attributes of democracy

Notes: This graph shows the changes in trends in South Africa for Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher performance on a given attribute.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government Index, Impartial Administration Index).

People’s attitudes towards immigration are not necessarily related to their perceptions of their country’s economic conditions.
migrants and unexpected migration flows can result in fiscal shortages in countries where local spending is supported centrally on a per capita basis (UNDP 2009: 88). Some highly skilled or entrepreneurial immigrants create enough wealth through tax contributions, spending their own income, or creating new jobs and establishing businesses—such as Google, Yahoo and Tesla—to produce significant economic gains for native citizens. States with well-developed immigration systems can expect per-immigrant costs to remain steady, even as the number of immigrants increases; Canada and Sweden appear to be successful in this regard (Bonin et al. 2008). However, a lack of comparable data hampers efforts to perform cost–benefit analyses of the economic impacts of migration (Bonin et al. 2008).

Policymakers and political leaders—such as US President Trump—have reacted to concerns about immigration by proposing solutions such as building walls to keep migrants out, or externalizing borders and establishing camps in third countries. Some countries, notably Czechia, Hungary and Poland, have refused to admit refugees in line with agreed EU quotas. Hungary has enacted particularly restrictive policies towards asylum seekers, including the establishment of refugee camps against the background of a particularly nationalistic anti-immigrant stance taken by its leadership.

Other countries have adopted multiculturalist integration policies with regard to migration, such as Australia, Canada and Sweden. Other examples of pluralistic societies include India, the UK and the USA (Buzzle n.d.). Yet multiculturalism has increasingly come under pressure (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008) and there has been a growing global backlash against multiculturalism in public opinion, political discourse, immigration policy and political theory (Castles and Miller 2009). In 2010–11, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that ‘multiculturalism has utterly failed’, with ‘immigrants needing to do more to integrate in German society’.

Former British Prime Minister David Cameron questioned the UK’s longstanding policy of multiculturalism in 2010–11, arguing that some young British Muslims were drawn to violent ideology because they found no strong collective identity in Britain (Green and Staerklé 2013; UNHCR 2015). The virulent French debate on headscarves exemplifies the fear that immigrants threaten national values that pervades the public discourse in many countries. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC in 2001; in Madrid and London in 2005; in Brussels and France in 2015; the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria; Al-Shabab attacks in Kenya in 2015; and Islamic State attacks in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Yemen in 2015 (Alpert 2015) have led to calls for increased immigration and border control, and fuelled backlashes and retaliatory violence against immigrants.

Many countries that used to have a strong policy emphasis on multiculturalism, such as Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden, have shifted to requiring more ‘adaptation’, ‘sharing of values’ and ‘integration’ from immigrants, often under pressure from rising far right parties. Other European countries that had once considered multiculturalism are now adopting coercive ‘civic integration’ policies, such as Austria and Germany (Green and Staerklé 2013; Joppke 2007). Conversely, in Canada, multicultural immigrant policies have made the political process more inclusive (Kymlicka 2010a), and united immigrants and minorities to identify with, and feel pride in, their new country.

Policy implications: approaches to migration challenges

Migration policies must be based on the rule of law and equal access to justice, particularly ensuring access to impartial assessments of asylum claims. Legitimate and democratic governments have the right to make the laws and rules that govern immigration as well as to enforce them. Even a restrictive immigration
Democratic dialogue can help promote tolerance of immigrants and counter inaccurate public beliefs about immigration, as well as enhance the legitimacy of government policies. In Argentina, immigration is recognized as a fundamental right in the Constitution, while the federal immigration law guarantees immigrants equal treatment, non-discrimination, and access to educational, medical and social services (Hines 2010). The constructive involvement of immigrant and host communities in the planning and implementation of public policies can help engage citizens and improve decision-makers’ understanding of communities’ needs. In addition, dialogue platforms and participatory policymaking contribute to building social cohesion and trust among immigrant and host communities, as they are both offered the space to interact and understand each other’s views and concerns. The inclusion of less-skilled and less-educated migrants is important in this regard.

Creating opportunities for people to meet and interact in common spaces—such as workplaces, political parties, schools, neighbourhood facilities and public transport systems—can help create a collective national identity, while respecting the diversity of group identities. Public institutions and governments have an important role to play in creating such spaces that are sensitive to (and promote) diversity (Buzzelli 2001; Hansen and Pikkov 2008; Wong 2010). Similarly, programmes that foster partnerships and social and civic engagement can contribute to building social capital in and across communities; governments may consider providing public funding to such initiatives (Hyman, Meinhard and Shields 2011). Since cities and municipalities can play a significant role in fostering social cohesion, governments can particularly learn from local-level engagements.

To respond to migration effectively, host country governments should enforce immigration policy and rules through competent institutions and based on accurate data. Many countries struggle to equip their national and local institutions with the necessary resources, and to enact a legislative framework and guidance on competencies to ensure that migration policy can be enforced fairly and in line with human rights and democratic principles. To ensure safe and orderly migration, government institutions and agencies need to provide clear and accessible information regarding immigration laws and policies, as well as reliable and publicly available data about migration flows (EIU 2016). This will facilitate a better-informed measurement of the impact of migration on countries. Such data can form the basis of a public debate to set realistic priorities regarding migration policy. In addition, governments should invest in research on the nexus between migration and democracy.

Learning from local initiatives
Many cities are forming partnerships between migrants, local governments and civil society to manage migration by increasing mobility and social diversity. Except for citizenship acquisition, the inclusion of migrants is facilitated locally, including provision of language courses, civic education, access to health services and ensuring public safety. National governments can strengthen their capacity to deal with migration by learning from successful local examples.

Forming social networks within cities furthers migrants’ integration and helps build resilient and democratically inclusive societies. Cities today link local urban social cohesion to economic growth and global competitiveness (Schwedler 2011). The participation and inclusion of migrants in their host cities is an indispensable part of building stable, open and vibrant communities (IOM 2015b). Cities have a key role to play in community building and in supporting social, cultural, economic and political participation at the local government level.
Local governments influence social capital indirectly through policies and programmes designed to increase social inclusion, such as transportation and recreational services, and to create common spaces. Local governments should thus work to strengthen community organizations that represent the interests of diverse communities (Saloojee 2005; Richmond and Saloojee 2005; Hyman, Meinhard and Shields 2011). For example, several US cities guarantee equal access to all types of services for immigrants and natives, while in Canada cities implement a strict policy of non-discrimination and inclusion (Sisk 2001). Canada’s approach to multiculturalism is discussed in more detail in Box 7.12.

Some cities in Europe (such as Athens, Berlin, Bilbao and Dublin) and Asia (Fuzhou in China, as well as Singapore and a network of cities in Japan) are forming institutional structures with the support of national authorities to harness the diverse interests of migrants and further inclusive cooperation. Berlin, Dublin and Lille are establishing partnerships with migrant associations to promote citizenship and political participation among migrant groups. Participatory budgeting (i.e. community members directly deciding how to spend part of the public budget) is being used to finance municipal inclusion policies in over 1,700 local governments in more than 40 countries, especially low-income countries where municipal budgets remain low despite decentralization (IOM 2015b).

Therefore neighbourhood and community councils, along with e-democracy and participatory budgeting, enable local authorities to consolidate civil engagement. Urban inclusion policies often take a more pragmatic approach than migration governance at the national level by promoting the positive impacts of differences on competitiveness and social cohesion, and creating initiatives to fill gaps in central governance and policies on migration. For example in Buenos Aires, Argentina, legislation was drafted with the aim of giving every child—regardless of their legal status—the right to go to school and to provide access to public services for all people. These laws were passed years ahead of the national 2004 Immigration Law, but needed the national law to facilitate implementation (IOM 2015b).

Decisions that influence migrants and refugees are often taken by local governments, civil society and the private sector. Enabling migrant participation in public decision-making processes during planning processes can contribute to enhancing their skills, access to services and a sense of community. For example, the US city of Portland, Oregon, practices inclusive neighbourhood-level development planning, while Amsterdam promotes heterogeneous neighbourhoods as a way of achieving social and economic inclusion (Bosswick, Lüken-Klaßen and Heckmann 2007).

7.6. Conclusions and recommendations: managing migration democratically

Given the transnational nature of migration, effective policy approaches to maintaining a resilient democratic system must be designed around long-term goals that combine national and local approaches with cooperation in regional and global governance structures. In this way, policy approaches to migration will consider its non-territorial implications for national politics.

One of the key approaches to tackling the migration challenge is to address the disconnect and reduced trust between citizens and political institutions and governments, in order to encourage public attitudes towards immigration to lead to better governance.

To maximize the benefits of migration, the naturalization of resident non-citizens can be facilitated by reducing the administrative burden and time required to obtain citizenship. In the period before immigrants become citizens, migrants’ integration and sense of belonging can be enhanced with the support of civil society and local community-
Factors of success and their impact on democracy: Canada's multicultural immigration policy

Canada is the only country in the world that enshrines multiculturalism in its constitution, which gives this policy a high degree of legal security, making it more difficult to rescind. Since 1971 it has pursued a multicultural immigration policy that encourages a vision of Canada based on the values of equality and mutual respect with regard to race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion. One of its key objectives is to promote the full and equitable participation of migrants and to remove barriers to such participation. In 2016, Canada took in approximately 300,000 migrants, of whom 48,000 were refugees. Annual immigration accounts for roughly 1 per cent of the country's current population of 36 million (Foran 2017). Since 2006, Canada has naturalized over 1.5 million new citizens (Huddleston et al. 2015). Cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal are some of the most diverse in the world.

The Canadian population supports immigration and wants migrants to become citizens; approximately 85 per cent eventually do (Foran 2017). Canada's migration policy has its critics, who maintain that multiculturalism threatens national cohesion and contributes to ghettoization (Bissoondath 2002; Wong 2010). Others argue that 'as is the case in England, France, and other democracies, national unity in Canada is increasingly threatened by the growing atomization of our society along ethnic lines' (Gregg 2006; Bennett-Jones 2005). The Conservative Party has called for the deployment of Canada's army to detain potential refugees from crossing the border and for a new law to prevent asylum seekers from being eligible for refugee status determination hearings if they cross the border illegally (Freeman 2017).

In contrast to countries that are pursuing, or have introduced, ever more restrictive immigration policies in the last five years, particularly in the wake of the rise of populist parties, Canada deliberately strives to keep its borders open. In 2015, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau highlighted this longstanding policy as 'Canada's strength' because it is not taken for granted, and is based on shared fundamental human rights values and policies that aim to balance individual and collective identity, as well as on economic policies that benefit Canada's middle class (Trudeau 2015). He even went so far as to refer to Canada as the 'first post-national state', declaring that 'there is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada' (Trudeau 2015).

Besides having a strong political leadership that realistically acknowledges the challenges of migration and works to implement a bold multicultural migration policy, why has Canada’s migration policy worked, and how has it strengthened its democracy? History, geopolitics and its history as a heterogeneous country arguably play a role in this success, as well as the fact that its open border policy is subject to border control and passport checks. The country's history as an immigration country may have favourably influenced public opinion about the benefits and usefulness of migration. In addition, Canadians seem to interpret 'nationhood' dynamically, based on a sense of identity that encourages pluralism and embraces a diverse population (Foran 2017).

Canada's multiculturalist policy has had diverse effects on its democracy and social cohesion. It has helped successfully integrate immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities into the country (Kymlicka 1998, 2010b; Banting, Courchene and Seidie 2006; Bloemraad 2006). Immigrants and native-born Canadians mutually identify and accept each other to a higher degree, with a strong probability that immigrants to Canada will acquire citizenship. Intermarriage and proficiency in Canada’s official languages is common in Canada. The probability that Canadian immigrants will vote, join a political party or seek political office is higher than for immigrants to the USA, Europe or Australia (Kymlicka 1998; Howe 2007). There are even more foreign-born citizens and Canadian-born minorities elected to Parliament in Canada than in other Western countries, both in absolute numbers and in proportion to their percentage of the population (Adams 2007).

Immigrants to Canada, regardless of their religious affiliation, increasingly share the country’s liberal-democratic norms, including the protection of homosexual and women’s rights (Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2007). According to a survey conducted by Focus Canada in 2006, 83 per cent of Canadians agree that Muslims make a positive contribution to Canada (Adams 2009), suggesting that the country has been less affected by the global surge in anti-Muslim sentiments and the resulting polarization of ethnic relations experienced in many European countries (Kymlicka 2010b).

While Canada does not grant national or local voting rights to immigrants before they become citizens, it does encourage immigrants to participate in civic life and, before becoming citizens, to actively engage with civil society to develop lasting relationships in their communities. Canada is one of the few major destination countries that does not have established immigrant-led consultation bodies. However, when immigrants arrive, they do so as permanent residents and quickly become full citizens. The Canadian model of integration is thus based on the assumption that all immigrants can (and will) rapidly become citizens after 3–4 years, spending their first years in the country focused on employment and settlement. According to 2011 data, 92 per cent of immigrants became citizens after 10+ years in Canada (OECD 2014). This is one of the highest naturalization rates in the world, alongside Australia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and most Nordic countries (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEX 2015). Canada’s traditionally quick and clear path to citizenship is the strongest factor explaining its integration success (Huddleston et al. 2015). Recently, however, it has become more restrictive: permanent residents face longer waiting periods to become naturalized, and there are increased restrictions and documentation burdens to attain citizenship, reunite dependent family members and secure equal residence (Huddleston et al. 2015).

Canada nevertheless leads the developed world in promoting rapid labour market integration, non-discrimination and a common sense of belonging. Immigrants and citizens generally enjoy the same access, social rights and strong discrimination protections in a flexible labour market. Both low- and high-educated newcomers benefit from increasing funds for settlement services, long-term language support, and bridging and recognition procedures, depending on their economic sector and province. Federal and provincial support for cultural diversity encourages immigrants to identify with Canada and contribute to civil society, while helping society understand and respond to newcomers’ specific needs related to the labour market, adult education, schools, the health system or the local community (Huddleston et al. 2015).
Democratic institutions should thus consider policies that empower migrants to decide how they participate in public life, rather than defining policies based on citizenship-as-nationality or franchise-without-nationality models. As the Canadian example demonstrates, this can lead to a high level of naturalization without necessitating an interim step of voting rights for non-citizens. Enfranchising resident non-citizen migrants is a possible (albeit controversial) approach to increasing their political participation, but it sets a high political benchmark. Democratic institutions should thus consider policies that empower migrants to decide how they participate in public life, rather than defining policies based on citizenship-as-nationality or franchise-without-nationality models. To strengthen democracy, especially in countries with high or increasing proportions of migrants, policymakers should consider granting voting rights—particularly at the local level—as a pathway to easier citizenship. This would better promote respect for individuals’ choices than an approach that focuses on groups or ethnic nations.

Origin countries may enjoy a democratic dividend from emigration: migrants can serve as agents of democracy who diffuse democratic norms; returnees may increase demands for government accountability, help enhance the country’s electoral and political participation, and form new political parties. In addition to considering granting voting rights to expatriates, origin countries should empower returning migrants to engage politically in their countries, and should consult with their diaspora communities on migration issues to encourage them to act as goodwill ambassadors in destination countries and to invest in the development of their home countries, potentially enhancing social cohesion and cultural understanding. Origin countries should thus accept other types of political participation and advocacy from their diaspora, for example through migrant associations or formal consultative bodies, and provide them with the space to articulate their interests and views.

Migration can be tackled through multicultural policies that favour the inclusion of migrants and provide political benefits to societies by helping to create the conditions for strong and resilient democracies. Governments need to consider state capacities in relation to migration policymaking, and countries with high immigration rates and immigrant-friendly policies must work to reduce the potential backlash from citizens who have negative perceptions of immigration by engaging in fact-based debates. In this way, government institutions will be more capable of providing quality services and integrating migrants, which will strengthen the accountability of political institutions with regard to voters who may have concerns about the government’s ability to manage migration, in line with the notion that ‘democracy should deliver’.

Political parties in destination countries need to consider inclusive measures to enable effective migrant political participation and engage in fact-based political dialogue on migration with the entire voting population. A party’s agenda and views on migration—regardless of where it stands on the political spectrum—will influence whether immigrants are represented in political party structures, whether they can stand for election and whether they have a realistic chance of winning due to their ranking on a party’s candidate list. Political parties that have migrant-friendly policies can thus consider making party statutes, electoral platforms and candidate lists more inclusive, and can engage migrants with a view to strengthening their representative base. They can also incorporate migrants’ views in order to develop migration policies that benefit the country. Since political parties are potential holders of legislative and governing powers, they play a key role in encouraging immigrants to participate politically, to enable them to become agents of democracy and sustain social cohesion (Dähnke et al. 2014: 12–13).

To effectively address the challenge posed by migration to democracy and to strengthen democratic institutions, the following
recommendations are put forward to governments, parties and supranational institutions.

**National and local governments**
- Invest in data collection on the nexus between migration and democracy, including migration flows and the factors that influence the positive and negative impacts of migration to maximize the benefits. Such data should form the basis of a migration policy debate with the public to set realistic priorities and objectives.
- Design migration policies to focus on changing public perceptions of migration and encourage political accountability by making decision-making processes more accessible to migrants and more transparent to the public, including by clarifying objectives of public consultation on migration policies. Migration policies should focus on ensuring that ‘democracy delivers’ to increase public confidence in governments’ ability to manage migration.
- Taking each country’s circumstances into account, facilitate the naturalization of immigrants and consider granting local voting rights as a pathway to integration and easier citizenship for immigrants. This would promote respect for individuals’ choices rather than focusing policies on groups or ethnic nations.
- Engage civil society actors to help integrate immigrants at the national and local levels by harnessing civil society expertise and advocacy skills, building on evidence and data that identifies participation gaps to increase migrants’ political participation and promote cultural understanding, particularly in local communities.
- Consider the potential of emigrant voting rights and facilitate their political participation in origin countries by learning from successful diaspora women’s civil society initiatives, ensuring good access to information for emigrant voters, facilitating voter registration and engaging in dialogue with host countries to avoid political controversy.

**Political parties**
- Empower returning migrants to engage politically and in dialogue and consultation on migration issues with their diaspora communities. Encourage them to act as goodwill ambassadors in destination countries and invest in the development of their home countries.
- Engage in fact-based democratic dialogue on migration to promote tolerance of migrants and to counter inaccurate public beliefs, knowledge and behaviour about migration.
- Political party statutes, electoral platforms and candidate lists should be inclusive and engage migrants to strengthen their representative base, including by creating equal conditions for migrants within their internal structures to influence political party programmes and policies and their contribution to an effective migration policy. This can be done by adopting measures that facilitate the entry of migrants, and particularly women migrants, into political forums, through targeted recruitment, training and coaching.
- Take a long-term view when defining party strategies to strengthen parties’ credibility with voters, and expand the party base to be inclusive and more representative of the population.

**Global and regional governance systems**
- Regional organizations, national and local governments, and civil society organizations should work together to define and meet the goals, targets and indicators of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly Goal 16, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. Greater attention should be paid to the role that cities and municipal authorities can play in effective migration governance, and to the political representation of migrants.
- Cooperate in regional and international organizations to define policies that equitably share the responsibilities for migration and refugee protection, and
uphold related international law such as the Global Compact on Migrants and Refugees.

- **Enhance the governance of international migration** through greater regional consultation and cooperation and more effective dialogue between governments and global international organizations focused on key policy issues such as the linkages between migration and democracy, development, security, human rights and trade.
- **Expand cooperation mechanisms such as advisory or consultative bodies to reinforce the mutual benefits of migrants** to improve cultural understanding, promote tolerance and integration, and facilitate the political participation of migrants in both origin and destination countries.
- **International and regional consultative processes on migration should strengthen their engagement with civil society, particularly migrant associations, to promote migrant integration and participation rather than migration control.** These processes should include representatives of academia, foundations and the private sector.
References


Adams, M., Muslims in Canada 2007 (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2009)

Aktürk, Ş., ‘The Turkish minority in German politics: trends, diversification of representation, and policy implications’, Insight Turkey, 12/1 (2010), pp. 65–80


Bissoondath, N., Selling Illusions, the Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2002)

References

Chapter 7

—, ‘Accessing the corridors of power: puzzles and pathways to understanding minority representation’, West European Politics, 36/3 (2013), pp. 652–70


Bosswick, W., Luken-Klaßen, D. and Heckmann, F., Housing and Integration of Migrants in Europe (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007)


Dumbrava, C., How Illiberal Are Citizenship Rules in European Union (Fiesole: European University Institute, 2010), <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14114/RSCAS_2010_50.cor.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>, accessed 5 April 2017


Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Measuring Well-governed Migration: The 2016 Migration Governance Index (London: EIU, 2016)
References


Freeman, A., ‘Build that wall? Some Canadians are calling for more border control too’, Washington Post, 30 March 2017


References

Chapter 7

—, 'Fostering identities: Mexico’s relations with its consular offices in Mexico’s relations with its diaspora', in R. de la Garza and J. Velasco (eds), Bridging the Border: Transforming Mexico–US Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997)
Joppke C., ‘Beyond national models: civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe’, West European Politics, 30/1 (2007), pp. 1–22


Saloojee, A., ‘Social inclusion, anti-racism and democratic citizenship’, *Policy Matters*, 14 (2005), pp. 1–4


Sobolewska, M., ‘Party strategies and the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities: the 2010
British general election’, West European Politics, 36/3 (2013), pp. 615–33
Sohoon, L. and Piper, N., ‘Understanding Multiple Discrimination against Labour Migrants in Asia: An Intersectional Analysis (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR’s Dialogues with Refugee Women (Geneva: UNCHR, 2013)
Wong, L. L., 'Debunking the fragmentation critique of Multiculturalism', Diverse, 3 (Summer 2010)