The Prevention and Mitigation of Election-related Violence

An Action Guide
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Sead Alihodžić and Erik Asplund
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Note to the second edition

The first edition of this Guide was published in 2013. In 2018 the support documentation for the Electoral Risk Management Tool (including this Guide) underwent a redesign. The document has now been re-formatted, and allocated an ISBN and a digital object identifier (DOI). Links to International IDEA resources have also been corrected. The Guides are living documents and will be continually updated. International IDEA welcomes feedback and user experiences. For more information contact the Electoral Processes Programme (elections@idea.int).
Abbreviations

CoC       Code of conduct
CSO       Civil society organization
DFID      Department for International Development (UK)
EAT       Electoral assistant trainer
EDR       Electoral dispute resolution
EISA      Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EMB       Electoral management body
EOM       Election observation mission
GIS       Geographic information system
IT        Information technology
LTO       Long-term observer
NGO       Non-governmental organization
OCV       Out-of-country voting
OSCE      Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SSA       Security sector agency
UNDP      United Nations Development Programme
VRC       Voter registration centre
About this Guide

The purpose of this Guide

This Guide is a support document to the Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERM Tool). Combined with the other support documents (see Figure 1), it aims to guide and inspire users to tailor strategies and actions for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence in a given country and electoral context.

These approaches may also contribute to broader electoral risk management efforts that aim to prevent and mitigate risks that do not have security implications but may undermine the credibility of electoral processes and results they yield. These include legal, political, financial, legal, operational and technical risks.

The action points presented in this Guide mirror the content of the ERM Tool’s Prevention and Mitigation module in a format which is easy to print and share.

Figure 1. Overview of ERM Tool support documents

The users of this Guide

This Guide is intended for those involved in identifying strategies and actions for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence and other risks to electoral processes. Users include electoral management bodies (EMBs), security sector agencies (SSAs) and other state and non-state actors, including organizations advocating for gender equality and women’s empowerment.
Methodology for identifying relevant strategies

The action points presented in this Guide draw on good electoral management, security and peace-building efforts undertaken to prevent and mitigate election-related violence in specific national and electoral contexts. Cases are identified through desk research and contributions from organizations with practical experience in this field.

The structure of the Guide

The Guide is divided into eight sections, reflecting the phases outlined in the pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral periods of the electoral cycle (see Figure 2). The eight phases of the electoral cycle are:

1. Legal and institutional framework
2. Planning and implementation
3. Training and education
4. Registration
5. Electoral campaign
6. Voting operations and election day
7. Verification of results
8. Post-election phase

The electoral cycle approach was developed by International IDEA and the European Commission as a visual planning and training tool that could help development agencies, providers of electoral assistance and electoral officials to understand the cyclical nature of the various challenges faced in electoral processes.

Figure 2. The electoral cycle

Source: International IDEA
Within each section, three different clusters of prevention and mitigation actions are explored:

- **Improved electoral management and justice**—specific measures which relate to electoral planning, implementation, coordination and dispute resolution that can be undertaken to avoid controversies and technical flaws in order to minimize the potential for outbreaks of violence and undermined the credibility of elections.

- **Improved electoral security**—specific electoral security measures that can be undertaken by SSAs throughout the electoral cycle to protect electoral actors, events, facilities and materials from violence.

- **Improved infrastructure for peace**—different activities that can be implemented by various state and non-state actors to mobilize and coordinate government agencies, civil society organizations (CSOs), traditional and religious leaders, reputable individuals and other organizations and individuals with capacity to contribute in defusing and mitigating election-related tensions and violence, and protecting the credibility of electoral processes.

A three-layered approach can be consistently applied throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle in such a way that actors from the three layers will cooperate closely to reinforce each other.

Each section includes:

1. a table—an overview of action points;
2. narratives—a brief, mainly common knowledge introductions relating to each action point; and
3. cases—brief good practice cases relating to each action point with the source references.
1. Legal and institutional framework

Table 1. Prevention and mitigation actions: legal and institutional framework

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Improved electoral management and justice</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.1. Advise political stakeholders about an appropriate electoral system that takes into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of different design options.</td>
<td>1.7. Advise adoption of a legal framework that assigns clear electoral security responsibilities to different security sector and government agencies.</td>
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<td>1.2. Advise adoption of a legal framework which will allow for the establishment of credible EMBs.</td>
<td>1.8. Define rules of engagement for SSAs during elections.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4. Design legal provisions which facilitate credible processes for the registration of voters, political parties and candidates.</td>
<td>1.10. Formalize collaborative mechanisms for coordination and information exchange with EMBs, other relevant agencies and political parties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5. Introduce regulations that define the roles and responsibilities of political parties in the electoral processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.6. Define collaborative mechanisms and information exchange with security sector and other relevant agencies and citizens' groups.</td>
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</table>

The legal framework is composed of the constitutional provisions, legislation, rules, regulations and procedures that govern the electoral system design, the formation of electoral institutions and bodies, and the implementation of electoral activities. An inclusive, fair, concise and uncontested legal and institutional framework constitutes in itself a milestone towards successful and peaceful elections. In addition to electoral legislation and institutions, responsibilities, rules of engagement and coordination between the SSAs should also be detailed in relevant legislation which governs their electoral engagement. Following the
analysis and evaluation of the previous electoral cycle, an EMB and SSAs should initiate legal and institutional reforms to address identified weaknesses, and where needed collaborate with other stakeholders. Other state and non-state actors may play an important role in the facilitation of public discussion and national consensus on the legislative and institutional framework.

**Improved electoral management and justice**

Reform of the legal and institutional electoral framework should draw on the evaluation of previous electoral processes. Such evaluation is conducted in the post-election phase to identify disputed, deficient or ambiguous legal provisions and acts which have had a negative impact on the conduct of the previous electoral processes. The reform, among other things, needs to take into consideration: (a) the appropriateness of the electoral system; (b) the credibility of the EMBS; (c) the effectiveness of the electoral dispute resolution mechanisms; (d) the integrity of processes for the registration of voters, political parties and candidates; (e) the quality of the legislation that regulates the roles and responsibilities of political parties; (f) the existence of mechanisms for the replacement of elected representatives; (g) the existence of mechanisms for information exchange with security sector and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups; and so on. EMBS are in a good position to initiate, advise on and influence these changes.

**1.1. Advise political stakeholders about an appropriate electoral system that takes into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of different design options**

The specific choices in the electoral system may affect participation, representation, the stability of government, the accountability of elected officials, the complexity of electoral processes, and political pluralism (International IDEA 2005). In particular, provisions relating to the formula for translating votes into seats, district magnitude, the votes-to-seat ratio, and boundary delimitation require careful consideration. An EMB is well positioned to advise legislators about the practical implications of different electoral systems in a given national and electoral context. In conflict-prone societies, an analysis may focus on the potential of a specific electoral system design to exacerbate or mitigate social conflict and electoral violence, including how gender-based violence can affect the participation of women in electoral processes and their representation in elective positions. At the very basic level, the legal framework should ensure that elections are a level playing field for all electoral actors.

**Case: Nepal**

Gender and minority quotas were introduced in Nepal in 2007 to defuse tensions. Political and social exclusion is one of the main roots of conflict in Nepal (Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research 2010). Gender and minority representation was therefore an integral part of the electoral law reform preceding the 2007 Constituent Assembly of Nepal. The electoral system design introduced quotas for women, securing them 33 per cent of seats, as well as for marginalized and oppressed groups and indigenous tribes, based on their representation in the population. (Election Commission of Nepal 2007).

**1.2. Advise adoption of a legal framework which will allow for the establishment of credible EMBS**

Careful consideration needs to be given to what type of EMB will perform best in a given country context and what will contribute to its credibility. Three major organizational modalities exist: independent, governmental and mixed (International IDEA 2006: 7–9). The legal framework should establish the fundamental principles that will ensure the
credibility of the EMBs. These principles include independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness. (International IDEA 2006: 22–25). An EMB should advise the legislator about legal reforms needed to improve an EMB’s capacity to organize credible elections. A balanced composition, for example, geographical, ethnic, gender, linguistic, religious and other, will increase the credibility of an EMB.

**Case: Indonesia**

Reform of the Indonesian National Election Commission in 1999 built trust in democratic processes. ‘To indicate a breakaway from an old election system which allowed manipulation with electoral processes and massive election fraud in the past’, a new electoral law was adopted in early 1999. This led to the establishment of an independent National Election Commission (NEC). To promote trust, the Commission was composed of representatives from each of the competing 48 political parties and five government-appointed officials. In 1999, the NEC delivered the first open and competitive election since 1955. During the elections, approximately 100 million Indonesians cast their ballot (International IDEA 2012: 22–23).

**1.3. Establish trusted and efficient electoral dispute resolution mechanisms and introduce mechanisms to sanction perpetrators of electoral offences**

The legal framework for electoral dispute resolution should ensure that electoral actions, procedures and decisions throughout the electoral cycle are in conformity with the law and based on the right to an effective remedy (International IDEA 2010: 20, 37). Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms can take on four separate types of challenge: (a) administrative, (b) judicial, (c) legislative and (d) international. The type of challenge will typically dictate which institution will be responsible for hearing and resolving the dispute concerned. Administrative challenges, which are the most common type of challenge, are addressed and usually resolved by the EMBs. Contested EMB decisions can be revisited either by the same organ or by a higher-ranking organ such as a constitutional court (Orozco–Henríquez et al. 2010: 137). This system is widespread. Judicial challenges are addressed to judicial bodies, which may be regular or administrative courts, a constitutional court or special electoral courts as defined by law. Legislative challenges systems allow legislative bodies or other defined political assemblies to resolve electoral disputes (Orozco-Henríquez et al. 2010: 138, 141). The international means for bringing electoral challenges are those legal instruments provided for in international treaties and conventions (for example the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) after exhausting the domestic remedies provided.’ (Orozco-Henríquez et al. 2010: 142). Well-functioning electoral dispute resolution mechanisms have an inherent potential to prevent violence. The legal framework should therefore be simple, clear and consistent, making it easily understandable and ensuring complete and effective access to the system for resolving electoral disputes. Because the electoral process cannot be halted if a challenge is introduced, the timeliness of challenge submission and dispute resolution mechanisms is essential if the credibility of the electoral process is not to be affected (Orozco-Henríquez et al. 2010: 20, 24–25).

Where individuals and groups feel they have impunity from prosecution they may be tempted to engage in electoral fraud or perpetrate acts of election-related violence to achieve political gains. When this is a risk, an EMB should get a mandate to investigate, prosecute and sanction perpetrators of electoral offences independently or in collaboration with other relevant agencies.
Case: Bhutan
After Bhutan’s 2008 parliamentary elections, which saw some political violence (IPU 2008: 38; IPU PARLINE database, n.d.), the EMB conducted a self-assessment of its electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. Based on the analysis of electoral complaints lodged during the 2008 elections, the Electoral Commission improved the rules and procedures for the submission of electoral challenges. It was noted that in some instances dealing with less severe complaints at the district level enhanced the effectiveness of electoral dispute resolution as disputes would be resolved faster and the central body could receive fewer complaints. Consequently, the electoral dispute resolution system became more effective and transparent (Orozco-Henríquez et al. 2010: 51–2).

Case: Kenya
The EMB sets up an Investigation and Prosecution Department in Kenya, 2012–2013. A sense of impunity among political and electoral officials is seen as an important factor that contributed to the violent outcomes of the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections. Ahead of the 2013 general election, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) started building its capacity to investigate and prosecute election offences by setting up an Investigation and Prosecution Department. Neither the preceding Election Commission of Kenya (2002–2008) nor the Interim Independent Election Commission (2008–2011) had this mandate. The November 2011 Election Act gave the IEBC the mechanisms to settle electoral disputes, prosecute any offences defined under the Election Act, and impose sanctions against electoral offenders (Republic of Kenya 2011).

1.4. Design legal provisions which facilitate credible processes for the registration of voters, political parties and candidates
The legal framework for voter registration should establish legal clarity and be conflict-sensitive in order to generate preventive potential (Höglund and Jarstad 2010: 3). Laws regulating voter registration must ensure that there are no disfranchised categories. It is of the greatest importance, especially in conflict-prone societies, that no ethnic, religious or other social group feels disenfranchised or marginalized through boundary delimitation or other legal provision that may impact on their right to register for voting. The procedural criteria for political parties and candidates’ registration should be clear, reasonable and transparent (UNDP 2009: 46). At the same time, they should not offer a pretext for banning parties (Bogaards 2008: 51). This legislation should be designed in a way which will enhance political pluralism, encourage reconciliation processes, and enhance gender equality and respect for human rights.

Case: Bosnia and Herzegovina
The international community intervened to end the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and mediate the peace agreement. The peace agreement stipulated that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) would be mandated to supervise implementation of the post-war elections. In the period 1996–97, the Provisional Election Commission, working under the supervision of the OSCE, adopted rules and regulations which allowed displaced people and refugees to vote in their pre-war municipalities. This largely defused tensions within the displaced groups (Ellis et al: 2007: 163–65).
1.5. Introduce regulations that defines the roles and responsibilities of political parties in the electoral processes

The electoral legal framework should include provisions defining the roles and responsibilities of political parties in the electoral processes. In particular, it should provide political parties with incentives to resolve political conflicts through institutional frameworks and in a democratic way (Reilly and Nordlund 2008: 11). One widely-used mechanism for defusing the risk of an outbreak of election-related violence is political parties’ own codes of conduct (CoCs). These are defined as a set of rules of behaviour for political parties and their supporters relating to their participation in an election process (International IDEA 1999). A distinction is drawn between those texts to which political parties subscribe voluntarily and those which are imposed either by law or by some other authority. CoCs may therefore be: (a) a part of the electoral law or a particular provision in the electoral law that prescribes the conduct of the parties; (b) agreed by political parties as an outcome of negotiations among themselves or as a result of negotiations moderated by a third party; (c) agreed by the parties, and then embodied in law; or (d) determined by a third party, such as an EMB. If codes of conduct are embedded in the legislative framework, they are more likely to be implemented and enforced. They can prevent and defuse tensions by prohibiting the use of hate speech and violent means during the campaign and by including commitments that parties losing elections have to accept the election results and work together to maintain peace in the post-election phase, as well as other measures including those directed towards the prevention and elimination of gender-based violence. CoCs may further become powerful tools for building confidence, as well as creating and promoting relationships (UNDP 2009: 32–38).

The process leading to the formulation of a CoC may be initiated, driven and facilitated in cooperation with civil society representatives or negotiated in party liaison committees. However, there are a number of challenges in terms of implementation and enforcement of such codes, in particular when political parties use violence as a political instrument (Mehler 2007: 208). Stakeholders’ public declarations and commitments to respect a CoC can reinforce implementation, particularly if they are made jointly. Institutionalized monitoring of the codes of conduct, as well as public and civil society pressure directed at parties which disregard them, may also facilitate implementation. In addition, regulations against illegal financing are of great importance to avoid illicit party funding and thus keep violent criminal groups out of electoral processes. In this regard, legal obligations for political parties may include obligations for the disclosure of income and expenditure, limits and bans on contributions, as well as monitoring and enforcement systems. For more information see Ohman (2010: 1–5). If an elected representative resigns, dies or is convicted of a legal offence, and if the process for replacing her/him is not clearly regulated, her/his replacement may become contested and contribute to rising tensions. It is important that such mechanisms are defined in the legal framework in a way which will create certainty (Höglund and Jarstad 2010: 3).

Case: Colombia

In 2009 an electoral legal framework was introduced to sanction parties and candidates linked with organized crime in Colombia. Organized crime had been largely responsible for election-related violence in Colombia for the past decade. This violence was linked to efforts by criminal actors to get hold of power over the local governments during local elections through their connections with the politicians (International Crisis Group 2011). Since 2009, penalties have been introduced for those parties that support candidates with links to illegal armed groups or are facing charges for crimes against humanity and drug trafficking (Caracol 2009). Furthermore, political parties are not allowed to replace an elected member of parliament who has been convicted of crimes against humanity or links to illegal groups.
The law concerning the filling of these vacant seats provides political parties with incentives to avoid nominating candidates with suspected links to illegal groups (Caracol 2009).

1.6. Define collaborative mechanisms and information exchange with security sector and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups

Cooperation with SSAs will help EMBs ensure that electoral security arrangements are put in place to protect electoral stakeholders, including election officials, facilities, events and materials. The establishment of collaborative mechanisms that facilitate information exchange and joint action will be beneficial to both electoral and security organizations. If collaboration structures and procedures are defined in the electoral legal framework, this will ensure that coordination is structured and not left to chance.

**Case: Mexico**

In Mexico, as a result of the number of attacks on civil society by organized criminal organizations, which had caused uncertainty and fear ahead of the 2012 federal elections, the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) initiated formal cooperation with a number of Mexican agencies in order to protect the electoral process. These included the Federal Police, the Army, the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE), the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPFJ), the Navy, the intelligence agency (CISEN), local governments, communications (TELMEX), and infrastructure agencies (water and electricity). Through an inter-agency collaborative process, the IFE reached a formal political agreement with SSAs and other organizations on how to respond to the threat of election-related violence during the election period. Practical aspects included agreement on the exchange of risk data and analysis between the IFE and its partners during and after the 2012 federal elections. The formal information-sharing mechanism between the IFE and the SSAs contributed towards a positive environment between partners, enhanced inter-agency coordination and increased election security during the elections.

**Improved electoral security**

SSAs are mandated to provide safety to electoral actors, events, materials and information throughout the electoral cycle. In doing this, SSAs may follow regular rules of engagement. However, practice shows that, due to the specific dynamics of political and social mobilization and conflicts during elections, the SSAs may benefit from specific legal provisions referring to their electoral duties. These provisions can define the responsibilities of different SSAs, rules of engagement when securing electoral actors, events and facilities, enforcement of sanctions, and forms of collaboration between different SSAs and other relevant actors during elections. In some instances, SSAs benefit from an EMB being mandated to direct their work when they are engaged in electoral processes.

1.7. Advise adoption of a legal framework that assigns clear electoral security responsibilities to different security sector and government agencies

The legal framework that regulates the electoral responsibilities of SSAs should establish a clear division of responsibilities and define the specific role of the various SSAs during elections. The responsibilities relating to public safety during elections—the safety of electoral materials during transport and storage, safeguarding of electoral facilities, intelligence gathering, the prosecution of electoral crimes, logistical support and so on—may be assigned to different ministries and institutions including the police, the army, intelligence agencies, the public prosecutor’s office and so on. Legal clarity will enhance preparedness and collaboration between the different agencies and the establishment of collaboration with EMBs.
Case: India

India’s Constitution vests in the Election Commission of India (ECI) the superintendence, direction and control of the entire process for the conduct of elections to parliament and the legislature of every state and to the offices of President and Vice-President of India (ECI n.d.). The ECI mandate includes coordination of the police forces’ engagement in and around elections. The ECI’s Compendium of Instructions presents guidelines and directives to the Indian Central Police Force as well as the state police. The ‘maintenance of law and order and deployment of security forces and home guard’ section, among other things, describes the need for a ‘number of measures over and above the purview of normal law and order arrangements, for augmenting the measures taken for peaceful, free and fair poll’ (ECI 2013: 126).

1.8. Define rules of engagement for SSAs during elections

The conventional routines for engagement of law enforcement agencies, usually found in ‘rules of engagement’ or ‘use of force’ frameworks, guide the conduct, rights and obligations of security sector personnel in certain circumstances. In some contexts, these frameworks may need to be reviewed ahead of elections to ensure that the engagement of law enforcement agencies does not interfere with democratic processes and practices. In particular, it is important to ensure that security forces are not ‘baited into actions that may later be politicized’ (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2012d). Specific rules of engagement for electoral security, based on professional standards, may also be developed (Creative Associates International 2010: 26).

Case: Sierra Leone

The death of six persons in separate incidents involving the use of live ammunition by Sierra Leone’s police created concerns relating to the potential misuse of force ahead of and during the 2012 general elections. To ensure that such incidents do not create challenges for the management of elections, the Sierra Leone Police, with support from the United Nations, undertook a review of its Rules of Engagement in parallel with the development of a strategy on governance mechanisms in the force ahead of the general election in November 2012 (Sierra Herald 2012).

1.9. Define sanctions and enforcement mechanisms against perpetrators of electoral fraud and violence

Researchers point to the increased importance of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms directed against perpetrators of electoral violence. Höglund and Jarstad (2010: 3–4) argue that ‘more attention needs to be directed at measures which can support the implementation of the legal framework. Without sanctions against those breaking the electoral law, including violence makers, a culture of impunity is upheld’. The report of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security (2012) finds that ‘electoral violence is more likely in a context in which institutions like the courts, the criminal justice system, the security forces, and the media are corrupt or too weak to carry out their roles in the face of violence and intimidation. To ensure long-term electoral security, there is no substitute for ending the impunity that often surrounds electoral violence’ (Global Commission 2012: 25, 26). This, however, requires meeting the rule-of-law challenges, and the development of ‘institutions, processes, and networks that deter election-related violence and, should deterrence fail, hold perpetrators accountable’ (Global Commission 2012: 62).
1.10. **Formalize collaborative mechanisms for coordination and information exchange with EMBs, other relevant agencies and political parties**

Enhanced information exchange and coordination between SSAs and other electoral actors is required during elections. Practice shows that these collaborative mechanisms require flexibility and the commitment of the organizations involved. Given the mandate of SSAs to provide electoral security, they represent a key interlocutor to different stakeholders, including EMBs, political parties, and other relevant agencies and citizens’ groups. In particular, the responsibilities of SSAs to collaborate with an EMB and other state agencies should be formalized within the relevant legal framework or through intra-institutional collaboration agreements. Collaboration will improve information exchange and allow holistic analysis and coordination of prevention and mitigation efforts.

**Case: Liberia**

Although Liberia’s 2005 general elections were categorized as violence-free, orderly and well managed, a few incidents of violence were recorded during the campaign phase. This was despite the fact that political parties committed themselves to abstain from violence and intimidation by signing a code of conduct (International Observation Delegations 2005: 1, 14). Ahead of the 2011 general elections, the Liberian National Police (LNP) and 11 political parties signed a memorandum of understanding which regulates the conduct of political rallies with the aim of ensuring a peaceful environment during elections. The memorandum’s provisions specify that (a) each political party was expected to submit at least two focal persons to work with the LNP during rallies, marches and campaigns, and (b) all marches would be monitored by LNP officers in a peaceful manner (Johnson 2011).

**Improved infrastructure for peace**

Improved infrastructure for peace (I4P) relates to putting in place standing capabilities for peace building and conflict prevention from the community to the national level. These strategies may include mobilization and coordination of state and non-state actors, including CSOs, traditional and religious leaders, reputable individuals and other organizations and individuals that have the capacity to contribute in preventing and defusing social conflicts. The value of the infrastructures of peace in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence in different national contexts is well documented (van Tongeren and Brand-Jacobsen 2012: 18–21). The initial electoral phase, in which legal and institutional frameworks for the organization and conduct of elections are discussed, provides an opportunity for early engagement of various state and non-state actors. On the one hand, they can engage in facilitation of a national consensus relating to electoral legal frameworks; on the other hand, they can promote and advocate for the acknowledgement of the role that civil society groups and traditional leaders may have in resolving electoral disputes.

1.11. **Mobilize and involve non-state actors in discussions on the electoral framework in order to achieve citizens’ participation and national consensus**

The involvement of multiple stakeholders, who share a mandate and an interest in contributing to peaceful elections, in the discussion on the reform of the electoral legal framework may be crucial for avoiding legal controversies at later stages. When formal processes are not inclusive and trusted, non-state actors can take initiatives to convene cooperative forums aiming to bring together relevant stakeholders, including EMBs, political parties, SSAs, traditional or customary governance structures and civil society organizations. These forums may create an environment of ownership and trust, and ensure the involvement of minority groups and balanced gender representation. They can work to
secure the commitment of the organizations involved to adhere to, or implement, conclusions resulting from the discussions. If political actors are unwilling to agree on reforms, national and international specialists and reputable individuals may be involved to mediate and help align processes with international standards and obligations.

**Case: Guinea-Bissau**

Guinea-Bissau’s 2005 presidential election was intended to mark the end of the country’s history of trouble marked by civil war and political violence. In 2003, a Transitional Charter was adopted to allow the transitional government to govern the country until the new leadership was elected. Ahead of the 2005 presidential elections, the Citizens’ Goodwill Task Force (CGWTF), supported by the International Peace and Prosperity Project, engaged international legal experts in a review of the electoral laws regarding candidacy for public office contained within the Transitional Charter. After expert review, the CGWTF recommended that the Charter’s legal status should be recognized by the High Court in order to resolve issues relating to candidates’ eligibility to run for presidential office (UNDP 2009: 40–41). The CGWTF also drafted an election CoC to promulgate an ‘issue-based and peaceful campaign’. It was endorsed by all but one of the presidential candidates. The CoC was distributed in French and Arabic and presented in rural areas by the country’s main religious and civil society leaders. International organizations and national leaders praised the CGWTF’s efforts as important in contributing to enhanced national debate on the electoral legal framework (International Peace and Prosperity Project 2005; UNDP 2009: 1–40).

1.12. Promote understanding of the role of non-state actors in contributing to peaceful elections, and advocate for the integration of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms into the electoral legal framework

The effect of the efforts of formal institutions, such as EMBs and SSAs, to prevent and mitigate election-related violence may be maximized if they are combined with existing peace building and conflict prevention initiatives. These may include national mediation panels, peace councils, traditional and religious leaders, and reputable institutions and individuals, including women’s organizations and activists that work to promote gender equality and participation. Formal recognition and integration of these actors in the electoral legal framework, as part of dispute mediation and resolution, may be an effective strategy to prevent and mitigate election-related violence.

**Case: South Africa**

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to a new democratic dispensation from 1991 to 1994 was supported by fairly well-developed peace architecture, with the local peace committees (LPCs) as the primary strategy to prevent violence. The LPCs were a product of the National Peace Accord signed on September 1991 by 27 South African stakeholders, including the government, the main political parties and the major liberation movements. The South African Electoral Law (103A, insertion to the 2003 amendment to the Electoral Act, no. 34, 2003) states that the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) can resolve any electoral dispute, complaint or infringement of the CoC through conciliation or mediation (Tip 2011).
2. Planning and implementation

Once the electoral legal framework is finalized, planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities need to be instigated. This will include developing operational plans for the implementation of the different phases of the electoral cycle, such as voter information; registration of voters, political parties and candidates, and observers; political party campaigning; polling and counting; and result management. Operational plans will point to activities to be implemented, timelines, geographical scope, human resources and training needed, budget and so on. Weakness or controversy in one electoral phase can compromise the integrity of the subsequent phases or the whole electoral process.

When elections are organized in conflict-prone societies, they can exacerbate existing tensions and trigger violent conflicts. On the other hand, existing tensions and violence may spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. It is therefore important that electoral planning is timely, holistic and conflict-sensitive and that it considers both the process and the structural factors of conflict. A baseline risk analysis conducted during the planning phase will be an asset for conflict-sensitive planning.

**Improved electoral management and justice**

Electoral planning is a process led by an EMB. Key considerations of electoral planning are the timing of electoral events and the resources, financial and human, needed for the implementation of specific activities. Specific considerations include, among others, the costs associated with different activities, the recruitment and training of election staff, the procurement of electoral materials, logistical organization, communication, security and so on. Timely, thorough and holistic planning processes will ensure broad consultations within an EMB, as well as with external actors. In conflict-prone societies, an EMB will benefit from conducting a risk assessment to identify potential process weaknesses and security threats, both internal and external to the electoral processes. An EMB should also establish an analytical capacity to record incidents and observe changing risks throughout the different electoral phases. In this case, the planning processes should, where feasible, include specific details on how these threats can be addressed.
Table 2. Prevention and mitigation actions: planning and implementation

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2.1. Conduct an inter-agency exercise to foresee factors and scenarios which may represent security risks for elections in different phases of the electoral cycle and across different geographical regions

Conflict-sensitive planning entails a thorough analysis of the security risks associated with electoral processes. A baseline risk analysis should be implemented as an inter-agency exercise that brings together election officials, SSAs, CSOs, academia and others. Such an exercise can look into the historical record of election-related violence and current trends at national, provincial and local levels. The aim is to identify internal and external factors that may increase risks and trigger election-related violence throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle. A baseline risk analysis should also explore prevention and mitigation strategies. Due to the changing dynamics of electoral processes, a baseline analysis should be followed up by periodical exercises which will explore emerging risks.
Case: Kenya
Following the outbreak of election-related violence in Kenya in 2007–08, the IEBC took a number of steps to strengthen its capacity to prevent and mitigate electoral violence ahead of and during the general elections in March 2013. The IEBC, supported by International IDEA, organized a workshop that brought together the IEBC staff, the Kenyan police and intelligence agencies, national human rights and reconciliation commissions, and academics. A two-day discussion was focused on mapping electoral risks in different counties ahead of the general elections. The risks associated with the different phases of the electoral cycle were also considered. In parallel, a national public opinion survey was conducted to measure citizens’ perceptions in this regard. These exercises made it possible to generate a baseline risk analysis which pointed to 14 risk factors which needed to be monitored and analysed throughout the different electoral phases (Asplund 2012).

Case: Mexico
Mexican elections are complex undertakings which, due to presence of organized crime groups, often face enhanced security challenges. During the planning phases, the IFE maintains close consultation with the major national agencies and institutes, including the army, navy, police, civil protection organizations, energy and water agencies and others represented in the national Group for Strategic Facilities Coordination. The Group coordinates operational planning and prevention and mitigation of conflicts in different areas, including electoral processes (Alhodžić 2012). Through the inter-agency data exchange, the IFE is able to identify areas where electoral processes face increased risks.

Case: Pakistan
Historically, elections in Pakistan have been marred by violence. After the President announced the 2013 general election date, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) immediately started preparing an election schedule (Khan 2013). The schedule was soon completed and published on the ECP website (Dawn.com 2013). The resulting transparency allowed political parties to scrutinize the schedule and to present arguments with respect to the suggested changes in the election schedule. Following those appeals, the ECP made a modification to the schedule. Modified operational timelines included deadlines for the filing of candidates’ nomination papers and scrutiny of nomination papers by returning officers, as well as the timelines for submitting nomination appeals (Election Commission of Pakistan 2013).

2.2. Secure sufficient funds for electoral activities in the budget and allocate specific funding lines for conflict and violence prevention efforts
EMBs need sufficient funds to safeguard the integrity of elections. This entails investment in a well-trained electoral staff, the production of high-quality electoral materials, the building up of internal information technology (IT) and communication capacities, strong public relations and outreach. In addition, an EMB should include specific budget lines for the collection of unbiased information that will help in assessing the quality of electoral processes and understanding measures that need to and can be taken to improve their integrity. In conflict-prone societies, it may be important to have resources that can be directed towards the prevention and mitigation of electoral violence.

Case: India
With over 700 million voters, India is the largest democracy in the world. The ECI is funded by the government of India. A so-called Consolidated Fund pays for staff, technical operations, electronic voting machines and various office expenses. Federal state governments
cover expenses relating to staff at the state headquarters and in the districts, the printing and transport of ballot papers, preparing and printing the electoral register, procuring material for the conduct of elections, training, the salaries of election officials and the expenses of central election supervisors. Each state also pays for security forces deployed for elections. During the 2009 parliamentary elections, prevention efforts, which for example included video monitoring of ‘dangerous’ individuals, were funded out of the general election budget (Scharff 2011: 7). ‘The broad powers given to the ECI by the constitution have been liberally and boldly interpreted to make the government pay for any necessary expenses. The ECI’s accounts are subject to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General and its report is tabled in the Parliament’ (Wall et al. 2006: 195).

2.3. Ensure that boundary delimitation process is conducted in timely fashion and that political stakeholders accept the outcomes

The delimitation of electoral boundaries may be very complicated, especially under some electoral systems (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005: 153). Electoral districts are often aligned with a country’s administrative divisions, which may have some practical advantages when citizens know them well. However, there are some drawbacks. These boundaries may be artificial and of little significance to citizens. Furthermore, this may divide natural communities, such as racial, ethnic, religious, or spoken language communities (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2012a). The decision to establish electoral districts must therefore be sensitive and well informed to avoid division of the traditional communities of interest. Fundamental principles for boundary delimitation include: (a) the impartiality of the boundary authority; (b) equality of voting strength; (c) the representativeness of cohesive communities defined by administrative boundaries, geographic features, and interest; (d) non-discrimination with respect to race, colour, language, religion, or related status; and (e) transparency and accessibility to the public (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2007: 59). The EMB should plan and conduct boundary delimitation in a cooperative manner in order to prevent the emergence of violence (UNDP 2009: 45). In this regard, electoral dispute resolution mechanisms should be put in place to deal with complaints. The technical capacity of an EMB to implement boundary delimitation may require the use of geographic information system (GIS) software (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2012b).

Case: South Africa

Preparations ahead of South Africa’s 1999 general elections—the second non-racial elections to take place—included adjustments to the electoral district boundaries. The process started in 1997 with the Election Steering Committee working in cooperation with the Department of Land Affairs and Statistics in order to create a geo-spatial database for the entire country. After more than a year, the geographical dataset was delivered to the IEC. GIS software was used to delimit approximately 14,500 electoral districts. In parallel, local electoral officers from each municipality had been requested to convene party liaison committees consisting of local representatives from all political parties to examine the newly created maps depicting the voting districts. In total, the IEC received only six disputes, all of which were resolved within two weeks of the election. The IEC was honoured with the prestigious 2000 Smithsonian Award in the Government and Non-profit Organizations category for ‘innovative applications of information technology that benefit society’. In making this award, special mention was made of the innovative use of GIS systems by the IEC (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 2002).
2.4. Ensure that the operational timelines for implementation of election activities are realistic, feasible, and translated into the election calendar

Even if the legal framework defines the timing of elections, rules may allow the EMB to choose the exact date of elections and consequently decide the timing of the different electoral phases. In the timing and sequencing of elections, the EMB needs to allow sufficient time for the implementation of all preparatory activities preceding election day. Unrealistic timelines may cause delays and thus affect the credibility of electoral processes and their outcomes. Planning of election timelines should consider external risks, particularly in areas that are prone to environmental hazards, as well as seasonal weather conditions. In some countries, the planting season may affect the participation of women due to their roles in food production. Poor weather conditions may affect the transport of election materials and citizens’ access to the electoral facilities. Time lost may be difficult or impossible to make up. Furthermore, an EMB when planning needs to consider whether a possible second round of elections is applicable. The second round of presidential elections may be particularly sensitive because of the high electoral stakes and frustration that may accumulate during the period leading up to the run-off. Once formulated, operational timelines should be included in an election calendar that needs to be periodically updated.

2.5. Establish electoral dispute resolution bodies and mechanisms at an early stage in the process

Well-functioning electoral dispute resolution mechanisms have an inherent potential to prevent violence. Planning should pay particular attention to the timeliness of dispute resolution and the capacity of the responsible bodies to deal with a potentially large number of complaints. Since the electoral process cannot be halted when a challenge is introduced, the establishment of adequate dispute resolution mechanisms which are trusted and effective is essential for ensuring the credibility of the electoral process (Orozco-Henríquez 2010: 20, 24–25).

Case: Bhutan
After Bhutan’s 2008 parliamentary election, which witnessed some violence (IPU PARLINE database n.d.) the country’s EMB undertook efforts to understand and address weaknesses relating to the election dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms. The improvements included (a) the establishment of a two-level EDR body; (b) the introduction of clearer rules for complaint adjudication; (c) guidelines for the proper presentation of complaints; (d) the establishment of investigation committees; (e) improved regulations governing the hearings; (f) better guidance for decision-making; (g) the enabling of summary decisions; (h) better provisions for final and binding decisions; (i) time limits for considering cases; (j) mandatory referral; and (k) the making of provision for complaints during non-election periods (Orozco-Henríquez 2010: 51–52).

2.6. Design sample electoral materials at an early stage and test their usability and accuracy

Electoral materials, including voter registration forms, provisional and final electoral registers, ballot papers and tabulation forms, need to be designed carefully to minimize the potential for mistakes, disputes and conflicts. These materials should be clear, concise and understandable for a broader population, including linguistic minorities and people with disabilities, and have security features, such as watermarks, security printing or other secure features as may be appropriate for the context in which these will be applied. Allowing sufficient time for the designing, testing and improvement of electoral materials may be beneficial in avoiding tensions generated by technical problems. Furthermore, there are many
countries that do not have sufficient capacity to print or source some of these materials and therefore resort to sourcing same abroad. In these instances, communication with internal stakeholders is vital. The process of sampling electoral materials and the security measures to be taken by suppliers in the printing country become an important consideration for electoral stakeholders. Decisions and activities need to be taken well in advance, to compensate for the longer supply chain applicable in those circumstances.

2.7. Establish data collection and analysis capacities to understand risk levels and make informed and conflict-sensitive decisions

Numerous factors can cause outbreaks of election-related violence. These may be process-specific (electoral) or context-specific (structural) factors. Risk assessment is a useful methodology in assessing relevant risk factors in a given national and electoral context. However, the risks associated with specific factors may change over time. Factors that are not initially categorized as risks may resurface during the later stages of electoral processes. It is therefore important to establish a standing capability within the EMB to analyse risk dynamics throughout the electoral cycle. This can be done through continuous data collection and analysis, with the aim of producing information that allows conflict-sensitive electoral decision-making. Furthermore, such analysis can be used to mobilize external agencies that may have mandates and capacities to address identified risks, such as SSAs and other state and non-state actors. At the same time, EMBs will benefit from improved information and analysis generated and shared by external agencies and actors.

Case: Mexico

One year ahead of the 2009 legislative elections, Mexico was experiencing an increased number of attacks on civil society by organized criminal groups, causing uncertainty and fear. Due to increased security risks, the IFE put in place a general strategy to prevent attacks on citizens and political actors. Two mechanisms were put in place, namely a ‘political-electoral information system’ and a ‘scenario analysis programme’, to allow the IFE to assess risks relating to drug trafficking, murders, robbery, kidnapping, poverty and electoral complexity throughout the country. The ‘state risk index’ included data from a task force composed of local state governments and security sector, communication and infrastructure agencies. The system was designed to minimize the risks related to the electoral process and to protect the electorate going to the polls in 2009. The overall strategy contributed to informed decision-making in terms of preventative action.

2.8. Ensure that the introduction of information technology-based solutions is timely and manageable

EMBs are increasingly relying on the application of sophisticated IT-based solutions in the implementation and management of delicate and complex electoral processes. Popular IT systems include biometric voter registration, electronic voting and electronic vote transmission. The use of IT may ensure that electoral processes are more expeditious and less prone to human mistakes, and thus contribute to increased trust in, and the credibility of, election results. On the negative side, late procurement and testing and breakdowns of these systems may cause serious problems to election administrators, resulting in loss of public confidence and damaged credibility of election results. To minimize the risks relating to the introduction of new technologies, an EMB should ensure that the testing and procurement of equipment happen during an initial stage of the electoral processes. It should be possible to compensate for delayed delivery and testing, or failure of these systems, through the deployment of alternative resources and procedures. Experience shows that introduction of ITs may work best if the development and implementation are incremental, and are owned and trusted by all relevant national stakeholders.
Case: Brazil
The introduction of e-voting in Brazil was motivated by economic and fraud-prevention factors. A multi-year approach for the gradual introduction of e-voting was adopted and included the following steps:

- voter and civic information including usability and feasibility studies starting in 1986;
- capacity building within the EMB, and digitalization of the result aggregation;
- development of hardware and software, involving local technical expertise;
- testing of equipment in the Brazilian environment; EMB’s final decision on the type of machine fitting the Brazilian context best;
- quality control and testing in various environments;
- authorization of e-voting in 1996 local and municipal elections;
- post-election review and subsequent quality overhaul; and
- full e-voting roll-out in the 2002 general elections.

A hacking competition was organized in 2009 to create additional confidence in the technology. Over the years, citizens and stakeholders gained enough trust in the system for the paper trail that was initially included to be deemed redundant and scrapped after technical problems associated with the printers. While systems without paper trails are often disputed, the Brazilian case exemplifies what can be achieved with successful trust, capacity and consensus building over many years and several electoral cycles (International IDEA 2011).

2.9. Ensure political preconditions for the implementation of technical activities
Elections are often organized in national contexts where the political landscape is very complex. Political divisions within the legislative and executive institutions can increase the complexity of electoral processes and demand increased integrity and operational capacities of the organizations with electoral mandates. While it may be important to ensure that a political consensus is reached among the relevant political actors that give an EMB legitimacy, an EMB should have a good awareness of the politically delicate phases and activities in order to ensure that political consensus is maintained before and during the implementation of specific technical segments of elections. This may require political sensitivity and consensus-building skills among election administrators.

Case: Mexico
To implement its mandate in the complex political context of Mexico, the IFE distinguishes between two aspects of electoral management. The first is the technical dimension. It entails management of resources and operational activities to ensure that election processes are implemented in a timely, credible and peaceful manner. The second dimension is political. The IFE acknowledges that election administrators require a good sense of the political situation in order to better understand the possible political connotations of electoral activities. This allows it to make politically sensitive electoral decisions and take action ensuring that electoral processes do not raise political controversy. In fact, Mexican experiences confirm that there is an interplay between the technical and political dimensions of electoral processes. ‘Politics and technique change jointly: technique is the administrative body, and politics is what gives sense and feeds the spirit of the administration’ (Carrillo Poblano 2013).
Improved electoral security

Planning of security precautions and responses needs to be undertaken on the basis of risk assessments of the general election environment and specific issues related to the geographic or political landscape (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 2006: 2). SSAs are generally accustomed to strategic and operational security planning. In an election year, these plans must take into account the dynamics of electoral conflicts, such as increased political tensions and conflicts, and requirements to provide security for a large number of electoral actors, activities and facilities and a great deal of information. To support and reinforce the integrity of electoral processes, SSAs’ electoral security planning must be timely and well informed about specific electoral needs. Specific consideration should include electoral risks, needs for the provision of physical protection (to actors, events, facilities and materials), financial and human resources, coordination with other actors and so on.

2.10. Conduct a timely exercise to assess security risks relating to electoral processes within different electoral phases and across different geographical regions

SSAs should mobilize organizational expertise to carry out a comprehensive electoral risk assessment early on in the electoral processes. This assessment must look into the historical and current electoral conflict dynamics in different geographical regions. To the greatest extent possible, consultations should involve all relevant stakeholders including EMBs, relevant ministries (for example, interior, defence, police, justice, health and transport), local governments, political parties and CSOs (UNDP 2009: 33). Understanding of the political actors’ incentives to resort to the use of violence during electoral processes can inform the planning of appropriate security responses (Sharma and Kammerud 2010: 10).

Case: Colombia

In 2008, the Colombian Government estimated that illegal armed groups could, through intimidation and other violent means, potentially disrupt the 2011 local elections in as much as one-third of the country. As a response, the Ministry of Defence mapped out high-risk areas with a focus on electoral security. In total, 53 police regional centres were involved in mapping out risk areas by using the existing statistical data and targeted surveys. The exercise identified 58 municipalities where candidates might experience increased security risks. High-risk areas were provided with security protocols and protection schemes in order to guarantee a functional electoral process. Political actors travelling to areas where protection schemes were put in place were encouraged to inform the police before travelling. This allowed the authorities to ‘dispatch adequate protection measures’ (Cawley 2011).

2.11. Operationalize the electoral security strategy in respect to protection of electoral actors, events, facilities and materials during the different electoral phases

Operationalization of electoral security plans will help in translating broader electoral security concepts into practical action points. It will point to specific categories that need security protection, such as actors (election officials, political leaders), electoral events (political party rallies, for example), electoral facilities (such as voter registration centres and EMB offices and warehousing facilities where electoral materials are kept), and electoral materials (such as sensitive electoral materials). Furthermore, it will link specific security protection needs with specific phases of the electoral cycle and assign inter-agency responsibilities.

Case: India

The ECI was in charge of putting in place an electoral security strategy for the protection of electoral actors, facilities and materials ahead of the 2009 parliamentary elections. The
challenges included the provision of security arrangements for 828,000 polling stations. To compensate for a shortage of security personnel, since demand for them would be so great, the ECI issued detailed instructions to chief electoral officers in each state requesting them to make a preliminary assessment of where to deploy extra security and where to take specific action to deter individuals who might perpetrate fraud or violence. Through ‘vulnerability mapping’, a methodology designed to help the chief electoral officers identify which polling places in their state would be most vulnerable, the chief electoral officers had the power to call upon the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), a paramilitary police service operated by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, to supplement state police during elections. Thus, the CRPF operated under the command of the Director General of the police, who took orders from the Chief Electoral Officer during the electoral period. This led to a decline in the number of election-related incidents and the ECI declared that the 2009 election was one of the most peaceful in the country’s history (Scharff 2011: 1–8).

2.12. Ensure that joint security planning, that involves multiple SSAs and an EMB, is a collaborative exercise that takes place at the national and sub-national level

Electoral security is most effective when adapted to the local security context. Implementation of the electoral security strategy may require the establishment of joint coordination bodies such as task forces or joint election operation centres (Creative Associates International 2010: 25–26). Such security forums will maintain and enhance coordination between agencies throughout the electoral cycle. Security planning may also take into account a wider range of actors including political parties, other ministries and civil society groups (UNDP 2009: 86).

**Case: Kenya**

Post-electoral violence in 2007–08 claimed the lives of over 1,500 Kenyans and caused the internal displacement of more than 300,000 people (Roberts 2009). In the context of preparations for the 2010 constitutional referendum, the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) and the Kenyan police collaborated on the development of a comprehensive electoral security plan. The methodology included identification of the security personnel required to provide electoral security. Needs assessments were conducted nationwide by the respective officer commanding police divisions (OCPDs). This information was consolidated at the national level and collated through a comprehensive report that was shared with the Commission. The IIEC, through a committee on security, worked closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police on security operations ahead of the elections. The committee also consulted with the Office of the President, the Department of Registration of Persons and Immigration and, the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs in order to ‘effectively operationalize election activities’. To strengthen the capacity of the Kenyan police force to provide electoral security, uniformed personnel from the Kenyan Wildlife Services and the Prison Department were seconded, trained and then appointed as police officers immediately before and after election day (Hassan 2010: 7, 9).

2.13. Develop a curriculum for training of SSAs on the specifics of security engagement during the electoral processes

SSAs need training to understand the specific challenges relating to their engagement during electoral processes. Such training should include human rights and gender awareness (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2010). In terms of the development of training methodologies and deciding on training timelines, the SSAs will benefit from close collaboration with an EMB. The design of a training methodology needs to take into account the levels of literacy and linguistic diversity of security sector officers and the length
of the training. If the training is cascaded, the capacity of trainers to convey the training, while maintaining its standard, must be ensured.

Case: Sudan
The 2010 general election was regarded as an important milestone of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the armed conflict in Sudan (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) 2010: 2). With assistance from the UNDP Elections Assistance Basket Fund, the UN Police and the UN Mission in Darfur developed a training curriculum on electoral security in order to train over 34,000 Sudanese police officers at different levels ahead of the 2010 general elections. The curriculum provided a summary of the electoral law, the polling process, the role of the police, likely offences, and mock polling scenarios. The UN Police also produced 27,000 pocket-sized copies of a quick reference guide outlining basic procedures and recommended police conduct during polling days. This training curriculum covered the development of a polling-day deployment strategy to mitigate election ‘flashpoints’ (UNDP Sudan 2010).

Improved infrastructure for peace
In addition to EMBs and SSAs, which have clear mandates and responsibilities to ensure that elections are peaceful, a number of other state and non-state actors may have a specific interest in contributing to peaceful elections. These may include CSOs and other groups and individuals which represent the building blocks of a national infrastructure for peace. During the election planning phase, these actors should be proactive in identifying and reaching out to other organizations and individuals with a similar agenda and recognized potential to mediate and resolve disputes, such as traditional leaders. This may require the establishment of a joint collaborative forum which can ensure that efforts are coordinated and results are maximized. Specific actions may include the mapping of all existing organizations and actors that may contribute to peaceful elections, the promotion of collaborative platforms and forums, resource mobilization, operational planning, and the establishment of collaboration with EMBs and SSAs.

2.14. Map organizations and individuals with an agenda or capacity to promote peace and conflict resolution during elections at a national and sub-national level
Effective mechanisms for conflict prevention and mitigation may take different forms in different societies. In consolidated democracies, judicial institutions usually enjoy the citizens’ trust and are able to mediate or resolve conflicts effectively. In some societies, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and authorities, such as religious or tribal leaders, complement the judiciary and constitute an essential conflict prevention and mitigation mechanism. In conflict-prone societies, additional efforts are often required to develop and enhance conflict-prevention and peace-building capacities through the establishment of peace and liaison councils and forums that involve CSOs, political parties, government agencies, reputable citizens, and organizations and individuals that work to promote gender equality and women’s participation. Understanding the full peace-building and conflict-prevention potential may require mapping of the existing infrastructure for peace.

2.15. Join or initiate discussion forums for participatory dialogues between EMBs, SSAs and non-state actors in the planning phase of electoral processes
Participatory and democratic dialogue through multi-stakeholder forums and consultations between state and non-state actors should be established during the planning phase. If EMBs and SSAs do not take the initiative to organize dialogue forums, or do not include non-state organizations, these may take proactive steps to convene such forums themselves. Existing
forums, established to coordinate broader peace-building and conflict-prevention efforts outside the electoral context, may serve as platforms for the discussion and coordination of actions for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence during the election period.

**Case: Somaliland**

Although recognized as free and fair, the 2010 elections in Somaliland witnessed some election-related violence in the form of intimidation and murder (CNN 2010). Ahead of the November 2012 local government election, the Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum (SNSAF) conducted a nationwide consultation process which created a platform for dialogue, bringing together all electoral stakeholders such as the National Election Commission (NEC), the Committee for the Registration and Approval of Political Associations, political parties and associations, government officials, parliamentarians and CSOs which included traditional and religious leaders, women’s organizations and legal experts. The objective of the pre-election dialogue was to identify the main issues that might have a negative impact on the elections as well as generate appropriate strategies to address these constraints in order to ensure that elections are free, fair and peaceful. Some of the concerns identified during the dialogue included shortcomings in the electoral legal framework relating to ballot paper design, polling station arrangements, the demarcation of electoral districts and boundaries, inadequate voter education, the NEC’s general lack of capacity and finances, inappropriate election timing (no election date was decided at the time of the consultations) and security concerns (SNSAF n.d.).

**2.16. Formalize coordination between state and non-state actors during elections, and mobilize sufficient financial and human resources for joint action**

Strengthening a society’s resilience to conflict and violence during elections may require enhanced coordination between, and joint action by, the major state and non-state actors that have a mandate to work for peaceful elections and an interest in doing so. These organizations should work together to develop operational plans for engagement throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle at the national and subnational level. In conflict-prone societies, such plans should foresee the establishment of standing bodies for data collection and analysis, the creation of early warning alerts, and coordination of prevention and mitigation activities. The establishment of joint structures and capacities to implement preventive and mitigation actions requires funds. Nevertheless, in the long run, such mechanisms are inexpensive and cost-effective (van Tongeren 2011: 50).

**Case: Kenya**

During the outbreak of election-related violence in Kenya in 2008, far fewer incidents were recorded in the Kenyan districts where a District Peace Committee (DPC) existed than in districts without such a committee. The results were so convincing that, after the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was passed, the government decided to establish DPCs in all of Kenya’s districts. The establishment and strengthening of the peace infrastructure gained further momentum with the approaching 2010 constitutional referendum. With the support of the UNDP, the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), PeaceNet Kenya (an umbrella body for peace-building CSOs in Kenya), and UNDP Kenya established the Uwiano Platform for Peace. This Platform also involves other key government agencies such as the Provincial Administration, Kenya Police, Administration Police, the National Security Intelligence Service and the IIEC in ‘a unique multi-stakeholder conflict prevention, de-escalation and response strategy that emphasized preventive action, diplomacy and community dialogue’ (Uwiano Joint Secretariat 2012). The success of Uwiano in
contributing to the peaceful holding of the referendum has been well documented. The key success factors hinged on the strong national profile of the principal partners and their linkage to credible grass-roots networks, including the Provincial Administration, security agencies and district peace committees. Positive media input, supportive donors and development partners, and the UNDP’s invaluable role in mobilizing resources were viewed as making important contributions to the success of the Uwiano Platform for Peace. The establishment and operationalization of the Emergency Response Fund (ERF), also referred to as the Rapid Response Fund, was one of the most notable achievements of Uwiano.

2.17. Consult with traditional and religious leaders in order to understand their interest and potential to assist in mediating electoral conflict

Acknowledgement of the role of traditional and religious leaders in the peace infrastructure is an important measure for preventing electoral violence, particularly in remote areas. This should be based on a constructive approach and respect for traditions (UNDP 2009: 39). However, there are limitations that must be borne in mind, including the fact that some traditions are themselves not always inclusive and participatory, in particular where women are concerned. At the same time it is important to be aware that the authority of elected leaders has been often in competition with traditional leaders’ power (Huyse and Salter 2009: 18). Traditional and religious leaders should not be perceived as biased if they are to have the legitimacy to resolve disputes (Ashanut 2010: 65–66). It is of importance to be sensitive and aware of the gender stereotypes perpetuated by traditional practices and religious interpretations when engaging the traditional and religious leadership in any particular context.

Case: Sierra Leone

Following a decade-long conflict, Sierra Leone organized its first peacetime general elections in 2002. These elections did witness some incidents of election-related violence. In this respect, the potential of the paramount chiefs to contribute to the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence ahead of and during the 2007 elections was explored. Ahead of the campaigning phase, the Fatima Institute and the UNDP organized several leadership consultation workshops around the country in an effort to clarify the role of the paramount chiefs in the electoral process. Three workshops were organized in different parts of the country, each attended by approximately 40–50 chiefs. The workshop organized in the north of the country resulted in the Makeni Protocol whereby chiefs affirmed their commitment to promote the democratic and electoral process (The Patriotic vanguard 2007). In general, the 2007 election was regarded as free and fair; however, incidents of intimidation were still recorded during the campaign period and on election day (DFID 2008: 1–2).
3. Training and education

Electoral training and education refer to the building of understanding, knowledge, skills and capacities of different electoral actors in relation to electoral processes. Voter information aims to disseminate relevant information about the electoral process to voters. As a general rule, training is provided to all who have specific tasks in respect to implementation, security, observation or reporting on electoral processes. Given the complexity and sensitivity of electoral processes, it is of great importance that all actors are acquainted with the procedures and have relevant, timely and accurate information, in particular about the registration and polling and counting processes. When elections are organized in conflict-prone societies, electoral training and education should also enhance the awareness and sensitiveness of electoral officials, SSAs and CSOs with respect to specific electoral risks and prevention and mitigation strategies. Training and education efforts should be maintained throughout the electoral cycle.

**Table 3. Prevention and mitigation actions: training and education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improved electoral management and justice</th>
<th>Improved electoral security</th>
<th>Improved infrastructure for peace</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Ensure that the training for election officials is of a high standard and timely.</td>
<td>3.4. Conduct electoral training for SSAs to enhance and build understanding of the electoral process, the roles and rights of electoral actors, and electoral offences.</td>
<td>3.6. Ensure that all non-state actors which form an integral part of the national infrastructure for peace are familiarized with electoral processes, including timelines, procedures and operational details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Provide electoral training at the national and sub-national level to political party representatives, the media, CSOs and electoral observers.</td>
<td>3.5. Reinforce SSAs’ professional standards.</td>
<td>3.7. Train the conflict mediation personnel at the level of local communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3. Design and conduct a timely voter information campaign that is gender-sensitive and far-reaching in respect to diversity and citizens with special needs.</td>
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<td>3.8. Design and implement electoral training, information and education activities targeting high-risk areas.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Improved electoral management and justice**

Election officials should undertake continuous professional development programmes. During an election year, EMBs will engage a large number of temporary staff to conduct voter registration or to perform polling and/or counting duties. In some countries it is customary to engage public servants to act as polling station and counting officials. In others,
temporary staff are recruited for this purpose. Newly recruited officials may not have prior experience or understanding about electoral processes and therefore require intensive training. New electoral rules and regulations will increase the training needs of experienced personnel. An EMB should also provide training to other stakeholders, such as political parties, the media and civil society organizations, who engage in observing or reporting about electoral processes. Furthermore, an EMB should ensure that all citizens are well informed about timelines and procedures through a far-reaching information campaign. These measures will help avoid technical problems that may harm the credibility of electoral processes, raise tensions and lead to violence.

3.1. Ensure that the training for election officials is of high standard and timely

Training of electoral officials entails training in procedures and standards of professional conduct (Wall 2006: 151–62). Adequate knowledge and skills reduce the likelihood of procedural mistakes being made. Training can be implemented at two levels. For permanent electoral officials, training should be a part of professional development. The most comprehensive professional development course is the Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) project (BRIDGE n.d.). Training for the temporary staff should be implemented before they are assigned to do specific electoral work. Depending on their specific role, training topics may include registration of voters, political parties and independent candidates, and observers; external voting; polling and counting; electoral security; human rights, including gender-participation; and conflict resolution. The training methodology for temporary staff may involve cascade training which can be multiplied at different levels so that it is more cost-effective and it is possible to train a large number of staff members. For more on training by mobile teams or simultaneous training, see Wall (2006: 161).

Case: Mexico

Mexican elections are highly contested, and the winning margins between presidential candidates were very narrow during the general elections in 2006 and 2012. Such outcomes have raised tensions and led to street protests in 2006 (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2012: 2). Large-scale recounts were undertaken by the IFE to ensure that the credibility of the election results was upheld in 2012. In this context, it is critical that election officials in charge of the polling and counting processes perform well and impartially. The IFE therefore puts much effort and resources into ensuring that polling station officers, who are drawn at random from the voter register, and without the intervention of any political party, are properly instructed and trained (Domínguez and McCann 1998: 192). The most important thing is to ensure the credibility of each of the polling stations.

In the 2012 federal elections 143,130 polling stations were installed during election day, which means 99.98 per cent of the total. The training programme has a cascade scheme. The electoral supervisors (ESs) and the electoral assistant trainers (EATs) are selected, hired and trained at the district level. The ESs coordinate, support and verify the electoral training and assistance activities implemented by the EATs. The EATs inform selected citizens about their assignments and duties and train them in the polling and counting procedures. Furthermore, EATs are responsible for the proper installation and functioning of the polling stations. The ESs are hired for five months and the EATs for around two weeks (Carrillo Poblano 2013).

3.2. Provide electoral training at the national and sub-national level to political party representatives, the media, CSOs and electoral observers

Political parties have high stakes in electoral processes and are therefore greatly interested in following different electoral activities in order to verify their quality and integrity. CSOs and
other national and international actors may also be interested in observing different electoral activities. Furthermore, journalists are involved in providing media coverage of electoral processes. To avoid misunderstandings, tensions, ungrounded complaints and sensationalist media reporting, an EMB should organize training for the key external stakeholders. This type of training can be tailored to address the needs of the specific stakeholder. Among other things, it can include topics about electoral rights and duties, technical procedures, dispute resolution mechanisms, gender equality and participation, diversity perspectives in electoral processes and so on.

Case: Sudan

Following the peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the People’s Liberation Movement in 2005, Sudan organized its first multiparty elections in 2010. Ahead of the elections, the National Election Commission (NEC), supported by the UNDP, organized an extensive training programme for political party representatives, female political candidates, state prosecutors, representatives from civil society organizations, journalists and electoral observers (UNDP Sudan 2010). About 140 political party agents attended a training workshop on their roles during polling. Specific topics included parallel vote tabulation, polling regulations and the importance of monitoring. Workshops for female political candidates were organized in five states in northern Sudan with a focus on campaigning, agenda setting, and intimidation and violence (UNDP Sudan 2010: 4). Six workshops in the north and south of the country were organized in order to train 250 prospectors and legal counsellors on their role in applying the 2008 Election Act in terms of election offences. Ninety community-based organizations underwent training on the electoral system and polling process that included mock polling exercises in order to work directly with local communities on electoral and democratic issues. Approximately 300 journalists were given training in elections reporting skills/media monitoring. Training was also provided to 4,760 domestic observers in the north and south of the country using a training-of-trainers methodology.

3.3. Design and conduct a timely voter information campaign that is gender-sensitive and far-reaching in respect to diversity and citizens with special needs

Voter information is provided by EMBs. The aim is to provide relevant information about electoral processes to citizens. This information primarily includes details on when, where and how to register and vote. Sometimes voter information may encompass elements of voter education and address issues relating to human rights, such as the rights to elect representatives freely, to gender equality, and to freedom from harassment and intimidation (UNDP 2009: 38). It is also useful to inform voters on how to submit electoral complaints. In conducting an information campaign, an EMB may benefit from partnership with civil society groups. Information and educational activities should be designed to reach remote communities and overcome language, literacy and disability barriers.

Case: Yemen

During the 2001 local council elections in Yemen, 67 people were killed and over 100 wounded (Fattah 2006). Ahead of the 2006 elections, the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER), with the support of the UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and other international assistance providers, implemented a national voter information and education campaign in order to increase citizens’ information, participation and confidence in the election. This included the use of radio and television and the production and dissemination of a range of printed materials, including booklets, posters, stickers, banners, fact sheets and taxi advertising. The information included electoral laws/rights, election
logistics and the importance of participation among marginalized groups such as women, ethnic minorities, young people and persons with disabilities (UNDP n.d.). The outreach activities were directed at communities living in rural areas who lacked access to traditional sources of voter education information such as radio or television. This was implemented through the training of 20 CSOs that conducted face-to-face campaigning. The aim was to enable citizens to make informed decisions about the registration and election day processes and to provide them with accurate, culturally sensitive and timely information about these processes. This gave marginalized groups, especially in rural locations, an opportunity to obtain electoral information in a simple format and receive immediate answers to their questions (IFES 2012).

**Improved electoral security**

Electoral training for the security sector personnel will contribute to their professionalism and sensitivity when engaging during elections. A curriculum that could be used to train police in electoral security practices may include the following topics: (a) the nature of the electoral legislation and an overview of the electoral process; (b) the role of the police in supporting the democratic process; (c) human rights issues in relation to the police’s role; (d) the police’s role in an election; (e) security objectives and strategy in relation to the election; (f) the standards of professional, neutral and non-intimidating conduct to be upheld by police forces during the election; (g) contact mechanisms and liaison details (on an as-needed basis) between the electoral commission and police forces; (h) details of specific offences against electoral laws; and (i) details of other laws such as those regarding public gatherings that will have an impact on police planning (Graham 2006: 18). In particular, training should focus on an enhanced understanding of the roles and responsibilities of electoral actors, electoral offences and professional standards.

**3.4. Conduct electoral training for SSAs to enhance and build understanding of the electoral process, the roles and rights of electoral actors, and electoral offences**

In addition to having clarity about their roles and mandates during elections, security officers need to be aware of the roles and mandates of other stakeholders, including elected officials, political party candidates and election observers. Security personnel should be able to understand voters’ rights and electoral offences and be able to differentiate between sensitive and non-sensitive materials. Training should be intended for the leadership as well as national and local security personnel. See the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (2012c). Training will have the greatest impact when all relevant national institutions are involved in its planning and implementation and when it is organized well in advance of elections (UNDP 2009: 47, 86).

**Case: Ghana**

Ghana experienced a peaceful transition of power after the 2008 general elections. However, the capacity of the police to respond to election-related violence remained a concern (Modern Ghana 2012d). Prior to the 2012 general elections, DFID supported the national electoral security training programme that was implemented in all 10 regions of the country using a train-the-trainers methodology. Approximately 16,000 security officers from the Ghanaian police, the fire service, and the prisons and immigration services were trained. The training was designed to acquaint the officers with the electoral laws, public order management and intelligence gathering in order to prevent election-related violence occurring. The training in public order management was designed to assist in effective and professional handling of crowd-related violence and introduced international standards of policing to ensure peaceful and violence-free elections. The training included field and
simulation exercises on problem solving related to election violence (DFID 2012; Modern Ghana 2012c).

A simulation exercise covering election day operations, including election security, was also undertaken in the city of Ho shortly before the 2012 elections. The Volta Regional Task Force, together with the Election Commission of Ghana and the National Commission for Civic Education, coordinated the exercise. It was focused on the escorting of election materials and simulations in which the police were tasked to foil the ‘snatching of ballot boxes’ and detain suspects (Ghanaian Times 2012). Similar simulation exercises were conducted in other parts of the country to demonstrate the readiness of the security agencies ahead of election day (Ghana News Agency, ‘Election 2012a). Nevertheless, some parts of Ghana experienced election-related violence during the elections. Acts of violence included assaults, shootings and the burning of houses (Modern Ghana 2012a).

3.5. Reinforce SSAs’ professional standards
Training for SSAs should emphasize professional standards and values that sustain the democratic nature of electoral processes and SSAs’ own legitimacy. These include neutrality, transparency, consistency in the application of the law and non-intimidating behaviour, as well as cooperation with other electoral actors (Graham 2006: 12–13, 18). In addition to training, police officers can be provided with a pocket book that contains all relevant instructions relating to professional standards when engaging in electoral processes.

Case: Uganda
During its general elections in 2006, Uganda experienced incidents of election-related violence involving the police and the main opposition party following the rejection of the election results (The Guardian 2006). Ahead of the 2011 general elections in Uganda, the police force, with the support of the Electoral Commission and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, provided ‘guidelines for law enforcement officials during the national elections’ (Uganda Police Force 2011: 22–26). The document sets out the professional standards expected from security officials with an emphasis on political neutrality and discipline. References were made to the constitution and the electoral legal framework with an emphasis on the rule of law and human rights, as well as law enforcement standards. In addition, the document provided some information on the responsibility of the Electoral Commission in managing the elections. The document was produced in a pocket fact-book format and distributed to the police officers (Election Commission of Uganda 2011: 20).

Improved infrastructure for peace

The capacity of different non-state and state actors to engage effectively in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence may be contingent on their understanding of the legal and operational aspects of electoral processes. These actors should therefore be acquainted with the election rules and regulations. This can be achieved through training initiatives implemented in collaboration with EMBs at the national and subnational level. Once familiarized with electoral processes, these organizations may be well positioned to engage in designing and implementing conflict-sensitive electoral training, and information and education programmes for communities that experience conflicts and for women and other marginalized groups.
3.6. Ensure that all non-state actors which form an integral part of the national infrastructure for peace are familiarized with electoral processes

The national infrastructures for peace may include actors with extensive experience in conflict prevention and resolution, such as peace builders, mediators, reconciliation experts and similar organizations. However, conflict prevention practitioners may lack a good understanding of the operational and legal aspects of electoral processes and the specifics relating to electoral security. To apply their skills in electoral processes effectively and contribute in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence, these agencies need capacity-building training in electoral issues. This training can be implemented with the support of an EMB and SSAs at the national and subnational level.

3.7. Train the conflict mediation personnel at the level of local communities

Effective conflict prevention and resolution can take different forms in different societies. In some national contexts, conflict prevention and resolution at the local level may benefit from the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions that involve traditional leaders, such as traditional chiefs or reputable individuals. Religious institutions in particular may have an infrastructure that enables access to different communities. Cooperation with traditional leaders in the area of voter education may be very effective. Cultural sensitivity as well as respect and appreciation for their contribution are central to making such cooperation work. At the same time, if cultural and religious institutions practice exclusivity and intolerance, additional measures to promote dialogue and social cohesion will be needed (UNDP 2009: 39).

Case: Guinea

In 2010, Guinea organized its first free presidential elections since independence in 1958. Ahead of the election, four mediation training workshops were organized in different parts of the country. They were organized by MSP (a joint project of Swisspeace and CSS ETH-Zurich) together with International Alert (IA), with support of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF). These three-day workshops were attended by 100 participants representing CSOs, women and youth groups, elders and religious leaders, political parties, the election commission and the security sector forces. The workshops allowed the participants to familiarize themselves with the electoral legislative framework, conflict analysis, the electoral cycle, and mediation techniques and methods. Lessons from Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and South Africa were presented by experts from International Alert, Swisspeace and EISA (Peace Mediation Course n.d.; International Alert 2010b). Practical training methods such as role play were also used. Some reports suggest that the mediation training did help to de-escalate conflicts and stop them becoming violent in a number of cases around the country before, during and after election day (International Alert 2010a).

3.8. Design and implement electoral training, information and education activities targeting high-risk areas

CSOs are well positioned to work with EMBs and implement programmes relating to electoral training, information and education at the grass-roots level. The added value of such work may be particularly visible when it is done in regions that face increased inter/intra-communal tensions and gender-based violence and discrimination.

Case: Tostan

The participants in the Tostan human rights-based education programme receive civic education to organize drama events for entire villages in order to disseminate messages on
election procedures. Furthermore, Tostan participants organize radio broadcasts on a range of civic education issues with a conflict and violence prevention potential. This has been the case in various countries such as the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Somalia, where Tostan has been operating during election periods and beyond through its Community Empowerment Programme (Ringquist 2013).
4. Registration

The registration phase encompasses the processes of voter registration, registration of political parties and candidates, and accreditation of election observers. Registration may be controversial for a number of reasons. An inaccurate electoral register may misspell voters’ names, assign them to the wrong polling places, omit eligible electors and registrants or include non-eligible electors (for example, people who have died). Such problems will be likely to give rise to speculation as to whether those mistakes were intentional and part of electoral fraud. It is therefore important to have a registration process of a high standard which will ensure that only eligible electors are registered. Likewise, it is important to ensure that all eligible political parties and independent candidates have the opportunity to register and compete in elections. Furthermore, it is important to allow interested organizations, including political parties, civil society and international non-governmental and governmental organizations, to be accredited to observe the voter registration, polling and counting processes.

Table 4. Prevention and mitigation actions: registration

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Ensure that the voter registration process is conveniently accessible to all eligible citizens.</td>
<td>4.5. Establish and maintain close coordination between different SSAs and with an EMB during the voter registration period through a joint electoral operations centre.</td>
<td>4.9. Observe voter registration processes and share findings with an EMB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. Ensure that electoral justice mechanisms have the capacity effectively to resolve complaints and disputes relating to voter registration.</td>
<td>4.6. Provide security to citizens and officials that participate in registration processes and safeguard registration materials and facilities.</td>
<td>4.10. In collaboration with an EMB, build and provide capacity for dispute resolution relating to the voter registration period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Ensure transparency of and sufficient time for registration of political parties, party candidates and independent candidates.</td>
<td>4.7. Ensure that citizens face no security challenges while travelling to and accessing the voter registration facilities.</td>
<td>4.11. Promote multi-stakeholder collaboration through joint forums that create space for discussion and coordination of violence prevention during voter registration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4. Ensure timely and transparent accreditation of voter registration observers.</td>
<td>4.8. Provide a safe environment to those who wish to put up their nomination.</td>
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</table>
Improved electoral management and justice

Improved electoral management and justice during the registration phase aim to achieve a process that is technically flawless, safe, and trusted. The success of the registration processes will depend on the quality of the electoral laws, rules and regulations; the comprehensiveness of operational planning; and the quality of training and information campaigns. To be able to address emerging issues, an EMB must have a good situational awareness and operational agility to engage in resolving challenges that arise. This may include modification of operational plans relating to the establishment of voter registration centres and revision of the procedures and timelines relating to registration of voters, parties, candidates and observers. An EMB will benefit from credible election observation groups and therefore needs to be transparent in its work. The environment in which registration takes place should be safe and secure, while all related complaints are resolved effectively.

4.1. Ensure that the voter registration process is conveniently accessible to all eligible citizens

Voter registration may be passive or active, depending on whether eligible citizens are included in the electoral registers automatically, on the basis of the civil registry data, or are required to register by visiting designated voter registration locations. Passive voter registration requires an accurate and trusted citizen register. In many countries, the citizen register is not of sufficient quality to be used to extract an electoral register and voter registration needs to be organized in order to establish and maintain the electoral register. Most often, an EMB is mandated to organize these processes. Critical elements of voter registration relate to voters’ awareness, the procurement and dissemination of voter registration equipment and materials, administrative procedures, the professionalism of staff, trust and transparency. For an overview of voter registration procedures, see Wall (2006: 65–66, 265). Preparations need to start early on. Procedures for voter registration must be clear and concise, and voter registration staff must be professional and well trained. They must be impartial and transparent in their work. In addition, the voter registration process must be accessible to all men and women, in particular marginalized and vulnerable groups. In post-conflict or conflict-prone countries, voter registration should ensure that refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are given an opportunity to register for voting. This may require special arrangements in terms of personal identity documentation needed for the voter registration, such as a refugee or ID card. Also, citizens of all geographical regions, regardless of their gender, ethnicity and race, must have equal access to the voter registration locations.

Case: Bangladesh

The 2007 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh were postponed due to a growing political crisis, demonstrations and violent incidents that had marked the pre-election period. Among other things, the EMB was criticized for lack of action to ensure the credibility of the electoral registers. These had last been updated in 2000, and it was estimated that they included 10 million ‘ghost voters’, which could lead to widespread fraud on polling day. Following the cancellation of the 2007 parliamentary elections, the newly appointed Bangladesh Electoral Commission (BEC) implemented a number of reforms, among them a new voter registration process. The BEC initiated a new voter register with photographs and other biometric data details. The registration centres were managed by the armed forces, mainly because they were the only institution in the country with the manpower and the technical and logistical expertise to complete the process on time. In addition, the army enjoyed public trust. Technical assistance was provided by UNDP, while several CSOs
engaged in a widespread voter and civic education programme. The accuracy of the electoral register was verified by an independent audit which affirmed that 99 per cent of the eligible electorate were on the register. The process was characterized as both careful and transparent and generated high levels of public trust in the upcoming elections and in the BEC. The level of election-related violence was also considerably lower in the run-up to the December 2008 elections compared to the levels of violence reported in the 2007 pre-election period. This was believed to be in part due to the electoral reforms (Eicher, Alam and Eckstein 2010: 6–12, 42, 43, 79–80, 120).

4.2. Ensure that electoral justice mechanisms have the capacity effectively to resolve complaints and disputes relating to voter registration

The way in which electoral processes are implemented may sometime open the process to legal challenges. Participation in the registration phase will be massive, involving citizens, political actors and observer groups, and the number of complaints can therefore be very high. Adequate dispute resolution capabilities should therefore be put in place to ensure that complaints are resolved efficiently and professionally. Dispute resolution mechanisms can take different forms. Administrative challenges, which are the most common type, are usually addressed and resolved by an EMB. Contested decisions can be revisited either by the EMB or by a higher-ranking organ, such as an electoral court, high court or even a constitutional court (Orozco-Henríquez 2010: 137). This system is widespread. Judicial challenges are addressed, as defined by law, to judicial bodies, which may be regular or administrative courts, a constitutional court or special electoral courts. Likewise, legislative challenges systems allow legislative bodies or other defined political assemblies to resolve electoral disputes (Orozco-Henríquez 2010: 138–41).

Case: Iraq

The general elections in Iraq in 2005 witnessed numerous cases of election-related violence (International Crisis Group 2006). During the run-up to the 2010 National Assembly elections, the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) undertook an update of the voter register. During the updating, the IHEC increased its institutional capacity to handle legal complaints. In Kirkuk, in particular, the IHEC established close cooperation with the Global Justice Project–Iraq (GJPI). Through this collaboration, three electoral dispute experts were brought on board to support the IHEC and the Kirkuk Governance Electoral Office (GEO) with the ‘adjudication of complaints concerning voter registration’. Practical work included the categorization of appeals, organizing responses to appellants and the compilation of an electronic archive of voter registration cases. This allowed the IHEC and the GEO to process disputes in a timely manner, ensuring a minimal backlog of undecided cases. Ultimately, this helped the IHEC to publish the final voter register without delays (Global Justice Project Iraq 2009).

Case: South Africa

A voter register that is out of date or inaccurately compiled, or excludes eligible voters, has the potential to jeopardize the credibility and integrity of the entire electoral process. In South Africa voters are required to register to vote in the voting district in which they reside. An objection to the voter register may relate to a voter’s inclusion, exclusion or registration details. A common objection relates to a voter’s being registered in a district in which the objector believes he or she does not reside. Objections must be lodged with the IEC, which is required to investigate the objection and respond within 14 days. The investigation involves verifying the residential address of the voter. The Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC then needs to implement the decision of the Electoral Commission within three days. All eight
general elections in South Africa, since the 1994 liberation elections, have been declared free and fair—underpinned by a credible voter register (Moepya and Murphy 2013).

4.3. Ensure transparency of and sufficient time for registration of political parties, party candidates and independent candidates

Legal requirements guiding the registration of political parties and candidates are usually included in the electoral legal framework. These may relate to geographical or gender representation, authenticating citizens’ support, minimum requirements with respect to founding documents, financial disclosure and so on. Sufficient time, fair requirements, clarity and transparency in the registration procedures, and the existence of electoral justice mechanisms to deal with complaints will ensure that the registration is a ‘level playing field’ in which rules are not designed and applied to favour or disfavour specific actors. Provisions may deny registration for individuals convicted of criminal offences and human rights abuses, or those linked to illegal armed groups. For more information see the debate about vetting candidates in ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (2008). Candidates with a record of stirring up electoral violence may also be disqualified through vetting procedures. However, EMBs must ensure that their mandate to disqualify candidates is not used for political reasons and, if such fears do exist, that they are properly addressed.

**Case: Bangladesh**

The 2007 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh were postponed due to a growing political crisis and violence that started during the pre-election period. To address cases of violence, the new BEC introduced a new election law that required all political parties to register with the BEC. This had not been the case previously. To be allowed to register, all political parties were required to enhance their internal democratic procedures. Specific provisions included establishment of internal election committees, nomination of parliamentary candidates based on the recommendations of committees at grass-roots level, and agreeing to fill at least one-third of all party committee seats with women by 2020. Party constitutions were also required to ban affiliated bodies such as student and labour groups. These groups had been involved in partisan violence in the past. The amendments also introduced new transparency requirements for candidate nominations to ensure that ‘clean’ candidates run for seats. Several parties opposed the reforms, but ultimately all the major parties were registered (Eicher, Alam and Eckstein 2010: 6, 9, 120).

4.4. Ensure timely and transparent accreditation of voter registration observers

Political parties and candidates, domestic civil society groups and international non-governmental and governmental organizations are interested in observing electoral processes, including voter registration. Their engagement in electoral processes may have multiple benefits for the process, among other things a decrease in manipulation and fraud, and increased credibility of elections. To ensure the professionalism of observers, an EMB should work together with observer organizations to organize joint training courses, thus ensuring that observers are well informed about relevant procedures, operational details, and the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in electoral processes. The guiding reference documents that can be used to strengthen the training of observers are: (a) the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations (Global Network of Domestic Monitors 2012) and (b) the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (2005).
Case: Kenya

The former Kenyan EMB, the Election Commission of Kenya (ECK), was primarily responsible for the flaws in the 2007 general elections (Independent Review Commission 2008: 10). These flaws have contributed to triggering large-scale election-related violence. In particular, the Kriegler Commission cited the voter register as being defective to such an extent that it alone ‘impaired the integrity of the election results’ (Independent Review Commission [Kriegler Commission] 2008: 8). To address previous weaknesses, the IEBC set up a new voter registration process, using biometric voter registration equipment. To enhance public confidence in the process, the IEBC invited electoral observation organizations to observe the voter registration processes. Among others, the European Union, the Carter Center and the East African Community (EAC) accredited long-term observers (LTOs) to observe biometric voter registration. Before the deployment of LTOs, accredited organizations conducted meetings with key electoral stakeholders, including the police, CSOs and the donor community. These pre-assessment meetings allowed the EAC to ‘prepare for the deployment of an election observation mission’ which included 30 LTOs and 25 short-term observers (Barasa 2012).

Improved electoral security

During the registration period, a large number of voter registration centres will be established across the country. This will increase the demand for a security presence and protection. The main electoral actors that need protection include electoral officials, election observers, and political party nominees/candidates, as well as vulnerable and marginalized groups. In addition, security arrangements need to be put in place to safeguard electoral facilities, including regular or mobile voter registration centres, and registration materials and equipment while they are being transported or stored. In particular, SSAs may have to deal with ‘no-go zones’ where registration is not taking place because of lack of security (UNDP 2009: 20).

4.5. Establish and maintain close security coordination between different SSAs and with an EMB during the voter registration period through a joint electoral operations centre

Joint electoral operations centres (JEOCs) combine military-police-civilian communications and coordination centres (Fischer 2002: 25). The establishment of a JEOC may serve the purpose of enhanced collaboration between different SSAs that share electoral security mandates and an EMB during elections. These centres have been essential in the planning and implementation of electoral security strategies in post-conflict environments where security responsibilities are shared between national and international security stakeholders. Examples of international peacekeepers initiating the formation of JEOCs include Bosnia, Kosovo and Liberia. This practice may be applicable in a context where international peacekeepers are not present.

Case: Kosovo

After the armed conflict in Kosovo, which saw approximately 12,000 deaths and over 200,000 refuges, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established to govern the province until its future status was determined. Ahead of the 2000 municipal elections, UNMIK and the OSCE had the responsibility for administrating civil and voter registration (OSCE 2000). To address registration challenges, UNMIK and the OSCE set up a Joint Registration Taskforce. With respect to security issues, the Taskforce involved the NATO-led international Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the international policing
component of UNMIK. Additional security was carried out by the Kosovo Police Service which was at the time subordinated to the UNMIK Police (Fischer 2002: 9, 25–28).

4.6. Provide security to citizens and officials that participate in registration processes and safeguard registration materials and facilities

Citizens need adequate security guarantees to engage in voter registration (Creative Associates International 2010: 5–6, 26). Not all voter registration centres may face security risks, and the deployment of SSAs should reflect risk levels. When risks are very high and security agencies lack sufficient resources to provide adequate security to all locations, SSAs may work closely with an EMB to organize mobile voter registration centres. These should allow the registration of citizens in high-risk areas while at the same time safeguarding them properly. However, such a decision may create logistical complexities and increase the exposure of election staff and security sector personnel during relocation. If such a decision is taken, it is crucial that the EMB carries out an information campaign stating clearly the dates and times when the mobile voter registration centre will be visiting particular locations. The integrity and transparency of the process must be maintained. It is also important to balance the presence and visibility of SSAs. Ideally, they should be visible to the extent sufficient to deter violence, but without scaring potential registrants off (Höglund and Jarstad 2010: 4).

**Case: Iraq**

Elections in Iraq are organized in a complex security environment. Security for the voter registration centres (VRCs), governorate electoral offices (GEOS) and sensitive materials (including escorts for convoys transporting materials) was provided by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) throughout the voter registration phase. Ahead of registration, the ISF and field security officers categorized each VRC as a high-, moderate- or low-risk location and deployed protection based on the threat ratings. Protection to the VRCs was provided by the Iraqi police or army or a combination of the two. In terms of coordination, election security was maintained through an Elections High Security Committee composed of the IHEC, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Office of the National Security Advisor, the Multi-National Force, and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq. On the local level, IHEC field security personnel, located in each GEO and working with other SSAs (the Iraqi MoI and MoD liaison officers attached to each GEO), were tasked with planning and implementing security procedures for their GEO and VRCs (IHEC n.d.).

4.7. Ensure that citizens face no security challenges while travelling to and accessing the voter registration facilities

Some citizens, in particular women and other marginalized groups, but also vulnerable groups such as minorities, IDPs and others, may face increased security challenges in reaching voter registration centres. This may entail exposure to psychological intimidation and physical attack. Strategies for protecting these voters may include increased security on the main routes they use to access the voter registration facilities, or the organization of mobile centres that will bring the voter registration process closer to marginalized and vulnerable groups.

**Case: The Philippines**

Past elections in the Philippines have witnessed numerous incidents in which citizens and candidates were the victims of election-related violence perpetrated by armed groups. During voter registration in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 2012, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) were tasked with ensuring the safe conduct of the voter registration process that was carried out by the Commission on Elections (Comelec). In coordination with Comelec, security checkpoints,
manned by soldiers and police officers, were established to enforce a ban on private individuals carrying guns. This measure was deployed to ‘ensure a safe, peaceful conduct of a region-wide voters’ listing process’. The army also monitored 900 election hot spot areas and movements by partisan groups during the voter registration period in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao Del Sur, Suli and Twai-Tawi (Unson 2012).

4.8. Provide a safe environment to those who wish to put up their nomination

Standing as a political party or independent candidate in elections may, in some country and social contexts, entail exposure to potential psychological or physical violence perpetrated by political opponents or dominant or majority groups. This is particularly true where women stand as candidates in societies that are traditionally dominated by males or where religious dogmas are abused to suppress equality. Similar challenges may be faced by ethnic and religious minority group candidates or members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. SSAs should gather intelligence and take concrete measures to identify problems and create a safe environment in which all citizens can safely put up their political nomination and participate in the electoral processes.

Case: The Philippines

In 2012, a group of 57 people heading towards an election office to file a candidacy for the Deputy Mayor of the Philippine town of Buluan were abducted and killed. Ahead of the 2013 elections, Comelec issued a resolution that allows political candidates running for senators’ positions to apply for security personnel or bodyguards. These may be ‘regular members of the national police or the armed forces, or the National Bureau of Investigation, and as augmentation, duly licensed/authorized protective agents of private detective agencies or accredited private security agencies, to provide security, for the duration of the election period’. Candidates for all other local elective positions may, upon application, be authorized to employ, avail themselves of and engage the services of no more than two duly licensed/authorized protective agents of private detective agencies or accredited private security agencies, to act as their security personnel or bodyguards within the duration of the election period. Security personnel are allowed to carry two firearms, one short and one long or two short (Comelec 2012).

Case: Nigeria

Election-related violence is common in Nigeria. To avoid ‘those who lost out in the primaries ganging-up to cause chaos in the state’ (The Nigerian Voice 2011) the Nigerian Police increased security during state and national political party primaries (African Examiner 2011). During the political party primaries ahead of the 2011 general election, a total of 17,000 security officers were deployed into regular, anti-riot and anti-bomb units. The security provided to venues and the delegates was coordinated by the Nigerian Police, the State Security Services and the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (Nigerian Tribune 2011).

Improved infrastructure for peace

Starting the registration phase will increase the need for extended collaboration among various state and non-state actors which, as part of the national peace architecture, work to support peaceful elections. In particular, collaboration with the EMB and SSAs will gain new impetus. Obtaining accreditation to monitor electoral processes may be a first step that CSOs should focus on. They also need to build communication routines that will allow them to share relevant information and analysis with the EMB and explore the potential to work with it in providing support to dispute resolution. This may include the establishment or
promotion of multi-stakeholder collaborative forums where the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence during registration processes can be coordinated.

4.9. Observe voter registration processes and share findings with an EMB

It is well established that observation and monitoring of highly contested processes, such as elections, may have a violence-prevention effects. This is especially true when impartial and reputable stakeholders, domestic or international, do the observation. CSOs should therefore collaborate in ensuring that their observers are accredited to observe voter registration processes. If the observers’ presence is not sufficient to deter violence, they will be able to make a record of incidents that includes details about the perpetrators, victims and circumstances that triggered these incidents. In addition to observing incidents at the voter registration locations, CSOs should engage in the collection of data relating to electoral violence that occurs outside voter registration facilities, and may relate to intimidation, threats and physical violence directed against citizens, political actors, journalists, and so on. It may be particularly useful to disaggregate the data and show to what extent the perpetrators of violence target women registrants, candidates and journalists. The data collected should be shared with relevant stakeholders, including the EMB, law enforcement agencies and other organizations that have a mandate to prevent and mitigate electoral violence or an interest in doing so. In some instances, it may be productive to make these data publicly available through websites or the media.

Case: Nigeria

The Nigerian elections held in 2003 and 2007 were marked by widespread election-related violence. Ahead of the national elections in 2011, Project 2011 Swift Count was initiated. It brought together a consortium of CSOs and religious groups, both Christian and Muslim, to promote peaceful, free and fair elections through independent citizen observation. The objective of the project was to provide all electoral stakeholders, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), with independent, non-partisan, comprehensive and detailed information on the conduct of the electoral process. For the voter registration exercise, approximately 1,000 volunteers were trained, accredited and deployed throughout all of Nigeria’s 36 states as well as the Federal Capital Territory. Among other things, observers were requested to record incidents of individuals attempting to disrupt the registration exercise as well as incidents of intimidation and violence. Furthermore, observers were required to make a note of security personnel present at the registration centre. Observers were requested to send their reports on a daily basis using their mobile phones to the National Information Centre where the data were reconciled. The observation and reporting also covered voting operations and vote counting. Throughout the process, Project Swift Count communicated its findings through public reports and statements which included recommendations with the INEC (Project Swift Count 2011).

4.10. In collaboration with an EMB, build and provide capacity for dispute resolution relating to the voter registration period

The implementation of voter registration on a large scale may be very challenging. For example, determining citizens’ eligibility to register for voting in a post-conflict environment where record books have been destroyed and people have been displaced on a massive scale may involve exceptional operational and political challenges. Furthermore, voter registration may involve complex procedures that are prone to technical glitches and human error. It is important that any crises arising from perceptions that the voter registration processes are being manipulated in order to disenfranchise particular individuals or groups are addressed in timely fashion and effectively. Where electoral justice institutions lack capacity to deal with electoral disputes effectively, or they enjoy little trust among political actors, it may be
beneficial to promote the use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in the management of disputes relating to voter registration. This is not to replace electoral justice institutions, but rather to open up additional channels that can produce outcomes that will be accepted. In some instances, mediation by reputable and knowledgeable individuals will resolve the matter instantly and avoid the sometimes long and complicated processes that will lead to an administrative or judicial ruling. Engagement of non-state actors in the mediation of electoral disputes should always be done with the consent of, and in collaboration with, the EMB and backed by relevant legislation.

4.11. Promote multi-stakeholder collaboration through joint forums that create space for discussion and coordination of violence prevention during voter registration

Improved coordination during the voter registration phase between non-state and state actors which work to support peaceful elections will help them to build an understanding about the efforts and strategies of individual organizations in this regard. This information will be useful in ensuring that different organizations cooperate in such a way that they reinforce each other, and that possible gaps are identified and addressed. If such collaborative forums have not already been established by an EMB or other state actors, or do not include non-state participants, non-state actors may take the initiative to establish and maintain such forums. In that case, they should involve the EMBs and SSAs in discussions.
5. The electoral campaign

Table 5. Prevention and mitigation actions: electoral campaign

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During the election campaign phase, political parties mobilize significant human and financial resources to communicate messages to citizens in order to win their support. The list of potential risks during the campaign period is wide-ranging and may include psychological and physical violence directed against candidates, party activists and supporters, and violence directed against women and other marginalized or vulnerable groups. In particular, the electoral campaign may be marked by aggressive and inflammatory rhetoric. The use of the media and political rallying are two main ways of campaigning. In conflict-prone societies, both methods are often used to convey messages that exacerbate conflicts. During the electoral campaign period, an EMB should introduce mechanisms to constrain hate speech and violent actions by political parties and their supporters. This may include investigating and sanctioning perpetrators. SSAs should maintain a safe environment for political party candidates, activists and citizens to organize and participate in the campaign activities. Other non-state and state actors should promote peaceful and
democratic electoral campaigning as well as monitoring, recording and reporting about incidents.

**Improved electoral management and justice**

Electoral management strategies to prevent election-related violence during the campaigning period will draw on legal provisions that define an EMB’s mandate in this respect. An EMB may have a specific mandate to investigate and sanction those who violate election campaign rules or perpetrate electoral violence during this period. Where an EMB does not have a specific mandate to investigate and sanction perpetrators, it should support the responsible agencies in implementing their mandate. In any case, an EMB will collaborate with other actors to put in place mechanisms that will ensure that incidents are observed and documented, and that perpetrators are held accountable.

5.1. Collaborate with other agencies to ensure comprehensive monitoring of media campaigning at the national and sub-national level

Political actors use media extensively during the campaigning period. They strive to occupy media space through paid advertisements, party press releases, and giving interviews to the media. In addition, political parties increasingly use the Internet and social media to reach citizens and promote their political agenda. From the media side, journalists can be proactive in reporting on campaign events and in facilitating political debates. In conflict-prone societies, in particular where political divisions follow ethnic and religious lines, political campaigning may be negative. Hate speech and intimidation are often directed against political opponents and their supporters. The electoral legislation usually includes provisions that prohibit such behaviour and define sanctions against perpetrators. It is therefore important to ensure systematic monitoring of campaigning through the media, both traditional and social, and the sanctioning of those who resort to unlawful campaigning. Media monitoring may be a complex task that exceeds the capacity of an EMB. Where this is the case, an EMB should coordinate with different agencies to ensure full coverage of the media campaigning, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private businesses that specialize in media monitoring.

**Case: Guyana**

In response to the election-related violence that occurred in Guyana’s 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections—instigated in part by the ‘conduct of irresponsible media which incited extremist elements to ethnically motivated violence’—the Guyana Election Commission established an independent Media Monitoring Unit. The Unit was established following the signing of the self-regulatory Media Code of Conduct by the country’s main media houses. During the campaign phase, 17 people were recruited to the Unit to ‘analyse the political content of broadcast news and current affairs programs and of the main daily newspapers’. After initial support and training by the Commonwealth Secretariat, local professionals were in charge of the process. On a weekly basis, the Unit published ‘assessments of the balance and discouragement of violence achieved by each media house’. In contrast to previous elections, the 2006 general election in Guyana witnessed no violent incidents as a result of irresponsible media reporting (UNDP 2009: 43).

5.2. Establish mechanisms for the monitoring of political party campaign rallies in order to compile data on the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech

Political party rallies involve mass gatherings of the party leadership and supporters. They therefore represent high-risk events. On the one hand, violence can be directed against the participants at rallies. On the other hand, participants can resort to violence against other
groups as a result of a mob mentality and the excitement that is generated during the actual event. An EMB should, independently or in collaboration with other state and non-state actors, establish mechanisms for monitoring political party rallies. This may entail the deployment of campaign monitors to attend political party rallies and report on incidents. Systematic monitoring may discourage inflammatory rhetoric. Audio and video recording of electoral events may further discourage negative campaigning, given that these records may be used as an evidence against the perpetrators.

**Case: Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord, which ended the violent conflict that had raged from 1992 to 1995, ethnicity has played a major role in political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an effort to win voters along ethnic lines, ethnic political parties have been inclined to use nationalistic rhetoric which is directed against other ethnic groups or minorities. Ahead of the 2008 local elections, the Central Election Commission (CEC) warned all political parties and candidates not to incite religious or ethnic hatred during the campaign period. Penalties for hate speech included USD 7,500 fines, the removal of candidates from the party list and the withdrawal of political certification by the CEC (BBC Monitoring 2008).

5.3. Ensure that those responsible for violations of the campaigning rules and the instigation or perpetration of electoral violence are sanctioned

Perpetrators of actions that may trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence, including hate speech and inflammatory rhetoric, should not feel that they have impunity from prosecution. If an EMB is mandated to sanction perpetrators, it needs to invest in efforts to deter unlawful campaigning and, if deterrence fails, to take resolute action to investigate and sanction perpetrators. When applying sanctions against political stakeholders, an EMB or other electoral justice institution must maintain the highest professional standards in order to avoid politicized decisions that can further increase tensions. In this respect, an EMB should work with other agencies, including the prosecutor’s office and relevant regulatory agencies.

**Case: India**

Election-related violence is common and widespread in India (UNDP 2011). This was also the case during the 2009 general elections, which saw incidents of both physical and psychological election-related violence (CBS News 2009). In early 2009, the ECI found one high-profile candidate guilty of violating the code of conduct during the campaign period. The candidate allegedly used inflammatory rhetoric, causing ‘feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes on the ground of religion’ during two separate election rallies (ZeeNews.com 2009). The evidence was brought to the notice of the ECI by the District Election Officer (Shardai 2009). The ECI ordered all video footage of the candidate’s campaign to be submitted as evidence. Based on this evidence, the ECI advised the political party concerned to withdraw its support for the candidate, stating that ‘any sponsorship of his candidature by the party would be perceived as endorsing his unpardonable acts of inciting violence and creating feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes of citizens in India’ (Shardai 2009). The ECI also initiated a criminal case against the candidate under Indian law by cooperating with the District Magistrate. The candidate was later arrested and taken into judicial custody awaiting trial (Times of India 2013).
5.4. Maintain close collaboration and information exchange with the SSAs throughout the campaign period at the national and sub-national level

During the campaign period an EMB will collect wide-ranging information relating to political party campaigning, including tension-raising behaviour and incidents. This information will be useful to SSAs when planning and implementing security measures to protect electoral actors and events during the campaign period and after. It is important that election officials collaborate closely with the security personnel at the national and subnational level to ensure that the information is shared in timely fashion. Election officials will benefit from security updates and specific information provided by the SSAs. This will help officials from both agencies to obtain a more holistic analysis and maximize the effectiveness of their actions.

Case: Kenya

Election-related violence was widespread throughout the 2007 general elections in Kenya (Roberts 2009; Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA) 2008). Although the main outbreak of election-related violence took place after the actual 2007 elections, incidents of violence were also recorded before election day, including during the campaign phase (Agence France-Presse 2007). In the course of the preparations for the 2013 general elections, the IEBC decided to enhance its capacity to understand and analyse electoral risks, and to take action to prevent and mitigate election-related violence throughout the electoral cycle. The IEBC partnered with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in using the Electoral Risk Management Tool. The use of the tool allowed the IEBC to collect electoral risk data and generate electoral risk alerts. These were used by IEBC officials to make informed and conflict-sensitive electoral decisions. Also, risk data and alerts were shared with external agencies, including the police (International IDEA 2013b) and other electoral stakeholders, such as the Uwiano Platform for Peace (International IDEA 2013a).

Improved electoral security

During the electoral campaign phase, SSAs will be responsible for providing and maintaining a safe environment for electoral officials, political party candidates, party activists, journalists, event monitors and citizens. This may include providing protection to individuals, events, and vulnerable groups and their settlements. In particular, SSAs should focus on the security of electoral campaign events that will gather large numbers of participants, such as political party rallies. In this respect, SSAs will benefit from close cooperation with an EMB and other state and non-state actors.

5.5. Maintain close cooperation and coordination with an EMB through a joint election operations centre

Following the process of registration of political parties and candidates, SSAs need to work closely with an EMB to obtain information on registered political subjects and candidates. Furthermore, EMBs will be able to provide information and updates relating to the electoral campaign processes. This information, in particular incidents of hate speech and inflammatory language, will be relevant in the deployment of security personnel during the electoral campaign phase. The establishment of a JEOC that provides a platform for close-to-real-time information exchange between different SSAs and an EMB may improve situation awareness and improve coordination of actions.
Case: The Philippines
Political and election-related violence in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) of the Philippines is prevalent and deep rooted (McIndoe 2010). In late 2009, politicians and political party supporters, including large numbers of women, travelling to Comelec offices were intercepted and abducted or killed by armed gangs (Asia News 2009). As a result, the PNP and AFP, in close cooperation with Comelec, enhanced security arrangements in the run-up to the 2010 elections. Comelec deputized law enforcement agencies to perform security duties relating to the conduct of the elections (Comelec 2010). Regional police offices strengthened ‘their respective Joint Security Coordinating Centers (JSCC) with the AFP field commander to immediately address any untoward incidents during the campaign period’. Throughout Mindanao, the PNP and the AFP ‘mobilized 9711 personnel, many of which were deployed to man the 828 mobile checkpoints established to enforce a total region-wide ban on firearms’. Moreover the PNP was also tasked with preventing private security companies acting as armies for political stakeholders ahead of the elections, as well monitoring the actions of local volunteer security personnel. Round-the-clock close coordination with the officials of Comelec was also implemented (Manila Bulletin Publishing Cooperation 2010a). According to the PNP and AFP, the elections were generally peaceful and orderly, and ‘minor incidents were quickly addressed by the Joint Security Coordinating Centers (JSCC) positioned at various strategic places in the three regions’ (Manila Bulletin Publishing Cooperation 2010b).

5.6. Provide physical security to prominent electoral actors which may face security threats during the campaign period
Depending on the country context and the security risks associated with running for an elective seat, SSAs may need to provide physical protection to political leaders or high-profile political candidates, their offices or households. In societies where women are marginalized, their activism during the campaigning period may expose them to psychological or physical violence. Furthermore, similar security arrangements may need to be put in place for journalists, public opinion leaders and other individuals whose engagement or activism during the electoral campaign increases the likelihood of their being exposed to violence.

Case: Taiwan
Following assassination attempts on high-level Taiwanese politicians during the election periods of 2004 and 2010, security arrangements were stepped up ahead of the 2012 presidential elections. The National Security Bureau (NSB) provided security teams to all presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The NSB special protective task force provided candidates with a protective arrangements following the registration processes. The special task force provided security plans as well as security protocols which, for example, would require the campaign teams to provide lists of their staff and guests at events to the NSB during the campaigning. In total 135 members of the NSB security task force were included in three teams assigned to provide security for each of the three presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Each team was also supported by specially trained police officers and bullet-proof vehicles throughout the campaign period (Chang 2011).

5.7. Provide physical security at electoral campaign events
Political campaign events and activities include political party rallies, town-hall meetings, media appearances, posting of campaign materials and so on. These events will bring political leaders, candidates, activists, supporters, citizens and journalists to public locations that may not have appropriate security arrangements in place. To provide security, SSAs need to have prior information on planned events. The responsibility for providing timely information
about campaign events usually lies with the respective political subjects. In some contexts, the police may have a mandate to authorize or decline requests for the organization of campaign-related events due to security concerns. This may be an effective strategy to avoid conflicts arising from situations where political rallies are scheduled at the same time or the same location by different political subjects. Political party rallies are mass gatherings and participants may be vulnerable to attacks or acts of terrorism. Securing these events may therefore require the deployment of substantive intelligence and security personnel. If participants are travelling from different locations to attend rallies, SSAs should secure the main routes of travel.

**Case: India**

Election-related violence is a common issue in India (CBS News 2009), especially in areas where separatist movements wish to exploit the ‘visibility of the electoral campaigns to conduct paramilitary and criminal strikes against the government and its symbols’ (Fisher 2002). Ahead of India’s 2009 general election the police intensified their security arrangements during campaigning in the ‘Maoist belt’ and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Enhanced security arrangements were necessary as Maoists had increased their attacks in various states ahead of the polling process. The police therefore conducted random searches around the campaigning sites and increased their presence throughout the rallies themselves (Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) 2009b). Other security measures included helicopter transport to take candidates to and from the election rally sites and police roadblocks in the vicinity of election rally sites throughout the campaign period. Moreover, increased security was provided by the Border Security Force along the border with Pakistan (Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) 2009a). Enhanced security measures were put into place since the ‘model code of conduct for the guidance of political parties and candidates’, which was endorsed by all political parties in 2007, stipulates that all political parties or candidates must inform the local police of the venue and time for all political party rallies and routes to be used during a procession ‘well in time in order for the police to make necessary arrangements for controlling traffic and maintaining the peace’ (Election Commission of India 2010).

**5.8. Enhance security arrangements to protect marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women and minorities, during the campaigning phase**

In an effort to galvanize their electoral base during the electoral campaign period, political actors may resort to threats and intimidation and use inflammatory rhetoric directed against other ethnic, religious or social groups. Hate speech and other inflammatory rhetoric may lead to physical violence. Intimidation and coercion are also recognized as a category of election-related violence that deserves sanctioning. When violence occurs, marginalized groups such as women suffer greatly. Minorities and other vulnerable groups can be targeted as well. If the electoral campaign period is marred by inflammatory rhetoric, SSAs should put in place standing capacities for the protection of marginalized and vulnerable communities. This may be particularly important in situations where political party rallies or other mass gatherings may turn hostile to minority communities based near the location of a rally.

**Case: Kenya**

Approximately 20 female political party candidates were assaulted during the run-up to the 2007 general elections in Kenya (Agence France-Presse 2007). Furthermore, women in general were exposed to high levels of violence during the post-election period, lasting in to 2008, which resulted in over 1,300 deaths and approximately 3,000 cases of rape (Roberts 2009). Ahead of the 2013 general elections, security for female candidates was increased by the setting up of a specially trained security unit. The unit, consisting of officers from the National Youth Service, the Kenya Forest Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service, were first
5. The electoral campaign

gazetted by the Inspector General of the Police and then deployed across the country to deal with election-related matters, including providing female candidates with security during the campaigns and guarding women candidates on election day.

5.9. Cooperate with electoral actors and the broader public to increase their security awareness and promote their constructive engagement in preventing and mitigating electoral violence

The efficiency of the SSAs in maintaining safety during the election campaign phase may depend on their ability to forge constructive relationships with electoral actors and the broader public. SSAs should initiate discussions that will increase the security awareness of political stakeholders and the public, in particular vulnerable groups. The benefits can be twofold. On the one hand, such discussions will allow SSAs to communicate how individuals and groups can work with the police to increase public security. On the other hand, SSAs will get a better understanding of security concerns among different electoral actors and social groups. Electoral actors and the broader public will benefit from an enhanced understanding of the security risks and of how their actions and behaviour may exaggerate security threats or contribute to peaceful outcomes of tense situations.

Case: Ghana

In 2012, Ghana experienced election-related violence in certain part of the country during the voter registration phase. Acts of violence included assaults, shootings and the burning of houses (Modern Ghana 2012). As a result, the Ghana Police Service (GPS) cooperated with the National Commission for Civic Education and several other stakeholders in the organization of a public event entitled ‘peacemakers rally’. The event, held at the National Theatre in Accra, was attended by several hundred people. The GPS together with the Ghana Journalists Association made a public declaration of their commitment to peace ahead of the 2012 elections. The GPS address also aimed to broaden the public’s security awareness ahead of the campaign period. On this occasion, a senior police official assured Ghanaians that the police and other security agencies were ready to provide security to ensure peaceful elections. In that regard, the public was informed about security arrangements put in place to protect political party rallies, electoral materials, facilities and voters, as well as to preserve the integrity of the elections. It was also underlined that preserving peace is a shared responsibility and politicians were admonished to promote peace during the electoral campaign and avoid the use of hate speech or insults. Furthermore, politicians were asked to be wary of their utterances since they could spark tension and lead to mayhem (Ghana News Agency (GNA) 2012b). Police announced plans to establish the National Election Security Taskforce and train 16,000 personnel from all the security agencies to provide security during the elections. Ghanaians were encouraged to contribute to peaceful political processes and to avoid comments, statements and insults that would incite others. They were also advised to abstain from violence even in the face of provocation, and to resort to the law instead of taking the law into their hands. Finally, voters were advised not to give their voter IDs to others, not to destroy ballot papers or supply ballot papers to any person, or engage in other malpractices (Modern Ghana 2012b).

Improved infrastructure for peace

Non-state and state actors involved in peace activism can play an important role during the campaigning phase. Provocative campaigning may exacerbate tensions between different social groups and in particular raise anxieties among vulnerable groups. Organizations that constitute a countrywide infrastructure for peace may engage in activism which will constrain
provocative campaigning and deflate interparty or inter-communal tensions during the campaign period.

5.10. Create forums to facilitate discussion and consensus relating to the implementation of the political party campaigning code of conduct and enforcement mechanisms

The code of conduct for political party campaigning may be an influential tool to promote peace during the campaigning phase. These provisions may already be included in the electoral law or a specific code of conduct that regulates the behaviour of political parties and during elections. However, where such provisions do not exist, or are not respected and enforced, these commitments need to be established and enforced. Reputable non-state and state actors may have a convening power to bring political parties together to discuss and agree the principles of peaceful electoral campaigning and the effective enforcement mechanisms.

Case: Ghana

Although Ghana’s Political Party Code of Conduct was first adopted in 2000, lack of an enforcement mechanism resulted in non-compliance and political parties’ misconduct throughout the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections. Ahead of the 2012 national elections, the Institute of Political Party Affairs (IEA) facilitated a series of interparty dialogue meetings with the aim of revising and strengthening the CoC enforcement mechanisms. The revision of the CoC was in part based on experience, such as the use of hate speech and unsavoury language during the voter registration period, and on the realization that preventative action needed to be taken to prevent or mitigate ‘irresponsible political conduct or activity’ (GhanaWeb 2012). The new CoC, adopted by all political parties, has set out the guidelines by which all political parties agree to be responsible in the course of their campaigning. The CoC covered a broad range of issues including abuse of incumbency, defacing of posters, biased media reporting and campaign violence. The IEA, with the approval of the political parties, established a National Enforcement Body (NEB) to monitor political parties’ adherence to the CoC ahead of the general elections. The NEB was composed of members representing the Electoral Commission, the National Commission for Civic Education, the Ghana Journalists Association, the security services and political parties, and chaired by the Ghana National Peace Council. The NEB is also tasked with educating the electorate and political party supporters on the provisions of the code (Institute of Political Party Affairs 2012). The establishment of a national enforcement body and 10 regional enforcement bodies was intended to increase the capacity to monitor campaigns, rallies and other political party activities throughout the country, investigate alleged incidents and impose sanctions on those in breach of the CoC. The NEB was also able to publish its investigation findings in newspapers and on the air waves, thereby naming and shaming party offenders (All Africa 2012). In the case of serious offences, SSAs and other state bodies were alerted for appropriate action to be taken (GhanaWeb 2012).

5.11. Promote peace activism at the national and sub-national levels to deflate tensions and conflicts arising from inflammatory campaigning

CSOs, including women’s and youth groups, religious networks and interest groups, may play an important role in promoting peace during the campaigning period. They can engage in activism and involve political representatives, state officials and traditional leaders in addressing anxieties that emerge from provocative party campaigning. Peace campaigning strategies should clearly define the target audience (e.g. young people) and the communication mechanisms (e.g. the media, roadshows), messages and symbols used (UNDP 2009: 23). Strategies implemented at the community level, such as the use of community-based radio stations, will have the potential to reach all citizens, including
vulnerable groups, and to bridge language barriers (Haider 2009: 5). Peace campaigning should promote tolerant political debates and seek public commitments by politicians in support of peaceful elections (UNDP 2009: 32).

Case: Kenya
Due to the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–08, the Kenyan economy suffered losses estimated at USD 3.7 billion. For that reason, the Kenyan business community, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, launched a peace campaign ahead of the 2013 general elections. The initiative, supported by numerous civil society and faith-based organizations, aims to prevent violence during general elections in 2013. The peace initiative dubbed 'My Kenya' was launched with the beginning of the formal political party campaign period. My Kenya includes the use of media advertisement, road shows and concerts in order to remind Kenyans to reject violence before and after election day. Kenya’s corporate organizations provide most of the funding needed to implement campaign activities, which amounts to over USD 4.6 million (Opiyo 2012).

5.12. Establish mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on provocative political party campaigning in the media and political party rallies
To reach out to citizens, parties mobilize candidates, members and supporters in an effort to occupy spaces through which political messages can be sent to voters. Electoral campaigning is mainly done (a) through the traditional media, including newspapers, radio and television; (b) through new media, including social networks and blogs; and (c) in person, through political party rallies. In conflict-prone societies, campaigning strategies may appeal to fears and emotions, or resort to intimidation. The media can also contribute to provocative campaigning by favouring particular political options and working against their competitors and supporters, which may include intimidation. Even if the use of inflammatory rhetoric is defined as an election offence in the electoral and media codes of conduct, gathering information and evidence relating to provocative campaigning and intimidation may be a challenge. In some cases, political parties will be watchful and report incidents involving their political opponents or media. However, in conflict-prone societies, it may be effective if a reputable non-state or state actor, without a stake in the electoral outcome, monitors and reports such incidents. These actors may include media regulatory agencies and civil society groups that specialize in media reporting or have the capacity to observe local media and political party rallies at national and sub-national level.

Case: Sudan
The 2010 general elections in Sudan were a milestone in implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the 22-years-long conflict there. During the period leading up to the 2010 general elections, the Sudan Media and Elections Consortium (SMEC), made up of six national and international organizations with experience in media support (the Sudan Development Initiative (SUDIA), International Media Support (IMS), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Osservatorio di Pavia, the Arab Working Group for Media Monitoring and the Fojo Media Institute) monitored and reported on equal access to the media and the use of hate speech during the electoral campaign. The SMEC conducted both quantitative and qualitative media monitoring, providing detailed information on the allocation of air time given to political parties, media impartiality and incidents of hate speech by the various newspapers, radio and TV channels or political parties interviewed by the media. The SMEC’s final report, which covers media reporting from the campaign up until the post-electoral phase, also included recommendations on specific provisions for the media and other agencies to improve equality of access and to reduce incidents of hate speech in the future (Sudan Media and Elections Consortium 2010).
5.13. Share reports on violations of campaigning rules, in particular use of inflammatory language and hate speech, with the EMBs, prosecutor’s office, SSAs and media

Collecting evidence on the use of inflammatory rhetoric during an electoral campaign is a complex task. However, it may be of little relevance if those who resort to such rhetoric are not sanctioned. Imposing sanctions on political parties and prosecuting political party candidates during election campaigns may be extremely difficult. If responsible agencies abuse their mandates, or if the prosecution is perceived as action directed against one party or candidate for the benefit of another political actor, it can escalate tensions and lead to deeper conflicts. When reports of unlawful campaigning are collected, they should be forwarded to the relevant body that has the mandate and integrity to investigate and prosecute electoral offences. These may include an EMB, general or special prosecutors and SSAs. In cases where institutions which are mandated to prosecute electoral offences show a lack of commitment to sanctioning perpetrators, this information can be presented to the public and other stakeholders through the media, thus putting pressure on the perpetrators and responsible agencies.

**Case: Kenya**

Following the outbreak of election-related violence in Kenya in 2007–08, the NCIC was formed with the mandate to promote peaceful coexistence among all Kenyans. During the campaign period ahead of the 2013 general elections, the NCIC monitored political rallies, public forums and traditional media in relation to the use of hate speech and incitements. The 2008 National Cohesion and Integration Act gives the NCIC the power to ‘investigate complaints of ethnic or racial discrimination or any issue affecting ethnic and racial relations and make recommendations to relevant authorities, including the Director of Public Prosecution, on remedial measures’. The NCIC has partnered with national telephone providers in order to prevent and mitigate text messages that include hate speech. It has also worked with the Cyber-Crime Unit at the Police Criminal Investigation Department to obtain telephone records of people suspected of sending hate messages from telephone providers. Furthermore, the NCIC monitored use of hate speech on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as commentaries on news websites. This has been achieved through the employment of 40 staff members tasked with the monitoring of social networking sites. The monitoring also included Kenyans in the diaspora (Menya 2011).
6. Voting operations and election day

Activities in the voting operations phase include logistical preparations for election day, the ballot casting process, vote counting and tallying of the result. This is the period when the logistical and security arrangements are put to the crucial test. High-level mobilization of the electoral administration, domestic and international observers, and SSAs, as well as the massive participation of citizens, makes the management and coordination of voting operations processes a very complex undertaking. Given that the period of time in which voting operations are implemented is relatively short, the time available for intervention and for correcting deficiencies in the process is very limited. If problems are widespread, they may seriously threaten the integrity of the election results. No elections are perfectly organized and trouble-free. However, the extent of the problem and reactions to it may differ. It is therefore important that possible risks are identified in advance and that measures are put in place to ensure that elections are peaceful and that the integrity of election results is preserved. In this respect, EMBs, SSAs and other state and non-state actors must work closely together throughout this sensitive period.
Table 6. Prevention and mitigation actions: voting operations and election day

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Improved electoral management and justice

During the voting operations phase, an EMB must undertake all necessary steps to maintain political stakeholders’ trust in the voting processes and their outcomes. In many ways, this may depend on the EMB’s ability to understand how problems or weaknesses related to previous phases may affect voting operations. It is also important to assess the potential for technical problems and electoral fraud to occur. In respect to logistical and technical challenges, an EMB must ensure the timely production and distribution of electoral materials, the presence of well-trained and professional electoral personnel, and transparent and accurate voting, counting and result tallying methods. During this period, an EMB needs to maintain close cooperation with political stakeholders, observers, SSAs and citizens. All electoral actors should have the means to communicate concerns to electoral officials at different levels, so that these can be addressed in a timely way. Also, all electoral actors should have access to effective electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.
6. Voting operations and election day

6.1. Ensure that all electoral materials are produced in sufficient quantities and delivered in timely fashion and safely to the storage facilities and polling and counting centres
The production, storage and distribution of election materials may raise controversies. In particular, if sensitive materials, such as ballot papers, voter registers and tabulation sheets, are unaccounted for, this may raise suspicion of electoral manipulation. The production, transport and storage of electoral materials therefore need to be timely, transparent and well safeguarded. Sensitive electoral materials may have different security features and serial numbers. However, these features should not compromise the secrecy of the voting. Sensitive materials need to be safeguarded at all times, during both transport and storage, and accessible only to authorized personnel. This needs to be coordinated with the SSAs. Observer groups should be able to observe the handling of the sensitive election materials throughout the voting operations phase.

Case: Nigeria
Election-related violence is a recurring issue during election periods throughout Nigeria (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2007). In 2012, the INEC cooperated with the Nigerian Central Bank (NCB) and SSAs in Edo State to ensure that all electoral materials, including anti-fraud customized ballot papers (The Guardian (Nigeria) 2012) were stored and transported safely ahead of the governorship elections. After the production of electoral materials they were stored at the NCB. Two days before polling day, electoral materials were moved by armoured vans with security escorts to Edo State and stored in the branch NCB offices for safe custody. Electoral materials were unloaded by INEC officials and security personnel and observed by accredited party agents and the media. At the time, the INEC offices and officials in Edo State were also provided with increased security by the police, the army and the Civil Defense Corps (Punch 2012). The INEC logistical plans included measures to ensure that voting materials were delivered to the polling stations in a secure manner with the assistance of security personnel. However, due to the limited capacity of the security agencies, INEC’s insistence on delivering materials to polling locations only under the protection of security personnel led to some delay in voting procedures (Ebegbulem 2012). The governor in Edo State had to publicly condemn the late start of the election (Iredia 2012). However, no major incidents of election-related violence were reported on polling day or during the announcement of the results (Murdock 2012).

6.2. Ensure that polling and counting staff are professional, well trained and acquainted with the latest electoral rules, regulations and procedures
During voting operations, a number of temporary staff will be engaged to perform polling and counting duties. Although an EMB may be able to engage staff with prior experience, training for polling and counting personnel needs to be organized. Because the actual voting and counting exercises take place over a very short time, an EMB’s ability to replace polling and counting staff who show lack of understanding of the relevant procedures, or of the integrity or skills to conduct electoral assignments, will be very limited. Following the training of polling station and counting staff, therefore, an EMB should consider testing the trained staff to verify their understanding of the relevant electoral procedures, rules and regulations. This exercise should be conducted in good time to allow for retraining and replacement of the staff.

Case: Indonesia
Indonesia holds the biggest single-day elections in the world. Ahead of the 1999 parliamentary elections, the first democratic elections in 45 years, 2.8 million poll workers were employed by the National Election Commission (KPU) to work at 300,000 polling
stations spread across 17,000 islands. Although election day was mostly peaceful, it was described as ‘seriously flawed administratively’ because the poll worker training programme was ‘inconsistent at best, and/or non-existent throughout the country’ (Kaplan 2000). The fear of election-related violence between political parties emerged after violent conflicts involving political parties’ security personnel in 2003. Ahead of the April 2004 legislative election 4 million polling staff members were employed to serve 150 million voters expected to vote at 585,000 polling stations. With the technical support of the UNDP, IFES and the Australian Election Commission, the KPU trained poll workers. Due to timing and budgetary constraints, as well as the large number of poll workers mobilized, training was divided into two components: (a) a cascade training-of-trainers system, reaching 15 per cent of the poll workers, and (b) publicly aired training videos and radio programmes, quick reference sheets, manuals and booklets designed to train 85 per cent of poll workers. Both the legislative and the presidential elections of 2004 were relatively free of major incidents and irregularities, although some procedural problems with the handling of ballot papers by polling station staff suggested that more training, especially for those managing polling stations, was needed for the future (Asian Network for Free Elections 2004: 165).

6.3. Maintain close collaboration with SSAs in relation to the provision of physical security to voting materials, polling and counting staff, and facilities

To ensure that SSAs can engage in the protection of electoral staff and facilities at the right time and adequately, and prevent violence against actors participating in the voting processes, an EMB should liaise with, and provide relevant data to, SSAs at the earliest opportunity. For this purpose, electoral officials should work closely with security officers at the national and sub-national levels. It may be particularly useful for the chairpersons of polling stations and counting committees to meet with responsible security officers prior to election day in order to inspect the polling/counting locations together and discuss security arrangements. If concerns exist, these should be communicated to the relevant instances in both organizations, so that security arrangements can be strengthened in time.

Case: India

In India historical social divides have often spilled over into the electoral processes through the use of intimidation and violence. To address these challenges, the ECI has developed a Vulnerability Mapping Tool which formalizes collaboration between EMB officials, SSAs and the judiciary in taking action to analyse, deter and mitigate election-related violence. The Election Commission’s Compendium of Instructions (Instruction SI. No 1) provides the framework for mapping out hot-spot areas ahead of an election as well as the inter-agency coordination efforts needed to prevent intimidation of vulnerable voters (Election Commission of India 2013: 1–6). Ahead of election day, presiding officers are also provided with detailed instructions on security arrangements at polling stations in the form of a handbook provided by the ECI. These instructions include information on the responsibility of the Central Police Force, the Local State Police and the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF) in terms of protecting the polling station perimeter and regulating orderly entry into the polling station. The handbook also makes clear that polling should not start unless the CPF are present. It also points out that the CPF are responsible for (a) escorting the presiding officers and the electronic voting machines (EMVs) to the reception centre after the voting is completed and (b) guarding the ‘strong room’ where the EVMs are stored until the day of the count (Election Commission of India 2009).
6.4. Ensure that the designated polling and counting locations provide a safe environment for election officials, observers and voters

When elections are organized in post-conflict or conflict-prone environments, the actual physical location of polling or counting centres may determine the likelihood of election-related violence occurring. It is therefore important to ensure that polling and counting locations provide a safe environment for electoral officials, observers and voters. Some practical considerations are: (a) whether the location is acceptable to all voters; (b) whether it can be associated with historical atrocities and related grievances; (c) whether access roads can be safeguarded; (d) whether it will serve antagonistic groups; (e) whether it is associated with incidents during previous elections; and (f) whether it has sufficient space, lighting and other capacities to facilitate voting and counting and so on. Conflict-sensitive decisions with regard to determining polling and counting locations will consider the potential triggers of conflict in a given geographical and social context.

Case: Mauritius

According to EISA, ‘Issues of political violence and intimidation have been minimal in Mauritius. There was a fair amount of violence in the election of 1976 but as the years have gone by, the electoral commission, the police, the candidates and their agents have ensured that a peaceful electoral environment prevails’ (EISA 2012). Among other measures, the Electoral Commissioner’s Office in Mauritius uses the following criteria when identifying polling stations: accessibility to voters; the size of the voting population; availability and sustainability of public buildings, schools in particular; and security. Other criteria include access for women, elderly people and physically handicapped people. Furthermore, the police are requested to deploy sufficient manpower in order to maintain 'law and order of each voting station’. Counting locations are also identified for each electoral district based on the following criteria: access; close proximity to polling stations in the electoral district; the size of the building, including the number of rooms to accommodate the ballot boxes, the electoral staff and the counting process itself; and security. Security within the counting locations also includes the safeguarding of sealed ballot boxes ahead of election day as well as for the counting process (Kasenally 2009: 293–94).

6.5. Ensure that special voting operations start on time and that the process is transparent

Special voting is organized for voters who are unable to cast their ballots at regular polling stations. These categories may include refugees, IDPs and diaspora voters, as well as voters who are housebound, hospitalized, jailed, or performing military, security or election services on election day, or are temporarily absent from the country for diplomatic or other reasons. Out-of-country voting (OCV) may be particularly important in countries which have experienced displacements of population as a result of armed conflict. Inclusion of these categories of people in the democratic processes will ensure that they are not deprived of their voting rights. However, it is very difficult to ensure that OCV processes are transparent. In many cases, out-of-country voters will vote at special polling stations abroad, such as consular offices, and by post. In such cases, political parties may find that observation of these processes is too difficult. It may therefore be of great importance to organize OCV in cooperation with international organizations that can guarantee the impartiality of the processes, such as the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Memorandums of understanding between the host countries (refugee hosts) and the country of origin are often necessary.
**Case: South Africa**

Elections in South Africa are organized in a highly contested environment with some social tensions and conflicts. Conflict sensitivity is therefore an important aspect of electoral management. In 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled that South Africans living abroad would be entitled to cast their ballot during the 2009 national and provincial elections (Gabriel 2009: 22). In total, the IEC approved 18,855 of the 20,350 notifications for OCV. One week before election day, 9,857 voters cast their vote in 123 South African missions across the globe. The head of each mission was appointed special voting officer and the staff of the mission were tasked with administering voting procedures. Also, 2,457 votes were cast at foreign missions by government officials and their families. The ballot papers were then sent to the IEC national office in Pretoria before election day. The registration details of voters who had cast special votes (using a double envelope system) were checked against the electoral register to ensure that only eligible voters’ ballot papers were considered. This reconciliation process was undertaken in the presence of political party agents and election observers. Thereafter, the ballot paper was placed in the relevant ballot box to be counted, again in the presence of party agents and election observers (IEC 2009: 93).

6.6. Ensure that all electoral stakeholders are familiar with complaint procedures and that electoral dispute resolution bodies process complaints relating to voting and counting processes in good time and effectively

The voting operations period may see many electoral complaints filed by political actors. When the legal deadlines for the announcement of the preliminary and final election results are short, timely processing of electoral complaints may be difficult. Electoral justice mechanisms must therefore have sufficient capacity to process large numbers of complaints in a short period, while at the same time maintaining high professional standards and integrity. To ensure that election complaints (sometimes referred to as election petitions) are filed with the relevant electoral dispute resolution authority, EMBs should work with political actors to make them familiar with the complaint procedures.

**Case: South Africa**

The pre-election phase ahead of the 2009 elections in South Africa saw clashes between political parties in some provinces (EISA Election Observation Mission 2010: 24–25). The country has established an Electoral Court, which has the status of a Supreme Court. Its powers include, among others, the review of any decision of the IEC relating to an electoral matter as well as matters relating to the interpretation of any law or any other matter for which appeal is provided in law. In total, 867 formal complaints were lodged with the IEC, 200 of which came directly from political parties. None of these complaints were eventually referred to the Electoral Court. Using an Issue Tracker Application, the IEC was able to refer complaints to the relevant department for prompt resolution. The outcome was then communicated to the complainant (Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) 2009: 99). Nine formal complaints relating to voting and counting procedures were submitted to the IEC by three political parties before the election results were announced. After reviewing the individual complaints, the IEC notified the political parties that it did not find any major irregularities concerning the voting operations. No appeal process was initiated by the political parties to the Electoral Court (Gabriel 2009: 25). Also, through the Conflict Management Program, which deployed 107 trained mediators throughout the country, complaints were dealt with on election day relating to long queues or delays or insufficient ballot papers (EISA Election Observation Mission 2010: xvi–xvii).
6.7. Establish open communication channels with all electoral stakeholders including political parties, observer organizations and citizens

An EMB will face an increased workload during the voting period. This will include extensive decision-making, coordination of field activities, and resolving urgent logistical, technical or legislative challenges. However, it is important that the EMB remains available for cooperation and exchange with political stakeholders, observer groups and citizens during the voting operations phase. In this respect, an EMB should encourage frequent meetings of political party liaison committees, organize briefings for observers and journalists, and open voter hotlines to improve exchange with citizens. In particular, hotlines will enable it to provide voters with personal information while also learning about perceptions of, and satisfaction with, its own work.

Case: South Africa

Ahead of South Africa’s 2009 national and provincial elections, incidents of election-related violence occurred during political party gatherings in KwaZulu-Natal province (EISA Election Observation Mission 2010: 24–25). The IEC met formally with the National Party Liaison Committees (PLCs), which are a permanent consultative structure, 30 times between April 2008 and April 2009. During this time, the PLCs raised ‘matters of concern’ or made ‘recommendations on electoral processes’ to the IEC. The meetings also served as a forum in which the IEC could ‘inform and consult’ the PLCs on specific activities. In particular, the PLCs (in the national, provincial and local spheres of government) were consulted when the IEC was considering (a) changes to existing legislation; (b) the electoral timetable; (c) boundaries of electoral districts and the locations of polling stations; and (d) the recruitment of presiding officers, among other things. Through the PLCs, political parties were available for consultation with the IEC during the voting operations phase, as they were situated in the Results Operation Centre. Furthermore, the PLCs served as a valuable conflict-resolution mechanism between parties to resolve interparty disputes without going to court (IEC 2009: 9, 25).

Case: India

Incidents of election-related violence are common and widespread in India, especially on election day (UNDP 2011). As a result, the ECI has established a complaints mechanism for citizens. Ahead of election day, the state chief electoral officers are required to set up mechanisms to register complaints by voters. These may include websites and toll-free call centres supervised by election officials. Once the complaint is registered, action will be taken within a defined time frame. The complainants will be informed via SMS, through the website or by the call centre operators about action taken (ECI 2012). Ahead of the 2011 legislative assembly election in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, the State Chief Electoral Officer opened a call centre in each district. In particular, citizens were encouraged to report electoral malpractice such as the distribution of money, liquor or arms to voters (The News Himachal 2013).

6.8. Ensure that ballot casting, counting and result tallying are implemented according to the rules and regulations, accurately and transparently

Many aspects of polling, counting and result tallying can go wrong. Some very common problems include delayed distribution of materials; missing, insufficient or unaccounted-for materials; voters arriving who are not found in the electoral registers; prolonged voting time; disputes and conflicts involving voters and political party and civil society observers, as well as polling station committee staff; procedural confusion; counting mismatches; threats of violence and violent incidents inside or outside the polling stations; the destruction of
sensitive voting materials; and so on. If there are problems with the voting and counting processes, an EMB will only have a narrow window of time to address problems, correct deficiencies or resolve disputes on the spot. Its success may depend on an EMB’s contingency planning, agility, mediation skills and credibility. Detailed records of events from the polling stations, including complaints from observers, will help in resolving voting and counting appeals more effectively.

**Improved electoral security**

During the voting operations phase, SSAs must take all necessary steps to ensure that elections are conducted in a peaceful environment in which all electoral actors feel safe, and where electoral materials and facilities are well protected. In practical terms, SSAs will need to ensure that sensitive electoral materials are safeguarded while in storage facilities, during transport, and during the actual voting and counting. Furthermore, SSAs will need to ensure that all electoral actors feel protected. Safety should not be limited to the immediate surroundings of polling centres, but should include access roads and other public spaces. Due to the large number of polling and counting locations on election day, this may stretch SSAs’ human and material capacities. SSAs will therefore benefit from collaboration with an EMB and other state and non-state actors in terms of understanding where to focus their efforts and resources. While performing election security duties, police officers must maintain the highest professional standards and keep the use of force to a minimum.

6.9. Provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations before, during and after election day

In the period before, during and after elections, SSAs have the mandate and responsibility to provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations. Personal protection arrangements for political party candidates, electoral officials and journalists who face increased security threats should be extended throughout the voting operations phase. Other arrangements may include the provision of security to electoral officials and observers in high-risk areas. Security arrangements for voters should ensure that they feel safe to cast their ballots. Access roads to polling locations need to be safe. In the event of incidents and technical problems on election day, SSAs need to be able to maintain control of the situation and protect electoral officials, offices and vulnerable groups which may be targeted by perpetrators of electoral violence. From the moment the sensitive electoral materials are produced, SSAs need to ensure that these materials are safely stored and protected during the voting and counting.

**Case: Colombia**

In the run-up to the 2011 local elections in Colombia more than three dozen candidates were assassinated. This included 15 mayoral candidates and 26 people running for seats in town and city councils (Fox News Latino 2011; Colombia Reports 2011b). Approximately one month ahead of election day, the police activated security protocols for 72 municipalities identified as high-risk. Candidates residing in these municipalities received exceptional protection by SSAs before and during election day (Colombia Reports 2011a). On election day itself, the military and the police mobilized 300,000 servicemen across the country as part of a government-led security initiative called Operation Democracy which aimed to ‘protect the right to elect and be elected’ (Colombia Reports 2011b). This included the deployment of 165,000 officers at over 85,000 polling stations. Reserves were deployed across the country. ‘As part of these efforts, the Strategic Police Information Center was created to coordinate the police deployment, provide public information, and to ensure the safety of voters. The National Police Information System of Plan Democracy (SIPDE) has also been created to gather information and to provide protection for official websites which
contain sensitive information (Colombia Reports 2011c) In the city of Bogota, the police also invoked a 30-hour gun ban around election day. The high level of security was deemed appropriate in order to protect candidates and civilian voters from organized criminal groups and non-state armed actors such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) which threatened to destabilize the electoral process (International Crisis Group 2011).

Case: Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinean elections are often marred by intimidation of voters and electoral officials by candidates and their supporters through the use of firearms, the hijacking of ballot papers and boxes, the stuffing of ballot boxes, and the destruction of private and public property. For these reasons, over 8,000 police, army and correctional officers and Australian defence personnel were enlisted to provide security for 4,700 polling stations, out of which 1,700 were only accessible by air. Due to complexities related to security and logistical challenges, elections in Papua New Guinea are conducted over a 14-day period. The process is coordinated by an inter-agency coordination body, chaired by the Chief Secretary to the government. The security arrangements put in place ensure that sufficient security capacities are deployed in the region where elections take place. Thus, half of 8,000 security personnel were deployed in the highlands provinces a few days before the election. When the polling was completed, they were transferred to the next province where polling was scheduled (Ivarature 2013).

6.10. Monitor and analyse developments that may impact on the security situation around election day
A deterioration of the security situation during the voting operations phase, especially with the approach of election day, represents a major challenge to SSAs. Security actors need to monitor events and adjust their contingency planning to reflect changing realities. They need to develop a good understanding of the areas where election-day problems, such as technical hiccups or perceptions of rigging, may trigger violent reactions. In addition to establishing a security presence to counter violence, they should share such information with an EMB to ensure that risks are managed through improved electoral management and justice.

Case: Ghana
Numerous incidents of election-related violence took place in northern Ghana ahead of the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections. Violent incidents included attacks on journalists during the voter registration period as well as shootings during political party gatherings (IRIN 2008a). In response to these incidents, members of the SSAs, which included the police, the military, customs and immigration, established a ‘coordinated security strategy under the unified command of the Inspector General of Ghana’s police force’. Security personnel cooperated with ‘other electoral stakeholders to watch for early warning signs of violence and take steps to address potential flash points’ (National Democratic Institute 2009). In total the Ghana Police Service identified 1,399 hot spots that could see unrest during the election. Areas varied from specific villages to entire districts (IRIN 2008c). A National Elections Security Task Force was also established to provide operational capacity for swift action with respect to election-related threats and acts of violence (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) 2008). This was further operationalized through the deployment of regional security task forces responsible for election security (EU-EOM 2009: 19) and a dedicated polling station communications network (African Elections Projects 2012).
6.11. Maintain close cooperation and coordination of responses with the EMBs and other agencies through the JEOC

During the voting operations phase, SSAs need to establish and maintain an operational centre where information from different security agencies, the electoral management body and other relevant organizations can be gathered and analysed and prevention or mitigation actions initiated. Whenever possible, strategies to address increased risks and incidents should include multi-layered approaches to conflict resolution, for example, peace building, negotiations, conflict mediation and so on. Joint electoral operations centres provide a good working platform to operationalize and coordinate conflict prevention and mitigation during elections.

**Case: South Africa**

The 2011 local government elections in South Africa were fiercely contested. Before election day, ‘protests threatened to disrupt elections in at least three of South Africa’s poorest provinces—North West, Limpopo and Northern Cape’ (BBC News 2011a). The National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS), led by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and represented by multiple government departments including the IEC, started preparing security arrangements six months ahead of the 2011 local elections. Approximately two months before election day NATJOINTS activated nine National Joint Operational Centres (NATJOCs) situated in nine South African provinces. NATJOCs were responsible for all coordination related to security actions and reactions in their respective provinces. Election security coordinated by NATJOCs on election day included safeguarding of the inner perimeters of the 20,864 polling stations. In certain areas, the outer perimeter was secured as well. NATJOCs also coordinated SAPS and IEC escorts of election materials to and from the polling stations as well as general crime prevention duties (South African Government Information 2011).

6.12. Ensure that security sector interventions are in line with the rules of engagement, and that the use of force is kept to a minimum

In the event of election-related violence occurring during the voting period, SSAs must intervene to protect electoral actors, facilities and materials, and vulnerable groups. In some cases, violent incidents may be sponsored by political actors who seek political gains. In other instances, tensions and incidents may be the result of people’s anxieties relating to deficient electoral processes, manipulation by political stakeholders, or even responding to unfounded rumours. In any case, it is important that police act in line with the rules of engagement and refrain from the excessive use of force.

**Case: Nigeria**

During the 2012 Edo State gubernatorial elections in Nigeria, the Police Service Commission (PSC), a civilian oversight body, was tasked with monitoring the conduct of police officers during the elections. The monitoring mission was part of the PSC’s overall responsibility of holding the NPF to account for its actions. Before the election, the PSC issued a document entitled Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Election Duty (Cleen Foundation 2011: 43–5) to the NPF. The guidelines highlight 11 key principles such as alertness; approachability; professionalism; maintenance of impartiality; fairness; use of force; awareness of electoral law; and so on. In total 11 officers divided into three teams monitored the election in Edo State. The PSC also opened three telephone hotlines for citizens to lodge complaints. The police also cooperated with the CLEEN Foundation, a Nigerian-based NGO which deployed observers throughout Edo State to observe the conduct of security operatives on election duty (Cleen Foundation 2012). Overall, the PSC...
monitoring mission concluded that the NPF had conducted themselves very well and congratulated the police for their professional conduct. The PSC also praised the NPF for their rapid-response capability which had allowed for increased security in certain areas at short notice (News Diary 2012).

Improved infrastructure for peace

During the voting operations phase, non-state and state actors that share an interest in and a mandate to support the conduct of peaceful elections should focus their efforts on voter information, election observation and the exchange of risk data with other actors, including EMBs and SSAs. Due to the scope and dynamics of voting operations, these actors will need to build internal capacity to engage and coordinate efforts so as to maximize results.

6.13. Implement voter information and education activities relating to voting day operations

CSOs are well positioned to implement programmes tailored to reach out to the general population, but also to remote or isolated communities and marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women. In addition to the general set of skills required to implement training programmes, CSO activists should be acquainted with the electoral rules and regulations, and have specific information on the timing and locations of electoral events and electoral dispute resolution procedures. Voter education should focus on the rights and obligations of all citizens to participate in electoral processes. Specific education efforts should aim to generate interest among and create a safe environment for vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as women, to participate in electoral processes.

Case: Tunisia

Due to the negative experiences with elections under the pre-revolution regime, there was suspicion and fear among the people of Tunisia during the run-up to the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections. To address these concerns, Radio Mosaique FM, one of Tunisia’s foremost radio stations, together with the UNDP, launched a voters’ educational game designed to promote youth participation. The game, called DemocraTweet, was initiated a few weeks ahead of election day. It covered broad election-related topics, from the institutional legal framework to election procedures. Radio Mosaique FM, which attracts a large number of website and Facebook visitors, decided to make particular use of social media. Young people were targeted in particular because they make up a large proportion of the Tunisian population, and because of their pivotal role during the 2010–11 ‘Jasmine Revolution’ (UNDP 2012).

6.14. Compile, share and publicize information relating to electoral risks and violent incidents during the voting operations phase

With the approach of election day, incidents of election-related intimidation and physical violence directed against electoral actors, journalists and citizens may increase. If such violence is directed against citizens in remote areas or against marginalized groups, such as women, incidents may never be reported to the authorities, and even if they are reported SSAs may, for political reasons, fail to prosecute perpetrators. Non-state actors may be well positioned to engage, through their networks, in systematic collection of data on incidents, perpetrators and victims. Such data should be shared with the SSAs for investigation and prosecution. Where SSAs fail to respond, these data can be publicized in the media to pressure responsible actors to take action.
Case: Sri Lanka
The Sri Lankan elections in 1999 and 2005 saw cases of election-related violence. Ahead of the presidential election in 2010, violent attacks against candidates, campaigners and political activists were reported. The Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV) was formed in 1997 by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), the Free Media Movement (FMM) and the Coalition Against Political Violence as an independent and non-partisan organization to monitor the incidence of election-related violence. CMEV deployed several hundred electoral observers in 2010 across the country. One of their main tasks was to record incidents of electoral violence. The organization started monitoring activities long before the elections, kept them up during voting operations, and continued thereafter. On election day alone, the CMEV deployed 3,790 monitors throughout the county, who worked in mobile teams or stationed at polling stations (CMEV 2010). On election day, it recorded 178 incidents, of which 94 were categorized as major and included intimidation and the use of firearms. The CMEV used a range of means to analyse and present information, including Google maps for mapping incidents of violence (International IDEA 2015). This information was presented to the public and used to pressure the responsible agencies to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of election-related violence.

6.15. Observe the voting and counting processes
Election observation efforts, involving political parties, civil society groups and international actors, are always focused on voting and counting operations. Through observation, interested actors can witness the integrity of electoral processes and record incidents that, in their view, represent irregularities. The capacity of electoral observation missions to discourage manipulation of voting and counting is well established. Well-documented cases which identify the perpetrators of electoral violence and fraud will make it possible to prosecute and sanction offenders. The presence of independent observers will also discourage political party observers from intimidating voters.

Case: Ghana
Several incidents of election-related violence were recorded in Ghana during the 2008 election and during the run-up to the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections (Modern Ghana 2012d). The Coalition for Domestic Electoral Observation (CODEO), the largest independent and non-partisan domestic observation coalition in Ghana, observed the 2012 general election. CODEO trained and deployed approximately 4,500 non-partisan observers, 3,000 of whom observed the voting, counting and collation process, while 1,500 observed the parallel vote tabulation. Information collected by the observers during polling day was collected and analysed by the CODEO secretariat ahead of public dissemination. CODEO published two reports during election day, a midday report and a close-of-the-polls report. The observers, constituency supervisors and regional coordinators were also tasked with reporting critical incidents directly to a dedicated CODEO hotline. These incidents, which included violence, harassment and intimidation, voting procedure violations, suspension of voting, and the presence of unauthorized persons in polling stations, were then verified by a Critical Incident Team. In total 79 critical incident reports were received during voting operations, of which 13 cases related to harassment and intimidation (CODEO 2012).

Case: Nigeria
The Nigerian Police Force has on occasion been regarded as biased and non-responsive towards imminent threats (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2007: 5, 6, 18). During the 2012 Edo State gubernatorial elections, the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN Foundation) recruited, trained and deployed observers in all local government areas
to observe the conduct of security officials on election duty. CLEEN also published a shortened version of the police’s Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Electoral Duty in state and national newspapers. The notice also included numbers of CLEEN-established call centres, where citizens could issue complaints and report incidents with respect to the conduct of security officials during election day. Shortly after the election, the centre issued a public statement which included specific observations and recommendations on election security for future elections (CLEEN Foundation 2012).

6.16. Initiate or sustain peace initiatives and dispute resolution networks during the voting operations phase

Non-state and state actors that promote peace and engage in mediation and conflict resolution around elections will usually build their capacities and commence peace initiatives during the earlier phases of the electoral cycle. These efforts need to be intensified, or otherwise established, and tailored to address risks and tensions surrounding the polling and counting processes. Specific peace campaigning activities can include the promotion of dialogue forums with the aim of bringing together political leaders and getting them to pledge non-violent resolution of electoral disputes. Furthermore, peace councils can be activated to mediate the resolution of electoral disputes relating to tensions and incidents before and after election day. In cooperation with EMBs and SSAs, CSO representatives and other state and non-state actors can be trained to engage in peaceful conflict resolution and dispute mediation around election day, thus complementing EMB and SSA efforts.

Case: Kenya

The Uwiano Platform for Peace was launched several months ahead of Kenya’s 2010 constitutional referendum. The referendum was the first voting exercise since the 2007 general election, when post-election violence caused the deaths of more than 1,500 people and the displacement of more than 300,000 (Roberts, 2009). The strategic aim of Uwiano was to promote peace building, conflict management, and national cohesion and integration processes by developing a platform in which state and non-state organizations could work together at the national and sub-national levels. This was done through the identification of hot spots and the taking of timely action before, during and after election day. On the grassroots level, DPCs, peace monitors and CSOs were tasked with communicating with the Joint Secretariat in Nairobi on issues of peace and conflict on a regular basis. This included SMS messages and early warning reports throughout the election period. Furthermore, DPCs were tasked with building partnerships with businesses and professionals at the local level as well as identifying rapid response teams and mediators to engage in confidence-building measures. In order to deploy for ‘local level negotiation and mediation processes, dialogue, communal cohesion activities, activities that counter propaganda and hate speech’ the DPCs were expected to request funds from the ERF administrated by the Joint Secretariat. In general, between 600 and 1,200 USD was disbursed per request within 48 hours, and the ‘ERF received over fifty applications for community visit projects, public meetings, community dialogues, mediation and reconciliation’ (Uwiano Joint Secretariat 2012).
7. Verification of results

The official election results are announced by the leadership of an EMB. To safeguard electoral integrity, the results must be managed professionally and transparently. Also, at the time when the election results are announced, there should be no cases that could influence the election outcome still pending judicial resolution. In practice, unofficial announcements often precede the official announcement. In addition to an EMB, political parties and other observer groups may publish their preliminary results and estimates. Such reporting can differ in accuracy and in some cases be based on unverified facts, even rumours. Contradictory and sensationalistic statements may deepen mistrust and feed the perception that elections are rigged. If the margin of victory is narrow, complaints are not resolved professionally, and the winner takes all power, losing parties may resort to violence to prevent the results being implemented or secure a power-sharing agreement. To prevent election-related violence, an EMB must ensure that the management of election results is transparent and that complaints are resolved effectively and professionally before the final results are announced. SSAs must ensure that they act on signs of impending electoral violence and protect vulnerable individuals, groups and facilities. Other state and non-state actors can work at the grass-roots level and with the key political actors to promote peace between different groups and peaceful implementation of the election results, especially if it involves the transition of power.
7. Verification of results

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### Improved electoral management and justice

Following voting day and the completion of the count, an EMB will face pressures from politicians, the media and the public to announce the final election results as soon as possible. Before doing so, it must ensure that the results are accurate. This may include obtaining original log forms and consolidated reports from each polling station/region. Electoral complaints that could influence the election outcome must also be resolved. Due to the large number of polling stations and the geographical distance between central office and remote regions, shipping the necessary documentation to the central EMB office may take time. Also, the timelines for resolving electoral disputes may be prolonged due to specific legal remedies. If the time between voting day and the announcement of the results is longer than expected, or the announcement is delayed, an EMB must be able to demonstrate that results and complaints are being managed professionally and in a way which leaves no room for malpractice or malversation. Transparency and openness to collaboration with other stakeholders, such as political parties and CSOs, will help an EMB to promote its integrity and credibility of election results.

**7.1. Manage the election results in a professional and transparent way to ensure that the credibility of the results is protected**

An EMB must have a safe and secure means for the transmission of election results. These may include electronic transmission and shipment of a hard copy. An electronic transmission system should be established and tested in advance, including alternative methods of data transmission. In addition to conveying the election results to the central EMB, locally generated results should be made available to all electoral monitors, including political party and other domestic and international observers. It is good practice to ask observers to co-sign result the forms and to issue them a copy of the forms. Sensitive electoral materials, primarily ballot papers, must be kept safely to ensure that they can be inspected and recounted when necessary.
Case: The Philippines

Election-related violence in the Philippines, especially in the ARMM, is a common and deeply rooted issue. During the 2007 national and local elections, due to manual procedures, it took days and weeks for local-level results to be announced and months for the national results to be announced. In 2010, Comelec decided that the national and local elections would be automated through the use of precinct count optical scanners. By the close of voting, all ballot papers were scanned. The optical scanners tabulated the results and transmitted them electronically to the higher canvassing bodies. Hard copies of the results were also delivered to those concerned. As a result, local-level results were compiled within just a few hours and within 72 hours the national results were almost final. In Sulu province, there were fewer incidents of election-related violence during the 2010 elections than in earlier elections ‘as a result of the significantly decreased human involvement in the counting of votes and canvassing of election results, and the unprecedented speed with which the results were arrived at’ (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2011: 4).

Case: Bolivia

In 2005, Bolivia experienced violent protests in which the formation of an assembly to draft a new constitution which would grant more autonomy to the Bolivian provinces was demanded (BBC News 2005). The election of a constituent assembly and a referendum on regional autonomy took place in 2006. Although they were organized in tense environment, the Election Commission of Bolivia delivered an election that the EU Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) regarded as credible and genuine (EU-EOM 2006: 2, 5). The transmission of results was also handled to the satisfaction of the EU-EOM. For example, its final report observed that ‘provisions of copies of the results forms from the polling stations to the party agents helped the political organizations to monitor the process’. Furthermore, the EU-EOM report explains that ‘electoral authorities placed scanned copies of the result forms from all polling stations on the internet, which further increased the credibility of the counting process’. In terms of the result announcement the EU-EOM mentions the following: ‘The low number of official complaints, together with the general efficiency of the electoral authorities, made possible an exceptionally fast processing of the results. While the legally established deadline for finalizing the counting of the votes was July 27, the CNE was able to give the official proclamation of the results already on July 12, more rapidly than ever before in the electoral history of Bolivia’ (EU-EOM 2006: 29–30).

7.2. Ensure that complaints, in particular those with the potential to affect the overall election results, are resolved before the final results are announced

During the polling and counting processes, electoral actors may submit a large number of complaints. The bulk of complaints may relate to occurrences at the polling and counting locations and include systemic problems, for example, inaccuracies in the electoral registers or a lack of sufficient sensitive and non-sensitive electoral materials; the performance or actions of polling and counting officials, observers and voters (e.g. the management of polling and counting processes and compliance with relevant procedures); and serious breaches of the electoral rules and regulations that can impact electoral outcomes, such as ballot stuffing and falsification of the election results. In addition, electoral complaints may relate to incidents outside the polling and counting locations, such as violation of a ‘no-campaigning period’, vote buying, intimidation of electorates and other electoral stakeholders, and so on. An EMB must work closely with the security, prosecution and judiciary agencies to ensure that all complaints are processed in an effective and timely way. In particular, an EMB must ensure that the complaint log forms from the polling and counting locations are examined by the relevant instances. If malpractice is suspected, an investigation should be initiated and the
perpetrators sanctioned. Where evidence or indications exist that electoral manipulation has affected the election results, a recount or a repeat of the polling can be imposed to ensure that the credibility of the election results is preserved.

Case: Mexico
In Mexico in 2006, street protests broke out for several months after one presidential candidate, who had lost by a narrow margin, rejected the election results (Grayson 2012: 2). During the 2012 general elections, the margin between the winning and the next candidate was 6 per cent, and one losing presidential candidate rejected the preliminary results published by the IFE. Moreover, a full recount was demanded. Allegations included vote buying, through giving away supermarket food coupons; manipulating opinion polls; and paying broadcasters to favour one candidate. The fraud allegations triggered peaceful demonstrations in Mexico City (The Guardian 2012). Soon after polling day, the IFE decided to recount the votes at more than half of the country’s 143,000 polling stations. The TEPFJ, after considering all legal challenges to the results, dismissed appeals calling for an annulment of the vote, finding insufficient evidence of vote buying (Seelke 2012: 2, 9). The official election results were declared by the TEPFJ and the IFE approximately two months after polling day. Although the IFE had found some irregularities during the recount, these were not significant to change the results. The IFE regarded the recount as an ‘exercise in openness and transparency’ (BBC World 2012).

7.3. Collaborate with election observation groups, including domestic and international election observation missions, and the media in respect to the publication of unofficial and official preliminary and final results
Well-organized electoral observers, including political party and domestic observers, will be able to cover most, rarely all, polling and counting locations. Transparent voting and counting processes will allow observers to get results from different counting locations and compile the overall results in parallel with the election administrators. In some situations, observers may publish unofficial results even before an EMB is in a position to do so. However, these results may be prone to mistakes and misleading, sometimes intentionally. For example, if these results are compiled wrongly or presented only partially, or if they ignore electoral complaints, they may be misleading. On the other hand, when observers manage the results accurately and impartially, they may be an important reference point for an EMB. An EMB should therefore collaborate closely with election observation groups and the media to ensure that results can be cross-checked and that disputed results are verified before being presented to the public. An EMB should discourage publication of incomplete or disputed results that may raise unrealistic expectations and tensions and lead to conflicts and violence. If such results are announced, an EMB should react to make the public aware and inform it about the status of the official results.

Case: Uganda
During the run-up to the 2011 general elections in Uganda, which witnessed some election-related violence (BBC News 2011b), one presidential candidate issued a statement that he and his campaign team would announce the results immediately after polling day in order ‘forestall rigging’ (Nabulala 2012). In 2006, the same candidate had rejected the election results, calling for a recount after losing to an incumbent candidate (BBC News 2006). However, the announcement of the results in 2011 was regulated by the Ugandan Electoral Commission, which released a set of rules for media coverage. The code of conduct was developed by the Commission with the help of the Independent Media Council of Uganda and the UN High Commission on Human Rights. It emphasizes the importance of free and fair media coverage, and points out that only the Electoral Commission has the right to
announce the final results. This specific provision aimed to prevent misunderstandings and faulty reporting. Accordingly, the media are allowed to cover different polling stations and present the result from the specific station, but are not allowed to announce the final results (Natabaalo 2012). Prior to the launching of the Code of Conduct, the African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME) published guidelines for media coverage through a participatory process to which the Ugandan Election Commission was a party (ACME 2016).

7.4. Communicate preliminary results and announce the final election results in a clear way

Following the voting and counting processes, political actors, journalists and the broader public will expect an announcement of election results in a short period of time. However, publication of the preliminary and final results is a sensitive process that, especially in conflict-prone societies, can generate disputes and conflict. When providing preliminary results for general elections, an EMB must ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, these draw on a proper sample. For example, it should reflect the ratio between rural and urban communities as well as the geographical, social and other diversities that determine political alignments. The broader public, journalists and political analysts should be able to understand these details. Use of the geo-spatial tools for data presentation may be helpful. Preliminary results should be published periodically and an EMB should avail itself of press conferences to provide comments and explanations. If any serious complaints, which could impact on the final results, are being considered, an EMB should keep the public informed about this fact. When an EMB publishes the final results, these should be presented in a clear and concise way. If the final results include seat allocation, the background information on candidates’ electoral unit, the number of votes and the method for converting number of votes into number of seats should be available and explained.

Case: South Africa

Elections in South Africa are organized in an environment characterized by some social tensions and conflicts. Conflict sensitivity is an important aspect of electoral management. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections, certain areas of KwaZulu-Natal province experienced some election-related violence during the pre-election phase (EISA 2010: 24–25). During the phase of election results announcement, the IEC organized a display of the result information on leader boards at the IEC national and provincial results centres, as well as on the IEC’s website. In this respect, nine Result Operation Centers (ROCs) were established throughout the country. The national ROC in Pretoria was established to allow the IEC and other interested stakeholders, including the media and political parties, to monitor the various processes leading up to election day and the results announcements (IEC 2009: 64–65). Furthermore, on a regular basis, the ROCs used GIS mapping technology to display the results in a visually simplified manner which rendered the results information discernible. The IEC also published several of the maps through international and national broadcasting networks announcements (IEC 2009: 61). The IEC is legally bound to declare the results within one week of an election. The 2009 results were published after three days and included information on the allocation of seats to the political parties contesting the election. Within seven days after election day, the IEC designated seats to the respective party candidates, and published the names of the designated representatives in the announcements (IEC 2009: 99). All objections relating to election results were dealt by the IEC before the final results were announced. According to the Electoral Act, the IEC informs objectors, and any other party involved, about its decisions relating to objections. Objectors can appeal to the Electoral Court, but this does not delay announcement of the final election results. In 2009, the IEC received 25 objections, most of which were rejected as not being objections contemplated in terms of the Electoral Act.
Improved electoral security

The announcement of the final election results will reveal the electoral ‘winners and losers’. In some situations, political competitors will have a good sense of who is expected to win elections even before the final results are announced. In other cases, the margin of victory may be narrow and it may be hard to predict the winner before all ballot papers are processed and electoral disputes are resolved. Due to the high political stakes and anxieties, the period around the announcement of the election results may be prone to conflicts and incidents. If rigging of the result is suspected—regardless of whether these suspicions are grounded or not—losing parties, their supporters and the broader citizenry can initiate demonstrations. It should be kept in mind that candidates who have personal motives to obstruct verification and implementation of the election results may manipulate citizens. Some incentives to instigate violence may include a determination to remain in elected office, secure a power sharing deal, force a repeat of the elections, undermine electoral processes and institutions, and so on. During the period of the announcement of the election results, SSAs must focus on detecting signs of impending violence in order to prevent and mitigate violent incidents before they escalate into a large-scale violence. In particular, SSAs should focus on the protection of electoral actors, vulnerable groups and electoral facilities. In doing so, they must maintain impartiality and refrain from the excessive use of force. Close collaboration with other actors and civil society groups will increase the chances of such situations being peacefully resolved.

7.5. Monitor indicators of impending violence relating to announcement of election results
During the period of election result verification, SSAs should collect information that may give an early indication of impending violence. Such information may include early and ungrounded announcements of electoral victory; threats made by prominent political stakeholders against political opponents and their supporters, electoral actors and vulnerable groups; rejection of the results prior to or after the announcement; claims that the elections have been rigged; verbal conflicts between political stakeholders; cases of intimidation; and so on. The risks identified may be many, but good intelligence will assist in planning scenarios for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence and in ensuring that SSAs deploy rationally.

Case: Egypt
The 2012 Egyptian presidential election was the first election after the 2011 revolution. There was a run-off between two candidates, both of whom had declared victory before the results were officially announced by the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC). As a result, violent protests from candidates’ supporters were feared. To respond to increased risks, Egyptian security forces deployed 3,000 police and military officers to safeguard key political and economic sites throughout the country before the election results were officially announced by the SPEC. Enhanced security was provided to all public institutions and the Suez Canal (Ahramonline 2012).

7.6. Ensure that vulnerable individuals and groups, such as women and minorities, are protected
Experience from different contexts when the announcement of election results has triggered outbreaks of violence shows that election-related violence is often directed against marginalized and vulnerable groups. Women and girls, men and boys are sexually abused; ethnic and religious minorities are maltreated, killed and expelled from their homes and their property and places of worship are destroyed. In case of such concerns, SSAs should
demonstrate determination to protect vulnerable groups. Practical actions may include public statements in this regard, swift investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of incidents, and the deployment of standing security capacities to guard vulnerable communities.

7.7. Ensure that security sector interventions are not used to suppress political liberties and the free expression of opinion

In conflict-prone societies, security sector personnel will often receive additional training to ensure that they deploy sensibly when protecting electoral processes. However, in many cases, incumbent officials and elites have used SSAs to suppress opposition and stop citizens protesting against perceived electoral manipulation. Very often, police interventions against citizens have resulted in excessive use of force. If disturbances do happen relating to the election results, the SSAs must remain professional and politically impartial and act in accordance with the professional code of conduct. The force should not be used to suppress political liberties and the free expression of opinion. When this is a concern, senior officials must take measures to reinforce understanding of these principles within all agencies. On the other hand, security agencies must demonstrate resoluteness in prosecuting those who provoke violent conflict and instigate violent incidents.

7.8. Cooperate with other actors to ensure a multi-layered approach in addressing risks related to the announcement of election results

The deployment of SSAs in resolving electoral disputes may help in separating hostile communities and providing physical security to vulnerable groups and facilities. However, this will not address the root causes of conflict, nor will it help bridge different positions. The engagement of SSAs will prevent violence escalating and create space for peace-building efforts. SSAs therefore need to maintain close collaboration with other state and non-state actors and reputable individuals and groups that can help in mediating conflicts and reaching peaceful settlements.

**Improved infrastructure for peace**

It is well established that the announcement of election results, particularly in conflict-prone societies where the election winner takes all power, or where electoral processes lack credibility, may increase tensions and trigger violent outbreaks. Different actors may have different incentives to resort to violent means in order to derail the implementation of election results. If citizens’ groups and losing political parties fear that the election results have been rigged, they may initiate protests. These protests may turn violent, or attract violence responses from the SSAs. Incumbent candidates who lose an election may rig the election results and clamp down on their political opponents using the state security agencies. The opposition parties may resort to violent tactics in an attempt to secure favourable power-sharing deals. There are many possible scenarios that may lead to outbreaks of violence during the electoral phase in which election results are announced. Non-state and state actors which form infrastructures for peace may be important, and are sometimes the only force that has the legitimacy and capacity to engage with different actors and promote non-violent resolution of disputes surrounding election results.

7.9. Build scenarios for engagement in addressing tensions relating to the election results

Non-state and state actors that promote peace and the peaceful resolution of electoral disputes may be well positioned to engage in deflating tensions and mediating conflicts arising from disputed election results. Those familiar with electoral processes and the dynamics of structural conflicts in a given country will be able to make reasonably accurate predictions about the reactions of political actors and citizens with respect to different
electoral outcomes. Methodological consistency in the assessment and analysis of multiple risks will ensure that predictions are even more accurate. This analysis will help create different scenarios for action. The aim is to ensure that relevant non-state and state actors are prepared to engage in reducing tensions. Coordination will ensure that the engagement is timely and comprehensive and that it reaches all communities. Efforts should focus on protecting marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women. Scenarios need to be periodically revised and modified to reflect the most recent developments.

**Case: Iraq**

During the run-up to the 2005 Iraqi National Assembly elections, incidents of election-related violence were recorded throughout the country. These included assassinations of political party candidates and campaign workers (US Department of State 2005). This was the first election since the 2003 occupation by the US-led Multi-National Force. In the context of preparations for the 2005 elections, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) organized three scenario planning workshops, two in 2004 and one in early 2005. Workshops, each involving approximately 20 Iraq experts, were designed to explore alternative election outcomes using multiple-scenario analysis. This included scenarios relating to the actions of various groups and leaders based on the performance of an EMB; the final voter turnout; or the election results. The participants identified risks in respect to so-called ‘undesirable’ election outcomes, which might increase the likelihood of election-related violence, and perceptions that the elections were unfair. A working group was also tasked with recommending strategies and actions ‘to ward off’ certain outcomes or ‘at least ameliorate their effects’ (Schwartz 2005: 6). The experts concluded that ‘win–lose’ scenarios were less important than the Iraqi people’s perception of the transparency, legitimacy and fairness of the electoral process.

7.10. Uphold peace forums that involve diverse stakeholders at national and sub-national level throughout the period of the announcement of the election results

The period surrounding the announcement of election results may see polarization and increased mistrust between the main stakeholders, including political actors, an EMB, SSAs, communities and so on. If the margin of victory is expected to be narrow and tensions are on the rise, CSOs and other non-state and state actors should engage in the promotion of peace and trust building. Among other things, they can organize discussion forums where all relevant stakeholders can express and discuss their concerns and seek commonly accepted solutions. In addition, these forums may serve as a joint platform for inviting supporters of all political parties and the broader public to abstain from violence, regardless of the electoral outcomes. Peace forums should be established at the national and sub-national levels.

**Case: Kenya**

The election-related violence that broke out in Kenya in 2007–08 was triggered by the announcement of the presidential election results and aggravated when the president was sworn in later on the same day (Wachira 2010: iv). During a two-month period, 1,500 Kenyans lost their lives, 3,000 women were raped, businesses were ransacked and set on fire, and over 300,000 people were internally displaced (Roberts 2009). During this time, a group of five influential Kenyans, calling themselves Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), started to plead for dialogue and negotiations among the political leadership. Through this initiative, working committees were formed attracting a wide range of skilled and influential volunteers to reflect, analyse, strategize and act to mitigate violence. This included the launch of the Citizens’ Agenda for Peace which influenced the formal mediation efforts, led by Kofi Annan, that helped in reaching a power-sharing agreement between the opposing sides. The CCP also facilitated the international mediation process by initiating the visit of Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, briefing eminent persons, and interacting with the Kofi Annan mediation through a CCP High Level Dialogue Committee and Technical Committee. The CCP also worked with the Internal Security Ministry to set up peacekeeping in the city of Nairobi at a time when riots threatened to engulf the city. This also led to the creation of the Nairobi Peace Forum and the establishment of District Peace Committees (Wachira 2010: iv–xi).

7.11. Coordinate peace-building efforts with SSAs

Various non-state and state organizations have mandates, knowledge and skills to promote peaceful conflict resolution through conflict mediation, reconciliation projects, facilitation of negotiations and so on. During the period in which election results are announced, inter-communal tensions can be on the rise. Organizations within the existing peace infrastructure at the grass-roots level may therefore be well positioned to engage in the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence. In particular, these non-state and state actors should collaborate closely with SSAs to ensure that their efforts are coordinated. As SSAs focus on efforts to separate hostile communities, provide security to vulnerable groups, and apprehend and prosecute those who perpetrate violence, peace-building organizations can focus on deflating tensions and addressing the root causes of conflicts.

Case: Kenya

Due to the high level of violence directed against women during the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–08 (Roberts 2009; Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique 2008) the women’s movement of Kenya, with the support of UN Women and the UNDP, set up a Women’s Situation Room (WSR) ahead of the 2013 general elections. The WSR was mandated to monitor, verify, analyse and respond to incidents of election-related violence. The WSR deployed 500 field observers. In addition, a team of telephone operators was established to receive incident reports from Kenyan citizens via a toll-free number. In total, the WSR received over 500 incident reports, many of which included the post-election period. Once verified, the information was passed on to a group of local and international ‘eminent women’ who sought intervention from the decision makers within the police, the IEBC or political parties. Through its early warning and early response mechanism, the women’s situation room managed to resolve all cases it received before they escalated to bigger problems (UN Kenya 2013).

Case: Ghana

To promote responsible reporting before, during and after the 2012 general elections, the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA) developed a Code of Ethics handbook to be used by journalists. The GIBA also provided 400 copies of the handbook to the Ghana Police Service in order to help the police to understand ‘the ethical guidelines of private media practitioners with regards to maintaining peace’. The aim was also to reinforce the partnership between the GIBA and the Ghana Police Service. The police committed themselves to disseminate the handbook among all commanders and various departments to serve as a ‘guide in the discharge of their duties during the elections’ (Ghana Business News 2012).
8. The post-election phase

The electoral cycle approach underlines the cyclical nature of electoral processes. It reiterates that elections are not isolated events, but interlinked processes. Therefore, following the announcement of election results, electoral stakeholders should initiate evaluations of the past electoral cycle in order to identify areas that need improvement. This is also true for SSAs and organizations that form national infrastructures for peace.

The length of the post-election period may differ from country to country. In most cases, if national and local elections are organized together, elections usually take place every four to five years; if they are held separately, a country may have elections every two years. In any case, it is useful to engage in the post-electoral evaluation shortly after the final election results have been announced. Such an evaluation will benefit from stakeholders’ feedback, while memories are fresh, and provide sufficient time to address process weaknesses and structural causes of election-related tensions and violence before the next election. In addition, it will provide important reference points to inform the discussion in the first phase of the next electoral cycle, when the legal and institutional framework is revised.

Table 8. Prevention and mitigation actions: The post-election phase

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**Improved electoral management and justice**

Electoral processes are complex and dynamic. Even the most successful elections will face challenges and experience problems. Following the announcement of the election results, an EMB should initiate an evaluation of the processes. The evaluation should focus on internal processes and achievements relating to the implementation of the overall institutional mandate, and include details, such as the performance of individual departments, subnational offices and short-term personnel, communication challenges, finances and so on. Evaluation should identify both successes and unfulfilled objectives. This will help the promotion of good practices and identifying areas where legal and institutional reforms and human capacity building are needed. Furthermore, an EMB should assess how it managed its relationship with external stakeholders, such as SSAs, political parties, civil society and international observer groups, media and the citizens, in order to identify needs and spaces for improvement.

8.1. Evaluate the legal framework and identify areas that need to be reformed

The electoral legal framework may require periodic updating and improvement to ensure that it provides solid ground rules for the conduct of credible elections. The post-electoral period is a proper time for an EMB to reflect on this. On the one hand, memories are fresh. On the other, an EMB does not face immediate operational deadlines, so it has sufficient time to analyse and understand the practical effects of different laws, rules and regulations. In particular, an EMB can examine the extent to which implementation, or lack of implementation, of specific items of legislation or rules and regulations has generated tension or triggered violence. An EMB should document such cases and use them to initiate and inform legal reforms during the initial phase of the subsequent electoral cycle.

*Case: Honduras*

Ahead of the 2012 primary elections in Honduras, the first since the presidential coup in 2009, several incidents of election-related violence directed against political party candidates were recorded (Al Jazeera 2012). During the post-election period, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), with the assistance of IFES, conducted an evaluation of the electoral process. Using the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, the TSE assessed its administrative performance as well as identifying opportunities and challenges ahead of the 2013 general elections. In general, the evaluation found the TSE’s current organizational structure to be ‘obtuse and outdated’. Some of the specific challenges and threats identified included ‘uncontrolled variables’ such as electoral legal and institutional reform, budgetary restrictions and political interference. The evaluation included recommendations that the TSE could implement to improve its overall performance (IFES 2013). In addition, the evaluation was designed to provide input to the planning for the 2013 general elections.

*Case: South Africa*

In South Africa it is standard practice for the IEC to evaluate its performance following a general election. An evaluation session is also conducted with political parties represented on the National Political Party Liaison Committee. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections in South Africa, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law on voting abroad was unconstitutional in limiting the franchise to registered South African citizens who were temporarily abroad. During the post-2009 election evaluation, the electoral law was aligned with the 2009 Constitutional Court ruling, allowing citizens to register and vote from abroad. Legislative amendments were shared with members of the National Party Liaison
Committee in an effort to obtain the buy-in of political parties before the proposed changes were debated in the Parliament. Should parties remain dissatisfied, the legislation may be referred to the Constitutional Court for a final decision (Moepya and Murphy 2013).

8.2. Evaluate the institutional performance of electoral management and justice bodies and identify needs for institutional reform

There are three main organizational models of an EMB: (a) independent, (b) governmental and (c) mixed (International IDEA 2012: 8). The actual structure of each of these three main models may vary further. Some key variables relate to organizational leadership, executive powers, the design of operational competences, the hierarchy of national and sub-national structures, electoral dispute resolution capacities and so on. Some of these may be detailed in the electoral legal framework and result from specific mandates. However, some decisions may be made internally. An EMB may face different challenges from one electoral cycle to another. It is therefore important to periodically assess and adjust the internal organizational structures to ensure that an EMB can deal with all challenges effectively. To address challenges relating to increased risks and incidents of election-related violence, an EMB should strengthen its capacity to understand and analyse internal and external risks, and manage conflicts that threaten to develop into violence. The capacity to collaborate on and coordinate electoral security issues with external organizations should also be developed. The post-election phase will allow time for an EMB to assess and plan these important institutional reforms.

Case: Nigeria

The Nigerian elections in 1999, 2003 and 2007 were marked by widespread election-related violence (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2007). However, no evidence exists that a single person was prosecuted for an election offence during that time. Following the 2011 general elections, which also witnessed several incidents of election-related violence, the Independent National Election Commission (INEC), with the support of the Nigerian police and the judiciary, started arresting and prosecuting electoral offenders. The INEC also worked together with the Nigerian Bar Association to facilitate the prosecution at minimal cost (Iredia 2012). Although the INEC has prosecuted ‘more offenders than any other EMB in the history of Nigeria’, the INEC Chairman stated that the process was slow considering the number of cases still pending before various courts. He also suggested the establishment of a separate agency to handle election offences due to the INEC’s lack of capacity, in terms of funds and manpower, to manage elections and prosecute electoral offenders at the same time.

8.3. Assess staff performance and identify needs for professional capacity building

Electoral management and dispute resolution bodies need continuous development of their professional competences. This is particularly important for bodies which are not organized as permanent and independent structures, and organizations that face a high staff turnover. In addition, the adoption of new electoral management routines and systems, including IT solutions, will increase the need for capacity building. The post-election period will allow an EMB to focus on assessing the capacity-building needs and identifying training for relevant staff at all levels. National EMBS can benefit from international training programmes. For example, the BRIDGE training curriculum is the most prominent course offered by a number of electoral support providers to national EMBS. Some prominent EMBS, such as the IFE of Mexico and the ECI of India, also have training centres through which they promote peer-to-peer training programmes, including specialized electoral security courses. However, it is important to ensure that the capacity building is not limited to the institutional leadership and that there are internal mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge.
Case: South Africa
Following the 2006 municipal elections in South Africa, which saw widespread protests before election day (Think Africa Press 2011), the IEC established an internal performance assessment system. All members of staff were trained and assessed in terms of key result areas and key performance indicators. In general the system allowed the IEC to ‘reward meritorious performance and to identify skills development needs’. From early 2006 until early 2007, 107 IEC staff members were provided with internal or external skills development and training in various areas which included project management, supply chain management, certificates in IT and Geographic Information Systems (IEC 2007: 34).

8.4. Identify practices that will lead to improved collaboration with SSAs and other state and non-state actors
Throughout the electoral cycle, an EMB will engage with numerous stakeholders, including SSAs, political parties, civil society and international observer groups, the media and citizens. The nature of this engagement may vary from constructive collaboration and coordination to less successful engagements, even conflict situations. During the post-election period, an EMB should analyse how it engaged with other electoral stakeholders and identify successful and less successful practices. This evaluation can be conducted in collaboration with relevant organizations. Inter-agency discussions and workshops can be organized to help in identifying good practices that can be promoted and further strengthened, as well as areas where collaboration needs to be built.

Improved electoral security
The engagement of SSAs during elections, in particular in post-conflict or conflict-prone societies, requires increased collaboration between SSAs and EMBs. Furthermore, interactions with political parties and the media on matters related to electoral security may be needed. The fulfilment of the SSAs’ mandates—to create a safe environment for the conduct of peaceful elections—may depend on their capacity to uphold their credibility in the eyes of these actors and general public. During the post-election period, SSAs should critically evaluate their engagement in order to identify internal and external challenges (and successes) that affect the fulfilment of their electoral mandates. These findings will inform the plans for capacity building geared towards the next electoral cycle. They will also point to areas where collaboration with relevant electoral stakeholders can be improved.

8.5. Evaluate the institutional performance of SSAs and identify capacity-building needs
During different phases of the electoral cycle, SSAs will engage in different ways. They may be focused on providing security to electoral officials, registrants and voters, prominent political party candidates and other vulnerable individuals and groups. They will also provide security to electoral events and safeguard electoral materials and facilities. In the course of implementation of their electoral security mandates, SSAs may face different internal and external challenges. Post-electoral evaluation will allow identification of the main challenges and successes. These may relate to the specific phases of the electoral cycle, specific geographic regions, or specific electoral stakeholders.

8.6. Maintain collaboration with electoral stakeholders towards the next round of elections
National and local government elections may be held in different years. In some contexts, elections for local, provincial and federal authorities may take place in different years. If by-elections and primary elections are hotly contested, SSAs may have additional electoral security responsibilities. It is therefore important that SSAs maintain collaboration with all
relevant electoral stakeholders, even throughout the period when election-related activities are not taking place on the ground. The period following the announcement of election results may be used to hold bilateral and multilateral meetings between electoral stakeholders in order to discuss successes and challenges relating to collaboration and coordination during the different phases of the electoral cycle.

**Improved infrastructure for peace**

8.7. Evaluate structural factors of conflict

When elections are organized in societies that face high levels of violence, there is a likelihood that existing violence will spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. International IDEA has mapped 10 structural factors, identified by different researchers, which have triggered or contributed to triggering election-related violence in different electoral contexts. These factors include:

1. poor socio-economic conditions;
2. social and political exclusion;
3. conflict relating to changing power dynamics;
4. gender-based discrimination and violence;
5. the presence of non-state armed actors;
6. the presence of organized crime;
7. grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
8. human rights violations;
9. environmental hazards; and
10. unethical media reporting.

There is a broad academic and practitioners’ literature that elaborates strategies for addressing these structural factors of conflict. Strengthening of the state and non-state actors, which constitute national infrastructures for peace, to address structural causes of conflict is a long-term process that will ultimately contribute to the narrower efforts focused on the organization of peaceful elections. Specific action points relating to addressing the structural factors of social conflict remain outside of the scope of this Guide. The broader literature should be consulted in this respect.
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Understanding and explaining outbreaks of election-related violence is a complex task; predicting whether forthcoming elections will turn violent, which factors may underlie or trigger violence, and what can be done to prevent violence is even more difficult. One way to address the problem is to empower those who have immediate responsibility to prevent and mitigate election-related violence, such as electoral management bodies, security sector agencies and other state and non-state agencies.

The Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERM Tool) is designed to empower people to ensure peaceful and credible elections. The software aims to build the capacities of users to understand, analyse and mitigate electoral risks. Specifically, the ERM Tool can build users’ capacity to understand electoral risk factors; collect and analyse risk data; design prevention and mitigation strategies; and record the results of actions.

Modules
The ERM Tool consists of three integrated modules. First, a knowledge library describes in detail 36 electoral risk factors, both internal and external to electoral processes. Second, an analytical instruments section allows users to create analytical models specific to a country or election, upload data to generate risk maps and trend charts, and create a register of risks and actions. Third, the prevention module consists of a digital library with approximately 100 action points intended to inspire user in designing strategies to prevent and mitigate electoral risks, including election-related violence, at the different phases of the electoral cycle. The software is accompanied by three Guides and an Overview.

Download
To obtain a copy of the ERM Tool, please register via the International IDEA website. Genuine non-for-profit organizations will be granted a download key free of charge.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

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In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of work.

International IDEA provides analysis of global and regional democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge of good international democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-building on democratic reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.

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Our headquarters is located in Stockholm, with regional and country offices in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

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The software is accompanied by three Guides. This Prevention and Mitigation Guide aims to assist and inspire users to tailor strategies and actions for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence. It is complemented by an Internal Factors Guide and an External Factors Guide which provide guidance to the users of the ERM Tool in identifying electoral risks in a given country and electoral context.