



The Good, the Bad,

and the Ugly:

Rethinking Election Monitoring

Judith Kelley

Contents

A Few Facts About the Growth and Activities of Election Monitoring	5
Central Dilemmas and Questions	10
The Attention Dilemma	12
Recommendations	14
Closing Thoughts	16
References	17
Appendix 1	19

© International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2012

Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council of Member States.

Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of this publication should be made to:

International IDEA

SE – 103 34 Stockholm

Sweden



International election monitoring has become a prominent tool for promoting election integrity and democracy (Beigbeder 1994; Abbink and Hesselting 2000; Kelley 2008a).¹ But several factors raise questions about the validity and effectiveness of international election monitoring. When organizations have to return to the same countries election after election, what are they accomplishing? When politicians continue to cheat in the presence of monitors, is the mission worthwhile? When more and more organizations join the practice without any uniform standards for assessing an election, and when different organizations sometimes disagree, how can outsiders know which organizations are reliable?

Take the case of Zimbabwe (Baker 2002). After the 2002 presidential election, the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA) and the Commonwealth Secretariat were highly critical, but ECOWAS praised the elections. The South African Development Community (SADC) was somewhere in the middle. Similar contradictions occurred after the 2003 elections in Nigeria (Kohnert 2004). Indeed, they are not uncommon. But when some politicians are then able to use monitors' statements to legitimize manipulated elections, is election monitoring doing more harm than good? This paper draws on The Project on International Election Monitoring, a study that I have conducted over the last six years. I collected data on 1,324 national elections from 1975 to 2004, of which about a third were monitored. The project coded over 40,000 pages of election monitoring documents, such as reports, press releases, and interim statements from well over 600 monitoring missions. This dataset was supplemented by coding of all the reports from the US State Department on Human Rights Practices, providing comparable data covering not only the elections that were monitored, but also the many that were not monitored. The data includes the main activities of regional inter-governmental organizations as well as major non-governmental organizations that have been active in the field. Appendix 1 contains a full list of the organizations included in the data as well as information on their years of activity and number of national level elections monitored during the project period.

This paper discusses the project's findings and seeks to stimulate debate by highlighting several dilemmas facing election-monitoring organizations. It raises questions for further thought and suggests possible policy recommendations that flow from the project.

A Few Facts About the Growth and Activities of Election Monitoring


Election monitoring (or observation)² has grown exponentially in the last couple of decades. Figure 1 includes counts of missions from the 20 largest NGO and IGO organizations that conduct observations (excluding NGOs that merely subcontract for other organizations, as well as national delegations or embassy work). Today, nearly 80-85% of elections in all non-established democracies are monitored. It has become the

¹ This paper draws extensively on Kelley, Judith G., *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Monitoring Works and Why It Often Fails* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2012). Used with the permission of Princeton University Press.

² The terms monitoring and observation are often used interchangeably. Although some organizations imply that monitoring is more comprehensive than observation, no consistent use of the terms exist. This paper uses the terms interchangeably.

norm for non-established democracies to invite international observers to assess the quality of the election.

Figure 1: The frequency of monitoring missions to national-level elections in non-established democracies, 1975-2004



Source: Project on International Election Monitoring

Notes: Non-established democracies are defined as countries with a democracy score equal to or less than 7 in the year before the election on the Polity IV democracy scale ranging from -10 to 10, with 10 being fully democratic. For information on Polity IV data, see <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.

A monitoring mission is defined as the presence of a formal monitoring delegation from an international agency on the day(s) of the election. Smaller national delegations or local embassy activities are not counted, because they are ubiquitous and their observations usually remain internal. Missions of pure technical assistance (such as the OAS mission in Argentina in 2003) are also not considered monitoring events. Pre-election missions that leave before the day of the election and are not followed by another delegation present for the polling day itself are also not counted as missions. In many organizations, much of this information was originally in disarray.


The purpose of election observation is to assess the quality of elections and to offer recommendations for reforms of the electoral processes and administration. Sometimes organizations also offer other forms of logistical support. To these ends, election monitors (or observers) engage in a wide variety of activities. For example, many monitoring organizations send pre-election missions to study the legal framework and the administrative election infrastructure. However, organizational capacities vary. Based on a survey of all the final reports of election missions included in the project, on average, organizations have eighty observers present on the election day and spend twenty-four days in the country. Their final reports are on average about 39 pages. However, the variation around these averages



is considerable. The type of activities monitors engage in also varies widely. Figure 2 shows the percent of organization that engage in some of the most common activities, such as pre-election visits and media monitoring.

Figure 2: Frequency of monitoring activities in national-level elections.

Percent of elections, 1975-2004, that:



Includes missions between 1975 and 2004. Does not include the AU, the ECOWAS, and the OIF for which this detailed information was not available.

Source: Project on International Election Monitoring.

Project Findings

Monitoring organizations claim to deter cheating, boost voter confidence and teach valuable new democratic norms. Indeed, research is finding evidence that they do indeed achieve these goals somewhat under some conditions. In a study of Armenia, Hyde found that voting stations visited by monitors received fewer votes for the incumbent (Hyde 2007). Despite of this, the overall election was still fraudulent.


My own study has mixed findings. These are well summarized by the title of the classic 1966 Italian Western film, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’. The good part is that monitors can improve election quality. The bad part is that most of the time they do not. The ugly part is that they are sometimes biased and contribute to the false legitimization of governments.

My study found that monitoring works well in countries already on the road to transition, where there are domestic pressures for change, and countries where the international community is willing to assert leverage (Kelley 2012b). In such cases, although they generally cannot bring about change singlehandedly, election monitors can reinforce existing pressures on a country (Elklit 1999 47). They can help improve elections and increase turnover, and politicians sometimes do follow their advice and make real changes to the electoral process. This is both important and remarkable.

However, in many situations even repeated efforts in a country are futile. Progress is often piecemeal. Recommendations are often ignored. Thus, in many countries election monitoring makes little difference. It works particularly poorly in countries plagued by violence, and under electoral systems that produce a ‘winner-take-all’ mindset. It is also rather useless in countries whose leadership has no intentions of ceding power.

As a result, in many countries problematic elections clearly persist—even in the presence of monitors. Figure 3 shows the assessment of the monitoring organizations in the elections they have monitored between 1975-2004. The figure shows the strictest assessment. Thus, if several organizations were present, the figure shows the assessment of the organization that judged the election most critically.³ The figure shows that over half of monitored elections have a moderate or high level of problems. Moderate problems are when the monitors note serious problems and irregularities and list many highly problematic issues. They may use words such as ‘marred’ and ‘fraud’ and cheating, and use adjectives like serious or grave. A high level of problems is when the assessment’s list of criticisms is very long and grave in nature, and if the conclusion lists few redeeming values of the election at all. The figure also shows that election monitors deem over a fifth of monitored elections as unacceptable. These are cases where the organization assessed that the election did not represent the will of the people, or that the elections were fraudulent, not free and fair, fell short of international standards or international commitments.

Figure 3: Quality of monitored national-level elections, 1975–2004



Notes: these reflect the strictest assessment by any organization present in a given election.

Source: Project on International Election Monitoring.


³ In my research I have found many cases of organizations being too lenient, but no evidence of organizations inventing allegations of fraud. Thus, the most critical assessment is usually the most credible.



The fact that monitors do not always deter cheating is neither surprising nor terrible. After all, monitors cannot be expected to be effective all the time. The problem, however, is that it is not simply that monitors either deter cheating or do not deter cheating. Bigger problems exist. The most important of these are that monitoring organizations, especially regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), have political entanglements, practical constraints, and normative concerns that compromise not only their effectiveness, but also, more importantly, their long-assumed neutrality.

The biases of monitoring organizations matter in several ways. First of all, as noted in the introduction, they can lead to situations where monitoring organizations disagree. This invites spin, and leads to situations where monitors may falsely endorse fraudulent elections. This may help keep illegitimate leaders in power, depress the hopes of citizens for democracy, and misinform the rest of the world about the state of the regime.

Furthermore, my study has found that it is not only conditions in a given country that determine whether monitoring works. It is also the quality of monitoring organizations that matter: elections monitored by the most credible organizations are better and have greater turnover, whereas those monitored by low quality monitors look similar to those not monitored at all. Table 4 shows the differences in the data. The quality of organizations was coded based on how likely organizations were to criticize elections that were highly problematic either in the view of other monitoring organizations, or in the view of the US State Department. Organizations that criticized highly problematic elections at least 50 percent of the time were coded as high quality. This coding rule is arbitrary, but clear. Of the organizations included in this study (See Appendix 1), the high quality organizations were the Carter Center (CC), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Parliament (EP), the EU Commission, and the Organization of American States (OAS). As Figure 4 shows, when high quality monitors are present, then the likelihood of turnover in elections is 35 percent, whereas for low quality monitors or no monitors, is only about 15 and 12 percent, respectively. Similarly, when high quality monitors are present, then the likelihood of an acceptable quality elections is 61 percent, whereas for low quality monitors or no monitors, is only about 49 and 48 percent, respectively.

Figure 4: Monitor types, election quality, and turnover

Notes: Including national level elections only. Excluding single-party states and countries rated 'Free' by Freedom House in the year before the election, post-conflict elections, post-coup elections, and first multiparty elections.

Source: Project on International Election Monitoring.

In sum, the research shows us that election monitoring can be useful under the most favorable conditions: when countries are already in transition, when there is strong domestic support for reforms and when the international community actively applies leverage. However, election monitoring is often futile, and it is especially so when incumbents are set on keeping power and when the political system is a 'winner-take-all' model. Moreover, the quality of monitoring itself does matter: better organizations are clearly more effective. This means that it is important for monitoring organizations to continue to work to improve the practice of election monitoring.

Those wishing a more in-depth discussion of the project, method and findings should turn to the work that the Project on International Election Monitoring has produced (Kelley 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2012b, 2012a) or the project webpage (<https://sites.duke.edu/kelley/>) which has description of data and methods as well.

Central Dilemmas and Questions

As new handbooks, training manuals, and guidelines attest, monitoring organizations are trying to improve. To this end, many organizations have signed the 2005 UN Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (United Nations 2005). But it is hard. Monitoring organizations themselves are often painfully aware of these problems, but they do not know how to solve them. Even if they know how to fix the problems, not all the organizations involved will want to change. Thus, governments will continue to pick and choose to their liking, while journalists and politicians try to sort out the mixed messages.



The dilemmas discussed below represent some of the most persistent problems that have surface throughout my study. Monitoring organizations, be they regional organization or NGOs struggle with these problems, but I have learned that they are not keen on discussing them. These are uncomfortable dilemmas in that they question the methods and outputs of the organizations. However, if election-monitoring organizations want to remain viable and retain credibility, they have to address them. The leverage of monitoring organizations, and therefore their ability to be effective, hinges on their credibility and professionalism. Ineffective monitoring may also disenchant voters about the international community and democracy more broadly, devalue international election monitors, and further decrease their leverage. Thus reforms are necessary if international election monitoring is to play a constructive role in democracy promotion. The following dilemmas are important to discuss:

The Autonomy Dilemma

International election monitoring agencies face very different funding structures. Unfortunately the organizations with the greatest resources and leverage to conduct effective and professional election monitoring are also those with the greatest political baggage and least autonomy. No organization is entirely free of constraints, but an analysis of their track record shows that smaller NGOs are more likely to criticize elections freely than are large regional IGOs. Yet, the large IGOs are often better equipped, may have higher-level contacts within a country, and also have greater opportunities to exert political and economic leverage.

Questions

What are the appropriate funding and institutional structures for election monitoring organizations? Should regional IGOs conduct less monitoring and instead provide more grants for NGOs to monitor elections in the IGOs member states? This may provide some greater autonomy for monitoring organizations, but its worth keeping in mind that if NGOs become strongly dependent on IGO funding, they too can essentially be captured by IGO interests and in the end not appear that much more neutral.

The Targeting Dilemma

All organizations have to make decisions about which countries to target and how to allocate resources. Even if regional IGOs have mandates to respond to requests made in reasonable time, they still have the ability to decide how many resources to spend where. But it is difficult for organizations to figure out what countries to target. The countries that are most receptive to the advice of international monitors are also those that need international monitoring the least. Countries where citizens demand reform are keener to follow the advice of international monitors. Yet these countries could possibly get by without monitors. In contrast, countries without any domestic demand for reforms are those that need external help the most. But in these cases monitors are usually powerless. Yet, despite low odds of success, international monitoring organizations frequently face pressure to observe elections in countries that are highly unlikely to transition to democracy in the short term. Does this mean that observer organizations shouldn't go at all? The problem is that if the most difficult cases are avoided by the more credible observer groups,

the void is likely to be filled by observers friendly to the host-government, which may itself raise a whole host of new problems. Furthermore, uncooperative host governments do offer rare but unique opportunities: if a political opening of some sort does occur, observers may be able to help pressure for democratic change. Certainly some of the most high profile cases of ‘success’ in election observation could fall into this category, such as Panama in 1989, Philippines in 1986, Peru in 2000, and Ukraine 2004.

The targeting dilemma is complicated by the fact that those who make funding decisions that determine where monitors are able to go are not in the best position to know what the needs are and are not necessarily focused foremost on facilitating long-term democratic progress in a country. Administrative personnel understand the situations in each country best, yet they have little freedom to make spending decisions. In contrast, the donors or member states who often do determine where missions go know less and are often driven by political or economic concerns.

Question

How should organizations prioritize spending their assets? Should regional organizations be obligated to respond to all requests? Should election monitoring organizations avoid allocating their scarce resources in countries where there appears to be no near term prospect for democratization?

The Attention Dilemma

Monitoring organizations have limited amounts of time. They have to focus on upcoming elections because they need to organize their missions and survey the political landscape. But this constant need for preparation tends to occur at the expense of retaining their attention on the elections they recently monitored. Thus, it is unfortunately common for organizations to take a long time to issue final reports. Sometimes reports do not come out at all. This has important practical consequences. First, pressure on countries to continue election related reforms eases between elections. Second, recommendations are often forgotten by the time the next mission comes around. Thus, in the rush to prepare for new missions, organizations lose valuable leverage that could have been derived from past work.

Question

Is it better to do many missions in different countries and compromise on follow up, or should organizations lower the number of missions they undertake or the number of countries they operate in so that they can provide more sustained focus on the countries where they engage?

The Investment Dilemma

When organizations supervise elections or when they become heavily involved in high-profile elections, they expend a lot of organizational resources. Sometimes when organizations invest a lot of funds in an election, donors or member states expect them to show that they accomplished something. This can lead to a conflict of interest that produces a bias,



as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 when the OSCE supervised the election (International Crisis Group 1996). Thus, greater resources and engagement in a country improves monitoring capacity, but it can also lead to biases because the monitors become so vested in the process that they have a conflict of interest. In addition, a high level of external resources and engagement can neutralize local political actors who are essential to the eventual withdrawal of resources. If they come to rely on external assistance, local actors fail to develop the capacity needed to handle the electoral process independently.

Question

Should IGOs that fund big logistical election operations be the same organizations that issue opinions about the quality of elections? When organizations assist a country on several logistical levels, how can they ensure that they build domestic capacity rather than displace it?

The Assessment Dilemma

The mandate to assess elections frankly and the power to validate them are necessary to motivate progress, but this mandate is also what leads to entanglements and biases (Geisler 1993; Kelley 2010). It is the credible threat of criticism that can motivate domestic politicians to run honest elections. Without this credible threat, politicians have nothing to fear and thus no reason to change. Unfortunately, the monitors' responsibility to assess elections is also what provokes pressure both from within and outside the organizations to tone down their criticisms. This may occur because the organizations or their sponsors fear the repercussions of criticizing elections, because this could damage interstate relationships or perhaps destabilize a regime. Thus, powerful member states wield influence within IGOs, or donor states may pressure NGOs. My research has found in extensive statistical analysis, that regional IGOs with more non-democratic members are least neutral. But even organizations such as the EU have political interests in countries, and these interests can interfere with the observation mission's freedom.

Biased assessments are dangerous because they can legitimize illegitimate governments. Sometimes organizations make very ambiguous statements, to avoid endorsing the election when they know there are problems. But politicians can exploit such ambiguity. Even if only one organization eases its criticism, and others remain critical, the disagreements can engender problems. Governments can contrast contradictions to spin and manipulate their conclusions or quote only the assessment they prefer (Balian 2001). For example, in Cambodia in 1998 the highly varying assessments provided ripe political fodder.

Consistent neutrality may be the only true solution to the problem. But this is unrealistic, and while attractive in many ways, it would also rob organizations of much of their leverage.

Question

Is it ever justified to suppress criticism? If an organization knows in advance that it will not be able to freely assess the election, is it better for the organization to refuse the mission, or to nevertheless go and render an ambiguous or positive assessment? What steps can organizations take to free themselves of donor or member state pressures?

The Proliferation Dilemma

More organizations mean greater coverage, more engagement in monitoring, and wider distribution of assessments. Yet when multiple organizations are present, this can also invite manipulation, conflicting recommendations, opportunities for governments to spin conflicting opinions or play them against each other, and forum shopping by governments for the friendliest organizations. The presence of multiple international monitoring organizations can also lead to damaging inter-organizational politics. As Cooley and Ron (Cooley and Ron 2002) have argued, all transnational actors are concerned about organizational survival. Recognition as an important monitoring organization helps non-governmental organizations fundraise and helps intergovernmental organizations to enlarge their mandates. Thus, a crowded field of monitoring organizations may lead to competition for resources, attention, credit and influence. As the Council of Europe (COE) complained after having to essentially work under the OSCE for the Russian 1999 parliamentary election, the cooperation ‘prevented the other delegations from getting full credit for their involvement and their investments in the observation of the elections’ (Council of Europe 2000 paragraph 28-29). As a result of this competition, organizations often rush to issue statements before other organizations.

Question

Are more organizations always better? What steps can donors or regional organizations take to avoid turf wars between organizations? Should regional organizations divide the countries between them to provide greater expertise? Should likeminded organizations seek to cooperate more in a given election? What are the bureaucratic and political obstacles to cooperation and how can organizations overcome them?

Recommendations

I have raised a number of dilemmas and accompanying questions above. The purpose of raising them is to get funders and organizations themselves to consider these dilemmas and think through about possible solutions. That said, having worked on the issue of election monitoring for several years now, I do want to offer some possible recommendations that seem at least worth contemplating, especially for regional organizations. Although I present these as recommendations, they too are intended to invite discussion of suitable measures.

A Conflict of Interest Statement

Monitoring organizations could benefit from being more frank about their own conflicts of interest and biases, especially if they invest vast resources in an election. To achieve this, monitoring missions could offer, as a standard part of their report, a conflict of interest statement akin to what many other organizations have to do. This could include considerations of the nationalities chosen to head regional missions. Furthermore, if monitoring missions experience direct attempts to meddle with their work or with the election process, they should attempt to document such meddling that may hinder domestic progress and interfere with their work.



Set Higher Standards for Government Cooperation

Monitoring organizations should consider setting higher standards for government cooperation before accepting invitations. This is especially true for regional organizations, because their mandates include accepting invitations from any member state. But if a government is not willing to cooperate on a serious level, how much of a contribution is the monitoring mission making? In contentious situations, monitoring organizations should consider setting higher thresholds for formal cooperation and access at different levels of the election administration as a condition for their work. After all, if governments are not willing to cooperate fully with the observers about the process of observation, this may also signal their unwillingness to follow their advice. As an example of how this can be done, in Mexico in 2000 the Carter Center solicited very high levels of access to the electoral administrative process within the country that improved the quality of the assessment (Carter Center 2000). Setting higher standards also involves demanding that the host country, barring sudden elections, issue invitations sufficiently in advance for the monitors to conduct a proper assessment. The OAS declined Venezuela's invitation to observe the October 21 2004 election, after receiving an invitation only two weeks in advance. Similarly, when Russia was presenting obstacles for the OSCE in 2008, the OSCE chose to stay away. These are good rules to follow.

Build Capacity Before Publicly Assessing Compliance with International Standards

In some cases monitoring organizations may benefit from using a form of mission that explicitly states at the outset that it will not assess the election's overall validity. These missions would be more akin to electoral assistance than monitoring and be labeled as such. Several countries struggle with basic capacity to assemble voter rolls, ensure the secrecy of the vote, and generally pull off the complicated exercise that is an election. In such cases, it may be wiser for regional organizations to assist countries that struggle with basic administrative capacity with addressing that problem first, rather than send teams whose central mission is to publicly assess the election's quality.

Keep Lower Profiles in Violent Contexts

In violent electoral contexts, monitoring organizations are often worried about how their assessments will fuel the conflict. This makes them hesitant to speak out. In such situations, high profile missions, as regional organizations tend to be, may not be ideal. Instead, it may be better not to send missions who make very public pronouncements of the validity of the election. Instead, it may be more valuable to offer more subdued forms of electoral assistance that can build voter confidence in the more procedural aspects of the election.

Follow Up

It is constructive for organizations to return repeatedly to elections in the same country and not abandon the intensity of monitoring efforts prematurely, as some did, for example, in Indonesia in 2009. Furthermore, when organizations return to countries they have previously monitored, they should review their previous recommendations and systematically recount the actions—or lack thereof—taken in response. Oftentimes this does not happen at all.

Monitors make long lists of recommendations in their reports but never follow up. Attention to these recommendations in the next round will enable them to exert greater leverage on the local actors, and it will also give them greater credibility from one election to the next.

Issue Timely Final Reports Publically

In the same way, organizations should place greater priority on issuing a final and public report in a timely fashion, preferably posting these online or otherwise making them easily accessible for all. Although most regional organizations have pledged in the UN Declaration to issue timely final reports, many do not. Clearly organizations need time to do proper post election analysis. But there is no reason a report should take months to come out. Reports that come out so late garner very little attention and are of much less use.

Set Moratoriums on Announcements

Competition for attention can breed hasty announcements by monitoring organizations. In some cases the election authorities have not even completed the counting and tabulation process before monitors pronounce their verdict. To prevent inter-organizational competition from fueling premature announcements, a common moratorium on their statements for a fixed number of hours after polls close might be useful.

Closing Thoughts

Election monitoring has supported the wave of democratization over the last couple of decades and regional organizations have played an important role. Monitoring has improved elections in countries keen to progress, and put pressure on those more reluctant to change.

However, from the early years of election monitoring, critics voiced concern (Geisler 1993 ; Carothers 1997). New research has found that many of these concerns not only persist; they are also systematic. But despite these long-standing criticisms, organizations struggle to reform and it is my own experience that they are often reluctant to really discuss the problems. This is clearly because regional intergovernmental organizations in particular face political and institutional constraints. However, this is the Catch 22: many problems are due to political constraints, but organizations cannot address many of the problems because they face political constraints. At the same time the proliferation of observer organizations of various quality threatens the integrity of monitoring.

This paper has suggested some modest steps that regional organizations can take to streamline monitoring and focus their efforts more effectively. Although it suggests some ideas for reforms, the goal is not necessarily for organization to adopt these particular suggestions, but for them to face the questions and discuss a variety of possible reforms. Certainly, ignoring the problems will not make them go away. If the international community wants to maintain the integrity and value-added of international monitors, more reforms, hard choices and funding will be necessary.



References

- Abbink, Jon and Gerti Hesselting, *Election observation and democratization in Africa* (New York, St. Martin's Press 2000)
- Baker, Bruce, 'When to call black white: Zimbabwe's electoral reports', *Third World Quarterly* 23/6 (2000), pp. 1145-1158
- Balian, Hrair, 'Ten Years of International Election Assistance and Observation,' *Helsinki Monitor* 12(3) (2001), pp. 197-209
- Beigbeder, Yves, *International monitoring of plebiscites, referenda and national elections: self-determination and transition to democracy* (Dordrecht and Boston, M. Nijhoff 1994)
- Carothers, Thomas, 'The observers observed', *Journal of Democracy* 8/3 (1997), pp.17-31
- Carter Center, *Observing the 2000 Mexico Elections* (2000)
- Cooley, Alexander and James Ron, 'The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action', *International Security* 27/1 (2002), pp. 5-39
- Council of Europe, *Ad hoc Committee to Observe the Parliamentary Elections in Russia* (19 December 1999) (COE 2000)
- Elklit, Jørgen, 'Electoral institutional change and democratization: You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink', *Democratization* 6/4 (1999) pp. 28-51
- Geisler, Gisela, 'Fair? What has fairness got to do with it? Vagaries of election observations and democratic', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31/4 (1993), p. 613
- Hyde, Susan, 'The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment', *World Politics* 60/1 (2007), pp. 37-63
- International Crisis Group, *Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina: ICG Bosnia Report* (ICG 1996)
- Kelley, Judith, 'Assessing the complex evolution of norms: the rise of international election monitoring', *International Organization* 62/2 (2008a), pp. 221-255
- Kelley, Judith, 'Documentation on the Data on International Election Monitoring (DIEM)', (2008b), available at <http://www.duke.edu/web/diem/>
- Kelley, Judith, 'The supply and demand for international election monitoring', *Working Paper* (2008c), available at <http://www.duke.edu/web/diem>
- Kelley, Judith, 'D minus Elections: The politics and norms of international election observation', *International Organization* (2009a), forthcoming
- Kelley, Judith, 'The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations', *Perspectives on Politics* 7/01 (2009b), pp. 59-64
- Kelley, Judith, 'Election Observers and Their Biases', *Journal of Democracy* 21(July 2010), pp. 158-172

Kelley, Judith, 'Do International Election Monitors influence Opposition Boycotts?'
Comparative Political Studies 45/7 (2012a), forthcoming

Kelley, Judith, *Monitoring Democracy: When international election observation works
and why it often fails* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2012b)

Kohnert, Dirk, 'Election observation in Nigeria & Madagascar: diplomatic vs.
technocratic bias', *Review of African Political Economy* 31/99 (2004), pp. 83-101

United Nations, *Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and
Code of Conduct for International Election Observers* (United Nations 2005)



Appendix 1

The activities of international monitoring organizations in national elections

Acronym	Full Name	Years active in sovereign states	Reports available, 1975–2004	Number of missions, 1975–2004
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	1991 to present	121	124
COE	Council of Europe	1990 to present	75	77
OAS	The Organization of American States	1962 to present	50	71
NDI	National Democratic Institute	1986 to present	47	58
IRI	International Republican Institute	1986 to present	47	63
OIF	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie	1992 to present	60 ⁱⁱ	60
EP	The European Parliament	1994 to present	27	59
AU	African Union	1989 to present	0	47 ⁱⁱⁱ
CW	The Commonwealth Secretariat	1980,* 1989 to present	43	46
UN	United Nations	1990 to present	12	45
IFES	The International Foundation for Election Systems	1988 to present	38	38
EU	European Union	1993 to present	34	34
CC	The Carter Center	1989 to present	33	33
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	2001 to present	14	14
IHRLG	The International Human Rights Law Group	1983 to 1990	10	13
NHC	the Norwegian Helsinki Center	1995 to present	12	12
ANFREL	The Asian Network for Free Elections	1998 to present	12	12
ECOWAS	The Economic Community of West African States	1997 to present	0	11
SADC	The South African Development Community	1999 to present	10	10
ECF	Electoral Commissions Forum	1999 to present	6	8
EISA	The Electoral Institute of South Africa	1998* & 2004*	8	7
Others	Other organizations	Varied	14	59
TOTAL			673	901

* Active in just this year

ⁱ Many organization also attend local and regional elections, but these are not tallied here.

ⁱⁱ Note, the reports of La Francophonie were only coded for the “main assessment” variables. See the Data Appendix for more information.

ⁱⁱⁱ Note, the AU claims to have conducted close to 100 missions, but given the lack of documentation, this study was able to verify only 47 national level elections. Some missions may have been to local or regional elections.