Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

*In Search of Consolidation*

Central and Eastern Europe Regional Report
Based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties
About this report

Political parties are indispensable for making democracy work and deliver. Finding the proper conditions for better internal functioning and effective legal regulation of political parties is of key importance anywhere.

This report is a result of world-wide research and dialogue with political parties. Together with national and regional research partners, International IDEA is improving insight and comparative knowledge. The purpose is to provide for constructive public debate and reform actions helping political parties to develop. For more about the Political Parties’ programme, please visit www.idea.int/parties

This publication is co-supported by the Czech Ministry of Education under the programme “Political Parties and Representation of Interest in Contemporary European Democracies” (MSM 0021622407).
Preface

More than 15 years have passed since the fall of Central and Eastern Europe’s non-democratic regimes yet the study of political parties in this region, in particular their development, character and manifestations, remains an enormous and important project. The development of party systems in post-communism has some unique characteristics, such as its occasionally haphazard dynamics, which can lead to various mutually contradictory and incomplete outcomes. Over time this has dislodged the long-standing conviction of social scientists (e.g. Lipset 1996) that a vital and stable party system is a necessary condition of democratic consolidation, in favour of more circumspect views, be it Tóka’s claim that political parties influence only the quality of democratic consolidation (Tóka 1997), or even the belief that the reproduction of democracy and the formation of party systems are not obviously connected (Anckar, Anckar 2001, cf. Fiala, Strmiska 2001).

The political parties in post-communist countries had to convince the citizens that they were playing a crucial role in democratic society at a time when parties were becoming unfashionable worldwide as a means of political participation. That in Central and Eastern Europe this would be a rather thankless task became obvious fairly quickly. In many countries, there was either a non-existent or far too distant experience with autonomous competition between political parties and competition that would be at least to some degree independent from the state. Political parties were therefore perceived negatively, and mobilization against them even became a source of legitimacy for exponents of the new regime. It is enough to remember the slogan with which Civic Forum, led by Václav Havel, won the first free election in Czechoslovakia in 1990: ‘Parties are for party members, the Civic Forum is for everyone.’ Nevertheless, 27 parties were represented in the Polish Parliament after the first democratic election. With so many parties, it was a delusion to think that they could properly fulfil the functions that the Italian political scientist, Giovanni Sartori (Sartori 1976), expects of vital parties that constitute parts of a whole: an ability to balance partisanship and non-partisanship in government, loyalty towards the party and loyalty towards the state, and the interests of the party and the interests of the state.

It might therefore be surprising that today most of the countries studied have relatively vibrant party systems. Party configurations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have in the first post-transformation years managed to navigate between the Scylla of disintegration (the whole breaks up into parts) and the Charybdis of a new devouring of parts by the whole and of fusion of parties with the state—to use Sartori’s words. Political parties have proven themselves extraordinarily active players, contributing to the cultivation of their environment. The more or less successful attempts at institutional (mostly electoral) reforms are good examples of this. In Poland, for instance, electoral reform of 1993 was instrumental in the fact that only six parties managed to win seats in the second election of the Sejm.

Herbert Kitschelt (Kitschelt 2003) points out that some of the activities of political parties were made possible by the credit that stemmed from the advantage of backwardness of post-communist countries. Since it was fairly easy and inexpensive to modify a party’s identity at that time, parties could react to the wide variety of new challenges arising from the transformation of mediation of interests in a way that was hardly imaginable for their Western European counterparts. The Western European parties are compared to bulky oil tankers by Kitschelt.

Kitschelt’s view presents us with an alternate path to the previously accepted claim that the Central and Eastern European political systems (in this case: party systems) are undergoing gradual, but more or less obvious, consolidation, and are approaching those of Western democracies. At a time when party systems in some Western European democratic polities are undergoing a period of instability and a significant transformation in both intra- and inter-party functioning, it is no longer absolutely clear precisely what a party system should look like in order for it to be considered ‘consolidated’. Even the accession of many countries of post-communist Europe to the European Union, connected with the ‘Europeanization’ of party politics, is not a completely one-way process: parties from new member states use strategies that can potentially modify the European level of politics and the direction of the EU as a whole. It becomes increasingly clear that the Central and Eastern European parties are not, and probably never will be, simply derivatives of their Western European counterparts (cf. Fiala, Holzer, Strmiska 2002).
Studying party politics in Central and Eastern Europe means keeping up with a very lively playing field, where the players often change and modify the rules mid-game. However, this should not discourage scholars from attempting to gain as much information as possible about the environment in which the parties of post-communist countries operate—by analyzing the modes of competition of political parties and studying their inner functioning. The present report intends to contribute to this end. It results from cooperation between International IDEA and the Institute for Comparative Political Research (ISPO) at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic.

The report’s main goal is to be a source of information about the current state of party politics in Central and Eastern Europe. We also tried to identify the main problems that adversely affect the effectiveness of party politics in each country and suggest possible reforms. We hope that you, the readers—whether members of party elites, party activists, non-governmental organizations, social scientists, the media, or other—will find this report useful.

Petr Fiala
Director, Institute for Comparative Political Research, March 2007

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the draft, which helped to improve the text significantly. They would equally like to thank their colleagues from the Institute for Comparative Political Research (ISPO) at Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, especially the director of the Institute, Petr Fiala, who welcomed and supported their efforts. Hana Vykoupilová deserves a special mention for her productive communications with International IDEA. Kateřina Vráblíková and Barbora Dudáková undertook the enormous task of gathering and verifying information on the political actors in the region. The authors are equally grateful to Otto Eibl for his efficient assistance in completing the appendices of the manuscript and for his suggestions regarding the book’s overall concept. Štěpán Kaňa, Julie Brown and Todd Hammond provided welcome and timely assistance with English.
# Contents

About the Project and Methodology ................................................................. 1  
Project methodology ..................................................................................... 1  
Regional Analysis – Party System ................................................................. 4  
  Trust in party politics ................................................................................. 4  
  Stability of the party system .................................................................... 5  
  Practices in terms of pacts, alliances, etc................................................ 9  
  Overview of electoral systems .................................................................. 12  
  Electoral systems of the lower chambers of parliament ......................... 13  
  Other important structural issues in the region ........................................ 20  
External Regulations .................................................................................... 23  
  Level of regulation of political parties and their activities ..................... 23  
  Implementation of existing laws and regulations .................................... 24  
  Prohibition/bans on political parties ....................................................... 25  
  Party finance: regulation and practice .................................................... 26  
  Attempts to suppress (armed) conflicts by laws or regulations .............. 27  
  Other external regulation issues of importance in the region ................. 28  
Internal Functioning ..................................................................................... 29  
  Candidate selection .................................................................................. 29  
  Leadership selection ................................................................................ 30  
  Policy/programme development ............................................................. 30  
  Membership relations and role of membership ....................................... 31  
Women’s political participation ................................................................... 33  
  The situation in figures ............................................................................ 33  
  Legal provisions ....................................................................................... 34  
  Efforts by parties to ensure women’s participation .................................. 35  
  The way ahead ......................................................................................... 35  
Region-Specific Issues .................................................................................. 36  
  Political parties in Central and Eastern Europe and ‘Europeanization’ .... 36  
Country profiles ............................................................................................ 39  
  Albania ....................................................................................................... 39  
  Armenia .................................................................................................... 40  
  Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ................................................................. 42  
  Bulgaria .................................................................................................... 44  
  Croatia ...................................................................................................... 46  
  Czech Republic ........................................................................................ 47  
  Estonia ..................................................................................................... 49  
  Georgia .................................................................................................... 51  
  Hungary .................................................................................................... 52  
  Latvia ........................................................................................................ 54  
  Lithuania .................................................................................................. 56  
  Macedonia (FYROM) ............................................................................. 57  
  Montenegro .............................................................................................. 59  
  Poland ....................................................................................................... 60  
  Romania .................................................................................................... 62  
  Serbia ....................................................................................................... 63  
  Slovakia .................................................................................................... 65  
  Slovenia .................................................................................................... 67  
Conclusions and Way Forward ..................................................................... 69  
Systemic level ............................................................................................... 69
About the Project and Methodology

Project methodology
International IDEA has, as part of a worldwide programme of research and dialogue with political parties, cooperated with its research partner organizations: the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEEO), Inštitút pre verejné otázky (IVO, Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia), Sociometr (Armenia) and the Center for Social Studies (Georgia) to gather data relating to political parties in Central and Eastern Europe. The study has covered 18 countries in the region: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia and Slovenia. For each country, two structured documents or databases were written during the research: Country Context, giving standardised information on the country’s sociopolitical circumstances (civic liberties, political development, the media), and the Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment, surveying especially the legal environment regulating the functioning of political parties (registration, participation in elections, access to the media). The third document, the Questionnaire on Internal Functioning, which queried representatives of 53 political parties in 11 countries, was also used in assembling this Report. Interviews in the Questionnaire have yielded information about the internal organization and workings of parties—for example, about decision-making processes. Much of that information is unique.

Expert or elite interviews are frequently used as a data collecting technique in order to obtain information about organizations, institutions and processes via the experiences of concrete individuals (de Vaus 2001). The respondents are high-level officials of political parties, who should know the topics very well. The main risk in employing this technique is the “effect of socially preferable answer”, i.e. a situation in which instrumentally rational respondents treat the questions with a political bias and not academically, which is revealed in their answers.

We tried to improve the validity of the data collected by employing a triangulation of methods wherever possible. The concept of triangulation refers to the collection of data from a wide range of varied sources using different methods, aiming at higher levels of confirmation and/or completeness of information. Triangulation is a strategy to overcome issues concerning the validity and bias of the respondent (Arksey – Knight 1999).

In addition to the already mentioned sources, which combine primary research of International IDEA with secondary data, the report also uses secondary data sources (Eurobarometer, European Values Survey, IDEA: Global Database of Quotas for Women, IDEA: Voter Turnout Website, IPU: Parl ine Database, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU): Women in National Parliaments, World Values Survey) with the aim of expanding the database and giving as faithful a rendition of the polities studied as is possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Primary Sources Used in the Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>Country Report, Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment, Questionnaire on Internal Functioning (29 interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Country Report, Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment, Questionnaire on Internal Functioning (20 interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Country Report, Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment, Questionnaire on Internal Functioning (16 interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>Country Report, Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment, Questionnaire on Internal Functioning (26 interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Country Report, Country Context, Questionnaire on External Regulations and Environment, Questionnaire on Internal Functioning (3 interviews)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The defining features of the International IDEA reports are the comparative exploration and the description of the issues studied. The balance between theory and data is strongly skewed towards the latter in the text that follows. In some cases, e.g. the phenomenon of trust in political parties, we tried to present their conceptual reflection in social sciences as well. We believe that in other cases the data in this book can serve as a basis for further theoretical reflection of the topics studied.

In the introduction to this report we have singled out two characteristics of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe: their low level of stability, but their strong ability and readiness to cultivate and re-cultivate the environment in which they operate via institutional reform. We consider those to be the chief characteristics by which they differ from parties elsewhere in the world and we therefore decided to focus both on the system and the actors. Whereas for the study of actors, we used mostly the primary data of International IDEA, in evaluating the system we have drawn on both the IDEA Country Context data and on our previous research.

The crucial themes of (a) stability and (b) electoral systems and electoral reforms are intimately connected in many countries. We attempt to identify the critical junctures at which the developing political party systems have had to negotiate and to describe the outcomes of these processes. We attempt to show that, for an overwhelming majority of the countries, the inevitable disintegration of the original broad opposition movements to the old regime was a major challenge with uncertain outcomes, and has had a major impact on the composition of party systems. We also try to document the significant formative influence of the electoral systems on party systems—be it at the level of their mechanical effects (the electoral formula) or at the level of tumultuous discussions of electoral reforms. We include information about the current electoral system in all countries studied. We also try to describe the environment in which the political parties operate, to explain the low approval rates of political parties in society and to clarify the impact of the inter-connectedness of national party systems and of the European level of politics.

A special section is dedicated to the internal functioning of political parties, especially to the question of leadership elections, candidate selection, and the writing of party programmes. Research into the intra-party dimension is extremely interesting and the data collected can be re-purposed in further studies; unfortunately this is often offset by the parties’ unwillingness to participate in such research, by discrepancies between statutes and programmes, and in the generally low reliability of data collected. We are nevertheless absolutely convinced that this truly Sisyphean task is worth it. The text also contains short information about parties that are currently relevant, including their ideological profile (or an explanation why about it is impossible to ascertain it).

The text is structured as follows. In Regional analysis, we concentrate on issues allowing for a synchronic comparison (trust in political parties, stability of parties, representation of minorities, development of party systems, external regulation of political parties, party finances, political party membership, internal functioning of parties, Europeanization etc.). The Country Report summarizes the constitutional systems of the
18 countries studied and briefly outlines specific factors that influence the functioning of countries’ political parties. Finally, Conclusions and Way Forward sums up the main findings and suggests measures which might improve the functioning of parties; it also proposes possible avenues for future research. The bibliography and appendices are located after the main text.
Regional Analysis – Party System

Trust in party politics

Securing the population’s trust in party politics was an important consideration in post-communist countries and had a significant influence over both the course and the pace of democratic consolidation. Low levels of trust in the political actors in some countries (e.g. Bulgaria at the end of the 1990s) encouraged strong and active mass participation in politics (for example in demonstrations) together with generally anti-political sentiments. It is by no means accidental that in the opinion polls the most trusted president of the countries studied was Czech Republic’s Václav Havel, specifically at the time he articulated his concept of ‘non-political politics’, while the least popular at that time were the presidents of Ukraine and Poland, whose influence on their countries’ political processes was frequent and significant (cf. New Democracies Barometer III 1994).

Levels of trust or distrust by citizens in political institutions and elements of civic society have been similar in all countries studied. Traditionally, the church and the army enjoy the highest credit, whereas the rating of trade unions and party politics is lowest (cf. Rose, Mishler 1997). Almost ten years ago Richard Rose and William Mishler claimed that citizens in post-communist countries have a ‘sceptical’ relationship with party politics and most other political and civic society institutions. According to those two scholars, scepticism typically means that citizens are unwilling to take a clear, unequivocal standing of trust or distrust towards the institutions. This scepticism is caused by the conjunction of several factors: the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the current economic situation, their expectations about its improvement, and their satisfaction with the degree of democratic freedom as compared with that of the previous non-democratic era. Rose and Mishler believe that the degree of scepticism is hardly influenced by differences in communist legacies in various countries. General scepticism is also reinforced by the fact that the citizens of post-communist countries cannot always properly differentiate political institutions from civil society institutions and tend to perceive them in a holistic fashion.

Table 2. Trust in political parties
Percentage of respondents in different categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Research year; Sample size)</th>
<th>A great deal</th>
<th>Quite a lot</th>
<th>Not very much</th>
<th>None at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB (2002; 974)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM (1997; 1,906)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR (1997; 978)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH (2001; 1,189)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE (1998; 1,103)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST (1996; 948)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO (1996; 1,941)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV (1996; 1,124)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN (1998; 611)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU (1997; 863)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA (1996; 1,144)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD (2001; 1,037)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL (1997; 992)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU (1998; 1,157)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCG (2001; 2,055)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK (1998; 1,026)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN (1995; 965)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006.
This ‘scepticism’ in the countries studied is confirmed by research such as the European Values Survey dating from the turn of the millennium (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006), from which it is obvious that in all countries studied the citizens placed ‘not very much’ trust in political parties more often than they distrusted them outright, and the percentage of those distrusting was significantly higher than those trusting party politics. Differences between the countries were negligible.

As the last Eurobarometer survey shows (Standard Eurobarometer 65, Table 3a, 3b.), trust in party politics in the new member states and candidate countries remains low in comparison with the older EU member countries. Even in Hungary, where trust in party politics is the highest of the post-communist countries, such trust does not reach the average of the older EU. Although the economy is picking up in most of the countries studied, trust in party politics nevertheless remains very low, and as such it is probably necessary to go beyond the Rose and Mishler’s thesis. In some countries (such as Albania or Bulgaria) the economic crimes committed by party leaders might be a special factor fuelling distrust in party politics. However, this reason does not explain a systemically lower degree of trust in this area. Anderson et al. (2005) attempt a systemic approach and believe that the cause of low trust in political institutions consists in the unwillingness of opposition supporters to accept the rules of the game they are losing (namely, democratic politics and its political institutions).

Electoral democracy in some countries (such as Poland) has led to a situation where the former winners are now losers, and the parties that used to lose now win. So far it does not look as if this development will contribute in any significant way to bridging the huge gap between how the supporters of the winners and losers in post-communist countries perceive political institutions in general and party politics in particular—a gap that is very significant in comparison with the situation in Western democracies.

**Table 3a. Trust in political parties**
The percentages of respondents saying ‘tend to trust’—EU15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUT</th>
<th>BEL</th>
<th>DNK</th>
<th>FIN</th>
<th>FRA</th>
<th>DEU</th>
<th>GRC</th>
<th>IRL</th>
<th>ITA</th>
<th>LUX</th>
<th>NLD</th>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>SWE</th>
<th>ESP</th>
<th>GBR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Average* 29.2

**Table 3b. Trust in political parties**
The percentages of respondents saying ‘tend to trust’—new member states and candidate countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BGR</th>
<th>CZE</th>
<th>EST</th>
<th>HRV</th>
<th>HUN</th>
<th>LTB</th>
<th>LVA</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>ROU</th>
<th>SVK</th>
<th>SVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Average* 14.0

*Source: Standard Eurobarometer 65.*

**Stability of the party system**

In post-communist countries the study of the stability of party systems is very strongly affected by the fact that most countries have been (and still are) located at very different points on the imaginary axis of stable versus unstable party system. This report uses such a continuum, as a strict division between stable and unstable would be impossible in the context of countries studied. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced a rather tumultuous developments since the beginning of 1990s. Within a few years their societies have been thoroughly transformed: this has meant the opening of new possibilities, but also the loss of securities. If the political parties wanted to remain relevant, they had to be able to react to a range of new impulses—under the difficult conditions of enjoying very low levels of confidence. Understandably, much research came to the conclusion that the stability of party systems in post-communist countries is poor
(Rose, Munro 2003, Birch 2003, Hloušek 2006—chapters on Baltic countries). Nevertheless, in at least some countries, stability now exists in the following areas: in the fact that established parties compete in the elections; in the share of seats they usually win; and, in some cases, in their position in the system.

Table 4. Stability of groups of parties and of their representation in parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability of group of parties seeking representation in parliament (according to the number of seats gained by “old” parties)</th>
<th>Their representation in parliament is (according to the number of seats retained by individual parties):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stable (“old” parties retained more than 80% of their seats)</td>
<td>Partially stable (“old” parties retained 60–80% of their seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia 1995</td>
<td>Czech Republic 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana 1996</td>
<td>Romania 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia 1992–5</td>
<td>Romania 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 2004</td>
<td>Serbia 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia 1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stable (unstable strategy)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania 2001</td>
<td>Albania 2005</td>
<td>Armenia 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro 2001–2</td>
<td>Georgia 1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia 2003</td>
<td>Hungary 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia 1997</td>
<td>Macedonia 2002–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 2005</td>
<td>Romania 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 2000</td>
<td>Romania 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 1996</td>
<td>Montenegro 1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partially stable (75–89% of seats are gained by “old” parties)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria 1994†</td>
<td>Bulgaria 2005</td>
<td>Armenia 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania 1992–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partially stable (unstable strategy)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 1992</td>
<td>Serbia 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unstable (50–74% of seats are gained by “old” parties)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia 2002</td>
<td>Latvia 1999</td>
<td>Armenia 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 1998–2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unstable (unstable strategy)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very unstable (less than 50% of seats are gained by “old” parties)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria 2001†</td>
<td>Georgia 2004</td>
<td>Estonia 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 1992</td>
<td>Georgia 2002</td>
<td>Latvia 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
Unstable strategy: more than one third of seats were gained by parties which changed their name or coalition partners
† Approaching greater stability
¶ Approaching lesser stability
* Stable and unstable strategies are not differentiated.
Source: Šedo 2006.

1 Some scholars refuse outright to talk at the early stages of development of ‘party systems’ and prefer to use other terms, for example ‘party configuration’ (Taagepera 1996).
Broadly speaking, the instability was common in the early stages, above all in countries with a broad opposition movement. The disintegration of this opposition movement between the first and second free elections meant that new parties entered parliament. Countries which from the very beginning used list proportional electoral systems, with small number of constituencies (Czech Republic, Slovenia), have seen their party systems stabilize relatively quickly; this is not to say, however, that using this system would be a universal way to secure stability. Countries which changed the electoral formula after the first election, such as the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Serbia, have been unstable to a degree that might seem surprising. Countries that frequently change the electoral formula do not suffer from such a pronounced instability, unless some relevant parties boycott the elections, as happened in Macedonia in 1994.

**Table 5. Stability of party system format**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>When the format was established</th>
<th>Main rivals</th>
<th>Number of parties/blocs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>De facto already at the first election</td>
<td>PSSh x PDSh (transformed communist party x its challenger)</td>
<td>Blocs surrounding the main poles, some smaller parties are more independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Partially stable</td>
<td>Dominant position of the HHSh, later HHK (pro-presidential)</td>
<td>Bloc surrounding dominant party, multiple parties and/or blocs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR in the 1990s</td>
<td>Already at the first election</td>
<td>BSP x SDS (transformed communist party x its challenger)</td>
<td>Blocs surrounding the main parties, the only stable minor pole is formed by the ethnic DPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR 2001</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td></td>
<td>Several parties and coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>The entities are interconnected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina (FBiH)</td>
<td>Second half of 1990s</td>
<td>Two ethnic parties (SDA, HDZ) x two parties striving for supra-ethnic character (SDP, SBiH)</td>
<td>Multiple parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>Only partial (significant shifts between the parties)</td>
<td>Ethnic SDS x parties proclaiming moderate policies (PDP, SNSD), this group is volatile</td>
<td>Multiple parties, differences between the strong and weak parties less explicit than in FBiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV in the 1990s</td>
<td>Already at the first election</td>
<td>Ultra-dominant position of HDZ</td>
<td>Several parties, the opposition aims to cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV since 2000</td>
<td>Partially stable</td>
<td>HDZ x SDP</td>
<td>Several coalitions and parties. Out of the former opposition, the coalition surrounding the SDP party had twice achieved the best result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Right-wing parties in 1992, left-wing parties in 1996</td>
<td>ODS x CSSD (the strongest right-wing party x the strongest left-wing party)</td>
<td>Several parties, the far Left KSČM and center KDU-ČSL are stable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Repeated shifts between possible main poles</td>
<td>Several parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>Discontinuity</td>
<td>Dominance of pro-presidential bloc</td>
<td>Several blocs and parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Mid-1990s (at the beginning it looked like the following model: Christian Nationals x Liberals x Socialists)</td>
<td>MSZP x Fidesz (since 1998, there was no really obvious dominant right-wing party before)</td>
<td>Left-wing bloc (MSZP, SZDSZ) x right-wing bloc (Fidesz together with smaller parties), attempts to establish a third player failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU in the 1990s</td>
<td>Since the second election</td>
<td>LDSDP x TS (LK) (transformed communist party x transformed opposition movement)</td>
<td>Multiple parties, the Right has a propensity for establishing a bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU since 2000</td>
<td>Partially stable</td>
<td>LDSDP (union LDDP + LDSP) x liberals x the right x unclear role of DP</td>
<td>Multiple parties/bloc with significant shifts of support. In 2004 an important entry of a new player (DP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>When the format was established</td>
<td>Main rivals</td>
<td>Number of parties/blocs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Repeated shifts between possible main poles</td>
<td>Several parties, new parties are constantly entering the competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td>Partially in the first election, following elections seem to reinforce the tendency</td>
<td>SDSM x VMRO-DPMNE (transformed communist party x the strongest right-wing party)</td>
<td>Blocs surrounding the major poles, the Albanian parties form a borderline case between the major and minor poles. Attempts to establish a centre player were unsuccessful. In 2006 new players entered the game.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE until 1998</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Ultra-dominant position of DPS CG</td>
<td>Several parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE since 1998</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>DPS x SNP (against Yugoslavia x for Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>Blocs surrounding the major poles (DPS being somewhat stronger) and several small parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL in the 1990s</td>
<td>Partially stable</td>
<td>SLD x right-wing parties</td>
<td>Multiple parties, the Right seeks a way to counter SLD domination (in 1997, the right-wing coalition AWS won)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL since 2001</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>In 2001 outright domination of SLD. In 2005, the right is more successful (parties formed at AWS's disintegration), SLD is crushed</td>
<td>Several parties; radical parties SRP and LPR enter into the parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>Partially stable</td>
<td>FDSN/PDSR/PSD (one of the FSN successors, often changes its name) x attempts of right-wing parties (unsuccessful in 1992 and 2000, in 1996 CDR was successful, in 2004 the alliance of PD and PNL succeeded)</td>
<td>Blocs surrounding the main parties plus ethnic UDMR and nationalistic PRM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB until 2000</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>SPS has dominant position</td>
<td>Multiple parties, attempts to establish a bloc against SPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB since 2000</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>The former wide cooperation in opposition is eroded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK until 1998</td>
<td>Since 1992</td>
<td>HZDS has dominant position</td>
<td>Multiple parties, attempts to cooperate against against HZDS were successful in 1998 with SDK, emerging victorious (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK since 1998</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Further decrease of support for both HZDS and SDKÚ (the main successor of SDK), in 2006 SMER enters the equation</td>
<td>Several parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN until 2004</td>
<td>Since 1992</td>
<td>LDS has dominant position</td>
<td>Several parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN since 2004</td>
<td>Stable (?)</td>
<td>LDS x SDS (centre left x centre right)</td>
<td>Several parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanatory notes:
Established format – stable – positions of parties in competition is clear (one party is dominant or two or more big parties/blocs compete); the behaviour of other parties is “predictable”.
Partially stable – positions of parties in competition is less clear; partial changes of format (e.g. more pronounced changes arising from repeated fusions and erosions of one of the main parties/blocs).
Unstable – significant changes in the strength of parties representing the main ideological tendencies; it is impossible to decide which party/bloc plays the role of a “major player” and which of a “minor player” for a significant period of time.
Years indicate since when the format is stable.
Several parties – in addition to the major parties, there are several (up to six) more smaller relevant parties in Parliament. This label is also used for stable coalition formats, even if that means that more than six smaller parties achieve representation in Parliament.
Multiple parties – in addition to the major parties there are numerous smaller parties in Parliament, although some are only partially relevant (e.g. parties that gain one seat thanks to a majority representation component of the election). This
A stable party system format can be found only in some countries. Most often it is a matter of multipartism with two main rival parties and several smaller parties. The competition of two blocs in Hungary is probably as close to classic bipartism as one finds in the countries studied. The Baltic countries and countries that experienced profound changes of political issues or had the general direction of their regime changed, are less stable. Out of those countries, it was only Montenegro where the ‘new stability’ quickly established itself. The outright domination of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) had been replaced by competition between DPS and its renegade pro-Serbian branch, the Socialist People’s Party (SNP). DPS has been repeatedly victorious in those competitions, but its lead is not as high as it used to be (Pavičević 2002, Kaňa 2002).

**Practices in terms of pacts, alliances, etc.**

Different types of electoral systems encourage, allow, or even preclude certain strategies of candidate nomination. Various factors might contribute to a situation in which other nomination methods are established, beyond that of competition between political parties as such. In certain countries, a relatively modest tradition of democratic party membership was decisive; in others, specific social cleavages played the main role. Principal among the aforementioned nomination methods are the following: loosely formed coalitions, formalised coalitions and independent nominations.

**Looser cooperation of parties in an election**

One especially encounters looser alliances in countries where some seats are elected by a majority system. Such cooperation very often leads to a coalition government or to collaboration in opposition. In systems with single-member constituencies, various forms of alliances between close political parties are not uncommon:

- Nomination of common candidates for single-member constituencies. The parties comprising the ‘new politics’ coalition in Lithuania proceed in this way. For seats elected by proportional representation, there were two separate ballots: Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS) and New Union–Social Liberals (NS–SL). For single-member constituencies, the two parties and their minor partners nominated candidates together (Hloušek 2005, Dančák 2002a, Matoušková 2004).

- Nomination of common candidates in selected constituencies. Examples of this practice can be found in almost all countries with a majority system, whether the entire house is elected by the majority system or just part of it. For example, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) in Hungary have been employing this strategy for quite some time (two common candidates in 2002, ten common candidates in 2006) (Benda 2003, National Election Office of Hungary).

- Cooperation during the second round. In all countries that use the two-round system, parties negotiate about cooperation before the second round. If only two candidates with the most votes from the first round proceed to the second round, cooperation usually consists of expressing verbal support for the candidates of the close party. A scenario where more than two candidates proceed to the
second round, as in Croatia (in 1990), Macedonia (in 1990 and 1994) and, as has existed in Hungary since 1990, is quite different. In Hungary, where 176 representatives are elected in single-member constituencies, the three candidates with the most votes proceed to the second round, as does any candidate who gains at least 15 per cent of votes. This arrangement reinforces the division into a left-wing and right-wing bloc, because it makes sense for each to leave only one candidate in the game before the second round. The stronger candidate usually remains, but not always: in 2002 six candidates of MSZP retracted to the benefit of their weaker partners in SZDSZ, this being somewhat ‘equal in value’ to retracting 71 candidates of the weaker SZDSZ party (Šedo 2002b, National Election Office of Hungary, Mlejnek 2004, Šedo 2006).

In both majority and proportional systems, one can also encounter other means of cooperation, for example ‘non-aggression pacts’ during the electoral campaigning. Political parties in Albania in 2005 present us with a very specific case of maximally exploiting the electoral system via loose cooperation. The Albanian electoral system is close to that of Germany, but in 2005 the results were noticeably disproportionate. The two strongest parties, the Albania Workers’ Party (PSSh) and the Democratic Party of Albania (PDSH), gained most votes in single-member constituencies: together they polled about five-sixths of all votes cast. In proportional voting, citizens cast their votes for close minor partners of the two major parties, which together polled only about one-sixth of all votes cast. This cooperation was most obvious in the right-wing Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Welfare (ALDM) coalition, which did not even nominate any representatives in the single-member constituencies. PSSh and PDSH gained no seats in the constituencies voted by proportional representation, which were all distributed among their allies (Šedo 2006).

**Formal coalitions**

In countries with proportional representation at least in part, coalition ballots have become more common than looser forms of cooperation. Various factors contributed to this: after the change of regime, a multitude of parties formed, and a number of them decided to form coalitions to increase their chances of being voted into office. Many countries also introduced minimum election thresholds for representation in parliament, which impeded the small parties.

Many perceived increasing numbers of coalitions as a destabilizing factor, because coalitions were prone to disintegration in the actual parliament. Several countries therefore decided to introduce rules impeding coalitions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB since 2001</td>
<td>Party threshold of 2.5%, coalition threshold of 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE 1992–8</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 7% for two parties, 9% for three parties and 11% for four or more parties forming the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE since 2002</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 10% for two parties, 15% for three parties and 20% for four or more parties forming the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST since 1999</td>
<td>Coalitions prohibited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV in 1995</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 8% for two parties and 11% for three or more parties forming the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN 1994–2006</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 10% for two parties and 15% for three or more parties forming the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU since 1996</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL since 1993</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU 1992–6</td>
<td>Party threshold of 3%, coalition threshold of 4–8% (depending on the number of parties forming the coalition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU since 2000</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 8–10% (depending on the number of parties forming the coalition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK 1992–4, since 2002</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 7% for two or three parties, 10% for four or more parties forming the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK in 1998</td>
<td>Threshold of 5% for each party forming the coalition (effectively prohibiting coalitions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Šedo 2006.*
In some countries the parties manage to circumvent measures impeding coalitions. ‘Quasi-coalitions’ are quite common: a candidate from another party is included on the ballot of a party ostensibly running on its own, or several parties are formally joined into one, but keep their independent existences (see for example Malíř, Marek 2005). In some countries, for example, Lithuania, the electoral law is fairly benevolent and unless the aggregation designates itself as a coalition, it is considered a party (Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania).

If a country is deeply split into two distinct alternatives, as in Bulgaria in the 1990s, or if there is one strong party to which the opposition is trying to form an answer, as in Croatia in the period closely preceding the fall of Tuđman’s regime, coalitions are more likely to appear. If the impediments to the creation of coalitions are moderate, they will not be effective. Coalitions are usually absent or minimally present in systems with stable parties or in countries which have introduced strict measures against them. The presence or absence of coalitions often continues even after the reasons for their introduction or demise have disappeared. For example, the political parties in Slovakia do not form coalitions in the way they did before 1998, even though the 1998 law was rescinded and the less strict 1992 threshold reinstated (Šedo 2006).

### Table 7. Share of coalition ballots in parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>97</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>99</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>02</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0–10 %</td>
<td>10–25 %</td>
<td>25–50 %</td>
<td>+ 50 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Šedo 2006.

**Independent representatives**

Among the factors that can facilitate the election of candidates who proclaim themselves independent are the following: an insufficiently structured party system; negative connotations of party membership lingering from the era of communist dictatorship; general distrust of political parties (see e.g. Mareš 2004 for more about the opposition to party membership).

In some countries which use proportional representation (such as Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania) independent candidates can successfully run for office—in theory. However, thus far independent candidates have succeeded only in majority voting (Šedo 2006). They have managed to gain seats in the upper chambers of the Czech and Polish parliaments (Election Server of the Czech Statistical Office, National Electoral Commission of Poland). In countries with proportional voting, independent representatives appear, in practice, only during the term of the parliament—that is, if they leave their original parliamentary party group.
Table 8. Share of independents in the lower chamber of the parliament after an election

| Country | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 |
|---------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| ALB     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| ARM     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| BGR     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| BIH     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| CZE     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| EST     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| GEO     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| HRV     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| HUN     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| LVA     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| LTU     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| MKD     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| MNE     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| POL     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| ROU     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| SRB     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| SVN     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

Percentage of total: 0 %, 0 – 5 %, 5 – 33 %

* Seats reserved for minorities are excluded.


Overview of electoral systems

Voters in post-communist countries generally elect local governments, often including mayors, as well as the lower chamber of parliament. A directly elected head of state is also common as increasingly are regional governments. Two-chamber parliaments are very rare, and if they exist the upper chamber is most often directly elected.

In direct presidential elections the majority run-off system is usually used. In indirect presidential elections, the parliament usually elects the head of state; convoking a wider electoral body is possible only in Estonia under certain conditions.

Table 9. An overview of directly elected bodies (the lower chamber of parliament and bodies at the local level are excluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Upper chamber of the parliament</th>
<th>Regional or subnational government</th>
<th>Another government at a lower level</th>
<th>European Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABL</td>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In Federation of BiH only</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>In autonomous republics only</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (abolished in 2001)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Kosovo, Vojvodina</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Indirectly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x—Does not exist.
Note: Especially in the countries that were part of Yugoslavia the local level comprises units (opštine) that are much larger than their counterparts in, for instance, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland.

Table 10. Indirect presidential elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral body</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Two-thirds of all members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Both chambers of parliament</td>
<td>Three rounds. 1. Absolute majority in each chamber. 2. Simple majority in each chamber. 3. Simple majority of the two chambers combined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Parliament (delegates of local governments and the Parliament) (367 in 2001)</td>
<td>Two-thirds of all members (three rounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Three rounds. Rounds 1–2: two-thirds of all members. Round 3: two candidates, simple majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kubát 2004a.

Table 12 lists the electoral systems of the parliaments (or their lower chambers, respectively) of the countries studied and reflects the situation as it stood on 1 August 2006.

Electoral systems of the lower chambers of parliament

In the formation of party systems in post-communist countries, the country-wide level, or in the case of federations, the state level, was crucial. Direct elections were held to the parliament (or, alternatively, to the lower chamber) during the whole period studied, whereas regional governments or upper chambers of parliaments were often established only at a later point. In an overwhelming majority of countries the elections to the lower chamber symbolized the beginning of the process of democratization, and election of state parliaments in 1990 in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia played an important role in the demise of those federations.

Typically, post-communist countries have gradually changed their electoral systems in favour of the list proportional type. Whereas elections at the beginning of the process of democratization often used a two-round majority system, the next elections marked the process of transition from the two-round majority system, via a mixed system, to a list proportional electoral system (cf. Kasapović, Nohlen 1996, Flores Juberías 2004). This observation remains valid to this day and, with the exception of countries with atypical alterations (such as the personalized proportional electoral system in Albania), no country has made reforms that would go against this tendency (Šedo 2006, Birch 2003). In many countries, the transition towards a list proportional electoral system was followed by another reform, or, in some cases, several. During the 1990s, those steps were mostly ones that worsened the chances of small parties, most often by introducing or increasing electoral thresholds (Flores Juberías 2004). Poland embarked on a major reform to severely limit the chances of smaller parties in 1993, combining country-wide thresholds, decreasing the size of the constituencies, changing the electoral formula and instituting stricter requirements for party registration (Kubát 2000). More recently, the significant changes curbing the chances of small parties were (a) in Romania before the 2000 election, the increase of the electoral threshold from 3 per cent to 5 per cent; and (b) in Serbia at the same time, replacing smaller constituencies, each with its 5 per cent regional threshold, by one large constituency for the whole of Serbia, with a 5 per cent country-wide threshold, thus drastically reducing the chances of many regional parties to stand independently in the election and be successful (Šedo 2006). Adjustments made even more recently have been mostly minor, and sometimes actually slightly improve the chances of smaller parties, as for example reform in Poland before the 2001 election, which decreased the number of constituencies and introduced a milder electoral formula (Birch et al. 2002). However, it is not possible to claim that the trend of worsening the chances of smaller parties is reversing, because so far there has been no larger reform that would improve their lot.

Among the mixed electoral system, the segmented type (in which two formulae are used independently of each other) became the most common one in post-communist countries. This type was rarely used in the past (Birch 2003, Massicotte, Blais 1999). List proportional electoral systems are often ‘tainted’—a threshold of some sort being the most common source of disproportion. Most countries use a country-wide threshold, which has gradually reached 4–5 per cent; in rare cases the threshold is even higher. Many countries have
higher thresholds for coalitions (e.g. 8–10 per cent in Romania, depending on the number of parties forming the coalition), Estonia prohibits coalitions altogether. District magnitude was an important factor in the Polish electoral system from 1993; however its importance has diminished since reforms at the beginning of the new century. Separate constituencies without the country-wide threshold (currently in use in Croatia and Macedonia) also play a certain role in the over- or under-representation of some parties. The district magnitude does affect smaller parties in the Czech Republic, Poland and at the distribution of 152 seats at the regional level in Hungary (Šedo 2006). The electoral formulae are mostly classic (d’Hondt’s divisor is most frequently used): only Estonia is using a specific system at the country-wide level (with the sequence 1, 2^{0.9}, 3^{0.9}, 4^{0.9}…), which allows for a modest advantage for large parties in very large constituencies (cf. Šedo 2006).

**Table 11. Number of parliaments elected over time in the countries studied, sorted according to the formulae used**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Majoritarian</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>List proportional</th>
<th>Other type of proportional representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Šedo 2006, Birch 2003, Szajkowski 1994
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral system type</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
<th>Constituencies</th>
<th>Seats per constituency (average)</th>
<th>Ballot structure</th>
<th>Form of voting</th>
<th>Level of seat allocation</th>
<th>Seat allocation method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB (2005)</td>
<td>Personalized proportional</td>
<td>140: 100 100 1 40 1 40</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Vote for an individual</td>
<td>Single-member constituency</td>
<td>Number of seats is determined according to Hare-Niemayer quota and largest remainder method for all 140 seats (party threshold of 2.5%, coalition threshold of 4%); if the party gains more seats in single-member constituencies than this calculation would allow, those seats are subtracted from the 'ideal' calculation for parties that did not gain as many seats in single-member constituencies as the 'ideal' calculation would allow them.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM (2003)</td>
<td>Mixed-superposition</td>
<td>131: 56 56 1 75 1 75</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Vote for an individual</td>
<td>Single-member constituency</td>
<td>Simple majority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH (2002)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>42: 21 5 3–6 4.2 7 1 7 9 3 3 3 5 1 5</td>
<td>Open party lists</td>
<td>Unlimited preferences</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>St. Laguè divisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Country-wide constituency</td>
<td>St. Laguè divisor (compensatory seats)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>St. Laguè divisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR (2005)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>240 1 240</td>
<td>Closed regional party lists</td>
<td>Single vote</td>
<td>Country-wide constituency</td>
<td>D'Hondt divisor at the country-wide level, country-wide threshold of 4%, party seats distributed to regional party lists (31 nominal constituencies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Electoral system type</td>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>Seats per constituency (average)</td>
<td>Ballot structure</td>
<td>Form of voting</td>
<td>Level of seat allocation</td>
<td>Seat allocation method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE (2006)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5–25</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>Open party lists</td>
<td>Up to two preferences</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>Party threshold of 5%, coalition threshold of 10% for two parties, 15% for three parties and 20% for four and more parties forming the coalition; d'Hondt's divisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST (2003)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>7–12</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Quasi-list system</td>
<td>Single vote</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>Hare quota on the level of constituencies (applied first on the candidates, then on party lists with country-wide threshold of 5%); remaining seats are distributed according to modified d'Hondt's divisor at country-wide level with country-wide threshold of 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO (2004)</td>
<td>Mixed-superposition</td>
<td>235:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Vote for an individual</td>
<td>Single-member constituency</td>
<td>Qualified absolute majority (in the first round majority of votes and qualified majority 1/3 of votes of all registered voters)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Vote for party list</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>Threshold of 7%, d'Hondt divisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV (2003)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>148+:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of seats depends on the turnout of Croatians voting abroad. The diaspora seats are determined according to the average number of votes per seat in the constituencies in Croatia itself (minorities excluded).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Vote for party list</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>Regional threshold of 5%, d'Hondt divisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Vote for an individual</td>
<td></td>
<td>Simple majority (one to three representatives of the six ethnic minorities, or groups of minorities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Electoral system type</td>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>Constituencies</td>
<td>Seats per constituency (average)</td>
<td>Ballot structure</td>
<td>Form of voting</td>
<td>Level of seat allocation</td>
<td>Seat allocation method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN (2006)</td>
<td>Supermixed</td>
<td>386:</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Vote for an individual</td>
<td>Single-member constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4–28</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Vote for party list</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Country-wide constituency</td>
<td>Threshold as in regional constituencies; d'Hondt divisor on the basis of unused votes from other formulae</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Open party lists</td>
<td>up to five preferences</td>
<td>Country-wide constituency</td>
<td>Country-wide party threshold of 5%, country-wide coalition threshold of 7%, Hare quota, largest remainder method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA (2002)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14–27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Open party lists</td>
<td>Single preference</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD (2006)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Single vote</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Electoral system type</td>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>Constituencies</td>
<td>Party lists</td>
<td>Single vote</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>Seat allocation method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Single vote</td>
<td>special constituency</td>
<td>Threshold of 3%, d'Hondt divider (in areas with Albanian minority)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL (2005)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Open party lists</td>
<td>Single preference</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>Country-wide party threshold of 5%, country-wide coalition threshold of 8% for party lists in multi member constituencies; d'Hondt divisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU (2004)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Single vote</td>
<td>Multi-member constituency</td>
<td>Country-wide party threshold of 5%, country-wide coalition threshold of 8–10%; Hare quota; remaining seats are distributed at country-wide level, d'Hondt divisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB (2003)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Closed party lists</td>
<td>Single vote</td>
<td>Country-wide constituency</td>
<td>Threshold of 5%, d'Hondt's divisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Electoral system type</td>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>Seats per constituency (average)</td>
<td>Ballot structure</td>
<td>Form of voting</td>
<td>Level of seat allocation</td>
<td>Seat allocation method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK (2006)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Open party lists</td>
<td>Up to four preferences</td>
<td>Country-wide constituency</td>
<td>Countrywide party threshold of 5%, country-wide coalition threshold of 7% for two or three parties and 10% for four and more parties forming the coalition; Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, largest remainder method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN (2004)</td>
<td>List proportional</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Open party lists</td>
<td>Single vote with optional preference</td>
<td>nation-wide constituency</td>
<td>Droop quota; remaining seats are distributed at country-wide level, d'Hondt divisor; threshold of 4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B.: The parliament was elected by the electoral system specified in the year indicated in brackets after the country name. If the year is 2006, the election was held before 1 August 2006.

Other important structural issues in the region

Electoral participation

Decreasing electoral participation, often cited as one of the problems of contemporary democracies, is also a common research topic in the study of post-communist countries making their transition to democracy (see e.g. Birch 2003, Rose, Munro 2003). Currently citizens in post-communist countries are significantly less interested in elections than their Western European counterparts (Blais, Massicotte, Dobrynyska 2003). These low turnouts at democratic elections stand in sharp contrast to the high turnouts witnessed under the various communist dictatorships, when according to official statistics almost everyone showed up for elections. In the last non-free election the turnout was at least 90 per cent in all countries studied except Poland, and in many countries the official number was 99 per cent or even higher (Birch 2003). Those numbers might not entirely correspond to the reality, of course; citizens were subject to coercion during the campaign itself and also risked an unspecified punishment for electoral absence. An overwhelming majority succumbed to this coercion. In the first at least partially free elections of the lower chamber of the parliament, the turnout was high. Though obviously not reaching the near 100 per cent of the previous era, a turnout of 90 per cent was not exceptional. The 1990s, however, witnessed a dramatic change: in most countries the turnout decreased significantly (Hungary being an exception, with approximately 60–70 per cent turnout in all elections since 1990). Currently, the turnout in most countries is between half and two-thirds of voters, and the rate of decrease is no longer significant. In some countries the turnout seems to have more or less stabilised, usually around the 60 per cent mark. Recently, however, the turnout at the parliamentary elections in Albania, Lithuania and Poland was less than 50 per cent. This is something of a warning sign: a similar drop in turnout could easily occur in other countries, as there is no evidence to indicate otherwise.

Turnout is generally also respectable at presidential elections, though it depends to some extent on the importance of the president (Pacek, Pop-Eleches, Tucker 2006). For example in Slovakia, where the president has limited powers, the turnout was 47.9 per cent in the first round in 2003 (43.5 per cent in the second round, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 2004); in Lithuania and Poland, by comparison, the turnout is higher at a presidential election than it is at the next parliamentary election (Rose, Munro 2003).

Other elections (of the upper chamber of the parliament, of the European Parliament, or at the regional and local level) attract little attention, unless they are directly connected with the election of the lower chamber of the national parliament. In some cases the turnout is less than 10 per cent. A good example of differences between electoral participation in Western and Central European countries are the European Parliament elections. In 2004, the five countries with the lowest turnout were the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland and Slovakia; in Slovakia the turnout was only 17 per cent. Lithuania was the only country of this region where the turnout was marginally higher than average (European Parliament 2004).

2 The direct election of the heads of the autonomous regions in Slovakia seems somewhat unfortunately organized. A majority run-off system is used and while the first round is connected with the election of the council, the second is not connected with any other voting. The turnout is usually low at the council election and minimal in the second round. It was rather low already at the first Slovak regional elections, and averaged at 22.61 per cent in the second round. Only in the Trnava and Nitra regions was the turnout more than one third, the second round being a duel between Slovak and Hungarian candidates. In 2005, the turnout in the first round was usually less than 20 per cent; in the second round it was less than 10 per cent in three out of the eight regions (lowest at 7.12 per cent in the Trenčín region) (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic website).
Table 13. Turnout at the election of the lower chamber of the parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1st (Year)</th>
<th>2nd (Year)</th>
<th>3rd (Year)</th>
<th>4th (Year)</th>
<th>5th (Year)</th>
<th>6th (Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

* Estimations vary.

Sources: Birch 2003, IDEA: Voter Turnout Database, IPU: Parline Database, Archive of the authors.

The representation of minorities

Several Central and Eastern European countries are markedly heterogeneous in their ethnic make-up. Disputes between the different ethnic groups were among the causes of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and are a source of tension in this region to this day. In almost every country of the region there is at least one relevant party representing an ethnic minority, or there has been such a party in the past.

Several countries regulate the issue of minorities via electoral laws or laws governing political parties. Some countries, notably Albania, Bulgaria and Georgia, operate a restrictive policy that forbids parties based on ethnicity or region. Such actions have had limited effect, however, because in practical terms all they have achieved is to force the parties representing the minorities (such as the Greek Human Rights Unity Party (PMDN) party in Albania and the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) party in Bulgaria) to declare that the defence of rights they promote applies to all citizens.

Rules encouraging political parties to put minority candidates on their ballots are (or were in the past) used only by a few countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantees minimum representation of the three constituent ethnic groups at the level of the entities in the directly elected lower chambers of the parliament (for details, see Bosnia and Herzegovina country chapter). In the second tier this can lead to the favouring of a party which has on its ballot an individual whose nationality has so far been inadequately represented in the given entity (Electoral law of Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, the number of seats reserved for the second scrutiny, at more than 25 per cent, de facto precludes a situation in which one party would be favoured over another by virtue of this measure. Since 1992 Croatia has guaranteed a minimum representation to minorities comprising at least 8 per cent of the population (i.e. the Serbs). Should they not achieve proportional representation in the election of 120 Members of Parliament, extra seats would be given to Serbs on the ballots of the parties which managed to reach the 3 per cent election threshold; should this prove insufficient, a by-election would be held. In 1992 both procedures had to be used in the end, because no Serb was elected in the normal process and the party ballots supplied 10 out of the 13 seats required (eight for the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) and two for the Croatian People's Party (HNS); both parties gained extra seats) (Kasapović 1993).
More often, seats are allocated to the parties representing ethnic minorities in a way that does not encourage the dominant ethnic group to put members of ethnic minorities on their own party ballots, or that favours the existence of independent minority parties. This applies especially to minorities that would not succeed very well in a normal electoral contest. More significant minorities—such as the Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania or the Russians in Latvia—gain representation in the usual electoral contests. For smaller minorities, any of the following approaches might apply (Šedo 2006, Šedo 2005, Alionescu 2004, Pavlećević 2002, CESID 2002):

- The country-wide threshold is not applied to the minority party. Since 1993 this rule has been in force in Poland and allows the German minority to gain two seats in the Sejm. The same was true of Lithuania in 1992, where two seats were gained by Poles in proportional voting and two in single-seat constituencies. Since 1996 this has no longer applied and the Poles now gain only two seats in single-seat constituencies.

- An extra constituency is specified which facilitates representation of the minority. Since 1998 Montenegro has—in addition to the country-wide constituency—an extra constituency in the area where the Albanian minority lives. Two out of the five seats (two out of four after 2002) are reserved for the Albanian parties, which could not otherwise reach the 3 per cent country-wide threshold.

- An extra constituency reserved for the minorities is specified. In Slovenia one representative each of the Hungarian and Italian minorities is elected according to the Borda rule. Since 1992 the representatives of minorities have been elected by plurality in special single-member constituencies in Croatia. Today eight seats are allocated by this method: three are for Serbs, one for Italians and one for Hungarians. The remaining seats are designated for the following groups: one for Czechs and Slovaks; one for Albanians, Bosnians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenians; one for Austrians, Bulgarians, Germans, Jews, Poles, Romanians, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Turks, Ukrainians and Vlachs.

- Minimum representation of the ethnic parties is guaranteed. With some later changes, this approach has been used in Romania since 1990. Since 2004 seats have been allocated in the Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) to any minority represented by a party which manages to win at least 10 per cent of the votes necessary to win a seat but which has not previously gained a seat. If more than one party per minority fulfils this condition, the seat is to be given to the strongest one. Eighteen seats in the present Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) are allocated in this way.
External Regulations

Level of regulation of political parties and their activities

The regulation of political parties in most Central and Eastern European countries is carried out in a comprehensive way. All countries use a constitution as the fundamental legal document for the functioning of their political parties; in all of the countries, laws about political parties, as well as the electoral codes themselves, regulate the activities of the political parties. Most of the national parliaments have passed legislation governing the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the access of political parties to the media. Some countries have implemented special regulations dealing with particular issues attached to their political parties. These include the Armenian Act of Holding Meetings, Processions and Pickets and Act on Holding a Referendum (both from 2005); the Estonian Income Tax Act Regulation of the Minister of Justice; Georgia’s Orders and Decisions by the Central Election Commission, and Law of the Autonomous Republic of Adjar on the election of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Adjar (2004); a law on the financing of political parties (Lithuania, Latvia, Serbia); Act on the Central Election Commission (1994, 2000 Latvia); regulations, decrees and notices issued by the Ministry of Interior (Czech Republic, Hungary); an Act on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (1993, 2002, Hungary); and a law on local self-government (1993, 2000 Slovenia).

Most of the definitions stress voluntarism and individual membership: ‘Political parties are voluntary unions of citizens on the basis of joint political interests, ideas, beliefs and points of view or interests, which aim at influencing the life of the country through participation in elections and representation of the people in the elected organs of power’ (Albanian Law on Political Parties Nr. 8580, 17.02.2000). Some countries (e.g. Estonia, Macedonia, Romania, Lithuania, Slovenia) explicitly stress in the definition the need to be a national citizen; interestingly, Slovenian legislation explicitly bans the membership of foreigners. Basically five main authorities decide on the registration of a political party: the Ministry of Justice (Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania); the Ministry of the Interior (Czech Republic, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia), the court of the capital city (Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Poland, Romania); higher courts according to the seat of the political party (Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Estonia, Hungary); while in Kosovo it is the Political Party Registration Office acting from within the Institution-Building Pillar of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Usually the following documents are required to be submitted to ensure the registration of a political party: an application for registration signed by the party representatives, the statutes of the party and a party programme. Sometimes there is the requirement for a list of names and a certain number of party members’ signatures (Albania, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia); a statement concerning the party headquarters, assets and liabilities (e.g. Romania); documentary evidence of a bank account (e.g. Romania); the graphic symbol or emblem of a party.

3 Serbia was the last country to approve a law on political parties, in September 2006. At the time of writing the approved legislation was not yet available.
4 ‘A political party is a voluntary political association of Estonian citizens…’ (Estonian Political Parties Act, 1994, last amended 18.12.2003).
5 ‘At least 500 adult citizens—citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, with permanent residence in the Republic of Macedonia, may found a political party.’ (Law on Political Parties, 2002).
6 ‘Political parties are political groupings of Romanian Citizens…’ (Romanian Law n. 14 of 2003 on Political parties)
7 ‘A political party is a legally established and named body whose aim is to act in the political interest of its members, to give voice to the political will of the citizens of the Lithuanian Republic.’ (Lithuanian Law on Political Parties 2004).
8 ‘A party may be founded by no less than 200 adult citizens of the Republic of Slovenia.’ (Slovenian Political Parties Act 1994, 2002).
9 ‘A foreigner may not become a member of a party, but may become an honorary member of a party where this is provided for in the party’s statutes.’ (Slovenian Political Parties Act 1994, 2002).
10 The most liberal in this sense is the Hungarian law, which requires at least 10 founding members, while the most ‘restrictive’ law is provided for by Romanian legislation: at least 25,000 founding members domiciled in at least 18 of the Romanian counties and not less than 700 persons for each of the counties and Bucharest.
Poland, Estonia, Georgia, Slovenia or as a part of statute in Macedonia; or the establishment of regional or local party branches (Armenia, BiH, Romania).

All of the countries analyzed regulate the political parties in relation to accessing media. Generally, the legislature deals with the election period, when all political parties are guaranteed to get appropriate and impartial treatment. In all countries the publicly owned television and radio broadcasters allocate free time for each contesting party (free of charge) and allocate not more than a certain amount of broadcasting time for political advertisements. In some countries the public radio and television channels may not broadcast paid political advertising (Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic) while in other countries they may (BiH, Georgia, Macedonia, Slovakia). Some countries limit the amount of time devoted to any given party on even commercial radio and television stations (Albania), whereas other countries have no time-limit for paid broadcasting on commercial radio and television (Armenia, Estonia, Serbia, Montenegro). Such broadcasting laws do not usually apply to the print media, in which there are only two barriers for journalists: the civic liability for libel or defamation and the ethical barrier.

Special provisions regarding (im)partiality are in place in Albania, where political parties which obtained more than 20 per cent of the seats in parliament in the last parliamentary elections gain equal air-time of not less than 30 minutes on public television and the same on public radio; for the other parliamentary parties this air-time is not less than 15 minutes. Each party not represented in the Assembly participating in elections is entitled to 10 minutes of air-time on public television and 10 minutes of air-time on public radio. (The Electoral Code of Albania, Articles 136–140). Very similar provisions are applied in Slovenia: all candidates and parties represented in the parliament have an equal amount of time to present themselves (equality principle). Political parties and independent candidates not represented in the parliament must have one-third of the entire programme time at their disposal. (Law of 1994 on Radio and Television, as amended in 2001, article 8. 9. 27.) In Romania, the parliamentary parties have access to the media during elections free of charge, whereas the non-parliamentary parties have the right to access television and radio under equal conditions. In Latvia there are special provisions concerning national minorities. At present, the public broadcasting service has devoted 20 per cent of the second channel, LTV 2, and one of the four public radio stations to broadcasting in minority languages. In terms of the private media, section 19 paragraph 5 of the media law (Radio and Television Law adopted in 1995) pertaining to private broadcast media stipulates that ‘the amount of broadcasting time in foreign languages in programmes produced by broadcasting organizations shall not exceed 25 per cent of the total volume of the broadcasting time in a 24-hour period.’ The restriction is important, because only 57.7 per cent of the population in Latvia is Latvian, which means that political parties representing minorities have to fight for air-time in order to transmit programmes in minority languages. However, during the election campaign political parties are entitled to free air-time.

**Implementation of existing laws and regulations**

There are different bodies responsible for the administration and enforcement of the legislation concerning political parties. The Central Election Commission usually performs the role of electoral management body; the Constitutional Courts, Supreme Courts, Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Justice generally have monitoring and controlling functions; the National Auditors’ Office or Ministry of Finance are entitled to supervise the legality of political parties’ financial affairs; the Office for Equal Opportunities is responsible for gender affairs in Slovenia.

In March 2001 the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) in BiH issued three summary decisions and two individual decisions regarding alleged violations of the campaign financing requirements set out in the Rules and Regulations and the State Law on Political Party Financing. As sanctions, the EASC requested the resignation of the accountants and vice-presidents of political parties, otherwise they would face further sanctions from the EASC, including the possible removal of mandates won in the November 2000 general elections. The democratic trend in participation of political parties on the Bosnian political scene could be seen even in the banning of the candidates from running for office: for example, of the 60 candidates

---

11 As a result of the internal conflict, the clause prohibiting use of the domestic and foreign state symbols is included.
prohibited from running for office in the elections of November 2000, 21 candidates had violated Provisional Election Commission (PEC) Rules and Regulations, or had not vacated property or apartments with tenancy rights of refugees and displaced persons within the deadline; 30 candidates were removed from the candidates list owing to EASC decisions; nine candidates were included in the candidacy list without their knowledge; and two candidates could not run for office owing to incompatibility with their public positions (Association of Election Officials in BiH).

Another good example of the implementation of existing laws and regulations is the case of Georgia, where sanctions\textsuperscript{12} are being applied to several political parties that failed to provide reports in the 2004 parliamentary elections. In the last ten years in Hungary, prosecutors have launched 482 legal actions against political parties; however, there is no data available to show how many of them ended with sanctions. The example from Latvia is the case of the Union of the Greens and Farmers, which was obliged to pay into the state budget the illegal donations it received prior to the parliamentary elections in 2002. In Macedonia, the Supreme Court reviewed the registration of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), which was accused of violating the Constitution with its programme and of having a logo written in the Latin alphabet rather than in Cyrillic. However, the Supreme Court accorded permission for registration of the DPA. Some parties have already been sanctioned in connection with breaches of electoral rules in Kosovo. For example, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) was fined 1,000 DEM because party supporters spray-painted public buildings and used an ambulance to display party posters in 2000. Other parties were fined for firing shots in the air during the election campaign.

But in the Balkans it is not only parties that are being sanctioned. From time to time the party representatives or state representatives are questioned by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or removed to the Hague—for example, the former president of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavšić, was indicted by ICTY in 2001, and the leader of the radical Serbi party in Republika Srpska, Nikola Poplašen, was removed from office in March 1999\textsuperscript{13}.

**Prohibition/bans on political parties**

The deregistration of a political party can be prompted by: an anti-democratic policy held by the party and a desired change of the territorial integrity of the state (most of the countries); bankruptcy or insolvency (Albania, Croatia); a breach of the Code of Conduct (Albania, BiH, Croatia); a breach of prevailing electoral laws (Albania, Armenia, Poland); hate speech or inciteful activities (Albania, Armenia, BiH, Georgia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania); the formation of military troops and war propaganda (Armenia, Georgia, Macedonia, Estonia); the propagation of racism or totalitarianism (Latvia, Macedonia); a lack of activity; or simply failing to meet the membership quota (BiH, Macedonia, Lithuania, Romania, Estonia). The Polish and the Kosovo legislatures are the only ones which may ban a political party for not providing its report about the cost of an election or its annual financial report within the given time limit. The Estonian legislature bans within Estonian territory and jurisdiction the formation and operation not only of foreign political parties or their sub-units, but also of any foreign-run political associations. There is no country in which a party could be deregistered if it fails to meet gender quotas. Usually, it is the Constitutional or Supreme Court which decides about the deregistration of a political party.

The very first example of implementing of the Law on Political Parties from the countries analyzed is the case of Omonia—a club of ethnic Greeks in Albania which was about to form a political party. The Albanian Law on Political Parties, approved shortly before the elections in 1991, prohibited the setting up of a political party based on ethnicity. As a result the Unity of Human Rights Party (PBDNJ) was founded, which was *pro forma* open to all Albanians but was principally representing the interests of ethnic Greeks.

\textsuperscript{12} Any party which has not reported to the Central Election Commission on its spending in elections campaign will not be allowed to participate in the next elections (Georgian Unified Elections Code, 2001, 2005, article 48).

\textsuperscript{13} For all bans imposed on the party representatives see the Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative.
The Pan-Armenian party, Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), was banned in 1995 owing to its alleged formation of military troops and aim of seizing power. The party was disbanded, the leaders were imprisoned and their official daily newspaper, *Yerkir*, and weekly paper, *Azatamart*, were banned. All the sanctions against the party were cancelled in 1998 and nowadays ARF is represented in the National Assembly and has two ministerial posts in the government.

**Party finance: regulation and practice**

In general, measures concerning political financing are divided into regulations and subsidies. These include:

(a) bans on certain types of donations,
(b) contribution limits,
(c) spending limits for political parties and presidential candidates,
(d) public subsidies,
(e) indirect public funding and in-kind subsidies (including regulations concerning political broadcasting),
(f) comprehensive disclosure and reporting regulations, and
(g) severe penalties (Transparency International 2004).

The countries analyzed do not share a common pattern of regulatory ordinances governing campaign finances. Some countries opted for detailed regulations (Poland), some chose liberal regulation (Croatia) and little state interference with campaign funding (Latvia). It is not possible to speak of stable campaign funding rules in the regions, as many countries are in the process of revising and overhauling their legislation on political finance (Istens, Smilov, Walecki 2001). Several countries introduced spending limits on expenditure, namely Armenia, BiH, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia and Slovakia. Others have refrained from introducing this kind of restriction: Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Romania. The contribution limits do not correspond to the limits on expenditure: Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia and Serbia introduced contribution limits.

The political parties have similar income sources: membership dues, donations from natural and legal citizens, direct state subsidies, and indirect state support in the form of free time in media or party charter-related restricted enterprises. A party can receive a subsidy after its registration (Albania), after the elections or in the form of annual subsidies (most of the countries), in the form of tax relief (BiH) or in the form of individual donations (most of the countries). Usually the parties cannot accept donations from state-owned companies or private companies with a government capital share, regardless of the size of the share. A very common feature is a ban on contributions from anonymous (most of the countries) or foreign source. For example, political parties in Serbia cannot accept material and financial assistance from foreign states, foreign legal entities and natural persons (Serbian Law on Financing of Political Parties 2003). Usually the law bans the influx of illegal money. An interesting case is Latvia, where a new law (2004) bans former officials of the Soviet-era Committee for State Security (KGB), and people who have been convicted of property crimes, economic crimes or crimes related to government service, from donating money to parties (Transparency International Latvia 2005). The only countries which have not introduced a ban on foreign money are Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia. Some countries have introduced only a partial ban: Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania (e.g. in Bulgaria foreign citizens are allowed to make donations but there are limits imposed on them—500 USD per year for individuals and 2,000 USD per year for group of individuals).

The only country where there are no direct state subsidies for political organizations is Latvia. Even though the political parties strive for subsidies they failed in their attempts to introduce them in the last amendment of the Law on Financing of Political Organizations (in 2005). The only state support in Latvia is that the parties do not pay income tax (donations to political parties are not tax-exempt, unlike in Bosnia). The law in Latvia also allows for a limited amount of free air-time on national television and radio for all parties registered for the respective parliamentary elections. Another form of indirect state support is the publication free of charge of political platforms of parties running in the elections (Latvian Law on Financing of Political Organizations (Parties) 2005). A similar situation exists in Armenia, where parties do not receive direct annual subsidies from the state and are only entitled to equal amounts of free air-time on television and radio.
The only difference is that the presidential candidates who have received 25 per cent or more of the votes cast in the elections are reimbursed 50 per cent of the costs during the pre-election campaign. A completely different situation exists in Hungary, where the state provides significant direct funding to political parties. To qualify, a party must gain at least 1 per cent of all votes cast in the parliamentary elections. Twenty five per cent of the total funds from the state budget are distributed equally among parties based on the number of votes gained by each party in the first lawful round of parliamentary elections. In addition, each party putting forward candidates for election is entitled to receive support from the state budget in proportion to the number of candidates presented, while independent candidates are entitled to receive the same amount as party candidates. It is clear, therefore, that the state funding of political parties is an important factor in the operation of Hungarian democracy (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001). 

In all countries parties are obliged to declare and register donations made to them and usually also to submit a notice to the relevant institution informing them about the contributions. However, in most of the countries the sanctions are inadequate and their enforcement remains a problem.

Table 14. Party finance regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partly&amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partly***</td>
<td>Yes****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Public radio and television may not broadcast paid political advertising; there is a time limit for private radio and television broadcasters.

** A ban on paid political advertising in public media. Political advertising in the commercial media during a pre-election campaign is unrestricted.

*** Foreign donations from corporations and individuals are banned, though financial gifts from foundations are allowed.

**** A ban on paid political advertising in electronic media.

Source: van Biezen 2004; Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001; Open Society Institute 2002a and 2002b; Law on Political Parties (Czech Republic, Montenegro, Slovenia); Law on Financing of Political Parties (Montenegro, Serbia); Law on Election Campaign (Slovenia), CESID 2005.

Attempts to suppress (armed) conflicts by laws or regulations

Some countries are very precise about the way in which they define the circumstances in which a political party may not be established, for example, the Bulgarian Political Parties Act: ‘when (a) its activities are aimed against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the country and the unity of the nation, against the rights and the freedom of the citizens; (b) its goals run contrary to the Constitution and the legislation of the country; (c) it is based on a confessional or an ethnic principle or purports to fan up racial, national, ethnic and religious enmity; (d) it proclaims a fascist ideology or is striving to achieve its goals through violence or other legally impermissible means.’ ‘Militarized or clandestine groups or organizations may not be established within or at
the political parties.’ The restrictions in the Georgian legislation are similar: ‘The formation and activity of such public and political associations aiming at overthrowing or forcibly changing the constitutional structure of Georgia, infringing the independence and territorial integrity of the country or propagandizing war or violence, provoking national, local, religious or social animosity, shall be impermissible. The creation of armed formations by public and political associations shall be impermissible.’ (Constitution of Georgia, 2004, article 26). ‘The creation and functioning of parties which aim to destroy the Georgian Constitutional order, or to change it by means of force, either undermine the state’s independence, or its territorial integrity, which propagate war and violence, foster ethnic, religious, social or territorial hostility, is forbidden. No party can be established according to the regional or territorial principle.’ (Georgian Organic Law on Political Associations of Georgian Citizens, 1997). Armenia included in its Law on Political Parties a prohibition of the ‘modification of the territorial integrity, formation of military troops and propaganda of violence and war’. Similarly, Czech legislation bans parties which ‘violate the constitution or which strive for the destruction of the democratic constitutional order, which do not have democratic statutes or democratically elected organs, which strive for power by undemocratic means, whose programme threatens morality, public order or the citizens’ rights and freedoms. Parties must not form military units.’ (Law on political parties and movements 424/1991).

Other external regulation issues of importance in the region

Probably the most important external factor in the region is the presence of the international community or, even better, the institution of the Office of the High Representative in the political system of BiH (being the final authority in the country) and the presence of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Both of these institutions have had an enormous impact on the legislative process in these states.
Internal Functioning

Candidate selection

Most countries do not have a law specifying how political parties should select their candidates, but rather leave it to the internal regulations of the parties themselves. Armenia is an exception, where according to the law the presidential candidate is selected by the party session (highest body) and parliamentary candidates by the second permanent body of the party (Party Act, Electoral Codex). In Kosovo the law guarantees a democratic selection of candidates for the election of the legislature (section 13). Likewise in Lithuania the law prescribes that the candidates should be selected by a party congress or conference, unless their statutes say otherwise (article 37, Law on Elections to the Seimas). Gender quotas set by some countries also influence the selection of candidates (see Women’s Political Participation chapter for more information). Quotas for the representation of minorities are not set by law, and if the electoral laws consider the representation of minorities, they usually encourage independent action on the part of the parties of those minorities (this topic is explored in greater detail in the section entitled ‘Other important structural issues in the region’).

The statutes of political parties do not usually restrict the candidate selection process, and the influence of third parties, for example non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or trade unions, is informal at best. The only real external limitation in the selection of candidates occurs on the ballots of coalitions or quasi-coalitions; some places on the ballot are reserved for the other parties in the coalition. Most parties do not introduce their own quotas besides those set by the law. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in Hungary is an exception: it specifies that 20 per cent of candidates should be under the age of 35 (§41 of MSZP Statute). Even if the statutes set some quotas, they are not necessarily always fulfilled.

Broadly speaking, various levels of the party are involved in the selection of candidates, depending on which body is being elected. Nomination of the presidential candidate is usually reserved for the central authority of the party; if the president holds important powers and parties are centralized, the candidate will be the party leader. For parliamentary elections, different levels cooperate. In local and regional elections local party organizations should be more independent. In reality, the process of nominating the candidates is dependent on the level of intra-party democracy and the strength of the central party authority. In post-communist countries, the parties are strongly centralised and the inner leadership and/or the party leader himself has a decisive say in the selection of the candidates. This is also true in countries with a majority system or those split into several multi-member constituencies. Where the local party organization enjoys a degree of autonomy, however, the central authority can veto the local or regional ballots. Country-wide ballots are mostly in the hands of the central authority, with the leader at the top of the ballot and the inner leadership and other individuals close to the leader following the lead. In some countries eminent sponsors of the parties are put at the forefront, thus guaranteeing them a seat in the parliament in exchange for their financial support of the party (IDEA Country Report on Armenia 2006). This is not exclusive to Armenia, however; as one can observe that parties are willing to nominate their sponsors in exchange for money in several other countries.

In countries where the whole society has quickly and smoothly become democratic, not only are there at least some parties of long standing, but if the country is split into multiple constituencies one can also expect a greater degree of intra-party democracy. Regional party organizations are in such cases able to retain a certain autonomy in candidate selection. For example, reform of the regional division of the Czech Republic, which led amongst other changes to introducing regional governments, has strengthened the regional party organizations as well. In some cases, individuals with close relationships to the leadership did not manage to secure a position high enough on the ballot to guarantee them an actual seat, because they were eclipsed by personalities with strong regional links (this is discussed in more detail in Lebeda 2003). The change of the electoral law for the election of the parliament was also a factor, because the second tier with a new country-wide ballot was abolished. In this country-wide ballot the influence of the central authority was decisive: one, two, three or four seats could be allocated to individuals who, though close to the leadership, did not secure their seats in the regions.
Leadership selection

The parties in all countries studied have a similar structure and differ only in the way they name their various organs. A party’s statutes specify how often its congresses shall be held. Long-term issues are decided at these congresses, as well as the leader and other party representatives. Between the congresses the councils decide on current issues, while boards and the leadership with the leader run the party on a day-to-day basis. There is also an auditing committee. The regional and local levels have a similar structure. In reality, one can observe that different party organs have varying influences and likewise the amount of power held by the inner leadership differs from case to case.

The party is very often heavily dependent on its leader. In many countries the founder of the party is its leader to this day. The longest continuously ruling leaders of relevant parties are: Ahmed Dogan of the Bulgarian Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), since spring 1990; Vuk Drašković of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), since October 1990; Zmago Jelinčić of the Slovenian National Party (SNS) and Vladimir Mečiar of Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), since the first half of 1991. Many leaders have been continuously in office since the first half of the 1990s (see for example Fiala, Holzer, Strmiska 2002). During the congress, the real contest is only for lower posts while the leader’s position is confirmed. If two strong personalities struggle for the leadership of a party, the loser often leaves the party—either out of choice or out of necessity—to form his own party. The leader retains a significant influence over the party even if he decides to leave it; this is because he will have reached a position (such as president of the country) which precludes him from returning to being an ordinary party member. Especially in the Balkans and Caucasus the inner leadership is a clique which is connected to family and clan structures. The only country which has seen all the leaders replaced since 2000 is the Czech Republic. To a degree it was the replacement of the original leaders of the Czech parties which also allowed for more competitive selection.

The position of the leader or the inner leadership also influences lower levels. It is somewhat weaker in countries where parties have been stable over a longer period of time and where the nomination of candidates is linked with the regions.

Strong identification of the party with the leader is also obvious when the leader's name is part of the ballot’s name, such as the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)—Milorad Dodik in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002; the names of both leaders in the name of the alliance of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) and the New Union–Social Liberals (NS–SL) in Lithuania in 2004; Milo Đukanović’s name, which was repeatedly connected with the ballot of pro-independence politicians in Montenegro etc, (see Šedo 2006).

Policy/programme development

Programmes are generally approved by the party congresses and implemented by the board and leadership. There are significant differences, however, not only among the different countries, but also among parties within one country.

The state authorities have limited power of surveillance over the programme of the parties. Most often it is limited to taking action against parties that encourage the overthrow of the democratic system, or in some other way jeopardize the constitution. In Armenia regulation of the parties is stronger: submitting the programme (and its future changes) is one of the conditions of registration by the Ministry of Justice.

In the Central European and Baltic countries one can encounter well worked out and sophisticated party programmes. To deal with specific issues, groups of experts are assembled and the findings of public opinion research used; cooperation with ideologically close think-tanks is also common. The suggestions are then discussed at the top levels and sometimes lower levels and individual members can have their say. Although it is the party congress which has the last word when a programme is to be changed, sophisticated use of professional expertise, whether internal or external, tends to limit the influence of common party members over a party’s programme development. In Hungary in the first half of 1990s the central party authorities had less influence over programme development than today.
Parties in the Balkans and Caucasus are also moving towards more detailed and professionally written programmes. However, one very often encounters parties whose programmes are limited to vague declarations and slogans and for which the function of party programmes is substituted by election manifestos. In the election, campaign slogans are often used instead of full programmes, and are not always compatible with the actual programme or declared objectives of the party.

**Membership relations and role of membership**

During the communist dictatorships party membership was widespread, although the probation period preceding full membership complicated the process somewhat. After the fall of communism, party membership in the existing parties has sharply declined. (It is worth noting here that even under communism, some non-communist parties were allowed, though they enjoyed only a limited autonomy.) New parties usually have only a few thousand members. It is difficult to obtain precise figures, as documentation of membership is often imprecise and vague (except in countries that specify a minimum membership, e.g. in Estonia, where a registered party has to have at least 1,000 members). Citizens do not seem to have a particular urge to join the parties (even though the admission process is now much easier) and many members are barely active at the local organization level. On the other hand, one can encounter people who link their careers with their party membership, or who expect to gain business advantages from their party activities (i.e. by having connections with people holding public offices). Low levels of membership in local branches of major parties has in some cases led to fraud, with ‘dead souls’, when certain individuals have sought to dominate the local branch by the fraudulent registration of members, hoping to attain more votes in intra-party decisions.

Party members have to pay membership fees, although they are not an important source of income for the parties. The members have the right to vote and be voted into party bodies (directly at a local level; at higher levels and for the party congress they might only be voting delegates), to aim for public offices through their party, and to participate in intra-party discussion. Being an ordinary member of a party does not bring direct material benefits.

The level of development of intra-party communication depends on a number of factors. In countries where the internet is readily accessible, emails and both intra-party and public discussion forums are gaining importance and one can encounter even party internet radio stations. Party newspapers vary between countries: in Central Europe especially, one encounters propaganda vehicles published during election campaigns rather than regular daily newspapers. However, in daily newspapers that claim to be independent a partisan influence is still discernible. In other countries the influence of daily party newspapers is more important; for example, after the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was banned, its newspaper, *Erkir (The Country)*, at the time the most read broadsheet, was banned as well.

Intra-party communication is usually along the top-down model; updates and changes of the programme are distributed to the lower levels. The tasks that need to be accomplished during the election campaign are distributed in a similar fashion. Between elections intra-party activities are noticeably reduced in many countries.
Table 15. Party membership

(\% of adult population)

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\end{figure}

*Source:* European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006.
Women’s political participation

The situation in figures

One striking feature of the new post-communist parliaments has been the precipitous decline in the number of women deputies. In Soviet-type systems ‘socialist’ representation required deputies that were reflective of society. Women never constituted a majority of deputies but for many years women were far more numerous in communist legislatures than in their Western European counterparts. In the new democratic environment more women used the opportunity to work for local governments, business or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than to become a member of parliament (Millard 2004).

Despite the fact that some Central and Eastern European states did not introduce quotas, the level of women’s representation in their parliaments is not necessarily low. Armenia is the country with the lowest percentage of women’s representation in the lower chamber (the quota is only 5 per cent of the female candidates on the political party lists); Macedonia is the country with the highest representation of women in the parliament (the quota is 30 per cent of the party lists). The Baltic states have traditionally high levels of female representation in their representative bodies. The greatest paradox is that in probably the most patriarchal society—in Kosovo society—women’s representation is the second highest of the countries analyzed.

Table 16. Women’s representation in lower chambers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>ALB</th>
<th>ARM</th>
<th>BIH</th>
<th>BGR</th>
<th>CZE</th>
<th>EST</th>
<th>GEO</th>
<th>HRV</th>
<th>HUN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/140</td>
<td>7/131</td>
<td>7/42</td>
<td>53/240</td>
<td>31/200</td>
<td>19/101</td>
<td>22/235</td>
<td>33/152</td>
<td>40/386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>LTU</th>
<th>LVA</th>
<th>MKD</th>
<th>MNE</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>ROU</th>
<th>SRB</th>
<th>SVK</th>
<th>SLN</th>
<th>UNK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29/141</td>
<td>21/100</td>
<td>34/120</td>
<td>7/81</td>
<td>94/460</td>
<td>38/332</td>
<td>30/250</td>
<td>26/150</td>
<td>11/90</td>
<td>34/150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In most countries there were popular, highly visible, and experienced women in parliament. Only four countries have experience with a woman in the post of prime minister (Renata Indzhova in Bulgaria, Kazimira Prunskienė and Irena Degutienė in Lithuania, Radmila Šekersinska in Macedonia and Hanna Suchocka in Poland) and four countries with a woman in the post of president (Biljana Plavšić in Republika Srpska, Nino Burjanadze in Georgia, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga in Latvia and Nataša Mičić in Serbia). However, Lithuania and Slovakia have had women ministers of finance, Poland and the Czech Republic women leaders of the Senate. In the Czech lands, Dagmar Burešová served as Chair of the Czech National Council in 1990, Vlasta Parkanová became the Czech Republic's Minister of Justice in December 1996. In the 1998 parliament Petra Buzková was described as the most popular social democratic politician. Hana Marvanová led the Czech Freedom Union. Slovakia's largest and most successful party, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), included Olga Keltšová and Katarína Tótova among its leaders, with Zdenka Kramplová as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997–8. Nadezhda Mihailova was highly respected as the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria.
after 1997. In Hungary in 2002 there was a sudden influx of women into key posts in parliament, with Ibolya David leading the opposition Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF); Monika Lamperth became Minister of the Interior. However, the lack of data about parties creates a huge gap in identifying women activists and in reconstructing the ‘ladder of their recruitment process’ (Millard 2004).

**Legal provisions**

An analysis of women’s political participation reveals many contradictions and paradoxes. It is clear that the political participation of women differs throughout the region. It was especially in countries which had a strong tradition of patriarchy and bigotry that various laws promulgating equality of women in politics were adopted and implemented. In countries where the emancipation of women took place much sooner—especially in secular societies or in those where the Church has no significant influence over politics—no such laws were adopted. In most of the countries of the first group, missions of the international community are or were present; these were in fact the main external factor influencing the adoption of gender-equality laws in those countries. In Croatia 10 per cent more funds are given to political parties that have women elected into parliament; this has proved a significant stimulus to the political parties as is witnessed by the fact that Croatia is one of the countries in the region with the biggest share of women in the parliament (IDEA Global Database of Quotas for Women). The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) together with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were instrumental in the adoption by Bosnia and Herzegovina of a complex gender-related legislation. Article 4.19 of the Electoral Law provides that ‘Every candidates’ list shall include candidates of male and female gender. The minority gender candidates shall be distributed on the candidates’ list in the following manner. At least one minority gender candidate among the first two candidates, two minority gender candidates amongst the first five candidates, and three minority gender candidates among the first eight candidates, et seq. The number of minority gender candidates shall be at least equal to the total number of the candidates on the list, divided by three rounded up to the closest integer.’ The electoral laws of the Republic of Macedonia for the Members of Parliament (2002) stipulate that a minimum of 30 per cent of each sex should be represented on party candidate lists. The same provision is included in the Local Government legislation (2004). The law includes a penalty as well: in the event that parties fail to meet the 30 per cent criterion they will not be registered for the elections. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had an impact on the local electoral law as well, and one can observe there the most generous gender provisions in the whole region. The Armenian Electoral Code of (1999) stipulates that women shall make at least 5 per cent of the candidates in the electoral lists presented by a party for the elections to the National Assembly.

However, there are two countries where the OSCE mission was or has been present and which do not have any gender legislative provisions. Even though the OSCE participated in the elaboration of a new electoral code in 1997 in Albania, it does not include any gender provision; the same applies to the ongoing OSCE mission in Georgia which has been concentrating instead on the resumption of constructive dialogue in the Georgian–Ossetian conflict. Countries where there was no international mission either have no constitutional gender quota for national parliaments or have adopted no electoral codes with a gender quota. The only exception in this group of countries is the country with the longest civil society tradition among the Central and Eastern European new democracies—Slovenia, which adopted a new electoral law in 2005 which

---

14 Among the countries with a strong tradition of patriarchy we count especially Balkan and Caucasian countries. The second group is formed especially by Central European and Baltic countries.

15 Law No.2004/2 on Gender Equality in Kosovo. According to section 10.1, all registered political parties shall ensure that both females and males are equally represented. Equal representation means, according to section 3.2 of the law, 40 per cent of each sex. This rule says nothing about candidacy in elections, however. Section 21 of the Electoral Code requires the fulfilling of gender quotas: (a) Of the first 67 per cent of candidates on a candidate list, at least 33 per cent shall be male and at least 33 per cent shall be female, with one candidate from each gender included at least once in each group of three candidates, counting from the first candidate in the list. (b) The number of candidates in the first 67 per cent of candidates on a list shall be calculated by rounding up to the nearest integer. (c) If the last group in the first 67 per cent of candidates on a list consists of a single candidate, then the candidate may be of either gender. (d) If the last group in the first 67 per cent of candidates on a list consists of two candidates, then each shall be of a different gender.
stipulates a 20 per cent quota for local elections in 2006. This quota will increase to 30 per cent for the 2010 election and 40 per cent for the 2014 election. Other provisions and penalties were incorporated into this new law. The electoral code for the local elections states that every third candidate must be of the under-represented sex; in 2003 the Slovenian parliament adopted a 40 per cent quota for European Parliament elections. To sum up, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Serbia and Montenegro have no gender provision either in the Constitution or in the electoral codes. Romania adopted in 2004 a new electoral law which states that the candidate lists for parliamentary elections must include both male and female candidates. However, the law does not specify a percentage of female candidates.

Efforts by parties to ensure women’s participation

Traditionally, left-wing parties are more favourable to women; it is usually only the social democratic or socialist parties in the particular countries that have introduced quotas (in BiH, Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary and in Macedonia). Right-wing or centrist parties introduced internal gender quotas in these countries: Union for National Self-Determination (NSDU) in Armenia, Freedom Union (UW) in Poland, Democratic Party (PD) in Romania, Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) in Slovakia and Liberal Democratic Party (LDS) in Slovenia. Parties that introduced quotas and could not be classified either as left or right include the Shamiram Women’s Party of Armenia, which is not currently present in the parliament, and the People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L’S–HZDS), currently in the government. There are no political parties with quotas in Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro.

The way ahead

A range of factors and variables could be identified as relevant to issues of women’s representation: affluent societies are more conducive to women’s representation; traditional political culture is not conducive (unlike secular culture) to women’s representation; the presence of women’s organizations in society is advantageous; left-wing parties are most favourable to women, right-wing extremist parties are least favourable to women; institutionalized parties are better for women and large parties are better than small ones; a strong women’s presence in local government may provide a career ladder for women; single-member districts are less conducive to women’s representation than a proportional representation system; closed lists are better for women than open lists (Millard 2004).

Even though some parties have high female memberships, the women are not visible in the party leadership. Women are also usually on rather low positions on the ballot, so even if the ballots have gender quotas, only a small number of women get elected into the parliament. Therefore, support for the creation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that promote and educate the public about equal participation should be the first step so that social stereotypes can be overcome and the position of women in society improved. The second step should involve implementing the gender quotas.

16 ‘Political parties included in the register of political parties shall adopt, every four years, a plan in which they shall adopt a position on the issue of balanced representation of women and men and, in accordance with this position, determine methods and measures for the promotion of a more balanced representation of women and men within the bodies of the party, on candidate lists for elections to the National Assembly and to bodies of local communities as well as for elections of the President of the Republic. Political parties referred to in the previous paragraph shall submit a plan to the Office within three months following its adoption’ (article 31). ‘A political party shall be fined at least 300,000 SIT for a violation if it does not submit to the Office the plan referred to in article 31’ (article 35).
Region-Specific Issues

Political parties in Central and Eastern Europe and ‘Europeization’

The study of the relationship between the European level of politics and the party politics of nation states is a relatively new and undeveloped branch of the study of political parties (c.f. Ladrech 2002, Fiala et al. 2006). Whether the relationship between EU-level and national political systems is mostly one-way (e.g. Börzel, Risse 2003) or two-way (e.g. Enyedi 2005) in Central and Eastern European countries is one of the focal points of contemporary research. Studies of political parties prefer a one-way, ‘top-down’ concept, and concentrate on the analysis of the transformation of national party systems brought about by deepening European integration.

Understandably, the intensity of the problem varies depending on whether the countries studied are the EU member states which joined in 2004 (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Baltic countries, Slovenia), EU candidate countries which are set to become members soon (Bulgaria, Romania), which hope to join somewhat later (Croatia), or at a much more later point (all the other countries). According to Peter Mair (Mair 2000), the accession of a country to the EU, or the imminence of accession, brings about the ‘depoliticization’ of some political issues, because the national government loses a degree of influence in some areas, and the context in which the political parties operate also changes. This process is called the Europeization of party politics by Robert Ladrech (Ladrech 2002).

Thus defined, Europeization can be observed in at least five dimensions of party politics according to Czech political scientist Vít Hloušek (Hloušek 2004a).

- Changes in party programmes reflecting a party’s involvement in the process of European integration.
- Changes in party structure that are linked to the fact that the party elite is enlarged by the European Parliament representatives, and lobbyists at the EU level.
- Transformation of the patterns of party competition caused, for example, by the emergence of new strong parties that are parties of protest vis-a-vis the European dimension.
- Changes of relationships between the parties and the government, caused by the government’s split loyalty between the parties and the EU executive.
- Changes of relationships above the level of national party system, linked with the active role the Central and Eastern European parties play in establishing new European parties and federations of parties.

No predominant regional pattern has thus far emerged in any of the above-mentioned dimensions in any of the countries studied. Changes in party structure seem to be the least pronounced so far, although acceptance of certain elements typical of the European level of politics, e.g. gender quotas, intra-party referendums, etc. (see Internal Functioning chapter for more details) will probably change this in the near future. Relationships between the government and the parties have changed markedly in Bulgaria, which has led some analysts (see for example Kavalski 2004) to claim that transformation of the government’s loyalties, from the parties to the EU, is a typical trait of the EU accession process. This shift was linked with the creation of heterogeneous coalition governments in which loyalty towards the EU and fulfilling the goal of accession was the sole element cementing those coalitions. Voiced expectations (see for example Hloušek 2004a) that parties from the new EU members will be somewhat passive are not borne out by the reality of the dimension of party interaction above the level of the national party system. Contrary to expectations, the parties have been markedly involved in processes that have changed party interactions at the European level. The role played by the Polish party Self Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP) in the making of a new Eurosceptic party at the European level, the EUDemocrats- Alliance for a Europe of Democracies (EUD), in November 2005, or similarly the League of Polish Families (LPR) in the making of another Eurosceptic party, Alliance des

17 Hungarian political scientist Zsolt Enyedi (Enyedi 2005) found ten dimensions. The process of interaction with the European level of politics has implications in the following areas: the relative strength of political parties within the political system; the importance of European issues within national party systems; the attitudes of parties towards European integration; changes in the nature of party competition; party fragmentation and polarization; changes in the relative strength of party families; new impetuses for supranational party cooperation; changes in party organization and representation.
Démocrates Indépendants en Europe (ADIEU), during 2006, is worth mentioning in this context. The case of the post-communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which was accepted into the European-level Party of European Socialists (PES) as the first party with communist roots, was unprecedented and remarkable. Another noteworthy development again relating to PES occurred in 2006 when the Slovak party’s SMER membership in PES was suspended for a year because SMER formed a coalition with the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS). This suspension was not fully consensual, however, as the Czech Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) protested against it. Most recently, the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) together with the UK Conservative Party intend to establish a new ‘Eurorealistic’ faction in the European Parliament called Movement for European Reform. Membership in political parties at the European level has generally been an important source of legitimacy for many parties of Central and Eastern Europe, which have used this legitimacy back in their own nation states. Some parties fought for the privilege of being a member of the appropriate EU-level party. For example the Bulgarian National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) failed to become a member of the European People’s Party (EPP) because another Bulgarian party, Union of Democratic Forces, had established itself in the EPP beforehand. As in Western Europe, membership in the EPP and PES is the most prized, with EPP and PES having representatives in most new member states and candidate countries, their lead being closely followed by European Liberal Democrats (ELDR) (see Appendix 7).

The two remaining aspects of Europeanization, namely changes in party programmes and transformation of the patterns of party competition, are closely interlinked. With EU membership looming on the horizon, certain political issues become more salient and questions such as agricultural policy, rights of minorities, or land-ownership by foreigners come to the forefront and are articulated at the national level in connection with the European label (cf. Havlík, Kaniok 2006). The eastern wave of EU enlargement (this applies to Bulgaria and Romania as well) was relatively protracted, which allowed for a significant erosion of the original consensus about accession at the level of national party systems, and also for an expression of negative attitudes towards the present state of the EU and European integration as such (cf. Taggart, Szczerbiak 2001). However, two points must be made here. First, no single-issue, anti-EU parties have thus far emerged in Central and Eastern Europe—a few borderline cases like the Bulgarian National Union Attack (ATAKA) being exceptions. Second, distinctions need to be made between individual parties that in some way express their opposition to the EU and movement towards European integration. On the one hand, there are ‘hardline Eurosceptic’ parties (Taggart-Szczerbiak 2003:6)18 which oppose the EU and European integration as a matter of principle and therefore wish their country to leave the EU (or, eventually, not enter it). Parties such as the League of Polish Families (LPR), the ATAKA or the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) belong to this small category. ‘Soft Euroscepticism’ is embodied by parties that express qualified opposition to some of the EU’s policies, most often to the supranational paradigm of European integration. A range of parties in Central and Eastern Europe belongs to this broad category, among which are parties forming the main pole of party competition, such as the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Hungarian Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz), Polish Law and Justice (PiS) or Estonian Centre Party (K), and a range of other parties, for example the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), Romanian Movement for Romania (MPR), Slovakian Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), Bulgarian Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB), Polish Self Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP) or Slovenian National Party (SNS). Soft Euroscepticism cannot be correlated with a certain part of the political spectrum, or wholly identified with parties in opposition or even protest or anti-system parties, but only and exactly with opposition to the currently dominating trend of European integration. This opposition emerges from widely divergent parties.

Whether the European issues will play a more significant role in the party systems of the new member states than in the ‘old’ EU countries is a question to which scholars have so far provided equivocal answers. For example, Cas Mudde (Mudde 2005) believes that the new member states have a much bigger potential for the politicization of European topics. Mudde claims (cf. Havlík, Kaniok 2006) that neither the elites nor the masses in the new countries were fully included in in the process of European integration, the issue of Europe was more politicized (in pre-accession referendums, for example) and a significant portion of the elites only supported accession because it was a ‘no choice situation’. Vit Hloušek, on the other hand (Hloušek, forthcoming), believes that in most new member states the conflict surrounding EU issues will be absorbed partly by the existing structure of inter-party political competition, and partly inside the parties themselves. However, EU might become a divisive issue, especially in countries where (a) parties exist which

18 There are many other typologies of Euroscepticism; see especially Kopecký, Mudde 2002 and Conti 2003.
actively mobilize voters in connection with European issues, and where at the same time (b) there is the possibility of voter realignment caused by the EU integration process. Only in such a context is there the possibility—though not a certainty—that the issue of ‘Europe’ will disturb the current pattern of political conflict, which is usually structured along the axis of ‘victors’ and ‘losers’ in the process of regime transformation. From the countries studied this could be a possibility in Poland, where several relevant Eurosceptic parties operate and significant long-term distrust of the EU can be observed\(^{19}\). The ramifications of the emergence of European issues in the national party systems are not yet very clear and assume a distinctly path-dependent character.

\(^{19}\) In 1999, that is at the point when the ‘pro–European consensus’ began to erode, around 55 per cent of Poles distrusted the EU (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006).
The beginnings of democratization in Albania date back to 1992. The non-existence of a democratic tradition slowed transition, and caused the collapse of the state in 1997; a year later the country was still on the brink of civil war with the murder of prominent politician and member of the Democratic Party, Azem Hajdari. Albania has a population of 3,544,808 (July 2004). Unlike the other countries of south-eastern Europe, it is highly ethnically homogeneous—the largest ethnic minority is Greek (3 per cent of the total population). An important factor in internal politics is the division of the Albanians into two ethnic sub-groups. North of the Shkumbin River live the Gegs; almost all the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and the north of Albania fall into this category. The Tosks live the southern Albania. Before the Second World War the political scene was dominated by the Gegs under the rule of King Zog (1925–39). At present the Gegs form the voter base of the Democratic Party. The Tosks tend to back the Socialist Party (Krpec, Stýskalíková 2002). Albania’s status according to Freedom House Index is ‘partly free’.

In 1991 a temporary constitution was adopted that served until the adoption of a new Constitution, which came into effect on 28 November 1998. The constitutional name of the country is the Republic of Albania (Republika e Shqipërisë).

Albania is a unitary state; administratively the country is divided into 309 localities and 65 municipalities at the first level of local government, 36 districts and 12 regions at the second level.

According to the constitution, the President of the Republic serves a ceremonial function only; in practice this office was exploited by the charismatic Sali Berisha, who introduced in practice a semi-presidential system. In 2002 the somewhat colourless candidate, Rexhep Meidani, was elected president. The president is elected by a three-round vote of parliament to a five-year term, and can be re-elected. The constitution guarantees a strong position to the government; in Albania the principle of collective responsibility of a government or the direct responsibility of the premier does not apply; instead, each minister is responsible for the ministry he or she oversees. Since September 2005 the government has been headed by Sali Berisha. Ministral posts change hands often owing to charges of corruption or connections to organized crime. The Albanian political system is noted for its unstable governments. The single-chamber parliament consists of 140 representatives elected to a four-year term (100 representatives elected through a majority-based system, 40 through a proportional representation). The constitutional court is composed of nine members named by the President with the approval of parliament. Judges are named for nine years and cannot be re-elected; one-third of its members are changed every three years.

The electoral system gave birth to the two most important political parties that have alternated in power: the Socialist Party of Albania (PSSh), and the Democratic Party of Albania. There have been breakaways on both sides, smaller spin-off parties, most of which are coalition allies. The extreme left is represented by the marginalized Communist Party of Albania (PKSh) and the 8th of November Communist Party of Albania; on the extreme right there are two marginal monarchist parties—Legalita, and the National Front (BK). The Union for Human Rights Party (PBDNJ) represents the Greek minority. The current government coalition consists of the Democratic Party of Albania (PDSi), the Republican Party of Albania (PResh), the PBDNJ, the Agrarian-Environmental Party (PASh), and the New Democratic Party (PDR). At present there are 12 parties represented in parliament. The parties are not sharply defined in terms of programme; their role tends to be that of friends or foes of either the Socialist Party of Albania or the Democratic Party of Albania.
Since 1990 the electoral system has been changed six times, resulting each time (besides the first semi-democratic elections in 1991) in a combination of majority and proportional systems. The electoral law was last changed on 19 June 2003. There are 140 seats in parliament; 100 seats are filled on the basis of a relative majority system, the 40 remaining mandates on the proportional system. The threshold for winning a parliamentary seat is 2.5 per cent for parties and 4 per cent for nationwide coalitions. Albania has seen a steady drop in voter participation since the first partially free elections. In 1991 participation reached 98.9 per cent, while in the 2001 elections it was down to 53 per cent (Stýskalíková 2004).

The legal provisions governing political parties include the constitution (approved in a referendum in 1998); the Law on Political Parties (passed in 2003); and the Election Code (passed in 2003 and last amended in 2004). There are no legal provisions governing the internal functioning of political parties. The law of 2003 defines political parties as voluntary unions of citizens who come together on the basis of shared political interests, ideas, beliefs and viewpoints, and who aim to influence the life of the country by participating in elections and representing the people in the elected institutions of power. The Tirana District Court has authority over the registration of political parties. Applications for registration with the Court must be accompanied by the signatures of at least 500 Albanian citizens.

Election campaigns, and the regulations governing them, are the responsibility of the Central Election Commission (CEC). There do not appear to be any unusually prohibitive requirements for the registration of parties and candidates seeking to participate in elections. The Albanian political parties are headed by charismatic, authoritarian-style leaders; decisions are made by a very small group of the privileged, if not by a single person. The Democratic Party is personified by its leader, Sali Berisha, and the Socialist Party until last year’s election loss by Fatos Nano; the controversial Mayor of Tirana, Edi Rama, was elected party chairman in September 2005.

During the pre-election contest, the political programmes of the parties are not the most important factors. The same might be said of the situation even after many of the elections: for reasons that have little to do with political programme, the losing party usually refuses to recognize the results of the poll or the establishment of a government by the winning party. Most these governments are then hampered during their terms in office by boycotts on the part of one or the other of the two main parties.

In the last elections in 2005, only ten women won seats out of 140 total mandates. Some political parties have internal target quotas or affirmative action for filling some seats in parliament. The traditional role of women in Albania was especially altered by the Communist regime, which forcefully implemented a pro-active gender policy and the promotion of women in non-traditional professions.

Armenia

Republic of Armenia
Hayastani Hanrapetutyun
Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն
Armenia

The elections in 1990 saw the end of the hegemony of the Communist Party, and the overwhelming victory of the Armenian National Movement. A referendum on independence was held in September 1991. The first years of Armenia’s independence were marred by a conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, which lasted until the ceasefire in 1994. The question of the Nagorno-Karabakh has not yet been settled. Freedom House classifies Armenia as a ‘partly free’ country (IDEA Country Report on Armenia 2006).
The population of Armenia is estimated at 3,215,800. The population is 97.9 per cent ethnic Armenian, 1.3 per cent Kurd, and 0.5 per cent Russian. Of the population, 96 per cent speak Armenian, 75.8 per cent Russian. The world-wide Armenian diaspora numbers some 8 million people.

Armenia is a presidential republic. The president is elected through popular ballot for a four-year term (absolute majority with second round if necessary). The National Assembly is a unicameral body composed of 131 members who serve four-year terms: 41 members in single-seat constituencies, and 90 by proportional representation, with a 5 per cent threshold. The current government is controlled by three political parties: the conservative Republican Party of Armenia (HHK), the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (HHD), and the Rule of Law (OY) party. The opposition is joined in the Justice Bloc (IDEA Country Report on Armenia 2006).

One of the largest political parties is found on the left side of the political spectrum: the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Hekahakan Dashnaktsutun, Dashnak, or Tashnak), which advocates socialism. It was banned between 1995 and 1998. In the last elections of 25 May 2003, the party gained 19 out of 131 seats. In the last elections the Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) won the greatest number of seats in parliament (31 out of 131), and Adranik Markaryan became prime minister. HHK represents the conservative family of parties. A third party currently holding seats in parliament is Rule of Law (Orinants Erkir), a centrist political party that won 19 (out of 131) seats in the last elections. The opposition joined forces in a bloc called Justice that won 14 out of 131 seats in the 2003 elections. National Unity (AMK) is a conservative political party in Armenia. It is currently led by Artashes Gegamian. In the last elections the party won 9 out of 131 seats. The smallest party in parliament is the United Labour Party (MAK)—a social democratic political party that won 6 out of 131 seats in the 2003 elections.

Legislative measures that pertain to Armenia’s political parties include the constitution of 1995 (amended following a referendum in October 2005); the Civil Code of 2000; the Parties Act of 2002 (amended in 2004); the Electoral Code of 1999 (amended in 2005); the Published and Other Media Act of 1999 (amended in 2003); the Television and Radio Act of 2000; the Act on Meetings, Processions and Pickets of 2005; the Referendum Act of 2005; and the Public Organizations Act of 2001. A political party is defined as a public union based on individual membership of citizens, the activities of which are directed towards participation in the political activities of society and the state. The law specifies the conditions under which parties may be denied registration, but the party is entitled to challenge such a judgment in court. Registration may be denied if a party’s charter and programme are in breach of the law, or if its members are selected exclusively according to professional, religious or ethnic criteria (IDEA Country Report on Armenia 2006).

The new Parties Act aimed at reducing the number of parties by imposing more stringent registration criteria. These include at least 2,000 members; branches of the party must exist in all of the country’s regions; participation in two consecutive parliamentary elections; and winning at least 1 per cent of the vote. The parties are free to choose their internal structure, declare their goals, and go about their activities. There tends to be little turnover in party leadership, with the same figures being re-elected from one party congress to the next. Their power lies in the ability to raise money (or contribute their own). As a rule these party officials brook no rivals; thus a number of these would-be leadership figures have split off to establish their own parties. Any kind of discord or party failing might lead to a split. Within the past five years there have been splits in the National Democratic, Republican, People’s and Communist Parties; six new parties have appeared as a result. Most of the powerful parties are not part of any international organization, and do not receive funding from these sources.

The Armenian Electoral Code of (1999) stipulates that women shall comprise at least 5 per cent of the candidates in the electoral lists presented by a party for the elections to the National Assembly. In general, the higher the position within the party hierarchy, the less likely it is to be held by a woman. Politics is seen mainly as an arena for men: of the 131 MPs, only seven are women; in government, only three women hold deputy ministerial posts (IDEA Country Report on Armenia 2006).
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was declared an independent republic on 3 March 1992. The declaration of sovereignty marked the beginning of a civil war in which all three nationalities (Croats, Serbs, and Bosniacs) as well as the neighbouring states and the international community took part. The estimated population of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of July 2004 is 4,007,608. The Treaty on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, otherwise known as the Dayton Accords, was signed on 14 December 1995, ending the military conflict there, and laying the foundations for the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is contained in article 4 of the Dayton Accords). At present, security in the country is overseen by a European Union mission code-named Althea, which succeeded the previous missions under NATO: the Implementation Force (IFOR), the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and SFOR II. The constitutional name of the country is Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina). Bosnia’s Freedom House rating is ‘partly free’.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a federative democratic republic, divided into two main administrative units (entities), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51 per cent of the territory) and the Republika Srpska (RS) (49 per cent of the territory). Outside these two main administrative units is the district of Brčko. The Brčko district has its own 29-member lawgiving body (Skupština). The district is headed by an international supervisor. After the declaration of independence by Montenegro and the expected declaration of independence by Kosovo, nationalist calls for independence for the Republika Srpska are increasing.

The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is officially headed by a collective presidium in which all three constitutional ethnic groups are represented. Its term is four years. Members of the Presidium rotate as chairman every eight months. Members of the Presidium are elected by a relative majority system. The Croatian and Bosniac members are from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb members from the Republika Srpska. Among the powers of this collective leadership is the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the right to represent the state in international forums. Part of the executive branch is the government of BiH, consisting of nine ministries at present, headed by a premier nominated by the Presidium of BiH and approved by the Chamber of Deputies of BiH. Legislative power is exercised by a bicameral parliament organized on the principle of symmetrical bicameralism. In the Chamber of Deputies of the BiH there are 42 deputies (28 from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 14 from the Republika Srpska). In the House of the People there are 15 deputies (five Bosniacs, five Serbs, and five Croats) elected from the House of the People of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. The term of office of both houses of parliament is four years. At the national level the highest judicial authority is exercised by the Constitutional Court of BiH and the Court of BiH. There are nine constitutional justices (four are elected by the Chamber of Deputies of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and three are named by the chairman of the European Court for Human Rights. They may not be citizens of BiH or neighbouring countries. Each entity has its own judicial system.

A similar system is used at the level of the entities. At the head of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina stands a three-member Presidium, on which representatives of all three constitutional ethnic groups sit, and which is elected indirectly by the federal parliament for a four-year term. Part of the executive branch is the government, which consists of 16 members following the formula of eight Bosniac ministers, five Croat, and three Serbs. Legislative powers are exercised by a two-chamber parliament. In the Chamber of Deputies of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 98 deputies serve terms of four years, with each nationality being guaranteed at least four seats. There are 58 Delegates in the House of the People (17 Croats, 17 Serbs, 17 Bosniacs, and seven delegates of other ethnicity). The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of ten higher administrative units, or cantons (five Bosniacs, three Croatian, two mixed), which are further broken down into districts; the individual cantons have their own parliamentary bodies. The Republika Srpska is
headed by a three-member Presidium directly elected for four years. Governments are again assembled by ethnic quota (eight ministerial posts for the Serbs, five for the Bosniacs, three for the Croats, and two ministries for other ethnicities. The parliament is composed of two chambers; the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska contains 83 representatives (again, the minimum representation for the individual ethnic groups is four). The Council of Nations consists of 28 representatives delegated by the National Assembly (eight Croats, eight Bosniacs, eight Serbs, and four others). The lower units of self-government are the opštini, of which there are 63.

Because of the short two-year term of office that prevailed until 2002, there have been eight elections since the Dayton Accords were signed, five in the case of the Republika Srpska. Basically, there are two party systems existing in parallel (especially in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska), and the third is a combination of the first two. In the party systems the classic families of parties do not exist, and the systems cannot be described as stabilized. In each of the entities developments are trending in different directions. The main actors in the party system of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), and the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP). In Republika Srpska the dominant parties are the following: the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), and the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP). The most important key for voters is ethnicity; the Croatian parties have very little support among the Serbian and Bosniac communities, and vice versa; parties with their base in the Republika Srpska have very little success in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and similar parties based in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have nothing like the success of the Serbian parties (Sedo 2002a; Cabada 2004a). The political parties identified with ethnic groups and the consistent success of nationalistic parties in elections have been a thorn in the side of the international community, in particular the UN High Commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the final authority in theatre for the implementation of Dayton peace agreement) which after elections to the federal parliament in 2000 made efforts to see that a coalition of non-nationalist parties was formed. The Alliance for Change was composed of 10 completely incompatible political parties, and it was clear from the outset that it would fail. Lack of coherence and incompetence on the part of the governing coalition led to the renewed success of the nationalist parties. Trust in the political system is somewhat greater here than in the other countries of the western Balkans.

Political parties in BiH are regulated under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its laws on the financing of political parties (2000), political organizations (1991), elections (2001), the law regulating the presentation of political parties in the media during the pre-election period (2001) and the law on conflict of interest in the government institutions of BiH. Article 2 of the Law of Financing of Political Parties defines a political party: political parties shall be considered organizations into which citizens are freely and voluntarily organized and registered with the competent authority in either Entity, in accordance with the law, in order to carry out political activities and pursue political goals.

There is a strict provision in article 1 of the Electoral Law that declares that: no person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal may register to vote or stand as a candidate. Moreover, as long as any political party or coalition maintains such a person in a political party position or function as described above, that party or coalition shall be deemed ineligible to participate in the elections. A mandate belongs to the elected official and not to the political party (see article 1.9 of the Electoral Law of BiH), so if a member of parliament decides to leave the party through which he or she was elected he or she remains a member of parliament until the next election.

The Electoral Law includes a gender provision. Generally, the Serb ethnicity has the greatest percentage of women represented in the legislative or executive bodies of BiH. In the upper chamber of parliament at the federal level (House of Nations, Dom naroda) composed of 15 representatives, there is not a single woman. In the lower chamber on the state (House of Representatives, Zastupnički dom) of a total of 42 representatives there are 35 men and seven women. In the lower house of parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (House of Nations, 58 members, 17 from the main national ethnicities and seven others) there are three Bosniac women, two Croatians, and seven Serbs. Information on numbers of women in the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not available. In the government of
Prior to 1989 the old political regime sought to perpetuate the ‘leading role’ of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) by pushing forward the modernization and industrialization of underdeveloped Bulgaria. The country had never had any long experience of democracy. Thus the period after 1989 was a period of ‘democratization’, not ‘re-democratization’. The main problem seems to have been weak party structure and frequent interventions by the street in the political process, hindering the building of a functional parliamentary system.

Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with a population of 7.5 million. The Constitution was adopted during the period of the ‘Great’ National Assembly of 1990–1. Legislative power is vested in a single-chamber, 240-member National Assembly, directly elected by proportional vote. Executive power is held by the government and a directly elected president, currently Georgi Parvanov, who managed to keep his mandate again in 2006 in competition with Volen Siderov, head of the far-right party ATAKA. Judicial power lies with an independent court system, with constitutional issues being handled by a Constitutional Court. Administratively the country is divided into 28 provinces. The capital is Sofia.

The main lines of conflict determining the shape of the political process in Bulgaria can be identified as follows: (a) attitudes towards the era before 1989, or left versus right; (b) attitudes toward the era 1990–2001. The political system is relatively functional, which makes Bulgaria perhaps the most stable country in the region, with a high degree of immunity from internal and external conflict.

The foundations of the party system were laid in mid-1989, when the first opposition groups began to appear, for example the labour movement Podkreta and the ecological movement Ekojslasnost. After changes in the BKP in late 1989 the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) was founded, representing the opposition at round-table discussions.

The victory of the re-named but not-quite-reformed BSP in free elections in 1990 determined the shape of the political spectrum in the 1990s. Against the background of a lack of a social consensus on attitudes
towards the era of Communism, there was continuous political conflict between the BSP and SDS. Other parties winning seats in parliament included the moderate Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) representing the Turkish minority, and the agrarian Bulgarian National Farmers’ Union (BZNS).

In the 1991 elections the SDS won a narrow victory over the BSP; the only other party to make it into parliament was the DPS. The existence of two large blocs and the politics of confrontation placed a very serious burden on the party system. Bulgarian political scientist, Georgi Karasimeonov (Karasimeonov 1999), terms this situation a 'bipolar system of confrontation', characterized by the non-existence of a political centre, a high degree of ideology in politics, and exaggerated political promises.

This situation persisted throughout the 1990s, accompanied by a stagnant economy, corruption scandals, and erosion of trust in the political parties. Demand gradually arose for new political forces connected neither to the era of Communism, nor to the era after 1989 (see Chytilek 2002). This role was filled by forces that coalesced in 2001 around Simeon II of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who briefly became of the last Czar of Bulgaria at the age of six. His party, the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV), won the election convincingly with a ‘pro-European’ reform programme. Other parties that made it into parliament were the reformist United Democratic Forces (ODS), the left-wing Coalition for Bulgaria (KZB), and the DPS.

The success of the NDSV changed the character of Bulgarian party politics towards greater structuration as the ODS disintegrated into several smaller parties. This was also shown in the 2005 elections, in which the victorious NDSV, KZB and DPS brought with them into the parliament the smaller right-wing parties, SDS and the Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB) and the far-right National Union Attack (ATAKA). At present the government consists of the KZB, the NDSV, and the DPS; the premier is Sergey Stanishev. Party discipline in parliament is weak, representatives often switch party factions, complicating the problem of governability.

The functioning of political parties is dealt with in the Law on Political Parties from 1990, which was extensively amended in 2005. The new Law provides has stricter requirements with respect to incorporation, raising of property and the financial control on the activities of the political parties (Bulgarian Center for Not for Profit Law 2005).

A political party shall be established at a constituent assembly by the agreement of at least 50 citizens with voting rights. Since 1990 the state has tried to put a limit on ethnic parties ('A political party may not be established, when... it is based on a confessional or an ethnic principle or purports to fan up racial, national, ethnic and religious enmity') (Political Parties Act 1990, article 3). The DPS therefore declared in its statutes that its goal is to 'protect the rights and freedoms of all Bulgarian citizens' (see DPS Statutes). In fact, however, it remains the party of the Turkish minority.

The new law provides for annual public subsidies to political parties. The distribution of funding depends on the number of votes won in previous elections and the number of seats in parliament controlled by the parties. All parties receiving more than 1 per cent of the vote are eligible for state subsidies. Anonymous donations are no longer allowed. The legal limit on donations to a political party within one calendar year was decreased from 30 000 BGN to 10 000 BGN. The Law establishes the body which supervises the financial activities of the political parties—The National Audit Office (EurActiv 2002, UNPAN 2004, Bulgarian Center for Not for Profit Law 2005).

The rules for participating in elections are set forth in the Act on Election of Members of Parliament (2001). Political parties, coalitions, or independent candidates can run in elections; the conditions for their candidacies vary. The lists of candidates of parties and coalitions are subject only to the usual registration, while independent candidates may be registered if they can present the signatures of 1,100–2,000 voters (depending on size of constituency) holding a permanent address within the territory of the constituency. Candidates who hold positions in public service must take paid or unpaid vacation time until election results are announced (see ACE project on Bulgaria).

The election campaign starts 30 days prior to election day, and ends 24 hours prior to election day. No canvassing or publication of opinion polls is allowed beginning 24 hours prior to the election. The law sets thresholds for electoral campaign spending (1 million BGN for single parties, 2 million BGN for coalitions).
Political parties and independent candidates are to be provided with free media access by all public broadcast media during the campaign.

Of the countries under study here, Bulgaria is probably the most inclusive from the standpoint of participation by women, although there are neither legal nor intra-party mechanisms to promote gender balance, nor is there any governmental body for handling gender issues. In the election period 2005–9, there were 53 women out of 240 parliamentary representatives (22.1 per cent), three women ministers out of 18 in the government, and three (out of seven) in parliamentary leadership positions. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (part of the Bulgarian People’s Union, BNS) is chaired by Anastasia Dimitrova-Moser. The BSP is considering introducing gender quotas (30 per cent) within the party (Women’s Alliance for Development 2005).

**Croatia**

Republic of Croatia

*Republika Hrvatska*

The Croatian path to independence was fundamentally affected by Croatian and Serbian nationalism. In August 1989 parliament adopted a law stipulating that the Serbian language was no longer the official language of the Serbian minority in Croatia. Leaders of the Serb minority reacted by declaring the secession of the Serbian territories (the so-called *Krajina*), integration with Serbia and adoption of Serbian law. The civil war that followed was complicated by the support of Serbia itself for the Serbian minority as part of its war with Croatia, and the involvement of Croatia in supporting ethnic Croats in the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict was ended in 1995 with the signature of the Dayton Accords. The Serbian population of Croatia fell from an original 12 per cent to 5 per cent overall. The whole territory inhabited by the Serbian minority was re-integrated under the control of Croatia until 1998. In December 1990 a Constitution was adopted declaring that the Republic of Croatia is the national state of the Croatian nationality. The Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Croatia was announced on 15 June 1991. The Constitution was amended on 23 April 2001. Croatia has a population of 4,422,248 (July 2003 estimate).

The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) came to power and created an authoritarian regime under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman, which lasted until his death in 2000. Elections held in 2000 were won by the Socialist Party. Dissatisfaction with political developments was reflected in the elections of 2003 that returned the HDZ to power. The leader of the HDZ, Ivo Sanader, formed a new government with the Democratic Centre and the Independents. Freedom House classifies Croatia as a ‘free’ country.

In the period 1990–2001 the parliament (*Hrvatski Sabor*) consisted of two chambers, the National Assembly and the Regional Assembly; since 2001 the parliament has been unicameral. The minimum number of representatives is 100 and the maximum 160; they are elected by direct vote for a term of 4 years according to a proportional voting system, with a 5 per cent threshold on the district level. National minorities have eight seats reserved—three for Serbs, one each for Hungarians and Italians, one for Czechs and Slovaks, one for Austrian, Bulgarian, German, Polish, Gypsy, Ruthenian, Russian, Turk, Ukrainian, Jewish and Romanian minorities, and one seat for the Albanians, Bosniacs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Slovenes.

The president is elected by direct vote for five-year term; no more than two consecutive terms can be served. For presidential elections a two-round system is used. The president has a strong position in the system. The current president is Stjepan Mesić.

There are 93 registered parties in Croatia. Among the most important is the HDZ, which represented the Croatian version of the civic forum that came to embody an alternative for change; its nationalist politics mobilized Croatian voters in the context of civil war and the conflict in Yugoslavia (Hloušek 2004b). After the death of Tudjman the party was gradually transformed into a right-wing liberal party that began to work
with the international community, particularly with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The second-strongest party was the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), which successfully transformed itself into the Communist Party of Croatia. It advocates a social welfare state, integration with the European Union and NATO, and cooperation by Croatia with the ICTY. In programme the party is close to the Social Democrats in Western Europe, but maintains some of the traditions of its Communist past (especially the official position of the party towards modern Croatian and Yugoslav history). Among the parties of the right in Croatia is the Social–Liberal Party (HSLS) supporting the country’s decentralization; its ideology and programme combine Social Democratic ideas with liberal concepts. The HSLS is now a fully consolidated party with long-term prospects for political relevance that can aspire to the role of one of the main poles of the Croatian political system. The Croatian Agrarian Party (HSS) and the Croatian National Party (HNS) are rather conservative parties supporting integration into the EU. The extreme right is represented by the nationalist, xenophobic Croatian Rightist Party (HSP), which is against any cooperation with the ICTY. According to the HSP, Croatia’s right to national and state sovereignty has not yet been realized, since all of the areas inhabited by ethnic Croats have not been unified in a single state. The party Dalmatian Action (DA) is a regional party representing the specific interests of Dalmatia (see Hloušek 2004b; 2002).

The activities of political parties are regulated under the Constitution (1990, amended in 2001), the Act on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian parliament (2003), the Law on Association (2001), and the Croatian Law on Television (2001).

Freedom of the media in Croatia is better today than it has been in the past. However, the attacks on media owners and journalists still exist and the pressure from politicians persists. According to a new law, members of the Programming Council are not appointed by the public but by political parties, which is seen as a step backwards.

There are no legal provisions that require political parties to include a certain number (or percentage) of male or female candidates on party lists. The only incentive is that 10 per cent more funds will be given to political parties that have women elected into parliament. There are currently 32 (21 per cent out of 151 MPs) women in the Croatian parliament.

**Czech Republic**

Česká republika

The Czech Republic was created on 1 January 1993; democratization after the fall of the Communist regime began in November 1989 under what was then a federal Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had a democratic tradition from the period between the world wars; the transfer of power took place quickly and without serious complications. On the political scene, election results have repeatedly produced situations under which it was impossible to form a stable government. The problems include not only the handful of majorities in parliament, but also tense personal relations between leading politicians. (Fiala, Hloušek 2003). The Czech Republic has a population of 10,235,365 residents (June 2005); the capital is Prague. The Czech Republic is an ethnically homogeneous state; over 90 per cent of citizens claim Czech ethnic nationality. Ethnic minorities, except for the Polish (0.5 per cent of the population) are not territorially concentrated.

The current Constitution has been in effect since 1 January 1993; the constitutional name of the country is the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is a decentralized unitary state; the highest level of local government is the region (13 regions plus the capital city).
The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy. The president has a ceremonial function only; in practice his position is stronger at times of government crisis, when he has the chance to act as mediator. The President is elected at a joint meeting of both houses of parliament. Václav Klaus was elected president in 2003. The Constitution gives a strong position to the government, which depends on the confidence of the lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies. The government may be recalled by the Chamber of Deputies only as a whole; the motion of no confidence must be supported by a majority of all deputies. At the time this book went to press it was unclear who would govern the country: Mirek Topolánek (ODS) had been nominated prime minister and was talking to other parties about support for his government. This is Topolánek’s second attempt, the first one was unsuccessful. The main problem is that the Chamber of Deputies now consists of two blocs, each of which has exactly one half of the deputies. Legislative power is vested in a two-chamber parliament; the clearly dominant role is assigned to the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, which has 200 members and is elected by proportional representation for a four-year term. The upper house of parliament, the Senate, has 81 members elected for six-year terms, with one-third of the seats up for election every two years. Senators are elected directly by majority vote in a two-round run-off system. The Chamber of Deputies has existed since the establishment of the republic, taking in the members of the Czech National Council, the legislative body that functioned within the Bohemian part of the federal system of the former federal Czechoslovakia. The first elections to the Senate were held in 1996. The Constitutional Court has 15 judges nominated for a 10 year-term by the president with the approval of the Senate (Mrklas 2004).

The party system in the Czech Republic is stable; all of the present parliamentary parties except one have held seats in the lower house since the elections of 1992. Since 1996 there has been no major shift in support for the individual political groupings. The main protagonists are the right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the left-wing Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD). The third-strongest is the far-left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), with which none of the other parties has yet been willing to enter a government coalition. Stable support is enjoyed by the Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU–ČSL). Elections in 2006 brought the Green Party (SZ) into the Chamber of Deputies for the first time. The government coalition coming out of the elections in 2002 consisted of the ČSSD, the KDU–ČSL, and the liberal Freedom Union–Democratic Union (US–DEU), which failed utterly in 2006. Some smaller parties and independents also hold seats in the Senate (Election Server of the Czech Statistical Office; Marek, Malíř 2005, Mareš 2002).

The electoral system of the present Chamber of Deputies was changed only in detail from that of the former Czech National Council (within Czechoslovakia). Conditions have gradually been made worse for coalition candidates; in 1990 there was a 5 per cent election threshold at the national level for both parties and coalitions; in 1992 coalitions were required to get 7, 9, or 11 per cent according to the number of parties in the coalition; by 2002 the threshold had been raised to 10, 15, or 20 per cent. Measures taken to hinder coalitions have led to a significant decline in coalition candidacies. This has led to the phenomenon of ‘quasi-coalitions’ (formally grouped together within a single party), where candidates from one party appear on the ballot of another, or when multiple parties group together in a single election party. The voting system for Senate elections has been stable (Šedo 2006).

Voter turnout in elections for the Chamber of Deputies fell throughout the 1990s; in 1990 voter turnout was 96.79 per cent, in 1992 it was 85.08 per cent, in 1996, 76.41 per cent, and in 1998, 74.03 per cent; the lowest was 2002 at 58.0 per cent. In the last elections in 2006 turnout rose to 64.47 per cent.

Turnout for Senatorial elections varies depending on which round it is. In the rounds that take place at the same time as local or regional elections, some one-third of voters take part; in the other round participation dips to around 25 per cent. Voter turnout in elections to the Senate has been trending downwards.

The legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Law on Political Parties No. 424/1991 Sb. (passed 1991, last amended 2004), electoral laws and other regulations. A political party must be registered with the Ministry of the Interior; the petition signatures of 1,000 citizens of the Czech Republic are necessary to register. A party may not act against the democratic system, constitution, and the country's laws; a party may be dissolved if it fails to submit a financial report. Political parties may not themselves conduct business activities, but they may found or take a share in private businesses. For parties, important sources of financing are the state budget (money is distributed according to a certain scale
according to votes and number of seats obtained) and private contributions. In late 1997, campaign finance scandals occurred in several parties that ended in the fall of the government, which led to the adoption of stricter rules for acceptance of contributions. Because numbers of actual party members are small, membership dues are not a significant source. Before elections to the Chamber of Deputies the political parties are given campaign time in the state-owned media; advertisements on private television and radio stations are prohibited by electoral law.

Relations within the parties are regulated by the state in the sense that party organization must observe democratic principles. In contrast to the pre-war era, ties between parties and interest groups were significantly weaker. A strong role is played by the central party leadership, while the introduction of new regional governments and standardization of the system of electing districts has strengthened the role of regional party organizations, especially in nominating candidates (c. f. Lebeda 2003).

The Czech Republic has no set gender quotas for candidates. The number of women in the Chamber of Deputies has been steady at around 30 (Millard 2004); 31 women won seats in the last election (15.5 per cent of deputies). There are ten women with seats in the Senate (12.3 per cent of senators). Of the parties holding seats in the Chamber of Deputies, only the ČSSD and the Greens guarantee a proportion of women on the election ballot: although the ČSSD did not observe the stipulation in the last election, the Greens had one or two women out of every three on the candidate list except for the very lowest places on the ballot. The most recent elections were the first for the newly founded Equal Opportunity Party (Strana Rovnost Šancí, SRŠ); its 77 candidates were all women (Election Server of the Czech Statistical Office). No woman has held the office of either premier or president.

**Estonia**

Republic of Estonia
*Eesti Vabariik*

Estonian independence was restored in the summer of 1991 and the beginnings of democratization go back to the years 1980–90, when partially free elections began to be held in the Soviet Union and then in its component republics. Pro-independence candidates were elected in Estonia. The transition took place quickly and successfully, even though the country had only a limited experience with democracy between the world wars, which ended in 1934 with the imposition of an authoritarian regime. Evaluations of this country are complicated by the issue of Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority: After regaining its independence, Estonia recognized the citizenship only of those who were citizens at the moment independence was lost in 1940, and their descendants. Thus roughly one-quarter of the people living within the borders of Estonia, mostly Russians, did not qualify for citizenship. Meanwhile, conditions for naturalization were difficult to satisfy (Pospíšil 2005). As of 1 January 2006 Estonia’s population was 1,345,000, of which two-thirds were Estonian. The largest minority is Russian, comprising 25.7 per cent of the population (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).

The current Constitution was adopted in 1992. The official name of the country is the Republic of Estonia (*Eesti Vabariik*). Estonia is a centralized, unitary state, divided administratively into 15 regions; local self-government is limited to the community level.

Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. The President of the Republic has a more or less ceremonial function; however, he may introduce resolutions to amend the Constitution. He is elected indirectly, first by parliament; if no candidate wins a two-thirds majority in three rounds, the election falls to an electoral assembly composed of members of parliament and delegates from local government. The current president is Arnold Rüütel. In the executive the decisive role is played by the government, which depends on the support of the
Parliament. Parliament may, by majority vote of all members, remove a prime minister (and the whole government), or individual ministers may be recalled. Estonian governments have tended to be unstable, with an average lifespan of 18 months between major reconstruction or the naming of a new premier. The current premier is Andrus Ansip, who has been in office since the spring of 2005. Legislative power is held by a unicameral parliament (the Riigikogu), which serves for 4 years and has 101 members elected using a proportional system. Estonia does not have a constitutional court as such; protection of the constitution is entrusted to the Supreme Court, which stands at the head of the national judicial system. The court has 19 members, who are nominated by the Chairman of Supreme Court and approved by parliament; the Chairman is approved by parliament upon nomination by the president (Švec 2004a).

The party system in Estonia is unstable; votes percolate not only between individual parties, but between the ideological currents that the individual parties represent. The last elections held in 2003 were won by the populist Estonian Centre Party (K); the same number of seats were occupied by the newly founded conservative Union for the Republic—Res Publica (RP). The liberal Estonian Reform Party (RE) is one of the stronger parties; other parties holding seats are the agrarian People’s Union of Estonia (ERV), the conservative Fatherland Union (I) and the social democratic Moderates (M). The leading party in the victorious coalition of 1995, which won 41 seats—the most seats obtained by any party since the restoration of independence—was the Estonian Coalition Party (EKE), but today it no longer exists (Pospíšil 2005).

Before the first elections after independence, Estonia changed from a single transferable vote system (used only in 1990) to a quasi-list proportional system with 101 members of parliament and a 5 per cent threshold for the second and third tier (the conditions for progressing to the first tier allow for success by smaller parties, but such a situation is unlikely, and except for 1992 has not arisen). The most important change in the electoral system since 1992 was the prohibition on coalition candidacies passed before the elections in 1999, which contributed to a wave of fusion within the existing coalitions, or the break-up of former partnerships (Pospíšil 2005, Šedo 2006). The electoral law allows for the possibility of independent candidates, but so far not a single one has been successful (Estonian National Electoral Committee website).

Voter turnout in parliamentary elections has a slightly downward tendency. While in the early 1990s some two-thirds of eligible voters cast ballots (67.8 per cent in 1992, 69.1 per cent in 1995), numbers fell to around three-fifths in later elections (57.4 per cent in 1999 and 58.2 per cent in 2003).

The legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the Political Parties Act (passed in 1994, last amended 2003), the Non-Profit Associations Act (passed 1996, last amended 2002), electoral laws and other regulations. A political party is a voluntary association of Estonian citizens; political parties are registered by the court in the jurisdiction where it is active. Registration requires the payment of a 300 EEK fee and submission of a list of at least 1,000 members. A party may be banned if it undertakes activity against democracy and the integrity of the Estonian state, or if the pertinent regulations governing its financing are violated. The low number of existing parties is partly due to the requirement of 1,000 members. Political parties are financed from the state budget (parties holding seats in parliament according to the number of mandates won, parties outside parliament according to the number of votes obtained). Since 2004, financial contributions may be accepted only from individuals. During the election campaign political parties are guaranteed broadcast time in the state media. Private political advertising is not restricted in any way.

The nomination of candidates for political parties is not regulated by law. In practice, party leadership has decisive influence on the assembly of national ballots for the third tier. Conditions for the putting together of candidate lists for the first tier vary; some parties leave more freedom to the local organizations. Ties to non-governmental organizations are not formalized (IDEA Country Report on Estonia 2006).

Estonia does not set gender quotas for assembling ballots; nor are there quotas in internal party regulations. The proportion of women in the parties is quite high (48 per cent), but few take an active part in party affairs. The proportion of women represented in the Riigikogu increased slightly in the 1990s from 12 to 18 (Millard 2004). The greatest number of women was elected in 2003: 19, or 18.81 per cent of representatives (IPU: Parline Database). As yet no woman has held the office of president or prime minister.
Georgia has been an independent republic since 1991; the first competitive elections at the level of the republic had already taken place in 1990. The country has no democratic tradition, and the course of democratization has been very complicated. Freedom House classifies Georgia as a ‘partly free’ country. The current phase, and the second part of the 1990s, have seen the best Freedom House ratings. Elections are marked by manipulation in favour of candidates supporting the government, but elections are competitive enough to give the opposition a certain chance (IDEA Country Report on Georgia 2006). Internal instability is a major problem. The first president, Zviad Gamsachurdia, was removed by coup in late 1991 and early 1992, which led to violent conflict between his supporters and opponents. Another problem was the outbreak of a Russian-supported rebellion in the autonomous republic of Abkhazia and the autonomous region of South Ossetia. Local officials declared independence; internationally, however, both territories are considered integral parts of Georgia. International units are deployed on the border between Abkhazia and Georgia, and there is an international observation mission in South Ossetia. As a result of the fighting there are some 250,000 refugees in the country, mostly ethnic Georgians driven out of Abkhazia. (CIA World Factbook on Georgia).

The autonomous Republic of Adzaria was under the autocratic rule of Aslan Abashidze, whose government was marked by significant corruption and contacts with organized crime. Adzaria returned to the control of the central government in 2004. Another important event was the so-called ‘Rose Revolution’, which started as a protest against manipulation of parliamentary elections in 2003, and led to the fall of President Eduard Shevarnadze in November of the same year (IDEA Country Report on Georgia 2006). The population of Georgia, including territory outside the control of the government, is 4,661,473. The majority ethnicity is Georgian, the rest consists mainly of other ethnicities living in the Caucasus region (6.5 per cent Azeris, 5.7 per cent Armenian, and other smaller groups) (CIA World Factbook on Georgia).

The present constitution was adopted in 1995; it was extensively amended in 2004. The official name of the country is Georgia (Sakartvelo). Georgia is formally divided into ten provinces and two autonomous republics; the administrative border does not conform to the border of South Ossetia.

Georgia had a presidential system until 2004; the revision of the constitution established the office of a prime minister, and the power of the president to dissolve parliament. The real power of the president was strengthened, however. The president is elected by direct, two-round popular vote for a five-year term (with two candidates in the second round). The current president is Michail Saakashvili, leader of the ‘Rose Revolution’. The ties between the president and government have been somewhat relaxed: the parliament must give a vote of confidence to the government named by the president, and under certain circumstances can even recall it. The prime minister is Zurab Noghaideli. The parliament is unicameral, elected by a superposition mixed electoral system for a four-year term. Of the 235 members, 150 are elected by proportional representation in a single national district, with a 7 per cent threshold, and 85 by a two-round majority run-off system. The current parliament was elected during two elections; representatives from the single-mandate districts in 2003, and representatives from the national district in the repeated 2004 election (the first annulled due to manipulation). In the next elections the number of members of parliament will be lowered to 150, 100 by a proportional system and 50 by majority (IDEA Country Report on Georgia 2006). Independent candidates tend to do well in the single-mandate districts (Birch 2003).

The party system was completely altered as a result of the ‘Rose Revolution’. In the post-revolution euphoria Saakashvili’s United National Movement bloc (Ertsiani Nacionaluri Modzraoba, ENM) was victorious. The only other party to exceed the 7 per cent threshold was the bloc Rightist Opposition (MO). Also represented in
parliament were several parties and blocs elected in the single-mandate districts in late 2003. Since the elections there have been disputes within the ENM; a significant number of parliamentarians are now declaring themselves independent (IDEA Country Report on Georgia 2006). The situation is similar to that in other post-Communist countries (including those with a stable party system today) in that the first elections were won by a broad opposition movement, which fell apart after the first elections. Only after the second elections did the party system begin to crystallize: then it was decided which of the parties born after the last elections would continue to be viable, and which would be forced to adopt new strategies or identities (Fiala, Holzer Strmiska 2002, Šedo 2006). Election turnout is relatively stable at 70 per cent (Birch 2003).

Since 1992 the election system has had a stable formula and balance between the two types of voting system in the districts. A major change is the increased threshold for proportional representation, which has been raised twice, and is now set at 7 per cent (Birch 2003, OSCE 2004).

The legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution of Georgia, the Georgian Organic Law on Political Associations of Georgian Citizens (passed 1997, last amended 2005), the Unified Election Code of Georgia (passed 2001, last amended 2005) and other regulations. A political party is registered by the Ministry of Justice; signatures of at least 1,000 members must be submitted and a constituent congress held with the participation of at least 300 citizens. Registration of parties functioning on a regional or territorial principle is forbidden. Registration may be revoked if a party seeks violent change in the constitutional order, threatens the independence or integrity of Georgia or if it forms armed groups. Another possible sanction is exclusion of the party from the following elections if a party does not present to the election commission a list of campaign expenses, which was actually applied to several smaller parties running in 2004 (IDEA Country Report on Georgia 2006). The main source of funds for political parties are individual contributions; membership dues and subsidies attached to parliamentary mandates account for a very small proportion of total funds. Election campaigns are financed to a significant degree by the candidates from their own funds. Pro-government candidates enjoy a significant advantage, as public resources and the media are exploited on their behalf (formally, political parties are guaranteed free broadcast time and equal access to the public media). Private broadcasts are prohibited (IDEA Country Report on Georgia 2006, OSCE 2004).

Nomination of candidates by political parties is not regulated by law. Candidates for the presidency are usually the party leaders. In assembling candidate lists for parliamentary elections, local organizations tend to decide on nominations for the single-mandate districts, while central party organs decide on the proportional candidates, and can usually even veto the nominated single-mandate candidates. The internal affairs of political parties are closed; many of them limit membership by requiring sympathizers first to become candidate members, who are allowed to become members only after a waiting period, and with the approval of the existing members. Parties are highly personalized, with the leaders holding the key role, or else the party’s central leadership (IDEA Country Report on Georgia 2006).

There were no gender quotas set for the elections in 2004. There were 22 women (9.4 per cent) holding seats in parliament after the last elections (IPU: Parline Database).
limited). Hungary has a population of 10,090,330 (2005), and is ethnically very homogeneous: 93 per cent are ethnic Hungarians.

After the fall of the regime Hungary did not adopt a new constitution; the text from 1949 remained in place, though heavily amended. The constitutional name of the country is the Republic of Hungary (Magyar Köztársaság). Hungary is a decentralized, unitary state. Limited powers are reserved for local self-government at the level of 19 counties and the capital city; the basic unit of local government is the municipality.

Hungary is a parliamentary republic. The president of Hungary holds limited powers. The president is elected by parliament to a term of five years. The selection of a president is often based on an agreement between the political parties under which the strongest party allows the smaller parties to choose a president in exchange for support for the government or for important decisions (Benda 2004). The 2005 elections were an exception, however. The new President, László Sólyom, was nominated by members of the opposition Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) and supported by the government Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). In accordance with the Constitution, the government, especially the prime minister, plays a very important role. A government must gain the support of a majority of all members of parliament. Outside the regular election cycle, a government can only be recalled by a constructive vote of no confidence, with a majority agreeing on a successor government. This is one of the reasons why governments tend to last on average about three years without cabinet reorganization. Since 1990 the office of prime minister has changed hands only twice outside the regular term. The first time was in 1993 when the prime minister died; the second was in 2004 when the prime minister was replaced without any change in the shape of the coalition. The current prime minister is Ferenc Gyurcsány, heading a government coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and SZDSZ. The single-chamber parliament is elected for four years, with 386 members elected by the so-called supermixed electoral system. Of the members of parliament, 176 are elected by a two-round majority system in single-mandate districts: if no candidate receives more than half of the votes in the first round, a second round is held, in which the three top candidates compete, along with all candidates who received at least 15 per cent of the vote. Of the total members, 152 are elected in 20 districts corresponding to the counties; the rest are added from the national lists of candidates: these mandates are distributed by allocating the unused votes from the two main electoral elements. The Constitutional Court has 11 judges elected by a two-thirds majority of parliament (Benda 2004).

The party system in Hungary is fragmented into two distinctive blocs, the socialist-liberal left and the Christian-nationalist right, each of which has been represented since 1998 by a single big party and one smaller one. The electoral system forces especially the larger party elements towards compromise, which usually takes place within these blocs. In some cases, however, cooperation between parties of similar ideological bent is often hindered by disputes. The strongest party on the left and winner of the elections in 2006 is the MSZP; its traditional partner is the liberal SZDSZ. The strongest party on the right is the Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz–MPS), which ran in the last elections in coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). The conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) ran independently (and successfully) in the elections. During the entire 1990s the assortment of political parties changed only minimally; but programme orientations did go through some shifts, as did their relative strengths within the spectrum. For example, today’s weakest party, the MDF, won the 1990 elections as the strongest party on the right (Benda 2002, Sedo 2006, National Election Office of Hungary). Parties and party coalitions may run in elections; in the single-mandate districts scattered independent candidates have won as well.

The electoral system is highly stable; the biggest alteration was in 1994 with the raising of the threshold for proportional representation in parliament from 4 per cent to 5 per cent for parties, to 10 per cent for two-member coalitions, and to 15 per cent for three- or more-member coalitions. Voter turnout is stable at around two-thirds of voters; only in 1998 was it significantly lower (Rose, Munro 2003, National Election Office of Hungary).

The legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (passed 1949, last amended 2003), Law no. XXXIII of 1989 on the Operation and Financing of Political Parties (modified 1990), Act II. of 1989 on the Right of Association (amended 2004), electoral laws and other regulations. Political parties are registered at court in the county where their party headquarters are located. A
political party must have at least ten members at the moment it is founded. A political party may lose its registration by court decision if it does not carry out the activities of a political party; that is, if it fails to nominate at least one candidate in two consecutive parliamentary elections. Since 1997 there has been a limit of 1 million HUF per candidate on campaign expenditures, but in practice this is not observed, nor is there any sanction for violations. The set limit simply forces parties to behave less transparently and conceal real campaign costs. Political parties may make use of public and private media; before elections they have the right to free air time on public broadcasting.

Nomination of candidates within the political parties is not regulated by law; however, conditions for registration of ballots to a certain extent make cooperation on all levels of the party a necessity. Candidates in the single-mandate districts are required to obtain the signatures of 750 voters; at the regional level only those parties can field candidates that fill at least one-quarter of that region’s single-mandate districts (in the smaller regions at least two districts). National candidate lists may be run only by parties that are competing in seven regions. Thus, successful candidacies require close cooperation on all levels, starting with the local level (selection of candidate, gathering of signatures) on up to the national level (general election strategy). Of the political parties, the MSZP statutes require the nomination of at least 20 per cent women and 20 per cent candidates under 35 years old. Ties between political parties and other institutions are relatively loose. In its documents MSZP declares that it will cooperate with non-governmental organizations that advocate the same values. The MSZP is the only party that has made such a declaration.

There are no gender quotas set for elections. The proportion of women is consistently low; seldom has it exceeded 10 per cent. In the most recent elections 40 women were elected (10.36 per cent) (Millard 2004, IPU: Parlaine Database). No woman has held the office of either president or prime minister.

Latvia

Republic of Latvia

Latvijas Republika

Latvia gained independence in 1991. As in the other Baltic countries democratization began during the last months of the existence of the Soviet Union, when reform candidates won a majority in all-Union elections in 1989 and elections in the republics in 1990. Democratization was accompanied by a decrease in stability, especially concerning the question of the Russian-speaking minority. At the end of the 1980s Latvians were barely in the majority among the republic’s population. Citizenship was given only to those who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants; thus some 700,000 people living in the territory of Latvia found themselves without citizenship, while requirements for naturalization were made very strict. Previously, Latvia had experienced only a short democratic period between the world wars, which ended with the coup in 1934 (Švec 2004b). The population of Latvia is 2,306,434 (2005), of which 58.8 per cent are Latvians; the largest minority is the Russians (28.6 per cent), who live mostly in the urban areas and in the eastern part of the country. Other relevant minorities (6.4 per cent) include Slavic ethnicities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Belorussians and Ukrainians (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2005).

After regaining independence Latvia revived its constitution of 1922, but repeatedly revised and amended it during the 1990s. The official name of the country is the Republic of Latvia (Latvijas Republika). Latvia is a centralized, unitary state divided administratively into 26 districts and seven cities with special status; local self-government exists on the municipal level only.

Latvia is a parliamentary republic; the president has the right to introduce legislation, but his practical position is weak. The president is elected by a majority vote in parliament to a four-year term, and can be recalled by a two-thirds vote. At present the president is Vaira Vike-Freiberg. The government depends on the confidence of parliament; a majority in parliament can express no confidence in the entire government, or its individual
Latvian governments are relatively unstable, and usually do not last their entire term in office: the average time of governments in office is 15 months. Aigars Kalvītis has served at the head of the present government since 2004. The government consists of the People’s Party (TP), New Era (JL), the Latvia’s First Party (LPP) and the Latvian Farmers’ Union/Latvian Green Party (LZS/LZP). Legislative power is vested in a unicameral parliament (Seimas) that has 100 members.

The Latvian party system is very unstable. As a rule elections are won by parties that did not exist at the time of the last elections, or have undergone extensive transformation. Voter support shifts between parties, but also between ideologies: a drop in support for one party is not always balanced out by increased preference of another party at the same end of the spectrum. Competition between parties is extremely personalized; frequently candidates are well known personalities not previously associated with a political party. The last elections in 2002 were won by the newly founded JL, the chairman of which, Einars Repše, was a former successful president of the Bank of Latvia. Three parties relying on the Russian minority joined forces in the coalition For Human Rights in United Latvia (PCTVL). The winner of the previous election, the conservative TP, finished third. Also represented in parliament is the coalition LZS and the LZP; the Lutheran conservative LPP, and the nationalist conservative For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative Party (TB/LNNK). A key party from the early 1990s, the liberal Latvian Way (LC), missed getting into parliament by about 1,500 votes (Hloušek 2003, Šedo 2006, Central Electoral Committee of Latvia). The legal rules for parliamentary elections allow only parties and coalitions to field candidates (Central Electoral Committee of Latvia).

After it gained independence, Latvia changed from a two-round majority system to a list proportional system, which has proven quite stable. The only change in the rules was the raising of the threshold from 4 per cent to 5 per cent in 1995. Voter participation was at first high—89.9 per cent in 1993; later it fell to 70 per cent (Šedo 2006, Rose, Munro 2003).

The legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, the Law on Public Organizations and their Associations (passed 1992, last amended 2004), the Law on Financing of Political Parties (passed 1995, last amended 2004), electoral laws and other regulations. Parties are registered with the Ministry of Justice, to which they must present the signatures of at least 200 members, and pay a fee of 200 LVL. Parties can be disbanded by judicial measures if a party uses violent methods to advance its interests, advocates racism or totalitarianism or advocates the breaking of the law. Political parties are not financed from the state budget: the sources of their funding may be donations, membership dues or profits from business. Anonymous contributions are prohibited (not merely a formality; in 2002 the alliance LZS/LZP was required to remit to the state treasury an amount corresponding to the illegal contributions it received). The law sets limits on contributions by a single donor (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001). Access to the mass media by political parties is not restricted. During election campaigns political parties have guaranteed access to free broadcast time in the public media.

The nomination of candidates by political parties is not regulated by law. Political parties do not maintain formal ties with other non-governmental organizations. Their moorings in the structures of civil society are somewhat feeble.

There are no gender quotas set for elections. In the parliament elected in 2002 there were 21 women (21 per cent) (IPU: Parline Database). Since 1999 the President of the Republic has been a woman; a woman has not yet served in the office of prime minister.
The independence of Lithuania was restored in early 1990. Democratization began during the last year of rule by the Soviet Union, when all-Union elections and then elections in the republics were won by movements calling for independence. Democratization went forward quickly, even though Lithuania had but a short experience with democracy in the period between the world wars that ended with the overthrow of the government in 1926. Lithuania has a population of 3,483,972 (January 2005), of which 83.5 per cent are ethnic Lithuanians. The largest minorities are the Poles (6.7 per cent) concentrated in the south-east of the country, and the Russians (6.3 per cent) (Statistics Lithuania 2005).

The current Constitution was adopted in 1992; later amendments have not fundamentally altered its main points. The official name is the Republic of Lithuania (Lietuvos Respublika). Lithuania is a centralized, unitary state divided administratively into ten districts. Local self-government takes place at the community level only.

The Lithuanian system approaches a semi-presidential model. According to the Constitution, the head of state has direct influence on foreign policy and the right to initiate legislation. The president is elected by direct vote in a two-round majority system. When the turnout in the first round is above 50%, the winner needs at least half of the votes cast. If the turnout is below 50% in the first round, the candidate who obtains at least a third of the votes of all registered voters wins office. Failing that, a runoff is held between the top two candidates. The president may be recalled by a three-fifths vote of parliament if the president has violated the Constitution, his oath or has committed a crime: this mechanism has already been tested in practice in the case of President Rolandas Paksas, accused of violating the Constitution and threatening national security by maintaining contacts with organized crime. The current president is Valdas Adamkus, elected in 2004. The position of the government in this system is weakened in favour of a stronger president: among other things, the government must resign after presidential elections, which allows the president to influence the composition of the government after he takes office (removing and installing the prime minister or other ministers; in practice, however, the party or coalition in power remains the same). The government must obtain the confidence of parliament, while a vote of no confidence can be declared by a majority of all members against the government as a whole or against individual ministers. Governments in Lithuania are very unstable, the average government lasting only a little over a year. The current premier, who has been in office since July 2006, is Gediminas Kirkilas; he heads a governing coalition led by the LSDP along with three minor parties. Lithuania has a unicameral parliament, the Seimas, which is elected for a four-year term by a superposition mixed electoral system: 71 members are elected by majority vote in single-mandate districts, and 70 proportionally. Parliament has a relatively strong position. Especially at various phases during the 1990s, proposals made by parliament were passed more often than those of the government. Part of the judicial system is the special Constitutional Court, which has nine justices named by parliament to nine-year terms: one-third are nominated by the president, a third by the chairman of parliament, and a third by the chairman of the Supreme Court. A third of the court’s members are changed every three years (Dančák, Kubáť 2004; Government of the Republic of Lithuania website; de Zárate).

The Lithuanian party system is relatively unstable. New parties appear; old parties often transform themselves (merger, secession, name changes). The winner of the most recent elections held in 2004 was the newly founded populist Labour Party (DP); second place was taken by the left-wing coalition of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) and the New Union–Social Liberals (NS–SL). The parliamentary spectrum further consists of a coalition led by the Homeland Union–Lithuanian Conservatives (TS–LK). Former President Paksas headed the coalition ‘For Order and Justice’ (UTT), and a few seats were obtained by the Lithuanian Center Union (LCS), the alliance Peasants’ and New Democratic Party (LVP/NDP) and candidates of the Electoral Action for Lithuania’s Poles (LLRA). Electoral law allows for independent
candidacies, which tend to win seats in the single-mandate districts (Hloušek 2003; Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania).

The election system has been changed in one way or another before every election since 1990. In 1992 Lithuania switched in from the original two-round majority system to a superposition mixed system. Of 141 members of parliament, 71 are elected in single-mandate districts: the required majority keeps being changed (except for the 2000 elections, a two-round system has been used, with run-off). Seventy members are chosen in a single nation-wide district by proportional vote. Since 1996 the threshold for representation has been 5 per cent for parties and 7 per cent for coalitions (previously 4 per cent for parties and coalitions alike, with the threshold not applying to the ethnic minority parties). In practice, the raising of the threshold has had limited effect. Coalitions are only considered coalitions if they define themselves as such; so smaller parties working together just call themselves something else, like an alliance (Šedo 2006; Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania). Voter turnout has steadily decreased: in 1992 turnout was 75.2 per cent of voters; by 2004 it was down to 46.8 per cent.

Legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution, the Law on Political Parties (passed 1994, last amended 2004), electoral laws and other regulations. Parties register with the Ministry of Justice by presenting at least 1,000 citizen signatures. Political parties may have their registration voided by the courts if they work to overthrow the democratic system. The ministry must also revoke the registration of political parties whose membership falls below 1,000. Political parties are financed from private sources (contributions of over 25 USD may not be made anonymously). Since 2000 parties also receive funds from the state if they succeed in winning 3 per cent of the vote in national and local elections. The law also sets a limit on campaign expenditures: 50 times the average wage for candidates in the single-mandate districts, and 1,000 times the average wage for the ballot of candidates in the nation-wide district. However, there are no sanctions against violators (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001). During the election campaign, independent candidates are also guaranteed free broadcast time on state television and radio. Private stations may also broadcast political advertising.

Nomination of candidates within political parties is regulated by law only by guaranteeing the influence of the party congress on the nomination of candidates if not otherwise stipulated in that party’s statutes. Links between political parties and the institutions of civil society are not formalized.

There are no set gender quotas for assembling candidate ballot lists or allocating seats. Of the political parties, only the LSDP guarantees both genders a minimum one-third share on the ballot list; even so, the share of women elected for the LSDP is below average (International IDEA Country Report on Lithuania). The share of women in parliament in the 1990s fluctuated between 10 and 23 (Millard 2004). There were 31 women elected (21.9 per cent) in the 2004 election (IPU: Parline Database). The office of president has not yet been filled by a woman; in 1990 Kazimiera Prunskienė held the office of premier.

**Macedonia (FYROM)**

Republic of Macedonia

Република Македонија

On 8 September 1991, a referendum on independence was held as a prerequisite for the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia. International recognition of the new country was delayed because Greece objected to the use of the Hellenic name and national symbols. As a compromise, the United Nations recognized the state under the name of 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM) in 1993. Greece imposed a trade blockade at the beginning of 1994; the sanctions were lifted in September 1995 after Macedonia
changed its flag and the articles in the constitution that Greece perceived as encouraging separatism among its own Macedonian Slav minority. In the first ten years of its existence, Macedonia also had to deal with the demands of the Albanian minority for greater civic and cultural rights. The controversy ended in crisis in 2001. It was settled with the help of the international community when the so-called Ohrid peace agreement was signed. In March 2004, the Republic of Macedonia submitted an application for membership in the EU. On 17 December 2005, the EU Presidency listed the Republic of Macedonia as a candidate for accession. The constitutional name is the Republic of Macedonia. Freedom House rates Macedonia as ‘partly free’.

The Republic of Macedonia has a population of approximately 2,070,000 citizens. In the last census, approximately 1,300,000 inhabitants declared themselves to be ethnic Macedonians, representing 64.2 per cent of the total population. Approximately 500,000 inhabitants declared themselves Albanians, representing 25.2 per cent of the population. Albanians are concentrated mostly in the western and north-western part of the country. Smaller minorities include Turks (3.9 per cent), Roma (2.7 per cent), Serbs (1.8 per cent) and Aromanians (called Vlachs in the census) (0.4 per cent). Slavic Muslims, referred to as Bosniacs or Muslims in the census, represent 0.9 per cent of total population and include Torbesh, Gorans and Pomaks. In municipalities where the ethnic minority population reaches 20 per cent, the minority’s language is used for official purposes in local government. This applies only to the Albanian language. The majority of the population belongs to the Macedonian Orthodox Church (64.7 per cent). Muslims comprise 33.3 per cent of the population, and other Christian denominations comprise 0.4 per cent.

Macedonia is a semi-consolidated parliamentary democracy. The unicameral Assembly is made up of 120 seats, with members elected every four years. Until 1998 a majority voting system was used – all candidates with at least 7% of the valid votes in the first round could take part in the runoff, where the candidate with the relative majority got the seat. In the period 1998–2002 a segmented (parallel) system was used with a 5 per cent threshold. Since 2002 Macedonia has used a proportional system for all 120 seats, and there is no threshold. The president is directly elected for a five-year term, and may be elected no more than twice. The role of the President of the Republic is mostly ceremonial, with the real power resting in the hands of the prime minister. The current Prime Minister is Branko Crvenkovski (Šedo 2006; Šedo 2002b). Since Macedonia’s parliamentary elections of 5 July 2006, the major security concern has been the potential for future violence from the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), which was excluded from the new government. Led by former rebel leader Ali Ahmeti, the DUI claims an automatic right to be part of the new government because it won a majority of the minority Albanian vote. However, on 26 August 2006, the new government led by Nikola Gruevski from the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO–DPMNE) received 68 out of 120 votes (22 were against, and many Albanian members of parliament abstained). The vote of confidence was accompanied by the demonstrations organized by the ethnic Albanians. The new government consists of the VMRO-DPMNE, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), the New Social Democratic Party (NSDP), and a few small parties with one or two MPs. The international community has called on the DUI to be a constructive opposition.

There are 64 registered political parties in Macedonia. The three most important families of parties are the socialist, social democratic and conservative families, the representatives of which each hold about a third of the mandates. The key role in the system is played by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) led by Vlado Bučkovski, and VMRO–DPMNE led by Nikola Gruevski (Šedo 2002b). The liberals are represented by the The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The successor of the National Liberation Army, the DUI is the largest political party in the Republic of Macedonia among ethnic Albanians, and the third largest political party in all of Macedonia. It is led by Ali Ahmeti. The radical wing of the ethnic Albanians is represented by the DPA, led by Arben Xhaferi.

Legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution (passed in 1991 and last amended in 2001), the Law on Political Parties and the Law on the Election of Members of Parliament (passed in 2002). The former defines parties as ‘organized groups of citizens striving to participate in authority’ (article 2). Political parties must register with the District Court of Skopje and present the signatures of 500 adult citizens who are citizens of Macedonia and a copy of the party’s statutes. The parties’ internal functioning is not regulated by Macedonian law.
The rights of ethnic minorities in Macedonia are generally recognized, though the situation of the Roma minority is somewhat complicated. In 2001 the Albanian minority won itself special rights. The Macedonian Orthodox Church enjoys a very powerful position within Macedonian society.

One positive development is a trend towards female officials wielding greater influence in party activities. Several parties have women vice-chairmen, for example, as well as secretaries-general, spokespersons and, in a few cases, chairmen. The law on local elections stipulates that there must be at least 30 per cent of each gender represented among candidates on the first and second halves of the ballot list. In July 2006 the new parliament seated 34 women (28.33 per cent) (IPU: Parline Database).

Montenegro

Republic of Montenegro
Republika Crna Gora
Република Црна Гора

Montenegro declared independence on 3 June 2006, leaving the long-moribund joint state it shared with Serbia. Until 1997 Montenegro was a loyal partner of the Serbian leadership, and the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) presented no threat of secession from the federation. The crisis of 1997 led to the breakaway of the pro-Serbian wing of the party led by Momir Bulatović. That same year, presidential elections in Montenegro were won by Milo Đukanović, who decided to break away from the union with Serbia. Montenegro unilaterally adopted the euro as the official currency, imposed duties on exports to Serbia, and generally began to conduct a separate foreign and economic policy. Under pressure from the international community, 2003 saw a mere redefinition of the relations between Serbia and Montenegro. The stalemate was resolved through a referendum on 21 May 2006, and Montenegro declared independence. The Constitution of Montenegro was adopted on 12 December 1992; the country’s official name is the Republic of Montenegro. Freedom House rates Montenegro as a free country. The first election in the independent Montenegro was held on 10 September 2006.

The situation in Montenegro is complicated by the incomplete process of forming a national identity. According to the 2003 census, the number of those declaring themselves as Montenegrins decreased from 380,000 in 1991 to 273,000 in 2003, while the number of declared Serbs rose from 57,000 to 202,000. The declared composition of the total population is as follows: Montenegrins 40.6 per cent, Serbs 30 per cent, Bosniacs and Muslims 13.7 per cent, Albanians 7.1 per cent, Croats 1 per cent and Roma 1.2 per cent. Ethnic affiliation was not declared by 4.3 per cent of inhabitants, and that of 1.6 per cent of inhabitants is not known (Yugoslav Survey 2003).

The President of Montenegro is elected directly for a five-year term. At present the office is held by Filip Vujanović (since 2003). The single-chamber parliament consists of 81 members elected every four years. At present the government has 15 ministers. The premier is Milo Đukanović.

The winners of the last elections were the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPSCG) and the Socialdemocratic party of Montenegro (SDPCG); their coalition gained 41 seats. The party Serbian List was second with 12 seats. Coalition of Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNPCG), People’s Party of Montenegro (NSCG) and Democratic Serbian Party of Montenegro (DSSCG) gained 11 seats. Movement for Changes (PZP) achieved a similar result. Smaller parties holding seats in parliament include the Liberal Party of Montenegro (LPCG), Bosniak Party of Montenegro (BS), Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA) and the Albanian Alternative (AA).

Official results of the referendum showed 55.5 per cent voting in favour and 44.5 per cent against, severing the loose federation with their larger neighbour.
Until the end of the federation the parties presented themselves in the election campaigns according to their vision of the future of the union and their attitudes towards the international community, while other questions were of lesser importance in the election campaign. The classification of parties into ideological families must be considered approximate. The main reasons for this are the post-Communist legacy of the main parties, the delayed pluralization of the party spectrum and the major role played by charismatic leaders who have more influence in determining the orientation of parties than the usual, generally accepted, programmes (Káňa 2002; Cabada 2004c). Up to now, surveys on confidence in political parties have been done only for the entire federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Elections are regulated by the Electoral Law of 1998 (last amended in 2003). In no elections has Montenegro used the exact same system, but the changes have not affected the basic formula (a list proportional system). Since 1998 the changes can be described as cosmetic only, dealing with the overall number of members in parliament. The last change in the electoral law took place in 2002: 75 members were elected to parliament from two electoral districts (Šedo 2006).

At present there are nine women holding seats in the Montenegrin Parliament. Montenegro also hosts a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with human rights, women's rights and interethnic tolerance (USAID 2001).

**Poland**

Republic of Poland
*Rzeczpospolita Polska*

The beginning of democratization dates back to 1989, when round-table talks took place between officials of the Communist regime and the opposition. Among the results of these talks was the holding of partially free elections (35 per cent of the seats in the lower house of parliament (*Sejm*), and all the seats in the Senate). The first fully free parliamentary elections were held in 1991. In the context of the area, democratization went forward quickly and relatively smoothly. Previously Poland had only a short experience with democracy in the era between the wars, which was ended by the overthrow of the government in 1926. Poland has a population of 38,536,869 (2006). Ethnically Poland is very homogeneous, with a 96.7 per cent majority of ethnic Poles.

The current Polish constitution was approved in 1997 after a long series of negotiations. The constitutional name of the country is the Republic of Poland (*Rzeczpospolita Polska*). Poland is a decentralized, unitary state. Reforms in 1998 established local self-government on the levels, the highest being the *Voivodeships*, or regions, and below them districts. State administration is organized in the same manner.

Poland is a parliamentary republic, but the institutional system includes elements of a strong presidential tradition left over from the early 1990s. Formally, besides powers typical of parliamentary regimes, the president has the right to introduce legislation as well. The president is elected for a term of five years through a two-round majority system: a candidate wins in the first round by obtaining a majority of the votes cast; if no one does so, the two strongest candidates face one another in the second round. The current president is Lech Kaczyński. The position of the government as set by the Constitution is strong, but in practice governments are limited by the powers of the president and cabinet instability. The government is responsible to the *Sejm*; the average government lasts some 21 months. The departures of parts of coalition parties or splitting off of factions to the opposition are common phenomena. Governments can be recalled by a constructive vote of no confidence if the *Sejm* is able to agree on a new prime minister. No-confidence votes can be taken in regard to individual ministers as well. Since July 2006 the prime minister has been Jarosław Kaczyński, twin brother of the president. The governing coalition consists of the Law and Justice
(PiS), Samoobrona, and the League of Polish Families (LPR). Poland has a bi-cameral parliament, with the dominant role played by the lower house, called the \textit{Sejm}, which has 460 members elected by a list proportional voting system. The upper house of parliament, the senate (\textit{Senat}), has 100 members elected by a system of unlimited vote. The term of office in both houses is four years, and elections are held simultaneously. The Constitutional Court consists of 15 judges named to nine-year terms by the \textit{Sejm} (Kubát 2004b, Kubát 2005, de Zárate).

The party system in Poland is unstable and markedly personalized. This was evident in the electoral period 1997–2001, when the parties forming the right-wing governing coalition, Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), and the Freedom Union (UW), both fell apart. While their direct successor parties did not succeed, two of the parties formed by leading personalities of the AWS and UW did manage to win seats in parliament. No new parties made it into the \textit{Sejm} in 2005, but the winner of the last elections and strongest left-wing party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), lost nearly three-quarters of its voters, and 161 of its 216 seats. The winner of the elections was the conservative PiS, followed by the liberal Civic Platform (PO). Also winning seats was the radical agrarian Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP), the Catholic-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR), and the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Because the threshold for winning mandates does not apply to the ethnic-based parties, two seats in the \textit{Sejm} were taken by the German Minority (MN). The composition of the Senate, which is elected at the same time, is similar, but with a stronger advantage for the PiS and PO over the other parties; no seats are held by the SLD and MN, but some independent candidates are present (Dancáč 2002b, Kubát 2000, Antostzewki, Herbut, Sroka 2003, Kubát 2005, National Electoral Commission of Poland).

After 1989 the election system to the \textit{Sejm} underwent several fundamental changes. First, in 1991 a list proportional system was instituted, with rules allowing for representation by a large number of parties (24 parties in parliament, and at least five local bodies running for office alongside larger parties). Then, before the 1993 elections, rules were introduced to the advantage of the larger parties (5 per cent threshold for parties and 8 per cent for coalitions, or 7 per cent for distribution of part of the mandates reserved for the national level; smaller election districts and the d'Hondt system). In 2001 the rules for smaller parties were eased by increasing the number of election districts, and by a changed method of transforming votes to mandates (the threshold remained the same; the distribution of mandates now takes place only at the district level). Later Poland returned to the d'Hondt method, but in larger districts than in 1993. Thresholds for earning mandates are not applied in the case of ethnic minority parties, which in practice guarantees two seats to the German minority (Kubát 2005, Šedo 2006). The election system to the Senate is more stable. In 1991 the condition of a majority of votes for election was waived, and the second round of voting thus disposed of; since then the only change has been a slight alteration in the number of districts. Presidential elections tend to produce a higher turnout, but only once has participation exceeded two-thirds of voters (Rose, Munro 2003, National Electoral Commission of Poland).

The legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (passed 1997), the Act of 27 June 1999 on Political Parties, electoral laws and other regulations. Parties are registered at the Warsaw District Court upon presentation of 1,000 citizen signatures. Parties may be dissolved if they act in violation of the Constitution, or if they do not submit a campaign expense report. Parties are financed from the state budget depending on number of votes and mandates won, and membership dues and contributions. Some parties also expect the candidates themselves to help finance their own campaigns (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001). Media campaigns by the political parties are not regulated; parties are guaranteed broadcast time on state-owned radio television during the election campaign. There are limits placed by law on campaign expenses (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001).

Nomination of candidates within the parties is not regulated by law. In most of the parties surveyed, the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections takes place at the regional level, while the final decision lies with the central party bodies. Non-governmental organizations do not have a formalized influence on the internal decision-making of political parties.

No gender quotas are set for ballot lists and or election results. Internal quotas exist in a number of parties, usually around 30 per cent. The proportion of women in the \textit{Sejm} is slowly rising (in 1991 it was less than 10
Democratization in Romania began at the end of 1989 with an uprising against the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceaușescu. The process of democratization was accompanied by a number of problems stemming from a difficult economic situation, widespread demonstrations along with violent clashes, and from problems with the political culture (corruption, clientelism, circumventing of parliament by the executive). In the mid-1990s Freedom House rated the country as free; since then it has balanced on the line between free and partly free (Freedom House 2006 on Romania). Romania lacks a deeper democratic tradition, having experienced a relatively liberal regime only during part of the inter-war period. Romania has a population of 22,303,552 (2006), of which 89.5 per cent are ethnic Romanians. The most numerous minority are the Hungarians (6.5 per cent), concentrated mainly in the country’s western border areas (CIA World Factbook on Romania).

The current Constitution was approved in 1991, and significantly revised in 2003. The official name of the country is Romania (România). Romania is a centralized unitary state; local government is at the municipal level only. Administratively it is divided into 42 regions (41 regions + capital city) (Rosůlek 2004).

Romania has adopted a semi-presidential model. Since the constitutional reform of 2003 the president is elected for five years; previously the term of office was four years. A direct, two-round majority run-off system is used. The president may actively intervene in the activities of the executive. The strength of the president’s position is also based on the tradition founded during 1990–6, when the office was held by Ion Iliescu, who headed the National Salvation Front (FSN) that overthrew the Ceaușescu dictatorship. At present the office is held by Traian Băsescu (PD). The government depends on the confidence of the parliament, expressed at a joint meeting of its two houses. It takes a majority vote of both chambers to pass a no-confidence measure. Government cabinets last an average of two years, though some undergo extensive reconstruction during their term of office. The current premier is Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu (PNL). Romania has a bi-cameral parliament, with the two houses exercising balanced powers. Elections to both chambers are based on a list proportional system and are held at the same time (four-year term); their compositions therefore tend to be quite similar. Elections to both chambers are based on population numbers. At present the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies (Camera Deputaţilor), has 332 members; the upper house, the Senate (Senat), 143 members. National minorities are guaranteed representation in the Chamber of Deputies. According to current law, a party representing a national ethnic minority, which does not reach the 5 per cent threshold but does gain at least one-tenth of the votes needed to win one seat, will obtain that seat if it is the strongest party representing the given minority. In 2004, 18 parties achieved representation in this way. The measures did not affect the (larger) Hungarian minority, which so far has always attained the threshold. The Constitutional Court is composed of nine justices, nominated three at a time every three years for nine-year terms. Judges are nominated in rotation by the president, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate (Rosůlek 2004, de Zárate). The electoral law allows for independent candidates, but so far none has been successful.

The array of Romanian political parties is generally stable, though it shrank somewhat during the course of the 1990s. There are frequent minor changes in party identity, especially with the big parties, which have sometimes changed their names or formed and then dissolved alliances with other parties. The strongest left-wing party is the Social Democratic Party (PSD), which arose out of Iliescu’s wing of the FSN and ran in coalition with the Humanist Party of Romania (PUR). The main opponents of the PSD since 2000 are the
parties that before the 2004 elections made up the Justice and Truth Alliance (DA): the National Liberal Party (PNL), and the centrist Democratic Party (PD), which came out of the right wing of the FSN. Also holding seats in parliament are the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM), and the ethnic Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR). In the Chamber of Deputies there are also 18 other parties representing smaller ethnic minorities.

In the electoral law on standard competition between parties, the main changes have been with the threshold for earning mandates. Originally there was none. In 1992 the threshold became 3 per cent for parties and 4–8 per cent for coalitions according to the number of cooperating parties. In 2000 the threshold was raised to 5 per cent for parties and 8–10 per cent for coalitions (Šedo 2006). Voter turnout is gradually falling: in the 1990 elections to the Chamber of Deputies the turnout was 86.2 per cent, in 1992, 76.1 per cent, in 2000, 65.3 per cent, and in 2004 just 56.5 per cent (Rose, Munro 2003, Central Electoral Bureau of Romania 2004).

The legal provisions governing political parties include the Constitution of Romania (passed 1991, last amended 2003), the Law on Political Parties (passed 2003), electoral laws and other regulations. A political party may register with the Bucharest Court of Justice if it can gather the signatures of at least 25,000 voters in 18 regions, with at least 700 signatures from each of these regions. A party’s registration may be revoked if the party does not undertake the required activity (to hold a congress at least once every five years; if it does not participate in two consecutive elections by running candidates in at least 21 districts, or if it does not obtain at least 50,000 votes in any election). Political parties are financed from private contributions (there is a set limit on contributions), from member dues, business activities by the party, and contributions from the state budget corresponding to number of seats held, or at least 2 per cent of the vote in the case of parties that have no seats in parliament (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001). Campaigns may not be conducted in the private media; during the campaign parties are guaranteed broadcast time in the state media.

The internal affairs of political parties are regulated by law on a number of points (requirement to hold party congresses, building of party structure at the regional level, prescribed form of internal party organization, secret ballot in electing party officials, etc.). The nomination of candidates by political parties is not regulated by law. There are loose formal ties between political parties and other organizations. Real power within the political parties is held by small groups of party leaders; they (and campaign financing) determine the positions of candidates on the ballot.

There are no set gender quotas for elections. The proportion of women is gradually rising, but remains very small even at the regional level (Millard 2004). There were 37 women (11.18 per cent) elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the most recent elections, in the Senate there were 13 women (9.49 per cent) (IPU: Parline Database). As yet no woman has held the office of either president or prime minister.

---

**Serbia**

Republic of Serbia  
*Republika Srbija*  
*Република Србија*

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created on 27 April 1992, when it was proclaimed by parliament as the sole successor of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. On 4 February 2003 the union was redefined and renamed as Serbia and Montenegro. On 21 May 2006 a referendum on independence was held in Montenegro that resulted in the creation of two new states. On 3 June 2006 an independent Montenegro was declared, and on 5 June 2006 an independent Serbia. Yugoslavia’s process of disintegration is far from finished—discussions are being held at present about the future status of Kosovo, and a declaration of conditional independence for this autonomous province of Serbia is expected around the beginning of 2007 after the Serbian parliamentary elections. The constitutional name of the country is the Republic of Serbia.
The previous Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was adopted on 28 September 1990; the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was confirmed by a referendum which was held on 28 and 29 October 2006. Freedom House rates Serbia as a free country, and Kosovo as not free.

Two autonomous provinces exist within Serbia at present—Vojvodina, and Kosovo and Metohija. Since 1999 Kosovo has been an international protectorate of the UN (the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK). A constitutional framework for Kosovo was adopted in 2001. In 2002 Vojvodina adopted the so-called Omnibus Law, which represents a basic framework for governing this autonomous province.

According to the census of 2002, Serbia (without Kosovo) had a population of 7,498,001, of which 82.86 per cent were Serbs, 3.91 per cent ethnic Hungarians (especially in the Vojvodina region), 1.82 per cent Bosniacs, 1.44 per cent Romanys and 1.08 per cent declaring Yugoslavian nationality (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2002). Other ethnic minorities are less than one per cent of the population. Around 88 per cent of the population of Kosovo are ethnic Albanians, the Serbian population 6 per cent, while other ethnic groups together make up another 6 per cent of the general population (World Bank, Human Development Unit 2003).

The President of the Republic is elected directly for a term of five years. In 2004 the candidate for the Democratic Party (DS), Boris Tadić, was elected president. The unicameral National Assembly has 250 members elected to four-year terms. The electoral system in Serbia has been changed three times; the design of elections in and of itself, however, has not affected the actual development of the political system as a whole (Šedo 2006). The last change was made in 2003, when Serbia used the system of a single nation-wide electoral district with a mandate threshold of 5 per cent. This severely limited the chances of the regionally based parties, for which the previous arrangement presented no serious complication (Goati 2001). The Assembly of Kosovo has 120 members for the purposes of election of the Assembly, Kosovo is considered a single, multi-member electoral district. One hundred of 120 seats of the Assembly are distributed amongst all the parties, ten are distributed among the parties representing the Kosovo Serb Community and ten seats allocated to other Communities as follows: the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities four, the Bosniac community three, the Turkish community two and the Gorani community one. The president of Kosovo is elected by the Assembly of Kosovo (UNMIK 2001). The first post-war president, who served until his death in January 2006, was Ibrahim Rugova; his successor is Fatmir Sejdiu. Agim Çeku has been the Prime Minister of Kosovo since March 2006. This nomination drew condemnation from Serbia, which still regards him as a war criminal, but the then UN administrator in Kosovo Søren Essen-Petersen declined to intervene in the decision. The autonomous province of Vojvodina has its own representative body and government, the premier of which is Boran Pajić.

The strongest party on the left is the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), led throughout the 1990s by Slobodan Milošević. Its coalition partners were the majority of the Yugoslav left led by Milošević’s wife, Mirjana Marković, and representatives of the extreme right-wing Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by Vojislav Šešelj. The SRS advocates the creation of a Greater Serbia and supports fugitive war crimes suspects. The SRP was the winner of the most recent elections in 2003, but in the face of pressure from the international community it was not allowed to form a government. Among the monarchist and clerical parties is the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) of Vuk Drasković, and the New Serbia (NS) party led by Velimir Ilić. The main liberal and centrist parties: a party called G17+, the DS, and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), can be classified among the conservative family of parties. Among the smaller parties in the current parliament are the Serbian Liberal Party (SLS), the Social Democratic Union, the Serbian Democratic Renewal Movement (SDPO) created by the breakup of the SPO, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that split away from the DS. Ethnic parties represented in parliament include the Bosniac Democratic Party of Sandžak. Parties that until 2001 stood in opposition to the regime tend to argue among themselves, and mostly for reasons of personal animosity their leaders fail to cooperate with one another. This fact is illustrated by the current paradoxical situation where the government of the DSS, G17+, the SPO, and the NS party receive tacit support from their former rivals, the SPS, while not communicating with their most natural partner the DS. Besides the

21 Kosovo a Metohija is a Serbian term that the Albanians reject. The Albanian ethnicities use the name Kosovo. For its longstanding usage in the English language, the shorter term Kosovo will be used in this text.
Serbian party system, there also exist regional party systems in Kosovo and Vojvodina. Vojvodina is dominated by parties carrying the name of the autonomous province in their titles, such as the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, etc. The strongest parties in Kosovo are the Democratic League of Kosovo, chaired by Ibrahim Rugova until his death in 2006, and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)—a party the supporters, members, and leading officials of which are recruited from the former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Its top officials include Hashim Thaçi and Agim Çeku. Among the smaller parties are the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo led by Ramush Haradinaj, and the political party Ora led by the owner of the Koha Ditore media group Veton Surroi (Balik 2002, Cabada 2004c).

Political parties are regulated by the Law on Political Organizations as last amended in 1994; the term political party is not defined in that law. In Kosovo, Regulation No. 2004/11 on the Registration and Operation of Political Parties in Kosovo defines political parties (section 1.1. (c)) as organizations of individuals who voluntarily associate on the basis of common ideas, interests or views, for the purpose of obtaining influence and having their representatives elected to public office. Elections are conducted under the Constitution of Serbia (1990), the Law on Local Elections (2002), and the Law on the Financing of Political Parties (2003). The Constitutional Court decides whether the statutes or other general activities of political parties or other political organizations conform to the Constitution and law. It may ban a political party or other political organization; it also decides electoral disputes that are not within the jurisdiction of the courts of law or other state agencies. Some parties have in fact been sanctioned for breach of the electoral rules.

During the years of the Milosevic regime, the media, military and organized crime were clearly seen as being the most politically influential elements.

In Serbia there are no gender quotas for parliamentary elections, while in Kosovo there are many rules concerning gender quotas. In the current government of Vojislav Kostunica there are no women ministers. In the 250-member parliament there are 30 women representatives. The office of president has not been held by a woman. The status of women in Kosovo is determined by the customary Kanun law: a woman belongs to the household of her father; after marriage, of her husband. Until she gives birth she is the lowest member of her family (Elsie 2001).

Slovakia
Republic of Slovakia
Slovenská republika

Until 1992 Slovakia was a part of Czechoslovakia. During the final decades of its existence Czechoslovakia was a federation composed of two parts, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Slovakia became an independent state on 1 January 1993. The beginning of the democratic transition in Slovakia dates to November 1989; the initial impulse was the collapse of the Communist regime in the Czech part of the country. The democratic tradition in Slovakia was historically weak, limited to the short era between the world wars; this had a negative influence on the consolidation of the democratic regime after 1989. Under the governments of the charismatic Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar (1992–4 and 1994–8), liberal democratic standards were not observed, and Slovakia was classified as a hybrid regime balancing on the line between democracy and dictatorship (Diamond 2002). The population of Slovakia is 5,389,180 (December 2005—The Slovak Republic Government Office). There is a large Hungarian minority (about 10 per cent of the population). A certain amount of tension exists between the Hungarian minority and the Slovak majority (about 85 per cent); this tension was politically exploited during the Mečiar governments.
The current constitution was adopted in 1992. The official name of the country is the Republic of Slovakia (Slovenská republika). Slovakia is a unitary state divided administratively into eight regions, 79 districts, 138 towns, and 2883 villages. Regions, towns, and villages have their own local self-government, while the districts have the character of merely administrative departments.

Slovakia is a parliamentary democracy, with the president serving a mainly ceremonial role. Since 1999 the president has been elected by citizens in direct elections to a maximum of two five-year terms (previously, the president was elected by the parliament). A candidate who wins a majority of the vote becomes president. If no candidate wins the required majority, a second round of elections is held between the two most successful first-round candidates. The current president is Ivan Gašparovič. The government, which is responsible to the parliament, has the deciding role in the executive. After being named by the president, a government must ask parliament for a vote of confidence of a majority of members present. Parliament may recall a government or individual ministers at any time by a majority vote of all members of parliament. During the last two terms (1998–2002 and 2002–6) the premier was Mikuláš Dzurinda. The current prime minister is Robert Fico, who has held the job since July 2006. Perhaps because governments are usually formed by three or more political parties, governments have been plagued by numerous conflicts among coalition partners.

The term of office of the parliament elected in 2002 was shortened in early 2006 by three months when the coalition fell apart and early elections had to be called. Legislative power lies with a unicameral parliament (Národná rada Slovenskej republiky), which is directly elected using a proportional voting system for a term of four years, and has 150 members. The Constitutional Court is composed of 13 justices nominated by the president for 12-year terms. Two candidates for each open seat on the Constitutional Court are nominated by parliament for the president's approval. The general judicial system consists of district and regional courts, and the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic.

The party system in Slovakia is characterized by a high degree of instability. Some parties are able to gain and hold seats in parliament for only one or two terms. The number of votes received even by the larger parties tends to fluctuate. The last elections held in June 2006 were won by the populist Direction–Social Democracy (SMER–SD) (50 seats) led by the charismatic Robert Fico; the party is now presenting itself as a social democratic-type party. Some distance behind is the center-right Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ-DS) with 31 seats. Also winning seats in parliament were the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), the center-right Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) representing the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the People's Party–Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (IS–HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar, and the conservative Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). Failing to win seats in parliament were the far-left Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) and the liberal Alliance of New Citizens (ANO) that was successful in the previous 2002 elections. The governing coalition is made up of Direction along with the SNS and IS-HZDS.

For parliamentary elections to the 150-member unicameral legislature, a proportional system is used with a 5 per cent threshold for parties running by themselves, 7 per cent for a two- or three-member coalition, and 10 per cent for four or more parties in coalition. The entire territory of Slovakia comprises a single voting district (Kopeček 2006).

Voter turnout has fluctuated widely since 1989. The first democratic elections in 1990 saw an extraordinarily high turnout of 95.4 per cent. Later it declined—in the 1992 elections turnout was 84.2 per cent, and in 1994, 75.7 per cent. At the height of the confrontation between Mečiar's party, then calling itself the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, and the anti-Mečiar opposition in 1998, turnout rose to 84.2 per cent. As that conflict faded and democracy consolidated, it fell again to 70.1 per cent in 2002, and 54.7 per cent in 2006.

The main legal provisions governing political parties include the Law on Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic (passed in 2004, amended 2005) and the Law on Political Parties (passed in 2005). The basic requirement for registering a party is submission of a petition signed by at least 10,000 citizens. Parliamentary elections are open to every registered political party (or a coalition of registered parties) that submits a list of candidates and makes an election deposit of 500,000 SKK (about 17,000 USD). The deposit is refunded to every party (or coalition) that receives at least 2 per cent of the popular vote. A political party (or coalition of parties) that wins more than 3 per cent of the vote in elections receives funds for every vote gained amounting to 1 per cent of the average nominal monthly wage during the preceding calendar year.
Party campaign expenses are not financially limited at this time, although a limit existed until 2005 (IDEA Country Report on Slovakia 2006; Procházka, Földesová, Kaľavský, Orosz 2006).

The main themes of election campaigns in Slovakia have changed over time. Most of the campaigns in the 1990s were waged over the problems of liberal democracy, government of laws and the pro-Western orientation of Slovakia. Before the last elections in 2006 the main topic became the radical reforms carried out by the Dzurinda government (taxes, social welfare, pensions, health care). On the other hand, a constant factor in party politics is the importance of popular and charismatic leaders.

Slovakia does not set any gender quotas in assembling election ballot lists. A very few parties apply some quotas. With the parliamentary parties, women are often relegated to the unelectably low regions of the ballot. For example, in the last elections in 2006 women took up 22.7 per cent of the places on the ballots, but only 16 per cent of the electable positions (24 women out of 150 members of parliament).

**Slovenia**

Republic of Slovenia

Republika Slovenija

In 1989 the Constitution was revised to eliminate the ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party, opening the path to democracy, and to separation from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ). On 26 December 1990 the parliament declared the sovereignty of an independent Slovenia, and demanded a six-month deadline for writing up an agreement with federal officials on secession. On 25 June 1991 parliament approved a Declaration of Independence, to which the federal officials reacted by sending in the Yugoslav Army and occupying the border posts. After a ten-day war units were withdrawn to Croatia, and Slovenia could keep on its path to transformation. On 23 December 1991 the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted. Slovenia’s main ethnic group are the Slovenians (83 per cent). Nationalities from the former Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs & Muslims by ethnicity) make up 6.3 per cent, and the Hungarian, Italian and Roma minorities are 0.6 per cent of the population. The Freedom House rating of Slovenia is ‘free’.

Slovenia was very quickly integrated into the international community. In 1992 Slovenia became a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); on 29 March 2004 it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia, and on 1 May 2004 it joined the European Union.

Parliament is composed of two chambers, the National Assembly and the National Council. The National Assembly is made up of ninety deputies. The National Assembly will always seat one delegate from the Italian and one from the Hungarian national communities. Deputies, except for the deputies of the national communities, are elected according to the principle of proportional representation, with a 4 per cent threshold required for election to the National Assembly. The National Council is the representative body for social, economic, professional and local interests. The National Council has 40 members, and is composed of the following: four representatives of employers; four representatives of labour; four representatives of farmers, crafts and trades, and independent professions; six representatives from the non-commercial fields; and 22 representatives of local interests. The President of the Republic is elected directly for a term of five years, and may be elected to a maximum of two consecutive terms (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia). In comparison to the constitutions of other countries in south-eastern Europe, the position of the Slovenian president is clearly the weakest. The current president is Janez Drnovšek; the current prime minister is Janez Janša of the Slovenian Democratic Party.

Slovenia is a multiparty democracy; there are at last 38 political parties registered from the far left to the far right. On the left end of the political spectrum are the Social Democrats (SD), who advocate the welfare state,
human rights, etc. In parliamentary elections in 2004 they received 10 per cent of the vote. Until 2005 the party bore the name Unified List of Social Democrats (ZLSD). Another party of the left is the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS)—this is a single-issue party with little in the way of a developed programme (Hloušek 2005). The Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) supports the defence of national interests in relation to the EU, and emphasizes its anti-Communist stance. Its programme contains a number of Social Democratic elements, but its actual political stance is somewhat different. Among the centrist parties are the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS). Their policies contributed to the rapid transformation of the country and acceptance into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The LDS and SDS are the parties with the highest voter support, winning in the last parliamentary elections 23 per cent and 29 per cent of the vote respectively. Another important party during the entire 1990s was the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), which in 1999 merged with the Slovenian Christian Democrats (SKD) to form the party SLS-SKD; it has now returned to the name and acronym of SLS. The party represents the Christian democratic camp, with a number of conservative and agrarian elements. The New Slovenia-Christian People’s Party (NSi) broke away from the SLS-SKD, led by a group centered around Andrej Bajuk. On the far right is the Slovenian National Party, SNS (cf. Hloušek 2002a; Šaradín 2004; Hloušek 2005; Cabada 2005).

A political party is defined as an association of citizens who pursue their political goals as adopted in the party’s programme through the democratic formulation of the political will of the citizens, and by proposing candidates for election to the National Assembly, for the President of the Republic, and to local levels of government. The limitations on political parties in Slovenia are not unlike those in other democratic countries. A party which has its head office abroad may not function in the Republic of Slovenia. A party may not function or set up forms of organization within a commercial company, institute, other organization or state body. A party may not function as a military or armed association, and may not be established for such a purpose. A foreigner may not become a member of the party. The following documents relate to the activities of political parties: the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (1991), the Political Parties Act (1994), the National Assembly Elections Act (1992), the Law on Election of the President of the Republic (1992), the Associations Act (1995), the Law on Local Self-government (1993), the Law on Elections and Campaigning (1994) and the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (article 8 (2), article 31. and article 35; adopted in 2002).
Conclusions and Way Forward

The Regional Analysis and individual country chapters show that problems were experienced by all of the countries studied. Some problems are shared; others, whether they appear at the systemic level or within the party system, have a country-specific character.

Systemic level

The party system in the post-Communist countries has moved many of its elements towards modern democracy, but we can still identify many problems. Many of them occur in the western democracies as well, but in the region of Central and Eastern Europe they are deeper and more apparent; others are seen as specific to the region. Their neglect is all the more serious because some of the countries lack experience with democracy entirely; for others that experience was interrupted for a long time. The legitimacy of party competition has no long-standing tradition to depend on, and is potentially more endangered. A fundamental problem of practically the entire region is the low regard citizens have for political parties, and what seems to be a declining trust in the institutions of the state. Political parties have failed to take practical steps to improve their images. Moves towards greater transparency in the behaviour of leading politicians and their party organizations are implemented reluctantly, with many loopholes, often lacking sanctions, while other rules such as campaign expense limits are simply ignored.

Party systems in most countries cannot be regarded (compared to West European standards) as completely stable. Instability is manifested in all three dimensions; that is, the replacement of some of the relevant parties with new parties, abrupt swings in voter behaviour, and changes in the configuration of relationships between parties. To a certain extent some of this can be regarded as a ‘healthy’ development, in which parties that are old and have lost the faith of the voters are replaced by new and better parties. Unfortunately, many of the new parties have not brought new quality to the political arena, but instead have taken on and expanded the negative elements of the behaviour of their predecessors. An intrinsic problem of these parties is that many of them are not vehicles by which new elites would seek to exert themselves, but the product of internal party splits. Especially in the countries with strongly centralized parties, new parties are founded in the wake of disputes between two strong, authoritarian personalities, where the victor remains at the head of the ‘old’ party, and the vanquished goes off to found a ‘new’ one. As a result, both parties suffer from the weakening of dialogue and the plurality of opinions. Personal animosities among party chairmen limit the possibilities for cooperation in advancing the parties’ programmes, even if their goals are quite similar. This dynamic also applies to the newly established parties who build their campaign on criticism of the status quo (corruption, criminal behaviour among political leaders, insufficient attention to citizens’ interests) and declare themselves as the ‘next big thing’ on the political scene. Once they have attained power and denounced the sins of their predecessors, they pick up right where their predecessors left off. Populists of every persuasion predominate among the new parties. Some of the ‘old parties’ react to their rivals’ populism by making unrealistic promises during the election campaign. On this level we run into an apparent deficit in ‘political education’ among citizens, who are unable adequately to judge the programmes and behaviour of parties.

Coalition ballots have become a common part of political competition in a significant portion of the countries. They often serve as a symbol of a clearer definition of opinions on major topics, and presage future cooperation in forming a government or in the opposition. On this level they are to be welcomed. Unfortunately, in some cases they become the cause of the subsequent disintegration of the party, and deeper parliamentary splits during the election campaigns. A common mechanism for limiting election coalitions is to raise the threshold for coalitions: these measures have been introduced in Albania, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, while Estonia bans such coalitions outright. The setting of reasonable boundaries remains a problem, however. If coalitions are allowed, but the election threshold set for them is too high, an unreasonably large number of votes may be nullified. We can also identify certain weaknesses in looking at the way allies cooperate in Albania (detailed below). The presence of independent members has become a complicating factor in the region. Theoretically, independent candidates can bring new perspectives on important themes, without being linked to narrow partisan interests. In practice, however, the independence of at least some of these candidates is open to doubt. While maintaining formal
independence, these members are often either close to a certain party, or align themselves with various powerful interests.

Regulation of the party system through the electoral system and electoral reform is of limited usefulness. Abandonment of majority voting in favour of proportional representation has supported the development of more clearly structured political parties, but has not hindered the appearance and success of parties based more on popular leaders than on programme. Especially in the countries with a single electoral district (without the need for separate candidate lists), parties operating on such a basis have found easy entry onto the political scene. The effect of their existence has been frequent turnover in actors on the political scene, and a greater number of populist parties. Increasing the number of electoral districts has not always been successful in protecting the system against parties structured on this basis. The introduction or raising of election thresholds has limited the fragmentation of the party spectrum in parliament; on the other hand, in the early years especially, this resulted in the nullification of a significant proportion of votes. Nor have radical changes always produced the expected results. For example, in Poland the reforms introduced in 1993 succeeded in preventing more than 20 parties from getting into parliament. On the other hand, the integration of the unsuccessful right-wing parties after the 1993 elections to the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) led to the creation of a rather murky coalition that failed to hold together for a single term (cf. Kubát 2005, Kopeček 2002). It is impossible to formulate an infallible key to understanding the election systems in the region. However, we may conclude that a system that gives too much advantage to the victor is not good for the early stages of development but neither is a system that sets thresholds too low. The steps taken to reform electoral systems should be carefully considered, as the desired outcome is by no means guaranteed. Here the opinion of Taagepera should be kept in mind: that stabilization of the party system is helped by keeping the same electoral system rules over a number of elections (Taagepera 1996).

Low voter turnout is another fundamental problem in the region. This is evident even in elections to key institutions (lower house of parliament, president); for elections to other bodies it is even worse. On this level, there is room for a more active role by non-governmental organizations; in the more stable countries where there is a low risk of electoral manipulation, a more active role by the state is worth considering. Turnout might be helped somewhat by expanding the possible means of voting (early voting, voting by mail, etc.).

The increasing intensity of interaction of politicians with the European level presents an opportunity for parties in some of the countries studied. In the context of European party federations, parties from the new member countries play a relatively important role, taking part in the strengthening of European party pluralism. This is mostly taking place, however, at the level of parties that are advocating something other than the currently dominant trend of European integration.

**External regulation**

The preceding analysis shows that external regulation of political parties in the region under study is at a very high level. Regulation is necessary to prevent the return of the previous forms of government, an important element especially with the less-consolidated regimes. The fall of the regime in many countries was accompanied by a period of ‘laissez-faire’ also in the area of control of political parties; this euphoric period was followed by the gradual introduction of reforms. In the regions of Central, Eastern, and South-eastern Europe and the two Caucasian states studied, there is no one discernable standard model of legislation regulating the activities of political parties: each of the countries created a unique set of laws from the legislative elements available. In some countries political parties are regulated only by the law on political parties; in others, the pertinent articles are spread out over a number of laws.

These laws start by establishing under what conditions a political party may be founded, and the conditions under which it may be dissolved. Parties are outlawed mainly for undemocratic practices; it is interesting that in some countries, parties may be dissolved for falling below a set number of members. It is questionable, however, to what degree these measures are implemented in practice—among all of the analyzed states they were used only once to ban a party (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation), and this under less-than-democratic circumstances. Although in almost every country efforts to disrupt territorial or state integrity, or
hate speech, are grounds for banning a party, there continue to exist parties advocating the above-mentioned issues in their programmes without penalty (for example, the Croatian Party of Rights in Croatia, the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Serbian Radical Party in Serbia etc.).

In selected countries, on the other hand, rules have been introduced to ease, make possible, or guarantee minority representation (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania and Slovenia). The form of these rules (except for Bosnia and Herzegovina) has strengthened the tendency towards the creation of independent minority parties, rather than strengthening participation by minority candidates on the election ballots of the political parties of the national majority. However, a suitable solution is almost impossible, because limiting chances of minority candidates in ‘special’ competition may not necessarily force them towards significant involvement in the political parties.

Political parties in all of the countries studied are funded from the state budget. The only exception in this regard is Latvia, where support by the state is only indirect, in the form of free advertising time in the public media, publication of election brochures and tax exemptions. Most of the countries have introduced a complete or partial ban on funding from foreign sources. The only two countries not to impose this restriction are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, where funding from outside the country was the main source of financing for political parties. Twelve countries introduced campaign spending limits; a similar number of states, though not always the same ones, set contribution limits. In all of the countries, parties are required to submit financial reports. Especially tough in this regard is the legislation of Poland and Kosovo, where failure to submit a campaign expense report or an annual financial report can serve as a legal reason to shut the party down.

Political parties are also regulated in their access to media, while in most of the countries parties are guaranteed equal media rights. Some countries, in an effort to stabilize the party system, give an advantage to parties already holding seats in parliament by allowing them more free time for their presentations in the media.

All of the countries analyzed suffer from the question of making public the financial reports of individual political parties, implementation and enforcement of laws on political party financing, and application of sanctions. In all of the countries it is evident that the original liberal approach led to an environment of corruption and clientelism, and that regulation of political party financing contributes to the strengthening of democracy. Most of the countries have adopted, after a series of financial scandals, very strict legislation, and imposed limits on contributions and spending and a ban on foreign donations. The exceptions are Croatia and to some extent Estonia.

**Representation of women** in the region under study does not reach the average of Western European countries. The rapid effectiveness of quotas was shown in Macedonia and Kosovo, countries with a patriarchal tradition, but which now have the highest proportion of women in the legislative bodies. Unwillingness to raise limited quotas in Armenia (5%) is one of the factors giving that country the lowest proportion of women in the legislature (5.3%). Of the countries that has entered the EU, Hungary has the lowest proportion in the EU at a mere 10.4%, while the traditionally highest representation of women is in the Baltic countries. Internal quotas have been introduced by traditionally left-wing groups (socialist and social-democratic parties, and Green parties), while right-wing parties usually distance themselves from such regulation. It remains axiomatic that the proportional system is more favourable to the election of women, thus the size of election districts continues to play a role, along with the existence of thresholds for mandates, or type of candidate ballot (ballot structure: open vs. closed). The challenge in this area is continued support for the creation of non-profit governmental organizations dealing with gender issues, and lobbying support for adopting of quotas in individual parliaments.

**Internal functioning**

Formally, the internal structure of political parties is quite standardized, including territorially based organization; members have the possibility through delegates to party congresses to influence the direction of the party. Between the congresses, internal party bodies guide the day-to-day agenda. These allow for a
division of labour; in other words, there should be no threat that one party body will dominate over the others. In practice, however, the model of internal party democracy tends not to function properly. What has emerged is the model of a strongly centralized party, with centralization taking place in every aspect examined.

The selection of candidates depends on the importance of the elected party organ, while at the national level an important role is played by the party leadership. The experience of the Czech Republic shows that it is possible to strengthen the regional level by making the boundaries of election districts conform to those of the intermediate levels of self-government. The possibility of copying this step in countries where party structure is linked to clan or similar ties is very limited, however. The limited role of the national candidate ballot (for countries with a single district, or for the second scrutinium), however, might be one way to at least weaken the positions of party central committees.

State intervention in the process of candidate selection may be ineffective (general guarantees of democratic selection of candidates may be left unfulfilled), or open to abuse (possibility of selective persecution of ‘inconvenient’ parties). An exact description of sufficiently democratic forms of candidate selection might limit the chances of newly founded, weaker or loosely organized parties and distort the equal playing field in electoral competition. An active role might be played by non-governmental organizations, especially at the level of campaigns that are critical of some forms of candidate selection (for example, the buying and selling of positions on the ballot).

Despite a growing number of cases of peaceful and competitive changing of the party guard, the model prevails in the political parties where their founders (or persons close to them) are able to maintain their positions without limitation or competition. Internal party disputes are caused more by the ambitions of powerful competitors to the leader than discussion of policy principles, but instead of compromise or consensus they lead to the disintegration of the parties themselves. The result is destabilization of the party system, in which party splitters carry over the methods of party mechanisms according to the model they have left, and thus fail to bring in new ideas. The possibilities for regulation in such matters are more difficult than regulating selection of candidates. Splits could be prevented not by a dominating leader, but for example through prohibitions on switching parliamentary parties during term of office, etc. However, such rules would (a) further strengthen centralization by severely limiting the autonomy of individual members of parliament, and (b) would also apply to those who wish to leave their party for other than narrow personal reasons (disagreement on policy, opposition to authoritarian methods of decision-making). The possibilities for better methods of selection and turnover are also limited by the overall development of civil society.

Drawbacks in the way programmes and policies are created can be seen in two main spheres. Especially in the states lacking experience in democracy, and with weakly structured parties, party programmes are reduced to election campaign manifestos and utilitarian use of slogans with clear deficits of implementation. More developed party programmes that are the fruit of long-term systematic work at various levels of the party structure and perhaps sympathizing think-tanks are found mainly in the regions of Central Europe and the Baltics. But the realism of this has limits, too. In some cases, building the necessary compromises entailed therein may be part of the process. On the other hand, the proclaimed interests of coalition partners may sometimes serve as a good excuse if a party decides not to fulfil some part of its programme. Another problem is a significant populism evident especially in election platforms and campaigns. Instead of realistic plans, parties seek to trump one another with who can promise more. The possibility of state intervention (without unnecessary limitations on parties) in the creation of party programmes is almost nil. Preventive steps might be aimed only at formulations clearly incompatible with the functioning of a democratic state (see External Regulation chapter). An active role must be played by the non-governmental sector at the level of strict monitoring of parties and quality communication of relevant information to citizens.

Membership in political parties is not widespread; many members are so in a formal sense only. Especially in the countries of the Balkans and Caucasus, many of the parties function mainly during the election campaign, but otherwise undertake little or no activity. Generally the communication within parties is weakly dealt with, going mainly from the top down. Stability of parties and advances in communications technology have not contributed to greater internal democratization; what we see instead is the ‘professionalization’ of parties.
(better use of political marketing, special policy committees, etc.), in which the opinions of the rank-and-file members are even more difficult to hear. The possible path towards more democratically functioning parties will be quite complicated, with society at large playing a significant role. The role of the party membership will depend on what leadership methods will be tolerated by the public, and whether they will be willing and able to ‘punish’ their parties in electoral competition.

**The countries**

The biggest problem of **Albania** has been lack of transparency and insufficient mechanisms for sanctions. The two strongest parties use this situation to their advantage, and have failed so far to adopt the democratic elements of government. Government parties often exploit their position in allocating financial resources during election campaigns; state intervention in the work of election commissions is commonplace. Albania remains a country with a climate of nepotism, clientelism and corruption, all of which have a negative effect on the quality of democracy. In Albania the form of distribution of mandates in parliamentary elections can also be considered unsuitable, where two large parties concentrate votes in majority voting, and their smaller allies in proportional voting mean that the winner need not be decided by the will of the voters, but by the parties’ ability to split their votes carefully in the majority and proportional elements of the election system. If a bloc that was supported by a significant proportion of voters were to be defeated owing to the ‘incompetence’ of its voters, the entire system could be delegitimized. The biggest challenge for the future remains the publication of financial reports and the application of sanctions for failure to meet the deadline or publication of (false) information.

For **Armenia** a key problem is the publication of financial reports by the individual parties. These reports are available to the media, but given the ties between political parties and the individual newspapers, the news does not always get passed along to the voter. Armenia has the most severe regulations of any country to ensure internal party democracy, but the practical impact of these measures is negligible. Like in Albania, another acute problem is the issue of (non)application of sanctions, failure to prosecute or convict. Armenia is also the country with the consistently lowest proportion of women in top functions.

A problem of the party system in **Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)** is the continuing segmentation tied to individual ethnic groups. An attempt in 2001 to assemble a government by-passing the strongest ethnically defined parties failed (Hladký 2006). The country did not prohibit receiving financial contributions from foreign donors, which is striking considering the ties between individual Bosnian elites and foreign political parties trying to break up BiH and redraw its boundaries. As in the other countries, an acute problem in BiH is the question of releasing the financial reports of individual countries and (im)partiality in imposing sanctions. Individual parties receiving finance from abroad lose the incentive to build a unified BiH, which has been and is the goal of the international community present in the country since the signing of the Dayton peace accords in 1995. The willingness of voters to take part in elections is falling as well.

Compared to the situation in the 1990s the position of the elected bodies in **Bulgaria** is improving; political issues are no longer leading to mass demonstrations, which for example led to the fall of the government and early elections in 1997. Reconstruction of the party system at the beginning of the 21st century weakened the original deep division into right-wing and left-wing blocs. On the other hand, a new stable model has not yet been found, and representatives of the far right have found their way into parliament (though so far just a few). Political parties are more or less reliant on private contributions (state subsidies are so far negligible), and struggle with a lack of funding. The biggest challenge for Bulgaria is to increase state subsidies for political parties, and thus the avoid the exploitation and bribery of political parties. Bulgarian law does not clearly define sanctions for failure to submit or late submission of financial reports, which contributes to a lack of transparency and unwillingness of political parties to cooperate with the National Audit Office.

Of all the countries analyzed, **Croatia** has adopted the most liberal legislation—no contribution limits, spending limits, or ban on foreign donations; no ban on paid political broadcasts. The law stipulates that parties must announce their estimated campaign expenses and their financial sources before the elections, and sets financial penalties for failure to observe these articles. The law fails to stipulate, however, which institutions are responsible for overseeing compliance with this law. Croatia’s liberal approach may result in
the formation of a party system reflecting the financial backing of the individual parties, the contacts between party officials and wealthy companies, parties’ dependence on foreign sources of funding, and the awarding of state contracts according to previous contributions to the ruling parties. If the country wishes to avoid such abuses, it will be necessary to adopt more restrictive legislation to guarantee equal access by all parties to participation in the country’s democratic system.

In the **Czech Republic** we can identify certain positive elements. (a) The array of political parties and their positions has stabilized; voters choose from known alternatives. (b) There remains room for new themes and new actors, which to a certain extent prevents the ossification of the existing parties. (c) During the term 2002–6 the changing of the leadership guard in the main parties took place, often with real competition among candidates, without causing the disintegration and the creation of new ‘insurmountable’ animosities. However, there are a number of problems that cannot be ignored. (a) The existing form of party competition has repeatedly blocked the decision-making process or severely hindered the ability of the government to take action. (b) Election campaigns are repeatedly marred by a flood of unrealistic promises. (c) Except for elections to the Chamber of Deputies, voter turnout is markedly low, with a declining tendency. (d) There is a lack of representation by women in the legislative and executive branches and the leadership of political parties. (e) Public funds are spent in a non-transparent manner, which leads to suspicions of corruption reaching the highest levels of politics. Almost none of the main political parties avoided financial scandal during the period under study. Finally, a government decree in 1998 forbade the acceptance of financial contributions from companies with state share in ownership, and a Law on Political Parties was adopted in 2000 dealing with financial contributions from private individuals. Although the legislation adopted was of a thorough character, imposition, control, and application of sanctions remain problematic. A major challenge for the future, which might help head off problems in the future (decline in citizens’ trust in political parties and state institutions) is the publication and monitoring of financial reports by the individual parties.

Like the Czech Republic, **Estonia** has encountered problems with insufficient control of party financial reports and corruption in awarding state contracts. Recommendations for Estonia include building an institutional mechanism for monitoring and supervising political parties and assuring the independence of the Public Procurement Office, and strengthening its capacity for monitoring and imposition of sanctions (Open Society Institute 2002a). The incorporation of the Russian-speaking minority also remains an unsolved problem in the country’s politics.

Party politics in **Georgia** after the ‘Rose Revolution’ began a new chapter of development in many ways; therefore it is difficult to identify clearly the positive points and problems. Unfortunately, the new system has carried over many of the models of the previous period. In electoral competition there is an evident preference for the governing party in the public media (tone of reporting, air time given to individual politicians). Political parties are not easily ‘readable’; instead of building and defending a clear set of programme priorities, they concentrate on running a utilitarian election campaign. The internal workings of parties are dominated by a strongly centralized model. Another problem is the steady decline in voter turnout, and insufficient representation for women. But the greatest problem remains transparency. Political parties are required to submit a financial report to the Central Election Commission, but it is no longer released to the public. Another disputed point is the degree of independence of the Central Election Commission. Recommendations for Georgia are greater transparency, and the introduction of a strict mechanism of sanctions for failure to observe the rules.

In **Hungary** the system has settled out into a few main parties, which have formed themselves into blocs. After every election a stable government has been formed from the expected set of partners. A problem in the behaviour of the political parties has been the increase in unrealistic campaign promises by both blocs. One of the results has been the postponement of necessary reforms in public spending. Hungary has the lowest proportion of women in parliament among the EU countries. The biggest source of political party funds is the state; political parties are required to publish their income once a year in the Hungarian *Gazette*. There are very strict sanctions for violating this rule. However, critics believe that Hungary should reform its state funding and introduce tax credits for donations to political parties as a way of galvanizing small and medium donations. In terms of campaign finance disclosure, the issue of donations in-kind is not sufficiently regulated by current legislation (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001).
Lithuania is a country with a very unstable party system. The low level of trust in political parties is manifested in sharp swings of voters towards new parties, which are usually strongly oriented towards a single leader. Lithuania is the only one of the countries analyzed that has not introduced direct subsidies for parties from the state. In the case of these countries it would be better to support non-governmental organizations that would help in promoting a law that would allow more strict regulation of this phenomenon. Another continuing problem is the degree of control over the financial reports of individual parties, which could lead in the long run to an increase in corruption. The participation of the Russian-speaking minority in politics is yet another unsettled problem. Although the proportion of women in parliament is not high compared to the standards of Western Europe, it is so in the context of the region; moreover, the country was headed for two terms by a female president.

In Lithuania the law allows for anonymous financial donations of up to 25 USD, which provides a great opportunity for anonymous financial contributions from large firms. A positive element in Lithuania is the introduction of state subsidies for political parties. As in other countries, the financing of political parties is not very transparent. On the other hand, it must be added that Lithuania has taken the most visible steps against links between politicians and organized crime, namely the removal of President Rolandas Paksas. The fact that Paksas headed an alliance of parties in the next election calling itself For Order and Justice is one of the ironies and a typical phenomenon of the region's post-Communist countries.

Although Macedonia has adopted legislation establishing sanctions for non-publication of a financial report or giving false information therein, these sanctions remain little applied (for example, the articles on nullification of elections in the event some party uses illegally gotten funds in the campaign). A fundamental problem will also be to maintain stability between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority. Compared to neighbouring countries, Macedonia has taken a number of steps that have led to a lessening of tensions. The radical wing of the Albanians, however, refuses to be satisfied, and the implemented measures are meeting with the opposition of the Macedonian nationalists. On this level an active role by the international community is necessary, which must support in an adequate manner the positive steps taken by the Macedonian executive, and provide it assistance in case the radicals of both camps raise their demands. The situation of the 1999 Kosovo crisis must not be repeated when Macedonia, a state with a population of 2 million and one of the lowest incomes per capita in Europe, was criticized by the West for insufficient aid provided to hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees—a wave which the country was incapable of managing without extensive financial and humanitarian assistance.

Montenegro in 2004 adopted a law that sets a fine for failure by a political party to submit a financial report to the authorized institution, but it does not specify which institution is authorized, or which bureau is responsible for the fulfillment of paragraph 17 of the Law on the Financing of Political Parties. The fleshing out of the missing parts of the law on financing of political parties is required, as well as greater transparency, accountability, enforcement, the application of sanctions, and increasing of fines for failure promptly to submit a financial report. It will be interesting to track the consequences of the country’s gaining independence. The previous split into adherents and opponents of separation from Serbia, expressed in the competition between two blocs, might be gradually weakened, which could also destabilize the current format of electoral competition.

In Poland the party system continues to be markedly unstable; the existing parties are losing support owing to wide-reaching financial scandals (the loss of the great majority of its voters by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in the 2005 elections); however, new parties are very often tied to charismatic leaders. Compared to the 1990s the number of radical parties in parliament, such as the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP) has grown, and larger doses of populism are found in the programmes of the moderate parties as well. Voter turnout in the country has long been low. In the first half of the 1990s Poland introduced a system of state financing of political parties, but this was insufficient. In 2001 reforms were passed to the system of state financing of political parties that significantly increased the amount of financial subsidy from the state, and led to an overall decrease in corruption. A problem remains the insufficient control of the financing of political parties, and application of sanctions, the result of which are the above-mentioned problems on the political scene.
Political parties in **Romania** suffer from financial and corruption scandals. The Romanian system of financing political parties does not offer sufficient enforcement and sanctions mechanisms. The non-existence of functioning sanctions mechanisms allows political parties not to submit their financial reports to the control mechanism or to publish them. Political parties allow themselves to be bought by private companies that then receive public contracts. In this regard Romania is an ideal country for corruption and clientelism. In Romanian politics we also find a lower proportion of women than typical for the surrounding countries (with the exception of Hungary).

**Slovakia** has succeeded in balancing out the democratic deficit of the Mečiar governments, and despite this handicap has managed to take its place alongside the best-rated countries in the region. Another positive development is that the main representative of the largest ethnic minority in the country, the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), has become an acceptable governing coalition partner. Continuing problems include (a) lower stability of the party system, apparent for example in the repeated success of new populist groups (Učeň 2004); (b) tension and conflicts between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority, provoked mainly in situations when the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) is part of the government; (c) the identification of political parties with their leaders, where internal party disputes lead to the breakaway of new parties instead of finding consensus within the existing subjects; (d) corruption and clientelism; (e) generally declining voter turnout for regional elections; and (f) insignificant proportion of women in top functions. Most of the above problems will require a long time to sort out, with cooperation between government and non-government institutions (strengthening of transparency, etc.). Only the case of elections for chairmen of the regions, where a minimum of citizens vote in the second round, is a solution available in changing the voting system to one that uses only one round of voting with alternative or supplementary vote. Most of the political parties, besides submitting a financial report to parliament, also publish their financial reports on their websites. However, the disclosure rules are rather weak and their implementation hard to enforce. Spending limits are very low and difficult to implement, limiting parties’ ability to mount an active campaign (Ikstens, Smilov, Walecki 2001).

**Slovenia** has a stable set of political parties, allowing voters plenty of room for choice; political parties are also willing to overcome significant differences and find a consensus across the spectrum. The form of nomination supports the role of the lower levels of the party hierarchy, while at the same time requiring that the lower levels of elected representation be occupied by names that are known to their voters. Nevertheless, a certain problem remains in the dependency of parties on their leaders, the names of which have changed little since the restructuring of the system in the early 1990s. Implementation of legislation on the financing of political parties in Slovenia is at a high level. Even so, political parties in Slovenia have not escaped scandals relating to financing, or links between party donations and the awarding of state contracts. Monitoring of the financing of political parties is certainly the weakest link in the system in **Serbia** (CESID 2005). In autumn 2006 a new draft law was to be passed which, however, has not yet been released to the public; thus its effects when passed and put into practice cannot be predicted. In the past, however, connections between political parties, the state, private firms, members of the media and criminal elements were widespread. The case of **Kosovo** is an interesting one, where under pressure from the international community an incredible number of detailed laws and regulations were adopted. Even this, however, did not prevent the financing of political parties from sources close to organized crime.

**Ways forward**

A key feature of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe is pragmatism, flexibility, and the goal-oriented rational behaviour of its narrow elites. Political party actors are working on from that basis when they reform electoral systems, modify their operations, especially financing, or undertake activities at the European level. Parties voluntarily regulate and limit their activities, but at the same time seek other paths to assure, with impunity, that the real workings of the system remain untouched by these regulations. Parties reform the election laws in the name of the good of the whole in a manner designed to benefit themselves and no one else. Many parties have defined in their statutes the elements of internal party democracy that they fail to observe in practice. In a number of passages in this text we have demonstrated that politics—and especially party politics—is all about incentives. A change in the conditions described, which are clearly not satisfactory to everyone, should
also be related to incentives. Academic research, for example, should not give up its chance to provide expertise to political parties in matters of election reform, while keeping in mind that reform itself often becomes an explosive political topic that can lead to the defeat of the initiator. Non-governmental organizations should link the pressure they apply on the political parties to the concept of ‘electoral change’ or ‘punishment at the polls’, and point out the cases, such as they have appeared on the electoral market, of voters rewarding parties as advocated by Giovanni Sartori: to strike a balance between partisanship and non-partisan government; loyalty to party and loyalty to state; interest of the party and interest of the state. This publication, too, has endeavoured to contribute in a similar way.
Appendices

Appendix 1. Accessing the broadcast media in the pre-election period

Albania
Public Radio and Television provide free air-time for each registered political party. Parties that have obtained more than 20 per cent of the seats in the last parliamentary elections, are granted equal air-time of not less than 30 minutes, whereas for the other parliamentary parties this air-time is not less than 15 minutes. Each party not represented in the Assembly participating in elections is entitled to 10 minutes of air-time. Public radio and television may not prepare or broadcast paid political advertising. Private broadcasters are obliged to accept and transmit advertisements, giving equal time to all parliamentary parties that obtained up to 20 per cent of the seats in the last elections. For the parties with more than 20 per cent of the seats, the equally allocated air-time is doubled. Private broadcasters will make available extra air-time for the advertisements of non-parliamentary parties and independent candidates as well.

Armenia
All parties have equal opportunities in utilizing media sources that run by state institutions and governmental bodies. Presidential candidates have a right to free broadcasting time on public television (no more than 60 minutes) and public radio (no more than 120 minutes). Presidential candidates (or, upon their agreement, the party or initiative group that has nominated them) have the right to use pre-election foundations for paid broadcasting time on public television (no more than 120 minutes) and on public radio (no more than 180 minutes). Private broadcasters may provide air-time on in the commercial media without any limitations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
Political parties shall be provided free broadcast time by all public broadcast media during the 30 days prior to polling day. All public electronic media shall ensure direct access by organizing debates (during the debate all political parties must have at least three minutes, etc.). Paid political advertisement is allowed in the private and public media during the 60 days prior to polling day.

Bulgaria
All candidates/parties/coalitions for the National Assembly shall enjoy access to the national media in a manner which shall be established by a resolution of the Grand National Assembly. The editor or publisher of a daily newspaper or another periodical which has published an item affecting the rights and reputation of a candidate shall publish the candidate’s reply in the first subsequent issue. The reply shall be printed in the same position, with the same type, shall be free of charge, and shall not exceed in volume the item it replies to.

Croatia
Political parties get free media access during the campaign. Croatian Radio-Television shall not advocate the views of any individual political party, or any other individual views, in its programmes. In the campaign period, the total air-time of all programmes shall be established in the electronic media operating in the Republic of Croatia so that time can be bought in equal duration by the political party that has the majority, and the opposition parties or coalitions; while equal time shall be calculated according to the particular list participating on elections.

Czech Republic
From the 16th day prior to the polling day, until the 48 hours prior to the opening of ballots, political parties/coalitions nominating candidates to stand for elections shall be allotted a total of 14 hours of air-time on broadcasting channels on Czech Radio, and 14 hours of air-time on broadcasting channels on Czech Television for the purpose of their election campaign. The broadcasting time shall be allotted free of charge and apportioned evenly among the parties/coalitions involved. The time and hour when each party/coalition shall be on air shall be determined by drawing lots. Neither any local radio station nor any public address system shall be used for the purposes of any political party, coalition, and independent candidate canvassing.
**Estonia**

During the election campaign only the Public Broadcast (ETV) is regulated strictly. Special air-time slots are allocated to the candidates and are free of charge. For the private media there are no such regulations, and political advertising is allowed. Only sponsorship is regulated; thus it is prohibited to use sponsors for the news, current affairs and political programmes.

**Georgia**

Parties have a legal right to equal access to the media—public broadcasters shall provide two hours of air-time daily free of charge for election campaign and political advertising purposes for at least the period of the last 15 days prior to polling day. Parties may not own their own broadcast media or sponsor programmes. All media wishing to broadcast pre-electoral advertising are obliged to broadcast the advertisements furnish of all allowable electoral subjects, on a non-discriminatory basis and free of charge, but no more than 60 seconds within three hours.

**Hungary**

All media (both private and public) shall publish political advertisements under equal conditions for candidates and organizations nominating candidates. No opinions or evaluating explanations may be added to political advertisements. Political advertisements must be adequately separated from other items (programmes), and must be presented in blocks. Political parties and their associations are entitled to present political advertisements only during the election period, or during normal times in connection with a proclaimed referendum.

**Latvia**

Public organizations, in order to perform their public activities, may freely (a) disseminate information about their activities; (b) create their own mass media (there is an inconsistency between the Public Organizations Act and the Radio and Television Law that prohibits political organizations from establishing broadcasting organizations); (c) shape public opinion. The amount of broadcasting time in foreign languages shall not exceed 25 per cent of the total volume of the broadcasting time in a 24-hour period. This restriction is important, because only 57.7 per cent of the population in Latvia is Latvian. Political parties representing minorities must fight for air-time in order to transmit programmes in a minority language. During the election campaign political parties are entitled to free air-time. During the non-election period there is no limitation on transmitting or publishing of political advertisements paid by parties.

**Lithuania**

Political parties that have submitted a list of candidates or candidates in single-member constituencies shall be granted the right to use state mass media free of charge. The allocation of free air-time is based on agreement between the Central Electoral Committee (CEC) and the Lithuanian National Radio and Television. Campaigning in the commercial mass media is restricted only by the size of special election accounts.

**Macedonia (FYROM)**

Broadcasting activity should be based on appropriate and impartial treatment of the political entities in the programmes of the broadcasting organizations. Programmes must not serve the sole purpose of any one political party, group, or authorized individuals, especially in the election campaigns. The duration of the electoral presentation, as well as the conditions and methods of advertising for the use of programming time, shall be determined by the parliament upon a proposal by the Broadcasting Council. There are sanctions for violating the principle of equal treatment of the political parties in the media (in the election campaign period only). These rules are to apply both to public and private media; there are no specific rules for print media.

**Montenegro**

At the national level the parties are entitled to equal media access free of charge during the election campaign period. Besides elections, the media law requires equal treatment of different political forces.
**Poland**
Political parties get free and equal media access during the election campaign. Polish radio and television shall inform the National Electoral Commission (NEC) of the opportunity for cost-free presentation of information during the period which begins with the declaration of elections to the Sejm (lower house) and to the Senate.

**Romania**
Any commercial advertising of political parties via media intended as electoral propaganda is prohibited. All the parties have the right during the electoral campaign to express their opinions freely and without any discrimination. The parties represented in the parliament have the right of access to radio and television subsidized by the State. Other parties have the right of access to television and radio equally and free of charge.

**Serbia**
At the national level the parties are equally entitled to media access free of charge during the election campaign period, and equal treatment for different political forces is required.
Kosovo: All broadcasters in Kosovo shall provide equitable access for paid political advertising by political entities participating in the election. Media access free of charge is not guaranteed.

**Slovakia**
Public television and radio broadcasters allocate free air-time (not more than 30 minutes) for each contesting party, and shall allocate not more than ten hours of broadcasting time for political advertisement. Slovak Radio and Slovak Television shall allocate in addition ten hours of broadcasting time for discussion programmes. The law also provides for the sale of air-time to all competing parties on an equal basis.

**Slovenia**
Political propaganda is allowed only during an election campaign. Election campaigning in RTV Slovenija programmes may begin 24 days before the polling day and end at least 24 hours before elections. During this period RTV Slovenija must reserve programme time for the presentation of the candidates, political parties and their programmes free of charge under equal conditions. Political parties and independent candidates not represented in the Parliament must have one-third of the entire programme time at their disposal.
### Appendix 2. Causes of de-registration of a political party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Anti-democratic policy</th>
<th>Bankruptcy or insolvency</th>
<th>Breach of code of conduct</th>
<th>Breach of electoral law</th>
<th>Failure to meet gender quotas</th>
<th>Hate speech</th>
<th>Inciteful activities</th>
<th>Non-payment of registration fee</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Central Electoral Commission</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Constitutional Court. Only the president of the country has right to appeal to the Constitutional Court with the according inquiry.</td>
<td>Constitutional Court</td>
<td>Constitutional Court</td>
<td>Constitutional Court</td>
<td>Compulsory modification of the territorial integrity, formation of military troops, propaganda of violence and war.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Sofia City Court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No/Will not be registered Sofia City Court</td>
<td>No/Will not be registered Sofia City Court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Anti-democratic policy</td>
<td>Bankruptcy or insolvency</td>
<td>Breach of code of conduct</td>
<td>Breach of electoral law</td>
<td>Failure to meet gender quotas</td>
<td>Hate speech</td>
<td>Inciteful activities</td>
<td>Non-payment of registration fee</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>Constitutional court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Constituional court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A party which aims to destroy the Georgian Constitutional order or to change it by means of force, either undermine state independence, or its territorial integrity, which propagates war and violence, fosters ethnic, religious, social or territorial hostility, or which creates or has created military units can be de-registered. Decision is made by the Constitutional Court of Georgia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Court judgment (compulsory dissolution).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The political party shall be dissolved when: (a) has ceased functioning as a party; (b) fails to nominate at least one candidate in two succeeding parliamentary elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>The political party shall be dissolved when the number of party members falls below 1,000; Ministry of Justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The political party shall be dissolved when: (a) doesn’t comply with the court ruling about suspension of its activities; (b) uses or instigates the residents of Latvia to use violent methods of activities; (c) urges residents of Latvia or its own members to activities that don’t comply with the laws; (d) propagates ideas of racism or totalitarianism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td>Municipal court depending on the location of the seat of the political party.*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>The political party shall be dissolved when the number of party members falls below 500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-democratic policy</td>
<td>Bankruptcy or insolvency</td>
<td>Breach of code of conduct</td>
<td>Breach of electoral law</td>
<td>Failure to meet gender quotas</td>
<td>Hate speech</td>
<td>Inciteful activities</td>
<td>Non-payment of registration fee</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MNE</strong></td>
<td>Register of the political parties at the Ministry of Justice.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POL</strong></td>
<td>Warsaw District Court</td>
<td>State Electoral Commission, Warsaw District Court</td>
<td>Warsaw District Court, Constitutional Tribunal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROU</strong></td>
<td>Bucharest Court Bucharest Court of Appeals Constitutional Court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political party shall be dissolved when: (a) does not act according to a constitution and rule of law; (b) merges with other party; (c) has the same name as the party already signed in a register.

The lack of activity: (a) if it has held no general assembly for 5 years; (b) if it fails to present candidates, alone or as part of an alliance, in two successive parliamentary election campaigns, in at least 21 constituencies; When a political party fails to poll the minimum number of votes in two successive general elections. The minimum number required to meet the conditions is at least 50,000 votes for candidacies entered at national level in any of the following ballots: county councils, local councils, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-democratic policy</th>
<th>Bankruptcy or insolvency</th>
<th>Breach of code of conduct</th>
<th>Breach of electoral law</th>
<th>Failure to meet gender quotas</th>
<th>Hate speech</th>
<th>Inciteful activities</th>
<th>Non-payment of registration fee</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRB**</td>
<td>In Kosovo: The Office (Q5)</td>
<td>In Kosovo: The Office shall, upon direction of the CEC, remove a political party from the Register of Political Parties if the party: (a) has not been certified by the CEC to participate in three consecutive elections; (b) has been ordered dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) has voluntarily dissolved itself in accordance with its Statute; (d) has been suspended under section 5 for 48 consecutive months; Grounds of suspension: The Office shall suspend the registration of a political party if the party: (a) fails to inform the Office that it has held an Assembly within 6 months of its registration or within 24 months of its previous Assembly; (b) fails to submit a complete Annual Update or Bi-Annual Financial Report to the Office (c) adopts a Statute or Political Programme that does not conform to the requirements of this Regulation; No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or who is under indictment by the Tribunal and has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may hold any office or function within or representing a political party. Judges, prosecutors and their deputies, ombudspersons and their deputies, members of the Kosovo Protection Corps, professional members of the police and members of the armed forces of any State shall not hold any appointed, elected, or other function within or representing a political party. - 21.3 requires full cooperation with auditors of the Office. - 25.1 prescribes the submitting of a Statute. - 25.2 stipulates the requirement of holding an Assembly within 24 months after its previous Assembly. (e) fails to pay fines imposed by the Office, the CEC, or the Election Complaints and Appeals Commission within the applicable deadline; or (f) fails to return a Contribution that is not a permitted Contribution to the contributor or remit it to the Kosovo Consolidated Fund.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>Highest court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Highest court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Highest court</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Highest court</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>The Ministry of Interior shall begin the procedure to remove a party from the register: (a) upon a request from the party; (b) if it establishes that the entry of the party in the register was carried out on the basis of false information; (c) if it establishes that the party has not participated in elections to the National Assembly or to local community bodies twice in succession.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia establishes that the programme or statute of the political party does not comply with the Constitution.

** The Serbian Political parties Act was expected to be approved in autumn 2006 and by the writing of the text was not available.
### Appendix 3. Political party female quotas for electoral candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left-wing or left centrist party</th>
<th>Right-wing or right centrist party</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARM</strong></td>
<td>Union for National Self-Determination (UNSD): a 20% quota.</td>
<td>Shamiram Women's Party (SWP): All women's party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIH</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH): 30% quota (2001).</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CZE</strong></td>
<td>Social Democrats (CSSD): 25% of those elected by the party must be women. If a local party organization has failed to nominate 25% women among its top candidates, then the Social Democratic Women's Organization has the right to nominate extra women.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIT</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (LSDP): a quota on at least one-third of either sex.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HRV</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP): in 1996 a voluntary party quota of 40%; in 2000 a formal 40% quota for men and women on electoral lists, but no rank-order rules.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUN</strong></td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP): a 20% quota for women.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MKD</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM): a 30% quota for both genders.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POL</strong></td>
<td>Democratic left Alliance (SLD): a 30% quota, both internal and to candidate lists. Labour Union (UP): a 30% quota.</td>
<td>Freedom Union (UW): a 30% quota; in 2005 the UW became Partię Demokratyczną (PD).</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROU</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR): Previously: a 25% quota for women on party lists; since 2001 a member of the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Prior to the 2004 election PSD adopted a 30% gender quota.</td>
<td>Democratic Party (PD): 30% quota.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SVN</strong></td>
<td>Social Democrats (SD): In 1992 a firm 33% quota for both genders. In the 1996 election 42% of the party's candidates were women (not even one of these got elected). The quota was changed from firm to soft in 1997, and the party has currently a 40% target. (In 2005 the party shortened it's name to Socialni Demokrati).</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy Party (LDS): In 1990 a 30% quota, but did not follow up in the election. In 1994 LDS adopted a firm quota for women on party lists for national elections. In 1998 the quota was changed to a gender neutral 25%, but is supposed to increase by 3 percentage points in every upcoming election until it reaches 40%. The LDS has also implemented a 33% quota for both sexes on the party lists for local elections, but the requirement is looser as the provision says that the party shall ensure this share as a rule.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice: There are no quotas for electoral candidates in Albania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro. For Bulgaria there are no data available.

Source: IDEA: Global Database of Quotas for Women.
Appendix 4. The requirements to register a political party at the national level

ALBANIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: No.
Monetary fee: No.
Institution of registration: Tirana District Court.
Signatures: Yes. The request for registration of a political party shall be signed by not less than 500 Albanian citizens, its founding members, with a permanent domicile in the Republic of Albania.

ARMENIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: The new party has to have 200 members and branches in one-third of regions including the capital city of the country, and after six months party has to have 2,000 members and branches in all ten regions including the capital city of the country, and the local branches have to have at least 100 members.
Monetary fee: Law does not stipulates monetary fees, the party only provides the document of state due payment during the registration process.
Institution of registration: Ministry of Justice.
Signatures: Documents necessary for the registration of a new party (minutes of the constituent assembly) are signed by the representative (or the representatives) of the assembly and the decision of state registration is signed by the Ministry of Justice.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: Yes. It has to be established by the Statue of the Political Party.
Monetary fee: No.
Institution of registration: The higher court according to the location of the seat of the party.
Signatures: No.
Other: The party shall be founded by at least 50 adult citizens. The party shall enclose its Statute, the Decision on Foundation and the party’s programme.

BULGARIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: No.
Monetary fee: No.
Institution of registration: Sofia City Court.
Signatures: The registration shall contain the signatures of the representatives of the party.

CROATIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: No.
Monetary fee: No.
Institution of registration: Ministry of Justice.
Signatures: The party can be founded by at least 100 adult Croatian citizens.
Other: The party shall enclose programme, statute, list containing names of members and the proof of their Croatian citizenship. The name of the party has to be in Croatian language. The party must not use the symbols of Croatia or other states.

CZECH REPUBLIC
Establishment of regional or local party branches: No.
Monetary fee: No.
Institution of registration: Ministry of Interior.
Signatures: Signatures of 1,000 citizens which agree with the founding of the political party.
Other: The party shall enclose statute (name of the party, acronym, seat, programme, rights and the duties of members, organs and sub-units, economic policy, regulation of member fees, property) and petition (at least 1,000 citizens).

ESTONIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: No.
Monetary fee: Non-profit Associations Act declares that the entry in the register costs 300 EUR.
Institution of registration: County and city court.
Signatures: No.
Other: (a) Platform signed by the members of the leadership; (b) a list of members of the political party, which contains members’ names, personal identification codes and the day and year of becoming a
member of the political party; (c) a sample or sketch of the insignia of the political party if these are prescribed by the articles of association.

**GEORGIA**

*Establishment of regional or local party branches:* No.
*Monetary fee:* No.
*Institution of registration:* Ministry of Justice.
*Signatures:* Signatures of at least 1,000 members, with the details about their identity, address, working place.
*Other:* Holding founding congress. Founding congress of the party should consist of not less than 300 citizens. There is a list of other formal details, such as party statute, party address, party symbolic, etc. necessary for registration.

**HUNGARY**

*Establishment of regional or local party branches:* -
*Monetary fee:* -
*Institution of registration:* County court on territory of which the party has seat.
*Signatures:* -
*Other:* Party has to have at least 10 founding members. These have to accept the statute, select the officials in charge and party’s representatives.

**LATVIA**

*Establishment of regional or local party branches:* -
*Monetary fee:* 200 LVL.
*Institution of registration:* Ministry of Justice.
*Signatures:* Signatures of at least 200 founders.
*Other:* (a) Application; (b) Minutes of the meeting of founding members; (c) By-laws; (d) Programme of political organization; (e) List of founders; (f) Receipt proving the fee paid.

**LITHUANIA**

*Establishment of regional or local party branches:* Yes.
*Monetary fee:* No.
*Institution of registration:* Ministry of Justice.
*Signatures:* 1,000.

**MACEDONIA (FYROM)**

*Establishment of regional or local party branches:* Not applicable.
*Monetary fee:* Not applicable.
*Institution of registration:* District court in Skopje.
*Signatures:* At least 500 adult citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, with permanent residence in the Republic of Macedonia, may found a political party.
*Other:* The decision on founding of a political party shall contain: title of the party, seat of the party, name of the authorised person who is to register the political party with the court registrar, names of the founders, register number and address of permanent residence in the Republic of Macedonia.

The Statute of the political party shall contain provisions: the name and seat of the political party, the political goals, publicity in the work and manner of activity, the conditions and the manner of becoming a member and termination of membership and the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the members, the representation and presentation of the political party, the organs of the political party, the manner of their election and recall, the duration of the mandate and the manner of decision-making, acquisition and use of the funds, termination of the political party, procedure concerning the assets in case of termination of the political party; and symbols of the political party (flag, abbreviated name, symbol, emblem, etc.). The name and symbols of the political party must be different from the name and symbols of the already registered political parties in our country and abroad.

The political parties may not have domestic and foreign state symbols.

**MONTENEGRO**

*Establishment of regional or local party branches:* No.
*Monetary fee:* No.
*Institution of registration:* Ministry of Interior.
*Signatures:* At least 200 citizens who have the right to vote in Montenegro.
*Other:* Party shall enclose the decision on foundation, statute and programme.
POLAND
Establishment of regional or local party branches: -
Monetary fee: -
Institution of registration: Warsaw District Court
Signatures: At least 1,000 signatures of citizens of the Republic of Poland, who have reached the age of 18 years, and are legally qualified.

ROMANIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: Establishments in at least 18 counties.
Monetary fee: No.
Institution of registration: Bucharest Court; its decision can be challenged at Bucharest Court of Appeals.
Signatures: At least 25,000 founding members domiciled in at least 18 of the Romanian counties and in Bucharest, but not less than 700 persons for each of the counties and Bucharest.
Other: Statute, Programme, Statement concerning party headquarters and assets and liabilities, bank account documentary evidence.

SERBIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: The Serbian Political parties Act was approved in September 2006 and at the time of writing the text was not available.

SLOVAKIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: No.
Monetary fee: No.
Institution of registration: Ministry of Interior.
Signatures: At least 1,000 citizens.
Other: Draft of statute.

SLOVENIA
Establishment of regional or local party branches: -
Monetary fee: -
Institution of registration: Ministry of Interior.
Signatures: 200 founding declarations (a person deprived from the capacity may not be a founder), signed by the founders and certified by notary.
Other: Party shall enclose founding declaration, he party statute and programme, the minutes of the founding assembly, meeting or congress, stating the elected bodies of the parties and the office-holder who in accordance with the statute represents the party as the responsible person, a graphic representation of the symbol of the party.
Appendix 5. Women’s participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of women in lower house</th>
<th>Election law quota or regulation, national parliament?</th>
<th>Constitutional or legislative quota, sub-national level?</th>
<th>Legal sanctions for non-compliance?</th>
<th>Rank-order rules?</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>2003: 7/131: 5.3%</td>
<td>Yes. The Electoral Code of 1999 states that political party lists of candidates for the PR election should contain no less than 5% female candidates.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes. Those parties, which participate in the elections to National Assembly must provide 15% of seats for the women in their proportional candidacy lists, and minimum each 10th candidate should be female.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>2002: 7/42: 16.7%</td>
<td>Yes. 1 candidate of the under-represented sex to be included in the first 2 candidates on lists, 2 amongst the first 5 candidates, 3 amongst the first 8 candidates. At least 1/3 of the under-represented sex should be included on party lists.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>2005: 53/240: 22.1%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>2006: 31/200: 15.5%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>2003: 19/101: 18.8%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>2004: 22/235: 9.4 %</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>2003: 33/152: 21.7%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10% more funds will be given to political parties that have women elected into parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>2006: 40/386: 10.4 %</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>2004: 29/141: 20.6%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>2002: 21/100: 21.0 %</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Number of women in lower house</td>
<td>Election law quota or regulation, national parliament?</td>
<td>Constitutional or legislative quota, sub-national level?</td>
<td>Legal sanctions for non-compliance?</td>
<td>Rank-order rules?</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td>2006: 34/120: 28.3%</td>
<td>Yes. A minimum of 30% of each sex should be represented on party candidate lists.</td>
<td>Yes. Lists of candidates for the county council and City of Skopje shall include 30% of each sex. Half of these 30% should be placed in the first half of the list.</td>
<td>Yes. Parties not meeting the 30% criterion will not be registered for elections.</td>
<td>Yes. For local elections. No rank-order rules for national elections.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>2006: 7/81: 8.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>2005: 94/460: 20.4%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Women's Parliamentary Group has proposed a 30% quota, but this proposal did not receive sufficient support in parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>2004: 38/332: 11.4%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>In 2004 a new electoral law was adopted; candidate lists for parliamentary elections must include both male and female candidates. No specified percentage. The Democratic Party had proposed introducing quotas for all parties, but this initiative was rejected by the Chamber of Deputies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>2003: 30/250: 12.0%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>2002: 26/150: 17.3%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women in lower house</td>
<td>Election law quota or regulation, national parliament?</td>
<td>Constitutional or legislative quota, sub-national level?</td>
<td>Legal sanctions for non-compliance?</td>
<td>Rank-order rules?</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SVN</strong></td>
<td>No. The statute of political party must determine the method of ensuring equal opportunities for both sexes in determining candidates for election.</td>
<td>Yes. In 2005 a new electoral law stipulates a 20% quota for local elections in 2006. The quota will increase to 30% for the 2010 election and 40% for the 2014 election.</td>
<td>A political party shall be fined at least 300,000 SIT for a violation if it does not submit (every 4 years) to the Office the plan in which they shall adopt the position on the issue of balanced representation of women and men.</td>
<td>Yes. Local elections: Every third candidate must be of the under-represented sex.</td>
<td>In 2004 the Slovene parliament voted for a change of the constitution allowing affirmative action in politics. The Coalition for Parity is currently lobbying for a 40% quota in national elections. In 2003 a 40% quota for European Parliament elections was adopted by the Slovene parliament (including rank-order rules and sanctions for non-compliance). 42.9% of the Slovene MPs of the European Parliament are women.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNK</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Law No.2004/2 On Gender Equality in Kosovo, according to its section 10.1 all registered political parties shall ensure that both females and males are equally represented. Equal representation means according to section 3.2 of the law 40% of each sex. This rule says, however, nothing about candidacy in elections.

Section 21 of the Electoral Code requires the fulfilling of gender quotas: Of the first 67% of candidates on a candidate list, at least 33% shall be male and at least 33% shall be female, with one candidate from each sex included at least once in each group of three candidates, counting from the first candidate in the list. The number of candidates in the first 67% of candidates on a list shall be calculated by rounding up to the nearest integer.

Note: None of the countries observed has a constitutional quota for national parliaments.

Source: IDEA: Global Database of Quotas for Women, IPU: Parline Database.
## Appendix 6. Women serving as presidents and prime ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Prime minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>19.7.96 – 4.11.98: <em>Biljana Plavšić</em> (Биљана Плавшић) (Rep. Srpska)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.10.94 – 25.1.95: <em>Reneta Indzhova</em> (Ренета Инджова)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>23.11.03 – 25.1.05: <em>Nino Burjanadze</em> ( נינו בירז'נאדיצ'ה)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.3.90 – 17.3.90; 17.3.90 – 10.1.91: <em>Kazimira Prunskienė</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5.99 – 18.5.99; 27.10.99 – 3.11.99: <em>Irena Degutienė</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>1999 – 2003; 2003 – …: <em>Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga</em></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5.04 – 2.6.04; 18.11.04 – 17.12.04: <em>Radmila Šekerinska</em> (Радмила Шекеринска)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.7.92 – 25.10.93: <em>Hanna Suchocka</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>30.12.2002 – 4.2.2004: <em>Nataša Mićić</em> (Наташа Мићић)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To date no women have held the office of president or prime minister in Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Montenegro, Romania, Slovakia or Slovenia.
## Appendix 7. Affiliations of parties from the report in European Party Federations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Observer</th>
<th>Associated Member</th>
<th>Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>PDSH</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>PRSh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>SDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>DPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSB</td>
<td></td>
<td>ZPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BZNS</td>
<td>BSDP</td>
<td>NDSV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE</td>
<td>KDU-ČSL</td>
<td>ČSSD</td>
<td>SZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KSČM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ODS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td>RE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ERV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td></td>
<td>HNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HSS</td>
<td></td>
<td>HSLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRV</td>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>TS</td>
<td>LSDP</td>
<td>LiCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VNDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU</td>
<td>JL</td>
<td>LSDSP</td>
<td>LC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TP</td>
<td></td>
<td>LZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TB/LNNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td></td>
<td>SDSM</td>
<td>LP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>PDeM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>PiS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROU</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>PNL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Albania
- AD – Democratic Alliance Party
- PDS – Democratic Party
- PDR – New Democratic Party
- PRSh – Republican Party

### Bosnia and Herzegovina
- HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- DPS – Movement for Rights and Freedoms
- NDSV – National Movement Simeon II.

### Bulgaria
- BSP – Bulgarian Socialist Party
- DSB – Democrats for Strong Bulgaria
- HSS – Croatian Peasant Party

### Croatia
- DC – Democratic Centre
- HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union
- HSS – Croatian Peasant Party

### Czech Republic
- KDU–ČSL – Christian and Democratic Union
- ODS – Civic Democratic Party
- ČSSD – Czech Social Democratic Party

### Estonia
- RP – Res Publica
- SDE – Estonian Social Democratic Party

### Hungary
- FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Union
- MSZP – Hungarian Socialist Party
- SZDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats

### Latvia
- LC – Latvia’s Way
- TB/LNNK – Fatherland & Freedom

### Lithuania
- DP – Labour Party
- LDP – Liberal Democratic Party
- LSDD – Lithuanian Social Democratic Party

### Macedonia (FYROM)
- LP – Liberal Party

### Poland
- PDS – Democratic Party
- PiS – Law & Justice

### Romania
- PNL – National Liberal Party
- PSL – Polish People’s Party

### Serbia
- DSS – Democratic Party of Serbia

### Slovakia
- KDH – Christian Democratic Movement
- SMK (MKP) – Hungarian Coalition Party

### Slovenia
- LDS – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia
- SD – Social Democrats

### Sources
- Fiala, Mars, Sokol 2006, author’s archive.
Appendix 8. The Evolution of Party Systems
Number of seats (percentage of total in brackets)

Albania

1991  
PDS
75 (30)

1992  
PDS
92 (65.1)

1996  
PDS
122 (87.1)

1997  
PDS
26 (16.77)

PDS
26 (16.77)

PLL
2 (1.29)

PRSh
3 (2.1)

BpF
46 (32.86)

2001  
PDS
56 (40.0)

2005  

Armenia

1990
SIM 1 (0.38)
IM 1 (0.38)
HHK 1 (0.38)
HKDM 1 (0.38)
HHSh 52 (20.0)
HRAK 17 (6.54)
AZM 9 (3.46)
HDK 23 (8.85)
NK 13 (5.0)
HHD 17 (6.54)
Independents 125 (48.08)

1995
SIM 1 (0.38)
IM 1 (0.38)
HHK 1 (0.38)
HKDM 1 (0.38)
HHSh 99 (66.0) 20 (50.0)
HRAK 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
AZM 5 (2.63)
HDK 8 (4.21)
NK 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
HHD 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
Independents 45 (23.68)

1999
SIM 1 (0.38)
IM 1 (0.38)
HHK 1 (0.38)
HKDM 1 (0.38)
HHSh 99 (66.0) 20 (50.0)
HRAK 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
AZM 5 (2.63)
HDK 8 (4.21)
NK 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
HHD 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
Independents 45 (30.0) 0 (0)

2003
SIM 1 (0.38)
IM 1 (0.38)
HHK 1 (0.38)
HKDM 1 (0.38)
HHSh 99 (66.0) 20 (50.0)
HRAK 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
AZM 5 (2.63)
HDK 8 (4.21)
NK 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
HHD 1 (0.67) 0 (0)
Independents 45 (30.0) 0 (0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RS RS</th>
<th>SRS</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>SDS</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>SNSBP</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>34 (26.2)</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>4 (9.52)</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>6 (14.29)</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>SRS 1 (2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>9 (21.43)</td>
<td>SNSBP</td>
<td>1 (2.38)</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>5 (11.9)</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>SNSBP 1 (2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>NSSM 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>Sloga 4 (9.52)</td>
<td>1 (2.38)</td>
<td>SNSBP 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>SNSBP 3 (7.14)</td>
<td>SNSBP 2 (4.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>HDZ 21 (16.2)</td>
<td>HDZ 6 (14.29)</td>
<td>HDZ 5 (11.9)</td>
<td>HDZ 5 (11.9)</td>
<td>HDZ 5 (11.9)</td>
<td>HDZ 5 (11.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>SDA 43 (33.1)</td>
<td>KCD 17 (40.47)</td>
<td>SDA 8 (19.05)</td>
<td>SDA 10 (23.81)</td>
<td>SDA 6 (14.29)</td>
<td>SDA 6 (14.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MBO 2 (1.5)</td>
<td>SDA 19 (45.24)</td>
<td>SDA 5 (11.9)</td>
<td>KCD 5 (11.9)</td>
<td>KCD 5 (11.9)</td>
<td>KCD 5 (11.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSS 1 (0.8)</td>
<td>SBiH 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>DNZ 1 (2.38)</td>
<td>DNZ 1 (2.38)</td>
<td>DNZ 1 (2.38)</td>
<td>DNZ 1 (2.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EKO 1 (0.8)</td>
<td>ZL 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>SD 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>SD 4 (9.52)</td>
<td>SD 4 (9.52)</td>
<td>SD 4 (9.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SRSJ BiH 12 (9.2)</td>
<td>SDP 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>SNSBP 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>SNSBP 3 (7.14)</td>
<td>SNSBP 2 (4.76)</td>
<td>SNSBP 3 (7.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SKBiH-SDP 15 (11.5)</td>
<td>SDP 4 (9.52)</td>
<td>SDP 9 (21.43)</td>
<td>SDP 4 (9.52)</td>
<td>SDP 4 (9.52)</td>
<td>SDP 4 (9.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bulgaria

1990

SDS 144 (36.0)
BZNS 16 (4.0)
OPT 1 (0.25)
BSP 211 (52.75)
DPS 23 (5.75)
Others 5 (1.25)

1991

DS 110 (45.83)

1994

SDS 69 (28.75)

1997

ODS 137 (57.08)

2001

ODS 51 (21.25)

2005

NOA 21 (8.75)
ODS 20 (8.33)
DSB 17 (7.08)
BNS 13 (5.42)
NDSV 120 (50.0)
NDSV 53 (22.08)
KZB 82 (34.17)
KZB 34 (14.17)

Czech Republic

1990

OF
127 (63.5)

ODS/KDS
78 (38)

ODA
14 (7)

KDU-ČSL
15 (7.50)

HSD-SMS
14 (7)

ČSSD
16 (8)

KSČ
32 (16)

1992

SPR-RSČ
14 (7)

ODS/KDS
78 (38)

ODA
14 (7)

KDU-ČSL
15 (7.50)

HSD-SMS
14 (7)

ČSSD
16 (8)

KSČ
32 (16)

1996

SPR-RSČ
18 (9)

ODS
68 (34)

ODA
13 (6.50)

KDU-ČSL
18 (9)

HSČ
16 (8)

ČSSD
61 (30.5)

KSČM
22 (11)

1998

SPR-RSČ
18 (9)

ODS
63 (31.5)

ODA
19 (9.50)

KDU-ČSL
20 (10)

Koalice
31 (15.5)

1998

1998

2002

2006

ODS
58 (29)

KDU-ČSL
13 (6.5)

SZ
6 (3)

ODS
81 (40.5)

ODS
63 (31.5)

US
19 (9.50)

KDU-ČSL
20 (10)

Koalice
31 (15.5)

KDU-ČSL
13 (6.5)

SZ
6 (3)

Estonia


EK  8 (7.92)
ERSP  10 (9.49)
I  29 (28.71)
SR  8 (7.92)
KK  17 (16.93)
EEE 1 (0.99)
ER 1 (0.99)

Others
8 (7.6)

VE  27 (25.7)

ERa  43 (41)
IF  27 (25.7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Coalition</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKP</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Friendship and Justice Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of God’s Children</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independent Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE-PMK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motherland’s Revival</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Mountain Peoples</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/Nation Integrity Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Monarchists’ Union</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The blocs NM-D and MO were created by a number of smaller blocs before the 2004 elections.

Source: Slide 1997, Eurasianet.org
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1 (0.26)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1 (0.26)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>190 (48.7)</td>
<td>68 (38.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1 (0.26)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>190 (48.7)</td>
<td>68 (38.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1 (0.26)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>190 (48.7)</td>
<td>68 (38.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1 (0.26)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0.57)</td>
<td>190 (48.7)</td>
<td>68 (38.64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latvia


Independents
15 (7.5)

LNNK
15 (15.0)

TB
6 (6.0)

LKDS
6 (6.0)

LZS
6 (6.0)

LTF
131 (65.2)

LC
36 (36.0)

SLAT
13 (13.0)

LT
7 (7.0)

KPL/IF
55 (27.4)

TKL-ZP
16 (16.0)

DPC
5 (5.0)

DPS
18 (18.0)

LNNK
8 (8.0)

TB
14 (14.0)

LZS/LKDS/LDP
8 (8.0)

LC
17 (17.0)

LVP
8 (8.0)

TSP
6 (6.0)

LSP
5 (5.0)

TP
20 (20.0)

LPP
10 (10.0)

LZS/LZP
12 (12.0)

TB/LNNK
17 (17.0)

TP
24 (24.0)

TB/LNNK
7 (7.0)

TP
20 (20.0)

LPP
10 (10.0)

LZS/LZP
12 (12.0)

LPP
10 (10.0)

JP
8 (8.0)

JP
8 (8.0)

LPP
10 (10.0)

LZS/LZP
12 (12.0)

LPP
10 (10.0)

LC
21 (21.0)

LSDA
14 (14.0)

TSP
16 (16.0)

PCTVL
25 (25.0)

JL
26 (26.0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>TS-LK</th>
<th>LNPJL</th>
<th>KDS/LNPJL</th>
<th>LKP-LP/KTS</th>
<th>KDS</th>
<th>LNPJL</th>
<th>TS-LK/LKD/LPKTS</th>
<th>LKDP</th>
<th>LNPJL/LDP/LPKTS</th>
<th>LKP-LP/KTS</th>
<th>LNPJL/LDP/LPKTS</th>
<th>LNPJL/LDP/LPKTS</th>
<th>LNPJL/LDP/LPKTS</th>
<th>LNPJL/LDP/LPKTS</th>
<th>LNPJL/LDP/LPKTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30 (21.28)</td>
<td>70 (51.09)</td>
<td>1 (0.73)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>16 (11.68)</td>
<td>1 (0.73)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>25 (17.73)</td>
<td>8 (5.97)</td>
<td>34 (24.11)</td>
<td>4 (2.82)</td>
<td>1 (0.71)</td>
<td>1 (0.71)</td>
<td>1 (0.71)</td>
<td>1 (0.71)</td>
<td>1 (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>13 (18.31)</td>
<td>37 (55.22)</td>
<td>33 (47.14)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>4 (2.82)</td>
<td>1 (0.73)</td>
<td>4 (2.82)</td>
<td>1 (0.73)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17 (24.29)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>8 (11.43)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>14 (19.72)</td>
<td>10 (14.29)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
<td>2 (2.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11 (15.71)</td>
<td>8 (11.27)</td>
<td>10 (14.29)</td>
<td>1 (1.49)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
<td>1 (1.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Macedonia (FYROM)
1990

VMRO-DPMNE
38 (37.1)
SRSM
17 (14.2)

SKM-PDP
31 (25.8)
SPM
4 (3.3)

Common candidates
2 (1.7)
SJ
2 (1.7)

PDP
22 (18.3)
NDP
1 (0.8)
Independents
3 (2.5)


1994

VMRO-DPMNE
boycott
DP
boycott
DPM
1 (0.83)

SZM
95 (79.17)

SDSM
27 (22.5)
SPM
1 (0.83)

SR
1 (0.83)

PDP/DPA
25 (20.83)

1998

VMRO-DPMNE/DA
62 (51.67)
LDP/DPM
4 (3.33)

VMRO-DPMNE/LP
33 (27.5)

1990

VMRO-DPMNE
6 (5)

2002

VMRO-DPMNE/LP
45 (37.5)

2006

VMRO-NP
6 (5)

SRSM
17 (14.2)

DP
1 (0.83)

SKM-PDP
31 (25.8)
SPM
4 (3.3)

Common candidates
2 (1.7)
SJ
2 (1.7)

PDP
22 (18.3)
NDP
1 (0.8)
Independents
3 (2.5)

Montenegro

1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSCG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSJ</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKCG</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRSCG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCG</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCG</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSCG</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS CG</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>63.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZB</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>53.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNP CG</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCG</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZJ</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZP</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCG/BS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCG/BS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poland


KO 161 (35.0)
NSSZ ‘S’ 80 1 (0.22)
PSL-PL 28 (6.09)
KPN  51 (11.09)

NSSZ ‘S’ 27 (5.87)
WAK  50 (10.87)
PChD  4 (0.87)
POC  44 (9.57)
UPR  3 (0.65)
KLD  37 (8.04)
UD  62 (13.48)

PAX  10 (2.17)
PZKS  5 (1.09)

ZSL  76 (16.52)
UChS  8 (1.74)

SD  27 (5.87)
PZPR 173 (37.61)

NSSZ ‘S’ 27 (5.87)
KPN  51 (11.09)

AWS  201 (43.7)
BBRW  16 (3.48)
KPN  22 (4.78)

AWS  201 (43.7)

KO 161 (35.0)

Romania

AUR  9 (2.27)  PUNR  30 (8.80)  PUNR  18 (5.25)  PRM  84 (24.35)  PRM  48 (14.46)
PRN  1 (0.25)  PRM  16 (4.69)  PRM  19 (5.54)
PTLDR 1 (0.25)  CDR  82 (24.05)  CDR  122 (35.57)
PER  8 (2.02)  PNL  29 (7.32)  PNL  30 (8.70)  DA  112 (33.73)
MER  12 (3.03)  PNŢCD 12 (3.03)  PDSR  91 (26.53)  PDSR  155 (44.93)  UN  PSD+PUR  132 (39.76)
PNŢCD 12 (3.03)  FSN  263 (66.41)
PSDR  2 (0.51)  FDSN  117 (34.31)
PNL  29 (7.32)  USD  53 (15.5)
PDAR  9 (2.27)  PSM  13 (3.81)
PSoDR  5 (1.26)  UDMR  27 (7.92)  UDMR  25 (7.29)
ULB  1 (0.25)  UDMR  27 (7.83)  UDMR  22 (6.63)
PSoDAR  9 (2.27)  minorities  13 (3.81)  minorities  15 (4.37)  minorities  18 (5.22)  minorities  18 (5.42)

Serbia

1990
- GG 8 (3.2)
- SDS 1 (0.4)
- UJDI 1 (0.4)
- SPO 19 (7.6)
- SDA 3 (1.2)
- DS 7 (2.8)
- SJ 1 (0.4)
- SRSJV 2 (0.8)
- NSS 1 (0.4)
- DZVM 8 (3.2)
- SSSS 2 (0.8)
- DSHV 1 (0.4)
- PDD 1 (0.4)
- DRSM 1 (0.4)
- SPS 194 (77.6)

1992
- SRS 73 (29.2)
- GG ŽR 5 (2.0)
- DEPOS 50 (20.0)
- SRSJV 2 (0.8)
- NSS 1 (0.4)
- DZVM 8 (3.2)
- SSSS 2 (0.8)
- DRSM 1 (0.4)
- SPS 194 (77.6)

1993
- SRS 39 (15.6)
- DEPOS 45 (18.0)
- DS/RDSV 2 (0.8)
- NSS 1 (0.4)
- DZVM 8 (3.2)
- SSSS 2 (0.8)
- SPS 194 (77.6)

1997
- SRS 82 (32.8)
- DEPOS 7 (2.8)
- DS 29 (11.6)
- SRSJV 2 (0.8)
- NSS 1 (0.4)
- DZVM 8 (3.2)
- SSSS 2 (0.8)
- SPS 194 (77.6)

2000
- SRS 23 (9.2)
- DEPOS 45 (18.0)
- DS 29 (11.6)
- SRSJV 2 (0.8)
- NSS 1 (0.4)
- DZVM 8 (3.2)
- SSSS 2 (0.8)
- SPS 194 (77.6)

2003
- SRS 82 (32.8)
- DEPOS 7 (2.8)
- DS 29 (11.6)
- SRSJV 2 (0.8)
- NSS 1 (0.4)
- DZVM 8 (3.2)
- SSSS 2 (0.8)
- SPS 194 (77.6)

Slovakia

1990
SNS 22 (14.67)
VPN 48 (32)
Eg./MKDH 14 (9.33)
KDH 31 (20.67)
DS 7 (4.67)
SZ 6 (4)
KSS 22 (14.67)

1992
SNS 15 (10)
HZDS 74 (49.33)
Eg./MKDH 14 (9.33)
KDH 18 (12)

1994
SNS 9 (6)
HZDS/RSS 61 (40.67)
MK 17 (11.33)
KDH 11 (11.33)
DÚ 15 (10)

1998
SNS 14 (9.33)
HZDS 43 (28.67)
SMK 15 (10)

2002
HZDS 36 (24)
SMK 20 (13.33)
KDH 15 (10)
SDKÚ 28 (18.67)
ANO 15 (10)

2006
SNS 20 (13.33)
HZDS 15 (10)
SMK 20 (13.33)
KDH 14 (9.33)
SDKÚ-DS 31 (20.67)

50 (33.33)

Slovenia

1990
- SNS
  12 (13.64)

1992
- SKD
  11 (14.1)
- SLS
  11 (14.1)
- SDS
  6 (7.69)
- LS
  3 (3.85)
- SDZ
  8 (10.26)
- SZMS
  12 (15.38)
- ZS
  8 (10.26)
- SSS
  5 (6.41)
- ZKS-SDP
  14 (17.95)

1996
- SNS
  4 (4.55)
- SLS
  10 (11.36)
- SDS
  4 (4.55)
- DSS
  6 (6.82)
- LDS
  22 (25.0)
- ZS
  5 (3.68)
- ZLS
  14 (15.91)

2000
- SNS
  4 (4.55)
- NSi
  8 (9.09)
- SKD
  8 (9.09)
- SLS+SKD
  9 (10.23)
- SDS
  16 (18.18)
- LDS
  14 (15.91)
- SMS
  4 (4.55)

2004
- SNS
  6 (6.82)
- NSi
  9 (10.23)
- SDS
  29 (32.95)
- LDS
  34 (38.64)
- LDS
  23 (26.14)

List of Parties/Coalitions and Abbreviations

Albania
AD – Democratic Alliance Party (Partia Aleanca Demokratike)
ALDM – Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Welfare (Aleanca për Liri, Drejtësi dhe Mirëqenje)
BK – National Front (Balli kombëtar)
BLD – Liberal Democratic Union (Bashkimi Liberal Demokratik)
BpF – Union for Victory coalition (Bashkimi për Fitoren)
LSI – Socialist Movement for Integration (Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrin)
OMONIA – OMONIA – Democratic Union of the Greek Minority (OMONIA-Bashkimi Demokratik i Minoritet Grek)
PAA – Environmentalist Agrarian Party (Partia Agrare Ambientaliste)
PASh – Agrarian Party (Partia Agrare ë Shqipërisë)
PBDNJ – Union for Human Rights Party (Partia Bashkimi për të Drejtat e Nnjeriut)
PD – Democratic Party (Partia Demokrate)
PDK – Christian Democratic Party of Albania (Partia Demokristiane ë Shqipërisë)
PDR – New Democratic Party (Partia Demokrate e Re)
PDSH – Democratic Party of Albania (Partia demokratikë ë Shqipërisë)
PDSSh – Social Democracy Party of Albania (Partia Demokracia Sociale ë Shqipërisë)
PKSh – Communist Party of Albania (Partia Komuniste Shqiptare)
PMDN – Human Rights’ Unity Party (Partia për mbrojtjen e te drejtave te njeriut)
PPSh – Albanian Workers’ Party (Partia ë Punes Shqiptare)
PRSH – Republican Party of Albania (Partia Republikane ë Shqipërisë)
PSDSH – Social Democratic Party of Albania (Partia social demokratike ë Shqipërisë)
PSSh – Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste ë Shqipërisë)
PUK – National Unity Party (Partia e Unitetit Kombëtar)
Vet. – National Veterans’ Committee (Kombëtar Veteran Komiteti)

Armenia
AD – Justice Alliance (Ardarutyun)
AMK – National Unity Party (Azkayin Miyavorvats Ashkhatankayin Kusaktsutiun)
AR – Mission (Araqelutiun)
AZM – National Democratic Union (Hayastani Zbogovrdavarakan Miutun)

Bosnia and Herzegovina
BOSS – Bosnian Party (Bosanska stranka)
BPS – Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party (Bosanskohercegovačka patriotska stranka)
DNZ – Democratic People’s Community (Demokratska narodna zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine)
DPS – Democratic Patriotic Party (Demokratska patriotska stranka Republike srpske)
DS – Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka)
DSP – Democratic Party of Pensioners of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Demokratska stranka pensjoneri Bosne i Hercegovine)
DSS – Democratic Alliance of Socialists (Demokratski socijalistički savez)
EB HDU – Economic Bloc – Croatian Democratic Union (Ekonomski blok Hrvatske demokratske unije)
EKO – EKO Democratic League of Greens (EKO Demokratski pokret „Zeleni“)
HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine)
K HDZ – Coalition (Koalicija)
KCD – Coalition for a Whole and Democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina (Коалиция за целовиту и демократска Босна и Херцеговина)
MBO – Muslim-Bosniak Organization (Мусулмано-Босниачка организација)
NHI – New Croatian Initiative (Нова хрватска иницијатива)
NSSM – People’s Union for Peace (Народни савез за живот и мир)
PDP – Party of Democratic Progress (Партија демократског прогреса Републике српске)
RS RS – Serbian Radical Party of the Republika Srpska (Српска радикална странка Републике српске)
SBIH – Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Странка за Босну и Херцеговину)
SD – Socialdemocrats of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Социјалдемократи Босне и Херцеговине)
SDA – Party of Democratic Action (Странка демократске акције)
SDP – Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Социјалдемократска партија Босне и Херцеговине)
SDS – Serbian Democratic Party (Српска демократска странка)
SKBiH-SDP – League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Party of Democratic Changes (Савез комуниста Босне и Херцеговине – Странка демократских промјена)
SNS BP – Serbian National Alliance – Biljana Plavšić (Народни савез – Билјана Плавшић)
SNSD – Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Савез управних социјалдемократа)
SP RS – Socialist Party of the Republika Srpska (Социјалистичка партија Републике српске)
SPAS – Serbian Patriotic Party (Српска патриотска странка)
SPU – Pensioners’ Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Странка пензионера умрлих људи BiH)
SRS – Serbian Radical Party of the Republika Srpska (Српска радикална странка Републике српске)
SRSJ BiH – Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Савез реформских снага Југославије за Босну и Херцеговину)
SSO-DS – Socialist Youth Alliance – Democratic Alliance (Социјалистички савез омладина – Демократски савез)
ZL – United List of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Здухена листа Босне и Херцеговине)

Bulgaria
ATAKA – Bulgarian National Union Attack (Национален съюз Атака)
BBB – Bulgarian Business Bloc (Български бизнес блок)
BE – Bulgarian Euroleft (Българска Евролевица)
BNS – Bulgarian People’s Union (Български народен съюз)
BSP – Bulgarian Socialist Party (Българска социалистическа партия)
BSDP – Party of Bulgarian Social Democrats (Българска социалдемократическа партия)
BŽNS – Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (Български земеделски народен съюз)
DPS – Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Движение за права и свободи)
DSB – Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (Демократи за сила България)
KZB – Coalition for Bulgaria (Коалиция За България)
NDSV – National Movement Simeon II (Национално движене Симеон Втори)
NOA – National Union Attack (Национален съюз Атака)
NS – People’s Union (Народен съюз)
ODS – United Democratic Forces (Обединени демократични сили)
ONS – Alliance for National Salvation (Обединение за национално спасение)
OPT – Fatherland Party of Labor (Отечествена партия на труд)
SDS – Union of Democratic Forces (Съюз на демократичните сили)
ZBP – Bulgarian Green Party (Зелена партия в България)

Croatia
ASH – Social Democratic Action of Croatia (Аkcija социјалдемократа Хрватске)
DA – Dalmatian Action (Далматинска акција)
DC – Democratic Centre (Демократски центар)
HDSS – Croatian Democratic Peasants Party (Хрватска демократска селска странка)
HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union (Хрватска демократска сфеденица)
HKDU – Croatian Christian Democratic Union (Хрватска кршианска демократска јединица)
HND – Croatian Independent Democrats (Хрватски независни демократи)
HNS – Croatian People’s Party (Хрватска народна странка)
HSL – Croatian Social Liberal Party (Хрватска социјално-либерална странка)
HSP – Croatian Party of Rights (Хрватска странка права)
HSS – Croatian Peasant Party (Хрватска селска странка)
HSG – Croatian Party of Pensioners (Хрватска странка умрлих људи)
IDS – Istrian Democratic Assembly (Истрски демократски сabor)
KNS – Coalition of People’s Accord (Коалиција народног споразума)
Koal. Reg. – Coalition of Regional Parties
LS – Liberal Party (Liberalska stranka)
Nov. Sab. – New Assembly 95 (Novi Sabor 95)
PGS – Alliance of Primorje – Gorski Kotar (Primorsko-goranski savez)
RDS – Democratic Alliance of Rijeka (Riječki demokratski savez)
SBHS – Slavonia and Baranja Croatian Party (Slavonsko-baranjska hrvatska stranka)
SDP – Social Democratic Party of Croatia (Socijaldemokratska stranka Hrvatske)
SDS – Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka)
SKH-SDP – League of Communists of Croatia – Party of Democratic Changes (Savez komunista Hrvatske – Stranka demokratskih promjena)

Czech Republic
ČSSD (until 1993) – Czechoslovak Social Democracy (Československá sociální demokracie)
ČSSD (since 1993) – Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická)
CZ – Path of Change (Cesta změny)
DEU – Democratic Union (Demokratická unie)
HDS-SMS – Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia (Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii-Spoléhací pro Moravu a Slezsko)
KDS – Christian Democratic Party (Křesťanskodemokratická strana)
KDU – Christian and Democratic Union (Křesťanská a demokratická unie)
KDU-ČSL – Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie-Československá strana lidová)
KSČ – Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa)
KSČM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy)
LB – Left Bloc (Levý blok)
LSU – Liberal Social Union (Liberalní sociální unie)
ODA – Civic Democratic Alliance (Občanská demokratická aliance)
ODS – Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana)
OF – Civic Forum (Občanské forum)
SPR-RSČ – Association for the Republican-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku-Republická strana Československa)
US – Freedom Union (Unie svobody)
SZ – Green Party (Strana zelených)

Estonia
EEE – Estonian Entrepreneurs’ Party (Eesti Etevõtjate Erakond)
EK – Estonian Citizen (Eesti Kodanik)
EKE – Coalition Party (Eesti koondserakond)
EKP – Estonian Communist Party (Eesti kommunistlik partei)
ELDR – Estonian Liberal Democratic Party (Eesti Liberaaldeokraatlik Partei)
EME – Estonian Country People’s Party (Eesti maarahva erakond)
ER – Estonian Greens (Eesti Rahvusvered)
ERa – Estonian Popular Front (Eesti rahvaliit)
ERSP – Estonian National Independence Party (Eesti rahvusliku sõlutumatuse partei)
ERV – Estonian People’s Union (Eestima rahvusliit)
EÜRP – Estonian United People’s Party (Eestima ühendatud rahvuspartei)
I – Pro Patria Union (Isamaaliit)
IF – Interfront
J – Estonian Centre Party (Eesti keskerakond)
KK – Secure Home (Kindel Kodu)
KMÜ – Coalition Party and Rural Union (Kooperatsioon ja Maalised Ühendus)
M – Moderates (Mõõduskad)
MKOE – Our Home Is Estonia! (Meie kodu on Eestimaa)
RE – Estonian Reform Party (Eesti reformierakond)
RKE – People’s Centre Party (Rahva Keskerakond)
RP – Res Publica (Svaz pro Estonskou republiku) (Ühendus rahvaräägi Eest „Res Publica“)
SDE – Estonian Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond)
SR – Independent Royalists (Sõltumatud Kunigiklased)
VE – Free Estonia (Vaba Eesti)
VKR – Right-Wingers’ Party (Vabariiklaste ja Konservatiivide Rahvakong)

Georgia
AS – For a New Georgia (Akhali Sakartvelosatvis)
DAP – Union of Democratic Revival (Demokratiuli Aghordziinetebi Pasxiri)
DP – Democratic Party (Demokratiuli Partia)
E – Unity bloc (Eptoba)
EDP – National Democratic Party (Eravundemokratiuli Partia)
GRP – United Republican Party (Gaerianebuli Republiki Partia)
IChS – Ilia Chavchavadze Society (IIa Chavchavadzis Sazogadoeba)
K91 – Charter 91 (Kartiia – 91)
KTK - Union of Georgian Traditionalists (Kartvel Traditionalista Kasxiri)
M – Peace bloc (Mshvioba)
MG8 – Industry Will Save Georgia (Mretsveloba Gadaarchens Sakartvelos)
MKS – Merab Kostava Society (Merab Kostavas Sazogadoeba)
SSAK – All-Georgian Union for Revival
(Mrgyali Magida - Tavisupali Sakartvelo)
MO – Bloc ‘Rightist Opposition’ (Memjarjene Opozicija) (MGS + AM – New Right / Aakhli Memjarjenebi)
NM-D – National Movement – Democrats (Natsblionakhluri Mudroba – Demokrateli)
P – Bloc ‘Progress’ (Progrebi)
RS – Rustaveli Society (Rustaveli Saqtgadobia)
SA – Bloc ‘Revival of Georgia’ (Sakartvelos Agordzinebi)
SEE-PMK – Bloc of the Party of National Integrity and of the Union of Highlanders (Sakartvelos Erevunuli Ertianobis Partia da Mtielta Kavshiri)
SKP – Communist Party of Georgia (Sakartvelos Komunisturi Partia)
SLP – Georgian Labour Party (Sakartvelos Leoboristuli Partia)
SMK – Union of Georgian Citizens (Sakartvelos Mokalaketa Kavshiri)
SRKET – Union of Georgian Reformers – National Agreement (Sakartvelos Agordzinebis Kavshiri da Mtielta Kavshiri)
SSAK – All-Georgian Union for Revival (Sakartvelos Reformatorsta Kavshiri – Erevunuli Tanchmoba)
SSDP – Social Democratic Party of Georgia (Sakartvelos Social-Demokratiuli Partia)
SSP – Popular Front of Georgia (Sakartvelos Sakhalkho Pronti)
SSP – Socialist Party of Georgia (Sakartvelos Socialistiuli Partia)
SSSK – Union of Social Justice of Georgia (Sakartvelos Socialuri Samartlianobis Kavshiri)

Hungary
ASZ – Agrarian Alliance (Agrárszövetség)
Fidesz – Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége)
Fidesz-MPP – Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége-Magyar Polgári Párt)
FKGP – Independent Party of Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Citizens (Független, Közgazdaság- és Polgári Párt)
KDNP – Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt)
LPSZ – Liberal Citizens’ Alliance (Liberális Polgári Szövetség)
MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokratá Fórum)
MIÉP – Hungarian Justice and Life (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja)
MSZP – Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt)
S - Association for Somogy (Somogyért)

Lithuania
DP – Labour Party (Darbo partija)
KDS – Christian Democratic Union (Krikščionių demokratų sąjunga)
LCS – Lithuanian Center Union (Lietuvos centro sąjunga)

Latvia
DPC – Democratic Center Party (Demokrātiskā centra partijā)
DPS – Democratic Party-Saimnieks (Demokrātiskā partija Saimnieks)
IF – Interfront
JL – New Era (Jūnais laiks)
JP – New Party (Jāņā partijā)
KPL – Latvian Communist Party (Latvijas komunistiskā partija)
LC – Latvia’s Way Alliance (Latvijas ceļš)
LDP – Latgale Democratic Party (Latgales demokrātiskā partija)
LKDS – Latvian Christian Democratic Union (Latvijas Kristīgo demokrātu savienība)
LNNK (do roku 1994) – Latvian National Independence Movement (Latvijas nacionālā neatkarības kustība)
LNNK (od roku 1994) – Latvian National Conservative Party (Latvijas Nacionāli konservatīvā partija)
LPP – Latvia’s First Party (Latvijas Pirmā Partija)
LSDA – Social Democratic Alliance (Latvijas Sociāldemokrātu apvienība)
LSDSP – Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Latvijas Sociāldemokrātiskā Strādnieku Partija)
LSP – Latvian Socialist Party (Latvijas Socialistiskā partija);
LT – Equal Rights (Līdztiesības)
LTF – Latvian Popular Front (Latvijas tautas frontē)
LVP – Latvian Unity Party (Latvijas Vienības partija)
LZP – Latvian Green Party (Latvijas zelā partija);
LZS – Latvian Farmers’ Union (Latvijas zemnieku savienība)
PCTVL – For Human Rights in a United Latvia (Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā)
SLAT – Harmony for Latvia (Saskaņa Latvijai – Atdzīmšana tautsaimniecībā)
TB – For Fatherland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai)
TKL – ZP – Popular Movement for Latvia-Siegerist Party (Tautas kustība Latvijai (Tautas Partija)
TP – People’s Party (Tautas partija)
TSP – National Harmony Party (Tautas saskaņas partija)

LSSDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége)
LDDP – Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (Lietuvos demokratinė darbo partija)
LiCS – Liberal and Centre Union (Liberalų ir centro sąjunga)
LKD – The Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Lietuvos krikščionių demokratai)
LKP – Lithuanian Communist Party (Lietuvos komunistų partija)
LKD – The Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Lietuvos krikščionių demokratai)
LKP-KPSS – Komunistická strana Litvy – Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu (Lietuvos komunistų partija – Kommunističeskaja partija Sovětského sajuza)
LLaS– Lithuanian Liberty Union (Lietuvos laisvės sąjunga)
LLRA – Electoral Action for Lithuania’s Poles (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija)
LLS – Lithuanian Liberal Union (Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga)
LMP – Lithuanian Women’s Party (Lietuvos moterų partija)
LNPJL – National Party ‘Young Lithuania’ (Lietuvii nacionalinė partija „Janojo Lietuva“)
LPKTS – Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees (Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga)
LSDP – Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija)
LTS – Lithuanian Nationalist Union (Lietuvii tautinių sąjungų)
LVP – Lithuanian Peasants’ Party (Lietuvos valstiečių partija)
LŽP – Lithuanian Green Party (Lietuvos žaliųjų partija)
MKDS – Modern Christian Democratic Union (Modernų krikščionių demokratų sąjunga)
NDP – New Democratic Party (Naujosios demokratijos partija)
NKS – Moderate Conservative Union (Naosaikinių konservatorių sąjunga)
NP – Independence Party (Nepriklausomybės partija)
NS-SL – New Union-Social Liberals (Naujoji sąjungos-Socijaldemokratska partija)
S – Sajūdis
SDK – Social-Democratic Coalition of Algirdas Brazauskas (A.Brazausko socialdemokratinė koalicija)
TS-LK – Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives (Tėvynės sąjunga-Lietuvos konservatoriai)

UTT – For Order and Justice (U. Tvarka ir Teisinguma)
VND – Union of Peasants and New Democracy (Valstiečių ir Naujosios demokratijos partijų sąjungos)

Macedonia (FYROM)
DA – Democratic Alternative (Demokratska alternativa)
DOM – Democratic Renewal of Macedonia (Demokratska obnova za Makedonija)
DP – Democratic Party (Demokratska partija)
DPA – Democratic Party of Albanians (Demokratska partija na Albanci)
DPM – Democratic Party of Macedonia (Demokratska partija na Makedoniji)
DPT – Democratic Party of Turks (Demokratska partija na Turciji)
DUI – Democratic Union for Integration (Demokratska unija za Integraciju)
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno-demokratska partija)
LP – Liberal Party (Liberalna partija)
MDPSM – Young Democratic Progressive Party of Macedonia (Mlada demokratsko-progresivna stranka na Makedoniji)
NDP – People’s Democratic Party (Narodna demokratska partija)
NSDP – New Social Democratic Party (Nova socijaldemokratska partija)
PCERM – Party for full Emancipation of Roma in Macedonia (Partija za celostna emancipacija na Romite vo Makedonija)
PDP – Party for Democratic Prosperity (Partija za demokratski prosperitet)
PDPA – Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (Partija za demokratski prosperitet na Albanci)
PEI – Party for European Future (Patija za Evropska Bdinija)
SDPM – Social Democratic Party of Macedonia (Socijaldemokratska partija na Makedoniji)
SDSM – Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedoniji)
SJ – Party of Yugoslavs (Stranka za Jugosloveni)
SKM-PDP – League of Communists of Macedonia - Party for Democratic Change (Sojuz na komuniste na Makedonija – Partija za demokratska preobrazba)
SPM – Socialist Party of Macedonia (Socijalistička partija na Makedoniji)
SR – Union of Roma (Sojuz na Romite)
SRSM – Alliance of Reform Forces of Macedonia (Sojuz na reformski sili na Makedoniji)
SZM – Alliance for Macedonia (Sojuz za Makedonija)
VMRO-DPMNE – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic
Party for Macedonian National Unity (Vnestrino-Makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – Demokratska partija za makedonsko narodno edinstvo)
VMRO-NP – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Peoples’ Party (Vnestrino-Makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – Narodna partija)
ZMZ – Together for Macedonia (Za Makedonija zajedno)

Montenegro
AA – Albanian Alternative (Albanska Alternativa)
BS – Bosniak Party (Bošnjačka stranka)
DK – Democratic Coalition (Demokratska koalicija)
DK AZ – Democratic Coalition – Albanians Together (Demokratska koalicija – Albanci zajedno)
DLE CG – Democratic List for a European Montenegro – Milo Đukanović (Demokratska lista za evropsku Crnu Gornu – Milo Đukanović)
DPSCG – Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (Demokratska partija socijalista Crne Gore)
DSCG – Democratic League of Montenegro (Demokratski savez u Crnoj Gorni)
DSS – Democratic Serbian Party (Demokratska srpska stranka)
DUA – Democratic Union of Albanians (Demokratska unija Albanaca)
DZB – For a Better Life – Milo Đukanović (Da živimo bolje – Milo Đukanović)
GPCG – Civic Party of Montenegro (Gradsanka partija Crne Gore)
KZE CG – Coalition for European Montenegro – Milo Đukanović (Koalicija za evropsku Crnu Gornu – Milo Đukanović)
LSCG – Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalski savez za Crnu Gornu)
NS – National Unity (Narodna stranka)
NSCG – People’s Party of Montenegro (Narodna stranka Crne Gore)
PCG – Victory Belongs to Montenegro - Milo Đukanović’s Democratic Coalition (Pobjeda je Crne Gore – Demokratska koalicija Milo Đukanović)
PDP – Party of Democratic Prosperity (Partija demokratskog prosperiteta)
SDA – Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije)
SDP – Social Democratic Party (Socijalna demokratska partija)
SDPR – Social Democratic Reform Party (Socijaldemokratska partija reformista)
SKCG – League of Communists of Montenegro (Savez komunista Crne Gore)
SL – Serbian List – Andrija Mandić (Srpska lista – Andrija Mandić)
SNP CG – Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (Socijalistička narodna stranka Crne Gore)
SNS – Serbian People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka)
SRSCG – Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro (Srpska radikalna stranka Crne Gore)
SRSJ – Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Montenegro (Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslovenije za Crnu Gornu)
ZJ – Together for Yugoslavia (Zajedno za Jugoslaviju)
ZP – Together for Changes SNP-NS-SNS (Zajedno za promene – SNP-NS-SNS)

Poland
AWS – Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarności)
BBRW – Non-Partisan Bloc in Support of Reforms (Bezpartyjny Bllok Wspierania Reform)
ChD – Christian Democracy (Chrześcijańska Demokracja)
KLD – Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny)
KO – Citizens’ Committee (Komitet Obywatelski)
KPN – Confederation for Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej)
LPR – League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzeń)
MN – German Minority (Mniejszość Niemiecka)
NSSZ S’80 – Independent Self-Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity 80’ (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy „Solidarność 80”) 
NSZZ „S” – Independent Self-Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy „Solidarność”)
PO – Citizens’ Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)
P X – Party ‘X’ (Partia „X")
PAX – PAX Association (Stowarzyszenie PAX)
PChD – Christian Democratic Party (Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów)
PiS – Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
PO – Citizens’ Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)
POC – Center Citizen’s Alliance (Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum)
PPPP – Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party (Polska Partia Przyjaciół Piwa)
PSL – Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)
PSL – PL – Polish Peasant Party – Peasant Alliance (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – Programowy Sojusz)
PZKS – Polish Catholic-Social Union (Polski Związek Katolicko-Społeczny)
PZPR – Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza)
RAŚ – Movement for Autonomy of Silesia (Ruch Autonomii Śląskiej)
RDS – Democratic-Social Movement (Ruch Demokratyczno-Społeczny)
ROP – Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (Ruch Odbudowy Polski)
SD – Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne)
SLD – Democratic Left Alliance (Sejmik Lewicy Demokratycznej)
SRP – Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samorodna Rzeczypospolity Polscy)
SP – Labour Solidarity (Solidarność Pracy)
UD – Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna)
UCHS – Christian-Social Union (Unia Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna)
UP – Union of Labor (Unia Pracy)
UPR – Real Politics Union (Unia Polityki Realnej)
UW – Freedom Union (Unia Wolności)
UWL – Union of Great Poles and Lubuszan (Unia Wielkopolian i Lubuszan)
WAK – Electoral Catholic Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka)
WpiP – Great Poland and Poland (Wielkopolsce i Polsce)
ZP – Podhalan Union (Związek Podhalan)
ZSL – United People’s Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe)

**Romania**
AUR – Romanian Unity Alliance (Alianţa pentru Unitatea Românilor)
CDR – Democratic Convention of Romania (Convenţia Democrată Română)
DA – Justice and Truth Alliance (Alianţa Dreptate si Adevăr)
FDGR – Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania (Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România)
FDSN – Democratic National Salvation Front (Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naţionale)
FSN – National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naţionale)
GDC – Democratic Group of the Center (Gruparea Democrat Centrist)
MER – Ecological Movement of Romania (Mișcarea Ecologistă din România)
MPR – Movement for Romania
PD – Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat)
PDAR – Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania (Partidul Democrat Agrar din România)
PDM – Democratic Party of Labour (Partidul Democrat al Muncii)
PDSR – Social Democratic Party of Romania (Partidul Social Democrat din România)
PER – Ecologist Party of Romania (Partidul Ecologist Român)
PLS – Party of Free Change (Partidul Liber Schimbul)
PNL – National Liberal Party (Partidul Naţional Liberal)
PNŢCD – Christian Democratic National Peasants’ Party (Partidul Naţional Țăranesc Creştin Democrat)
PRM – Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare)
PRN – Party of National Reconstruction of Romania (Partidul Reconstituţiei Naţionale din România)
PSD – Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat)
PSDR – Romanian Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat Român)
PSM – Socialist Labor Party (Partidul Socialist al Muncii)
PSoDR – Romanian Socialist Democratic Party (Partidul Socialist Democrat Român)
PTLDR – Party of Free Democratic Youth of Romania (Partidul Tineretului Liber Democrat din România)
PUNR – Romanian National Unity Party (Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor)
PUR – Humanist Party of Romania (Partidul Umanist din România)
UDMR – Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România)
UDRR – Democratic Union of the Roma of Romania (Uniunea Democrată a Romilor din România)
ULB – Liberal Union 'Bratianu' (Uniunea Liberală Bratianu)
UN PSD + PUR – National Union PSD + PUR (Uniunea Națională PSD+PUR)
USD – Social Democratic Union (Uniunea Social-Democrată)

**Serbia**
DA – Democratic Alternative (Demokratska alternativa)
DEPOS – Democratic Movement of Serbia (Demokratski pokret Srbije)
DOS – Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija Srbije)
DPA – Democratic Party of Albanians (Demokratska partija Albanaca)
DRSM – Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (Demokratska reformna stranka Muhoma)
DS – Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka)
DHSV – League of Croats in Vojvodina (Demokratski savez Hrvata u Vojvodini)
DSS – Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije)
DZVM – Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (Demokratska zajednica vojvodanskih Mađara)
GG – Groups of Citizens (Grupe gradana)
GG ŽR – Group of Citizen Željko Ražnatović (Grupa građana Željko Ražnatović)
GSS – Civic Alliance of Serbia (Gradanski savez Srbije)
JUL – Yugoslav Left (Jugoslovenska levica)
KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army
KV – Coalition Vojvodina (Koalicija Vojvodine)
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno demokratska partija)
LS – List for Sandžak (Lista za Sandžak)
ND – New Democracy (Nova demokratija)
NS – New Serbia (Nova Srbija)
NSS – People’s Peasant Party (Narodna seljačka stranka)
PB – Democratic Coalition Preševo – Bujanovac (Demokratska koalicija Preševo – Bujanovac)
PDD – Party for Democratic Action (Partija za demokratsko delovanje)
PDK – Democratic Party of Kosovo
PSS – Pensioners’ Party of Serbia (Pensionerska stranka Srbije)
RDSV – Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina (Reformarska demokratska stranka Vojvodine)
SDA – Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije)
SDPO – Serbian Democratic Renewal Movement (Srpski demokratski pokret obnove)
SDS – Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka)
SJ – Party of Yugoslavs (Stranka za Jugosloveni)
SLS – Serbian Liberal Party (Srpska liberalna stranka)
SDU - Social Democratic Union (Socijaldemokratska Unija)
SPO – Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove)
SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije)
SRS – Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka)
SRJV – Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia in Vojvodina (Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslovenije u Vojvodini)
SSJ – Party of Serbian Unity (Stranka srpskog jedinstva)
SSS – Peasants Party of Serbia (Seljačka stranka Srbije)
SSSS – Party of the Alliance of Peasants of Serbia (Stranka Saveza seljačka Srbije)
SVM – Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (Savez vojvodanskih Mađara)
UJDI – Association or Yugoslavs Democratic Initiatives (Ujedinjene jugoslovenske demokratske inicijative)

Slovakia
ANO – Alliance of the New Citizen (Aliancia nového občana)

DS – Democratic Party (Demokratická strana)
DÚ – Democratic Union (Demokratická únia)
Fg. – Coexistence (Spoľačenie)
HZDS(ĽS) – Movement for Democratic Slovakia (People’s Party) (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (Ľudová strana))
KDH – Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie)
KSS – Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická strana Slovenska)
MK – Hungarian Coalition (Maďarská koalícia)
MKDH – Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (Maďarské kresťanskodemokratické hnutie)
RSS – Farmers’ Party of Slovakia (Roľnícka strana Slovenska)
SDSS – Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (Sociálno-demokratická strana Slovenska)
SDK – Slovak Democratic Coalition (Strana demokratickej koalície)
SDKÚ – Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Slovenská kresťanská a demokratická únia)
SDĽ – Party of the Democratic Left (Strana demokratickej ľavice)
SMER – Direction (Smer)
SMER-SD – Direction – Socialdemocracy (SMER – sociálna demokracia)
SMK – Hungarian Coalition Party (Strana maďarskej koalície)
SNS – Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana)
SOP – Party of Civic Understanding (Strana občianskeho porozumenia)
SV – Common Choice (Spoločná voľba)
SZ – Green Party (Strana zelených)
SZS – Green Party in Slovakia (Strana zelených na Slovensku)
VPN – Public Against Violence (Verejnosť proti násiliu)
ZRS – Association of Workers of Slovakia (Združenie robotníkov Slovenska)

Slovenia
DEMOS – Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratična opozicija Slovenije)
DeSUS – Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (Demokratska stranka vpokojencev Slovenije)
DSS – Democratic Party of Slovenia (Demokratska stranka Slovenije)
LDS (till 1994) – Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalna demokratska stranka)
LDS (since 1994) – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Liberalni demokrati Slovenije)
LS – Liberal Party (Liberalna stranka)
NŠi – New Slovenia-Christiant People’s Party (Nova Slovenija – Krščansko ljudska stranka)
SDS (do roku 2003) – Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (Socialdemokratska stranka Slovenije)
SDS (od roku 2003) – Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenska demokratska stranka)
SDZ – Slovenian Democratic Union (Slovenska demokratska zveza)
SKD – Slovenian Christian Democrats (Slovenski krščanski demokrati)
SLS – Slovenian People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka)
SMS – Party of Slovenian Youth (Stranka mladih Slovenije)
SNS – Slovenian National Party (Slovenska nacionalna stranka)
ZKS-SDP – League of Communists of Slovenia – Party of Democratic Renewal (Zaveza komunista Slovenije – Stranka demokratske prenove)
ZLSD – United List of Social Democrats (Združena lista socialnih demokratov)
ZS – Greens of Slovenia (Zeleni Slovenije)
Non-Party Abbreviations

ACEEEO Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials
ALB Albania
ARM Armenia
AUT Austria
BEL Belgium
BGR Bulgaria
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CEC Central Election Commission
CZE Czech Republic
DEU Germany
DNK Denmark
EASC Election Appeals Sub-Commission
ESP Spain
EST Estonia
FBiH Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FIN Finland
FRA France
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GBR United Kingdom
GEO Georgia
GRC Greece
HRV Croatia
HUN Hungary
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRL Ireland
ITA Italy
IVO Inštitút pre verejné otázky Institute for Public Affairs (Slovakia)
LTU Lithuania
LUX Luxembourg
LVA Latvia
MKD Macedonia
MNE Montenegro
NDI National Democratic Institute
NGOs Non-governmental organizations
NLD Netherlands
PEC Provisional Election Commission
POL Poland
PRT Portugal
ROU Romania
SCG Serbia and Montenegro
SMP single-member plurality (electoral voting system)
SRB Serbia
SVK Slovakia
SVN Slovenia
SWE Sweden
UNK Kosovo resident
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Selected Bibliography


Alionescu, Ciprian-Calin, ‘Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Romania’, *Southeast European Politics*, 5/1 (2004), pp. 60–75


Balík, Stanislav, ‘Republika Srbsko’, in Petr Fiala, Jan Holzer and Maxmilián Strmiska (eds), *Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropě. Ideové-politický profil, pozice a role politických stran v postkomunistických zemích* (Brno: Masarykova univerzita. Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2002), pp. 400–419


Cabada, Ladislav, ‘Jugoslávie (Srbsko a Černá Hora)’, in Michal Kubát (ed.), *Politické a ústavní systémy zemi středovýchodní Evropy* (Praha: Eurolex Bohemia, 2004c), pp. 159–177


Havlík, Vlastimil and Kaniok, Petr (eds), *Euroskepticismus a země střední a východní Evropy* (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2006)


Kopeček, Lubomír, ‘Slovenská politika’, in Petr Fiala, Jan Holzer and Maxmilián Strmiska (eds), Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropě. Ideově-politický profil, pozice a role politických stran v postkomunistických zemích (Brno: Masarykova univerzita. Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2002), pp. 355–381


Kopeček, Lubomír, Demokracie, diktatury a politické stranictví na Slovensku (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2006)


Krpec, Oldřich and Stýskalíková, Věra, ‘Republika Albánie’, in Petr Fiala, Jan Holzer and Maxmilián Strmiska (eds), Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropě. Ideově-politický profil, pozice a role politických stran v postkomunistických zemích (Brno: Masarykova univerzita. Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2002), pp. 28–42

Kubát, Michal (ed.), Politické a ústavní systémy zemí středovýchodní Evropy (Praha: Eurolex Bohemia, 2004a)


Mareš, Miroslav, ‘Česká republika’, in Petr Fiala, Jan Holzer and Maxmilián Strmiska (eds), Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropě. Ideově-politický profil, pozice a role politických stran v postkomunistických zemích (Brno: Masarykova univerzita. Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2002), pp. 121–153


http://www.idea.int/upload/Slovakia_country_report_March06.pdf


Mlejnek, Josef, ‘Maďarský smíšený volební systém—inspirace pro Českou republiku?’ in Miroslav Novák, Tomáš Lebeda et al., Volební a stranické systémy. ČR v mezinárodním srovnání (Dobrá Voda: Aleš Čeněk, 2004), pp. 121–161


http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia_report.pdf


Open Society Institute 2002a, ‘Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy in Estonia’,
http://www.eumap.org/topics/corruption/reports/international/sections/estonia/2002_c_estonia.pdf

Open Society Institute 2002b, ‘Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy in Slovenia’,
http://www.eumap.org/topics/corruption/reports/international/sections/slovenia/2002_c_slovenia.pdf

OSCE, Gender Task Force, *Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men*, 21 June 2002,
http://www.gtf.hr/slovenia/ActOnEqual.php


Pacek, Alexander; Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Tucker, Joshua A., ‘Voting More When It Matters More: Turnout In Post-Communist Countries’, March 2006, Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1–4 September, and at Princeton University’s Center for the Study of Democratic Politics in December, 2005,


Pospíšil, Ivo, ‘Republika Lotyšsko’, in Petr Fiala, Jan Holzer and Maxmilián Strmiska (eds), Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropě. Ideově-politický profil, pozice a role politických stran v postkomunistických zemích (Brno: Masarykova univerzita. Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2002b), pp. 207–222

Pospíšil, Ivo, Útváření politického systému v Estonsku. Příklad napětí mezi institucionálním rámcem a dynamikou tranzice (Banská Bystrica: Čižmár-Partner, 2005)


Raděj, Tomáš and Setněčka, Tomáš, ‘Romunsko’, in Petr Fiala, Jan Holzer and Maxmilián Strmiska (eds), Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropě. Ideově-politický profil, pozice a role politických stran v postkomunistických zemích (Brno: Masarykova univerzita. Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2002), pp. 315–332


Rychlik, Jan and Koubá, Miroslav, Dějiny Makedonie (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2003)


Szajkowski, Bogdan, Political Parties of Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States (Harlow: Longman, 1994)


What is International IDEA?
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance—International IDEA—is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. Its objective is to strengthen democratic institutions and processes.

What does International IDEA do?
International IDEA acts as a catalyst for democracy building by providing knowledge resources, policy proposals and supporting democratic reforms in response to specific national requests. The Institute works together with policy makers, donor governments, UN organizations and agencies, regional organizations and others engaged in the field of democracy building.

International IDEA provides:

- **knowledge resources**, in the form of handbooks, databases, websites and expert networks;
- **policy proposals** to provoke debate and action on democracy issues; and
- **assistance to democratic reforms** in response to specific national requests.

Areas of work
IDEA’s notable areas of expertise are:

- **Constitution-building processes.** A constitutional process can lay the foundations for peace and development, or plant seeds of conflict. International IDEA provides knowledge and makes policy proposals for constitution building that is genuinely nationally owned, sensitive to gender and conflict-prevention dimensions, and responds effectively to national priorities.
- **Electoral processes.** The design and management of elections has a strong impact on the wider political system. International IDEA seeks to ensure the professional management and independence of elections, adapt electoral systems, and build public confidence in the electoral process.
- **Political parties.** While political parties form the essential link between voters and the government, polls taken across the world show that political parties enjoy a low level of confidence. International IDEA analyses how political parties involve their members, how they represent their constituencies, the public funding of political parties, their management and relations with the public.
- **Democracy and gender.** If democracies are to be truly representative, then women—who make up over half of the world’s population—must be able to participate on equal terms with men. International IDEA develops comparative analyses to advance the participation and representation of women in political life.
- **Democracy assessments.** Democratization needs to be nationally owned. The *State of Democracy methodology* developed by International IDEA allows people to assess their own democracy instead of relying on externally produced indicators or rankings of democracies.

Where does International IDEA work?
International IDEA works worldwide. It is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and has offices in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Who are International IDEA’s member states?
The Member States of International IDEA are democratic countries. They provide both political and financial support.

International IDEA’S member states are: Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, India, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, The Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay. Japan has observer status.

Governance
International IDEA is governed by a Council composed of its member states and assisted by a Board of eminent personalities. Mr Vidar Helgesen, Norway’s former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, is the Secretary-General.