Political Parties in Africa:

Challenges for Sustained Multiparty Democracy

Africa Regional Report

Based on research and dialogue with political parties

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About this report

Political parties are indispensable for making democracy work and deliver. Finding the proper conditions for the better internal functioning and effective legal regulation of political parties is of key importance anywhere.

This report is the result of worldwide research and dialogue with political parties. Together with national and regional research partners, International IDEA is improving insight and comparative knowledge. The purpose is to provide for constructive public debate and reform actions helping political parties to develop.

For more about the Political Parties programme, please visit www.idea.int/parties.

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UGANDA Kampala
A supporter of opposition candidate Kizza Besigye at a rally the day before Uganda's first multiparty election since President Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1980. Riot police, seen in the background, ended the rally a short time later.

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LIBERIA Monrovia
Supporters of the Unity Party's presidential candidate, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, wave campaign placards at a rally during the 2005 general elections. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf eventually won the elections to become the first elected female head of state in Africa and the 24th president of the Republic of Liberia.

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Besides this report on political parties in sub-Saharan Africa, IDEA and its partners are preparing three sub-regional reports. The authors of these are Khabele Matlosa for Southern Africa, Michael Chege for East Africa and Said Adejumobi for West Africa. These reports are forthcoming, May 2007, and will be found at www.idea.int. This Africa report also draws on the drafts for the sub-regional reports and we express our gratitude to our fellow authors for their input and cooperation.

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Chapter 1

Methodology

Chapter 1

1. Methodology

By building systematic, comparative knowledge on political parties, International IDEA aims to explore the possibility of strengthening the institutional arrangements that make parties more effective players in the political system. Although parties are part of our daily discussion, there is little systematic knowledge of how they are regulated and how they function internally in different countries. We know very little about the operational problems they face and seldom think of the challenges they face in the present and in future. The objective of this International IDEA Programme of Research and Dialogue with Political Parties is to contribute to an environment that is conducive to the development of political parties, and thereby to contribute to democracy.

Research on parties so far has not led to the construction of any single 'ideal' type of political party, and it may not be possible to do so. The aim is therefore not to work out a universally ideal model of a political party, but to examine and collate information on the extraordinary variety of parties that function in different political systems of the world. The results of the study may help parties identify and exchange good practices and learn from one another.

The programme is being carried out in more than 75 countries. In Africa, this study was conducted in 30 countries:

- West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo;
- East Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda; and
- Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

IDEA and research partners have carried out research and interviews with political parties in 19 countries, altogether covering 71 major political parties (see Table 1.1). In 11 countries, research was only done on the national context and the national legislation and regulations of political parties; no interviews with political parties where conducted in these cases. This is indicated in the table below by 'National regulations only'.

Table 1.1: The major African political parties

Country	Party name (English)	Party name (nations language)	Acronym
Angola	National regulations only		
Benin	National regulations only		
Botswana	National regulations only		
Burkina Faso	Alliance for Democracy and Federation-African Democratic Rally	Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain	ADF/ RDA
	Congress for Democracy and Progress	Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès	CDP
	National Union for Democracy and Development	Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Développement	UNDD
	Party for Democracy and Progress/Socialist Party	Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès/ Parti Socialiste	PDS/PS;
	Union for Rebirth/ Sankarist Movement	Union pour la Renaissance/ Mouvement Sankariste	UNIR/MS
Cape Verde	National regulations only		
Côte d'Ivoire	National regulations only		
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Congolese Rally for Democracy	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie	RCD
	Movement for the Liberation of Congo	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo	MLC
	People's Party for Democratic Reconstruction	Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie	PPRD

Country	Party name (English)	Party name (nations language)	Acronym
Ethiopia	Oromo National Congress		ONC
	Tigray People's Liberation Front		TPLF
Ghana	National Democratic Congress		NDC
	New Patriotic Party		NPP
Guinea	National regulations only		
Kenya	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya		Ford-Kenya
	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People		Ford-People
	Kenya African National Union		KANU
	National Party of Kenya		NPK
Lesotho	Basotho National Party		BNP
	Basutoland African Congress		BAC
	Lesotho Congress for Democracy		LCD
	National Independence Party		NIP
	Popular Front for Democracy		PFD
Liberia	National regulations only		
Malawi	Alliance for Democracy		AFORD
	Malawi Congress Party		MCP
	United Democratic Front		UDF
Mali	Democratic Republican Union	Union pour la République et la Démocratie	URD
	Malian People's Rally	Rassemblement du Peuple Malien	RPM
	Party for Education, Culture, Health and Agriculture in Mali	Parti pour l'Education, la Culture, la Santé et l'Agriculture au Mali	PESCAM
	Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally	Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain	US-RDA

Country	Party name (English)	Party name (nations language)	Acronym
Mauritius	Labour Party	Parti Travailliste	PTR
	Mauritian Militant Movement	Mouvement Militant Mauricien	MMM
	Mauritian Socialist Movement	Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien	MSM
Mozambique	National regulations only		
Namibia	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance		DTA
	Monitoring Action Group		MAG
	National Union of Democratic Organisations		NUDO
	South West Africa People's Organization		SWAPO
Niger	National regulations only		
Nigeria	All Nigeria's People's Party		ANPP
	All Progressives Grand Alliance		APGA
	Alliance for Democracy		AD
	People's Democratic Party		PDP
Senegal	Alliance of Progress Forces	Alliance des Forces du Progrès	AFP
	Democratic League-Movement for the Labour Party	Ligue démocratique/ Mouvement pour le parti du travail	LD/MPT
	Senegalese Democratic Party	Parti Démocratique Sénégalais	PDS
	Socialist Party	Parti Socialiste	PS
	Union for Democratic Renewal	Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique	URD
Sierra Leone	National regulations only		
South Africa	African Christian Democratic Party		ACDP
	African National Congress		ANC
	Democratic Alliance		DA
	Inkatha Freedom Party		IFP
	United Democratic Movement		UDM

Country	Party name (English)	Party name (nations language)	Acronym
Sudan	Sudanese Communist Party		SCP
	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement		SPLM
	Umma Party		Umma
Swaziland	Ngwane National Liberation Congress		NNLC
	People's United Democratic Movement		PUDEM
	Sive Siyinqaba		Sive Siyinqaba
Tanzania	Civic United Front		CUF
	National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi		NCCR-Maguezi
	Party for Democracy and Progress	Chama Cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia	CHADEMA
	Revolutionary State Party	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	CCM
Togo	National regulations only		
Uganda	Democratic Party		DP
	Justice Forum		JF
	Uganda' People's Congress		UPC
Zambia	Forum for Democracy and Development		FDD
	Movement for Multiparty Democracy		MMD
	United National Independence Party		UNIP
	United Party for National Development		UPND
Zimbabwe	Democratic Party		DP
	Movement for Democratic Change		MDC
	National Alliance for Good Governance		NAGG
	Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga		ZANU-Ndonga
	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front		ZANU-PF

The study consisted of three questionnaires. The first was about the socio-political and economic environment in which the parties function and about how free or restricted the parties are in carrying out their political and electoral activities in the respective countries. The second questionnaire dealt with the legal provisions that regulate parties. These include the founding of parties, their registration and internal functioning, the rules and regulations for contesting elections, the conduct of election campaigns and the agencies that monitor the conduct of parties. This was done mainly by desk research. Sources of information on the country context and external regulations included constitutions, legislative acts and orders passed by the executive branch; rules, regulations, codes and orders of the election commissions; and judgements of the highest courts in the respective countries. Official statistical reports, reports of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Freedom House Index, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report,* and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, among other sources, were used for relevant information.

The third questionnaire constituted an in-depth analysis of the organizational structures of the parties and the way in which the parties actually function. Information was collected through face-to-face interviews with the leaders of various parties. In most cases, five leaders and party officials from each party were interviewed. Each interview took at least one hour and some required longer. Sometimes it required more than one sitting with a leader or official. In choosing the representatives for parties for the interviews, care was taken to interview at least one of the top party leaders, a people's representative in legislative bodies, preferably at the national level, a woman leader and a youth leader. Wherever the treasurer of a party was available, he or she was interviewed. Thus, the account of the internal functioning of parties is based primarily on the information and responses of the party leaders. What is attempted is to develop a self-portrait of parties as presented by party leaders themselves.

Before the interviews with individual leaders were conducted, the parties were informed about the research project and provided with an overview of the research. The meetings with leaders were arranged by prior appointment. Most of the party leaders were cooperative and willing to spare time. Busy as they were with other pressing matters, some were not able to spend sufficient time to discuss the questions in depth, and some found that the questionnaire was taking more time than they were willing to give (two or three interview sessions were required for some leaders). Some were reticent and unwilling to respond in detail to some questions with which they felt uncomfortable, such as those concerning the election of leaders within the party, and descriptions of internal party structures and the selection of candidates. For some questions, such as those concerning party income, funding and election

campaign expenditure, it was not possible to elicit sufficient and accurate information either because the leaders do not have full knowledge or because they were reluctant to speak about them.

The work began with pre-testing of the questionnaire in Ghana and Lesotho in May 2004. Afterwards, a three-day workshop on the methodology to be adopted for this programme and to discuss in detail the questionnaire on parties' organizational structures and functioning was held in Pretoria, South Africa, in July 2004 for the researchers in Southern Africa. A similar methodology workshop was held in Ouagadougou later in July 2004 for the West Africa researchers and in April 2005 for the researchers in East Africa.

The database on parties that will be developed as part of this research will be of help to those who would like to take a closer look at the working of political parties around the world.

Based on the two questionnaires relating to the country context and the external regulations and environment, as well as the interviews with party leaders, separate Country Reports were prepared for several of the countries. As a sequel to the research phase, national and regional dialogue workshops where held between political parties, researchers, civil society and international actors to validate the research findings and discuss agendas for further research, debate and reform. Such regional dialogue workshops were held in South Africa December 2004, and Mauritius April 2005, for Southern Africa, in Burkina Faso June 2005, for West Africa, and in Kenya in December 2005, for East Africa. In addition, national dialogue workshops have been conducted in Burkina Faso November 2004, Mali November 2005, Ghana February 2005, Nigeria in January 2006 and Senegal January 2005. The dialogues provided an opportunity for the party leaders to tell others the difficulties and challenges they face and for the public and intellectuals to tell the party leaders how they view parties and how they think the problems in the party domain could be tackled.

The information gathered from political parties during the interviews with the leaders and the discussions at the dialogue workshops are the major source for the preparation of this report. This report is the second in a series of regional reports that IDEA will be publishing. When all the regional reports come out, we hope to arrive at some meaningful conclusions on the state of political parties in different parts of the world, the problems and challenges they face in the 21st century and the measures to address them.

Chapter 2

Introduction

Chapter 2

2. Introduction

Since the start of the third wave of democratization in 1974 (Huntington 1991), various forms of multiparty political systems have been introduced around the world. Today, therefore, we live in times when more countries than ever before decide on their leaders through multiparty elections—and where more people than ever before are governed by rulers of their choice. Multiparty politics, however, is no guarantee for development. It may empower vulnerable groups, increase transparency, mediate conflict and achieve redistribution of income to the poor—but it may also give more influence to already powerful elites, marginalize the poor and minorities, and be used to mobilize ethnic and religious groups against each other. Hence, the good functioning of mature political parties is central for democratization and development.

In democratic societies, political parties are therefore indispensable voluntary and informal associations of society, where people share commonly understood values, customs and attitudes to their role in politics. They are products of and operate within economic structures, and in a context of interests that are affected by and respond to the accumulation and distribution of goodwill and resources, including the wealth of society (Leiserson 1955). As instruments of collective action, political parties are the creation of the political elite in a bid to control the resources and personnel of government in order to implement an ideology or a political programme. According to Weiner, 'in competitive political systems, parties are organized by politicians to win elections; in authoritarian systems, parties are organized to affect the attitudes and behaviour of the population. In both instances, an organizational structure must be forged, money must be raised, cadres recruited, officers elected or selected, and procedures for internal governing established and agreed upon' (Weiner 1967: 1–2).

Although they are part of the informal constitution of society, once they have contested legally sanctioned elections, political parties obtain power and formally, under the jurisdiction and formal 'constitution' of the state, obtain legitimacy and control the personnel and resources of the state. The rulers and political officials who

emerged triumphant in free and fair elections constitute the governing political party (or coalition of parties), which are endowed with the legitimacy to assume

> the authority and the logical implications of the separation and consequent relations between rulers and ruled in a politically organized society. Political party is a strategically critical concept for understanding, in any developed political system, not only the institutions and practices that permit and justify the exercise of political authority, regulate the effective choice and removal of political rulers, and prescribe and delimit the authority of the government in power, but also the ways in which public policy-makers are guided by the subject of the broad movements of popular sentiment and inter-group feelings (Weiner 1967: 1–2).

However, political parties straddle the space and span the connective linkages between citizens and government, and between a multitude of private, market-based, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the general public. They also cut across at least four conventional processes of government: the electoral, the legislative, the executive and the administrative. Beyond cutting across government processes, political parties also shape public policies and programmes that cut across party politics and government functions, and even the state's response to transnational public policy issues where the party in power holds sway in implementing policies informed by its electoral pledges.

By their very nature, political parties are representative institutions that endow regimes with legitimacy; provide ideologies that represent social, economic and political interests; and produce leaders who through democratic elections form the machinery of government (from parliament to the political executive) or opportunities for political participation, or a combination of all three. Political parties also intermediate and create opportunities for upward social and political mobility—the formation of coalitions of powerful political interests to sustain government. All these functions have a major influence on politics and they way in which parties carry them out in as indicator of whether a particular democratic system is institutionalized or fragile. When they win the majority of seats in parliament, political parties' programmes also inform the government's policies and programmes. In Africa, some political parties have been active not only in political mobilization but also in mobilization for self-help activities, conflict management and so on.

One of the authors of this report (Mohamed Salih 1999: 355–6) argues that the external emphasis on democratic governance means that there is a need to widen the scope of political party activities and the political space within which they operate through representation and competitive politics. Democratic consolidation can hardly be achieved without political parties playing a significant role not only in the debate but also by practising the principles and policies they advocate. Furthermore,

there is also the global coalition of interests between political parties of similar ideological orientation and regional and sub-regional parliamentary groups, with vested interests in expanding their role. Here, again, political parties have no serious competitors in the struggle for the minds and hearts of people in the political life of citizens across the globe.

Clearly, in a context of external pressures, the existence of global party-to-party networks, and philanthropic and party development institutions, not to mention development aid conditionality, the democratic content of African political parties is still fragile and the prospects of genuine democratic consolidation vary from country to country. At least six factors support this proposition.

1. The majority of African governing political parties are still heavily dependent on the direct or indirect (the embezzlement of public funds to finance elections) use or abuse of government resources. The party in power is hardly autonomous from government influence and it is difficult to draw the line where the influence of government begins and that of political party ends. The relationship between party and government is so blurred that the governing party tends to rely on the state resources to exact patronage in order to maintain the party organization and management.

2. The African private sector is too small to support the establishment of strong and vibrant civil society organizations and a non-political middle class that are autonomous of the state. If interest associations, which are the backbone of civil society anywhere, are subsumed by the state, what leverage can they have to make demands both on the state and on the party where the relationship between these three supposedly autonomous entities is so blurred and entangled?

3. The weakness of the private sector is not only detrimental to civil society's ability to make demands on the state and protect the interests of its membership; it also means that civil society is incapable of creating coalitions of interests with the political parties. The latter are often controlled by the business sector and the relationship develops into one between patron and client rather than creating a transparent platform for the negotiation of interests.

4. Political parties often perceive state capture for the control of the resources and personnel of the state as a source of elite enrichment; therefore politics itself becomes a means to an end, devoid of any idea of protecting public interests vis-à-vis private gains.

5. African political parties are sustainable only at the elite level because the elite depend on them to access the resources of the state. It is hard to maintain that the political parties are sustainable because the ethos of party politics has also been internalized by the party membership, often because of ethnic and regional loyalties rather than ideology or party programmes. However, this

conclusion should be put in perspective in the light of an expanding urban population which in some cases has lost touch with its ethnic base and devoted more energy to secular party politics.

6. The weakness of African opposition parties and the inability of their leaders to aggregate interests with the governing political parties deny them the opportunity to play their oversight role. The externally-driven quest for good governance being promoted by the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the IMF)), donors and Western democratic lobby groups has on some occasions forced opposition political parties to seek more favours from the governing political parties in return for silence. Few of the corruption or mismanagement charges brought against ministers from the governing political parties have resulted in loss of office, let alone court convictions.

Despite the critique and counter-critique that we could levy against and for African political parties, they are the main democratic institutions capable of impacting on the continent's polity and society. However, for African political parties to play their positive role, they have to build on what is uniquely African and seek bold alternatives informed by African reality. In the absence of such a vision based on what African societies could offer to promote democracy, externally-driven blueprints will always result in the status quo being maintained. Moreover, in the absence of African alternatives, the long-term prospects would be the creation of democracies without democrats at best and civil dictatorships at worst.

In short, this report reflects these important issues and outlines the architecture which informs the nexus between African political parties and African democracies. Because it is a pan-African report, covering a large terrain, some aspects, naturally, are treated in less depth than others.[1] We hope that after reading this report the reader would have developed an understanding of the complex relations African political parties do endure, with a constituency divided by ethnicity, language, culture, region and class, and at the same time will better understand what African people also have to endure, having to put their faith in political parties most of which fall short of delivering on their election promises.

2.1 The structure of this report

The report is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the methodology of the research in which the report is based. Chapter 2 is introductory and rather general,

[1] In 2007, IDEA will produce three sub-regional reports on political parties in Africa. The lead authors are Khabele Matlosa for Southern Africa, Michael Chege for East Africa and Said Adejumobi for West Africa.

designed to make the necessary connections between political parties and democracy and to underline the salient features of this relationship in Africa. In particular, it introduces some conclusions on the factors currently impeding the institutionalization of party-based democracy. These aspects of the report also inform the rest of the chapters and particularly the conclusions, paraphrased as recommendations.

Chapter 3 is about the internal and external factors in the context of which African political parties operate. Although history is important (colonialism), the authors saw little advantage in taking a long-term historical view (a) due to space constraints and (b) because the emerging interest in grappling with the contemporary issues confronting African political parties is overwhelming, and the contemporary issues should therefore be accorded more space.

Nationally, the context within which African political parties, indeed African democracy, operates is one of underdevelopment, rampant poverty, and social and political cleavages. Externally, it is a context on the one hand of global powers vying to maintain their advantages in trade and commerce and the import of cheap African primary products, and on the other of development aid, benevolence and the solidarity of NGOs.

African party systems and their conjuncture—the way in which they interact—with new and emergent electoral systems for better representation are introduced in chapter 4, which also introduces Africa's party-to-party networks and coalitions, regional and sub-regional inter-parliamentary associations, and African political parties' integration into political party internationals. This section is particularly important in the light of the envisaged interest in strengthening African party-to-party collaboration at the regional and sub-regional levels.

Chapter 5 addresses issues pertaining to African party structures and internal organization, also focusing on the role of women in politics, quotas for women, and the legal, administrative and constitutional arrangements made to strengthen women's role in politics in general and party politics in particular. These issues are certainly embedded in the compelling debate on internal and external political party regulations in Africa. These are elaborated in chapter 6 with the contention that, while a great deal of data has been collected on some of these aspects, little is really known about what goes on inside African political parties. Still less is known about whether laws on political parties and constitutional provisions governing political party and candidate behaviour are really adhered to in practice. The relative lack of knowledge in this area may cast doubt but does not rule out the fact that some countries adhere to and respect the laws they enact. Chapter 7 consists of conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 3

Context

Chapter 3

3. Context

In this chapter we elucidate the two main contexts in which African political parties are formed, organized and operate: (a) national factors, examining the consequences of socio-political and economic circumstances on party politics; and (b) external factors, examining political parties' ability to respond to external shocks emanating from the new global context of development. Section 3.1, on the internal context, gives weight to both socio-political and economic factors affecting the working of African political parties. Rather than offering a narration of the state of affairs of African economies and societies, it deals directly with the linkages between these processes and their immediate impact on political parties. Section 3.2, on the external context, deals with the general impacts of the emergent global order, which has shifted the decision-making mechanisms in many areas, from national to global financial institutions, world trade interlocutors, and powerful technology and information franchises operating on a global scale. It also introduces the integration of African political parties into regional and global networks, with the aim of showing not only the internal context in terms of party membership and parties' financial and organizational ability to contest elections, but also the increasing influences of these transnational organizations.

The depiction of the internal and external contexts is not complete. It is rather general and does little more than scratch the surface of complex and enduring phenomena. Nonetheless, it treats these issues adequately from the vantage point of addressing what makes African political parties different and the constraints under which they operate.

3.1 The internal context

3.1.1 Socio-political cleavages

Africa has its fair share of developing countries' instrumental use of politicized inter-ethnic relations, enhanced by and at times combined with equally diverse linguistic, religious and regional cleavages and rivalries. Ethnic mobilization, whether for political party formation, electoral campaigns or patronage, is commonplace and, when combined with economic disparity and inequitable access to political power, could (and has actually) become a source of long-drawn-out conflicts, with far-reaching destabilization effects. Norris and Mattes (2003) conducted research to analyse the impact of ethno-linguistic and ethno-racial characteristics on support for the governing party in 12 African states (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and Mali), based on data from Afrobarometer (1999–2001). Their research results are presented in Table 3.1.

Although Norris and Mattes' research results confirm the common trend for ethnicity to be a major political factor in political identification and voting behaviour, they brought some sanity to the debate by arguing, and we quote at length, that

> The results in the analysis of systematic survey evidence serves to confirm the common assumption that ethnic-linguistic cleavages do indeed structure party identification in many, although not all, of the African societies under comparison. In the national models, ethnicity remained significant in eight out of twelve countries. Yet ethnicity was not necessarily the primary cleavage as other structural factors are also important for partisanship, if less consistent across all societies under comparison, whether the rural–urban cleavage evident dividing cities, towns and villages in Mali, Namibia and Tanzania, the role of age and generation in Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, or the impact of education in Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Moreover, far from support being an automatic expression of group loyalties, judgments contingent upon how well the government delivers services to its citizens were also related to their patterns of party support in most countries (Norris and Mattes 2003: 13).

Table 3.1: Percentage of the largest language group identifying with the governing party in 12 African countries

No.	Country	Largest language groups	Percentage identifying with the governing party
1	Namibia	Oshiwambo	71.4
2	Tanzania	Swahili	56.1
3	Malawi	Chewa	49.6
4	Botswana	Setswana	45.5
5	Nigeria	Hausa	32.2
6	Lesotho	Sesotho	34.5
7	Zambia	Bemba	34.2
8	Mali	Bambara	33.7
9	Zimbabwe	Shona	31.3
10	South Africa	Zulu	29.8
11	Ghana	Akan	29.3
12	Uganda	Luganda	13.4
Average			38.7

Notes:
1. Q: *'Let's think for a moment about the languages that you use. What language do you speak most at home?'.* Note that dialects within languages are not counted separately in this classification, hence 'Sesotho' includes Sotho and S.Sotho. 'Setswana' includes Tswana. Groups less than 1 per cent of the sample are also excluded for the calculation of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF).
2. Norris and Mattes' data are more elaborate, indicating up to the seventh-largest ethnic group, as well as a munltitude of minority ethnic groups classified as 'all others'.
Source: Norris, Pippa and Robert Mattes, 'Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?', Afrobarometer Paper no. 26, March 2003, p. 9.

One of the present authors, M. A. Mohamed Salih, reached similar conclusions in his research on ethnicity and quasi-polyarchy (Mohamed Salih 2001), where he also included some of the countries studied by Norris and Mattes (2003). Table 3.2 complements the picture presented by Norris and Mattes (2003) in that it shows clearly that the backing of their ethnic group—the dominant ethnicity—has won the political parties in question their majority, but also that the elections were fought not only on the basis of ethnic affiliation but also by securing alliances with and the votes of the smaller ethnic groups in the electoral district.

Salih concluded, first, that although each political party has an ethnic base or is part of a pact of ethnic groups, ethnicity is more prominent in some countries than others. The manifestations of ethnicity also differ greatly. We can find examples of religious, regional and linguistic manifestations, such as minority ethnic groups within the

same region (north versus south, as in Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon), or language base (Amhara versus Oromo in Ethiopia). In politicized ethnicity, the identity of ethnic groups is not necessarily racial; during elections ethnic groups tend to forge regional, linguistic or religious identities.

Second, apart from Lesotho (the Basotho National Party) and Ethiopia's coalition of ethnically-based political parties or rather organizations (the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF)), African political parties tend not to use the names of the ethnic group or groups which make up the majority of their constituencies. The party name most commonly reflects an ideological orientation (socialist, social democratic, liberal or conservative) but not an ethnic one.

Third, countries with strong ethnic majorities (such as Mauritania, Zimbabwe and Nigeria) are not politically more (or less) stable than countries with several smaller ethnic groups (such as Benin, Kenya, Tanzania or Sierra Leone). The existence of a multitude of ethnic groups also heightens the expectations that both ethnic groups and political elite expectations place on each other.

Table 3.2: Voter behaviour in elections in ten African states, 1995–9

Country	Type of election	Remarks
Ghana	Presidential Parliament	New Patriotic Party (66% of the vote), which secured Akan/Ewe support, but also gained support from a variety of smaller ethnic groups
Kenya	Presidential National Assembly	Kenya African National Union (51.6% of the vote), elite pact, alliance of small ethnic groups, with larger ones (i.e. Lou and Kikuyu)
Lesotho	National Assembly and Senate	Lesotho Congress for Democracy (60.7% of the vote) and Basotho National Party. Basotho; formally Basutoland National Party
Malawi	Presidential and National Assembly	United Democratic Front (46.4% of the vote). Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuko, Yao, Lomwe, Sena, Tonga, Ngoni, Ngonde
Mali	Presidential National Assembly	Alliance for Democracy in Mali (87% of the vote). Bambari, Fulani, Songhai. Opposition: mainly Tuareg, Moors and Bella
Niger	National Assembly Presidential	National Independent Union for Democratic Renewal (70% of the vote). Hausa and Djerma
Sierra Leone	House of Representatives	Sierra Leone People's Party (36.1%), United National People's Party (21.6%) and People's Democratic Party (15.3%) of the vote. Temne, Mende, Creole

Country	Type of election	Remarks
Zambia	General elections	Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) (60.8% of the vote). Main ethnic groups include Bemba and Luapula, on the one hand, and Chinyanaia, Lozi and Tonga, with different constellations of party support
Zimbabwe	House of Assembly	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (82.3% of the vote). Ethnic divisions emanating from the late years of independence (Shona, with whom power rests, versus Ndbele)
Nigeria	Presidential House of Representatives Senate	People's Democratic Party (57.2%). Yuroba/Igbo provided the main ethnic base, with the opposition consisting of the northern-dominated Fulani/Huasa alliance with All People's Party and Alliance for Democracy

Source: Compiled from Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2001), pp. 37–8.

Fourth, the dominance of elite pacts is also a reflection of ethnic group pacts. While elections are fought on the basis of the support chiefs lend to one political party or another, after the elections, political pacts or coalitions are forged without reference to the constituencies. Although African political parties are modern, they appeal to ethnicity exploited and mobilized in a classic populist fashion in combination with linguistic, religious and regional cleavages.

Because a single ethnic group may speak more than one language (and more than two ethnic groups may belong to the same language group), the correlation between ethnic and linguistic affiliation could at times lead to the one being mistaken for the other. For instance, in Ethiopia, where political organizations such as ethnic liberation movements (rather than political parties in the strict sense) are permitted under the constitution, the conflation of language and ethnicity is more apparent. The case of Ethiopia is different from that of most other African countries, where the formation of political parties based on ethnicity or religion is banned by the constitution. Table 3.3 illustrates the diversity of African languages and the complexities they present for the formation of state-wide political parties where language—the main medium of communication—could be deployed to cement national integration through the aggregation of different language groups' interests. Some of these groups cannot even communicate with each other in any language other than the official national language (often a European language, and in other cases Arabic), and much also depends on the level of illiteracy among the members of particular language or ethnic groups.

Table 3.3: Language diversity in 25 African countries

	Country	Number of vernacular languages*
1	Angola	41 (+Portuguese)
2	Benin	54 (+French)
3	Burkina Faso	68 (+French)
4	Cameroon	279 (+ French and English)
5	Central African Republic	69 (+French)
6	Chad	132 (+French)
7	Côte d'Ivoire	79 (+French)
8	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	214 (+French)
9	Ethiopia	84 (+English)
10	Ghana	79 (+English)
11	Kenya	61 (+English)
12	Liberia	30 (+English)
13	Malawi	14 (+English)
14	Mali	50 (+French)
15	Mozambique	43 (+Portuguese)
16	Namibia	28 (+English, German and Afrikaans)
17	Nigeria	510 (+English)
18	Senegal	36 (+French)
19	Sierra Leone	24 (+English)
20	South Africa	24 (+English/Afrikaans)
21	Sudan	134 (+Arabic and English)
22	Tanzania	127 (+English and Kswahili)
23	Uganda	41 (+English)
24	Zambia	41 (+English)
25	Zimbabwe	19 (+English)

* Where one of the European languages is an official language, this is indicated in brackets.
Source: Infoplease, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855611.html, downloaded August 2006.

Religion can also arouse heightened sentiments, and African political parties are directly or indirectly affected by religious diversity and use (or rather abuse) it in the bid for political mobilization and electoral success. Table 3.4 shows the religious diversity in Africa, presenting only the major religions (traditional or indigenous beliefs, Christianity and Islam, and those countries with no majority religion). In the 46 countries covered in Table 3.4, the population of 19 is predominantly Christian, in 15 it is Muslim, and in 11 the majority of the population are believers in traditional religions. Twelve countries have no majority religion, whether Christianity, Islam or a traditional religion.

Table 3.4: Religious diversity in Africa

No	Country	Religions: share of the population
1	Benin	Indigenous beliefs 50%, Christian 30%, Islam 20%
2	Botswana	Christian 72%, Badimo 6%, none 21% (2001)
3	Burundi	Roman Catholic 62%, indigenous beliefs 23%, Islam 10%
4	Cameroon	Indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian 40%, Islam 20%
5	Cape Verde	Roman Catholic (infused with indigenous beliefs), Protestant (mostly church of the Nazarene)
6	Central African Republic	Indigenous beliefs 35%, Protestant and Roman Catholic (both with animist influence) 25% each, Islam 15%
7	Chad	Islam 51%, Christian 35%, animist 7%, other 7%
8	Comoros	Sunni Muslim 98%, Roman Catholic 2%
9	Congo	Christian 50%, animist 48%, Islam 2%
10	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Roman Catholic 50%, Protestant 20%, Kimbanguist 10%, Islam 10%, other syncretism and indigenous religions 10%
11	Côte d'Ivoire	Indigenous 25–40%, Islam 35–40%, Christian 20–30%
12	Djibouti	Islam 94%, Christian 6%
13	Equatorial Guinea	Nominally Christian (predominantly Roman Catholic), pagan practices
14	Eritrea	Islam, Eritrean Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholic, Protestant
15	Ethiopia	Islam 45–50%, Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity 35–40%, animist 12%, other 3%
16	Gabon	Christian 55–75%, animist, Islam less than 1%
17	Gambia	Islam 90%, Christian 9%, indigenous beliefs 1%
18	Ghana	Christian 63%, indigenous beliefs 21%, Islam 16%
19	Guinea	Islam 85%, Christian 8%, indigenous beliefs 7%
20	Guinea-Bissau	Indigenous beliefs 50%, Islam 45%, Christian 5%
21	Kenya	Protestant 45%, Roman Catholic 33%, indigenous beliefs 10%, Islam 10%, others 2% (estimates vary widely)

No	Country	Religions: share of the population
22	Lesotho	Christian 80%, indigenous beliefs 20%
23	Liberia	Indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian 40%, Islam 20%
24	Madagascar	Indigenous beliefs 52%, Christian 41%, Islam 7%
25	Malawi	Christian 80%, Islam 13%, none 4% (1998)
26	Mali	Islam 90%, indigenous beliefs 9%, Christian 1%
27	Mauritania	Islam 100%
28	Mauritius	Hindu 48%, Roman Catholic 24%. Other Christian 8%, Islam 17%
29	Mozambique	Roman Catholic 24%, Islam 18%, Zionist Christian 18%, none 23% (1997)
30	Namibia	Christian 80–90% (Lutheran at least 50%), indigenous beliefs 10–20%
31	Niger	Islam 80%, indigenous beliefs and Christian 20%
32	Nigeria	Islam 50%, Christian 40%, Indigenous beliefs 10%
33	Rwanda	Roman Catholic 56.5%, Protestant 26%, Adventist 11.1%, Islam 4.6%, indigenous beliefs 0.1%, none 1.7% (2001)
34	São Tomé and Principe	Catholic 70%, Evangelical 3%, New Apostolic 2%, Adventist 2%, other 3%, none 19% (2001)
35	Senegal	Islam 94%, Christian 5% (mostly Roman Catholic), indigenous beliefs 1%
36	Seychelles	Roman Catholic 83%, Anglican 6%, Seventh Day Adventist 1%, other Christian 3%, Hindu 2%, Muslim 1%, none 1%
37	Sierra Leone	Islam 60 %, indigenous 30%, Christian 10%
38	Somalia	Muslim (Sunni)
39	South Africa	Zion C, Pentecostal/Charismatic 8%, Catholic 7%, Methodist 7%, Dutch Reform 7%, Anglican 4%, other Christian 36%, Islam 2%, none 15% (2001)
40	Sudan	Islam (Sunni) (in north) 70%, indigenous 25%, Christian 5% (mostly South and Nuba Mountains and others)

No	Country	Religions: share of the population
41	Swaziland	Zionist (blend of Christianity and indigenous ancestor worship) 40%, Roman Catholic 20%, Muslim 10%, Anglican, Bahai, Methodist, Mormon, Jewish, and other 30%
42	Tanzania	Mainland: Christian 30%, Islam 35%, indigenous beliefs 35%; Zanzibar, more than 99% Islam
43	Togo	Indigenous beliefs 51%, Christian 29%, Islam 20%
44	Uganda	Roman Catholic 33%, Protestant 33%, Islam 16%, indigenous beliefs 18%
45	Zambia	Christian 50–70%, Islam and Hindu 24–49%, indigenous beliefs 1%
46	Zimbabwe	Syncretism (part Christian, part indigenous beliefs) 50%, Christian 25%, indigenous beliefs 24%, Muslim and other 1%

Source: Compiled from Infoplease, 'World Religions', http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855613.html, downloaded August 2006.

Although the table does not show which countries are politically more stable than others or provide any basis for relating political stability to the predominance of one religion, or a mixture of religions, it is evident that the proliferation of religious political parties is in the increase (Mohamed Salih 2003).

The practical implication of religious diversity and the interplay between religion and politics is found in the formation of religious political parties not only in North Africa (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria) but also in Africa South of the Sahara. The most highly profiled Islamic political parties include the National Islamic Front (Sudan), the banned Islamic Party of Kenya, the Islamic Resistance Party (Tanzania), the South Africa Islamic Party and the Africa Muslim Party (South Africa), and the Mauritian Islamic Political Party (Mauritius). The Christian Democratic Party of South Africa is one of the oldest African political parties in the continent, with strong ties to the global Christian Democratic movement.

Regardless of whether various religious groups have established political parties or not, religion tends to get its way to politics in several ways. For instance, in countries where religious parties are banned, they tend to hide behind seemingly secular names. The most prominent among these on the African continent include the Justice and Development Movement in Morocco, the Democratic Gathering Party

of Mauritania, and the ruling National Congress Party (led by President Omar El Bashir) and the opposition New National Congress of Sudan (led by the Islamic clerk, Hassan Al-Turabi) in Sudan.

3.1.2 The socio-economic context

Apart from the glitter of the capital cities and a few urban centres, the general socio-economic context in Africa can be characterized as one of underdevelopment and poverty. Africa is the poorest region in the world.

Over the last 30 years, on average, its people have seen virtually no increase in their incomes. Over the last decade Sub-Saharan African countries have seen average growth rates above 4 per cent, including ten with rates above 5 per cent and three with rates above 7 per cent. There are examples of strong performers from across the region, such as Mozambique in the south, Benin in the west, and Uganda in the east. However, despite these positive results, there is extensive evidence that poverty is increasing. For example, Jeffrey Sachs, using the World Bank standard income of 1 US dollar (USD) per day per person, measured in purchasing power parity, to determine the numbers of extreme poor, and income between 1 USD per day and 2 USD per day to measure moderate poverty, has illustrated that poverty is rampant in Africa (Sachs 2005). The overwhelming share of the world's extreme poor—93 per cent in 2001—live in three regions—East Asia, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1981 the numbers of the extremely poor have risen in Sub-Saharan Africa, but have fallen in East Asia and South Asia. Almost half of Africa's population is deemed to live in extreme poverty, and that proportion has risen slightly over the period. It is rising in Africa both in absolute terms and as a share of the population, while it is falling both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the population in the Asian regions.

Africa also endures highly unequal distribution of income, which significantly reduces the positive impact of growth on poverty. Inequality is particularly high in Lesotho, Botswana, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Swaziland and South Africa. It is most severe in Namibia, which has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world. Relatively equal distributions of income in Ghana and Uganda have meant that growth in these countries has been linked more strongly to poverty reduction.

Over the last decade the Human Development Index (HDI) has been rising across all the developing regions, although at variable rates—and with the obvious exception of Sub-Saharan Africa. Amid the overall progress, however, many countries have suffered unprecedented reversals. Thirteen African countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Botswana, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo,

Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) with a population of 240 million people between them have suffered an HDI reversal. HDI reversals are reflected in the relative standing of countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa the lethal interaction of economic stagnation, slow progress in education and the spread of HIV/AIDS has produced a free fall in countries' HDI rankings. Southern Africa accounts for some of the steepest declines—a fall of 35 places for South Africa, 23 places for Zimbabwe and 21 places for Botswana.

Another example is declining life expectancy. Life expectancy is one indicator that captures the impact of HIV/AIDS. But the epidemic is generating multiple human development reversals, extending beyond health into food security, education and other areas. HIV-affected households are trapped in a financial pincer as health costs rise and incomes fall. Costs can amount to more than one-third of household income, crowding out spending in other areas. In Namibia and Uganda studies have found households resorting to distress sales of food and livestock in order to cover medical costs, thereby increasing their vulnerability. Meanwhile HIV/AIDS erodes their most valuable asset, their labour. In Swaziland maize production falls on average by more than 50 per cent following an adult death from HIV/AIDS. Beyond the household, HIV/AIDS is eroding the social and economic fabric of society and the physical infrastructure on which they depend for the production and reproduction of life. Health systems are suffering from a lethal interaction of two effects—attrition among workers and rising demand. Already overstretched health infrastructures are being pushed to the brink of collapse. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda patients with HIV-related conditions occupy more than half of all hospital beds. HIV/AIDS is eroding human capacity on a broad front. Zambia now loses two-thirds of its trained teachers to HIV/AIDS, and in 2000 two in three agricultural extension workers in the country reported having lost a co-worker in the past year. The spread of AIDS is a consequence as well as a cause of vulnerability. HIV/AIDS suppresses the body's immune system and leads to malnutrition. At the same time, nutritional deficiencies hasten the onset of AIDS and its progression. Women with HIV/AIDS suffer a loss of status. At the same time, gender inequality and the subservient status of women are at the heart of precisely those power inequalities that increase the risk of contracting the disease. Violence against women, especially forced or coercive sex, is a major cause of vulnerability. Another is women's weak negotiating position on the use of condoms.

African political parties are caught between the aspirations generated through democratic resurgence and the African peoples' dire need for better standards of living, and the wretched economic and social circumstances that political parties are in most cases ill-equipped to resolve. Meanwhile the impact of powerful external forces such globalization does not make the attainment of these aspirations any easier.

3.2 The external context

Globalization as an omnipotent driver of the external context. This report will not deal with economic globalization as such, but rather with the impact of globalization on political party development and programmes. On the whole, the strong presence of global financial institutions and the development policy of donors and external actors have meant that most countries (and by extension the political parties which form the governments of those countries) design their national socio-economic policies in response to globally designed and agreed agendas. From this perspective, it could be argued that the new global context of development poses both opportunities and challenges to African political parties.

In his seminal work on globalizing party-based democracy, Burnell (2006: 25) explains the pressures political parties in both industrially advanced and developing countries have to face up to. He laments that if even the European Union (EU) political parties, with their long history of democracy, cannot claim the emergence of transnational political parties or the actualization of the political party agenda, then what hope is there for African parties and networks to respond to these global forces?

The current tendency of African political parties to operate simultaneously in national, regional and global party-to-party networks and partnerships (Mohamed Salih 2006)—although still relatively weak at the regional and global levels—could also be seen as cause for celebration. It signals the emergence of polycentricity at best, or at least an increased tendency towards Western-style democratic institutions and party structures.

However, according to Scholte (2005), the counter-argument in respect to the role of global governance institutions and party-to-party global networks is that

> These democratic inputs from political parties are sorely needed in contemporary governance of global affairs. The shift from statism to polycentrism has generated enormous deficits of public participation in and public control of regulatory processes in society, particularly as they concern global issues. Shortfalls in democracy have produced some of the greatest public unease with contemporary globalisation, as witnessed most dramatically in large street protests as well as more pervasively in the casual conversations of everyday life (Scholte 2005: 59).

In the particular context of Africa, free, non-state sponsored accession of African political parties to global-party-to-party networks is a new phenomenon dating back

less than two decades, as one of the present authors argues elsewhere (Mohamed Salih 2006). It is a product of the end of the cold war and the ideological schism between East and West, the post-1990s transition to democracy and the opening up of the political space for proactive transnational political, economic and social networks.

Here, we give a synoptic view of African political parties' integration into the global party networks, which will be elaborated later in section 4.7. By and large, the subsequent evolution and maturation of global party-to-party networks has signalled the end of the state monopoly of interstate relations and the emergence of non-state actors such as civil society and non-governmental organizations, and political party networks. The Centrist Democrat International (CDI) is an association that consists of conservatives, Christian democrats or so-called 'like-minded' political parties of the centre and centre-right. Ghana, for example, is represented by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) Youth Wing (the NPPY) and the Ghana Liberal Students Association (GHALSA), Malawi by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the United Democratic Front Youth (UDFY), and Kenya by the Democratic Party (DP). The youth element is particularly significant for recruitment, internalizing democratic values and preparing the next generation of democrats. In August 1997, 11 African conservative/right youth organizations founded the Dakar-based Democrat Union of Africa/African Dialogue Group (DUA/ADG) as part of the International Democrat Union (IDU). IDU member parties organized regional networks, most of which came into existence as new democracies established during the 1990s. The DUA/ADG provides a forum for parties with similar convictions to meet and exchange views and experiences on matters of policy and organization, so that they can learn from each other, act together and establish contacts. More importantly, they agree on common positions to influence the direction of global policies once they are in power and speak with one voice to promote democracy and centre–right policies around the globe. Ghana's NPP, Kenya's DP and Malawi's MCP are members of the IDU. While the NPP and the MCP are the main opposition parties in Ghana and Malawi, respectively, the DP of Kenya is a member of the governing National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Thus parties that share similar convictions have the opportunity to meet and exchange ideas regardless of whether or not they are in government.

Socialist International is a worldwide organization of social democratic, socialist and labour parties. Currently, it brings together 162 political parties and organizations from all continents. Thirty African political parties are Socialist International members (19 full members, seven consultative and four with observer status). Although Ghana's opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) is a member, Kenya, which has more leftist political parties than any other African country, has no representation there. For the sake of comparison, the Green Party Federation of

Africa is a member of the Global Green Federation, which consists of 800 'green' parties worldwide. There are 15 African green party members, including the Mazingira Green Party of Kenya. The general principles that bring greens together include economic efficiency, social justice, participatory democracy, sustainability, respect for diversity and non-violence. Although the African greens have yet to exert any significant influence on politics in Africa, they have considerable solidarity with the global green movement and its ecological campaigns against oil and mineral extraction activities, industrial pollution and rainforest logging, and its campaign for the protection of biodiversity (Mohamed Salih 1999). However, such support has yet to translate into parliamentary seats in any African country.

The Liberal International is an association of parties, groups, cooperating organizations and individuals that support and accept the liberal principles aimed at fostering the growth of a democratic society based on personal liberty, personal responsibility and social justice. The organization provides financial and human resources for the cooperation and interchange of information between member organizations and men and women of all countries who accept these principles. Malawi's United Democratic Front (UDF) is a member, and it also belongs to the London-based African Liberal Network (ALN), established in 2003 by 17 African liberal political parties (Mohamed Salih 2006).

It is paradoxical that, although the policies adopted by most African governing political parties have a liberal economic orientation in line with the policies of the international financial institutions (IFIs), they do not openly declare themselves liberal because they fear the criticism it will attract from their political opponents. However, UDF Malawi exceptionally does declare its adoption of liberal international principles, without which Liberal International would not accept it as a member. Rules on formal acceptance of the organization's basic constitution apply to the other global party-to-party networks.

Arguably, Africa's political party integration into global parliamentary and party-to-party networks illustrates that the emergence of a third generation of African party-based democracy is now an accepted fact (the first generation being the colonial, and the second the mix of one-party systems and restricted democracies of the 1990s). This generation is more confident and open to the influence of global party-to-party networks and the globalized democratic values they propagate. At least two scenarios might be envisaged. On the one hand, global parliamentary associations and political party networks, initiated by the longer-established democracies, will further influence the development of party-based democracy in Africa, by persuasion, training, and the exchange of ideas about strategy and policy. On the other hand, African political parties may develop their own regional and sub-regional party-to-party networks

independent of the party internationals in order to assert their individuality and African perspectives.

The ultimate outcome of these networks and interactions could be the creation of a global space for improved avenues for the dissemination of democratic values. On the other hand, there is the view that the continuing presence of powerful global democratic trends and universally inspired values could deprive Africans of the opportunity to devise their own pathways to, and models of, democracy independent of such external influences. The present writers' belief is that the main contribution of the global democracy networks currently is the incarnation of a gentler political modernization agenda under the guise of modernization, revisionism and a dominant neo-liberal paradigm (Mohamed Salih 2001). Another outcome of externally-driven globalized party-based democracy is the widening of the gulf between elite-dominated political institutions—which means the political parties and the parliaments—and the masses of illiterate African citizens, who will come to feel increasingly alienated by the conduct of their own society's political elite. The result of such a situation could well be widespread political apathy and even political withdrawal.

At the larger synthesis, the global struggle against poverty, as exemplified by the Millennium Development Goals, including Africa-originated initiatives such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD), is globally supported. These global party-to-party networks and global public agendas will serve Africa well if they act on their promises.

Chapter 4

African Party and Electoral Systems

Chapter 4

4. African Party and Electoral Systems

4.1 Introduction

African political parties originated in the non-democratic setting of colonial rule which was neither democratic nor legitimate. The post-Second World War colonial state could best be described as a reformed state that sought to include Africans in the administration of the colonies. Knowing that Africans' agitation for independence was inevitable, the colonial powers developed this understanding into an opportunity to introduce Africans to Western political institutions, including allowing Africans under strict political surveillance to establish political parties to oversee the development of a legislature. In the urge to leave behind political institutions similar to their own, the departing colonial governments decided 'to export to Africa their peculiar version of parliamentary government, with several parties and recognised opposition' (Mohamed Salih 2006: 141). In some countries, it took the political elite less than a decade to move from establishing political parties to contesting elections and assuming the role of governing their countries.

In practice, due to the speed of political development, numerous ethnically-based parties emerged in opposition to other ethnic parties. Once these political parties were established, they began to assume the structures and functions of Western-style political parties. After the attainment of independence and the waning of the 'decolonization nationalism', the political elite abandoned the goal of national unity, the very goal that gave birth to their political ambitions, and fell back on sub-nationalist politics. In some countries (Sudan, Nigeria, Congo, Angola, Mozambique and Uganda, among others), sub-nationalism flared up in civil wars and second liberation movements—for liberation from what some marginalized and minority ethnicity political elite conceived as a form of internal colonialism imposed by the 'ruling ethnicity'.

If African political parties initially emerged within the framework of the colonial powers' policies, which aimed to prepare the political elite to assume power when their countries were poised to gain independence, during independence some political parties were created by military rulers (Mohamed Salih 2003: 19–27) to bring about development and national integration and to defend against what they misconstrued as the 'threat of division' to national integration. In other instances, civilian politicians who inherited power from the colonialists banned all existing political parties and transformed their states into one-party systems in order to achieve goals similar to those professed by the military leaders—development and national integration. As recent history and subsequent events have shown, both goals remained elusive.

Clearly, not all political parties were inclusive. Historically, political parties established by European settlers on the eve of independence (in South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe) were neither inclusive nor mass-based, and some of them were racist and deliberately excluded the African majority.

However, from a formalist viewpoint, African political parties have been successful in adopting and assimilating the form and not the substantive content. Early on, as the struggle against colonial rule progressed, African political parties succeeded in cultivating not only nationalist sentiments but also the human and financial resources necessary to carry out their activities and realize their objectives. Typically, they did what Weiner says defines a successful political party: they were able to recruit and train personnel, thereby perpetuating themselves as organizations; win support (goodwill, money, votes) from the population; and maintain internal cohesion (Weiner 1967: 7). This essentialist measurement of political party success is consistent with a more recent conception developed by Hague et al. (1998: 131). In their view, political parties are permanent organizations which contest elections, usually because they seek to occupy the decision-making positions of authority within the state.

Almost all African political parties are in pursuit of actualizing the four major functions of political parties in the developing countries described by Randall (Randall 1988: 183–7). First, they endow regimes with legitimacy by providing ideologies, leadership or opportunities for political participation, or a combination of all three; second, they act as a medium for political recruitment, thus creating opportunities for upward social mobility; third, they provide opportunities for the formation of coalitions of powerful political interests to sustain government (interest aggregation), have major influence on policies as a result of devising programmes, supervise policy implementation, and promote the political socialization or mobilization of people to undertake self-help activities; and, fourth, they maintain political stability in societies able to absorb increasing levels of political participation by the new

social forces generated by modernization. Likewise, African political parties have become instruments or institutional mechanisms for transition to democracy. In competitive political systems, they have been able to provide, although often muted, the connection between the party system and government, and between government and society. They have become part of the electoral process, a rallying point for elite competition. Eventually, however, political parties became vehicles for the elite's ambition to capture power, influence the legislative and executive branches, and control the administrative functions of the state bureaucracy through the political executive.

Section 4.2 below deals with African party systems and typologies.

The rest of this report will attempt to explore the nature of African political parties and whether, once founded and having contested elections, they assimilate some of the institutional norms and behaviour expected of them.

4.2 African party systems

In the introduction to this chapter we argued that political parties are important because they play a pivotal role in democratic societies (representation, elite recruitment, aggregation of interests, socialization, national integration, etc.). Because parties compete with each other for the public's votes, and because they should adhere to the rules of the electoral game, they enter into complex relations with their internal and external environment and with other political parties. The alliances, coalitions, negotiations and debates in which political parties are engaged are crucial aspects of political life, the structure of the governing polity, and the measure of political stability (or instability).

In practice, therefore, party systems comprise the networks and relations whose classification has not changed much since the concept entered social science over 50 years ago.

While party competition for votes could be regulated, for instance, by the electoral law, in competitive political systems the number of parties in parliament will not be known for sure until the elections are contested, votes have been counted and the winners have been declared. The number of political parties that form government is very important for distinguishing between different types of party system, whether 'one-party', 'two-party', 'dominant-party' or 'multiparty' systems. The number of political parties is not only important in itself, but also because it reflects the socio-political contexts and the extent of societal divisions and regional differences.

In chapter 3, we alluded to the ethnic nature of African political parties and the significant role ethnicity plays in the formation of political parties, the support they receive, and voter behaviour. Their ethnic nature is an important aspect in, for instance, determining the number of parties that win seats in the parliament and their relative sizes. Ethnicity and religion could also determine political party relations, the formation of governments, and to some extent the stability (or otherwise) of government—in particular determining whether parties' size gives them the prospect of winning, or at least sharing, government power.

It is within this perspective that we recognize the presence of four African party systems, as already mentioned—one-party systems, two-party systems, dominant-party systems and multiparty systems. We deal with these in turn.

4.2.1 One-party systems

Historically, African one-party systems are associated with the late 1960s until the early 1990s when at least four-fifths of the continent was ruled by authoritarian regimes (one-party states, military regimes, military socialist regimes and civil dictatorships). Heywood (2002: 259–60) has made the point that 'one-party system' is a contradiction in terms, since 'system' implies interaction among a number of entities. The term is nevertheless helpful in distinguishing between political systems in which a single party enjoys the monopoly of power through the exclusion of all other parties (by political or constitutional means) and those that are characterized by a competitive struggle between a number of parties. Because monopolistic parties effectively function as permanent governments, with no mechanism (short of a coup or revolution) through which they can be removed from power, they invariably develop an entrenched relationship with the state machine. This allows such states to be classified as 'one-party states', their machinery being seen as a fused 'party–state' apparatus.

Two types of single-party systems had developed in Africa. Some countries became de jure single-party states,[2] that is, they changed their constitutions so that only one political party was allowed in the country. Using Heywood's classification, these 'were found in state socialist regimes where "ruling" communist parties have directed and controlled virtually all the institutions and aspects of society. Such parties are subject to strict ideological discipline, in accordance with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and they have highly structured internal organizations in line

[2] See Nordlund 1996 for a detailed discussion of de jure and de facto party systems, with specific reference to Zambia and Zimbabwe.

with the principles of democratic centralism' (Heywood 2002: 258–66). These are cadre parties in the sense that membership is restricted on political and ideological grounds. Examples of de jure one-party states were Ethiopia with the Ethiopian Workers Party (WPE), Angola with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Liberaço de Angola, MPLA), Mozambique with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo), and Sudan with the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), prior to their transition to various forms of multiparty democracy.

Other African countries became de facto single-party states. In these countries the constitution was not changed to mandate one party, but in reality the ruling parties in these countries gained and kept a monopoly on power, dominating all branches of government. According to Heywood, one-party systems were associated with anti-colonial nationalism and state consolidation in the developing world. In Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, for example, the 'ruling' party developed out of an independence movement that proclaimed the overriding need for nation-building and economic development. In Zimbabwe, one-party rule emerged between 1987 and 1989 (seven years after independence) when the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) forced the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) into a merger through violence and intimidation (Nordlund 1996: 154).

After a 30-year liberation struggle for independence that ended in 1991, Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence in a 1993 referendum under the leadership of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), which grew out of the EPLF, was established and designated as the only legal party despite the fact that in January 2002 the Transitional National Assembly accepted the principle of political pluralism. However, up to now, the Transitional National Assembly has not approved the registration of any political party. Eritrea's PFDJ therefore falls into the category of de facto single political parties. As in countries which had single political parties earlier, President Isaias Afworki (president since 8 June 1993, and leader of the EPLF since 1965) is the chief of state and head of government as well as head of the State Council and National Assembly, and indeed the secretary general of the PFDJ, the sole political party. There is no separation of power here. The PFDJ appoints the political executive, controls the judiciary, and scrutinizes who should become a party candidate and represent the political party in the rubber-stamp legislature.

Eritrea under the PFDJ is an archetype of Africa's single-party states. Others were demolished by the democratization process, which ensued during the late 1980s and culminated in the democratic resurgence which swept through the continent. Little wonder then that journalists, academics, civil society organizations, heavily armed

military resistance and political opponents have confronted the Eritrean regime and the governing political party. Whether and when Eritrea will become a multiparty system is difficult to tell, and is largely contingent on the internal and external contexts within which the democratization struggle is launched.

4.2.2 Two-party systems

A two-party system is duopolistic in that two 'major' parties that have a roughly equal prospect of winning government power dominate it. In its classical form, a two-party system can be identified by three criteria.

1. Although a number of 'minor' parties may exist, only two parties enjoy sufficient electoral and legislative strength to have a realistic prospect of winning government power.
2. The larger party is able to rule alone (usually on the basis of a legislative majority); the other provides the opposition.
3. Power alternates between these parties; both are 'electable', the opposition serving as a 'government in the wings'.

Two-party systems display a periodic tendency towards adversarial politics (see Heywood 2002: 326). This is reflected in ideological polarization and an emphasis on conflict and argument rather than consensus and compromise. It is also noted that such systems sometimes operate through coalitions including smaller parties that are specifically designed to exclude larger parties from government. (In similar vein, Sartori (1976) distinguishes between two types of multiparty system, which he termed the moderate and polarized pluralist systems. In this categorization moderate pluralism exists in countries where ideological differences between major parties are slight, and where there is a general inclination to form coalitions and move towards the middle ground. This classification is apparently relevant to African countries with a large number of ethnically-based parties.)

Table 4.1: African two-party systems

No.	Country	Major political parties, including the two dominant political parties
1	Benin	Union for Future Benin, Benin Rebirth Party, Democratic Renewal Party, African Movement for Development and Progress
2	Cape Verde	African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), Movement for Democracy (MPD), Independent and Democratic Cape Verdean Union (UCID), Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), Social Democratic Party (PSD)
3	Ghana	Convention People's Party, Democratic People's Party, National Convention Party, National Independence Party, New Patriotic Party, People's Convention, United Ghana Movement
4	Kenya	Kenya African National Union, National Rainbow Coalition
5	Seychelles	Democratic Party, Seychelles National Party, Seychelles People's Progressive Front
6	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone People's Party, All People's Congress, Peace and Liberation Party
7	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)

Source: Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

At least five observations can be teased out of Table 4.1.

1. Not all two-party systems have emerged from a truly democratic experience. The best example here is Zimbabwe, where the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which is known for its capacity for electoral fraud, intimidation of voters and outright intimidation and imprisonment of political opponents, has kept the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) at bay for too long.

2. The two-party system is not immune from engendering severe conflicts leading to state collapse, particularly in situations where the ethnic advantage of one political party vis-à-vis the other may lead to the opposition becoming impatient and resorting to the military as a way of advancing civilian politics. The case of Sierra Leone speaks volumes to this possibility.

3. Two-party systems are indicative of highly polarized ideological differences which in some cases undermine the smaller political parties; larger parties use (or rather abuse) them for their own political convenience. Kenya's National Rainbow Coalition and Kenya African National Union (KANU) offer a glaring example of this. However, although the future of the National Rainbow Coalition is uncertain, given the current internal squabbles which have marred the relationship between some of its coalition partners, the likelihood that it will maintain some strong presence in Kenyan politics cannot be ruled out.
4. It is not inevitable that two-party systems develop into a multiparty system or a dominant-party system. For example, following the first multiparty democracy elections in Mozambique, Frelimo gained and the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Renamo), which hinted at the possibility that the country was developing in the direction of a two-party system. However, following elections, Frelimo won votes and Renamo lost votes, and this tilted the balance towards a dominant-party system (the subject of the next subsection).
5. Two-party systems are not in themselves guarantors of political stability or otherwise, despite the fact that they are signifiers of polarized pluralism. Consider, for example, the political stability and almost near-perfect transition in Benin, as contrasted with the political turmoil of pre-civil war Sierra Leone and the current brutal and unwelcome development in Zimbabwe.

The development of two-party systems in Africa could be welcome, particularly from a national integration viewpoint. Multiparty system states are more prone to ethnic and regional conflicts whereby each group creates its own political parties, leading to fragile coalition politics at best and political instability at worst. There is also the possibility that smaller political parties, although they provide a mechanism for electoral participation, will be marginalized by larger political parties, contributing to distrust of politics and politicians in the event of massive 'floor-crossing'.

4.2.3 Dominant-party systems

In most of the literature, dominant-party systems should not be confused with one-party systems, although they may at times exhibit similar characteristics. A dominant-party system is competitive in the sense that a number of parties compete for power in regular and popular elections, but is dominated by a single major party that consequently enjoys prolonged periods in power. In Africa, there are dominant-party systems in 16 countries (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Dominant-party systems and the major political parties

No.	Country	Major political parties	Party system
1	Angola	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Party of Labor) or MPLA ruled from 1975. Liberal Democratic Party (PLD), National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Single-party/dominant-party system
2	Botswana	Botswana Democratic Party, Botswana National Front, Botswana Congress Party	Dominant-party system
3	Cameroon	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement, Social Democratic Front, Democratic Union of Cameroon, Union of the Peoples of Cameroon, National Union for Democracy and Progress, Alliance for Democracy and Development	Dominant-party system
4	Chad	Patriotic Salvation Movement, Rally for Democracy and Progress, Front of Action Forces for the Republic, National Rally for Development and Progress	Dominant-party system
5	Côte d'Ivoire	Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire, Ivorian Popular Front, Ivorian Workers' Party, Rally of the Republicans	Dominant-party system
6	Djibouti	People's Rally for Progress, Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy, National Democratic Party, Social Democratic People's Party, Union for a Democratic Change, Republican Alliance for Democracy	Dominant-party system
7	Equatorial Guinea	Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea	Dominant-party system
8	Ethiopia	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, Coalition for Unity and Democracy, United Ethiopian Democratic Forces, Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement	Dominant-party system

No.	Country	Major political parties	Party system
9	Gambia	Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction – ruling, National Alliance for Democracy and Development	Dominant-party system
10	Mozambique	Frelimo, Renamo, Party of Peace, Democracy and Development	Dominant-party system
11	Namibia	South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), Congress of Democrats, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia, National Unity Democratic Organization, United Democratic Front	Dominant-party system
12	Rwanda	Rwandese Patriotic Front, Christian Democratic Party, Islamic Democratic Party	Dominant-party system
13	South Africa	African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance, Inkatha Freedom Party, United Democratic Movement	Dominant-party system
14	Tanzania	Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Civic United Front, Party for Democracy and Progress, Tanzania Labour Party, United Democratic Party	Dominant-party system
15	Uganda	National Resistance Movement, Forum for Democratic Change, Democratic Party, Uganda People's Congress	Dominant-party system
16	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)	Dominant-party system?

Source: Mohamed Salih, *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

At face value, a relatively large number of dominant parties emerged in Africa a few years after the democratization process had been unleashed. Four challenges to democracy from dominant-party systems could be teased out because:

- they impede competitive politics, which contributes to political apathy and low voter turnout, as has been demonstrated in the last elections in South Africa, Mozambique, Mali and Senegal;
- dominant parties dominate the legislature and could monopolize the lawmaking process to promote the predominant party's economic and social interests;
- governments formed under the system are less accountable to the legislature, which they dominate, and the opposition, which is too small to be effective; and
- they encourage government to develop the arrogance of power and become irresponsive to citizen demands.

What needed to be done is explained by our colleague Renske Doorenspleet: 'This phenomenon of dominant one-party systems should be taken into account more explicitly. New classifications of party systems should be developed in which this new type is included and in which the new type with its special characteristics is investigated' (Doorenspleet 1999: 177).

This work is vitally important for the democratic future of these countries, particularly if competitive politics is to flourish and political parties are to play their pivotal democratic role in governance.

4.2.4 Multiparty systems

A multiparty system is characterized by competition between more than two parties, thus reducing the chances of single-party government and increasing the likelihood of coalitions. However, it is difficult to define multiparty systems in terms of the number of parties being explained by reference to the class nature of party support (party conflict being seen, ultimately, as a reflection of the class struggle), or as a consequence of party democratization and the influence of ideologically committed grass-roots activists.

One problem with the two-party system is that two evenly matched parties are encouraged to compete for votes by outdoing each other's electoral promises, perhaps causing spiralling public spending and fuelling inflation. This amounts to

irresponsible party government, in that parties come to power on the basis of election manifestos that they have no capacity to fulfil. A final weakness of two-party systems is the obvious restrictions they impose in terms of electoral and ideological choice. While a choice between just two programmes of government was perhaps sufficient in an era of partisan alignment and class solidarity, it has become quite inadequate in a period of greater individualism and social diversity.

Polarized pluralism, by contrast, exists when more marked ideological differences separate major parties, some of which adopt an anti-system stance. The strength of multiparty systems is that they create internal checks and balances within government and exhibit a bias in favour of debate, conciliation and compromise. The process of coalition formation and the dynamics of coalition maintenance ensure a broad responsiveness to voter demands that cannot but take account of competing views and contending interests. On the other hand, coalition governments may be fractured and unstable, paying greater attention to squabbles among coalition partners than to the business of government. We deal with these aspects of polarized pluralism in section 4.5 on party coalitions.

Table 4.3: African multiparty systems

No.	Country	Major political parties	Party system
1	Algeria	National Rally for Democracy, National Liberation Front, Movement for National Reform, Rally for Culture and Democracy, Workers' Party, Ahd 54	Multiparty system
2	Burkina Faso	Alliance for Democracy and Federation-African Democratic Rally (12.7%), Congress for Democratic Progress (49.5%), Party for Democracy and Progress (7.5%)	Multiparty system
3	Burundi	National Council for the Defence of Democracy, Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), Union for National Progress (UPRONA), National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD), Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens-Rurenzangemero, (MRC-Rurenzangemero), Party for National Recovery (PARENA)	Multiparty system
4	Central African Republic	National Convergence 'Kwa Na Kwa', Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People, Central African Democratic Rally, Social Democratic Party, Patriotic Front for Progress, Alliance for Democracy and Progress, Londo Association	Multiparty system

No.	Country	Major political parties	Party system
5	Congo	Congolese Labour Party, Convention for Democracy and Salvation, United Democratic Forces, Union for Democracy and Republic, Union for Democratic Renewal, Pan-African Union for Social Democracy	Multiparty system
6	Liberia	Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia, National Patriotic Party, Unity Party, Alliance for Peace and Democracy	Multiparty system
7	Malawi	Democratic Progressive Party, Alliance for Democracy, Malawi Congress Party, Mgwirizano Coalition, National Democratic Alliance, United Democratic Front	Multiparty system
8	Mali	Hope 2002 Democracy (Rally for Mali the largest political party), Alliance for the Republic and Democracy (Alliance for Democracy in Mali the largest party)	Multiparty system
9	Mauritius	Socialist Alliance, Alliance Militant Socialist Movement (MSM), Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), Rodrigues People's Organization	Multiparty system
10	Niger	National Movement for Society and Development (MNDS), Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism, Democratic and Social Convention	Multiparty system
11	Nigeria	People's Democratic Party, All Nigerian People's Party, Alliance for Democracy	Multiparty system
12	São Tomé and Príncipe	Independent Democratic Action, Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe, Independent Democratic Action, MDFM-PCD coalition (Force for Change Democratic Movement-Liberal Party and Democratic Convergence Party–Reflection Group)	Multiparty system
13	Senegal	Coalition Sopi (Alliance of Progressive Forces and Democratic League Movement for the Labour Party), Socialist Party of Senegal, Movement for Democratic Renewal	Multiparty system
14	Zambia	Movement for Multiparty Democracy, United Party for National Development, Forum for Democracy and Development, United National Independence Party, Heritage Party	Multiparty system

Source: Mohamed Salih, M. A., *African Democracies and African Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2001).

4.3 The relationship between the electoral system and the party system[3]

Elections, electoral systems and the way in which they interrelate are important element of any democracy, nascent or mature. Democracy is an 'institutional arrangement', an instrument for actualizing peoples' democratic preferences in the form of governments controlled by the victorious political party or parties, and a means of competitive politics to fill public offices (in the legislature and the political executive) whereby the electorates decide on who should represent them, rule, or make policies and take decisions that organize and impact on public affairs.

Elections, therefore, are an important instrument in the democratic process. In Heywood's words, 'the conventional view is that elections are a mechanism through which politicians can be called to account and forced to introduce policies that somehow reflect public opinion' (Heywood 2002: 230). Quoting Ginsberg, he also laments that 'elections are means through which governments and political elites can exercise control over their populations, making them more quiescent, malleable and, ultimately governable' (Heywood 2002: 230).

Without elaborating further on these important aspects, elections have at least seven major functions:

- recruiting politicians;
- making governments;
- providing representation;
- influencing policy;
- educating voters;
- building legitimacy; and
- strengthening elites.

Essentially, an election is not an event. It is a process which influences how a democratic polity and political party politics unfold following the election, including the type of government formed (majority, minority, coalition etc.). Because elections

[3] For a detailed account of electoral systems, see Reynolds, A., B. Reilly and A. Ellis, *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005).

are contested by political parties, political organizations and individuals (also called independent candidates), there will always be a conjuncture between party systems and electoral systems.

An electoral system consists of a set of rules that govern the conduct of elections. In general, African electoral systems can be divided into majoritarian and proportional. Majoritarian systems also called plurality/majority systems. However, as we will illustrate in what follows, in reality these systems are more complex than simple encyclopaedic definitions. These are systems in which larger parties typically win a share of seats in parliament that is out of proportion to the share of votes they gain in the election. Proportional electoral systems secure a more equitable relationship between the number of seats won and the number of votes gained in the election. In Africa, the proportional electoral systems defy the conventional wisdom that proportional representation (PR) makes dominant-party rule less likely, and that PR systems are often associated with multiparty systems and coalition governments (e.g. South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Rwanda). Table 4.4 shows different types of electoral system in 51 African states.

As Table 4.4 shows, there are two dominant electoral systems in Africa—List proportional representation (List PR) and First Past The Post (FPTP)—with the Two-Round System (TRS) and the Parallel System (both List PR and FPTP or List Party Block Vote (PBV)) in the third place and fourth places, respectively. List PR is prominent in 15 countries, FPTP in 14 countries, TRS in nine and the Parallel System in four countries. Only one African country (Lesotho) has adopted the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system.

Apart from providing a set of rules for conducting elections, electoral systems establish three elements of the electoral process: (a) their scope, i.e. what offices are elected (in particular we referred earlier to the legislature and political executive); (b) the franchise, that is, who can vote; and (c) turnout—who actually votes. There are regulations in all the 51 African countries presented in Table 4.4 which regulate these aspects in order to ensure that the claims to electoral victories which will eventually allow the winning party or parties to form a government are legitimate.

Table 4.4: African electoral systems and electoral system family

No.	Country	Electoral system for national legislature (2006)	Electoral system family
1	Algeria	List PR	PR
2	Angola	List PR	PR
3	Benin	List PR	PR
4	Botswana	FPTP	Plurality/majority
5	Burkina Faso	List PR	PR
6	Burundi	List PR	PR
7	Cameroon	PBV/List PR + FPTP	Plurality/majority
8	Cape Verde	List PR	PR
9	Central African Republic	TRS	Plurality/majority
10	Chad	PBV/List PR + TRS	Plurality/majority
11	Comoros	TRS	Plurality/majority
12	Congo	TRS	Plurality/majority
13	Côte d'Ivoire	FPTP + PBV	Plurality/majority
14	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	TRS (transitional)	Plurality/majority
15	Djibouti	PBV	Plurality/majority
16	Egypt	TRS	Plurality/majority
17	Equatorial Guinea	List PR	PR
18	Eritrea	FPTP (transitional)	Plurality/majority
19	Ethiopia	FPTP	Plurality/majority
20	Gabon	TRS	Plurality/majority
21	Gambia	FPTP	Plurality/majority
22	Ghana	FPTP	Plurality/majority
23	Guinea	Parallel (List PR + FPTP)	Mixed
24	Guinea-Bissau	List PR	PR
25	Kenya	FPTP	Plurality/majority
26	Lesotho	MMP (FPTP + List PR)	Mixed
27	Liberia	(Transitional)	
28	Madagascar	FPTP + List PR	Plurality/majority
29	Malawi	FPTP	Plurality/majority
30	Mali	TRS	Plurality/majority
31	Mauritania	TRS	Plurality/majority
32	Mauritius	Block Vote	Plurality/majority

No.	Country	Electoral system for national legislature (2006)	Electoral system family
33	Morocco	List PR	PR
34	Mozambique	List PR	PR
35	Namibia	List PR	PR
36	Niger	List PR + FPTP	PR
37	Nigeria	FPTP	Plurality/majority
38	Rwanda	List PR	PR
39	São Tomé and Príncipe	List PR	PR
40	Senegal	Parallel (PBV + List PR)	Mixed
41	Seychelles	Parallel (PBV + List PR)	Mixed
42	Sierra Leone	List PR	PR
43	South Africa	List PR	PR
44	Sudan	FPTP	Plurality/majority
45	Swaziland	FPTP	Plurality/majority
46	Tanzania	FPTP	Plurality/majority
47	Togo	TRS	Plurality/majority
48	Tunisia	Parallel (PBV + List PR)	Mixed
49	Uganda	FPTP	Plurality/majority
50	Zambia	FPTP	Plurality/majority
51	Zimbabwe	FPTP	Plurality/majority

Source: Compiled by the author from Reynolds, A., B. Reilly and A. Ellis, *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/upload/ESD_full_with%20final%20changes%20inserted.pdf, downloaded 20 July 2006.

Electoral systems are important because they have crucial impact on party performance, and particularly on political parties' prospects of winning (or at least sharing) power after the election. It is therefore common in severely divided societies for electoral systems to become the focus of heightened political debate and polemic—hence the debate on what electoral system is most representative.

Electoral systems are essential parts of the democratic process. Depending on what electoral systems are used, they are vehicles for ensuring that parliament, the main representative institution, the face of the nation, so to speak, is representative. The extent to which parliament is representative is a function of whether the electoral system is capable of reflecting the diversity of interests, ideologies, concerns and

commonly held or known interests of the political forces of a given country. This is important because the legislature—the end result of the electoral process and the electoral system a country adopts—is the only credible national institution that is capable of offering an inclusive platform for legislation, legitimacy and conflict management through peaceful means. Electoral reforms are therefore important instruments for conflict management in severely divided societies where conflicts are preferably resolved through parliamentary debate and compromise rather than by the use of the machete and the gun. It is through electoral systems in conjunction with political party systems that the whole political system could be sufficiently prepared to ensure inclusiveness and representation.

4.4 Political competition

While democracy is an ideal, political democracy or polyarchy is a practice. Its full range of possibilities is only seen in democratic countries with competitive political systems. Political competition is one of three dimensions without which it is impossible to describe a political system as democratic. Sorensen (1993: 12–13) summarizes Dahl's eight characteristics or conditions encompassing inclusiveness as an essential part of democracy both as idea and as practice, under three headings:

(a) a highly inclusive level of political participation in the election of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major social group is excluded;

(b) meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and strictly excluding the use of force or coercion; and

(c) an assured level of civil and political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.

Beyond these normative aspects of political parties as vehicles for participation in democratic politics, they 'are permanent organizations which contest elections, usually because they seek to occupy the decisive positions of authority within the state' (Weiner 1967: 7). In this sense, political parties' struggle for power is based on competition, even though, paradoxically, they maintain an internal sense of interest aggregation of politically and ideologically like-minded individuals and groups.

Political party competition is part of a healthy democratic system whereby competition, according to political theorists, encourages the diffusion of innovations

in party organization, fund-raising and electoral campaigns. Four important elements of political party institutionalization are that: (a) the rules governing political competition are stable; (b) the major parties have deep roots in society; (c) all significant political actors accept the legitimacy of political parties; and (d) parties have strong organizations and their own resources (Heywood 2002: 255).

One major threat to party competition is the presence of dominant-party systems which could abuse their parliamentary supremacy to suppress smaller political parties' aspirations and political programmes. Political party competition is currently directly or indirectly curtailed in 16 African countries. In an article published in 2004 on 'The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa', which we quote at length, Lindberg, who laments:

> The level of competition in African elections seems to convey slightly less impressive indications of democratic quality than does participation. Legislative majorities are generally overwhelming, with an average of 60 per cent of the seats, even after flee and fair elections, while the main opposition parties typically acquire only a fraction of the seats. Despite this, alternations in power have occurred in every fifth election. Anticipating a point here, the incidence of turnovers is related to both freedom and fairness (since it is more unlikely the opposition will win a fraudulent election), to opposition participation (since the opposition cannot win if it does not run, and unless they unite to present a viable challenge), and to electoral cycles. . . . A vast majority of African countries are presidential regimes where elections to the executive typically take political priority in electoral campaigns. It is therefore natural to expect these contests to be more competitive than legislative elections. This is encouraging from the vantage point of improved democratic quality since increasing competition in the elections to the executive is obviously of primary importance. Finally, as discussed above, for parliamentary elections a vast majority of countries operate majoritarian, mixed or PR electoral systems with small constituencies. These systems induce by design a relatively severe disproportionality between votes and seats in favour of a few larger parties. Hence, in comparison to presidential elections, it should come as no surprise that a lower degree of competition is recorded in the indicator for legislative elections. For these reasons, presidential elections provide a more valid measure of political competition in Africa (Lindberg 2004a: 74).

On the whole, unfortunately, the picture that emerges is that in most African countries the prospect of transforming ethnic, regional and religious cleavages and competition into cross-cutting party alliances has not been successful. Southall believes that there is little evidence as yet of the emergence of parties which cut

across ethnicity and region (Southall 2005). Generally, however, this is an area in which the evidence so far is still, by and large, anecdotal, although the general trend shows that there is more party competition, with the exception of dominant-party states, than there was for example during the first two multiparty elections in most African countries.

4.5 Party coalitions and networks

With the democratic renaissance of the 1990s, those political parties that were banned during authoritarian rule have been resurrected and new ones created. With the exception of the 16 African countries that are ruled by dominant-party systems (see Table 4.2), the majority are multiparty or two-party systems. One contributing factor is that the number of political parties in each country has increased dramatically, with fewer dominant-party states as a result. The awakening of ethnicity which was suppressed during the outburst of synthetic nationalism during the 1950s and 1960s has also meant that the post-1990s political parties are not less ethnically inclined in their orientation than their pre-independence predecessors. In some countries the proliferation of political parties has meant the demise of the so-called national political parties (e.g. KANU of Kenya, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, etc.); in others it has strengthened the old guard and enabled them to retain or stage a comeback to power (e.g. the Revolutionary State Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM) in Tanzania).

Although they are at the embryonic stage, African party-to-party coalitions operate at four levels—national, pan-African, regional and global party-to-party partnership. The following are examples of each of these four trajectories.

4.5.1 National party coalitions

Coalitions as forms of party-to-party-partnership are common to all countries, and are political mechanisms for aggregating interests and reaching a middle ground in order to form the government in situations where no single political party wins the majority of parliamentary seats. In the severely divided societies of Africa, party-to-party becomes an important vehicle for national integration. In this sense, party-to-party partnership enables political parties to articulate their programmes and interests and through dialogue create ideological affinity beyond the ethnic, cultural and linguistic group. The integrative role of national party-to-party partnership is also relevant to regional party-to-party partnerships; it supports regional integration and interdependence between regional and sub-regional political entities.

Evidently, post-1990s African elections are more peaceful than those of the early independence days. There is also more cooperation and to some extent peaceful party coexistence in most African states, except a few.

1. In December 1991, only days after the repeal of section 2A of the Kenyan constitution, which restored the multiparty system, Mwai Kibaki left the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), and founded the Democratic Party (DP), which later became the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK). He finished third in the presidential elections of 1992, and second (with 31 per cent of votes) in those of 1997. In preparation for the 2000 elections, the NAK allied itself with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Opposition groups and civil society groups united to press for a constitutional review. In early 1998, the mainstream opposition parties (the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya, or Ford Kenya, the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party) joined the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) to press for constitutional reforms. On 27 December 1997, NARC won a landslide victory over KANU, with Kibaki winning 63 per cent of the votes in the presidential elections, against only 30 per cent for the KANU candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta.

2. In Niger's 1993 elections two main contesting coalitions emerged: (a) the National Movement for Society and Development (MNSD), the ruling party since 1960, and its allies the Union Démocratique des Forces Progressistes (UDFP) and the Union of Democratic Patriots and Progressives (UPDP); and (b) the Alliance Forces for Change (AFC), led by the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS), with the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) and Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Social Progress (ANDP) as the other major coalition partners. However, these alliances were reconfigured in the 1995 parliamentary elections, when the PNDS and UPDP joined together, and hence helped to return the MNSD to power. In the 1999 elections, the majority in parliament was held by the MNSD, which formed the government together with the CDS.

3. Malawi exhibited a similar pattern when the opposition alliance of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) joined forces to win the 1993 referendum with a landslide and create a coalition government of national unity. It then saw Malawi through multiparty elections. In the first multiparty election of 1994, the UDF as part of a loose alliance known as the Common Electoral Group (CEG) won. However, the 1999 elections brought the Malawi Congress Party (the ruling party of the late dictator Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda) to power, with 33 per cent of the votes.

4. In Ethiopia, the struggle against the dictatorial regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974–91) culminated in the opening up of the political space for some competitive politics under the banner of ethnic-federalism. The country has no political parties in the common modern sense of the word, but there are ethnic organizations which compete for seats in the House of Representatives. Since its first multi-ethnic competitive election in 1994, Ethiopia has been ruled by a multi-ethnic coalition dominated by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF). The EPRDF consists of more than a dozen ethnically-based liberation fronts, the most prominent among them being the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (ERODM). Despite criticisms of the quasi-democratic nature of this coalition, it has managed to generate a certain degree of political stability by absorbing large numbers of minority ethnic groups which would have hardly been represented in the House of Representatives if their votes had not been pooled together during elections.

5. South Africa is another case where a party coalition was instrumental during the transition to multiparty democracy. The alliance between the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) was forged as an institutional mechanism for creating an inclusive political mechanism to end apartheid and to see South Africa through to multiparty democracy. Kadima (2006) comments that the glues that keep the Tripartite Alliance together are probably the long tradition of working together under difficult circumstances, the power and job opportunities provided by the ANC, and the adoption of and adhesion by some key leaders of COSATU and SACP themselves to neo-liberalism ideology to the detriment of the socialist ideals. Despite discomfort with some ANC policies, the Tripartite Alliance decided to remain together and influence each other from inside. In the same tradition, South Africa's first government of national unity was a coalition between the ANC, the National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The Democratic Alliance (DA) was formed in June 2000 and comprised initially the Democratic Party (DP), the New National Party (NNP, the former NP), and the Federal Alliance. The split of the Alliance in 2003 into a number of squabbling factions revealed the inability of the opposition parties to unite in the face of ANC–Tripartite political dominance. In 2003, the ANC and the NNP supported an item of legislation on floor-crossing, which the smaller political parties considered detrimental to democracy and a source of instability. In the case of South Africa we notice a sense of maturity in terms of temporary as well as long-term party-to-party partnerships.

6. Since it gained independence in 1968, Mauritius has always been governed by a coalition of at least two parties. The coalition agreement takes shape before the elections in the form of a platform and programme which they present to the electorate. Unlike the case with other coalitions, the prime minister is not necessarily from the largest coalition partners—for example, in 1983 the prime minister's party had only 15 per cent of the seats in parliament. The coalitions are often between political parties which are not ideologically coherent, and ethnic politics plays a more significant role in elections and coalitions than do party programmes and agendas. In fact it could be argued that coalition politics is ethnic politics, and therefore coalitions are more between ethnically-based political parties than between ethnic groups poised to control the government resources and personnel. Currently the government consists of a coalition of numerous political parties, including the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM), the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), and several others; the opposition is led by the Mauritian Labour Party (MLP) and the Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD).

Considering the large number of political parties in most of the African countries, there are at least four policy options to strengthen the existing party-to-party partnerships-cum-coalitions:

- explicit support for party-to-party partnership;
- working with and encouraging smaller political parties to create partnerships and go beyond partnerships towards mergers;
- supporting the development of a legal framework to ensure that political parties do abide by democratic governance practice; and
- exploring whether it is possible to use political party (financial) support as an instrument for creating, or at least not preventing, political party partnerships.

4.6 Regional and sub-regional networks and associations

There are four regional (pan-African) and sub-regional institutionalized parliamentary groupings which can be used as starting points for supporting and encouraging pan-African or sub-regional party to-party partnerships. So far these parliamentary groups have been created by top–down decisions and they are therefore seen within the framework of regional and sub-regional parliamentary arrangements rather than as arrangements produced by the political parties themselves. They are:

- the Pan-African Parliament;
- the East African Assembly;
- the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum; and
- the Economic Community of West African States Community Parliament (ECOWAS-PC).

The question that interests us is whether these state-sponsored party-to-party arrangements have the capacity to develop into direct party-to-party partnerships.

4.6.1 The Pan-African Parliament (PAP)

Although it was established for different reasons and in order to respond to different sets of problems, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor the African Union (AU) are close to the EU in their structure. However, because two-thirds of Africa's states were under military rule, military socialist or ruled by civil dictators, some observers called the OAU a club harbouring a large number of dictators who attended its deliberations only to gain external legitimacy—in contrast to the European Parliament, which is made up of representatives of democratic countries. (Yet even the EU needed the European Parliament to enact Europe-wide legislation and maintain a measure of oversight over the operations of the Union.)

One of the positive consequences of the democratization process that has swept through Africa since the 1990s is that it has also resulted in a positive change of the OAU's mission—from decolonization to consolidating the democratic institutions of the continent. The change of name from OAU to AU is a symbolic but important step in this direction.

The factors which motivated the change from OAU to AU are outlined in article 5 of the Sirte Declaration (9 September 1999) in which the African leaders' desire to establish an African Union was spelt out as follows; 'As we prepare to enter the 21st century and cognizant of the challenges that will confront our continent and peoples, we emphasize the imperative need and a high sense of urgency to rekindle the aspirations of our peoples for stronger unity, solidarity and cohesion in a larger community of peoples transcending cultural, ideological, ethnic and national differences'. This is further explained in article 6, which reads as follows: 'Article 6. In order to cope with those challenges and to effectively address the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and in the world, we are determined to fulfil our peoples' aspirations for greater unity in conformity with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community'.

The decision to establish an African Union and a Pan-African Parliament was taken in Lomé, Togo, on 12 July 2000, when the Draft Constitutive Act on the establishment of the African Union was approved. This was developed into a Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) relating to the Pan-African Parliament, signed in Sirte, Libya, in March 2001. The establishment of the PAP is informed by a vision of providing a common platform to enable African peoples and their grass-roots organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision making on the problems and challenges facing the continent and to ensure effectively the full participation of the African peoples in the economic development and integration of the continent.

As of 25 February 2004, 38 member states had signed, ratified and deposited the instruments of ratification of the Protocol, and 30 member states had submitted the list of their five members (at least one of whom is a woman) elected to the Pan-African Parliament. The president and four vice-presidents of the PAP were elected, and the Pan African parliamentarians were sworn in during the PAP's first session on 18 March 2004.

However, the PAP is not yet in a position to provide an institutional framework for the emergence of party-to-party partnership if the governments refused. Two articles of the PAP Constitutive Act indicate this: (a) article 2 (3.i), which stipulates that 'The Pan-African Parliament shall have consultative and advisory powers only'; and (b) article 2 (3.ii), which states that 'The Members of the Pan-African Parliament shall be appointed as provided for in Article 4 of this Protocol'. Since there is no single mention of political parties in the Protocol, the implications of these articles for national political parties' ability to contest Africa-wide elections, since PAP members are to be appointed or nominated, require some serious thinking. National political parties cannot contest Africa-wide elections without a legal framework allowing them to contest elections in countries other than their own.

First, the Pan-African parliamentarians will be selected by the member states from the political parties represented in the national parliaments. Election rather than selection will be critical for the emergence of a truly pan-African parliament representing the African peoples.

Second, the Protocol has allowed no space for the emergence of truly pan-African parliamentary party-to-party groups similar to those of the European Parliament. There is no hint in the Protocol to a remote possibility of developing a pan-African legal framework allowing the African peoples or parties to establish pan-African political parties.

Third, the Pan-African Parliament has no legislative powers. It is role is consultative and advisory on policy agendas put forward by the heads of states and the Council of Ministers. It is an institution without teeth, and will have little effect, if any, on the ability of the AU, let alone the member states, to tackle the challenges of the 21st century which give birth to the AU and the PAP as a sign of a significant shift from the authoritarian manner in which the continent's affairs are conducted to the age of democracy, good governance, human rights and the rule of law.

4.6.2 The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA)

The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) is best described as the reincarnation of the East African Community, established between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and disbanded in 1977. The treaty on the establishment of the East African Community (EAC) was signed on 1999, with the main objective 'to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the three partner states in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit' (article 5.1). Furthermore, 'The Community will have a Customs Union, a Common Market and a Monetary Union as transitional stages, and ultimately, a political Federation of the three states' (article 5.2). The EAC is set to establish various organs and institutions—the Summit, the Council, the Co-ordination Committee, Sectoral Committees, the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat (article 9.1).

This section introduces the EALA and its relationship to political parties, and examines whether it has succeeded in creating pan-East African party-to-party partnerships.

The EALA was inaugurated together with the East African Court of Justice in Arusha, Tanzania, on 29 November 2001. It consists of 27 elected members (nine from each country), three ex officio members (the three national ministers responsible for regional cooperation), and the secretary general of the EAC Council. Unlike the European Union, where population size is taken into account, the EALA gives equal representation to each country regardless of population size. However, the three countries make equal financial contributions for the running of the Assembly's affairs and programmes (which is not the case in the EU). In common with the Pan-African Parliament, the EALA is subservient to the executive (i.e. the Council and the Summit) who hold the real power over the running of the EAC's affairs; moreover, the 27 parliamentarians represent only token representation and cannot reflect the diversity of the countries they represent, let alone the whole East African sub-region.

Although there is no direct mention of political party development in its Treaty, one of the EALA's major objectives, in the words of the treaty, is 'the promotion of good governance including adherence to the principles of democratic rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities and gender equality, which are characteristics of democratic societies'. This, however, does not preclude the fact that EALA parliamentarians are drawn from political parties and as such represent political party interests, with the caveat that they should include parliamentarians both from the governing political party and from the opposition.

4.6.3 The Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF)

The Southern African Development Community's Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) was launched in July 1996 as a regional organization that brings together 12 parliaments of the Southern African region: those of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Forum represents the 1,800 members of parliament (MPs) of the SADC countries. Among the Forum's critical issues of concern in the 21st century is support for the growing democracy in the region. The Forum is motivated by the fact that for many years the peoples of the region have fought and struggled for democracy and human rights against forces, institutions and socio-economic and political bodies that limited or completely deprived them of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties. A key objective of the Forum is to develop into a regional parliamentary structure in order to strengthen the capacity of the SADC by involving parliamentarians of member states in its activities. Its programmes include election observation, conflict resolution, promoting gender-sensitive development, inter-parliamentary cooperation and regional integration.

Article 6.3 of the SADC Treaty (29 August 1994) stipulates that the 'SADC parliamentary Forum shall consist of the Presiding Officers and three (3) representatives elected to the SADC Parliamentary Forum by each national Parliament; provided that in the election of the three representatives to the SADC Parliamentary Forum, each national Parliament shall ensure equitable representation at the SADC Parliamentary Forum of women and political parties that are represented in that Parliament'.

Thus, although there is a constitution regulating the membership of three national MPs in the SADC Parliamentary Forum, there is no legal framework for involving the political parties in direct elections to the SDAC-PF. In the absence of direct party-to-party partnership, the selection of representatives to the SADC-PF is made subservient to the will of the national political party or coalition of parties in

government. It is difficult to conceive how regional political parties similar to the Euro-parties could emerge from such a state-driven constellation.

The SADC Parliamentary Forum is a Forum, and therefore has neither legislative powers nor any active oversight role vis-à-vis the SADC as a regional economic cooperation body. Its role is advisory, with some specific programmes to implement under its Strategic Plan.

The SADC-PF plays an important role in election observation, in conducting research on the state of democracy in the region, and in advancing the role of women in politics—it is the only inter-parliamentary forum which has achieved its promised 30 per cent women parliamentarians. It therefore lives up to the pronounced purpose and constitution—'to strengthen the implementation capacity of SADC by involving the representatives of the peoples of SADC' (SADC Treaty, article 2). In living up to this promise, it comprises parliamentarians from governing political parties and the opposition.

The development of transnational party-to-party cooperation within the SADC-PF is at its nascent stage, although liberation movement parties have developed strong networks of cooperation at the head of state level. In common with other regional parliamentary forums and assemblies, it is an important consultative body in addressing some of the major issues confronting the sub-region, such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, conflict and other social ills.

4.6.4 The Economic Community of West African States Community Parliament (ECOWAS-PC)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group, initially of 16 countries, founded on 28 May 1975 when 16 West African countries signed the Treaty of Lagos. Its mission is to promote economic integration. In 2000 Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS.

It was founded to achieve 'collective self-sufficiency' for the member states by means of economic and monetary union, creating a single large trading bloc. The very slow progress towards this aim meant that the treaty was revised in Cotonou, Benin, on 24 July 1993 towards a looser type of collaboration. The ECOWAS Secretariat and the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development are its two main policy-implementing institutions. The ECOWAS Fund was transformed into the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development in 2001.

The Parliament is composed of 120 seats. Each of the 15 member states has a guaranteed minimum of five seats. The remaining 45 seats are shared on the basis of population. Consequently, Nigeria has 35 seats, Ghana eight seats, and Côte d'Ivoire seven seats, while Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal have six seats each. The others—Benin, Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo—have five seats each (Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS and therefore there are seats uncounted for here). Whenever necessary, the number and distribution of seats is reviewed by the ECOWAS Authority either on its own initiative or on the recommendation of the Parliament.

The Community Parliament is empowered to consider issues concerning human rights and the fundamental freedoms of citizens; the interconnection of energy networks; the interconnection of telecommunications systems; increased cooperation in the area of radio, television and other media within ECOWAS and with other African development communities; and the development of national communication systems. The Parliament may also be consulted on matters relating to public health policies for the Community; common educational policy through the harmonization of existing systems and specialization of existing universities; the adaptation of education within the Community to international standards; youth and sports; scientific and technological research; and Community policy on the environment. Other areas for consideration include any issues affecting the Community, especially as they relate to the review of the ECOWAS Treaty, citizenship and social integration. On these issues, the Parliament may make recommendations to the appropriate institutions and/or organs of the Community.

Representatives and their alternates are to be elected by direct universal suffrage by citizens of the member states. Until they are thus elected, the national assemblies of member states or their equivalent institutions or organs are empowered to elect members from among themselves. The duration of the transitional period is subject to the approval of the authority of heads of state and government.

Representatives are to be elected for five years from the day they are sworn in. During the transition period, representatives who are not re-elected at the national level will remain in the office until the new representatives from their respective member states take their position.

ECOWAS' work with political parties and the advancement of multiparty democracy is governed by the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (Dakar, 21 December 2001). The Protocol consists of 50 articles organized in three chapters dealing with the principles and modalities of its implementation, sanctions, general and final provisions. The principles are set out according to the following eight thematic sections: (a) Constitutional Convergence Principles; (b) Elections;

(c) Election Monitoring and ECOWAS Assistance; (d) The Role of Armed Forces, the Police and the Security Forces in Democracy; (e) Poverty Alleviation and Promotion of Social Dialogue; (f) Education, Culture and Religion; (g) Rule of Law, Human Rights and Good Governance; and (h) Women, Children and Youth.

Although the observance of these principles can be verified only by actual practice, a number of ECOWAS interventions in support of the democratic principles are laudable (e.g. in Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, the Gambia, Guinea etc.). Another important point is that ECOWAS is conceived along the EU model whereby in the future parliamentarians will be directly elected, thus creating a more representative body. The implementation of such a principle would strengthen the role of political parties in agenda setting as well as bringing the forum closer to the people.

ECOWAS also leads the way in promoting dialogue and cooperation between the political parties, the media and civil society. In June–July 2005, approximately 250 representatives of political parties, the media and civil society from the 15 ECOWAS member countries plus Mauritania, Cameroon and Chad met at the Palais des Congrès in Cotonou, Benin. This forum was co-organized by the Sahel and West Africa Club/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Secretariat and the Strategic Watch Club for Peace in West Africa. This forum's main objectives were to facilitate dialogue and interaction at the regional level between the three categories of actors as regards their respective and common roles in the prevention of conflict, and in the building and strengthening of peace and democracy at the local, national and regional levels. It also aimed to help establish a network of these diverse actors and facilitate their concerted involvement in actions to be carried out.

4.7 African integration into international political party unions

Ironically, African political parties have fared better in international party-to-party contacts than in the regional equivalent. Currently, a large number of African political parties are members of the so-called party internationals. This section illustrates the involvement of African political parties in global party-based democracy associations and networks.

4.7.1 The Democrat Union of Africa Dialogue Group (DUA/ADG)

The Democrat Union of Africa/Africa Dialogue Group is part of the International Democrat Union (IDU), which consists mainly of conservative, Christian democrat

and like-minded political parties of the centre and centre-right in over 60 countries. Many of its member parties are organized in regional units, most of which came into existence as new democracies were established during the 1990s. The IDU provides a forum in which parties holding similar beliefs can come together and exchange views on matters of policy and organizational interest, so that they can learn from each other, act together, establish contacts and speak with one strong voice to promote democracy and centre-right policies around the globe.

The DUA/ADG was founded in August 1997 in Dakar, Senegal by 11 liberal youth organizations from the African continent (see Table 4.5 for the current membership).

Table 4.5: Members of the Democrat Union of Africa Dialogue Group (DUA/ADG)

No.	Country	Parties
1	South Africa	Democratic Party Youth (DP-Y), South African Liberal Students' Association (SALSA)
2	Benin	Nouvelle Ethique
3	Côte d'Ivoire	Jeunesse Militante du Parti Libéral de Côte d'Ivoire (JMPLCI), Organization de Jeunes Libéraux de Côte d'Ivoire (OJLCI), Femme Actuelle Liberale (FAL)
4	Mali	Jeunesse du parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (JPDP)
5	Mauritania	Jeunesse du Rassemblement Pour la Démocratie et l'Unité (JRDU)
6	Cape Verde	Juventud Para la Democratia (JPD), Rassemblement des Jeunes Républicains (RJR)
7	Ghana	New Patriotic Party Youth Wing (NPPY), Ghana Liberal Students' Association (GHALSA)
8	Senegal	Union des Jeunesses Travaillistes et Libérales (UJTL)
9	Malawi	United Democratic Front Youth (UDFY)
10	Burkina Faso	Jeunesse du Parti de l'Alliance Pour la Démocratie et la Fédération (JADF)
11	Angola	National Democratic Union of Angola
12	Mozambique	Renamo
13	Namibia	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)
14	Tanzania	Chama Cha Demantiza
15	Uganda	Democratic Party (DP)

No.	Country	Parties
16	*Associates*	
17	South Africa	New National Party (NNP)
18	Kenya	Democratic Party
19	Botswana	Democratic Party
20	Côte d'Ivoire	PDCI-RDA
21	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS)
22	Gambia	Democratic Party
23	Gabon	RNB
24	Lesotho	Basotho National Party
25	Liberia	Unity Party
26	Malawi	Malawi Congress Party
27	Niger	National Movement for Society and Development (MNSD)
28	Seychelles	Democratic Party
29	Sierra Leone	Campaign for Good Governance
30	Zambia	Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD)
31	Zimbabwe	Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)

Source: African Democrat Parties, list of members 2006.

4.7.2 The Africa Liberal Network

The Africa Liberal International, also called the Africa Liberal Network, is an association of parties, groups, cooperating organizations and individuals that support and accept the liberal principles. Its aims are to foster the growth of a democratic society based on personal liberty, personal responsibility and social justice, and to provide the means of cooperation and interchange of information between the member organizations, and between men and women of all countries who accept these principles.

There are 11 African political party members of Liberal International (also called the International Federation of Liberal Parties)—eight full members and three with observer status. As full members, the African liberal parties participate in the deliberations of Liberal International in order to develop strategies globally.

African liberals established a vibrant wing for African young people, called the Organization of African Youth (OALY), at the 156th Executive Committee meeting of Liberal International in Dakar, Senegal, on 26 October 1996. OALY's main

Table 4.6: African political party members of Liberal International

No.	Country	Party
	I. Full members	
1	Angola	Partido Liberal Democratico (PLD)
2	Côte d'Ivoire	Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR)
3	Equatorial Guinea	Union Democratica Nacional (UDENA)
4	Malawi	United Democratic Front (UDF)
5	Morocco	Union Constitutionnelle (UC) and Mouvement Populaire (MP)
6	Senegal	Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS)
7	South Africa	Democratic Alliance (DA)
8	Tanzania	Civic United Front (Ct1F)
	II. Observers	
9	Seychelles	Seychelles National Party (SNP)
10	Tunisia	Social Liberal Party (PSL)
11	Zambia	United Party for National Development (UPND)

Source: Compiled from the Liberal International membership list, August 2006.

objective is to promote and represent the interests of young liberals as well as the interest of the African young people in general. It holds an observer status in Liberal International (see Table 4.6 for the African political party members; some are members of several party internationals of like-minded ideological orientations).

4.7.3 The African members of Socialist International

Socialist International is a worldwide organization of social democratic, socialist and labour parties. Currently, it brings together 162 political parties and organizations from all continents. Table 4.7 shows that 30 African political parties are Socialist International members (19 full members, seven consultative and four with observer status).

Apparently, the association of Socialist International with the socialist political parties of the cold war era still haunts many socialist-oriented Africans who are still fearful of being associated with military socialism.

Table 4.7: African political party members of Socialist International

No.	Country	Political party
	I. Full members	
1	Algeria	Socialist Forces Front (FFS)
2	Angola	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
3	Benin	Social Democratic Party (PSD)
4	Burkina Faso	Party for Democracy and Progress/Socialist Party (PDP/PS)
5	Cameroon	Social Democratic Front (SDF)
6	Cape Verde	African Party of Cape Verde's Independence (PAICV)
7	Côte d'Ivoire	Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)
8	Egypt	National Democratic Party (NDP)
9	Equatorial Guinea	Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS)
10	Guinea	Guinean People's Assembly (RPG)
11	Mali	African Party for Solidarity and Justice, ADEMA-PASJ
12	Mauritius	Mauritius Labour Party
13	Mauritius	Militant Movement (MMM)
14	Morocco	Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)
15	Mozambique	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo)
16	Niger	Party for Democracy and Socialism of Niger (PNDS)
17	Senegal	Socialist Party (PS)
18	South Africa	African National Congress (ANC)
19	Tunisia	Constitutional Democratic Assembly (RCD)
	II. Consultative members	
20	Burundi	Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu)
21	Gabon	Gabonese Party for Progress (PGP)
22	Ghana	National Democratic Congress (NDC)
23	Mali	Assembly for Mali
24	Namibia	Congress of Democrats (COD), South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
25	Togo	Democratic Convention of African Peoples (CDPA)
26	Tunisia	Tunisia Democratic Forum for Labour and Freedoms (FDTL)

No.	Country	Political party
	III. Observers	
27	Botswana	Botswana National Front
28	Central African Republic	Patriotic Front for Progress (FPP)
29	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS)
30	Mauritania	Mauritania Assembly of Democratic Forces (RFD)

Source: Compiled from the Socialist International membership list, July 2006.

4.7.4 The Green Party Federation of Africa

The Green Party Federation of Africa (see Table 4.8) is a regional member of the Global Greens Federation, which consists of 800 green parties worldwide. The table shows that there are 14 African green party members, called the Federation of Green Parties of Africa. The general principles which bring greens together include economic wisdom, social justice, participatory democracy, sustainability, respect for diversity and non-violence.

Although they are yet to make any significant influence on African polity, they attract considerable solidarity with the global green movement and its ecological campaigns against oil, mineral and industrial pollution rainforest logging and the protection of biodiversity. However, this support is yet to translate into parliamentary seats.

Table 4.8: The Federation of Green Parties of Africa

No.	Country	Political party
1	Benin	Les Verts du Benin
2	Burkina Faso	Rassemblement Des Ecologistes du Burkina Faso
3	Cameroon	Défense de l'Environnement Camérounais (DEC)
4	Guinea-Bissau	Liga Guineense de Proteqao Ecologica
5	Guinea	Parti des Ecologistes Guinéens
6	Kenya	Mazingira Green Party
7	Mali	Parti Ecologiste du Mali
8	Mauritius	Mouvement Républicain - the Green Way
9	Morocco	Les Verts
10	Niger	Rassemblement pour un Sahel Vert
11	Nigeria	Green Party of Nigeria
12	Senegal	Les Verts
13	Somalia	Somalia Green Party
14	South Africa	Green Party of South Africa

Source: Compiled from the Global Green membership list, July 2006.

4.7.5 The importance of political party networks and associations

Elsewhere, Mohamed Salih (2005) argues that it is evident that global party-based democracy networks have developed three distinct strategies in dealing with international democracy promotion, which are rather different from the approaches taken by fraternal foundations and other multilateral organizations. First, global parliamentary networks promote globalized parliamentary-based democracy by developing the capacity of parliamentarians regardless of their ideological orientation. Second, global party-to-party networks promote globalized party-based democracy in a bid to bring Africa and other developing countries into conformity with the ethos and core values of 'Western' party-based democracy. Third, bilateral and multilateral institutions pursue global democracy, including in Africa, with the aim of strengthening democratic institutions, including, of course, parliaments, political parties and the rule of law, constitutional reforms, good governance, and state building among others.

It is difficult to argue that Africa can develop a unique party-based democracy that responds to its own political culture and position in the new context of development so long as it operates under the influence of such powerful global parliamentary and party-to-party democracy networks. However, African party-based democracy, as this report demonstrates, has so far retained some institutional arrangements informed by African levels of socio-economic development and the diverse political cultures, some of which impinge negatively on its overall democratic credentials.

However, African regional and sub-regional parliament-to-parliament associations are yet to develop into party-to-party networks through which like-minded African ideological approaches and similarities in economic development trends and experiences could develop into genuine interdependence for fostering peace and security, contributing to regional economic integration, and bringing these institutions closer to the people.

The relationship between party internationals and African political parties and the way in which it affects party programmes and manifestos have not been well researched and require some serious attention. Here International IDEA's Programme on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties could take a lead in order that ensure that this issue can be pursued further.

Chapter 5

Party Structures and Internal Organization

Chapter 5

5. Party Structures and Internal Organization

5.1 Introduction

What do political parties do between elections? Are African political parties sleeping ghosts that wake up to haunt the goodwill and political resources of the electorates only during election year (if not month) or during election campaigns? Or are they maintaining vigilance and playing their role in democratic governance as the link between citizens, parliament and government? It is a major challenge to decipher the inner working of African political parties, but this has to be done if we are to be able to make relevant and significant policy decisions on how to develop them internally.

This chapter therefore introduces the structure and internal organization of African political parties. This area has been poorly researched and needs continued attention. To address this shortcoming, International IDEA and national and regional African partners have over the last three years conducted a project on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties.[4] We therefore present data and tentative findings to assist those wishing to study the structure and functioning of political parties in Africa, and internal party regulations in Africa, and to encourage further stocktaking of Africa-specific and generic modalities.

African political parties can be distinguished by their structure and organization. Structure refers to the way in which a political party relates to citizens and (more narrowly) its supporters/members, and vice versa. Organization refers to the way in which a political party is internally organized and managed.

[4] See the International IDEA website at http://www.idea.int for updates on this project.

5.1.1 Party structure

Because of the voluntary nature of political parties, their supporters or members are bound by a set of values or ideologies, and a leadership with political skills and public appeal, which together generate collective discipline and loyalty. However, political parties differ from other social institutions in that, ideally, they are open to influences by other social structures and institutions. In Africa, as elsewhere, ethnicity, religion, kinship ties and economic conditions play an important role in the formation of political parties as social institutions, with far-reaching direct or indirect social and economic benefits and implications for their supporters.

While party leaders may use them as institutions for leadership recruitment, upward political mobility or instruments to uplift their social status, likewise, in most African countries, political parties are treated as institutions for securing their share of power and by extension of the national cake. Between these two interests, which converge and diverge, depending on the extent to which party leaders are predators, patrons or charismatic leaders, political parties provide possibilities for horizontal and vertical mobility. In random interviews that Mohamed Salih (2005) conducted with party leaders in several African countries (Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia), they all mentioned that their party leadership positions had improved their social standing both at the constituency level and nationally. Some (85 per cent) mentioned that party leadership had helped them to acquire wealth, prestige and a measure of power that enabled them to influence government decisions vital for their political survival (to lobby ministers to build health-care, water and education facilities or to interfere early enough to prevent local competition over resources developing into major conflicts).

Research on African political party structures and on why people join party organizations, considering the structural limitations of political parties—particularly opposition political parties—is scarce, although new knowledge is emerging.[5] However, what can be documented with confidence is what is known in political science as electoral party structure. In common with all modern party structures, African party structures consist of a membership organization parallel to the electoral structure. In other words, the political party structure consists, from the lowest to the highest organs, of the following multiple layers: (a) the polling place (ward, settlement, and neighbourhood) organization at the lowest level; (b) the electoral district or constituency level in the national or local elections; (c) the district or provincial coordinating office; and (d) the central or national office, also called the

5 See in particular International IDEA's sub-regional reports on Southern, West and East Africa, forthcoming in 2007.

party headquarters. This implies some parallels between the party structure and the electoral organization.

Political party structures are important elements informing the relationship between party leaders and party members or supporters at all levels, and as such they are pivotal players in (a) the electoral process and (b) how these relations are managed and whether the structure is centralized or decentralized. In investigating the political structures of 200 African political parties in 15 African countries we unfortunately found that the political parties have all adopted centralized party structures, whereby the central or national office takes all major and minor decisions affecting the functioning of the political parties. Mohamed Salih (2005) also found that 75 per cent of the political parties investigated had no offices at the polling station level and 62 per cent had no district or provincial coordinating offices.

However, in most cases political party structures emerge only a few weeks and even days, in some circumstances, in time to oversee the national or presidential elections. The absence of party offices at the local and district levels of party structure speaks strongly for the fragmented nature of party politics, the spatial as well as real political distance between party leaders and their supporters, and the elite-dominated nature of African democracy. Another implication of this anomaly is that central party organs predominate over the lower levels of party structure either by holding the strings of party finance or by controlling the choice of party candidates for the national elections. It is the central party organs that decide whether to reward skilled politicians with the opportunity to serve at national level, although local politicians play a crucial role in galvanizing support at the ward, neighbourhood or settlement levels.

5.1.2 Party and government structure

African political party structures are parallel to parliamentary structures and by extension to government structures in the case of the parties or coalitions in power. The question whether the parliamentary system is unicameral or bicameral affects the majority party standing in the case of cohabitation (i.e. in presidential systems where the president's party does not command a parliamentary majority) or when one political party commands the majority in the upper house and the other in the lower house.

Figure 1 shows the intimate relationship between party structure and government structure, with parliament as the mediating institution straddling the space between citizens (as voters represented by political parties) and government. Certain characteristics are pivotal for the good functioning of parliamentary democracy, in

particular the relationship between political party leaders and government on the one hand, and political parties and parliament on the other.

Figure 5.1: Comparison of party and government structure, with parliament as a machinery of government connecting voters, political parties and government



Source: Adapted from Leiserson, A., *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioural Approach* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), p. 210.

The institution of the party whip is at the heart of the business of how political parties influence members of government and parliamentary behaviour. The African whip system is inherited from the Westminster system, and whips therefore have an important role in party business within parliament, particularly when the voting strengths of the main parties are close. For important votes it is imperative for government and opposition to maximize MPs' turnout, and the whips try to ensure that every member from their party turns out to vote. The duties of whips include:

- keeping MPs and peers informed of forthcoming parliamentary business;
- maintaining the party's voting strength by ensuring that members attend important debates and support their party in parliamentary divisions; and
- passing on to the party leadership the opinions of back-bench members.

The term 'whip' also applies to the weekly (in the Westminster tradition) circular sent out by each chief whip to all his or her MPs notifying them of parliamentary business. The degree of importance of each item of business is indicated by the number of times the debate or division is underlined. Items underlined once are considered routine and attendance is optional. Those underlined twice are more important and attendance is required unless (in the British House of Commons, the lower house of Parliament) a 'pair' (a member of the opposition who also intends to be absent from the division) has been arranged. Items underlined three times are highly important and pairing is not normally allowed.

Three-line whips are imposed on important occasions, such as second readings of significant bills and motions of no confidence. Failure by MPs to attend a vote with a three-line whip is usually seen as a rebellion against the party and may result in disciplinary action, such as suspension from the parliamentary party.

Most countries that use the Westminster system have whip structures similar to those described for the British Parliament: the whips consist of the chief whip and, in the three main parties, the deputy chief whip and a varying number of junior whips. Each of the smaller opposition parties also normally has a whip.

The government chief whip is directly answerable to the prime minister. S/he attends the Cabinet and makes the day-to-day arrangements for the government's programme of business. The opposition chief whip receives advance notice of the government's business programme each week, and no final decision is taken by the government until after consultation with him or her. The chief whips together constitute the 'usual channels', often referred to when the question of finding time for debating a particular issue is discussed.

Our knowledge of the details of the way in which African political party leaderships interact with government and of the articulation or disarticulation of party and government leaderships remains anecdotal and is largely informed by media critique of the behaviour of the political executive. The dangers of this knowledge gap are manifold. We mention only two.

1. The current critique of political parties is anecdotal and does not reflect the reality of what political parties are really doing behind the façade of government success or failure, squabbling MPs or objectionable verbal comments by ministers. At times media reporting and the exaggerations generated by the media substitute for reality and do not truly reflect party politics.
2. The lack of informed knowledge about the articulation of political party leadership and government makes it difficult for political party promotion organizations to identify where intervention could contribute to substantive improvements in the sensitive area of the triangulated relationship involving parliament, the government and the political parties.

The implication of these two points is that the political party leaders who are also government leaders maintain a level of supremacy over the legislature because the government party leaders (a) appoint and/or control the appointment of the members of the national executive committee and (b) control the party's ability to maintain an effective organization based on its own internal regulations. With the state resources at hand and the ability to confer honours and rewards on aspirant party members and lower structures, a government party leader wields immense power and leverage over party organs. These issues also have dire consequences for internal party organization and internal democracy within most African political parties.

Internal party organization goes beyond party membership, the constituencies and the voters and involves issues of internal party democracy and transparency and accountability in five major areas of concern: the party bureaucracy (also known as party management); leadership selection; the selection of candidates; political party finance; and party policy or electoral programme development. We now turn to these.

5.2 Party management

One of the main functions of political parties is to maintain themselves as organizations capable of contesting elections, maintaining their membership, supporting their MPs,

and if they become the government party ensuring that their political programmes and election promises are acted upon and implemented. Maintaining contacts with an increasing number of party-to-party national, regional and global networks, working with special-interest groups, such as young people, women, the private sector, trade unions and civil society organizations, are also common activities in which political parties are constantly involved.

We really know little about how African political parties are managed, what type of bureaucracy informs the day-to-day running of the party office, or the relationship between political office-holders (the chairperson or secretary and their deputies, the treasurer and various portfolios) and the administrative staff together with the office administration, personnel, financial and election campaign and publicity management, programme development and party policy implementation procedures. However, the knowledge that is available suggests that, while certain political party activities, particularly during elections, and other minor ad hoc activities are conducted by volunteers, party offices are often managed by professional managers. The management of political party national and regional or provincial offices requires a certain administrative structure in order to ensure the rapid and efficient conduct of party affairs. Therefore a distinction must be made between the interests of party leaders and members and the range of political activities in which they are engaged, on the one hand, and the routine bureaucratic functions in which the technocratic or bureaucratic management of the party is involved, on the other. Political party office employees constitute a special category of party personnel who also develop into a special-interest group within the political party, and their level of remuneration depends on their political commitment to the party's values or ideology, and the level of service they provide to the political leaders.

In short, there is a need for full studies to be commissioned on how African political parties are managed, for a number of reasons, not least in order to gain a fuller understanding of their governability and the extent to which their operations conform to the democratic governance ethos, including transparency, financial accountability and even respect for human rights in the workplace. It is difficult, almost impossible, to advocate prudence in the management of the public finances of political parties or to require a certain level of financial accountability and transparency if the manner in which political parties are managed is not adequately understood.

5.2.1 Internal party democracy: Leadership and candidate selection

Ethnic, regional or religious cleavages and patronage all affect internal party democracy, as political parties become either fiefdoms of their political leaders or

democratic institutions and instruments for the recruitment of democratic leaders. Internal party democracy in terms of the selection of candidates, leadership contests, regular membership conventions, and internal rules to discipline the party leadership and hold it accountable to party members is in short supply in all the major political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi (Mohamed Salih 2006). Invariably, small groups of core committee members decide party affairs and policy.

With some exceptions, party leaders use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses in whose name they contest elections and win parliamentary seats. According to Mwakyembe (1994), African political parties are not democratic; they exclude ordinary, mostly uneducated people from the political process, and are elitist and non-transparent. In some cases, non-elected wealthy and powerful party members collude with the state to control the party, thus creating a situation in which the legislative or political checks and balances on the executive are muted. Although the situation has improved substantially in many countries since the early 1990s, checks and balances and the financial transparency of party executives remain a very serious concern.

In all three countries, the leaders of the major political parties are the products of and participated in a long period of one-party rule. They have defected, joined the democratic struggle or established their own political parties. Others were released from their ministerial duties by or disagreed with their former political mentors and joined the opposition.

The financing of the political parties is dependent on the personal wealth of the party leader at best or the public coffers at worst, which helps them to organize election campaigns and lead a lavish lifestyle. In such circumstances, the party leader becomes the party boss with unquestioned authority over party committees, policies and decisions. However, Bertha Chiroro reminds us that:

> In most parties an internal party democracy remains a challenge amidst the legacy of centralisation, which emanated from the liberation struggle [or the wealth of the political leader]. However, two developments are taking place in the region: i) the increased realisation that political parties are at the core of democratic governance. This has prompted the focus on the capacity building of political parties, which includes their funding, and creating an enabling environment for their existence. ii) The increased involvement of civil society organisations in the functioning of parties has led to the opening up of parties in the region to be able to participate more with Women's organisations labour unions, students, churches and other rural organisations to influence policies (Chiroro 2005: 2).

In this regard, the institutionalization of internal party democracy in Africa is contingent on the maturation of civil society associations and their ability to influence the political parties. It is important to realize that patron–client relationships and internal party democracy cannot be separated from the political environment in which democracy is practised.

At least four points can be teased out from this.

First, the current data on political party leaderships indicate that selection rather than election is the rule. Party leaders rise to prominence within the rank and file of their parties. Because of the patronage relationship that characterizes party leadership and constituencies, election in most cases is purely nominal and an empty formality, except in cases where a party leader is challenged from within by aspirant and ambitious rivals.

Second, one way of looking at party-based democracy is that it acquires its meaning from global policy influences on the current wave of multiparty democracy and the new global context within which political parties operate. In common with political parties in other parts of the globe, African political parties are aware of their position in the geopolitics of development, which characterizes their political programmes and policy orientations.

Third, political party vocabulary, policy and party–electorate relations straddle the contours of a similar but nationally different globally-informed liberal paradigm, without stifling the possibility of the emergence of vocal anti-globalization political parties and civil society activism. This trend is not different from other parts of the world where the challenge to the neo-liberal paradigm has come from the very democratic forces that it has unleashed.

Fourth, globalized party-based democracy does not mean universalized party-based democracy—a point which has been emphasized as opening up the political arena for political contestation (Burnell 2004) or a globalization deficit (Scholte 2005). In other words, political parties worldwide could subscribe to broadly defined global paradigms reflected in their political manifestos such as those the present authors have consulted. Evidently, there would always be points of convergence and divergence on some elements of any globally informed socio-economic or political paradigm. Global paradigms make leaders and parties subservient to external forces, in other words, to the market.

5.2.2 Internal party finance: Transparency and accountability[6]

The old contention that money must be raised in order for political parties to perform their functions as organizations still holds true for political parties both in mature and new democracies, and in countries in transition to democracy. African political parties are not different, and like other political parties worldwide they need money in order to perform their functions. African political parties raise money in order to maintain themselves as organizations, recruit personnel, win support, hold conventions, manage election campaigns, handle the media, establish political offices to canvass support and get their message through to the electorates. The main sources of political party funding in Africa are:

- donations;
- public funding;
- minimal membership fees;
- public funding/subsidies;
- trust funds; and
- corrupt kickbacks from businessmen and women.

Financial resources are an essential factor in sustaining a competitive democratic system: a party's functioning depends not only on goodwill, but also on the financial and human resources it is able to muster. It also depends on the political party's ability to deploy these resources successfully in order to achieve its goals. While public, private and citizens' funding and contributions to political party finance provide a linkage and an opportunity for citizen participation in the political process, funding should not be deliberately designed for misconstruing the public interests parties must serve for private gain.

In Africa, most political parties lack membership lists, let alone the expectation that membership fees are regularly paid. Incumbent political parties depend on the national coffers, the media, logistics and above all the advantage of incumbency to access resources in order to attain their political ambitions. In such circumstances, opposition political parties suffer three major disadvantages: (a) scarcity of resources,

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[6] The existing International IDEA database on the funding of political parties and election campaigns can be found at the International IDEA website, http://www.idea.int. The database is to be developed further through a partnership with the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), University of Leiden, the Netherlands.

(b) uneven access to resources and (c) limited outreach and geographical coverage. These factors often tilt the balance of electoral results in favour of the ruling political party, except in cases of popular revolt over serious political misconduct.

Fear of political parties depending on the private sector and corporate financing—the 'money in politics' issue—has compelled some African countries to introduce legislation in order to regulate the funding of political parties. The opponents of private and corporate power funding of political parties argue that:

- It compromises the independence of political parties, which are supposed to serve public rather than private interests.
- Money corrupts and advantages the 'high bidders'.
- It stifles internal party democracy and entrenches patron–client relationships.
- It ushers in authoritarian party 'bosses'.

The proponents of public political party financing defend it on the basis of four positive attributes:

- In societies where a sizable number of the population subsist below the poverty line, it is difficult if not impossible to expect political parties to rely on meagre, if any, grass-roots contributions and membership fees. Therefore, without public financing, the political stakes become so high that political opponents will be treated as enemies; this engenders political instability and may invite violence.
- Proportional funding for parties that secure votes above a certain threshold (for example, between 2 and 5 per cent of the vote) contributes to the equity principle and makes opposition parliamentarians less amenable to floor-crossing and sleaze.
- It could be used to achieve other desirable goals by making public funding contingent on political parties supporting better representation for women, minorities and young people in political party committees, as well as ensuring internal party democracy.
- By securing the minimum financial requirements for party functioning, public finance sets restrictions on private and corporate influences.

Instead of blanket party funding, International IDEA (2003: 9) suggests the alternative of targeted party financing in two important decisive moments in competitive politics in particular: elections and election campaigns. If interested money and

incidents of corruption have spurred regulation, the emphasis has been on rules for the financial conduct of parties, candidates and their supporters; if lack of funds and the desire to level the playing field have stimulated distributive measures (direct or indirect), public support has often been the cure applied to deal with shortcomings.

On a broader canvas, public financing of political parties is criticized in respect to three considerations cited by its opponents:

- It reinforces the gulf between political party leadership and members by cutting off the grass-roots contributions and membership fees which foster an important linkage between party and citizens.
- It leverages the 'pastoral tyranny' of the state and offers the governing party advantages over the opposition, with the former using public party funding to shore up its own position vis-à-vis other political parties.
- It engenders political apathy and withdrawal which would in the long run erode political parties' capacity to endow the regime with legitimacy. In other words, low citizen participation in politics at a decisive moment (e.g. low voter turnout in an election) raises the question where citizens invest their political energy and whether 'voting with one's feet' is a sign of dissatisfaction with politics, politicians, and hence the capacity of political parties to deliver on their electoral pledges, programmes and manifestos.

However, African political parties have to endure the burden of underdevelopment, the socio-economic and political context within which they operate and the 'missing links' associated with democracy in the developing countries in general—widespread poverty, relatively high levels of illiteracy and a widening income gap between the haves and have-nots, as well as the rural–urban disparity. In such contexts the unholy mix of money and politics tends to magnify other forms of deficit in party politics—such as elite dominance and exclusion based on gender (women) or caste, religion, ethnic and region (minority).

Three major challenges confront political party financing in Africa.

The first is the negative influence of money in politics, including illicit sources of finance. Most African countries have introduced one or more of three types of strategies to curb this: (a) party finance regulations; (b) procedures for the disclosure of political party sources of income and expenditures similar to the transparency requirements imposed on high-level government officials; and (c) state auditing of political party accounts. It is nevertheless difficult, if not impossible, to monitor or verify parties' compliance with their provisions.

In most African countries, political parties depend on a small core group of individuals, businessmen and women, and foreign donors, party-to-party networks and fraternal organizations for funding their activities. The financial exchanges that go on between political parties and those with a keen interest in the ideology, or those who expect paybacks or hope to fulfil their own political ambitions, are often unusual or unexpected and are difficult to verify with certainty.

Second, African political parties are elite-dominated, and those in government have in most cases lost touch with and lost the confidence of the people, who hardly trust them to the taxes they pay, let alone with party membership fees. How can an elite that is perceived by the people as corrupt be entrusted with public funding?

Third, African political parties are yet to own their political agendas and programmes. Globalized party-based democracy operates within the confines of neo-liberal globalization, which makes national politics subservient to the market and regional market blocs rather than to global conventions. The neo-context of global development has not only shaped political party ideologies, with the triumph of neo-liberalism over its more radical opponents (communism and military socialism), but has also imposed an almost universal model of economic and social policy reforms that no political party can escape complying with. As political African parties lose credibility among the electorates, the electorates feel that the political parties are not worthy of sharing their hard-earned incomes.

5.2.3 Leadership succession and crisis politics

A major consequence of the absence of internal party democracy and the non-democratic nature of African governments' party leaders is that the latter attempt to stay in power despite constitutional provisions that restrict their office to a specific number of terms (mostly two). There is also a strong correlation between government party leaders tampering with the constitution to secure more terms than what is constitutionally permitted and the flaring up of acute conflict. Among the cases of succession-driven conflicts in the prelude to democratization are those of Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo and Zimbabwe.

Another aspect of leadership succession that is emerging in Southern Africa is that presidents step down from presidential office but remain leaders of their respective political parties—for example, Joachim Chissano in Mozambique, Sam Nujoma in Namibia and Bakili Muluzi in Malawi. This has led to increased power struggles within the political parties, and in one case, that of Malawi, has resulted in national

political instability. It is therefore not unlikely that control over the political parties themselves will become more important for national political power as well. While this could potentially be a good thing, it also opens up the possibility of power struggles that can threaten the break-up of parties and governments.

Since material on leadership succession problems is abundantly available, we will devote some attention to recent cases of succession-driven constitutional crisis (see Table 5.1), divided into four categories:

1. cases where a coalition between opposition political parties, civil society and even opposition within the ruling coalition and parliament was able to thwart a president's ambitions to amend the constitution in order to extend their term of office (President Muluzi in Malawi and President Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria);
2. cases where the opposition parties and their leaders failed to stop the incumbent presidents from amending the constitutions (President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe);
3. cases where the succession issue engendered a constitutional crisis fuelled by ethnic rivalry, resulting in a military coup, electoral fraud, civil unrest and the subsequent division of the country into South and North, each under separate political leadership and military command (Côte d'Ivoire); and
4 the case of Togo, where the succession crisis was fuelled by the Togolese military, which subverted the constitution by appointing the son of the deceased president (Gnassingbe Eyadema) instead of the speaker of Parliament as required by the constitution. The succession crisis resulted in political instability, riots, the killing of demonstrators and the arrest of opposition leaders and democracy and human rights activists.

Table 5.1: Recent succession-driven constitutional crises, conflicts and consequences

Country	Constitutional crisis and leadership succession crisis	Constitutional provision	Election results	Consequences
Côte d'Ivoire	Bedie introduced the concept of Ivoirité or Ivorian-ness in order to exclude his political rival, Alassane Ouattara, from participating in the 1995 elections. The December 1999 military coup overthrew the government of Bedie	Regular free and fair elections should have been held in 1999	Junta leader Robert Gueï who rigged elections held in late 2000. Gueï tried to stop the vote-count in an attempt to cling to power but was finally forced into exile in Benin	Since September 2002, Côte d'Ivoire has been split into South (controlled by the government of Laurent Gbagbo) and North (controlled by the rebel Mouvement Partriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire)
Malawi	The Open Terms Bill was first presented on 24 May 2002, as a private member's bill with the purpose of removing the limitation on the number of terms a president may serve. When the Bill was rejected by parliament, President Muluzi introduced another bill for a third term. An emergency session of parliament was called on 27 January 2003 and the Third Term bill was at last tabled for debate. It was defeated	Presidential tenure of office is restricted by constitution to two terms of five years each	The 2004 presidential election was won by Bingu Muthalika, the current president	The defeat of the Open Term Bill and the Third Term Bill restored confidence in Malawi's democracy, but intensified competition between presidential hopefuls, which has marred political life with acrimonious politicking
Nigeria	In the build-up for the elections in Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo, political party Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), worked heard to amend the constitution so that he serves for a third term	The constitution restricts the presidential tenure of office to two terms	Presidential election is due in April 2007	The constitutional amendment motion was defeated both by the House of Representatives and the Senate

Country	Constitutional crisis and leadership succession crisis	Constitutional provision	Election results	Consequences
Togo	Army subverted the constitution and installed Faure Gnassingbe as president of Togo just hours after the death (on 5 February 2005) of his father, President Gnassingbe Eyadema, who had ruled for 38 years	Speaker of Parliament should have been appointed interim president according to the constitution	Faure Gnassingbe resigned due to internal and external pressures and ran for president, and won the April 2005 elections. Current president of Togo	Scores of people lost their lives in protests against the government. Togo was boycotted by major donors. On 21 August 2006, government and opposition signed an agreement on political reforms
Uganda	President Museveni ruled since 1986 under the no-party democracy banner. The constitutional amendment meant the return of multiparty democracy to Uganda. However, a constitutional crisis was sparked by an amendment that secured President Museveni a third term following the March 2006 elections	Two terms of office whereby President Museveni should not have contested the March 2006 elections	President Museveni won the elections, amid opposition protests and accusations of electoral fraud. However, the election was declared free and fair by African and non-African observers	Tarnished the image of President Museveni, known to some Western government as part of the 'new breed politicians'. Strained relationship with donors and hardened opposition resolve
Zimbabwe		The March 2002 elections were rigged, according to some election observers	President Robert Mugabe won the elections and continued as the only president Zimbabwe has known since 198	Intensified social political tension, including intimidation of the opposition, many people of European or African origin lost their property or lives

Source: Complied from various sources, notably daily and weekly magazines and newspapers.

5.2.4 The representation of women and political party leadership

As more extensive and systematic material on women's participation in politics will be presented in International IDEA's sub-Regional Reports for Southern, East and West Africa, we offer here a general comparative understanding of the position of women in African politics.

The UNDP *Human Development Report* (2006) provides some interesting statistics which are helpful in linking the general low ranking of African countries in all aspects of the Gender-related Human Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). As a reminder, the GDI is concerned with comparing female and male in respect to life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, combined gross enrolment for primary, secondary and tertiary schools, and estimated earned income. The GEM refers to seats in parliament held by women, female, senior officials and managers, and their earnings as compared to estimated male earned income. The *Human Development Report* (UNDP 2006: 366) shows that, out of 136 countries, African countries occupied 30 out of the lowest 33 positions on the GDI. The only non-Africa countries counted among the lowest 30 are Pakistan, Nepal and Yemen.

In respect to the Gender Empowerment Measure, the *Human Development Report* (2006: 369–70) shows that Africa again occupies the bottom 33 ranking positions, out of 177 countries. (Africa, however, includes some countries with the highest proportion of women legislators in the world. In other words, the representation of women in parliament is not a conclusive measure of women's empowerment across other areas, as senior officials and managers, or professional and technical workers, or their earned income relative to that of men.)

It is therefore not difficult to establish the association between the position of women vis-à-vis the GDI and the GEM and their poor representation in high positions in African political parties. There is no woman president or chairperson of any African political party, although there are a handful of women speakers of parliament and one woman president (President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia).

Noting that the number of women voters is larger than the number of men voters (see e.g. López Pintor and Gratschew 2002: 95–101), it is evident that across the board increasing women's representation in politics and public life cannot be achieved by electoral system reform alone. The African experience has shown that a host of other instruments is equally important—constitutional and legal instruments as well as party self-disciplining measures.

In the following section of this report, we have drawn heavily on International IDEA's 2004 book entitled *The Implementation of Quotas: African Experiences,* with special reference to the political representation of women. Three chapters of the book stand out as exemplary contributions to the debate. These are Aili Mari Tripp on 'The Changing Face of Africa's Legislatures: Women and Quotas'; Colleen Lowe Morna, 'Beyond Numbers: Quotas in Practice'; and Julie Ballington, 'Conclusion: Women's Political Participation and Quotas in Africa'. Because the reader can consult these

chapters, we will here summarize three different aspects which mark the individuality of each contribution and its relevance to the subject of this report.

In another source, Aili Mari Tripp offers a useful classification of how quotas are enacted as part of national constitutions, mandated by legislation or party-mandated (and voluntary). Table 5.2 shows seven African countries which have constitutionally-mandated quota for women. With the exception of Eritrea, all have done better than what is constitutionally mandated. Table 5.3 shows that two countries (Niger and Swaziland) have failed to meet the quotas which are legally mandated.

Table 5.2: Constitutionally-enacted quotas for women in African countries

Country	Percentage of women in legislature	Constitutional provision of quota for women	Quota	Year quota introduced
Djibouti	10.8	10% of all party seats allocated for women	10%	2002
Eritrea	22.0	Reserved seats for women; unicameral	30%	1995
Kenya	7.1	Executive appointment; unicameral	3%	1997
Morocco	10.8	Women-only national list	10%	2002
Rwanda	48.8	Reserved seats for women in upper and lower house Electoral college of women's councils	30% 20%	2003
Tanzania	22.3	Special seats; unicameral	20%	2000
Uganda	24.7	Reserved seats; unicameral	18.4%	1989

Source: Tripp, Aili Mari, 'Legislative Quotas for Women', in Mohamed Salih (ed.), *African Parliaments Between Government and Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 50.

Table 5.3: Legally-mandated quotas for women in African countries

Country	Percentage of women in legislature	Legal provision of quota for women	Quota	Year quota introduced
Niger	11.5	Elected Nominated; unicamera	10% 25%	2000
Somalia Transitional National Government	10.0	Women-only lists	10%	2001
Sudan	9.7	Reserved seats	9.7%	2000
Swaziland	10.8	Upper house: Executive appointment	28%	2003

Source: Tripp, Aili Mari, 'Legislative Quotas for Women', in Mohamed Salih (ed.), *African Parliaments Between Government and Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 51.

In the case of the party-mandated quota (see Table 5.4), it is clear that the majority of parties did not comply with what they have promised in respect to women representation and none of them has a woman president, secretary general or chair of a political party.

Table 5.4: Party-mandated parliamentary quotas for women in African countries

Country	Percentage of women in legislature	Party mandate of quota for women	Quota	Share of seats held by party	Year quota introduced
Botswana	7.0	Botswana Congress Party Botswana National Front	30% 30%	21% 2%	1999 1999
Burkina Faso	11.7	Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès	25% 25%	13% 50%	2002
Cameroon	8.9	Cameroon People's Free Movement Social Democratic Front	25–30% 25%	83% 12%	1996
Côte d'Ivoire	8.5	Front Populaire de Côte d'Ivoire	30%	43%	
Equatorial Guinea	18.0	Convergencia para la Democracia Social		5.8%	
Ethiopia	7.7	Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Free Front	30%	85%	2004
Mali	10.2	Alliance for Democracy	30%	40%	
Mozambique	30.0	Frente de Libertaçâo de Moçambique (Frelimo)	30%	49%	1994
Niger	11.5	National Movement for Society and Development	5 seats	42%	
Senegal	19.2	Senegalese Free Party Parti Socialiste	33% 25%	74% 8%	2001
South Africa	32.8	African National Congress	33%	70%	1994
Tunisia	22.8	Democratic Constitutional Rally	20%	80%	

Source: Tripp, Aili Mari, 'Legislative Quotas for Women', in Mohamed Salih (ed.), *African Parliaments Between Government and Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 52.

Colleen Lowe Morna's paper addresses a largely missing aspect of women's representation. That is the relationship between electoral systems and quotas for women. She offers an interesting combination of quotas and electoral systems with examples from Southern Africa. Morna shows that when the three dominant electoral systems in use in Southern Africa—(a) proportional representation, (b) constituency-based systems or FPTP, and (c) mixed PR and constituency-based systems—are combined with the two possible types of quota (voluntary party quotas and constitutional or legislated quotas), the PR system is more suitable for the adoption of voluntary quotas (Morna 2004: 114). The evidence is corroborated in Table 5.5.

Julie Ballington takes a larger selection of cases, and uses data collected from 21 African countries showing that 'while countries with quotas in Africa average nearly 17 per cent of women in politics (compared to nine per cent in those without them), there are notable differences between them. The highest rate of representation on the continent and in the world is to be found in Rwanda (48.8 per cent). Only two other countries, Mozambique and South Africa, have reached the 30 per cent target set by the Beijing Platform for Action' (Ballington 2004: 124). Ballington also illustrates that out of 16 countries with the highest level of women's representation in politics worldwide (Rwanda, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Cuba, Spain, Belgium, Costa Rica, Argentina, Austria, South Africa, Germany, Iceland and Mozambique) 14 have adopted either closed or open List PR, and only four (Rwanda, Belgium, Costa Rica and Argentina) have legislated quotas: the rest either have adopted voluntary political party quotas or have no quota (Ballington 2004: 125).

Table 5.5: Quotas in Africa: Electoral systems and the representation of women

Country	Electoral system	Quota type	Percentage ow women in parliament
Algeria	List PR (closed lists)	Voluntary party quota	6.2
Botswana	FPTP	Voluntary party quota	17.0
Burkina Faso	List PR (closed lists)	Voluntary party quota	11.7
Cameroon	FPTP/list PR (closed lists)	Voluntary party quota	8.9
Côte d'Ivoire	FPTP	Voluntary party quota	8.5
Djibouti	Party Block Vote (PBV)	10% reserved seats	10.8
Equatorial Guinea	Majority TRS	Voluntary party quota	5.0

Country	Electoral system	Quota type	Percentage ow women in parliament
Eritrea	FPTP	30% reserved seats	22.0
Kenya	FPTP	Nominated seats	6.7
Mali	Majority TRS	Voluntary party quota	10.2
Morocco	List PR (closed lists)	9% reserved seats	10.8
Mozambique	List PR (closed lists)	Voluntary party quota	30.0
Namibia	List PR (closed lists)	Voluntary party quota, legislated 30% at the local level	25.0
Niger	Parallel-FPTP	Voluntary party quota	1.2
Rwanda	List PR (closed lists)	30% reserved seats	48.8
Senegal	Parallel–PBV and List PR	Voluntary party quota	19.2
South Africa	List PR (closed lists)	Voluntary party quota	32.8
Sudan	FPTP	9.7 reserved seats	9.7
Tanzania	FPTP	20% reserved seats	22.3
Tunisia	Parallel–PBV and List PR	Voluntary party quota	11.5
Uganda	FPTP	20% reserved seats	24.71
Countries that had quotas in the past			
Egypt	Majority TRS	Previously 8% reserved seats, abolished 1986	2.4
Ghana	FPTP	Previously 10% reserved seats (1960–65)	9.0

Sources: International IDEA and Stockholm University, http://www.quotaproject and Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org, figures from 2004, quoted in Ballington, J., 'Conclusion: Women's Political Participation and Quotas in Africa', in J. Ballington (ed.), *The Implementation of Quotas: African Experiences* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2004), pp. 125.

Ballington finds that in Africa the picture is a little mixed: in countries that have adopted First Past The Post (Tanzania, Uganda, Eritrea and Botswana) the rate of female representation in politics is as high as it is in proportional or mixed systems. However, as Table 5.5 shows, electoral systems alone cannot explain the representation of women in politics. The socio-economic and political context (Egypt abolished the quota for women in 1986 under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sudan abolished it in 1986 with the end of President Nemeiri's socialist rule in 1986, and Ghana abolished it with the waning of socialism in 1965) within which women compete for political office combined with the Gender-related Human Development and Gender Empowerment measures may provide a better explanation as to why women's representation in politics is higher in one country than in another.

Women's representation at the party leadership level would offer better empowerment opportunities for women because politics is practised by people where they live and

work at the village, the neighbourhood and the parish, and most importantly at the local government level. If women are poorly represented at these levels—a fact about which we know very little, and what we know is substantially negative—then challenging the entrenched values and attitudes that contribute to their poor representation in national politics will be difficult. Inclusiveness and gender empowerment are as important at the local level as at the national level, if not more important, for the future representation of women, in the democratic process and above all in contributing to politics with political 'lenses' that have often been neglected.

5.3 Party policies and electoral programmes

Although there is some information available on political party policies and electoral programmes, there is not enough systematic analysis of how these policies and electoral programmes are conceived. Still scarcer are studies on whether party policies and electoral programmes are a result of a transparent democratic participatory process or are written by elites and consultants, whether they are followed through after the elections, and whether there are party follow-up committees to ensure their implementation or offer alternative policy prescriptions.

Chege (2007 forthcoming) finds in a comparison of Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan that the parties with the weakest programmes and platforms are those coming out of strong authoritarian traditions—Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan. Political culture clearly plays a role here, and clearly parties with a 'command' structure struggle to open up the agenda-setting arena within themselves.

In material published elsewhere on governing and opposition party policies and electoral programmes in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, Mohamed Salih finds striking similarities due to the influence of the IFIs and the dominant new liberal paradigm (Mohamed Salih 2005). The importance of this material stems not so much from the evidence that it provides (which is not conclusive, as more research is needed to be done) as from the fact that it highlights an area where political parties' role in governance, their commitment to social issues and their efficacy could be developed.

Chapter 6

External Party Regulations

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6. External Party Regulations

While the design of electoral systems—and electoral systems' impact on political party systems—is widely researched and analysed, the challenges of designing political parties and party systems are much less extensively analysed, and the outcomes are equally uncertain. Yet, except in microstates, there can be no democracy without political parties. The number of political parties contesting elections worldwide has increased many times over since 1974. The examples of regulation of political parties are therefore manifold and growing, and raise questions similar to those regarding elections: How to design party systems and parties so that democracy is promoted and not circumscribed? How can the design of party regulations assist in mediating conflict rather than increase the risks of social tension? What can be done to increase the internal democracy of political parties (if this is desirable) and how can the participation of women in politics be promoted? How can vulnerable groups and minorities in society be assured voice instead of exclusion?

Since 2004, International IDEA has embarked on its project of Research and Dialogue with Political Parties with the aim of providing some answers to and lessons learned from the questions raised above. We see two trends that are diverging further apart from each other, and this situation needs to be addressed. While support for democracy, and interest in politics, remain relatively high across regions, trust in and support for political parties is low and decreasing.[7] How is this growing mistrust towards the political parties to be understood and how can this challenge to sustainable democracy be addressed?

[7] Globalbarometer.org.

6.1 New parties—old theories?

At least three empirical arguments merit a further discussion on the applicability of theories on political parties and democracy based on Western experiences to political parties in new, restored and emerging democracies.

The first argument comes from the failure even in Western democracies to explain political party development on the basis of existing theories. The mass party model no longer applies and the explanatory powers of other theories are not sufficient for understanding present developments (Mair 2005: 11; and Biezen and Katz 2005: 4).

The second argument relates to the different historical trajectories that exist for established democracies in the West and for political parties in new, restored and emerging multiparty systems[8] and democracies. This is well illustrated by Robert Dahl's classification of political regimes along the dimensions of political competition and political participation/inclusiveness, and illustrates the process of moving from non-democratic forms of government to more democratic regimes (Dahl 1971: 4). In many new and emerging democracies, the trajectory towards democratization has not been one of gradual development along the dimension of competition or participation or inclusiveness. Instead, political systems have moved from little or no competition or participation to full competition and inclusiveness due to rapid processes of decolonization or because they have moved from one-party to multiparty systems. Naturally, this affects political parties in very specific ways and limits their capacity to develop a mass base and to ensure internally democratic structures.[9]

The third difference between 'old' and 'new' multiparty systems and democracies is that regulations on parties emerged gradually, and rather late (if at all) in the established democracies in the West, while in many new democracies regulations on political parties were already present from the onset of multiparty politics (Janda 2005: 23). Whether established to promote political competition or to protect ruling parties' positions in government, party regulations are today much more of a factor in processes of democratization than what was the case some 100 years ago in emerging Western democracies. This development clearly demonstrates the trend towards, and belief in, the ability to engineer regulations that shape political parties and their impact on political competition in specific ways.

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[8] The number of political systems that have multiparty elections but fall short of being liberal or consolidated democracies.

[9] See van Biezen 1998 for an elaboration on how this shaped the communist and socialist parties in Spain and Portugal.

This raises one of the most important questions for IDEA's programme on political parties: What is the right balance of regulations for political parties that promotes democratization? While recognizing the context-specific character of the impact certain types of regulations have on parties and politics in specific countries, the aim is also to make comparative knowledge available that can provide lessons learned across countries and regions.

6.2 Political parties and regulations

The existence of internationally and regionally recognized standards implies that free, fair and equitable competition between political parties is central to electoral democracy and democratization. If political parties are constrained by less than democratically motivated means, then this will have a negative impact on the citizens' capacity to articulate demands, aggregate preferences and hold their rulers accountable. In principle, the law should therefore treat parties equally rather than restricting or discriminating for or against specific interests that political parties might reflect. Political parties should have the right to decide on their own organization and management, and they should enjoy freedom of expression, opinion and assembly.[10] More often, however, parties are closely regulated, and it appears that regulation of parties is on the increase.

The desirability of political party laws and regulations has been the subject of debate and everlasting polemic. Historically, liberals have put up stiff resistance to the regulation of political parties in an attempt to reduce government intervention in regulating political life. In other words, government should not interfere in regulating political parties and they should operate as self-regulating institutions where private individuals compete for the distribution of social and political goods. Constitutional guarantees of liberty and freedom through democratic rights are more important than excessive governmental authority and officials seeking to regulate the distribution of social political goods. In effect, the private rights theory sees little wisdom in using public resources to advance private citizens' access to social goods and services beyond the need to ensure individual liberty through the rule of law. The regulation of political parties, and in particular of party funding, is not welcome, according to

[10] For a more detailed discussion, see Norris, Pippa, *Building Knowledge Societies: The Renewal of Democratic Practices in Knowledge Societies,* UNESCO World Report (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, February 2004), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Acrobat/UNESCO%20Report%20Knowledge%20Societies.pdf.

private rights theory. Magarian laments that 'Methodologically, the private rights theory requires an initial determination of whether and how seriously a government regulation burdens an individual's expressive freedom, entailing a strong public–private distinction' (Magarian 2003: 8).

According to the responsible party government theory of the electoral process, political parties serve as mediating institutions that facilitate people's political activity. Determining what kind of partisan competition a political system will allow—how many parties there will be, how large and diverse, and how autonomous they are—makes a critical difference in organizing a democratic society (Magarian 2003: 9). In V. O. Key's words, quoted in Magarian 2003: Ibid), 'a political party actually consists of three different entities: (1) the "party in the electorate", meaning the voters who identify as party members; (2) the "party in government", meaning the elected officials and political appointees who belong to the party; and (3) the "party organization", meaning the party's institutional leadership' (Magarian 2003: 8–10).

The question of party regulation then raises the question what element or elements of the political party constituency is/are to be regulated. An allied question is what the consequences of regulating one element of these three will have on the others. While individual liberty is regulated insofar as it should not deny others their liberty, to what extent is it desirable to regulate the freedom of individuals to organize themselves in a particular way, for example, to spend their own money on the party with which they identify? The argument for regulation, on the other hand, is based on the contention that a measure of regulation is important in order to create political stability and allow political parties to cooperate within the framework of a general code of conduct, as well as to enable them to manage societal and political conflicts within themselves and to restrain them from fomenting social and political conflicts within the wider society.

Let us therefore start by disentangling the concept of party regulations and political party law. This report follows closely Richard Katz's definition of party law (Katz 2004: 2) as state law that:

- determines what constitutes a political party (including who qualifies for access to the ballot), who benefits from public resources (subsidies and free time on the broadcast media), who participates in government and how, and so on;
- regulates the types of activities that parties may engage in, covering the raising and spending of funds, campaign activities, party manifestos, and more; and

- ensures specific forms of party organization and behaviour. This according to Katz is the more controversial form of regulation as it interferes with the internal functioning of political parties and can impose certain procedures for the s-/election of candidates, minority protection and so on.

Apart from specific *party laws,* a number of other regulations exist in the form of court decisions, administrative procedures and very importantly also in national constitutions themselves.[11]

A cursory look at some of the initial findings on regulations through various party laws seems to confirm Kenneth Janda's claim that regulations are more frequent today than they were when political parties emerged in Western countries some 100 years ago. Even today, political parties in the West seem to be less regulated than most political parties in new and emerging democracies. International IDEA's research on the external regulation of political parties shows that regulations on political parties are frequent and often far-reaching. One useful approach to analysing these various strategies for political party regulation is provided by Janda (2005).

6.3 Party law models

Political party regulation refers to a host of legal, administrative and institutional frameworks (the constitution, the electoral law, the political law, party finance law and election campaigns law, etc.). Kenneth Janda's 2005 paper, entitled 'Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Adopting Party Law', is one of the most analytically informed publication on political party law and democracy in the world. The five models he describes in respect to political party law particularly impress the present authors. Although these are not Africa-specific, they have a universal appeal that makes their applicability to the African contexts plausible. They are as follows (Janda 2005: 7–15).

[11] See Janda 2005: 5–6 for a more detailed discussion. On political finance law, see also International IDEA, *Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns,* Handbook series (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003).

6.3.1 The proscription model

To *proscribe* means to declare illegal or outlaw. However, the words 'illegal' or 'outlaw' are not used in any of the 159 national laws under the heading *political parties/legal status.* If countries seek to outlaw all political parties, they tend instead to do so by denying them legal status. One way to do this is by not mentioning parties in the constitution. But failing to mention political parties in constitutions is not a certain sign of the proscription model. Janda (2005: 9) offers the case of the Algerian constitution, article 42, as an example of the proscriptive model: it states that political parties cannot be founded on a religious, linguistic, racial, sexual, corporatist or regional basis. They may not resort to partisan propaganda pertaining to these elements and they may not in any way submit to any interest or any foreign party. No political party may resort to violence or constraint, of whatever nature or form.

6.3.2 The permission model

To *permit,* of course, means to allow. The permission model of party law allows parties to exist and operate without specifying what constitutes party membership, how parties should organize, how they should select their leaders, and how they should finance their operations (apart from the normal prohibitions of criminal law). It is a minimalist model of regulation—at the extreme, a laissez-faire model (Janda 2005: 9–10).

6.3.3 The promotional model

To *promote* is to advance, further, or encourage. Governments sometimes enact laws that promote not only the activities of political parties, but also their creation. Typically, they do so through electoral laws that favour the creation or continuance of numerous political parties. It has long been noted that parliamentary elections based on proportional representation in multi-member districts yield a larger number of parties than do elections in which seats are won by simple voting pluralities in single-member districts (Janda 2005: 10–11). Often, the nature of the electoral system is specified in statutes, usually in codified bodies of electoral law. The electoral law of Malawi, article 40 (92), provides that the state shall provide funds so as to ensure that, during the life of any parliament, any political party which has secured more than one-tenth of the national vote in elections to that parliament has sufficient funds to continue to represent its constituencies. The electoral law of Congo (Brazzaville),

article 54, stipulates that 'The State assures the financing of political parties. The law determines the conditions and the modalities of the financing of political parties'.

6.3.4 The protection model

To *protect* is to shield from injury or loss. The most extreme protection possible for any party is to declare it the only legitimate one (that was common in African one-party systems). Short of declaring a one-party state, some nations protect certain parties by a judicious dispensation and interpretation of party law. Consequently, the protection model differs only in degree from the promotion model. Countries that follow the protection model go beyond enacting law simply to assist parties; they build a legal framework to fend off competition with existing parties. A clear example is controlling candidates' and parties' ability to contest elections (Janda 2005: 12).

Janda (2005: 13) mentions cases of five African states where the state protects parties with constitutional provisions against 'crossing the floor':

- In Namibia, members of the National Assembly must vacate their seats if the political party which nominated them for election informs the speaker that they are no longer members of the political party.
- In Nigeria, an MP whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party loses his/her seat if he/she becomes a member of another political party before the expiry of the period for which that House was elected.
- In the Seychelles, a person ceases to be a member of the National Assembly and his/her seat becomes vacant if, in the case of a proportionally elected member: (a) the political party which nominated him or her nominates another person as member in their place and notifies the speaker in writing of the new nomination; and (b) the person ceases to be a member of the political party of which he or she was a member at the time of the election.
- In Sierra Leone, an MP must vacate his/her seat in Parliament if he or she ceases to be a member of the political party of which he was a member at the time of his/her election to Parliament and s/he so informs the speaker, or the speaker is so informed by the leader of that party.
- In Zimbabwe, an MP's seat becomes vacant if he or she ceases to be a member of the political party of which s/he was a member at the date of their election to Parliament and the political party concerned, by written notice to the speaker, declares that s/he has ceased to represent its interests in Parliament.

6.3.5 The prescription model

To *prescribe* means to issue orders, to dictate. Doctors prescribe medications to remedy ailments; national governments prescribe party laws to cure what they think is wrong with the way parties function. At the extreme, the prescription model of party regulation allows regimes to boast that they have a multiparty system while still controlling the parties' organization and behaviour (Janda 2005: 14).

There is a need for systematic application of these five models of party laws to Africa, particularly in the light of the fact that some African states refuse to codify party laws out of fear of being held legally accountable for imposing measures that might hinder the access of their leaders to power. Kenya's Political Party Law is a case in point: one aspirant politician who tried to form new political parties in order to contest the 2007 elections never heard of the fate of his applications for months, and some had still not heard of the fate of their applications at the time of writing. Emerging systematic knowledge on the impact of party regulations indicates the highly contextual nature of institutional design, as illustrated by the attempts in Ghana and Nigeria to use national parties to mediate regional, ethnic and religious cleavages—and the absence of such regulations in South Africa despite the existence there of similar social divisions.

Ghana is in effect developing into a two-party system in which the two major parties have taken on a genuinely national character. In Nigeria, the imposition on the political parties of a national character, where ethnic, religious and regional issues are not allowed to be used to mobilize the electorate, has instead created tensions within the four major political parties that threaten the very existence of those parties.[12] The tensions in Nigerian politics along ethnic and regional cleavages have now been moved inside the parties instead of being issues for different bases of mobilization between the parties—thus creating division inside the parties that threaten to cause breakdown or splits in all of them.[13] The third example, South Africa—with all the

[12] The ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) is now being split over the succession of party leader and President Obasanjo—a process partly driven by internal tension created by regulations stipulating the national character of parties.

[13] See IDEA's country reports on political parties: Wiafe-Akenten, Charles, *Ghana: Country Report Based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), available at http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Ghana%20laid%20out.pdf;

Ibrahim, Jibrin, *Nigeria Country Report based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), available at http://www.idea.int/parties/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14997; and

Lodge, Tom and Ursula Scheidegger, *South Africa: Country Report based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), available at http://www.idea.int/parties/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=15063.

potential that exists there for conflict between parties based for instance on ethnicity and regionalism—has no requirements for parties to be of a national character, and at the same time shows no serious signs of political crisis as a result of political mobilization based on ethnicity or other social cleavages.

Given these three examples, the question whether party regulations (or the absence of party regulations) aiming to promote the national character of political parties lead to stable or unstable political parties is therefore very much open for debate. Let us take a closer look at this aspect of the impact of regulations, and also introduce the question of their democratic legitimacy.

6.4 Democratic and effective regulations?

Two dimensions are central to this debate on party regulations. First, are regulations more or less democratic? Second, do the regulations result in forms of political competition that are better for democracy than what would have been the case without regulations? The examples drawn from Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa above illustrate these two dimensions well. How democratic is it to impose regulations on the national character and organization of political parties? Do such regulations result in more democratic outcomes?

The picture based on these examples is mixed and reminds us of the highly context-dependent character of regulations. While regulation might work in Ghana (at the moment), it is certainly less successful in Nigeria. Or would the alternative—no regulations in Nigeria—have produced much more adverse outcomes for democracy, like civil war or secession?

One useful example that illustrates why these dimensions may be useful in evaluating regulations is the case of quotas for women in parliaments. Whether voluntary or legislated, quotas—like any question on affirmative action—raise the issue whether such measures are compatible with democratic principles. While this is a valid discussion for any regulation of parties or party systems, it is also widely recognized that more equal participation by and representation of women is indeed good for democracy, and that quotas can achieve more inclusive forms of political competition than what would otherwise have been the case.[14]

Many other forms of regulations—such as regulations to prevent parties from mobilizing along ethnic, religious, regional or language group lines—should also

[14] Visit http://www.idea.int for free downloads of several publications on quotas and women in politics that support this argument. See also Dahlerup 2006.

be discussed in relation to democratic principles. Most often, the countries' own constitutions include protection for the freedoms of association, assembly and speech that arguably could be infringed by specific party regulations. IDEA will address this dimension of party regulations in its future work and research partnerships.

The second dimension, that of the consequences of regulations for political competition and democracy, is important but also very delicate to analyse. In many cases, too little time has passed since the introduction of regulations for us to pass judgement on the success or otherwise of the engineering of laws for democratic purposes. It is also clear that regulations may be put in place for other reasons than promoting democracy, not least for reasons of maintaining political power; but such conclusions should be the result of analysis and not prejudged statements.

The first dimension, of regulations and democratic principles, needs to be evaluated against some widely accepted definition of democracy. Regulations could also be measured against the extent to which they harmonize with or breach international and national principles and standards of democracy.

Ultimately, regulations that are less than democratic and do not achieve the stated aims should be identified and avoided, and the same applies to democratic regulations that do not achieve their aims; these may even have harmful consequences for democratization. Democratic regulations that do achieve their aims are less problematic; but most interesting of all may be those cases where the regulations can be questioned on the democratic dimension but achieve more long-term effects that are positive for democratization and democratic consolidation. Quotas may be a good example of the latter case.

How, then, should political party regulations be enforced?

6.5 Regulations, electoral management bodies and enforcement

Mechanisms for the enforcement of regulations vary, but from IDEA's research on political parties it is clear that contacts between electoral management bodies (EMBs) and political parties are frequent. This holds true both for the formal representation of parties on EMBs and for informal, consultative forms of engagement.

Why are relations between EMBs and political parties arguably so important for further democratization? It is important to keep in mind that, despite the progress of democracy, there are too many superficial democracies in which patronage and autocracy are excused for economic or security reasons. Constitutions which should

set the stage for participatory democratic practices are often treated as tools for rulers rather than instruments for checks and balances.

There is widespread agreement that democracy is the best tool for the peaceful management of social and political conflicts, and hence lays the most solid foundation for political and economic development. Yet, since democratization involves profound changes in the distribution of power and in the relationship between citizens and the state, democracy often generates violence before it becomes able to manage conflict, and elections are often at the centre of such conflict.

Elections are in too many cases staged events with predetermined outcomes rather than expressions of true democratic processes. EMBs can often be influenced by ruling elites to produce the desired outcomes. We know from other research that political parties, so crucial for the good functioning of democracy, are among the least trusted institutions in all parts of the world. Hence, two of the central institutions of democracy, EMBs and political parties, are increasingly interlinked and often also increasingly questioned. To further complicate the situation, EMB–political party relations are also often characterized by low levels of mutual confidence and trust—even if good relations also prevail in some countries. This is of central importance for conflict management and democracy, as democratic consolidation can only be established through citizens' trust in the institutions that represent them and regulate elections.

A central function of EMBs is the extent to which they enforce regulations on political parties. A more detailed look at these relations is part of the ongoing process of analysing the available data.

Drawing on the experience of quotas for women in politics, it is clear that the enforcement of regulations tends to be relatively effective when it is placed in the hands of EMBs. The reason for this is obvious: EMBs in most cases can choose not to register parties for elections if they are in breach of the regulations. This further underscores the importance of more research on EMB–political party relations and on how predictability and trust can be built into the enforcement of regulations and the management of elections.

The next section is descriptive and is meant to inform the reader of what types of political party regulations exist in Africa and whether their application has contributed to a better political dispensation. Below we deal with the regulations that governing five principal aspects of the operation of political parties in Africa: the requirements political parties and candidates must meet before they can contest elections; the funding of political parties and election campaigns; political fund-

raising; political parties' sources of income; and the direct or indirect funding of political parties.

6.6 Political party and candidate election contestation requirements

With the democratization process which swept across Africa during the 1990s and the end of one-party rule, it became possible for most Africans to form and register political parties. However, the formation of political parties is prohibited in Eritrea and Swaziland, and until 2005 it was prohibited in Uganda under the National Resistance Movement. The second set of prohibitions concerns the religious and ethnic political parties which are prevalent in most African countries with the exception of Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa and Sudan.

In countries where the existence of political parties is allowed, the registration of political parties which intend to contest national elections is mandatory and most African countries have frameworks and legal procedures for this. Table 6.1 shows that in the majority of African countries where political parties are legal they have to meet a set of requirements before they can contest elections to the first chamber of the legislature.

Table 6.1: Requirements for political parties to contest national elections (first chamber)

No.	Requirements	Countries	No.
1	Sign election registration forms or file application	Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Zanzibar, Zimbabwe	14
2	Payment of a deposit	Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zimbabwe	18
3	Trans-regional presence	Cameroon, Gambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Zanzíbar	7
4	No registration required	Benin	1
5	Minimum number of candidates	Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania	6
6	Other	Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Gambia, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Tunisia, Zambia	9
7	No regulation	Eritrea, Swaziland, Uganda	3

Source: Compiled from the ACE database, http://www.aceproject.org, downloaded July 2006.

Table 6.2 shows that in countries with bicameral parliaments requirements such as registration deposit payment forms, deposit requirements and regional presence are not major requirements. They have only been adopted by small percentage of a sample of 16 countries. The most common requirement is for the payment of a deposit. Other requirements are largely about payments and registrations in a list system paid for by the individual political party.

Table 6.2: Requirements for political parties to contest national elections (second chamber)

	Countries	No.	Percentage of sample (16)
Registration forms or file application	Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia	5	31.2
Payment of a deposit	Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria	6	37.5
Regional presence requirement	Nigeria	1	6.2
Other	Egypt, Morocco, Namibia	3	18.8

Source: Compiled from the ACE database, http://www.aceproject.org>, downloaded July 2006.

Table 6.3 reflects the registration and other requirements for candidates wishing to stand for election. Fourteen countries (i.e. 29.17 per cent) require candidates to submit formal registration forms or file an application, with the signatures of certain number of witnesses, nominated by a political party or included in a party list in the case of proportional representation. Deposit requirements apply to 22.91 per cent of the countries, while in the case of Mali and Mauritius the acceptance of the candidate's deposit by the electoral commission is tied up (as in the case of all other countries) with meeting the nationality, clean criminal record and age requirements.

Table 6.3: Requirement for candidates to stand in parliamentary elections (first chamber)

	Countries	No.
Sign registration forms or file application	Botswana, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Zambia, Zanzibar, Zimbabwe	15
Payment of a deposit	Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zanzibar, Zimbabwe	11
No registration requirements	Mali and Mauritius	2
Other	Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Malawi, Morocco, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tunisia, Zambia	9
No regulation	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania	11

Source: Compiled from the ACE database, http://www.aceproject.org>, downloaded July 2006.

In bicameral Malawi, Morocco and Namibia, candidates are expected to register or file an application and pay a deposit as main requirements for contesting the elections.

6.7 The funding of political parties and election campaigns

This section reproduces parts of Yaw Saffu's contribution 'The Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns in Africa', in IDEA's Handbook *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns* (2003).

6.7.1 Legal provisions governing political fund-raising

Political financing is relatively under-regulated in Africa. In general, the raising of funds by parties and candidates is a matter of unregulated self-help. Fewer than one in five African states have comprehensive laws to govern the raising of revenue, detail permitted sources of revenue, prohibit others (such as foreign and corporate donations), or impose ceilings and specify sanctions. Laws demanding the disclosure

of sources of party funds and audited accounts—the minimum regulation required to grapple with the issues associated with the difficult relationship between political financing and liberal democratic governance—exists only in a tiny minority of African states. Even in those states, implementation is usually a problem. There appears to be no rhyme or reason or pattern to the current patchwork of legal provisions on political financing to be found in Africa. Mali, for instance, bans any form of foreign donations but has no provisions regarding other aspects of political financing.

South Africa has no provisions on general disclosure or bans on foreign donations but it has provision for substantial public funding and accounting requirements with respect to the public funds. Kenya used to have limits on campaign spending by parties and candidates (although admittedly these were universally ignored), but removed them in 1992, before the first multiparty elections to be held there since the 1970s. In 1999, however, the Kenyan Parliament approved a bill for state funding of political parties (*The Nation* 21 July 1999; Pan-African News Agency 22 July 1999).

For reasons of partisan or personal advantage, incumbents at the time of transition, during constitution-making and at the passing of legislation on political parties, elections and electoral commissions have preferred to address none or only some of the issues involved in political financing. The opposition parties which stand to benefit most from the adoption of regulations that enhance transparency and limit funding and spending have usually been too divided and too weak for their views and interests to influence these provisions strongly.

6.7.2 Sources of income of African political parties

All methods of funding political parties practised elsewhere in the world are also in use in Africa. These are listed here in what, it is argued, is a descending order of conformity with democratic ideals and the principles of good governance.

The most compatible with democracy would be party membership dues, local fund-raising by party activists, and small, individual donations by party members and sympathizers. Next would be levies on the salaries of categories of party members occupying offices of state, public funding, and returns on investment portfolios.

Further away from the democratic ideal would be donations by interest groups, lobbyists and corporate bodies, and investments by political entrepreneurs—the founders, proprietors or owners of political parties who launch and finance parties

as they would any investment vehicle. Finally, the completely unacceptable would be kickbacks from recipients of government contracts and other largesse, diverting state resources to the governing party through front organizations, and donations from foreign sources such as business owners, multinationals and governments.

Of the above, the most prominent in Africa in terms of size and frequency are donations (of various types, including those by founders of political parties and foreigners), corrupt kickbacks, state subventions and returns on business investments, in that order. In many African countries the use and abuse of state resources is a corrupt form of massive public funding, albeit indirect and unauthorized by the law, and is available only to the governing party. Governing parties' use of state resources, with evident impunity, and their brazen demand for and acceptance of kickbacks explain much of the apparent electoral impregnability of many African governing parties, even those with clear records of economic and human rights failures. They manage to build such formidable electoral war chests that their impoverished opponents usually have little chance.

Donations. Donations are the modal source of political financing in Africa. Whereas only parties in government can exploit 'toll-gating' or percentage kickbacks, or use front organizations to funnel state money to the party, all parties can depend on donations to varying degrees. Furthermore, given that in the transition to electoral democracy new parties had to be formed outside government circles in order to challenge incumbent autocrats and military regimes, seed money was necessary from the beginning.

In the African situation, opposition parties struggle for consistent support from business owners who would rather donate to governing parties which can deliver prompt returns than risk the vengeance of vindictive governments whose basic instincts are still authoritarian and whose deeds often suggest that they still believe the opposition has no place in African politics. If business owners decide to finance an opposition party in Africa, they could just possibly be unusually committed democrats, because it is a high-risk game for their business. However, when they decide to finance an opposition party, nine times out of ten they are political entrepreneurs seeking to make money directly from politics by owning a party, or by filling it with their own people to run it, waiting for the day when they can buy enough votes to put the party into power.

Donations from citizens living abroad are an important source of funding for political parties in Africa, particularly for opposition parties. In Ghana, political parties list 'Ghanaian citizens living abroad' in their disclosure of sources of funds, and the

presidential candidate of the main opposition party allegedly received 100,000 USD from its US branch for the 1996 elections (Gyimah-Boadi 2000). Such apparently small individual donations from party members and supporters would normally be counted favourably as an index of support for democracy, especially if the donations go to support opposition parties that face the combined resources of a ruling party and, thus, the state (although not all such financial support from exiles can or should be applauded). But most publicized donations from foreign sources are far less defensible.

The African National Congress (ANC), as is widely known, survived its epic struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa largely through the financial and other support it received from organizations and governments around the world. In 1994, fighting its first election, the ANC would not have been short of money, and most of it would have come from abroad.

Corrupt kickbacks. Parties that were created within governing circles when incumbents finally bowed to pressures to reform their undemocratic systems, for instance the NDC in Ghana, had less need for political entrepreneurs with fat wallets. In their control of the state they already had a powerfully lucrative source of funding—kickbacks on government contracts and the sale of state assets.

6.8 Direct and indirect public funding of political parties

As Table 6.4 shows, the forms of public funding in 16 African countries can be divided into direct and indirect public funding.

1. Direct funding consists of funding during and between elections and during election campaigns, and in some countries depends on a threshold of party representation in the legislature.
2. Indirect public funding includes media time or free media access and equal broadcast time, and tax reductions for income generated by party activities.

Table 6.4: Forms of public funding of political parties

No.	Country	Direct public funding	Indirect public funding
1	Benin	Election period and between period, election campaigns and current representation in the legislature	Media time access Tax deduction for incomes generated from party activities
2	Burkina Faso	Election period and between elections; election campaign, representation in the legislature dependent on performance on elections	Media access and allocation of broadcast time
3	Cape Verde	Election period and between elections; election campaign, representation in the legislature dependent on number of candidates put forward in the elections	Media access and allocation of broadcast time. Entitled to special tax deduction status
4	Ghana	No	Free media access and equal broadcast time
5	Malawi	Election period and between elections; election campaign, representation in the legislature dependent on number of candidates put forward in the elections	Free media access and equal broadcast time
6	Mauritius	No	Free media access and time allocated for candidates in the present election
7	Mali	Election period only and election campaign	Free media access and equal broadcast time
8	Morocco	Election period, election campaign, dependent on performance at current elections and number of candidates put forward in the present elections	Free media access and equal broadcast time
9	Mozambique	Election period and between elections; election campaign, representation in the legislature dependent on performance in the last election	Free media access and equal broadcast time
10	Namibia	Election period and between elections; election campaign, representation in the legislature dependent on performance in the last election	Free media access and time allocated for candidates in the previous election. Entitled to special tax deduction status
11	Niger	Election period and between elections; election campaigns and current representation in the legislature	Free media access and equal broadcast time

No.	Country	Direct public funding	Indirect public funding
12	São Tomé and Prîncipe	N/A	Free media access and equal broadcast time. Entitled to special tax deduction status
13	Seychelles	Election period, election campaign, dependent on performance at current elections and number of candidates put forward in the present elections	Free media access and equal broadcast time
14	Sierra Leone	No	No
15	South Africa	Election period and between elections, general party administration, election campaign activities; equal funding, current representation in the legislature	Free media access and equal broadcast time
16	Tanzania	Election period only, election campaign activities, equal funding, dependent on performance at current elections	Free media access and equal broadcast time

Source: Compiled from the ACE database, http://www.aceproject.org, downloaded August 2006.

Samuel Fambom's (2003) work illustrates that the direct and indirect flow of public funds to African political parties has not been appreciated or fully recorded. Another problem is that political parties, particularly opposition parties, often accuse the governing party of using public funds to finance its election campaigns, denying them access to the public media and at times creating draconian laws that restrict the opposition parties' access to public resources.

Famborn (2003) goes further to quantify public subsidies for political parties in African democracies by year of introduction, recipient, basic allocation criteria and total amount paid per political party (see Table 6.5).

Only Benin, Mali and Niger impose a ceiling on political party finance whereby no party is allowed to receive more than 20 per cent of its own resources (in Benin and Mali) or 50 per cent of the political parties' own resources (in Niger).

Table 6.5: Public subsidies for parties in African democracies by year of introduction, recipient, allocation criteria and amount

No.	Country	Year of introduction	Recipient	Basic allocation criteria (amount for party) for each election	Total amount per year
1	Benin	N/A	Parliamentary candidates Presidential candidates	Reimbursement of campaign expenses for successful candidates. (Rule for proportional distributed funding not implemented.) Candidates must win more than 10% in presidential elections	Decided by presidential decree
2	Burkina Faso	1997	Parties' election campaign Central party organization	50% distributed proportionally among the parties in the National Assembly, 50% to parties with candidates in at least 5 of the 45 provinces. Unspecified support between elections	380,000 USD
3	Cameroon	1990	Political parties		
4	Chad	1993	Grant to new parties	10,000 USD for each new party	
5	Egypt	N/A	Central party organization	All registered parties (29,000 USD for each party)	
6	Equatorial Guinea	N/A	Presidential candidates Central party organization	All participants (30,000 USD each) All parties (8,900 USD each)	
7	Gabon	1990	Central party organization	All parties with a candidate in each constituency	37,700 USD
8	Morocco	N/A	Parties' election campaign	The parties receive 20% before the end of candidate registration, 30% is given to parties based on the number of candidates filed, 25% is given to parties based on the number of votes obtained by each party in every district, and finally 25% is distributed based on the number of seats won	Total amount to be decided by prime minister (1997: 13.6 million USD)

No.	Country	Year of intro-duction	Recipient	Basic allocation criteria (amount for party) for each election	Total amount per year
9	Mozambique	1999	Central party organization Presidential candidates	1/3 distributed equally among presidential candidates, 1/3 distributed proportionally to parties represented in Parliament, 1/3 distributed to all participating parties based on number of approved candidates	340,000 USD to the two largest parties
10	Namibia	1997	Central party organization	Funding limited to parliamentary parties	
11	Seychelles	1996	Central party organization	Parties that nominated candidates for the preceding election, based on percentage of the votes	1.5 million USD
12	South Africa	1996	Central party organization	Funding limited to parties in National Assembly or in a Provincial Legislature. A sum divided equally among parties plus another sum based on their share of parliamentary representation	9 million USD
13	Tanzania	1992 1995 1996	Law not implemented. 9,600 USD for each presidential candidate. 1,900 USD per constituency for campaign costs + 1,900 USD for each constituency won towards administrative costs	Support for parties between elections, proportional to parliamentary representation	10 million USD for 1996–2000
14	Zimbabwe	1992 1997	Central party organization	Must hold 15 seats in the National Assembly to receive funds	Funds given to parties receiving 5% of the votes in previous election

Source: Quoted in Mathisen, H. and Svåsand, L., 'Funding Political Parties in Emerging African Democracies: What Role for Norway?', Report R 2002: 6 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2000), updated in Fambom, Samuel, 'Public Funding of Political Parties in Africa', Paper submitted at the conference on Elections, Democracy and Governance, Pretoria, South Africa, 7–10 April 2004.
N/A = not available.

The enforcement authorities which ensure that the laws or administrative orders governing political party finance, public funding, election campaigns, subsidies and so on are summarized in Table 6.6. Notably, eight different types of enforcement authorities exist in 15 countries.

Table 6.6: Enforcement authority in African countries with political party finance and income disclosure regulations

Country	Enforcement authority
Benin	Minister of internal affairs
Cape Verde	
Ghana	National Electoral Commission
Lesotho	National Electoral Board
Malawi	National Electoral Commission
Mali	Ministry of Interior and Revenue Court
Morocco	Minister of internal affairs and information, and minister of finance
Mozambique	National Electoral Commission
Namibia	Auditor general
Niger	Ministry of Interior and the Revenue Court
São Tomé and Príncipe	General Accountancy Office
Seychelles	Party Finance Regulatory Board
Sierra Leone	National Electoral Board
South Africa	National Electoral Commission
Tanzania	National Electoral Board

Source: Compiled from IDEA database, downloaded July 2006.

While national, external regulation of African political parties is becoming increasingly better documented, less is still known of the internal organization, functioning and management of political parties. We still do not know how these regulations and instruments work in reality, whether political parties really adhere to them. Another area of concern is whether political parties are accountable institutions and who manages them? Are they briefcase political parties whose resources and files are carried around by the leaders, or are they effectively-operating institutions? What are the requirements for developing political party management norms beyond the rhetoric of their role as democratic institutions?

Chapter 7 summarizes some of the important findings for the role of African political parties for democratic progress and consolidation.

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter 7

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusions

How can African political parties be assisted to make progress towards becoming more responsive, representative and effective organizations in support of democratization and development?

Internally, African party systems are diverse and fragmented, and externally, globalization and the IFIs' policies have made political party programmes subservient to global agendas, with political parties increasingly unable to deliver on their promises. Hence among many Africans we observe political apathy and withdrawal from the political process; this is also confirmed by low voter turnout in some countries. It is safe to argue that political ideology is informed and largely influenced by global, liberal thinking and policy options formulated by the IMF and the World Bank, and with alternative African party programmes increasingly absent where they are most needed. Important steps towards more informed party programmes and policy formulation processes could be achieved by increased South–South exchange of experiences, not least between Latin America and Africa.

The current understanding of political parties' role in governance is narrow. The growing documented narrative on internal and external party regulations should be subjected to reality checks. Our knowledge of how political parties are managed and internally organized and of how they develop their party programmes is insufficient and the need for better understanding is growing as political parties develop and change over time. African party systems are changing rapidly, with the emergence of two contradictory tendencies: (a) fragmentation;[15] and (b) the consolidation of dominant-party and two-party systems. Although minority governments and coalitions persist, little is known about how and why coalitions are really formed,

[15] Basedau 2007: 118ff.

for what purpose they are formed, what legal instruments govern their power-sharing arrangement, and what are the implications for political party formation and alignments in the future. Kadima (2006) provides useful insights into the politics of party coalitions in Africa but more research is needed. The generic relationship between parties, government and parliament is generally well understood. However, in many countries, the actual constellation of these relations in between elections is inadequately understood.

A recurrent feature of all dialogue events during 2005–2006 carried out by International IDEA and partners in Africa has been the issue of dominant ruling parties and their relationship to the state. We do not have to got to extreme cases of party abuse of state resources, be they financial, media, use of repressive arms of the government or the judiciary—as in Zimbabwe today—to see that this fusion of party and state boundaries constitutes a real challenge to the sustainability of multiparty politics in Africa. While the problem is more serious in Africa than in other regions, it is certainly a common feature also in other regions, including Europe. Carothers (2006: 68–73) provides a useful insight into this problem at the global level.

No evidence emerges from the research conducted thus far to suggest that the increase in the numbers of women parliamentarians has been matched in women's representation in party leadership positions and committees. In our view, women's participation and representation in party politics is more important than token parliamentary representation. Women's presence in political party leadership positions is an important step for sustaining democratic governance at the local level given political parties' proximity to society and to local political culture and the very values that we aspire to nurture in order to foster political inclusion at the national level.

Pan-African party to-party networks of like-minded ideological trends and policy orientation are yet to develop independent of party internationals. Almost all pan-African parliamentary groupings are engaged in elections or election observation, but their conclusions may have been less than impartial and accurate: it is problematic to see how election observation missions to other African countries have concluded that elections have been free and fair (even Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential election, for some organizations) while at the same time we see various forms of civil authoritarianism emerging in the same countries.

Two serious challenges will keep upsetting the African democratization process: political party financing and succession politics. First, the current patterns of political party financing corrupt politics and by extension spread corruption in political institutions based on political appointments. It is difficult to imagine

how corrupt political parties which have won elections through fraud would, upon finding themselves in control of government, finances and personnel, adopt the principles of good governance overnight. Second, the enigma of succession politics is a major conflict-inducing factor in almost all African countries, including collapsed states. Little is known, let alone understood, of the relationship between leaders and political parties and we do not know whether succession crises are political party-driven or a reflection of nationwide leadership crises.

These challenges might seem few on paper. However, their political ramifications—how to come to grips with their solutions and what policies and actions could contribute to meeting them—are difficult and complex to address. They form a long-term agenda that requires interfaces with several other institutions, and some of that agenda is not even directly within the domain of party politics.

7.2 Recommendations

1. Although the role of political parties in promoting democratic governance is commonly understood, most African countries use political parties in the narrow sense as instruments developed by the elite for state capture. This could be rectified through increased capacity-building and awareness workshops and seminars on the centrality of political parties for thriving democratic governance.
2. There is a pressing need for the vast documentation on internal and external party regulations to be subjected to a reality check in order to support political parties through workshops, training and capacity-building programmes to redress deficiencies in their organization, structures and functions.
3. Too little is known about how political parties are managed and internally organized, how their programmes are developed (and in fact the content of these programmes and how the global context affects them), what mechanisms parties have in order to implement these programmes once in government, or how opposition political parties develop policies to influence government programmes by actively referring to and improving their own. There is therefore a need for training programmes on political party management and organization in order to increase their effectiveness, transparency and accountability.
4. While some progress has been made on women's representation in parliament, not least in Southern Africa, this has not been matched by any increased influence of women in political parties, or by policy agendas reflecting many gender-related matters. There are no short cuts to increased gender equality

except real influence over party agendas and policy formulation. Training and decision-making processes that can help to alleviate these shortcomings must remain high on the agenda for parties and development partners.

5. African party systems are changing rapidly, with contradictory tendencies. One is towards fragmentation and the end of the nationwide, towards the formation of regional, quasi-ethnic and religious parties. The other is towards dominant-party and two-party systems. In this sense African political parties are not static; once a country's system has been classified as a one-party system or another the classification could change in subsequent elections. By implication, studies on political party institutionalization are important and should be carried out to show what aspects of party systems have been institutionalized, which have not, and why. The lack of regime turnover through elections needs to be analysed further from the perspective of opposition parties and coalitions, and their prospects for institutionalization and consolidation.

6. More efforts are needed to find ways in which to curb domination by ruling parties through the abuse of state funds and resources. Independent audit functions can be introduced, but parliamentary committee systems can also contribute to transparency in this regard. The establishment of a code of conduct for ruling parties and coalitions in Africa could be another important step in the right direction.

7. There is an increasing body of literature on minority governments and coalitions, but little is known about how and why coalitions are really formed, and what legal instruments govern their power-sharing mechanisms. There is therefore a need for a better understanding of coalition politics and its short-, medium- and long-term implications for the democratic process. Kadima shows how presidential systems are more prone to the breaking up of winning coalitions than parliamentary systems are (Kadima 2006: 224ff), giving further evidence of the problems associated with the concentration of power in the office of the president.

8. Although the generic relationship between political parties, government and parliament is well understood, in fact the constellation of these relations *between elections* is poorly understood. This could be a result of too much capacity building for parliamentarians (in effect empowering the machinery of government) and too little training for political parties' leaders and their key members. Training for political parties and political party functionaries is important for creating democratic interfaces and synergies as well as building a solid base for democratic practices which can be passed 'up the line' from political parties to parliament.

9. There is reasonable documentation on the financing of political parties in their efforts to maintain themselves as organizations, to compete for elections and to participate in national politics and national debates. However, there is a pressing need for detailed case studies on how political parties are really configured on the ground. This topic has not been meaningfully researched, and only a few full-fledged case studies, concentrating on priority area, have been carried out. A comparative database has been developed by International IDEA. IDEA and the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in the Netherlands are in the process of establishing a partnership to provide better opportunities for comparative analysis.

10. The desirability or non-desirability of party laws and further party regulations has not been fully documented or debated in many African countries. Similar regulations may have very different impact. Some countries have kept delaying the enactment or implementation of party laws until such time as these laws would give the governing political party advantages over the opposition. However, there should be a serious debate on political party regulations before rash policy recommendations are hastily implemented, probably creating more problems that they have been expected to solve.

11. Although African political parties are integrated into global party-to-party networks, associations and the so-called party internationals, corresponding pan-African party-to-party networks of like-minded ideologies is yet to develop among African political parties independent of the internationals (apart of course from the so-called progressive liberation movement governments). IDEA and other democracy promotion institutions should build on IDEA's current work with African regional and sub-regional parliamentary forums, communities and networks. Finally, more encouragement of South–South exchange and sharing of experiences is also important.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACE	Administration and Cost of Elections (project)
AEC	African Economic Community
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
AU	African Union
DP	Democratic Party (Kenya)
DUA/ADG	Democrat Union of Africa/African Dialogue Group
EAC	East African Community
EALA	East African Legislative Assembly
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS-PC	Economic Community of West African States Community Parliament
EISA	Electoral Institute for Southern Africa (former)
EMB	Electoral management body
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Forces
EU	European Union
FPTP	First Past The Post
Frelimo	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
GDI	Gender-related Human Development Index
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
IDEA	(International) Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDU	International Democrat Union
IFI	International financial institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KANU	Kenya African National Union
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MMP	Mixed Member Proportional (electoral system)
MNSD	National Movement for Society and Development (Niger)
MP	Member of parliament
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Liberaço de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MSM	Militant Socialist Movement (Mauritius)
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition (Kenya)
NDC	National Democratic Congress (Ghana)

NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPP	New Patriotic Party (Ghana)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PBV	Party Block Vote (electoral system)
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice (Eritrea)
PR	Proportional representation
Remano	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC-PF	Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum
TRS	Two-Round System (electoral system)
UDF	United Democratic Front (Malawi)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	US dollar
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

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IDEA acts as a catalyst for democracy building by providing knowledge resources, expertise and a platform for debate on democracy issues. It works together with policy makers, donor governments, UN organizations and agencies, regional organizations and others engaged on the field of democracy building.

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Democracy building is complex and touches on many areas including constitutions, electoral systems, political parties, legislative arrangements, the judiciary, central and local government, formal and traditional government structures. International IDEA is engaged with all of these issues and offers to those in the process of democratization:

- **knowledge resources,** in the form of handbooks, databases, websites and expert networks;
- **policy proposals** to provoke debate and action on democracy issues; and
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