



Open List Proportional Representation

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

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Alan Wall

Open List Proportional Representation (OLPR) is unusual for an electoral system in that it is notable for the large number of variations in the way it is implemented rather than for a set of rules common to all OLPR frameworks. Some designers of electoral systems describe it as more of a concept than a system. The concepts behind all OLPR frameworks are that votes are pooled to candidate lists and seats are allocated to these candidate lists more or less in proportion to their share of the total votes cast after any representation threshold has been considered, but voters may vote for a candidate or candidates within these lists in order to influence which candidates are elected. Like all electoral frameworks, none of the OLPR variants are perfect. All have advantages and disadvantages in achieving the objectives required of an electoral system in a specific country environment. As when considering any electoral system, it is important to remember that electoral systems do not determine behaviour. An OLPR electoral system may facilitate certain behaviours but critical elements, such as the attitudes of electoral participants and legal and societal controls on political behaviour, are outside of the ambit of an electoral system.

While there are critics of OLPR, many of the criticisms are based either on specific elements of its configuration in a specific country or on elements that are external to the system itself (e.g. poor implementation of controls on political financing in Indonesia).¹ While there have certainly been ugly configurations of OLPR, such as in Colombia before 2003 (see Albarracin and Milanese 2012), if configured sensibly and with adequate controls on political behaviour, OLPR can facilitate a wider range of electoral system objectives than many other electoral systems.

OLPR can bring a number of positive attributes that may fulfil a country's electoral system objectives. OLPR can have most of the advantages of closed list PR, such as inclusiveness, lack of wasted votes, promoting diversity in parties and candidates, and promoting multi-party systems. OLPR can provide a simpler means of giving voters more power over who represents them in a potentially proportional and inclusive electoral outcome than other electoral systems with these qualities, such as single transferable vote and mixed member proportional systems. OLPR can: (a) provide the voter with multiple choices; (b) allow a voter to choose local representation within a proportional framework; (c) bolster internal party democracy and limit the power of party executives; and (d) provide opportunities for independent candidates or lists of independent candidates.

1. For some critics of OLPR, this paper could perhaps have been called 'A Fistful of Dollars' or 'For A Few Dollars More'.

1. Different versions of OLPR

Some of the variations between different OLPR systems are also found in other list proportional representation systems. For example, district magnitudes in countries that use OLPR vary widely, which has an impact on the proportionality of results and natural representation thresholds.² Seven countries use OLPR with a single, national electoral district.³ In the remaining countries, district magnitudes can vary between 2 and 70. Smaller district magnitudes can reduce the proportionality of election results and produce more ‘wasted’ votes. Some OLPR countries, such as Iceland and Norway, address this by using multi-tiered electoral districts. Seats are initially contested in multiple electoral districts but national level compensatory seats are awarded to ensure the proportionality of the overall election results. This can be the most effective variant of OLPR at localizing representation while maintaining proportionality.

Around half the countries that use OLPR set no legal threshold of votes that a list must receive in order to obtain representation. Of those that do apply such a threshold, the most frequently used is 5 per cent, at either the national or the electoral district level (see Table 1; for more detail see Annex 1).

Table 1. Legal representation thresholds under OLPR

Threshold percentage of total votes	Number of countries	Per cent of OLPR countries
No threshold	15	38%
0% except for compensatory seats	4	10%
0.67%	1	3%
1%	1	3%
3%	2	5%
3.5%	1	3%
3.6%	1	3%
4%	4	10%
5%	10	25%
8%	1	3%
TOTAL	40	

Similarly, a wide range of ‘largest remainder’, ‘highest average’ or hybrid seat allocation methods are used (see Table 2; see also Annex 1 for more detail).

Table 2. Seat allocation methods in countries using OLPR

Seat allocation method	Number	Percentage
D’Hondt	15	37.5%
Sainte-Lague	4	10.0%
Modified Sainte-Lague	3	7.5%
D’Hondt and Sainte-Lague	1	2.5%
Total highest average	23	57.5%
Largest remainder Hare	9	22.5%
Total largest remainder	9	22.5%
Largest remainder Hare and D’Hondt	5	12.5%
Largest remainder Droop and D’Hondt	1	2.5%
Hagenbach-Bischoff and D’Hondt	2	5.0%
Total hybrid	8	20.0%
TOTAL	40	

2. The analysis in this paper is based on countries that use OLPR for a single or lower chamber of their national parliament.

3. These countries are Aruba, Fiji, Kosovo, Lithuania (as part of a parallel system), the Netherlands, San Marino and Slovakia.

However, most of the variations are generally found only in OLPR systems. These include in:

- the limits on the choices the voter can make, for example:
 - whether voters must vote for a list and optionally for a candidate or candidates, or just for a candidate or candidates, or either for a list or for a candidate or candidates;
 - the number of candidates a voter can vote for, and whether this is a fixed or variable number;
 - requiring voters to vote for candidates on the one list, or allowing them to vote for candidates across multiple lists;
 - whether negative votes against candidates within the same or across multiple lists are allowed;
- the format in which candidate lists are presented on the ballot paper;
- the number of lists a political entity may nominate in a single electoral district;
- any provisions for independent or non-partisan candidates or lists to contest an election;
- the composition of lists; for example, whether political party and non-partisan candidates can be included on the same list;
- any vote threshold that a candidate must attain to be qualified to fill a seat won by the list;
- the method by which votes only for a list are distributed to the candidates on that list;
- the method used for applying representation quotas for disadvantaged groups; for example, on the basis of ‘best loser’ or reserved seats.

2. Voting methods

There are almost as many different configurations of OLPR as there are countries that use it. In the 40 countries that use OLPR as the sole or partial method for electing the main chamber of their national parliament,⁴ the major variations are in the voting method, which can affect both political party cohesion and effectiveness, and in how much influence the voter has over which candidates are elected. Additionally, there can be variations in other elements of the system such as thresholds for lists or candidates, single or multiple tier electoral districts and seat allocation formulae.

Depending on the electoral rules, voters may be required to vote for a list and may then choose to vote for a candidate or multiple candidates. This is list or party-focused OLPR as practised in the Netherlands and Slovakia. Other variants, such as those in Chile and Jordan, are more candidate-centred. The voter votes only for a candidate or candidates. Some countries, such as Belgium and Denmark, combine both elements. Voters can vote for a list or for a candidate or candidates. Voters are sometimes given further choices and powers. In countries such as El Salvador, Honduras and Switzerland, voters can vote for candidates from different candidate lists (panachage), while in those such as Luxembourg and Switzerland, voters can also vote against as well as for candidates. The distribution of OLPR voting methods is summarized in Table 3. More detail is provided in Annex 2.

4. This includes countries such as Lithuania and Panama, which use OLPR as part of a parallel electoral system.

Table 3. Voting methods under OLPR

	Number of countries	
Must vote for a list and	22	
• may vote for a single candidate		9
• may vote for multiple candidates		10
• may vote for or against multiple candidates ⁵		3
Vote only for a candidate(s)	9	
• must for for a single candidate		6
• may vote for multiple candidates within a list		1
• may vote for multiple candidates across lists		2
May vote either for a list or for candidate(s)	9	
• may vote for a single candidate		4
• may vote for multiple candidates in multiple districts		1
• may vote for multiple candidates within a list		1
• may vote for multiple candidates across lists		1
• may vote vote for or against multiple candidates across lists ⁶		2

In fully OLPR systems, such as in Finland, Latvia and Brazil, the number of votes each candidate receives is the sole determinant of which candidates take up the seats won by a list. However, in what are sometimes called ‘flexible list’ systems, candidates may have to surpass a threshold of personal votes to be automatically considered for an available seat. If insufficient candidates pass this threshold to fill all the seats won by a list, then the list’s unfilled seats are allocated to so far unelected candidates in the order of their position on the list, in a similar way to closed list PR systems.

Such ‘flexible’ OLPR systems reduce the power of voters to determine who represents them, but the ‘candidate vote threshold’ can also reduce the prospects of candidates being elected in their own right with very few personal votes. It may not prevent candidates with few personal votes from being elected if they are high up the party list. It is generally harder for a candidate to meet this threshold in OLPR variants where voters vote for a list and then may optionally vote for a candidate. In such systems, political parties can still retain significant control over who is elected. Examples of such ‘flexible’ systems exist in Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia, where a candidate must receive 7 per cent, 10 per cent or 3 per cent of the list’s total votes, respectively, and the Netherlands, where a candidate must receive 25 per cent of the quota used to allocate seats to lists in order to be automatically considered in the filling of seats won by the list.


Maximizing the choices available to voters in an OLPR framework—by requiring them to vote for a candidate, by giving them multiple votes, and by allowing them to vote for candidates from different lists or to vote against candidates—can promote democratic activity. On the other hand, some more candidate-centred configurations of OLPR can also hinder the consolidation of an effective political party system that is capable of making the executive or government accountable.

3. Who is permitted to contest an OLPR election?

There can be complaints from non-partisan interests that closed list PR systems promote a monopoly of political party elites. There are significant variations among OLPR countries in who may contest elections. While OLPR can facilitate non-partisan candidates contesting an election (as can closed list PR), whether as individual independents or other individuals, or as combined independent or other non-partisan group lists, this is not always allowed under a country’s specific electoral rules (see Figure 1 and Annex 2).

5. These countries are Iceland, Latvia and Norway.

6. These countries are Luxembourg and Switzerland.

Figure 1. Who may contest an OLPR election: number of countries

Around one-third of the countries that use OLPR in the elections for their main national chamber do not allow non-partisan candidates to contest the election. Even where non-partisan candidates are permitted, it can be difficult for them to be successful. Of those OLPR countries that allow non-partisan candidates, only Chile, Jordan and Lebanon currently have significant numbers of independent representatives in parliament.

In OLPR countries where voters only have the option of voting for a list, there are variations in whether such votes are distributed to the candidates on that list and, if so, to which candidates. Common variants include: (a) that such votes are not distributed to any candidates, which increases the chances of candidates with few personal votes being elected; (b) that such votes are distributed only to the candidate or candidates at the top of the list, which promotes their chances of being elected; or (c) that such votes are distributed to all candidates on the list, which can increase legitimacy by increasing the ‘personal votes’ of the elected candidates.

4. Ballot design

There are wide variations in how lists and candidates are presented on OLPR ballot papers. Voter-friendly ballot paper design is critical to the effective operation of OLPR. Among the critical design elements are that candidates should be grouped by list; that lists are identified by party or group; and that each list has its own section of the ballot paper. Because voters are able to vote for individual candidates, each candidate must appear on the ballot paper. This can lead to unwieldy ballot papers, especially where district magnitudes are large, as in the ballot paper for the Netherlands in Figure 2. It might also call for a more sophisticated voter population.


Figure 2. Netherlands ballot paper 2017

Photo: J. M. Luijt/CC

While ballot papers for smaller magnitude districts may be easier to design and more comprehensible to voters, such as in the example from Honduras in Figure 3, smaller magnitude districts can reduce the proportionality of the election results.

Figure 3. Honduras ballot paper 2013



Source: Electionpassport.org

Some countries attempt to mitigate the impact of a large number of contesting parties and candidates by using ballot paper shortcuts, such as in the example from Kosovo (see Figure 4). Voters must vote for a list and can then vote for candidates from that list, who are represented by the serial numbers on the right-hand side of the ballot. These numbers correspond to the serial numbers for each candidate shown on the candidate lists displayed in each voting compartment.

Figure 4. Kosovo ballot paper 2014

ZGJEDHJET E PARAKONSHME PËR KUVENDIN E REPUBLIKËS SË KOSOVËS 2014
PREVREMENI IZBORI ZA SKUPŠTINË REPUBLIKË KOSOVË 2014

1 Shënjoni VETËM NJË subjekt politik
 Oznojite SAMO JEDAN politiki subjekt

☐ 31. PLE - PARTIA LIBERALE EGJIPTIANE

☐ 32. PDAK - PARTIA DEMOKRATIKE E ASHKANLIVE TË KOSOVËS

☐ 33. PDS - PROGRESIVNA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA

☐ 34. PREBK - PARTIA ROME E BASHKUAR E KOSOVËS

☐ 35. Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE!

☐ 36. VAKAT - KOALICIA VAKAT

☐ 37. PF - PARTIA E FORTE

☐ 38. SRPSKA LISTA

☐ 39. PDP - POKRET ZA DEMOKRATSKI PROSPERITET

☐ 40. AAK - ALEANCA KOSOVA E RE

☐ 41. SD - SOCIJALDEMOKRATIA

☐ 42. KNRP - KOSOVAKI NEVI ROMANI PARTIA

☐ 43. BOŠNJAČKA JEDINSTVENA LISTA

☐ 44. AAK - ALEANCA PËR ARDHMERINË E KOSOVËS

☐ 45. HASAN GASHI

☐ 46. NDS - NOVA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA

☐ 47. IRDK - INICIATIVA E RE DEMOKRATIKE E KOSOVËS

☐ 48. KZG - KOALICIA ZA GORA

☐ 49. PAJ - PARTIA E ASHKANLINJËVE PËR INTEGRIM

☐ 50. SDA - STRANKA DEMOKRATSKJE AKCIJE

☐ 51. CDU - CENTAR DEMOKRATSKJE UNIJE

☐ 52. KTAJ - KOSOVA TÜRK ADALET PARTISI

☐ 53. BSDAK - BOŠNJAČKA STRANKA DEMOKRATSKJE AKCIJE KOSOVA

☐ 54. LIDHJA DEMOKRATIKE E KOSOVËS - LDK

☐ 55. POKRET ZA GORA

☐ 56. SLS - Samostalna Liberalna Stranka

☐ 57. KDTP - KOSOVA DEMOKRATIK TÜRK PARTISI

☐ 58. PDK-PARTIA DEMOKRATIKE E KOSOVËS

☐ 59. NISMA për Kosovën

☐ 60. LËVIZJA GRUPI MI TRADICIONAL SHQIPTAR

2 Shënjoni ME SË SHUMTI PESË kandidat
 Oznojite NAJVE PËT kandidata

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	32
33	34	35	36
37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44
45	46	47	48
49	50	51	52
53	54	55	56
57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64
65	66	67	68
69	70	71	72
73	74	75	76
77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84
85	86	87	88
89	90	91	92
93	94	95	96
97	98	99	100
101	102	103	104
105	106	107	108
109	110		

Source: Author

5. Disadvantages of OLPR

With all these choices available, what can possibly go wrong? OLPR frameworks have some of the potential disadvantages of all list PR systems: they generally result in coalition governments, which may be more difficult to dislodge from power; they require a functioning party system; and they could promote the existence of multiple single-issue-based parties. In addition to these general issues, the answer lies both in the external political environment and in the appropriateness of the combination of choices that comprise the specific OLPR framework adopted.

The external political environment must be calibrated appropriately. For example, if there are very low barriers to political party formation and to list nomination, this can both promote fragmentation of political entities and make it more difficult to form governments and hold governments accountable to parliament. In an extreme situation where parties can nominate multiple lists for which votes are not pooled, what is nominally OLPR can become similar to the single non-transferable vote system, as in Colombia before 2003. In addition, if there are poor controls on candidate fundraising and campaign expenditure, competition for votes between candidates on the same list could lead to illegal vote buying, although without effectively enforced controls on campaign expenditure this can be an issue under any electoral system.

While the intra-party competition for votes among candidates that is inherent in OLPR can promote internal party democracy and limit the power of party executives, it can also contribute to party fragmentation. OLPR could hinder party development and consolidation in situations, such as in Jordan, where lists can be made up of mixed party and non-partisan candidates, or if the barriers to independent candidates or lists contesting the election are significantly lower than for political party lists. OLPR could be more effective where there is a more mature political party system.

In OLPR systems where voters can vote for different numbers of candidates,⁷ or where voters can vote for or against a varying number of candidates,⁸ confidence in the election results rests on public trust in the full integrity of both the political contestants and the electoral management body. Use of such voting methods in OLPR makes it impossible to reconcile the number of voters issued with a ballot to the number of votes counted for all candidates. This removes one of the basic objective measures of the integrity of vote counts and election results. Under such voting arrangements, there have been examples, such as in Kosovo, of attempts to alter individual candidate vote totals to the advantage of specific candidates on a list.

Voter-friendly ballot paper design is noted above as a critical element in the effective operation of OLPR. Issues can arise where low barriers to party formation or list nomination result in a proliferation of electoral contestants, or where there are poorly defined links on the ballot paper between candidates and their lists. If OLPR ballot design is not voter-friendly, this can lead to voter confusion or make it difficult for voters to find the candidate they wish to vote for. Such issues have been found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where there have been multi-page ballot papers. In other cases, poor ballot paper design can make it difficult for voters to identify the political party or non-partisan group with which each candidate is affiliated, which may or may not be intentional. Examples of this are Jordan, where candidates are not grouped on the ballot by list or party, and Fiji (see Figure 5), where candidates are randomly assigned positions on the ballot paper and represented by numbers, and neither the ballot paper nor the information provided at voting stations linking the numbers to candidate names shows the candidates' party or list affiliations.

It can also be more difficult for voters to understand the relationship between list votes, seats allocated, individual candidate votes and winning candidates than in simple systems such as closed list PR and first past the post (FPTP). There can be a particular issue with understanding why candidates are elected with fewer personal votes than have been received by some unelected candidates. For example, in the 2018 Fiji election, 14 ruling party candidates were elected with fewer personal votes than some unelected opposition candidates—although, unlike closed list PR, these candidates did at least receive some personal votes. This effect can be exacerbated—especially in OLPR systems where voters can only vote for one candidate and/or where there is one national electoral district—if a party list contains one 'rock star' candidate who attracts a large proportion of the candidate votes for the list. To combat such problems, voter education needs to stress that it is the aggregate total of votes for the list—whether obtained through a vote for the list or a totalling of the votes cast for candidates on the list, or a combination of both—that determines how many seats each list wins, not a ranking of individual candidate votes. In some circumstances it may be possible to reduce the 'rock star' effect by increasing the number of districts, although this may not work if parties and groups can find multiple 'local heroes' to head their list in each district, and is likely to reduce the overall proportionality of the election results.

7. It is common in OLPR for voters to be able to vote for 'up to' as many candidates as there are seats to be filled in the electoral district, for example as in Greece, Honduras, Jordan, Latvia; or in fewer countries for 'up to' a lesser specified number of candidates, as in Czechia and Kosovo.

8. As in countries such as Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland.

Figure 5. Fiji ballot paper 2018




Photo: © VNP/Daniela Maoate-Cox

It may be harder under OLPR to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups such as women and minorities through mechanisms such as representation quotas. Unlike closed lists, where a combination of candidate quotas and zippered lists can ensure that disadvantaged groups are represented in parliament, it is the voters who to a greater or lesser extent choose which candidates are elected under OLPR. Representation quotas do operate in some OLPR systems, such as for women in Kosovo. Kosovo uses a ‘best loser’ concept whereby if sufficient women are not elected, then the highest vote winning women on a list replace the lowest otherwise elected men from that list until the representation quota is met. This may be difficult for some voters to accept and could be viewed as a disproportionate method for achieving disadvantaged group representation, as it can be argued that it subverts the will of the voters. In other OLPR countries, such as Croatia, a constituency or a set number of seats is reserved for minorities. In others, such as in Kosovo, minority parties have reserved seats and are not subject to the representation threshold. None of these, however, is a perfect solution to disadvantaged group representation in OLPR systems.

6. Misconceptions about OLPR

There are three frequent misconceptions about OLPR. First, that competition in OLPR is purely personality based as party candidates cannot distinguish themselves from other candidates from the same party while running on the party’s platform. This, however, discounts the ability of individual candidates to campaign on the basis of their superior ability to implement the party platform or modify it for local benefit. Second, that OLPR facilitates vote buying. The extent of vote buying is generally a function of the effectiveness of the framework for political finance, and of its enforcement, rather than the electoral system per se. Whether vote buying would be greater under OLPR than under other electoral systems in the same environment is a difficult proposition to test in most circumstances, as it is unusual for OLPR to run in parallel with other systems. One potentially useful reference point is Colombia, where political parties can currently choose to use either an open or closed list of candidates in each electoral district, which makes contemporaneous comparisons of behaviour under both systems possible. While observer reports

on the Colombian national elections, such as those from the Organization of American States (OAS n.d.), report individual instances of vote buying, and there is much anecdotal reporting of vote buying (see Moloney 2014), these reports do not distinguish between parties with open lists and those with closed lists. The largest study of candidates campaigning in Colombia—of elections in 1,100 municipalities between 2003 and 2015—does not directly address vote buying, but concludes that:

We find that the adoption of open list dramatically increases parties' vote and seat shares. Semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of candidates reveal that parties that use closed list struggle to attract high-quality candidates and to incentivize them to campaign. Consistent with these mechanisms, our statistical analyses confirm that open-list candidates [Compared to candidates for parties adopting closed lists for the same elections] are more experienced, more engaged in their constituencies and campaigns, and less likely to have committed election fraud in the past (Hangartner, Ruiz and Tukiainen 2019).

Lastly, it is sometimes contended that OLPR weakens parties as aggregators of public opinion and as democratic representatives. This can happen in some specific OLPR frameworks, such as in Jordan, that appear to have been configured to restrict the role of political parties, but it is not a necessary consequence of OLPR—as the experiences of Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Norway and Sweden, among others, show. Factors external to the electoral system, such as candidate selection processes and any mechanisms for internal party democracy on policymaking, can have more influence in this respect.

A significant number of recent changes to electoral systems—in Sri Lanka in 1989, Croatia in 2000, Ecuador in 2002, Indonesia in 2004, El Salvador in 2012, Fiji in 2014 and Jordan in 2016—have been moves towards OLPR. In Afghanistan a move to replace the current single non-transferable vote system with a version of OLPR is currently being considered in order to strengthen a weak party system and strengthen parliament against the executive, while maintaining voters' right to vote for an individual candidate.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it is important to remember that OLPR is a concept with multiple variants, some better- or worse-suited to specific environments, rather than a standard electoral system. No variant of OLPR can perfectly fulfil every electoral system objective desired—but neither can any electoral system. OLPR needs to be configured carefully in order to maximize the benefits and minimize any potential negative impacts in a specific environment. This suits OLPR, as it is the most flexible of electoral systems and can be configured to meet many different environments and combinations of electoral system objectives. As with any electoral system, OLPR will perform better when other elements of the political and electoral environment have also been carefully calibrated and electoral rules are effectively enforced.

A notable advantage of OLPR compared to closed list PR systems and plurality/majority systems is that if configured appropriately, OLPR can give voters both inclusive representation and a strong influence over which candidate represents them, rather than just which party. It can also promote links between voters and local representatives as well as representation of a wide range of political movements. OLPR can do this with less complex electoral arrangements than systems, such as mixed member proportional systems, that aim for similar outcomes.

About the author

Alan Wall has 30 years of experience in electoral administration and as a democracy adviser. Mr Wall has published widely on electoral issues, including as co-author of International IDEA's Handbook of *Electoral Management Design*, on electoral systems for the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, on voter registration systems in Africa for the Electoral Institute of Sustainable Democracy in Africa and as a lead author for the ACE Project's Electoral Encyclopedia in the fields of electoral management and voting operations.

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Annex 1. Thresholds, district magnitudes, numbers of entities represented in parliament and seat allocation methods in countries using OLPR

Country	Electoral system	PR election threshold for individual parties	Number of PR districts	PR district magnitude	No. of parties with seats in Lower House	Lower House PR seats seat allocation method
Aruba	OLPR	0%	1	21	4	Highest average D'Hondt
Austria	OLPR	4% nationally or a Grundmandat in a regional district	9 regional 1 national	Regional 7–36 National 27	5	Highest average D'Hondt
Belgium	OLPR	5% (at district level; no national threshold)	11	4–24	13	Highest average D'Hondt
Bosnia and Herzegovina	OLPR	3%	8 regional 1 national	Regional 3–6 National 12	14	Highest average Sainte-Lague
Brazil	OLPR	0%	27	8–70	30	Highest average D'Hondt
Bulgaria	OLPR	4% (nationally)	31	4–16	5	Largest remainder Hare quota; quota only considers votes for parties attaining threshold
Chile ¹	OLPR	0%	28	3–8	17	Highest average D'Hondt
Croatia ²	OLPR	5%	12	3–14	8	Highest average D'Hondt
Cyprus	OLPR	3.6% (district) plus 1.8% (nationwide)	6	3–20	8	Largest remainder Hare quota based on all valid votes but threshold only used for allocating seats to fractions of quotas
Czechia	OLPR	5%	14	5–25	9	Highest average D'Hondt
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Parallel (FPTP ³ /OLPR)	1%	109	2–17	19+	Largest remainder Hare quota
Denmark	OLPR	0% (district) For national compensatory seats, either a district seat, 2% of national valid vote or more than the average valid vote per party in at least 2 regions	10 regional 1 national	2–20	9	Highest average D'Hondt for regional seats For compensatory seats largest remainder Hare quota calculated using votes for parties which have passed threshold
Ecuador	OLPR	0%	34 regional and OCV ⁴ 1 national	Regional 2–6 National 15	9	Regional seats—highest average D'Hondt National seats—highest average Sainte-Lague
El Salvador	OLPR	0%	14	3–24	14	Highest average D'Hondt
Estonia	OLPR	5% (for national compensatory seats only)	12 regional 1 national	Regional 6–13 National 26	5	Regional seats—largest remainder Hare quota for full quotas and more than 0.75 of a quota only National compensatory seats—highest average modified D'Hondt
Fiji	OLPR	5%	1	51	3	Highest average D'Hondt
Finland	OLPR	0%	14	7–36	10	Highest average D'Hondt
Greece	OLPR	3%	56 regional 1 national	Regional 1–18 National 12 Additional 50 seats to party with highest number of votes	6	Largest remainder with Hare quota based on all valid votes for seat allocation at MMD ⁵ constituency level; remainders pooled to national level and seats allocated according to highest average D'Hondt
Honduras ⁶	OLPR	0%	18	1–23	8	Largest remainder Hare quota
Iceland	OLPR	5% nationally (only for compensatory seats)	6	10–11	8	Highest average D'Hondt

1. Largely combined in five coalitions. Plus one independent.

2. 5% is also the natural threshold, apart from the OCV district and minorities district.

3. First Past the Post

4. Out-of-country voting

5. Multi-member districts

6. Results for two single member districts determined by plurality of votes.

Country	Electoral system	PR election threshold for individual parties	Number of PR districts	PR district magnitude	No. of parties with seats in Lower House	Lower House PR seats seat allocation method
Indonesia	OLPR	4%	80	3–10	9	Highest average Sainte-Lague (change for 2019 elections from largest remainder Hare quota)
Jordan ⁷	OLPR	0%	23	3–10		Largest remainder Hare quota based on all ballots cast, including for reserved seats and invalid ballots
Kosovo ⁸	OLPR	5%	1	120 (Including 20 reserved for minorities)	14	Highest average Sainte-Lague
Latvia	OLPR	5% (nationally)	5	13–32	7	Highest average Sainte-Lague
Lebanon ⁹	OLPR	0%	15	5–13	19	Highest average D'Hondt
Liechtenstein	OLPR	8% (nationally)	2	10 and 15	4	Hybrid—initial distribution by Hare quota considering only votes for parties attaining threshold—for full quotas only; unfilled seats allocated from remaining votes using highest average D'Hondt
Lithuania	Parallel (FPTP/OLPR)	5%	1	70	11	Largest remainder Hare quota—quota only considers votes for parties attaining threshold
Luxembourg	OLPR	0%	4	7–23	7	Hagenbach-Bischoff method: initial distribution using Hagenbach-Bischoff quota for full quotas; remaining seats allocated from remainder votes using highest average D'Hondt
Netherlands	OLPR	0.67%	1	150	13	Largest remainder Hare quota—quota based on all valid votes—to allocate full quotas. Remainder votes used to allocate any unfilled seats using highest average D'Hondt
Norway	OLPR	4% (only for compensatory seats)	19	3–17	9	Highest average modified Sainte-Lague
Panama ¹⁰	Parallel (FPTP/OLPR)	0%	13	2–7	4	Largest remainder—2 tier Hare quota
Peru	OLPR	5%	251	2–36	9	Highest average D'Hondt
Poland	OLPR	5%	41	7–19	6	Highest average modified Sainte-Lague
San Marino	OLPR	0.4% times the numbers of contesting lists, to a maximum of 3.5%	1	60	6	Highest average D'Hondt
Slovakia	OLPR	5% 7–10% for coalitions	1	150	6	Largest remainder Hare quota—quota only considers votes for parties attaining threshold
Slovenia ¹¹	OLPR	4%	8	11	9	Two level allocation: largest remainder using Droop quota for full quotas; unfilled seats allocated using highest average D'Hondt considering only remainders from parties that passed 4% national threshold
Sri Lanka	OLPR	0%	22 regional 1 national	Regional 4–20 National 29	15	Largest remainder Hare quota
Suriname	OLPR	0%	10	2–17	6	Highest average D'Hondt
Sweden	OLPR	4% (national level) 12% (district)	29 regional 1 national	Regional 2–34 National 39	8	Highest average modified Sainte-Lague
Switzerland	OLPR	0%	26	1–35	11	Hagenbach-Bischoff method: initial distribution using Hagenbach-Bischoff quota for full quotas; remaining seats allocated from remainder votes using highest average D'Hondt

7. No formal parties in Jordan. Plus 15 seats for highest vote winning women who did not win a seat.

8. Includes eight parties which did not win seats but received seats reserved for ethnic minorities. Threshold does not apply to ethnic minority parties.

9. Plus 10 independent representatives.

10. Plus five independent representatives from the FPTP part of the election.

11. Threshold is for national allocation of seats unfilled by full quotas at district level. Two minority seats are filled by a modified Borda method.

Annex 2. Voting methods and contestants in OLPR systems

Table A2.1. Vote for party, then may vote for candidate(s)

Country	Number of candidates each voter may vote for	Election contestants
Aruba	1	Political party lists only
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	Political party lists, independent lists or candidates
Bulgaria	1	Political party lists, independent candidates
Croatia	1	Political party lists, independent lists
Cyprus	1 for every 4 seats in the district	Political party lists, independent candidates
Czechia	Up to 4	Political party lists, non-partisan 'political movement' lists
Greece	1 to 5 depending on number of mandates in the district	Political party lists, independent lists or candidates
Iceland	May change order of candidates on list or cross out rejected candidates	Political party lists, independent lists
Kosovo	Up to 5	Political party lists, independent candidates or 'citizen initiative' lists
Latvia	May vote for as many candidates or reject as many candidates as there are on the list	Political party lists only
Lebanon	1	Political party lists, independent lists
Liechtenstein	As many as there are mandates in the district	Political party lists, independent lists
Lithuania ¹²	5	Political party lists only
Netherlands	1	Political party lists only
Norway	May change order of candidates on list or cross out rejected candidates	Political party lists, lists from 'groups' that are not registered parties
Panama ¹³	As many as there are mandates in the district	Political party lists, independent lists
Peru	Up to 2	Political party lists, independent lists
San Marino	1	Political party lists, independent lists
Slovakia	Up to 4	Political party lists only
Sri Lanka	Up to 3	Political party lists, independent lists
Suriname	1	Political party lists only
Sweden	1	Political party lists only (multiple lists from a party not prevented)
TOTAL = 22		

Table A2.2. Vote for candidate(s)

Country	Number of candidates each voter may vote for	Election contestants
Chile	1	Political party lists only
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1	Political party lists, independent candidates
Ecuador	As many as there are mandates in the district Panachage allowed	Political party lists, independent candidates and non-party 'political movement' lists
Estonia	1	Political party lists, independent candidates
Fiji	1	Political party lists, independent candidates
Finland	1	Political party lists, non-partisan 'district association' lists
Honduras	As many as there are mandates in the district Panachage allowed	Political party lists, independent candidates
Jordan	As many as there are mandates in the district	Political party lists, independent lists
Poland	1	Political party lists, non-party 'voters election committees' lists
TOTAL = 9		

12. As part of mixed electoral system.

13. As part of mixed electoral system.

Table A2.3. May vote either for party or for candidate(s)

Country	Number of candidates each voter may vote for	Election contestants
Austria	1 in each geographic level of candidate list	Political party lists only
Belgium	As many as there are mandates in the district	Political party lists only
Brazil	1	Political party lists only
Denmark	1	Political party lists, independent candidates
El Salvador	As many as there are mandates in the district Panachage allowed	Political party lists only
Indonesia	1	Political party lists only
Luxembourg	May vote for or delete as many candidates as there are mandates in the district Panachage allowed	Political party lists, independent lists
Slovenia	1	Political party lists, independent lists
Switzerland	May vote for or delete as many candidates as there are mandates in the district Panachage allowed	Political party lists, independent lists
TOTAL = 9		