

Nepal in Transition

A Study on the State of Democracy

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January 2008

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ISBN 978-91-85724-35-2

Printed by: Dongol Printers

Foreword

In 2004, International IDEA and the State of Democracy in South Asia/Nepal Chapter had done a survey on the state of democracy in Nepal. Three years later, they conducted a follow-up survey to gauge the people's changing perceptions of democracy and other related issues. The 2007 survey findings have shown marked differences in the people's opinions from the opinions prevalent in 2004. This shift in perspective is shaping Nepal's new political direction.

The tumultuous developments that have taken place in Nepal in recent years have been characterized by many positive trends such as the tendency to reexamine the nature of the Nepali state and the elite structure, popular aspirations for bringing about positive changes in the country, and above all, a growing desire for peace and stability. The changes brought about in the imaginative domain of the Nepali people by the 10-year long Maoist insurgency and the subsequent incorporation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) into a pluralistic democracy are in themselves significant developments. And even though the CPN-Maoist dismisses the western parliamentary or presidential models of democracy and professes to follow *janabad*, and even though the CPN-Maoist changed its ideological position only because it realized that its doctrinaire position was neither feasible nor acceptable to the rest of the world, the party's entering the political mainstream can be viewed as a triumph of democracy.

The current transitory phase is a critical period for the country: there are many challenges to be overcome, but these fluid times also offer many opportunities to meet these challenges. The challenges seem daunting in view of the heterogeneity of political groups and their petty politicking to get themselves recognized as real political forces. But ideologically, there is not much of a difference among the principal political parties, including the CPN-Maoist, as most of them have accepted multiparty competitive politics, republicanism, popular sovereignty to be guaranteed by the duly elected Constituent Assembly (CA), and the upholding of the people's freedoms. Still, sometimes these convergences can be overshadowed by the divergent strategies the political parties adopt to realize their partisan interests, frustrating the common people; and setbacks like the postponement of the CA elections for a third time,

coupled with the uncertainties prevailing in the country, have raised doubts that the period of transition might be subverted.

But no matter how the current transitory phase plays out, the Nepali political landscape is likely to undergo a significant transformation, given that the ideological content of politics is being supplanted by the rise of ethnicity, regionalism and other forms of loyalties. Where that transformation would lead to depends on how imaginative, bold and confident the political parties would be in managing the transformation, but some positive changes are bound to occur. The growing rising awareness of the people would doubtless help to ensure some sort of a culture of accountability among the political parties and the rising trends of regionalism, ethnicity and other elements of identity would force the political parties to address the legitimate demands of regional and ethnic groups.

Nepal in Transition has tried to explore many important issues related to transitional politics: the issues of monarchy, inclusive democracy, and the transformation of the Maoists from an insurgent group to a mainstream party that engages in competitive politics. The survey has also studied the new phenomenon of the rise in ethnic consciousness among Nepalis, a phenomenon that demands vigilance and deft social engineering from the major political actors in the transition process, and the dynamics of ethnic and national identity. The discriminatory character that the Nepali state has had, ever since the state was formed, encouraged the politics of exclusion, and only privileged caste and class groups have enjoyed power and access to resources. *Jana Andolan II* has given us an opportunity to rectify this and many other outmoded characteristics of the Nepali state, and the survey catalogues the people's expectations for positive changes.

I am confident that the messages conveyed by the survey results, if paid heed to and acted upon by the political actors, would help to smooth the transition underway in Nepal. Nepal's recent developments are being watched by the world: people everywhere would like to see the democratization process bear fruit and would like to see a nation that was riddled by conflict transform into a peaceful, thriving democracy. The coordinator of the survey, Dr. Krishna Hachhethu, and his team members deserve appreciation for creating a report that will help everyone understand the democratic machinery that's working to bring about a better Nepal.



Lok Raj Baral
Professor & Executive Chairman
Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies (NCCS)
Kathmandu, Nepal
January 2008

Preface

What does democracy mean to people? Which institutions of governance are trusted by the population? How are people's views affected by tumultuous events in their country? The cross-sectional surveys in this study were used for mapping citizens' opinions, attitudes and behaviours in Nepal during the critical period of 2004 to 2007. The surveys aimed to create a snapshot of the views held by the people on what democracy meant for them, people's confidence in institutions of governance, levels of political activity, people's views on the status of minorities, on personal safety and the material condition of their families and the country. The two surveys together allow us also to identify political and social trends during these critical years of transition.

There is a debate in Nepal, as elsewhere, about the purposes and relevance of surveys, especially in times of transition. To be sure, surveys are but one method for gauging people's opinions—there are many other methodologies that can be used to achieve the same ends, but surveys can be helpful in understanding popular perceptions and common sense. Furthermore by giving people the forum to express themselves, such studies broaden the scope of democratic discourse: by their very nature surveys capture the voices prevalent at the grassroots levels and bring to the fore the opinions of people that may never otherwise be entertained by the media and other disseminators of information.

This survey has been complemented by qualitative interviews with some of the respondents, which should help readers understand the contexts that informed the responses. The study is also complemented by interviews with representatives of Nepali elites and a survey amongst the members of Parliament/Legislature.

In the course of conducting this survey, a tangential benefit for the country has accrued as well: more than two hundred university students were trained in surveying methods, and this crop of surveyors could indeed help future researchers seeking to undertake studies on the nature of Nepali democracy.

I do believe that these results will serve as an invaluable databank for researchers well into the future. Decades from now, researchers will be able to marshal these findings to come to a conclusion about how the Nepali people felt about democracy,

security, politics and the economy in the period of 2004-2007. Furthermore, in a country like Nepal, where scientific data are hard to come by, this study will contribute to bulking up the body of Nepal's historical archives.

One of the most important findings of the study is that Nepali people do share the global citizenry's aspirations for democracy: In both the 2004 and the 2007 surveys, the majority of the respondents said that democracy, rather than any other form of governance, was suitable and desirable for Nepal. The positive implications of such a finding should, however, be tempered by our acknowledging the fact that the promise of democracy in Nepal has yet to be converted into a viable, working democracy—and the disappointment expressed by the respondents about Nepal's inability to do so should be taken into account. Still, the study has shown that the people greatly support the on-going peace process and the processes of democratization, which will hopefully fire up the national politicians and the members of the international community to do what they can to live up to those expectations.



Vidar Helgesen
Secretary-General
International IDEA
January 2008

Acknowledgements

Nepal in Transition: A Study on the State of Democracy is the second volume of a survey study conducted on the nature of democracy in Nepal. The first study, with a different title—*State of Democracy in Nepal: Survey Report*—was published in November 2004. The second volume is probably more informative than the first because this time around the cross-section citizen survey has been complemented by an MP survey with members of interim parliament/legislature and a booster survey and includes qualitative information garnered through interviews with the commoners of the sampled areas and through interviews with the national-level elites. International IDEA is, therefore, grateful to the respondents of the citizen survey, the MP survey and the booster survey and those included in the qualitative study, for giving their valuable time to this study.

This report is a product of the collective effort of around a hundred people who were involved in different capacities. The credit for the study's success should go mainly to the supervisors and investigators, for the hard work they put in when conducting the field work.

We would also like to thank Prof. Lok Raj Baral (Executive Chairman of NCCS) and Prof. Yogendra Yadav (Lokniti, CSDS, Delhi) for the guidance they provided. In addition to their contributions in their advisory roles during every stage of the study, from the project-design stage to the publication of the report, Dr. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham and Ms Leena Rikkila (International IDEA) gave moral and intellectual support, and Sanjay Kumar (Lokniti, CSDS, Delhi) offered technical input. We would like to thank them for their work and support. Prof. Krishna P. Khanal (Central Department of Political Science, Tribhuvan University) and Prof. Dilli Ram Dahal (Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University) also contributed in several ways, and their contributions as peer reviewers deserve to be mentioned here. We would also like to thank Nebin Lal Shrestha and his data team for the technical input they provided. Tiku Gauchan copyedited the report and Ajit Baral helped fine-tune it. We are indebted to them for bringing the report into its present shape.

The study is part of International IDEA's project 'Supporting Constitution Building in Nepal', supported by the Royal Embassy of Norway in Kathmandu and the UK government.

Contents

	Page
Foreword	v
Preface	vii
Acknowledgements	ix
Tables	xiv
Charts	xvi
Abbreviations	xviii
I. Introduction	1
1. Context	1
A. The call for a republic	2
B. The CPN-Maoist transforms into a legitimate political force	3
C. The call for a more inclusive democracy	3
2. The state of the nation today	4
A. Democratic governance	4
B. Dealing with the CPN-Maoist militia	5
C. Inclusive democracy	5
3. Ten key findings	6
4. Organization of the report	7
II. Methodology	9
1. Citizen survey	9
2. Sampling	10
3. MP survey	11
4. Booster survey	12
5. In-depth interview with commoners	12
6. In-depth interview with national-level elites	13
7. Observation report	13
8. Survey context	13
9. Survey process	15
10. Data entry and cleaning	16
11. Sample characteristics	16

III. Democracy, <i>Jana Andolan</i> II and Political Participation	19
1. <i>Jana Andolan</i> II is an unprecedented event	20
A. Mass participation in <i>Jana Andolan</i> II was not confined to people's involvement in rallies	22
B. Peace and reconciliation are the main expectations from the success of <i>Jana Andolan</i> II	24
2. The process of social capital formation has been expediting	25
A. The level of people's exposure to the mass media has increased significantly	26
B. People's political awareness in post- <i>Jana Andolan</i> II is quite impressive	27
C. The higher the level of political awareness, the greater the level of political participation	29
3. Nepali people's adherence and commitment to democracy has increased after <i>Jana Andolan</i> II	33
4. Political parties and CPN-Maoist are catalysts of <i>Jana Andolan</i> II	36
IV. Transition and Expectation	45
1. The election of the CA is the main goal of the current transitional process	47
2. The formation of a republic as a goal of <i>Jana Andolan</i> II has been increasingly endorsed by the Nepali people	49
3. People's trust in the CPN-Maoist was not very high, though they believed in its transformation	53
4. The majority of Nepali voters don't understand the CA but do have a sense of it	59
5. Political parties seem skeptical but people do think that it is possible to hold a fair CA election	62
6. People believe that international supervision would help in ensuring free and fair elections of the CA	69
V. Ethnicity and Inclusion	73
1. National identity remains the preference of many citizens	75
2. The rise of ethnicity in Nepal is associated with the problem of exclusion	79
A. Inclusion and exclusion are reflective of the caste hierarchy	80
B. Several factors have worked together to exclude certain groups	82
C. The conditions of excluded groups have been improving	82
D. CPN-Maoist has been credited the most with working for the cause of excluded groups	84
E. There is unanimity on the need for constitutional provisions for inclusive measures	84
3. Ethnic/regional assertion for inclusive democracy is associated with some concrete proposals	85
A. Citizens want to retain Nepal as a Hindu state but demands for a secular state are on the rise	85
B. On proposal of federalism, citizens are divided but the elite have a consensus	87
C. Citizens want an end to the monopoly of the Nepali language	88

VI. Conclusion	91
1. Six messages	92
2. Four challenges	94
References	97
Major Political Events in Nepal	99
Index	102
Appendices	104
1. List of Persons Interviewed at Local Level	104
2. List of Persons Interviewed at National Level	105
3. Frequency Table	106

List of Tables

	Page
II.1 Jhapa-2: Sample Areas and Respondents	10
II.2 Distribution of Sample Parliamentary Constituencies: Ecological Zones and Development Regions	16
II.3 Demographic Backgrounds of Sample Respondents	16
II.4 Caste/Ethnic and Religious Backgrounds of Respondents	17
III.1 Citizens' Participation in <i>Jana Andolan II</i>	21
III.2 Forms of Participation in <i>Jana Andolan II</i>	23
III.3 Expectations from <i>Jana Andolan II</i>	24
III.4 Increment in Exposure to the Media from 2004 to 2007	27
III.5 Media Exposure and Political Awareness	28
III.6 Increment of Participation in Protests/Movements and in Political Discussions	30
III.7 Participation in Formal Organizations	31
III.8 Increment of Participation in Formal Organizations from 2004 to 2007	33
III.9 Understanding of Democracy	34
III.10 Choice of Regime	35
III.11 Association with and Participation in Political Parties	37
III.12 Participation in and Association with Political Parties: 2004 and 2007	38
III.13 Trust in State/Political Institutions	39
III.14 Trust in Party Leaders	40
IV.1 Understanding the CA as a Process for Making a New Constitution	48
IV.2 Expectations from the CA	48
IV.3 Citizens' Opinions on the Future of the Monarchy	50
IV.4 Parties' Positions on the Future of the Monarchy	51
IV.5 Proportion of the Increase in Republican Opinion	52
IV.6 Trust in the CPN-Maoist and Belief in its Transformation: Citizens and MPs	54

IV.7	Trust in the CPN-Maoist and Belief in its Transformation: Political Parties	55
IV.8	Experiences with the CPN-Maoist	58
IV.9.A	People's Understanding of the CA and Associated Issues	60
IV.9.B	People's Understanding of the CA and Associated Issues	61
IV.10	Confidence on the Election of the CA without Fear	63
IV.11	Security Situation	64
IV.12	Security Situation in Comparison to the Past	65
IV.13	Reasons behind the Improvement of Security Situation	66
IV.14	Sources of Insecurity	67
IV.15	Grading the Role of the International Community	70
V.1	Preference of Identity	77
V.2	Pride in being a Nepali and Pride in their Ethnicities	78
V.3	Included Groups and Excluded Groups	80
V.4	Factors Leading to the Marginalization of the Groups	82
V.5	Improvement in the Conditions of the Excluded Groups in the Last Few Years	83
V.6	Actors Contributing to Promoting the Cause of the Excluded Groups	84
V.7	Choice of a Secular or Hindu State	86
V.8	Choice of a Unitary or Federal State	87
V.9	Choice of an Official Language	88

List of Charts

	Page
III.1 Participation in the April 2006 <i>Jana Andolan</i> II	20
III.2 Forms of Participation in <i>Jana Andolan</i> II: Citizens and MPs	22
III.3 Expectations from <i>Jana Andolan</i> II: Citizens and MPs	25
III.4 Use of the Media (Newspaper, Radio and Television): Citizens and MPs	26
III.5 Use of the Media by Citizens: 2004 and 2007	26
III.6 Participation in Protest/Movement: 2004 and 2007	29
III.7 Participation in Political Discussion: 2004 and 2007	29
III.8 Levels of Participation in Activities Conducted by Various Organization: Citizens and MPs	32
III.9 Level of Participation in Activities Conducted by Various Organization: 2004 and 2007	32
III.10 Understanding Democracy: 2004 and 2007	34
III.11 Support to Democracy: Citizens and MPs	35
III.12 Support to Democracy: 2004 and 2007	35
III.13 Suitability of Democracy: 2004 and 2007	35
III.14 Association with and Participation in Political Parties: 2004 and 2007	37
III.15 Trust in State and Political Institutions: 2004 and 2007	41
IV.1 Understanding the CA: Citizens and MPs	47
IV.2 Expectation from the CA: Citizens and MPs	48
IV.3 Choice: Republic or Monarchy: Citizens and MPs	51
IV.4 Choice: Monarchy or Republic: 2004 and 2007	51
IV.5 Reasons for Becoming a Republic: Citizens and MPs	52
IV.6 Belief in Maoist Transformation and Trust in the Maoists: Citizens and MPs	53
IV.7 Experiences with the Maoists: Citizens and MPs	57
IV.8 Familiarity with the CA and other Important Issues	60
IV.9 Confidence on the CA Election without Fear: Citizens and MPs	63
IV.10 Security Situation: Citizens and MPs	64
IV.11 Security Situation: 2004 and 2007	64

IV.12	Security Situation in Comparison to the Past: Citizens and MPs	65
IV.13	Security Situation in Comparison to the Past: 2004 and 2007	65
IV.14	Reasons behind Improvement of Security Situation: Citizens and MPs	66
IV.15	Sources of Insecurity: Citizens and MPs	67
IV.16	Role of International Community: Citizens and MPs	70
IV.17	Significance of International Supervision for a Free and Fair CA Election: Citizens and MPs	70
V.1	Preference of Identity: Citizens and MPs	77
V.2	Preference of Identity: 2004 and 2007	77
V.3	Included Groups: Citizens and MPs	81
V.4	Excluded Groups: Citizens and MPs	81
V.5	Improvement of Excluded Groups: Citizens and MPs	83
V.6	Improvement of Excluded Groups: 2004 and 2007	83
V.7	Institutions Working for the Cause of Excluded Groups: Citizens and MPs	84
V.8	Constitutional Provision for Backward Communities: Citizens and MPs	84
V.9	Choice: Hindu or Secular State: Citizens and MPs	86
V.10	Choice: Hindu or Secular State: 2004 and 2007	86
V.11	Choice: Unitary or Federal State: Citizens and MPs	87
V.12	Choice: Unitary or Federal State: 2004 and 2007	87
V.13	Choice of a Language Policy: Citizens and MPs	88
V.14	Choice of a Language Policy: 2004 and 2007	88

Abbreviations

CA	Constituent Assembly
CBES	Chure-Bhabar Ekata Samaj
CBO	Community Based Organization
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN-Maoist	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
EC	Election Commission
FPTP	First-past-the-post
HOR	House of Representatives
JTMM	Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha
MJF	Madheshi Janadhikar Forum
MPs	Members of Parliament
NC	Nepali Congress
NEFIN	Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSP	Nepal Sadbhawana Party
NWPP	Nepal Workers' and Peasants' Party
PA	Proportional Allocation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime Minister
PR	Proportional Representation
RJP	Rashtriya Janashakti Party
RPP	Rashtriya Prajatantra Party
SPA	Seven Party Alliance
ULF	United Left Front
UML	Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
VDC	Village Development Committee
YCL	Young Communist League



Introduction

The Nepali team of the State of Democracy in South Asia network—in collaboration with International IDEA—has completed the second round of the cross section citizen survey on the State of Democracy in Nepal. The first Nepal Democracy Survey was conducted in August-September 2004 as part of a regional initiative to carry out a baseline evaluation of the democratic enterprise in five South Asian countries. The second round of survey featured the same sample areas and respondents that were chosen in 2004. The survey field work, spreading over 41 parliamentary constituencies of 40 districts, was carried out from 28

March to 27 April 2007 in 162 polling stations (23 in urban areas and 139 in rural areas). The survey was done through face to face interviews with a nationwide sample of 4,089 respondents. A survey with the members of the interim parliament/legislature (hereafter MP survey) was also conducted in July 2007, in which a structured questionnaire was administered to 300 of the total 330 members of the interim parliament; and a qualitative interview was taken with 46 people at the local level in April 2007 and with 30 national-level elite from different fields, from July to September of 2007.

Context

The April 2006 mass protests known as *Jana Andolan II*, in which at least three to four million Nepalis (in a nation of 25 million people) participated, marked the beginning of a journey towards a new Nepali democratic state. This new Nepali state will probably not manifest through gradual evolutionary steps; instead, given the prevailing political ethos in the country, this new Nepal will have to be forged through processes that will ensure

Nepal's radical departure from its past—a departure from the two-and-a-half-century long history of monarchical rule, a departure from the decade-long tumultuous period that was marked chiefly by the insurgency carried out by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) and a departure from a Nepal in which the political sphere was dominated by the Hill-Hindu Brahmin and Chhetri males. Thus, the new Nepali



state can be envisioned as one in which three major transformations will have taken place—the kingdom transformed into a republic, the milieu of civil conflict transformed into one of peaceful politics and the non-inclusive state ruled by the high-castes transformed into an inclusively democratic Nepal. The first major milestone on this journey towards the new Nepal, the concrete achievement embodying the vision as expressed by the people during *Jana Andolan II*, will be

the election of the Constituent Assembly (CA).

A brief summary is given below of the current political climate in Nepal and the provenance for and the interplay of the overriding issues that are shaping current political discourse. The purpose of the summary is to familiarize the readers of this report with the context of this study.

The call for a republic

The overwhelming consensus among the political parties and the people of Nepal is that the country should be transformed into a republic. The people and the parties have reached this conclusion primarily because Nepali kings have time and again derailed democracy and usurped absolute power.

Democracy in Nepal was first attained in 1951 through an armed revolution against the century old oligarchic Rana regime (the Shah Kings had been propped up as figurehead rulers then). But in December 1960, King Mahendra usurped power and thereby nipped Nepal's first incipient democracy in the bud. King Mahendra supplanted democratic rule with the partyless *Panchayat* regime, a system that continued until 1990. Multiparty democracy was restored in April 1990 after the people demanded its return through mass protests. This second era of democracy lasted longer, and this new era of democracy witnessed many achievements that are usually associated with a thriving democracy: a new constitution was promulgated, parliamentary elections were held in 1991, 1994 and 1999 and local elections were held in 1992 and 1997. But Nepal's second stint with democracy was also derailed by the palace. King Gyanendra, through two royal coups in October 2002 and February 2005, usurped power in a manner reminiscent of his father, King Mahendra.

The king's seizure of power antagonized the public who already viewed him with suspicion. King Gyanendra—who had been crowned after his brother King Birendra along with all members of his family and five other royalties were murdered in June 2001—was not seen as the legitimate heir to the throne, much less accepted as an active and all-powerful head of state. As it was, the masses had suspected that the royal massacre had been an act of conspiracy, and King Gyanendra's problematic ascension to the throne under such murky circumstances, coupled with his dismantling of democracy and usurpation of absolute power, served to make the king an unpopular ruler. While it is true that the internecine party politics after 1990, the detrimental effects of the CPN-Maoist insurgency, and the overall culture of political decadence had weakened the state of democracy in Nepal, the king overplayed his hand by usurping power. His wresting of total power not only spurred the political parties to align with the CPN-Maoist but also further alienated the king from the masses. The people responded by taking to the streets in *Jana Andolan II*, rallying for republicanism: the people wanted a complete extirpation of the institution of monarchy. In the days that followed, the king was ousted from power, and the political parties and the CPN-Maoist cobbled together an interim parliament to run the affairs of the state. And,

ever wary of how the palace could scupper democracy—given the palace’s meddlesome history—the political forces

and the masses have now come to view republicanism as the only solution to ensuring the sustenance of democracy.

CPN-Maoist transforms into a legitimate political force

The exit of the monarchy from the state affairs coincided with the entry of the CPN-Maoist into the post-*Jana Andolan* II transitional arrangement. Thus, *Jana Andolan* II was remarkable not only because it jumpstarted the political processes that would eventually end monarchical rule but also because it signaled the beginning of the transformation of the CPN-Maoist from an insurgent group into a mainstream political party. This mainstreaming of the CPN-Maoist actually fulfilled one of the purposes of *Jana Andolan* II—the ending of the state of armed conflict between the government and the CPN-Maoist. With an avowed objective of overthrowing the monarchy and scuttle the multiparty parliamentary system, the CPN-Maoist had launched an insurgency in February 1996, which had escalated to a countrywide movement within a very short span of time. There had been attempts to settle the CPN-Maoist problem through negotiations in 2001 and in 2003, but these negotiations had failed. The CPN-Maoist, with an army of 30 thousand fighters (the People’s Liberation Army), had run a parallel administration in the areas under its control. Around 15 thousand people lost their lives during the insurgency. So the transformation of the CPN-Maoist from an armed insurgency group into a political party had become an integral

part of the anti-monarchy movement of April 2006. In the background, the mainstream force of the Seven-Party-Alliance (SPA) endorsed the CPN-Maoist’s longstanding demand for an election of the CA, and the CPN-Maoist reciprocated by professing their commitment to multiparty democracy and peaceful politics, the bottomline demands of the SPA. The SPA and the CPN-Maoist also made a tacit understanding to redouble their efforts to bring about republicanism.

Today, the CPN-Maoist has abandoned its decade-long armed insurgency, jettisoned its original ideological goal of establishing a one-party People’s Democracy and is now eagerly looking forward to assuming its role in the new Nepal. Furthermore, in the new political climate that *Jana Andolan* II ushered in, the CPN-Maoist has negotiated with and worked with the SPA to undertake several important decisions, including the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006, the promulgation of the Interim Constitution in January 2007, the formation of the interim legislature in January 2007 and the interim government in April 2007. The CPN-Maoist is significantly represented in the current interim parliament and government.

The call for a more inclusive democracy

All the aforementioned positive developments show that Nepali democracy is on the mend again, but the third component to restructuring Nepal, the creation of a truly inclusive democracy, can only be attained once Nepalis of all ethnic backgrounds and both genders are represented in the country’s governing bodies. Nepal is home to 101 caste/ethnic groups, 91

linguistic groups and 9 religious groups, but only Hill-Hindu high castes—Brahmins and Chhetris—who constitute only 31 per cent of the total population of the country occupy the lion’s share of key positions in the country’s social, economic and political power structures. Nepal’s social diversity is not reflected in its body politic.

The upper-caste hegemony in Nepal is a product of the historical acculturation processes that have been undertaken by the insular Nepali state to subsume all the other caste/ethnic groups into the ruling *Pahadiya* fold. Ever since the unification of Nepal in 1768, the rulers of Nepal—the Shah Kings (1768-1845), the Ranas (1846-1950), the *Panchas* (1960-1990) and the party leaders (1951-1959 and 1990-2002)—have tried to forge Nepal into a homogeneous, monolithic and unitary state by sanctioning and promoting only one language (Nepali), one caste group (Hill Brahmin and Chhetri), and one religion (Hinduism) and ignoring the reality of the diversified and pluralistic characteristics of Nepali society. To make matters worse, this state-designed ‘Nepalization’ process, together with the attendant centralization of politics and administration, has served to increase the disparity among Nepal’s social groups. The Hill high castes have long been placed in positions of privilege, and other groups—the *Janajati*, *Madheshi*, and Dalit—have been excluded.

Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, there has been a distinct rise in ethnicity as a socio-political identity among Nepal’s excluded groups. The call for inclusive democracy by the ethnic groups, which includes demands like reservation, caste/ethnic based proportional representation in elected bodies and federalism, has grown louder in the post-*Jana Andolan* II period. The *Madhesh* uprising in January-February

2007, a singular movement in Nepali history that was markedly different from any other socio-political movement Nepal has ever witnessed, exemplified this new ethos. In its 21-day long violent movement participated in by large masses of the *Madheshi* people, 29 persons lost their lives surpassing the casualty, 21 deaths, of the *Jana Andolan* II. Also tied to the *Madhesh* unrest was the tragic event of the massacre of 27 Maoists (all people of Hill origin) in Rautahat, a Tarai district. But even so, the *Madhesh* uprising can be credited with forcing the transitional authority to finally concede to the demands for federalism and the redistribution of electoral constituencies on the basis of population size and ethnically based representation: thanks to the uprising, about half of the total number of members of the CA will be elected under the proportional representation (PR) system (the other half of the CA’s 240 members will be elected on the basis of the first-past-the-post system). Furthermore, some changes were made recently in December 2007 in total number of the CA members and allocation of seats. Accordingly, out of the total 601 CA member, 335 seats will be filled up by proportional representative (PR) system; 240 seats will be elected through first-past-the-post (FPTP) system; and the PM will nominate 26 members. All these measures that the transitional government is now considering for implementation are some of the most important and substantial issues of inclusive democracy.

1.2 The state of the nation today

Democratic governance

The restructuring of the Nepali state, which began with *Jana Andolan* II, has brought substantial changes in the spheres of governance. The House of Representatives (HOR) was reinstated on 24 April 2006, and G.P. Koirala, the leader of the Nepali Congress party (NC), was appointed as Prime Minister

(PM) on 27 April 2006. By a declaration on 18 May 2006, which is considered as a Nepali *Magna Carta*, the reinstated HOR reduced the monarchy to the role of a non-entity by debarring the king from henceforth playing even a symbolic role in government. In a similar spirit, the Interim Constitution, promulgated in

January 2007, made a provision that would allow for the abolition of the institution of monarchy by a simple majority in the first CA meeting. In addition, the second amendment to the Interim Constitution has added a provision that the country can be declared a republic even before the election of the CA if the king makes any

attempt to foil the CA election. The May 2006 declaration is remarkable for other important achievements as well—the promise of the election of the CA, the proclamation of Nepal as a secular state, and a provision that will allow one-third of the seats in the state apparatus to be reserved for women.

Dealing with the CPN-Maoist militia

A formal negotiation between the SPA and the CPN-Maoist, which started on 26 May 2006, successfully concluded with the signing of the CPA in November 2006. According to the terms of the agreement reached, the CPN-Maoist combatants were put in cantonments and their arms were locked up. The Nepali Army was also confined to the barracks. Its arms—a similar quantity of arms of the CPN-Maoist—were also locked up.

The CPA was a prelude to the mainstreaming of the CPN-Maoist into the larger body politic whereby the CPN-Maoist would share power in the interim legislature and the interim government. How the CPN-Maoist deals with its militia will play a huge role in determining how successfully the CPN-Maoist transforms itself from an insurgent group into a competitive political party.

Inclusive democracy

While the negotiations between the SPA and the CPN-Maoist have led to the implementation of several progressive measures designed to rejuvenate democracy, the efforts of the SPA and the CPN-Maoist to build a more inclusive democracy have been marked more by rhetoric than by the undertaking of substantive measures. During the negotiations between the SPA and the CPN-Maoist, groups representing women and the Dalit, *Janajati* and *Madhesh* communities lobbied and pressured the political parties to acknowledge their concerns and suggestions about the processes that needed to be included during the making of the new Constitution. But sensing the indifference of the SPA and CPN-Maoist to their agendas, the marginalized groups had to resort to taking to the streets to further their cause. The SPA's and CPN-Maoist's reluctance to address the grievances of marginalized groups provided the ground for the flaring up of the ethnic movements. The *Madhesh* uprising of January-February 2007, for

example, was unique in terms of its level of popular participation, for the political impact it had and because the movement led to the government's finally negotiating with *Madheshi* representatives. The *Madheshi* movement also led to the Interim Constitution of 2007 being amended twice in an extremely short span of time. The amendments included provisions to incorporate some of the key issues of the ethnic/regional movements—federalism, a PR system in proportion to the size of population groups and an increase in the number of electoral seats earmarked for the Tarai in the CA, from 43 to 49 per cent. The interim government also made separate agreements with some of the emerging forces like the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), Chure-Bhabar Ekata Samaj (CBES) and the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN). The post-CPA period has thus been marked by highly intense ethnic uprisings, which have put all the other important issues that need to be tackled on the backburner.

1.3 Ten key findings

In the context discussed in the earlier section, the Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 sought the opinions of both citizens and the elite on several issues related to the three major components needed for restructuring the Nepali state—the end of monarchical rule, the transformation of the CPN-Maoist and inclusive democracy. The respondents' perception of democracy, their trust in political institutions and leaders, their observations of the transitional arrangement and their opinions on the election of the CA are some of the important elements that this survey gauged. Outlined below are the highlight of the ten key findings (discussed in the following chapters) of this survey.

1 The process of social capital formation, which has been exhibited in several ways, ensures the sustainability and consolidation of democracy in Nepal. Democracy is preferred to any other kind of government and so this system is suitable for Nepal. Although the political parties and the CPN-Maoist garnered a relatively low level of trust, the public's trust in the overall state and political institutions is admirable. People's political awareness and participation is on the rise. People have greater media exposure and greater association/involvement with formal organizations. Many are keeping themselves informed about recent political developments and participating in political discussions and political activities.

2 The majority of Nepali voters don't understand the meaning of the CA but do have a sense of what it means. Nepalis have never experienced an election to the CA. So a large portion of the Nepali population don't understand its academic and technical meaning; they do, however, sense that the CA is somehow associated with their aspirations, i.e., peace, security,

governance, economic development, change, etc.

3 The elite doubt that fair CA elections can be held, but people think otherwise. The elite are pessimistic about the security situation, but the people believe that the situation is improving. The creation of the 'Eight Party Alliance' (SPA plus the CPN-Maoist) and the 'resolution of the Maoist conflict' were, more than any other factors, credited with contributing to the improvement of the security environment in the country. Both the MPs and commoners affirmed that supervision by the international community would ensure free and peaceful elections to the CA.

4 People are more concerned with peace, political stability and economic development whereas the elite are more concerned with the restructuring of the Nepali state. People expect most of their aspirations, as embodied by *Jana Andolan II*, will bear fruit and that the upcoming elections of the CA will bring peace and political reconciliation, help in the formation of a stable and effective government and promote economic development. The elite are concerned more with a project of restructuring the Nepali state.

5 Opinion is swinging dramatically and exponentially in favour of a republic. People's preference for a republic is on the rise, and their opinion against the institution of monarchy has been influenced by decisions taken by political parties and the government in the post-*Jana Andolan II* period.

6 Both the people and the elite believe in the CPN-Maoist's new commitment to multiparty democracy. The CPN-Maoist's laying down of arms, entering into a peace agreement, agreeing to the subsequent power sharing arrangement and its public affirmation of its

commitment to multiparty democracy have made many people and the elite believe that the CPN-Maoist is committed to multiparty democracy. Some, however, doubt its intentions.

7 Assertion of ethnic and regional identity is rising. Nepal has witnessed a rise in ethnic consciousness, particularly after *Jana Aandolan I* (1990 mass movement). In the post-*Jana Andolan II* period, the issue of ethnicity became more prominent after the *Madheshis* (in the Tarai) and the *Janajatis* (in the Hills) took to the streets demanding inclusive democracy. The rise of ethnicity and regionalism, however, won't contribute to the disintegration of the country.

8 People are in favour of affirmative action for the excluded groups and have a sense of who the excluded and included groups are. Both the elite and the public sympathize with the excluded groups. Generally, the Hill high castes (Brahmin, Chhetri) are considered as

included and others—like the Dalits, *Janajatis*, *Madheshis*, Muslims and women—are considered as excluded.

9 There is a gap between the parties' formal positions and people's choices on key issues regarding the restructuring of the state. The interim parliament—with the consensus of the eight-political-parties—declared Nepal a secular state, and the interim government also proclaimed that it would adopt a federal form of government in the new Constitution, which will be framed after the election of the CA. But the majority of the surveyed citizens want Nepal to be a Hindu and unitary state.

10 People of *Pahadi* (Hill) origin and *Madheshi* (plains/Tarai) origin are divided on the agenda of state restructuring. People of Hill origin appear to prefer the status quo regarding language policy and the nature of government, whereas *Madheshis* want a bi/multi lingual policy and federalism.


Organization of the report

I.4

This report is organized into six chapters. It begins with a brief overview of the context of the survey and highlights of the major findings of the study. The reliability of a cross-section survey is generally measured by analyzing the sampling method adopted in the study and by comparing the level of representativeness of the sample areas and respondents to the national characteristics. Chapter two is, therefore, about the methodology employed in conducting the study, i.e. sample framing, questionnaire designing, quantitative data entry/cleaning, qualitative interviews, etc. Chapter three illustrates the different aspects of social capital formation and their links with the people's understanding and assessment of

democracy. Chapter four focuses on the key issues of transitional politics, making the election to the CA the central area of analysis; the transformation of the CPN-Maoist, obviously an integral part of the transitional arrangement, is also featured; the people's preference for either a republic or a monarchy, another major issue related to transitional democracy, is also examined. Chapter five establishes a link between inclusive democracy and the rise in ethnic consciousness. Chapter six, the conclusion, draws out a summary of the state of democratic affairs in Nepal, highlighting the main findings of the survey. The people of Nepal have a message that is clearly communicated through this report.

Sample District/Constituencies





Methodology

Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 is primarily based on a cross-section citizen survey. An MP survey with the members of the interim parliament/legislature has been included as an added component to this second round of democracy survey. The study team also felt that there was a need to investigate how the rise in ethnicity among the Hill-*Janajatis* and the *Madheshis* of the Tarai had affected members of these groups and how they perceived matters related to democracy and agendas of state restructuring; so this study includes a booster survey of the Gurungs of Kaski, a Hill district, and the *Madheshis* of Dhanusha, a Tarai district. To complement the cross-section citizen

survey and the MP survey, in-depth interviews were also taken with commoners at the local level and elites at the national level. Thus, Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 adopted two major pathways for eliciting information: (I) **quantitative methods** in the form of (a) cross-section citizen survey, (b) an MP survey, and (c) a booster survey; and (II) **qualitative methods** through (d) in-depth interviews with the common people at the local level from sample areas, (e) in-depth interviews with national-level elites from different professions, and (f) direct observation reports prepared by the surveyors.

Citizen survey



Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 adopted the same sample frame for selecting both the study areas and respondents that was used in the first round of the survey on democracy undertaken in 2004. Of the 162 polling stations surveyed in 2007, 121 were the same stations that had featured in the 2004 survey; similarly, out of a total of 3,249 respondents of the 2004 survey, 1,410 were featured again in

the 2007 survey. Furthermore, the questionnaire used in the 2004 survey was taken with a revision retaining many relevant questions of the original set and adding several new questions to reflect the impact of the major developments that had taken place after the 2004 survey. There are two reasons for resurveying the same areas and for using the same respondents: 1) the area

surveyed was largely representative of the diverse geographical/topographical regions and different social segments in the country; and 2) the Election

Commission did not have an updated voter list when the 2007 survey was conducted.

II.2 Sampling

Nepal Democracy Survey is based on multistage (3-stage) probability sampling. In the first stage, 41 parliamentary constituencies (i.e., 20 per cent of the total of 205 constituencies of the country) were randomly selected using systematic sampling techniques. To generate the sample, the code numbers for parliamentary constituencies prepared by the Election Commission were used. These serialized code numbers start out by covering the Mountainous region in the east (Taplejung-1), then move on to the eastern Hills, then to the eastern Tarai and back to the mountains, and finally complete the circle at Kanchanpur-3, located in the corner of the Far-western Tarai. The method used for generating the sample ensures the probability of including all parliamentary constituencies over the three ecological zones (Mountain, Hill and Tarai) and in all five development regions (Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western, and Far-western) in the sample frame. As 20 per cent of the total 205 parliamentary constituencies was fixed for the study through the systematic sampling technique, the sampling interval was fixed at 5 ($205/41 = 5$). The first sampling unit was selected randomly between the first and fifth unit, and the remaining sampling units were selected by adding 5 to the ordinal number of

each preceding sampling unit. The numerical order of the first selected sampling unit in this study was thus 2, the second sampling unit 2+5, the third, (2+5) + 5, and so on.

In the second stage, 4 polling stations were selected from each of the 41 sample parliamentary constituencies, again using the systematic sampling technique. The same procedure that was applied at the first stage was used to select 4 out of the total number of polling stations of the sample constituency. Altogether 164 (41×4) polling stations were selected for the survey.

In the third stage, respondents were selected from each of the second-stage samples (polling stations) through proportionate allocation (PA). Respondents were selected by using the systematic sampling technique, from electoral rolls that had been prepared and updated through 2002 by the Election Commission.

The targeted number of respondents for each of the parliamentary constituencies was 100, constituting a total of 4,100 for the entire 41-sample frame. In view of the possibility that that targeted numbers might not be reached, respondents were over-sampled at two levels: (1) 20 per cent of the respondents were added at the beginning, (2) later, 50 per cent more respondents from the Hills and 30 per cent more from the Tarai, in accumulative numbers of 120 respondents, were oversampled. Table II.1 illustrates the basic features of the PA sample used at the third stage, along with the provision for over-sampling. The

II.1 Jhapa-2: Sample Areas and Respondents

Sample polling station no.	Name of polling station	Total voters	Total sample provided	Targeted sample	Actual sample*
2	Baigundhara	4,659	48	31	16
10	Mahabhara	2,663	27	17	16
18	Satashidham	3,817	39	25	25
26	Shivaganj	4,092	42	27	29
Total		15,231	156	100	86

* Including 15% from the age group of 18-21.

table illustrates the case of parliamentary constituency Jhapa-2.

Altogether, the survey team administered questionnaires to 4,089 persons, which constituted only 11 fewer respondents than the targeted number of 4,100 respondents.

For the 2007 survey, two changes were made in the sources employed in the survey. First, the provision for including two extra polling stations—in addition to the four sample polling stations from each of the parliamentary constituency samples—was dropped because peace had already been restored between the state and the CPN-Maoist when the survey was taken (unlike the war-time situation prevalent during the time when the 2004 survey was conducted). In the 2004 survey, the concept of ‘extra sampling’ had been introduced in anticipation of the possibility that the surveyors would not be allowed to work in some of the sample polling stations because of the situation of armed conflict then prevailing in the country. That premonition came true in many instances, and so replacements were made from the extra sampling polling stations that had been included as contingency choices. With the restoration of peace in April 2006, however, the

context for the 2007 survey had changed, and so the concept of ‘extra sampling’ was dropped. The second change made for the 2007 survey involved a change in the procedures used for selecting the respondents of the 18-21 age group, for which a different sample frame from the one used in 2004 was used. Since the 2007 survey used the voter list updated in 2002 and the respondent list prepared during the first round of survey, people who belonged to age group of 18-21 at the time of second round survey were not in the original respondents’ list. Since, according to the 2001 census, people from this group constituted 15 per cent of the voting-age population, a different sample frame was designed to include them. Fifteen percent of the respondents of this age group was selected randomly in the following manner: a fifth household after every seventh respondent from the original list was first selected; from the selected household, the person whose name came up first alphabetically and who fell in 18-21 age group was chosen as the respondent for the interviews. The advantages of using this method were that one, it would ensure the inclusion of 15 per cent of the respondents of the 18-21 age group, and two, the selection of respondents would remain unbiased with respect to the age and sex of the respondents.

MP survey

Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 has an additional component—the MP survey. A team of eight surveyors set out to interview as many members of the interim parliament/legislature as possible in the given time period of one month (1-31 July 2007). The structured questionnaire made for the citizen survey

was used for the MP survey as well, but eight questions from the questionnaire used for the citizen survey that were irrelevant to the MPs were dropped. The surveyors were able to administer the questionnaire with 300 MPs out of the total 330 interim parliament/legislature members.

11.3

II.4 Booster survey

As mentioned earlier, Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 has also attempted to capture people's perceptions regarding the ethnic uprising and regional movements in Nepal. For this purpose, a three-stage sampling technique was used. In the first stage, two districts—Kaski and Dhanusha—were selected purposively. Kaski district was selected for the further investigation of the *Janajati* movement in the Hills and Dhanusha district was selected for the *Madheshi* movement in the Tarai.

In the second stage, three local government units—one municipality and two Village Development Committees (VDCs)—from each selected district were sampled purposively, to account for the differences among the sites, e.g. homogeneous society (Ghandruk VDC of Kaski district and Yadukuha VDC of Dhanusha district) and heterogeneous social composition (Deurali VDC of Kaski district and Godar VDC of Dhanusha district). For the municipalities sampled in Pokhara (Kaski district) and Janakpur (Dhanusha district), five wards from each of these urban areas were selected through systematic random sampling.

In the third stage, the Election Commission's voter list, updated in

2002, was used for selecting respondents. Voters belonging to communities other than the Gurung community were deleted from the electoral roll of all three sample units of Kaski district, and then a total 150 respondents from each of the three units were selected through the systematic random sampling technique. The same procedure was used for all the three sample units of Dhanusha district—non-*Madheshis* were deleted from the electoral roll, and then 150 *Madheshi* respondents from each sample unit were selected using the systematic random sampling technique.

The targeted number of respondents for each sample unit was 100, which meant a total of 600 respondents (300 from Kaski district and 300 from Dhanusha district). Anticipating that the targeted number might not be reached, the survey team decided to over-sample fifty per cent of the respondents ($150 \times 6 \text{ units} = 900$). A structured questionnaire was administered to the targeted groups—Gurungs and *Madheshis*—by two teams, each constituting four members, in May 2007. The total number of respondents was 468: 195 Gurungs and 273 *Madheshis*.

II.5 In-depth interviews with commoners

To complement the citizen survey, the survey team also conducted in-depth interviews with 46 out of the targeted number of 50 commoner respondents. Based on questions used in the structured questionnaire prepared for the citizen survey, a checklist of interviews was prepared in advance (see appendix 1 for the names and places of interviewees) and used by supervisors who were assigned to conduct in-depth interviews, along with

their supervising responsibilities in the field. Respondents of this qualitative study were selected by using the three-stage sampling design. In the first stage, five out of the 41 parliamentary constituencies sampled in the citizen survey were selected through the systematic random sampling technique. The constituencies selected were Bhojpur-1, Mahottari-1, Nuwakot-3, Parbat-2, and Dang-2.

In the second stage, two (from a total of four) polling stations from each of the five parliamentary constituencies sampled were selected through a lottery process. The ten sample polling stations thus selected for qualitative study were the following: 1. Kudakaule, 2. Jarayotar (Bhojpur-1), 3. Vangha, 4. Gauribas (Mahottari-1), 5. Khadga Bhanjyang, 6. Bidur Municipality (Nuwakot-3), 7. Kurgha, 8. Horsyangdi (Parbat-2), 9.

Kabre, and 10. Tribhuvan Municipality (Dang-2).

In the third stage, five respondents, the required number, from each of the total of 10 sample polling stations were selected by using the systematic random sampling technique from among persons who had been included in the list of the administered questionnaire.

In-depth interviews with national-level elite

II.6

Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 entertained a qualitative study with elites at the national level. In a period of two and a half months—from 1 July to 15 September 2007—in-depth interviews were conducted with a total of 30 national-level figures from different

fields, i.e. army, business, planning commission, ethnic organization, civil society, academia, media, and obviously, from the political parties and parliament as well. (see appendix 2 for the names of interviewees).

Observation report

II.7

As per the instructions that were given to the teams before they went to the field to conduct their citizen survey, each team prepared a field-observation report. The report that was compiled included details about the observations the members of the field group made in the localities

to which they were assigned. The observation reports are significant not only because they explored the other relevant stories not covered by the structured questionnaire but also because they outlined the context in which the survey was taken.

Survey context

II.8

The second round of Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 was conducted in an environment that was much more conducive to taking the survey than had been during the previous survey. The 2004 survey had been undertaken during tenuous conditions, during the days of the triangular conflict among the monarchy, mainstream parties and the CPN-Maoist. The royal takeover of

October 2002—after which the king's regime was sustained for three and half years until April 2006—had curtailed the freedom of citizens. Furthermore, the CPN-Maoist's insurgency, which had started in February 1996, had also resumed after the failure of the second round of peace talks in April-August 2003. The first survey was therefore conducted under the threat of an all-out

armed conflict between the state and the Maoist rebels. The war had left only two districts (Manang and Mustang) out of 75 in the country relatively unaffected by actual conflict. Killings, bomb blasts, ambushes, use of landmines, kidnappings, abductions, evictions, extortions, displacements, forced migrations, disappearances, rapes and tortures were the order of the day at that time. So the risk factor was obvious, and fourteen out of nineteen survey teams encountered the Maoists at least once in their respective fields and engaged with them for varying durations, from a minimum of four hours to a maximum of three days. Many respondents were understandably afraid of speaking their minds, and that fear led many of them to answer 'could not understand' to some sensitive questions related to the monarchy and the CPN-Maoist. Fortunately, the second round survey of 2007 did not have to be conducted in such a tumultuous environment.

Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 was undertaken in a completely different environment. Following the successful *Jana Andolan II*, the SPA government and the CPN-Maoist had announced a ceasefire in May 2006 and signed the CPA in November 2006. The CPN-Maoist had joined the interim parliament in January 2007 and then the interim government in April 2007. So the field groups' encounters with the Young Communist League (YCL)—a militant wing of the CPN-Maoist—did not hamper field work during the 2007 survey; but the surveyors did have to allot some of their time to the YCL, to explain the nature of their work.

The conditions in the Tarai were, however, different due to the prevailing situation of communal tension between the *Madheshis* (people of Tarai origin) and *Pahadis* (people of Hill origin). The fallout from the 21-day long violent *Madhesh* uprising of January-February 2007 still affected the Tarai: several armed *Madheshi* groups had been involved in killing, extortion and kidnapping, and they targeted *Pahadis*. To

facilitate work under such circumstances in the Tarai, only *Madheshi* enumerators were assigned to carry out surveys in the sample areas in the Tarai. This decision proved germane as the survey teams were able to conduct their work without undue problems, despite the general state of disturbance in the Tarai.

In general, the restoration of democracy and peace contributed significantly to bringing back an atmosphere of freedom and in lessening the fear psyche among the people. Perhaps this was one of the reasons that the number of 'could not understand' responses on all sensitive questions declined considerably in the 2007 survey. However, the people's ignorance on the agendas of state restructuring i.e. federalism, reservation, constituent assembly etc. was evident. These terminologies are recent entrants to the Nepali political discourse and so the answers of 'could not understand' scored highly on questions related to an understanding of these issues. The reason, as observed by almost all surveyors during a month long field work, was understandable. They observed the non-attendance by or only the marginal presence of political parties and the CPN-Maoist in rural areas in terms of political mobilization and political education of the masses.

Even in places that have not witnessed any significant political change, people are generally suspicious of strangers' asking questions, and this suspicion of strangers obviously affected both the 2004 and 2007 surveys as well. When the enumerators of the 2007 survey arrived in their sampling areas, they were initially thought to be either Maoists or party workers or agents of the king. The teams had to build a rapport with the people to allay the people's understandable suspicion of the teams' motives. In time, the respondents opened up and shared their ideas and opinions. The local assistants employed for the survey are to be credited for their role in fostering an atmosphere of trust between the respondents and the enumerators. The survey team had been extra careful

to recruit local assistants, people who commanded respect in their localities and who were not affiliated to any political

party. These assistants contributed immensely to bolstering the survey team's credentials.

Survey process

11.9

The surveys of 2004 and 2007 were the first political surveys undertaken in Nepal that applied rigorous social scientific survey techniques. In a country where quantitative study is still in its infancy, these surveys amount to pioneering comprehensive studies, in terms of the issues covered, the areas and individuals sampled and the scientificity of the techniques used.

Among several efforts undertaken to advance the studies in both content and methodology, a one-day experts meeting that was held on 16 February 2007 is worth mentioning here. The meeting was convened to review the questionnaire and sampling techniques used in the 2004 survey and to elicit suggestions for revisions that needed to be made for the second survey of 2007. Based on the input received during this meeting, the questionnaire for the 2007 survey was framed, which adopted the 2004 survey questionnaire for most questions related to the demography of respondents and also retained the 24 main and 12 secondary questions pertaining to peoples' understanding and perceptions of democracy, their trust in political institutions, their sources of information, and ethnic identity. Twenty five new questions, which pertained to the political developments after *Jana Andolan II*, the transition towards the election of the CA, the transformation of the CPN-Maoist and issues regarding the inclusion of excluded groups were also added to the original list. In fact, the feedback from the February 2007 review meeting significantly influenced the survey team's decision to drop the provision of 'extra sampling of polling stations' and to create a device to include the age group of 18-21 through a different sample frame.

Nearly two months (February-March 2007) were spent for pre-field work, i.e. drafting, pre-testing and finalizing the questionnaire, framing the sample and imparting training to the surveyors, processes in which national and international experts were also involved. Altogether 80 surveyors, including 8 supervisors, who were trained in a two-day orientation programme (23-24 March 2007) that was held before the survey teams ventured into the field, were involved in administering the questionnaires. Besides the teams involved in the booster survey, the MP survey, and the in-depth interviews with national elites, the surveyors were grouped into 19 teams consisting of three to five members, and each team was assigned to undertake their survey in two or three sample parliamentary constituencies. Some of the surveyors who had been trained in the orientation programme were reassigned to undertake the booster survey in May 2007, the MP survey in July 2007 and the in-depth interviews with national elites in July-September 2007.

Altogether, Nepal Democracy Survey 2007 collected data from the following:

- a) 4,089 respondents from the cross-section citizen survey,
- b) 300 members of the interim parliament, through the MP survey,
- c) 468 respondents belonging to specific groups (Gurung and *Madheshi*) in the booster survey; and qualitative information of
- d) 46 commoners, through in-depth interviews,
- e) 30 national elites, through in-depth interviews, and
- f) 25 observation reports prepared by 19 study teams and 6 supervisors.

II.10 Data entry and cleaning

The collection of the filled-in questionnaires from the field began in mid-April 2007. From the time that the second half of the fieldwork began, the tasks of data cleaning, questionnaire administration and data entry went hand in hand. Filled-in questionnaires were first verified by supervisors in the field and then checked and edited by a team consisting of eight members who were assigned mainly for coding the open-ended questions. After all the filled-in questionnaires had been checked and cross-checked, these were transferred to three data entry experts who keyed in the data. The questionnaire-oriented data entry programme was developed using an Epi Info software package (version 6.04d). In order to ensure the quality of the data, sufficient range checks, legal

values, skip patterns and logical check options were developed in the data entry programme. Several consistency checks were also performed between variable to variable, once the constituency-wise data sets were completed. Once the data was cleaned, the Epi-Info data was converted into SPSS software package. All the data processing work was carried out using an SPSS software package (version 11.5), and the output tables were translated into an MS Excel format. The same process was adopted for the data obtained by the booster survey and the MP survey. As for the qualitative data, the recorded/collected information was transcribed and translated from the local languages into English for further analysis.

II.11 Sample characteristics

The reliability of a cross-sectional citizens' survey is generally assessed by evaluating the *sampling method* used in the study and by gauging the level of

representativeness of the sample areas and respondents *vis-à-vis* the national characteristics.

II.2 Distribution of Sample Parliamentary Constituencies: Ecological Zones and Development Regions

Ecological Zone	Total	Sample
Mountain	22 (10.7%)	3 (7.3%)
Hill	95 (46.3%)	20 (48.8%)
Tarai	88 (42.9%)	18 (43.9%)
Development Regions		
Eastern	49 (23.9%)	10 (24.4%)
Central	65 (31.7%)	13 (31.7%)
Western	43 (21.0%)	9 (22.0%)
Mid-Western	30 (14.6%)	6 (14.6%)
Far-Western	18 (8.8%)	3 (7.3%)
	205 (100%)	41 (100%)

II.3 Demographic Backgrounds of Sample Respondents

Contents	Sample (%)	National (%)* (census 2001)
Sex		
Male	47.2	49.9
Female	52.8	50.1
Area		
Rural	86.6	86.0
Urban	13.4	14.0
Education		
Illiterate	39.6	51.4
Literate	60.4	48.6
Age group		
18-30	39.0	40.4
31-44	27.3	29.1
45-59	20.7	18.5
60+	13.0	12.0

* National figures refer to data for the entire population, except for the category of education in which the reference population is 15 years and above. The reference population of 'age group' was 18 years and above. The age group of sample respondents was 18 years and above.

Table II.2 shows that in terms of the distribution of characteristics across ecological and development regions, the sampled parliamentary constituencies are largely representative of national characteristics. The overrepresentation of the Hill and Tarai ecological zones by a margin of 1-2 per cent caused a 3 per cent underrepresentation of the Mountain region; similarly, the Eastern and Western development regions are overrepresented by margins of 0.5 and 1 per cent respectively; and the Far-west development region is underrepresented by a margin of 1.5 per cent. The margin of over and under representation is negligible.

Table II.3 shows that the sample of respondents is largely, if not absolutely, representative of the national demography. Of the 4,089 respondents, males constitute 47.2 per cent and females, 52.8 per cent, showing an over-sampling of women by a margin of 2.7 per cent. Villagers constitute 86.6 per cent, while 13.4 per cent are urban dwellers, suggesting an insignificant margin of 0.6 per cent *vis-a-vis* the national population. The illiterate population seems to have been underrepresented by a margin of 11.8 per cent but such a reading does not factor in the reduction in the rate of illiteracy in the last seven years, from the time the national census was taken in 2001. It should also be noted that the reference age group in the sample population was

18 years and above whereas in the census it was 15 years and above. The category for the literates includes people with different levels of educational attainment, e.g. the just-literate were at 18.9 per cent, school-level literates at 32.9 per cent, and higher-education literates at 8.6 per cent. The age distribution of the sample population also resembles the national characteristics, but in this case, there is a 2 per cent margin of overrepresentation for the 45-59 age group and an underrepresentation of the 31-44 age group. Occupation-wise, the distributions of the 4,089 respondents are as follows: agriculture 56.4 per cent, housewife 13.3 per cent, student 10.3 per cent, business 6.2 per cent, service 6.1 per cent, labour 6 per cent and others 1.9 per cent.

Table II.4 shows a proportional representation of the sample respondents in terms of their caste/ethnicity and religion *vis-à-vis* the 2001 census. The Hill-caste, Hill-ethnic, and *Madheshi* ethnic groups are slightly overrepresented by a margin of 1-2 per cent. Similarly, those who profess Hindu religion are also overrepresented by a margin of 2 per cent, which led to an underrepresentation of other major religious groups, but the figures for over and under representation are insignificant. On the whole, sample areas and respondents are more or less representative of the characteristics of the national population.

II.4 Caste/Ethnic and Religious Backgrounds of Respondents

Caste/Ethnic	Sample	National
Hill High Caste	33.5	30.9
Hill Ethnic	30.2	28.6
Hill Dalit	8.4	8.9
<i>Madhesh</i> High Caste	12.1	13.7
<i>Madhesh</i> Ethnic	9.6	8.7
<i>Madhesh</i> Dalit	3.6	3.9
Muslim	3.6	4.3
Unidentified	0.1	1.0

Religion	Sample	National
Hindu	82.8	80.6
Buddhist	9.6	10.7
Islam	2.7	4.2
Kirat	2.4	3.6
Christian	1.1	0.5
Others	1.5	0.4



Democracy, *Jana Andolan* II and Political Participation

The history of democracy in Nepal—similar to the history of democracy in the South Asian nations of Pakistan and Bangladesh, but different from the history of democracy in India and Sri Lanka—is a chequered one, marked by several interruptions. Though democracy was first attained in Nepal in 1951 through an armed revolution against the century-old Rana oligarchy, the authoritarian *Panchayat* regime, with its twin characteristics—active monarchy and a partyless system—soon replaced democratic rule. In 1990, a mass movement launched jointly by the NC and the United Left Front (ULF, made up of seven splinter groups) ended the three-decade long *Panchayat* system and restored multiparty democracy in Nepal. But that era of democracy was brought to an end by the royal takeover of power in October 2002 and which culminated in another coup d'etat in February 2005 during which the king seized all powers and usurped the position of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But the successful April 2006 mass uprising known as *Jana Andolan* II, which was a climactic moment in a series of resistance movements that started in October 2002 against the royal regime, restored democracy in Nepal again.

The democratic apparatus between the years 1990-2002 had been overwhelmed by power-centric intra-party and inter-party conflicts (Hachhethu 2002), mis-governance (Baral 1993; Brown 1996; Hofton et al 1999; Dhruva Kumar ed. 2000), poor quality of legislation (Baral ed. 2004) and corruption (Pandey 1999). And the state of democracy eroded steadily. Consequently, even the two salient features of Nepali democracy—constitutional monarchy and the parliamentary system—set by the 1990 Constitution, were threatened by two antagonistic forces: by ambitious King Gyanendra on the one hand and by the CPN-Maoist on the other. The people's apathy towards political parties, which resulted from the parties' failure to link democracy with good governance and delivery of services to people, was demonstrated by the people's indifference to the anti-regression campaign launched by parliamentary parties after the king's usurping of power in October 2002. That apathy, however, changed as the people became more politically proactive because of two major developments: one, the royal regime's reign saw a worsening of the security situation in the country, as the armed

The long struggle between absolute monarchy and democracy in Nepal has now reached a very grave and new turn. Establishing peace by resolving the 10-year-old armed conflict through a forward-looking political outlet has become the need of today. Therefore, implementing the concept of full-fledged democracy through a forward looking restructuring of the state has become an inevitable need to solve the problems related to class, caste, gender, region, etc. of all sectors (political, economic, social and cultural) bringing an autocratic monarchy to an end and establishing full fledged democracy.

Preamble to the 12-point understanding between the SPA and the CPN-Maoist, 22 November 2005.

conflict between the state and the CPN-Maoist intensified and two, the alliance forged between the mainstream political parties and the CPN-Maoist generated a hope among the people that democracy and peace would be restored.

A 12-point pact made between the SPA and the CPN-Maoist in November 2005 marked a new beginning in Nepali politics, underscored by three key commitments. One, the mainstream political parties endorsed the CPN-Maoist's demand for an election of a CA; two, the CPN-Maoist reciprocated with its assurance to accept a multiparty competitive system; and three, both the CPN-Maoist and the coalition of parties agreed to launch a peaceful movement against the royal regime. The 12-point understanding helped strengthen the April 2006 movement to reinstitute democracy because the people now had leaders who were all on the same page.

The success of *Jana Andolan II* has led to the people's increased participation in political activities. In fact, the formation of social capital in the form of associational life of the citizens is a post-1990 phenomenon. The growth of the mass media, the proliferation of Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society bodies, and the rise in ethnic activism have been providing new spaces, beyond those outlined by the political party platforms, for political awareness, mobilization and participation of the masses. The restoration of peace and democracy by *Jana Andolan II*, along with the process being undertaken for restructuring the Nepali state, has helped civil activism and increased the people's participation in political activities. Besides, the transition period after *Jana Andolan II* has been an eventful time, and thus the people are paying greater attention to what is going on in the country.




Jana Andolan II was an unprecedented event, both in the history of mass movements that Nepal has seen, and in the magnitude of its effects

The April 2006 popular uprising was the most powerful anti-establishment struggle that Nepal has witnessed. Nepal's first anti-establishment movement, the successful armed revolution against the 104-year oligarchic Rana regime, was terminated after the NC's *Mukti Sena* (liberation army) captured more than 50 per cent of Nepal's territory; the 1990 mass movement, which ended the three-decade old *Panchayat* system and restored the multiparty system, was largely an urban and middle-class based movement; the CPN-Maoist insurgency had played out all over the country, but it was a war fought by only the cadres of the CPN-Maoist; but *Jana Andolan II*, with its

immense protest rallies in the urban areas and its huge masses of rural protestors, was a unique phenomenon in Nepali history. *Jana Andolan II* was thus an unprecedented movement in which millions of Nepalis participated to restore democracy.

The answers received in the survey should be understood in the context mentioned above. Table III. 1 shows that twenty-three per cent of the respondents in the 2007 citizen survey said that they had participated in *Jana Andolan II*. That figure would have been substantially larger had more of the people who wanted to participate in the movement not refrained from doing so: 19 per cent

III.1 Participation in the April 2006 *Jana Andolan II*



of the respondents said that they were 'interested (in participating in the movement) but did not participate'. Fifty-eight per cent of the respondents said that they were 'not interested at all' and thus did not participate in any form. But since more than one-fifth of the country's population participated in the movement, it was undoubtedly a large-scale national movement.

The findings of the 2007 survey show that there was widespread participation by the people in *Jana Andolan II*—across age, caste, class and region. More men participated in the movement than did women. Similarly young people (age group 18-30) were more involved in the movement than the people aged 60 years and above. Among the people of different social segments, participation by people from the Hill high castes was higher (30 per cent), followed by Tarai Dalits (23 per cent), Tarai *Janajati* (23 per cent), Hill *Janajati* (21 per cent), people of the Tarai castes (20 per cent), Muslims (17 per cent) and Hill Dalits (17 per cent).

The protests of *Jana Andolan II* were carried out mainly in urban areas. Thus the location of the protests determined the scale of mass participation in the different geographical areas. Twenty-seven per cent of the urban dwellers sampled confirmed their participation in *Jana Andolan II*, whereas this figure was only 23 per cent for rural dwellers. Among the inhabitants of the Tarai sampled, 26 per cent of the respondents

said that they had participated in the movement, which was a higher level of participation than by the respondents of the Hill (22 per cent) and Mountain (15 per cent) regions. And regionally, the survey shows that the people of the Western and Mid-western development regions had a higher degree of involvement in the movement than did the people in the Eastern, Central and Far-western development regions.

There is a correlation between educational attainment, awareness, media exposure and political participation. The level of participation in *Jana Andolan II* reported by the respondents increased with the level of education attained, from 9 per cent of the respondents in the illiterate group to 20 per cent of the respondents in the literate group, and from 33.5 per cent of the respondents in the school-level education group to 46 per cent of the respondents in the higher level education group. Similarly, 36 per cent of the respondents of the 'high level awareness'¹ group participated in *Jana Andolan II*, whereas only 4 per cent of the respondents of the 'no awareness' group participated in the movement. Among the people of the 'high level exposure to media'² group, 65 per cent of the respondents said that they had participated in *Jana Andolan II*, whereas only 12 per cent of the people of the 'no exposure to the media' group said that they did.

People with the ability to wield influence in society participated in *Jana*

III.1 Citizens' Participation in *Jana Andolan II*: Interested and Participated

All	23
Male	33
Female	14
Young	29
Old	11
Rural	23
Urban	27
Mountain	15
Hill	22
Tarai	26
Eastern	21
Central	20
Western	30
Mid-western	25
Far-western	18
Illiterate	9
Highly educated	46
No awareness	4
High awareness	36
No exposure to Media	12
High exposure to Media	65
<i>Pahadi</i>	22
<i>Madheshi</i>	21

Although I didn't get the opportunity to directly participate in Jana Andolan II, the news of the success of the Andolan from around the country used to make me happy. Sometimes, I used to clap unwittingly when I'd see demonstrations on television. I think the change that the country has seen as a result of Jana Andolan II is very positive.
Ms. Maya Kumari Poudel, Parbat

Revolution was in the air in the villages, cities and the Madhesh in this season of rhododendron. This time, Nepalis of all walks of life, classes, and occupations turned into a human sea and created a torrent in the political landscape. This has been the biggest uprising of the people since the unification of modern Nepal. The movement not only impressed our Nepali compatriots but also foreigners, while those in power lost their senses. The nascent political movement became a full blown people's movement when the initiatives outlined by the parties and the Maoist rebels received the support of the people. Like the Mahabharata war, the Jana Andolan that started on 6 April 2006 and continued until 24 April 2006 lasted for 18 days, and the movement brought the king to his knees in the same way that the arrogant Kauravas were humbled and the schemes of Sakuni were shattered.

Special Editorial, *Nepal National Weekly*, 7 May 2006 (Vol.6, No.39)

Many people had gone to Ghorahi (the headquarter of Dang, a Tarai district in the Mid-western region) from each village. There was a sea of people in Ghorahi, more than the eyes could take in. I had also gone there. We hadn't gone alone; we had taken along people of other villages as well, who had agreed to go to Ghorahi when we asked them if they wanted to go with us. Some of them wondered whether they would get anything to eat on the trip to Ghorahi. But despite lingering questions like these, they came with us to Ghorahi and participated in the Andolan.

Ms. Ishwari Gharti, Dang

Andolan II in greater proportion than the less powerful. This finding shows that the actual support for *Jana Andolan II* was qualitatively larger than shown by the headcount. In retrospect, the findings of this citizen survey, irrespective of the scale and quality of participation in *Jana Andolan II*, confirms the universal characteristics of popular movements—that the disadvantaged groups, i.e.

women, the elderly, the illiterate, the poor, and people with low levels of political awareness and low exposure to the media have their own constraints that prevent them from participating in mass movements, in comparison to those who are in advantageous positions, in terms of sex, class, caste/ethnicity, education, exposure to information and place of living.

Mass participation in *Jana Andolan II* was not confined to people's involvement in rallies; and the elite's involvement was obviously deeper and more extensive

Participation in political movements can mean different things to different people. It could range from participation in public rallies, the most common form of public protest, to the more committed forms of protest, such as courting arrest and thus being imprisoned for a cause. In between these two levels of participation, there are various other activities, such as mobilizing people for rallies, defying curfew, and so on, that people undertake to show support for a movement.


Among the surveyed citizens who said they participated in *Jana Andolan II*, 98 per cent said that they had participated in rallies; 38 per cent said that they had been involved in mobilizing people; 25 per cent said that they had defied curfews; and 6 per cent said that they had been arrested and imprisoned.

These figures confirm that people were actively involved in the movement. The people's participation in *Jana Andolan II* went beyond merely providing lip service to the larger cause of restoring democracy in Nepal.

As has been stated above, people's participation in *Jana Andolan II* was not confined only to participation in rallies held in various parts of Nepal. Among the respondents in the citizen survey, there were many who participated at a deeper level than through participation in rallies: more than one-third of those surveyed had been involved in mobilizing people, and more than one-fourth of them had defied curfews. Such levels of involvement could not have been possible if it were only the parties mobilizing the people. Thus, it can be concluded that the people's participation was spontaneous and that the people participated in the movement of their own volition.

Who among the commoners mobilized the people and who played an active role in defying the curfews? The findings of the citizen survey show that people from these groups showed a higher level of participation in mobilizing people than did the rest of the citizenry (the national average was at 38 per cent): the people from the old-age groups (46 per cent), inhabitants of the Mountain region (58 per cent); inhabitants of the Eastern development region (46 per

III.2 Forms of Participation in *Jana Andolan II*: Citizens and MPs



cent); Hill high caste people (47 per cent) and Muslims (44 per cent). And people from these groups recorded higher instances of defying curfews than did the average Nepali (the national average was 25 per cent): urban dwellers (35.5 per cent); inhabitants of the Mountain region (45 per cent); inhabitants of the Central development region (38 per cent); and Hill high caste people (34 per cent).

Table III. 2 shows that there is a correlation between acquisition of knowledge and political participation. The people with higher levels of education were involved more in mobilizing people and defying curfews during *Jana Andolan II* than those who

were illiterate. Similarly, the more the exposure to the media and the higher the level of awareness that people had, the greater was their level of participation, particularly in mobilizing the masses and defying curfews.

Obviously, the elites participated more extensively and intensively in the movement. Among the respondents of the MP survey, 87 per cent of the respondents said that they had participated in rallies; 93 per cent said that they had been involved in mobilizing the masses; 76 per cent said that they had defied curfews; and 57 per cent of them said that they had been arrested.

III. 2 Forms of Participation in *Jana Andolan II*

Participation in		Took part in Rally	Mobilized people	Defied curfew	Arrested
MP survey	Parliamentarians	87	93	76	57
Citizen survey	Commoners	98	38	25	6
Sex	Male	98	39	29	6
	Female	97	35	15	4
Age group	Young	99	39	27	5
	Old	98	46	24	4
Area	Rural	98	38	23	6
	Urban	96	39	35	7
Ecological region	Mountain	100	58	45	18
	Hill	98	41	28	5
	Tarai	97	34	21	5
Development region	Eastern	99	46	22	3
	Central	96	28	38	9
	Western	98	45	16	2
	Mid-western	98	37	27	12
	Far-western	100	27	10	2
Educational attainment	Illiterate	95	17	9	4
	Higher level	97	42	34	6
Awareness	No awareness	100	9	0	10
	High awareness	98	43	31	6
Media exposure	No exposure	98	22	13	5
	High exposure	100	55	34	4
Communities	<i>Pahadi</i>	98	37	24	6
	<i>Madheshi</i>	98	28	16	5

Peace and reconciliation are the main expectations from the success of *Jana Andolan II*; and the elites hold that the agenda of restructuring the state is profoundly important as well

The April 2006 revolution has opened up new possibilities. Its first and foremost mandate is to abolish the monarchy, which means we need to establish a democratic republic. Another mandate of the April 2006 revolution is to abolish feudalism, which means that we have to pursue a scientific agricultural revolution. The restructuring of the Nepali state is another goal set by the April 2006 revolution. That goal should be clearly reflected in the new Constitution to be made after the election of the CA. The nature of the democracy that we are advancing now should inevitably be inclusive. We should also radically change the culture and the social structure of the country. The practice of exploiting women should be abolished, and the practice of untouchability must end. In the spirit of the April 2006 revolution, we have already declared Nepal a secular state. What we need to do henceforth is to bring an end to all types of discrimination rooted in and based on language, culture, and religion.

Mr. Jhala Nath Khanal, leader of the CPN (UML)

The reinstatement of the multiparty system and the end of the royal regime were the immediate objectives of *Jana Andolan II*, and these issues might have been among the people's main expectations from *Jana Andolan II* had the survey been conducted around the time of the movement. But the citizen survey of 2007 was conducted nearly a year after the restoration of multiparty democracy and the fate of the monarchy had already been settled by the Interim Constitution at the time of its promulgation in January 2007. According to the provisions in the Interim Constitution, the future of the monarchy will be decided in the first meeting of the CA by a simple majority of the total members of the CA. And now the king has apparently chosen to refrain from commenting on the developments taking place in the post-*Jana Andolan II* days, and because it would be difficult for commoners to discern whether any political schemes are being designed in the palace, the commoners are apparently more worried about how the peace process will play out. The process of arms management has been started but is yet to be completed, and the horrors of the bloody civil war that occurred in the very recent past seem to be in every citizen's

mind. This context of the civil war thus seemed to colour the answers given by the respondents when they pronounced their expectations from *Jana Andolan II*.

The people were probably very enthusiastic about participating in *Jana Andolan II* because they had high expectations that the movement would be successful. Among the goals that the people had expected the movement to achieve, peace and reconciliation was one of the major ones, as two out of every five of the surveyed citizens said they expected the government to bring about peace (Table III. 3). Respondents across all groups—male and female, young and old, illiterate and educated, rural and urban dwellers, *Pahadis* and *Madheshis*, and inhabitants of all the three ecological regions (Mountain, Hill and Tarai) and five development regions (Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western and Far-western)—hoped that *Jana Andolan II* would bring about peace and reconciliation. Economic development ranked second among the goals that the people hoped the movement would achieve. Other expectations, in preferential order, were as follows: better governance (13 per cent), fulfilment of basic needs and infrastructure

III. 3 Expectations from *Jana Andolan II*

Multiple responses converted into 100 per cent*

Expectations		Peace and Reconciliation	Economic Development	Governance	Infrastructure Development	State Restructuring
MP survey	Parliamentarians	42	6	4	3	38
Citizen survey	Commoners	40	22	13	9	4
Awareness	No awareness	27	26	6	16	2
	Low awareness	33	23	11	12	3
	Medium awareness	41	21	13	9	4
	High awareness	43	22	14	7	5
Media exposure	No exposure	34	23	10	13	3
	Low exposure	43	22	14	8	4
	Medium exposure	44	23	15	5	6
	High exposure	46	16	15	4	14

* Responses received on 'mainstreaming Maoists', 'social change', 'negative', 'no-expectation' and 'others', which are insignificant in figure are not included in this table.

development (9 per cent), state restructuring (4 per cent), and social change (3 per cent).


The disaggregated data, however, shows that some groups had different expectations from *Jana Andolan II*. Respondents from some disadvantaged sections of society—Muslims and people with ‘low awareness’—said that both economic development, and peace and reconciliation were equally important goals. Among Muslim respondents, the choices for peace and reconciliation were only one per cent higher than that for economic development. Similarly, among respondents of the ‘no awareness’ group, 27 per cent of the respondents chose peace and reconciliation as the primary goal to be achieved by the movement, whereas 26 per cent chose economic development. For respondents from the Dalit and *Madhesi* communities, economic development mattered more than peace and reconciliation.

The respondents of both the citizen and MP surveys said that peace and reconciliation would be the main achievement of *Jana Andolan II*. Among the citizens, 40 per cent of the respondents believed that the movement would bring about peace and reconciliation, and 42 per cent of the respondents of the MP survey believed the same. But on other priorities,

the commoners and the parliamentarians had differing expectations. For the respondents of the citizen survey, economic development was the second most important priority but that issue was insignificant for the parliamentarians, as only six per cent of the respondents of the MP survey believed that *Jana Andolan II* would bring about economic development. Among the respondents of the MP survey, 38 per cent believed that *Jana Andolan II* would pave the way for state restructuring and inclusion, but this notion was echoed by only 4 per cent of the respondents of the citizen survey. Nearly 13 per cent of the common people surveyed said that they expected better governance as a result of the movement, but the elites seemed to be barely concerned about such ramifications.

The people may have taken to the streets because the king failed to restore peace despite his taking over democracy. I believe that the Jana Andolan was mainly for the establishment of peace rather than for the establishment of democracy
Mr. Netra Prasad Acharya,
Bhojpur

III.3 Expectations from *Jana Andolan II*: Citizens and MPs



The process of social capital formation has been increasing

III.2

The people's awareness of political issues and their participation in politics have largely been conditioned by the recent political developments in Nepal. With the reinstitution of democracy in the early 1990s, Nepali society was strongly politicized along party lines and many people participated in the political arena. The levels of participation by the people, however, decreased considerably because

of the cumulative effects of mis-governance by political parties, the CPN-Maoist's wide-scale insurgency and the royal takeovers. But the success of *Jana Andolan II* has created an environment where people can be politically active again. The media too has played a huge role in making people active in politics and public life.

The levels of people's exposure to the mass media has increased significantly


According to the Press Council of Nepal, there were 582 different newspapers that were published regularly in Nepal in the fiscal year 2006/2007; there were seven television channels operating as of July 2007; and there were 77 FM radio stations running, according to the updated information of July 2007.

Since the restoration of democracy and the creation of an open political environment in 1990, Nepal has witnessed a communication revolution, exemplified best by the proliferation of FM radio stations all over the country. The media has always played an important role in strengthening the associational life of citizens by making the people aware of what is happening and thereby motivating them to participate in issues of public concern. Before analyzing the media's impact, let's first look at the nature of mass media consumption in Nepal.


Among the respondents of the citizen survey, 34 per cent said they read newspapers; 45 per cent said they

watched television; and 76 per cent said they listened to the radio daily or occasionally. These figures are quite impressive when one considers that Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world. The finding that one-third of the citizens sampled read newspapers is probably a reflection of the literacy levels in the country—the 2001 census showed that 46 per cent of the total population of the country were illiterate. And people rely more on radio than on television to get their news—three out of every four citizens surveyed said that they used the radio to get their news. Because radio broadcasts can be picked up around the country and because radios are affordable, the radio has become the popular media of choice; today, there are FM radio stations all over the country, even in remote areas; and radios and transistors, particularly those made in China, are cheap enough for even the poor to afford. In fact, 71-72 per cent of the Dalit respondents of both the Hill and Tarai regions, who rank lowest in the poverty index for Nepal, said that they got their news from the radio; only 15-20 per cent of the Dalits sampled said that they read newspapers, and 25-28 per cent of the Dalits sampled said that they watched television.

III.4 Use of the Media (Newspaper, Radio and Television): Citizens and MPs



III.5 Use of the Media by Citizens: 2004 and 2007



The accumulative index figures for the consumption of all three forms of media—newspaper, television and radio—show that men used the media sources more (62 per cent) than women (42 per cent); urban dwellers used the media sources more (74 per cent) than villagers (48 per cent); young people used the media sources more (65 per cent) than the people of the 60-plus age group (33 per cent); and people with high levels of education were significantly more attuned to the media (87 per cent) than the illiterate (24 per cent). Similarly, people from the Hill region were far more exposed to the media (52 per cent) than the people living in the Mountain region (35 per cent); and the inhabitants

of the Eastern development region were more exposed to the media (57 per cent) than the inhabitants of the Mid-western development region (41 per cent). The Hill high caste people recorded the highest levels of exposure to the mass media (60 per cent), and the Tarai Dalits, ranked at the lowest position, came in at 32 per cent.

Among the respondents in the elite category, however, the findings on media exposure were the same across the board, irrespective of sex, class, age, education and caste/ethnicity. Almost all the respondents of the MP survey said that they read newspapers, listened to the radio and watched television everyday

A comparative study of the data collected during the citizen surveys in 2004 and 2007 reveals that more and more people are gaining access to the mass media. In 2004, only 36 per cent of the respondents had said that they listened to the radio (daily or occasionally) for news, but three

years later radio listeners among the respondents increased to 76 per cent. Similarly, the percentage of the respondents who got their news from the television went up by 22 per cent (from 23 to 45). But surprisingly, the number of newspaper readers increased by only one per cent, from 33 per cent in 2004 to 34 per cent in 2007.

Although more people across all groups—males and females, rural and urban dwellers, the young and the old, the illiterate and the educated and the inhabitants of all three ecological regions (Mountain, Hill and Tarai)—reported an increase in the use of the mass media, radio and television in particular, the increment was disproportionately in favour of men, the young, the educated and the inhabitants of the Hill region. There was, however, a decrease in mass media consumption in one category: the number of respondents from the illiterate and the old-age groups who said that they listened to the radio daily showed a decline of 2 per cent.

FM radio stations were established in Nepal after the reinstatement of democracy, and the blanket term for these radio stations is independent radio. The history of independent radio stations, which have had to fight for their right to broadcast even in the politically open environment after 1990, speaks volumes about their struggles and the obstacles they have had to overcome. The work done by independent radio stations has been widely appreciated by the public. Since the broadcast formats of independent radio stations were straightforward and simple, they made a significant contribution in delivering news to the villages, and these stations have made huge strides in improving their content in a very short span of time. In fact, the state of independent radio determines the benchmark for local broadcasting in Nepal.

Binod Dhungel. 2007. *Shahi Shaashanma Swatantra Radio: Daman or Pratirodhko Kathaa* (Independent Radio during the Royal Regime: A Story of Suppression and Resistance) Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2007, pp.5-6

People's political awareness in the post-Jana Andolan II days has been quite impressive

The opening of the political environment and the resultant freedom of speech that the citizens enjoyed after democracy was restored, coupled with the booming of the mass media, helped the citizens become more aware of political issues, and this in turn led to their participating

more in political processes. Two revelations from the surveys serve to highlight how the media contributed to restoring democracy and to increasing people's levels of awareness. Among the respondents who had a higher level of access to the media, 55 per cent of them

III. 4 Increment in Exposure to the Media from 2004 to 2007

		Daily use of Radio			Daily use of Television		
		2004	2007	Proportional increase	2004	2007	Proportional increase
All		22	30	+ 8	15	17	+ 2
Sex	Male	28	41	+ 13	18	21	+ 3
	Female	16	19	+ 3	13	13	-
Area	Rural	20	28	+ 8	9	12	+ 3
	Urban	31	36	+ 5	35	44	+ 9
Region	Mountain	14	24	+ 10	7	3	- 4
	Hill	25	29	+ 4	14	15	+ 1
	Tarai	19	31	+ 12	16	21	+ 5
Age group	Young	22	39	+ 17	15	21	+ 6
	Old	19	17	- 2	9	9	-
Educational attainment	Illiterate	10	8	- 2	5	4	- 1
	Higher level	50	60	+ 10	24	48	24

said that they had been involved in mobilizing people for the reinstatement of multiparty democracy through *Jana Andolan II*, but only 22 per cent of the respondents who had no access to the media were involved in mobilizing people. Another example of the role of the mass media in increasing mass awareness is outlined in the following section.

To gauge the level of political awareness of the Nepali people in the changed context, respondents were asked whether they were familiar or not with six major developments that took place after *Jana Andolan II*. The figures for affirmative responses received on each of these events were as follows: 67 per cent on *Jana Andolan II*; 84 per cent on the appointment of G.P. Koirala as prime minister of the country; 78 per cent on the CPA signed in November 2006; 72 per cent on the placement of the CPN-Maoist's combatants in cantonments; 61 per cent on the formation of the interim parliament in January 2007; and 75 per cent on the *Madhesh* uprising of January-February 2007. These results show that a huge majority of Nepali citizens had kept themselves informed about the recent political developments in the country.

The levels of awareness varied among the respondents of different groups. For instance, men were more aware (76 per cent) of *Jana Andolan II* than were women (58 per cent). As for the appointment of G.P. Koirala as prime minister of the country, 89 per cent of the respondents in the age group of 18-30 were aware of this appointment and the figure for respondents who were aware of this event in the age group of 60 years and above was 75.5 per cent. Ninety-

seven per cent of the respondents with higher levels of education were aware that the CPA had taken place but only 59 per cent of the respondents of the illiterate had any knowledge of the event. In reference to the placement of the CPN-Maoist's combatants in cantonments, 78 per cent of the urban dwellers sampled said they knew about this event but only 71 per cent of the rural dwellers sampled said that they knew about the event. Respondents living in the Hill region were more informed about the formation of the interim parliament (63 per cent) than those living in the Mountain region (59 per cent) and the Tarai region (56 per cent). As for the *Madhesh* uprising, the level of awareness of the event was the highest among respondents from the Eastern development region (86 per cent); it was slightly lower for respondents from the Central development region (80 per cent), and the figures were 78 per cent for respondents from the Western development region, 58 per cent for respondents from the Mid-western development region and 47 per cent for respondents from the Far-western development region. The difference in awareness levels among respondents of other groups followed the same patterns as were exhibited in the examples above: men, urban dwellers, the educated, hill dwellers and the inhabitants of the Eastern development region all reported higher levels of awareness of political events than did their respective counterparts—women, villagers, the illiterate, inhabitants of the Mountain region and inhabitants of the Far-western development region.

Levels of exposure to the media, more than any other factor, seemed to determine the people's levels of political awareness. Table III.5 clearly shows that the people with high levels of media exposure were aware of all the six major political developments that the surveyors had chosen for gauging people's levels of awareness of political events. In contrast, only 56 per cent (as shown by the aggregated data on familiarity with the six events chosen) of the respondents

III. 5 Media Exposure and Political Awareness

	Total	No Exposure	Low Exposure	Medium Exposure	High Exposure
<i>Jana Andolan II</i>	67	49	76	90	96
Appointment of G.P. Koirala as PM	84	72	93.5	97	100
Comprehensive Peace Agreement	78	63	88	95	99
Maoist combatants in cantonments	72	53	83	93	99
Formation of the interim parliament	61	39	72	87	97
<i>Madhesh</i> uprising	75	57	87	96	99

who had 'no exposure to the media' kept themselves informed on the political developments in the country. Still, despite the differences in levels of political

awareness reported, the study has shown that most people in Nepal are aware of the political developments taking place in the country.

The higher the level of political awareness, the greater the level of political participation

As shown by the results of the survey, a large majority of the Nepali people are paying greater attention to the political developments in Nepal. Although all the people who are aware of political developments are not involved in associational life, their political awareness could help them get involved in various political or social activities if they wanted to do so. Besides, with *Jana Andolan II* reinvigorating movements undertaken by the Dalits, women, *Janajatis*, *Madheshis*, civil society members, human rights activists and professionals, the space for political participation has grown in the country.

Twenty-nine per cent of the citizens surveyed in 2007 said that they had record of participation in one or other form of political protest or movement. Among groups which had respondents participating at higher percentages than this national average were men (41 per cent), people with high levels of education (53 per cent), urban dwellers (38 per cent), inhabitants of Western and Mid-western development regions (36 per cent and 35 percent respectively) and Hill high caste people (35 per cent).

In the last three years, there has been a marked increase in the number of people participating in protests and political movements, as evidenced by a comparison of the data collected in the 2004 survey and the 2007 survey. In 2004, only 15 per cent of the citizens said that they had participated in protests and movements, whereas the findings from the 2007 survey show that 29 per cent of the citizens participated in protests and political movements: that means the figure for this category almost doubled in three years. This increase in political participation was reported by

respondents from all sections of society, but the increment was disproportionately higher for men than for women, for the young than for the elderly, for urban dwellers than for rural dwellers, for the educated than for the illiterate, for the inhabitants of the Mountain region than for the inhabitants of the Hill region and the Tarai region, and for the *Pahadis* than for the *Madheshis*.

There has been a marked increase in the number of people participating in other forms of political activities as well. Nearly half the respondents of the 2007 survey (46 per cent) said that they discussed politics regularly or occasionally. Among the respondents of the citizen survey, more men (62 per cent) than women (30.5 per cent) said that they indulged in discussions of a political nature; similarly, more young people (55 per cent) than the elderly (31 per cent), more of the well educated (74 per cent) than the illiterate (20 per cent), more urban dwellers (52 per cent) than villagers (45 per cent), and more people from the Tarai region (48 per cent) than from the Mountain region (35.5 per cent) said that they discussed politics. The story among the elite respondents is remarkable: 98 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey said that they discussed politics regularly, and only 2 per cent of them said that they discussed politics occasionally.

A comparison of the data of the 2004 and the 2007 citizen surveys regarding the people's participation in political discussions shows an increment of 12 per cent, from 34 per cent in 2004 to 46 per cent in 2007. In terms of the milieu in which the people said that it was easy for them to discuss politics openly, 62 per cent of the respondents in


Because people did not respond to the appeals made by political parties to get involved in the protest against the royal takeover of October 2002, civil society decided to take up the people's cause. Civil society members gradually mobilized people in the year-long movement against the royal regime. By the eve of Jana Andolan II, huge masses of people had already started getting involved in the movements that had been called by civil society.

Mr. Shyam Shrestha, independent left and civil society activist


The political parties who came into power after the restoration of democracy in 1990 did not pay attention to the demands of the excluded groups—women, Dalits, Janajatis and Madheshis. So the ethnic and women activists had to organize themselves, take to the streets and launch their own movements.

Mr. Upendra Kumar Jha, leader of Madheshi Janadhikar Forum

III.6 Participation in Protest/Movement: 2004 and 2007



III.7 Participation in Political Discussion: 2004 and 2007



2007 said that they felt comfortable talking about politics in any social situation (the figure for the same category was 51 per cent in the 2004 survey); there was slight dip in the number of respondents, a dip of 1 per cent, who said that they felt comfortable with discussing politics only in their innermost circle of close family and friends (down from 27 per cent in 2004 to 26 per cent in 2007), but the number of people who said that they felt comfortable discussing politics with anyone increased by 5 per cent (up from 6 per cent in 2004 to 11 per cent in 2007). The findings show that more people from all segments of society, across all categories—caste/ethnicity, sex, age, area of habitation and educational levels—were discussing politics more and more, but the proportion of the increase was more marked for men, the young, the educated and the urban dwellers.

There is no doubt that the citizens' levels of political participation rose significantly in the last three years, and the increment recorded by the 2007 survey was probably a result of the change in the political context that had taken place when the survey was taken. This changed context explains why people participated less in political movements in 2004 and more in 2007. During the first survey of 2004, the freedom of the citizens had been curtailed by the royal regime in power, and the armed conflict between the state

and the CPN-Maoist's insurgents was at its height. The 2007 survey, on the other hand, was conducted after the multiparty democracy had been reinstated and after peace had returned to Nepal, a period when people could exercise their right to freedom of speech without fearing repercussions.

The respondents' levels of participation in formal organizations were varied—from a minimum of 16 per cent of the respondents who said that they participated in the activities of ethnic/Dalit/*Madheshi* organizations to a maximum of 29 per cent of the respondents who said that they participated in activities organized by the CBOs/NGOs/civil society; and 22 per cent of the respondents said that they had participated in activities organized by the political parties, while 25 per cent of the respondents said that they had participated in activities organized by women's organizations. Thus, the data shows that one-fourth of the citizens sampled, a pretty impressive number, engaged in associational life and activities that produce social capital. The aggregate data for respondents participating in the activities of the formal organizations mentioned earlier shows that more men participated in the activities (26 per cent) than did women (19 per cent), more young people participated in the activities (26 per cent) than did the elderly (13 per cent), more villagers

III. 6. Increment of Participation in Protests/Movements and in Political Discussion

		Participation in protest/movement			Political discussion		
		2004	2007	Proportional increase	2004	2007	Proportional increase
	All	15	29	+ 14	34	46	+ 10
Sex	Men	22	41	+ 19	50	62	+ 12
	Women	9	18	+ 9	20	30	+ 10
Area	Village	14	27	+ 13	33	52	+ 19
	Towns	18	37	+ 19	38	45	+ 7
Age group	Young	17	36	+ 19	37	55	+ 18
	Old	8	16	+ 8	25	31	+ 6
Education	Illiterate	6	12	+ 6	16	20	+ 4
	Higher level	39	53	+ 14	73	74	+ 1
Region	Mountain	6	27	+ 21	20	35	+ 15
	Hill	13	27	+ 14	32	45	+ 13
	Tarai	18	31	+ 13	37	48	+ 11
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	15	29	+ 14	33	43	+ 10
	<i>Madheshi</i>	16	26	+ 10	39	43	+ 4

participated in the activities (23 per cent) than did urban dwellers (21 per cent), more people from the Mountain region participated in the activities (28 per cent) than did people from the Hill region (25 per cent) and the people from the Tarai region (19 per cent), and more *Pahadis* participated in the activities (25 per cent) than did the *Madheshis* (16 per cent).

There were, however, deviations from this general picture. While more men reported that they had participated in activities carried out by formal organizations, more women (34 per cent) participated in the activities carried out by women's organizations than did men (14 per cent), which is not surprising at all. The Hill high caste groups had the highest number of respondents who participated in the activities conducted by the CBOs/NGOs/civil society (38 per cent), women's organizations (35 per cent) and political parties (26 per cent), but in the activities carried out by the ethnic/Dalit/*Madheshi* organizations, Hill Dalits (31 per cent) and Hill *Janajatis* (17 per cent) registered higher instances of participation than did the Hill high caste respondents (10 per cent). This is quite natural taking into account the rise of ethnic/Dalit/*Madheshi* movements as they have stake in such movements. This also explains that the Tarai high caste respondents reported a higher degree of participation in the activities conducted by ethnic/Dalit/*Madheshi* organizations

than did the Hill high caste respondents. Among the *Madheshi* communities, the Tarai *Janajati* respondents reported higher levels of participation in the activities carried out by the CBOs/NGOs/civil society (25 per cent), women's organizations (11 per cent) and political parties (19 per cent) than did the Tarai high caste respondents (who had figures of 16 per cent, 11 per cent and 17 per cent respectively). The Tarai Dalit respondents had the lowest levels of involvement with CBOs/NGOs/civil society, ethnic/Dalit/*Madheshi* organisations, women's organizations and political parties, with figures of only 11 per cent, 17 per cent, 11 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Their low levels of participation may have been a direct reflection of their low levels of educational attainment and their lack of access to sources of knowledge.

Table III. 7 shows that irrespective of some differences in participation levels along gender and caste/ethnicity lines, educational levels along with levels of exposure to the media and political awareness largely determined the levels of the respondents' participation in formal organizations. For instance, the proportion of the respondents in the various respondent-categories participating in the activities conducted by CBOs/NGOs/civil society increased according to the levels of education attended: 13 per cent of the illiterate

III. 7 Participation in Formal Organizations

Participation in		CBO/NGO/ Civil Society	Ethnic/Dalit/ <i>Madheshi</i> Organizations	Women Organizations	Political Parties
MP survey	Parliamentarians	94	93	92	100
Citizen survey	Commoners	29	16	25	22
Educational attainment	Illiterate	13	7	18	8
	Literate	30	16	31	23
	School level	39	22	27	32
	Higher level	51	27	29	38
Awareness	No awareness	6	2	11	2
	Low awareness	13	8	17	8
	Medium awareness	26	15	27	19
	High awareness	42	23	30	35
Media exposure	No exposure	16	8	19	11
	Low exposure	30	17	27	23
	Medium exposure	48	26	30	40
	High exposure	65	35	32	52

Most villagers are involved in community organizations of some sort. Some of the villagers are members of groups that are made up of mothers, some are members of the forestry groups and some are members of savings groups. I am a member of the Gosaikunda Multipurpose Cooperative. The Cooperative provides us with loans that we can use for any kind of work we wish to do. I attend the Cooperative's meetings from time to time. Although I am uneducated, I am interested in knowing about what is happening in my area and outside.

Ms. Krishna Kumari Bogati,
Nuwakot


respondents said that they participated in these activities, while 30 per cent of the literate respondents said that they did so; and while 39 per cent of the respondents with a school-level of education said that they had participated in these activities, the proportion shot up to 51 per cent for those with a higher level of education. Among the respondents who had high levels of exposure to the media, 35 per cent of the respondents said that they participated in ethnic/Dalit/Madheshi organizations, whereas only 2 per cent of the respondents in the 'no exposure to the media' group did so. Similarly, 30 per cent of the respondents in the 'high awareness' groups said that they were involved with women's organizations, while only 11 per cent of the respondents in the 'no awareness' group said that they were involved.

Among the 300 respondents in the MP survey, almost one-fourth of the respondents said that they regularly participated in activities conducted by CBOs/NGOs/civil society, while 69 per cent of the respondents said that they did so occasionally. Similarly, 31 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey said they were regularly involved with ethnic/Dalit/Madheshi organizations, while 62 per cent of the respondents said that they were occasionally involved. As for their involvement in women's organizations, one-fourth of the respondents said that they were regularly involved, while two-thirds of the respondents said that they were occasionally involved. And not surprisingly, 95 per cent of the parliamentarians in the MP survey said that they regularly participated in activities conducted by the political parties. But what is surprising is that almost all the respondents for the MP survey said that they regularly or occasionally took part in activities organized by non-party organizations, like CBOs/NGOs/civil society, ethnic/Dalit/Madheshi organizations and women's organizations. This finding suggests that the constituencies of the politicians were rather broad indeed.


For all the formal organizations, the number of people who participated in their activities rose over the last three years. The proportion of the increase was higher for CBOs/NGOs/civil society organizations (19 per cent) than for political parties (7 per cent) and for women's organizations (5 per cent).

Table III.8 shows that in the last three years, there has been a marked increase in the number of people participating in formal organizations. This increase was shared by all the respondent groups—males, females, rural and urban dwellers, the young and the old, the illiterate and the educated, *Pahadis*, *Madheshis*, *Janajatis* and the inhabitants of the Hill and Tarai regions. The rate of increase for participation in CBOs/NGOs/civil society organizations

III.8 Levels of Participation in Activities Conducted by Various Organizations: Citizens and MPs



III.9 Levels of Participation in Activities Conducted by Various Organizations: 2004 and 2007



was in double digits, a figure that was higher than the single digit growth recorded by political parties and women's organizations. Those groups whose respondents recorded a growth in participatory levels of more than national average of 19 per cent were the males, the villagers, the young, *Pahadis* and people of the Hill and Mountain regions. Respondents of these groups also

recorded a higher percentage increase in participatory levels in women's organizations than the average national increment of 5 per cent. *Pahadis* and inhabitants of the Mountain and Hill regions had a greater percentage increase in the number of people involved with political parties than the national average growth rate of 7 per cent.

Not surprisingly, Nepali people's adherence and commitment to democracy has increased after *Jana Andolan II*

III.3

A democracy's success is determined by different indicators in different contexts. In the more developed countries, where democracies are mostly stable and have reached advanced levels, issues about accountability, institutions and processes matter more. But the people in a third world country may have a different understanding of what democracy means and may have different priorities. Nepal's own history of democracy, with its several high and low periods, would certainly influence the popular understanding of democracy.

As shown by the findings of the 2007 survey, the responses of citizens regarding their understanding of

democracy was weighted more towards people's rule (27 per cent) than towards institution³ (25 per cent) and 'freedom' (23 per cent). Some other factors perceived as being benchmarks of democracy, though they seemed to have been regarded as less significant factors if we are to go by the people's responses, were, in order of preference: peace and stability (10 per cent), development (4 per cent), justice (3 per cent), state restructuring (1.5 per cent) and the meeting of basic needs (1 per cent).

In a nutshell, democracy was primarily understood as people's rule, then equated with institutions and associated with freedom. The opinions of

Textbook understanding, itself drawn from a high theory of the experience of democracy in Europe and North America, privileges some elements. These include popular control over rulers, availability of equal rights and liberties for the citizens, the idea of the rule of law and of protection against the tyranny of the majority. ... In its South Asian version, democracy is associated principally with the idea of people's rule, political freedom, equality of outcomes and community rights. The South Asian version of democracy, as seen in the mirror of public opinion, does not accord equal centrality to the idea of the rule of law and institutional-procedural dimensions of democratic governance.
SDSA team. 2008. *State of Democracy in South Asia*. New Delhi, Oxford, pp.25-26

III.8 Increment of Participation in Formal Organizations from 2004 to 2007

		CBO/NGO/Civil Society			Women			Political Party		
		2004	2007	+	2004	2007	+	2004	2007	+
	All	9	28	+ 19	20	25	+ 5	15	22	+ 7
Sex	Men	12	36	+ 24	9	14	+ 5	23	34	+ 11
	Women	7	22	+ 15	28	34	+ 6	7	10	+ 3
Area	Village	8	29	+ 21	19	25	+ 6	14	22	+ 8
	Towns	12	27	+ 15	21	22	+ 1	15	20	+ 5
Age group	Young	10	33	+ 23	21	28	+ 7	11	25	+ 4
	Old	6	15	+ 9	10	12	+ 2	12	15	+ 3
Education	Illiterate	3	13	+ 10	15	18	+ 3	5	8	+ 3
	Higher level	32	51	+ 19	23	29	+ 6	38	38	-
Region	Mountain	2	37	+ 35	15	35	+ 10	10	21	+11
	Hill	9	32	+ 23	21	30	+ 9	13	23	+10
	Tarai	10	24	+ 14	18	17	- 1	15	20	+ 5
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	7	30	+ 23	21	28	+ 7	11	22	+11
	<i>Madheshi</i>	7	18	+ 11	13	12	- 1	13	17	+ 4

the respondents of the different groups—males and females, the young and the old, the illiterate and the educated, rural and urban dwellers, the inhabitants of all the three ecological regions (Mountain, Hill and Tarai) and the five development regions (Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western, and Far-western), and the different social segments of society including the *Pahadi* and *Madheshi* communities—converged in associating democracy with three major components—people’s rule, institution and freedom. There were some differences of opinion too, as the respondents belonging to the urban-dwellers group, inhabitants of the Eastern development region and Hill *Janajatis* gave more weight to the component of ‘freedom’ than to other components. A significant number of responses from Hill Dalits equated democracy with peace and stability (13 per cent) and also with justice (11 per cent). Similarly, development was perceived as a major criterion by a sizable


number (10 per cent) of the Tarai Dalit respondents.

A comparative study of the data of 2004 and 2007 surveys shows that there has been a change in how democracy is defined by Nepalis. In 2004, democracy was mainly perceived as freedom but this definition of democracy was only considered the third most important criterion in 2007. The use of the variable ‘people’s rule’ to gauge the state of democracy, however, saw a huge increase from 2004 to 2007. Only 15 per cent of the respondents in the 2004 survey considered ‘people’s rule’ as the main criterion for analyzing the state of democracy, whereas 27 per cent of the respondents in the 2007 survey did so. What were the reasons for this shift in perspective?

One possible explanation is that the respondents of the 2007 survey were overwhelmed by the post- *Jana Andolan* II period of republicanism. In 2004, the formation of a republic was not the main issue, and in fact, the support for constitutional monarchy was very high. That context changed during and after *Jana Andolan* II. A negation of the monarchy is now being seen as tantamounting to people’s rule. Besides, because the ambitious project of restructuring the state that has taken centre stage and with *Jana Andolan* II having been driven by populist ideals, the masses of people seem to have been influenced by the ideals of populism.

The members of parliament seem to have been more influenced by the current wave of Nepali politics than the ordinary people have been. The respondents of the MP survey gave greater weight to people’s rule (45 per cent) in defining democracy than did the citizens. More MPs equated democracy with institutions (31 per cent) than did the commoners (25 per cent). More than one out of every five citizens sampled equated democracy with freedom whereas only one out of every 10 parliamentarians sampled did so.

III.10 Understanding Democracy: 2004 and 2007



III.9 Understanding of Democracy

Multiple responses converted into 100 per cent

Democracy means	Citizen		Elite	Booster	
	2004	2007		Gurung	Madheshi
People's rule	15	27	45	11	17
Institution	21	25	31	15	10
Freedom	37	23	11	19	13
Peace and stability	3	10	1	2	7
Development	2	4	1	-	6
Justice	1	3	1	5	2
State restructuring	1	2	8	47	39
Basic needs	3	1	1	-	-
Negative appraisal	8	4	1	1	4
Others	9	2	1	-	1

That democracy in Nepal is a multi-verse was further evidenced by the findings of the booster survey. Nearly half of the Gurung respondents and two out of every five *Madheshi* respondents thought democracy should mean state restructuring. But only an insignificant number of respondents in the citizen survey and the parliamentarians in the MP survey held state restructuring as an important goal. The Gurung and *Madheshi* respondents said that while criteria like people's rule, freedom and institution were important indicators for gauging the nature of a democracy, these issues were less significant, and the respondents of the booster survey regarded state restructuring as their overriding concern.

That democracy in Nepal is still in its rudimentary phase was well manifested by the fact that democracy as process and substance was hardly considered by the respondents. An understanding of democracy according to its minimal attributes—people's rule and freedom—and the people's associating democracy with the project of state restructuring is probably informed by the tumultuous history of democracy that the Nepal has witnessed. The people know very well that Nepal's path towards multiparty democracy has only been made possible by the constant struggles the people have had to take up—the 1950-51 revolution,

the 1990 mass movement and the 2006 popular uprising were routinely mentioned by the people—against monarchical rule. Furthermore a revelation from the surveys that is relevant to this issue must be mentioned here: 44 percent of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey said 'I don't know' when they were asked the question, 'What, if anything, does democracy mean to you?' However, the lack of a definitive answer to that question on the part of a significant number of respondents in the citizen survey does not mean that people have no idea of democracy or that they support democracy any less. Most of the people sampled, including those who couldn't provide a definitive meaning for democracy, said that democracy is good for citizens, the society and the state. In fact, only 4 per cent of the respondents surveyed had a negative appraisal of democracy.


Besides, two-thirds of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey said that 'democracy is preferable to any other kind of government'. Only 6 per cent of the respondents preferred dictatorship and 28 per cent of the respondents were indifferent to whether the country was a dictatorship or a democracy. The parliamentarians, however, were clearly in favour of democracy: 98 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey chose

I think that democracy is a system in which everyone can be happy. Before, we had to live such difficult lives. Today, there is a mill in our village, whereas earlier, we had only dhiki-jaanto. Today, there is electricity in every house. There has been much change in our society and this is because of prajatantra (democracy). But there should be peace in the country; today, there are more people in the country, and they all seek peace.
Ms. Tej Kumari Poudel, Parbat


III.10 Choice of Regime

Choice of regime		Democracy	Dictatorship	Doesn't matter
	Parliamentarians	98	2	0
	Citizens	67	6	28
Sex	Male	73	6	21
	Female	59	6	35
Area	Rural	67	6	28
	Urban	62	11	27
Regions	Mountain	66	3	31
	Hills	69	6	25
	Tarai	64	6	29
Age group	Young	70	9	22
	Old	60	4	36
Education	Illiterate	53	3	44
	Educated	79	9	11
Awareness	No awareness	43	1	56
	High awareness	79	6	15
Exposure to media	No exposure	57	3	40
	High exposure	83	12	5


III.11 Support for Democracy: Citizens and MPs



III.12 Support for Democracy: 2004 and 2007



III.13 Suitability of Democracy: 2004 and 2007



democracy, while only 2 per cent said that they wanted a dictatorship.

The preference for democracy was shown by respondents of all groups—males and females, rural and urban dwellers, the young and the old, and the inhabitants of all three ecological regions (Mountain, Hill and Tarai). The support for democracy was higher among the males than among females, among villagers than among urban dwellers, among the young than among the old, among the respondents of the Hill region than among the respondents from the Tarai. The higher the levels of education, awareness and exposure to the media the respondents had, the greater was the support for democracy. However, it must be mentioned here that the respondents from the disadvantaged sections of society were less supportive of democracy. The majority of respondents of the ‘no awareness’ group said that they were indifferent to whether the country was a democracy or a dictatorship, and more than two out of five respondents in the illiterate, ‘no exposure to the media’, Tarai *Janajati* and Far-western region groups echoed that sentiment. And 38 per cent of the Hill Dalits and 40 per cent of the Tarai Dalits sampled also said that they did not care one way or the other. These findings show that although overall support for democracy has increased in the last three years, more needs to be done to include the disadvantaged groups like the poor, the Dalits, the illiterate and so on in the greater democratic design.

In the 2004 survey, 62 per cent of the respondents favoured democracy but in the 2007 survey, 67 percent favoured democracy, and the overall preference for dictatorship also declined from 10 per cent to 6 per cent. The decrease in the number of responses showing an ‘indifference to democracy or dictatorship’ was marginal, from 28.3 per cent in 2004 to 27.6 per cent in 2007. Although this finding shows that more than one-fourth of the citizens of both the 2004 and 2007 surveys remained indifferent to democracy, nevertheless an overwhelming majority of respondents of the 2007 survey, more than 90 per cent of them, in fact, were of the opinion that democracy is ‘suitable’ and ‘very suitable’ for Nepal.

A comparison of the number of respondents in the 2004 and the 2007 surveys who believed that democracy was not suitable for Nepal shows that more and more people feel that democracy works for Nepal. In the 2004 survey, a substantial minority—21 per cent—of respondents said that democracy was not suitable for Nepal, whereas in the 2007 survey, only 8 per cent of the respondents said the same thing. In other words, the proportion of people who shared the opinion that democracy was suitable for Nepal increased from 79 per cent of the respondents in 2004 to 92 per cent of the respondents in 2007. This increase was recorded by all groups of respondents—male and female, rural and urban dwellers, the educated and the uneducated, the young and the old, and the *Pahadis* and the *Madheshis*.

Democracy did not bring us any benefits. The poor remained poor. Bir Bahadur Rai (former Chairman of Kudakaule VDC) asked for our votes, saying that he would free us from oppression if we made him win, but he did not do anything after he won. For me, things remain the same no matter who comes to power. Bir Bahadur also sided with the rich. Actually, this world has been made only for the rich. The rich always extract money from the poor. Only the rich win. Even if a government that's supposed to be for us comes to power, it does not do anything for us.

Ms. Dil Maya Rai, Bhojpur

III.4

Political parties and CPN-Maoist are catalysts of *Jana Andolan II*, but people have less trust in them

Since *Jana Andolan II* has led to the citizens’ participating more in the political domain, the fact that more people are also participating in the

activities carried out by political parties should come as no surprise. Slightly more than one-fifth of the citizens surveyed said that they had participated in


activities carried out by political parties, which is by any standard of measure, a significant proportion. Twenty-three percent of the citizens sampled said that they felt close to political parties, which means that nearly one-fourth of the total voting population of Nepal had formal or informal associations with political parties. Among the respondents who said that they were close to political parties, 36 per cent had associations with the NC (including the NC-Democratic), 32 per cent had associations with the Communist Party of Nepal, Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML), 15 per cent had associations with the CPN-Maoist, and the rest were associated with the other smaller parties.

But what is surprising here is that the number of participants who said that they participated in the activities of the political parties (22 per cent) was slightly lower, by 1 per cent, than the number of respondents who said that they were associated with political parties (23 per cent). This means some of those who were associated with political parties did not have the chance to participate in activities conducted by political parties.

Among the respondents who were associated with or had participated in activities conducted by political parties, there were more men than women, more

villagers than urban dwellers, more of the young than the old, and more inhabitants of the Mountain and Hill regions than those of the Tarai. This gap in the number of respondents was much wider between respondents grouped according to levels of media exposure and educational levels. Among the highly educated respondents, 30 per cent said that they were associated with political parties and that 38 per cent had participated in activities conducted by political parties, whereas among the illiterate, only 15 per cent of the respondents said that they were associated with political parties, and only 8 per cent of the respondents said that they had participated in the activities conducted by political parties. The respondents in the 'low awareness' group recorded even lower figures (7 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively), but the respondents in the 'high awareness' group recorded figures of 33 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. Among those respondents who were highly exposed to the media, 35 per cent were associated with political parties and 52 per cent had participated in activities conducted by political parties. But the figures for the respondents in the 'no exposure' group were much lower. The findings of the survey clearly show that political parties have not been able to make significant inroads among the disadvantaged sections of society yet.

III.14 Association with and Participation in Political Parties: 2004 and 2007



III.11 Association with and Participation in Political Parties

		Association	Participation	Vote in CA for ... undecided/ Not disclosed
	Citizen	23	22	52
Sex	Male	31	34	44
	Female	15	10	60
Area	Rural	24	22	52
	Urban	18	20	52
Regions	Mountain	29	21	46
	Hills	23	23	53
	Tarai	23	20	52
Age group	Young	22	25	45
	Old	20	15	59
Education	Illiterate	15	8	64
	Highly educated	30	38	47
Awareness	No awareness	7	2	64
	High awareness	33	35	44
Exposure to media	No exposure	17	11	60
	High exposure	35	52	38

The lack of political involvement among the disadvantaged groups was further highlighted by the responses received on questions that pertained to the CA election. While 37.5 per cent of the respondents in the citizen survey said they would decide later about whom they would vote for in the CA elections, and 14.5 percent of the respondents refused to disclose information on whom they would vote for (making these two responses a total of 52 percent); these responses were higher among females than among males, among the old than among the young, and among the illiterate than among the educated. And the majority of the Hill and Tarai Dalit respondents—members of the most disadvantaged groups—said that they had either not decided whom they would vote for or refused to disclose whom they would vote for. The majority of Hill and Tarai *Janajati* respondents and Tarai caste group respondents also said that they did not know whom they would vote for in the CA elections and would not disclose information about whom they would vote for. What the findings show is that the less aware the respondents were and the less exposure they had to the media, the more the chance was that they would be undecided about voting in the CA elections. Sixty-four per cent of the respondents in the ‘no awareness’ group and 60 per cent of the respondents in the ‘no exposure to the media’ group said

that they did not know whom they would vote for in the CA elections or refused to disclose such information. What could account for this high level of indecisiveness and unwillingness to disclose preferences by the respondents? There could be many explanations, but preliminary conclusions about the cause could probably be derived from the observations made by almost all the 80 surveyors—that during their month-long work in the field, the surveyors witnessed hardly any political mobilization work being carried out by either political parties or the CPN-Maoist.

When the 2007 citizen survey was conducted, only 48 per cent of the respondents had decided whom they would vote for. The distributions for the party of choice among the respondents who agreed to disclose information were as follows: 14 per cent of the respondents said that they would vote for the NC (including NC-Democratic); 11.2 per cent of the respondents said that they would vote for the CPN-Maoist; 10.7 per cent of the respondents said that they would vote for the UML, and the rest of the respondents said that they would vote for the other, smaller political parties.

A comparative study of the data obtained in the 2004 and 2007 citizen surveys yielded a paradox: that participation in the activities conducted

III.12 Participation in and Association with Political Parties: 2004 and 2007

		Increase in participation			Decrease in association with political parties		
		2004	2007	Proportion of +/-	2004	2007	Proportion of +/-
	All	14	22	+ 8	29	23	- 6
Sex	Men	23	34	+ 11	38	31	- 7
	Women	7	10	+ 3	22	16	- 6
Area	Village	14	22	+ 8	29	24	- 5
	Urban	15	20	+ 5	27	18	- 9
Age group	Young aged	11	25	+ 14	26	22	- 4
	Old aged	12	15	+ 3	26	20	- 6
Education	Illiterate	5	8	+ 3	24	15	- 9
	Higher level	38	38	-	46	30	- 16
Region	Mountain	10	21	+11	14	29	+ 15
	Hill	13	23	+10	27	23	- 4
	Tarai	15	20	+ 5	34	23	- 11
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	11	22	+11	24	23	- 1
	<i>Madheshi</i>	13	17	+ 4	35	24	-11

by political parties had increased, but that there had been a decrease in the number of people who were associated with political parties. In the 2004 survey, 14 per cent of the people had said that they participated in the activities conducted by political parties, and that volume increased to 22 per cent of the respondents in the 2007 survey. What can be deduced from these findings is that people wanted to associate themselves more with political parties when they were spearheading a movement to reinstitute democracy than when they were heading the government.

The 2007 survey shows that more respondents from all samples of population were involved in activities conducted by political parties than were the respondents in 2004, but the increase in involvement was the most distinct among the *Pahadi* respondents and the respondents from the Mountain and Hill regions. As for the issue of the respondents' associations with political parties, only the respondents from the Mountain region recorded an increase of 15 per cent over the 2004 findings. The number of respondents from all other categories who said that they associated with political parties was actually fewer in 2007, and the decline in the number of respondents who said that they were associated with political parties was

higher among the urban dwellers, the highly educated and the *Madheshis*.

When this paradoxical situation, which features an increase in the people's participation in activities conducted by political parties while at the same time a decrease in the people's associating with parties, is taken into account, it is difficult to correlate these findings with the findings related to the rise or fall in levels of trust the citizens have for parties or state institutions.

The citizens' level of trust in state and political institutions—64.3 per cent of the respondents in aggregate said that they trusted the eight institutions named in the questions—was admirable. The institutions that garnered higher levels of trust than the national average of 64.3 per cent for all institutions were as follows: the Election Commission (78 per cent), the courts (75 per cent), the government (68 per cent), and the army (65.5 per cent). The respondents' levels of trust in the civil service, the police, political parties and the CPN-Maoist were below the national average level of trust for all institutions: 63.9 per cent, 59 per cent, 57 per cent, and 49 per cent, respectively. Nepalis seem to share a common ethos with the rest of the South Asian citizenry when it comes to trusting state institutions: those institutions with

III.13 Trust in State/Political Institutions (combined figures for 'great deal of trust' and 'some trust')

Trust in		Election Commission	Courts	Civil Service	Army	Police	Government	Political Parties	Maoist
	Parliamentarians	85	72	71	66	70.0	80.0	87	55
	Citizens	78	75	64	65	59	68	57	49
Sex	Male	79	74	61	66	57	67	58	45
	Female	76	76	56	65	60	67	56	48
Area	Rural	77	74	64	65	58	68	58	50
	Urban	83	76	62	69	62	64	50	41
Regions	Mountain	79	78	71	60	57	79	63	54
	Hills	86	81	72	67	61	75	63	57
	Tarai	69	77	53	65	57	58	49	39
Age group	Young	79	76	64	64	58	67	58	53
	Old	75	71	52	70	61	69	55	41
Education	Illiterate	72	73	63	66	61	69	55	44
	Educated	88	78	63	65	62	70	62	43
Awareness	No awareness	53	62	53	67	54	63	45	42
	High awareness	83	77	66	68	60	69	61	53
Exposure to media	No exposure	73	73	63	65	59	69	55	47
	High exposure	84	74	62	64	58	67	65	54

Broadly speaking, institutions that are not elected by the people and do not have to seek their renewed mandate seem to be trusted more, bringing to the fore the issue of accountability and trust.... Possibly, institutions which have a stronger interface with the public seem to score lower trust than those which are more distant.

SDSA team. 2008. *State of Democracy in South Asia*. New Delhi, Oxford, p.55

which the people interact regularly (the political parties, the civil service, the police, etc) are trusted less by the people than the institutions with which people interact only occasionally (the Election Commission, the courts, the army, etc.).

The rankings for these organizations on a scale of trustworthiness by the respondents of the citizen survey were reflective of the opinions mentioned just earlier, but not surprisingly, the MPs begged to differ. The parliamentarians ranked the political parties as the most trusted institution, quite in contrast to the citizens who ranked the political parties 7th in the scale.

The aggregated scores for the trust displayed by the respondents for the eight institutions accorded, for the most part, with the levels of trust for institutions as they were reported by respondents of various groups—male and female, rural and urban dwellers, the young and old and inhabitants of the Mountain, Hill and Tarai regions—with very insignificant plus and minus ratios. There were, however, differences among how various groups trusted which organizations. Although a majority of the respondents from the Tarai region trusted the Election Commission, the courts, the civil service, the army, the police and the government, the respondents from the Hill and Mountain regions reported

higher levels of trust in these institutions. And the respondents from the Tarai region said that they actually distrusted the political parties and the CPN-Maoist more than they trusted them. This finding shows that the region-based ethnic division is a crucial factor that informs levels of trust. The *Madheshi* people who live in the Tarai have always felt excluded from the state apparatus. And besides the ethnic and regional factors, levels of literacy, awareness and exposure to the media also determined how much the respondents trusted state institutions. Respondents who were illiterate and those had ‘no awareness’ and ‘no exposure to the media’ said that they had lower levels of trust in the eight organizations mentioned earlier, whereas respondents who were highly educated, who had high awareness and who were more exposed to the media recorded higher levels of trust in these institutions.

The people’s trust in party leadership varied from leader to leader. Fifty-three percent, in aggregate, of the respondents said that they trusted the main leaders of the nine major political parties. The breakdown for the levels of trust in the leaders of various political parties was as follows: the people trusted Girija Prasad Koirala, the NC leader, the most (76 per cent); he was followed by Madhav Kumar Nepal of the UML (64 per cent), Prachanda of the CPN-Maoist

III.14 Trust in Party Leaders (combined figures for ‘great deal of trust’ and ‘some trust’)

		G.P. Koirala	Madhav Nepal	Prachanda
	Parliamentarians	63	67	68
	Citizens	76	64	62
Sex	Male	76	65	64
	Female	75	62	60
Area	Rural	75	63	62
	Urban	77	68	62
Regions	Mountain	84	76	74
	Hills	79	75	73
	Tarai	70	51	48
Age group	Young	76	66	65
	Old	77	56	54
Education	Illiterate	74	54	54
	Educated	81	73	63
Awareness	No awareness	69	48	47
	High awareness	78	69	69
Exposure to media	No exposure	74	59	58
	High exposure	81	69	70

(62 per cent), Sher Bahadur Deuba of the NC-Democratic (56 per cent), Narayan Man Bijukchhe of the NWPP (47 per cent), Surya Bahadur Thapa of the RJP (46 per cent), Amik Sherchan of the UPF (43 per cent), Bharat Bimal Yadav of the NSP (42 per cent), and Pashupati Shamsher Rana of the RPP (39.5 per cent). It seems that the levels of trust the people placed in political leaders was determined by the size and strength of the political parties that the leaders represented. Since the trust in political parties was higher (57 per cent) than the aggregate figures recorded for trust in party leaders (53 per cent), it can be deduced that people trusted institutions more than they trusted individual leaders. However, it's also clear that many people don't differentiate between the parties and their leaders. But some leaders were trusted more than the political parties they represented.

From among the different segments of society, the inhabitants of the Mountain region showed the most trust in Koirala (84 per cent) and the inhabitants of the Tarai region showed the least trust (70 per cent) in him. Madhav Nepal and Prachanda were more popular in the Mountain and Hill regions than in the Tarai, and these two leaders were trusted more by the young than the old, by the highly educated than by the illiterate, by the respondents in the 'high awareness' and 'high level of exposure to the media' groups than the respondents in the 'no awareness' and 'no exposure to the media' groups.

But the respondents of the MP survey ranked the leaders a bit differently in their surveys: of the three leaders mentioned in Table III.14, the CPN (Maoist) leader, Prachanda, was trusted more by the MPs (68 per cent) than were the UML leader, Madhav Kumar Nepal (67 per cent), and the NC leader, Girija Prasad Koirala (63 per cent).

A comparison of the proportion of trust displayed by the citizens in the eight state/political institutions in the 2007 survey and the 2004 survey shows that


there was no significant change in proportion of trust. The proportion of people who trusted the Election Commission, the courts, the civil service, the army and the police dipped by 2, 3, 5, 7 and 6 per cent respectively. But, the people's trust in political parties increased by 4 per cent, from 53 per cent in 2004 to 57 per cent in 2007. Similarly, in the case of trust in government, the proportion of the people's trust increased by 5 per cent, from 63 per cent in 2004 to 68 per cent in 2007. Such an increase accords with the finding that among the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey: 73 per cent of the respondents said they were satisfied (a combined figure for the 'very satisfied' and 'somewhat satisfied' answers) with the functioning of the government.

The question of trust and distrust in political parties deserves further looking into, as it being central institution in the functioning of democracy. The public apathy for political parties in the post-1990 period was somehow compensated for by the parties playing a pivotal role, along with the CPN-Maoist, in bringing democracy back through *Jana Andolan II*. The finding of our surveys, that the people acknowledged the political parties' role as the catalyst in making *Jana Andolan II* a successful movement has been corroborated by a separate survey, one that was conducted by the NCCS a month after the restoration of democracy.⁴ That survey found that 64

Jana Andolan II became as big as it did because the political parties and the leaders contributed to the movement. The people did not conduct the Andolan by themselves. The leaders of the parties took to the field because the king tried to usurp all power, and the actions of the leaders that prevented the king from succeeding in his aim must be appreciated. Earlier the government had nearly mired itself in an inextricable crisis because the leaders were inexperienced back then. But the leaders have all gained some experience now, and the bringing of the Maoists into mainstream politics by the party leaders is a reflection of how the leaders have matured. The king became evil; the Maoists turned into killers; and yet the party leaders were able to handle them both. The leaders have also contributed to Nepal's development.

Mr. Sanjeev Poudel, Dang

III.15 Trust in State and Political Institutions: 2004 and 2007



All the leaders have been affected by this disease: they want to become rich at the cost of the poor people's lives; they want to educate their children in the cities, and they want to go abroad. They speak like revolutionaries when they have no chance of being in power, but they forget all the promises they made to the people once they come into power.

Mr. Bhim Prasad Sharma,
Parbat

per cent of the respondents trusted political parties, a figure that is 11 per cent higher than the figure recorded in our previous survey of 2004. But over the time that has elapsed since that survey was taken—our second democracy survey was conducted a year after the NCCS survey—political parties seem to have lost some of the trust that they inspired in the people. The figure of trust in political parties in the 2007 was 57 per cent, which is 4 per cent higher than recorded in 2004 but 7 per cent lower than a year before. So why did the people's confidence in political parties decline by 7 per cent in one year? There could be many explanations: one, political parties have been concentrating in urban areas since after *Jana Andolan II*, which means that they have not yet made a concerted effort to win the trust of the vast majority of the Nepali population (the 2001 national census recorded that 84 per cent of the Nepalis lived in rural areas); two, since the interim government is run by an alliance of the seven political parties and the CPN-Maoist, which was unable to hold the CA elections in June 2007 as scheduled, the people were unhappy with them for their failure to see through that promise; and three, the people may not have shaken off their disenchantment with the parties' behaviours in the past,

mainly the parties' failure to link democracy with delivery of services to the people. In fact, the trust that people have in political parties is held in a strange balance: the parties are credited with bringing democracy back to the country, but the people are also tired of the parties' inability or unwillingness to transform political rhetoric into political performance.

There are two issues to be noted here: one, the proportions of increment or decline of trust in the state or political organizations were marginal (2-7 per cent), suggesting that the citizens' levels of trust is an enduring phenomenon that does not change drastically over a short span of time; two, although the people's levels of trust in some state/political institutions increased in some cases and decreased in others over the last three years, the ranks accorded to all the seven state/political organizations on the basis of the people's levels of trust in them, remained the same. The Election Commission remained the most trusted institution, and the ranked positions of all the political parties—except for the CPN-Maoist, which was not included in 2004 survey—were the same as in the 2004 survey.

Summing up *Jana Andolan II*, which was a watershed event in the democratization processes that Nepal has undergone, was a more powerful movement than the 1990 mass movement, from which it derived its principles. This unprecedented event has contributed significantly to raising the people's awareness about political issues, has led to the people's being more politically active, and has helped in increasing the citizens' levels of associational life. All these increments have contributed to increasing social capital formation. Democracy, after all, thrives in societies where people are politically conscious, and a workable democracy demands greater awareness of and participation in the political and non-political spheres by

the people. *Jana Andolan II* was admirably able to rouse the people to meet the challenges that modern democracy demands of them.

But despite the strides the Nepali polity has taken, we should, however, sound a note of caution. The fact that the downtrodden strata of the society—the poor, the backward, the illiterate, the less educated and those who have no or less exposure to the media—have benefited relatively less from the widening of the democratic spaces in the post-*Jana Andolan II* period shows that the movement has not achieved its main goal of empowering the majority of the people. Some of the findings of our surveys have reflected this truth. The disadvantaged and the downtrodden

constitute the majority of the respondents who took an indifferent position on the question of whether they wanted a democracy or a dictatorship. And the proportion of respondents from the excluded groups—the Dalit, the *Janajati*, the *Madhesis*, and women—who said they trusted the state/political institutions is less than the proportion of respondents in the included groups who said they trusted these institutions.

The public opinion on democracy and related issues, as expressed in this survey should be taken to heed when the political actors in Nepal design both short-term and long-term goals for the country. As has been shown by this survey, there is a clear correlation between people's levels of education, media exposure, and development on the one hand, and people's levels of awareness, political participation and their degree of involvement and association with formal organizations on

the other. These findings suggest that the areas that the political actors need to focus on to produce a critical mass of politically involved citizens and social capital requires both long-term planning and vision, and immediate responses to some critical issues. The people's expectations from *Jana Andolan II*'s success indeed show that the government must consider development as the long-term goal and peace and reconciliation as the immediate task. And to prevent an all-out armed conflict like the one that the country recently experienced, the institutionalization of democracy by following through on the demands that were raised in *Jana Andolan II* is absolutely imperative.

Democracy in Nepal is still inchoate. The present transition period is therefore very critical in framing the democratic structure that Nepal will have in the future and for managing the intricacies of conflict transformation.

Notes

- 1 The index for the level of awareness was made on the basis of responses received on respondents' familiarity with six major developments that had taken place after *Jana Andolan* II. All the respondents were divided into four broad categories, in terms of their levels of awareness, ranging from 'no awareness' to 'high awareness'. People in the 'no awareness' group were those who were not aware of any political events that had taken place in Nepal during the last few years, while at the other extreme, the people in the 'high awareness' group were those who were aware of all the political developments that had taken place in Nepal during the same time. The next category comprised those people who knew about some of the political developments, but were unaware of other political developments. Within such parameters of definition, the survey found that 14 per cent of the people in Nepal were not aware of any of the recent political events, and we placed these people in the 'no awareness' category. At the other extreme were those people who were aware of all the political events. Such politically conscious people comprised a reasonably large 43 per cent of the people of Nepal. Twenty-nine per cent of the people were considered as those with low levels of awareness, while another 24 per cent were considered as people with medium levels of political awareness.
- 2 The index for the level of exposure to the media was made on the basis of the responses received on the use of the three sources of mass media (newspaper, radio and television) and information received through other means of information (e.g. face to face communication). All the respondents were divided into four broad categories in terms of their levels of exposure to the media, ranging from the 'no exposure' category to the 'high exposure' category. The people in the 'no exposure' group were those people who did not use any source of information, while at the other extreme, the people in the 'high exposure' group were those who used all the four sources of information. In between were those people who used some of the sources of information, but not all of the sources. Within such parameters of definition, the survey found that 44.7 per cent of the people in Nepal belonged to the 'no exposure' group, 33.1 per cent to the 'low exposure' group, 19.4 per cent to the 'medium exposure' group and 2.8 per cent to the 'high exposure' group.
- 3 Institution is a combined variable that takes into account these manifestations of democracy: elections; multiparty system; rule of law; separation of powers, and check and balance mechanisms; respect for fundamental/human rights; rule by majority, sovereignty of the people; political parties; effective parliament, representative government and local government; leadership, people's participation, and good governance.
4. NCCS's survey was conducted in 21 parliamentary constituencies with 1,746 respondents, in May 2006.

IV Transition and Expectation

The May 2006 declaration made by the reinstated HOR after *Jana Andolan II* was a milestone marking the beginning of the process of the current political transition in Nepal. The declaration included plans for an election of the CA and the deletion of the royal title from the state institutions, including from the army, parliament, government organizations and the bureaucracy. The goals of the declaration were brought into more focus after the CPN-Maoist got involved in the transitional process, through a negotiation with the SPA government, and after the CPN-Maoist joined the interim parliament and the government.

The Interim Constitution, promulgated on 15 January 2007, stated that the fate of the monarchy would be decided by a simple majority of CA members in the CA's first meeting. Previously, a Nepali democratic system sans the monarchy would have been near unthinkable. The monarchy has always been analyzed in relation to the political processes, whether negatively or positively (Muni 1973; Chatterji 1980; Dangol 1999; Shukla 2000). But it is now a beleaguered institution (Hachhethu 2007).

Another significant achievement of the post-*Jana Andolan II* transition period has been the transformation of the CPN-Maoist into a legitimate political party. The CPN-Maoist has accepted its new role in the multiparty competitive system, in sharp contrast to the anti-establishment stance that it had harboured during its 'People's War'. The literature on the CPN-Maoist during the period of insurgency had mostly concentrated on explaining the Maoist phenomenon, tracing its provenance and the reaction to it, and its social linkages (Maharjan 2000; Karki and Seddon 2003; Thapa 2003; Thapa and Sijapati 2003; Muni 2003; Upreti 2004; Hutt 2005; Pathak 2005; Onesto 2005; Baral 2006). Analyses of the CPN-Maoist's ideology would routinely project an ever-increasing state of confrontation between the CPN-Maoist and the government until the CPN-Maoist would achieve a complete victory. But the CPN-Maoist has now turned a corner, and although some of its proclamations have been ambiguous, and although its behaviour still shows sign of ultra leftist thinking, it has been largely welcoming of competitive and peaceful politics and has publicly asserted its faith in multiparty democracy.

The transformation of the CPN-Maoist is linked with the conflict transformation and arms management measures in which the international community, United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in particular has been involved. In the spirit of the 12-point understanding of November 2005, the negotiation between the SPA government and the CPN-Maoist was started formally on 26 May 2006, and it culminated with the signing of a CPA in November 2006. The CPA outlines the particulars of the arms management process.

Other countries and organizations have also increased their activities in Nepal in order to help in the conflict transformation and to ensure that the elections to the CA are held. Ever since its hosting of the 12-point understanding meet between the various major political actors in November 2005, India has been playing a very active role in bringing the SPA and the CPN-Maoist together and is changing its longstanding stance on monarchy, a move that has been highly

appreciated. So there is now little room left for cynicism towards India's intent. The other nations that have been helping Nepal along in its transitional course are the United States of America, China, the nations of the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

However, a major goal of the transitional process—the election to the CA—will only be achieved if some of the challenges, as outlined by these questions, can be met: Is the CPN-Maoist sincere about its new commitment to multiparty democracy? Is there a consensus among the political forces and the people of different social segments on the targeted goal of achieving a republic? Will the Nepali people understand what the CA is before they vote for representatives to the CA? Will the security situation in the country allow for free and fair elections? These are some of the important questions that can affect the developments that are being carried out in the present state of transition.

Excerpts from the
Comprehensive
Peace
Agreement,
November 2006

In order to hold the elections to the CA in a peaceful, free and fair environment and for democratizing and restructuring the Nepal Army, the following work will be carried out:

1. The Maoists combatants will be sent to cantonments. The UN will do the necessary verification and monitoring of the combatants. The Nepali Army will be confined to the barracks but will continue some of their work, such as providing border security, providing security in conservation areas, protected areas, airports, power houses, telephone towers, and for the central secretariat and the VIPs.
2. All the arms and ammunitions of the Maoists will be securely stored in the camps except those needed for providing security in the camps. The arms and ammunition will be put under a single-lock system, and the concerned party will keep the key to this lock. A similar quantity of arms of the Nepali Army will be stored away, sealed with a single-lock system; and the key to the lock will be handed over to the concerned party.
3. For the Maoist combatants in cantonments, the Nepali government will take up the responsibility of providing ration and other facilities to them.
4. The interim cabinet will form a special committee to monitor, integrate and rehabilitate the Maoist combatants. The cabinet will control, mobilize and manage the Nepali army. The cabinet will also prepare and implement the detailed action plan for the democratization of the Nepali Army.

The election of the Constituent Assembly is the main goal of the current transitional process

IV.1

The issue of the election of the CA is burdened with historical baggage because the first proclamation for electing a CA was made long ago, on 18 February 1951, the day that democracy was first introduced in Nepal. The CPN-Maoist must be credited with reviving the notion of instituting the CA half a century after the first proclamation for the CA was made; and the CPN-Maoist must also be credited with influencing the political parties, who had virtually given up on the issue of the CA in the past, to agreeing to hold the elections to the CA. In a *quid pro quo* for the CPN-Maoist's acceptance of multiparty democracy, the political parties decided to endorse the demand for an election of the CA. Since the May 2006 declaration by parliament, the election of the CA has been acknowledged as the central goal in all the major agreements involving the SPA and the CPN-Maoist. And the importance given to the CA being elected is justified. The election of the CA is the only process which legitimizes and concretizes the achievements made by the April 2006 *Jana Andolan II* and the achievements made thereafter. The expectations that many political actors have placed on the CA are tremendous. The election of the CA is being seen as an exemplification of how popular choice should rule the day in the new Nepal, and the CA is viewed as the body that will open the door to Nepal's future and cut off Nepal's ties with its dismal past.

The election of the CA meant different things to different people in our survey. Two-thirds of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey (excluding those people who turned in 'don't know' responses) referred to it as a process for making the new Constitution, when replying to the following question: *You may be aware that people are now talking much about the CA. According to your*

understanding, what is the election to the CA? Ten per cent of the respondents understood the election of the CA in terms of 'populism', and another 10 per cent associated the election of the CA with 'peace and conflict resolution'. Those who equated the election of the CA with political institution constituted 9 per cent of the respondents. For some others, the election of the CA meant 'development and social change' (4 per cent) and 'state restructuring' (4 per cent).


In the MP survey, 85 percent of the respondents said that the election of the CA was a process that would be needed to design the new Constitution; and 8 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey associated the election of the CA with 'populism', 4 per cent with 'state restructuring', and 2 per cent with 'political institution'.

The majority of respondents from all segments of society understood the election of the CA to be a process for making the new Constitution. However, as shown in Table IV.1, such a response was received more from males than from females, more from the young than from the old, and more from urban dwellers than from villagers. The higher a

I have come to know about the CA by reading the newspapers, listening to the FM radio, watching television and listening to the learned people. I think the CA is the assembly of representatives chosen by the people through an election, with the objective of making an outstanding constitution. In a real sense, the CA helps to bring out the desires of the people. At a time when the country is entering a new era, the CA may show the right path. I am eager to vote in the election of the CA.

Ms. Maya Kumari Poudel, Parbat

IV.1 Understanding the CA: Citizens and MPs



IV.1 Understanding the CA as a Process of Making a New Constitution

Multiple responses converted into 100 percent

Parliamentarians	85
Commoners	63
Male	65
Female	58
Young	65
Old	52
Rural	62
Urban	65
Illiterate	50
Highly educated	74
No exposure to Media	58
High exposure to Media	77
No awareness	5
High awareness	67

respondent's level of education, the higher a respondent's level of exposure to the media, and the higher a respondent's awareness level, the greater was the possibility that that respondent understood the election of the CA to be a part of the process that went into the making of a new Constitution. For respondents who were disadvantaged, in terms of education levels attained, exposure to the media and awareness levels, the understanding that the election of the CA was a process that had to be undertaken in the making of the new Constitution was reported by 50 per cent, 58 per cent, and 53 per cent of respondents, respectively.


The election of the CA will bring an end to one phase of the transition process that Nepal is undergoing, but it will also usher in another phase of transition.

The expectations of the people and parliamentarians from the election of the CA show the kind of a future Nepal they are aspiring for.

Peace remained the overriding concern of the people, since 45 per cent of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey expected that peace would be an outcome of the election of the CA. Many respondents also expected that the election of the CA would help create economic development (35 per cent). The other expectations from the election of the CA were as follows: framing of a new political structure (10 per cent), state restructuring (5 per cent) and social change (3 per cent)

The citizens' expectations from the election of the CA were largely different from the expectations of the parliamentarians. The respondents of the MP survey were more concerned with 'state restructuring' (49 per cent) and the framing of a 'new political structure' (38 per cent) as expected outcomes of the CA elections; but the citizens did not give these issues much attention. While the parliamentarians were more concerned with the plans for the future political and democratic structures of the nation, the citizens emphasized on substantial democracy and development, along with a desire to see a peaceful nation. The demand for peace, which had been made in the 2004 survey too, and which has

IV.2 Expectations from the CA: Citizens and MPs



IV.2 Expectations from the CA

Multiple responses converted into 100 percent

		Peace	Development	New political structure	State Restructuring
MP survey	Parliamentarians	7	3	38	49
Citizen survey	Commoners	45	35	10	5
Sex	Male	38	33	12	7
	Female	44	31	6	
Age group	Young	42	32	9	5
	Old	39	30	7	2
Area	Rural	39	34	9	5
	Urban	50	24	12	4
Education	Illiterate	38	33	5	2
	Highly educated	38	27	18	9
Media	No exposure	43	41	7	3
	High exposure	44	25	18	10
Awareness	No awareness	41	48	5	2
	High awareness	44	32	13	7

Responses received on 'social change', 'Maoist mainstreaming', 'negative' and 'no expectation', which were submitted in insignificant numbers, are excluded in this table.

been a central expectation from the success of *Jana Andolan II*, shows that the violent conflict has left a deep scar in the society and that the people want to bury that episode of Nepal's history. But the people's demanding a change in the living standards also shows that merely burying the past would not be enough: for the people, it's vitally important that the country also have a prosperous future.

Among the citizens' expectations from the election of the CA, peace and development were the two major hopes of the respondents from all different segments of society—males and females, the old and the young, the illiterate and the educated, and the rural and urban dwellers. But some of the respondents who were disadvantaged had different preferences. For instance, respondents of the 'no awareness' group preferred development (48 per cent) to peace (41

per cent). Similarly, the *Madhesi* Dalit respondents—the poorest group—mostly preferred development (37 per cent) over peace (23.5 per cent). But some respondents from other disadvantaged sections of society did not expect anything from the election of the CA. Eleven per cent of the female respondents, 15 per cent of the elderly, 17 per cent of the illiterate, 16 per cent of the *Madhesi* high caste respondents and 19 per cent of the Dalit respondents said that they did not expect the election of the CA to achieve anything. Since the majority of the respondents from some of these groups—the elderly, the illiterate, the *Madhesi* high caste and the Dalit—also wanted to see Nepal as a monarchy rather than as a republic, it can be concluded that those who favour the monarchy have no expectations from the election of the CA.

I cannot say exactly what the CA is and why it is necessary. But what I do know is that the CA will make a new Constitution. The present conflict will end when a new Constitution is made. This is good for everyone.
Ms. Goma Adhikari, Bhojpur

The CA could be an assembly where learned people gather to make a good Constitution. It would be good for all the people if peace were to be brought about by this assembly being elected, rather than disorder, which is always what happens in this country. So people from every village should be motivated to participate in the CA elections. As for me, I may die soon, and I would like to vote before I go.
Mr. Padam Bahadur Lamichane, Parbat

Talk about the CA is in the air, but the people do not have much knowledge about the CA. I think a republic (gantantra) will be established by the CA. The rich and the poor will become equal by the imposition of the ceiling on landholdings if the republic is established.
Mr. Uma Kanta Mahara, Dang

The formation of a republic as a goal of *Jana Andolan II* has been increasingly endorsed by the Nepali people

IV.2

Before *Jana Andolan II*, Nepal was under the grip of the monarchy. The political parties had wanted to reconcile with the monarchy even as they set about demanding a return of democracy; but the parties' overtures to the king were rejected outright by the king; and after the royal coup in February 2005, the parties changed their position on constitutional monarchy and struck a new political alliance with the CPN-Maoist, which had long been calling for a

republic. So the UML also declared the setting up of a democratic republic as one of their main objectives and the NC, the other major party, deleted the word 'constitutional monarchy' from its party constitution. The public had already begun to see the current king in a less favourable light after the June 2001 royal palace massacre, and with the king and his son being viewed as 'conspirators' in the massacre, the monarch is not as respected as before. All these

The eight parties (including the CPN-Maoist) conducted Jana Andolan II by uniting among themselves against the feudal government. But the monarchy still remains in place, even after the success of the Andolan. The monarchy is not good for Nepal at all; in fact, it has been an impediment to the development of the country. It should be removed because it has played a major role in increasing the gulf between the rich and the poor, in increasing the discrimination against certain peoples by creating and upholding caste distinctions and in turning women into slaves. A full-fledged democracy, one without the king, is necessary because the conscious people of today will not accept a king who does not wish the well-being of the people, who is only concerned about himself and his family, and who is an obstruction to the development of the country.

Mr. Uma Kanta Mahara, Dang

major events contributed significantly to making the monarchy an unpopular institution among the public.

In the 2007 citizen survey, 59 per cent of the respondents wanted a republic and 41 per cent were for the retention of the monarchy. The plea for a republic was higher among the parliamentarians; 84 per cent of the respondents of the MP survey were in favour of a republic. Six per cent of the MP respondents were for the retention of the monarchy and nine per cent of the MPs, mainly members of the NC (the NC's stance back then was non-categorical too), provided a non-categorical answer.

Table IV.3 shows that the issue of instituting a republic got different answers from respondents, depending on which side of a certain divide the respondents lay. In general, people who were advantaged, in terms of age, education, exposure to the media, and socio-political make up, wanted to see Nepal become a republic and those who were disadvantaged and relatively excluded, with the exception of urban dwellers, wanted to retain the monarchy. The dichotomy was pretty explicit: while 68 per cent of the young favoured a republic, 62 per cent of the elderly wanted to retain the monarchy; and while the majority of rural dwellers

wanted a republic, 51 per cent of urban dwellers were against that idea; similarly, 58 per cent of the illiterate were in favour of retaining the monarchy, but a huge proportion of the highly educated people (71 per cent) wanted a republic; this pattern of responses continued, with 70 per cent of the respondents in the 'no awareness' group favouring the monarchy and 72 per cent of the respondents from the 'high awareness' group opting for a republic. The majority of the respondents of all the three social groups in the *Pahadiya* community were for a republic, whereas a thin majority of respondents among the three of four groups belonging to the *Madheshi* community—caste, Dalit and Muslim—wanted to retain the monarchy. The *Madheshi Janajatis*, however, clearly wanted a republic (62 per cent).

Our surveys show that there was a consensus among the members of the political parties that Nepal needed to become a republic. The only exceptions were those respondents who had associations with the two small parties, the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), a conservative party, and the MJF, an emerging Tarai-based regional party, or who were representatives of these parties. Among the 934 out of the total of 4,089 respondents of the 2007 citizen survey who identified themselves with one party

IV.3 Citizens' Opinions on the Future of the Monarchy

		Republic	Monarchy
MP survey	Parliamentarians	84	6
Citizen survey	Commoners	59	41
Age group	Young	68	32
	Old	38	62
Area	Rural	60	40
	Urban	49	51
Education	Illiterate	42	58
	Highly educated	71	29
Media	No exposure	46	54
	High exposure	74	26
Awareness	No awareness	30	70
	High awareness	72	28
<i>Pahadi</i>	High caste	62	38
	Ethnic	60	40
	Dalit	60	40
<i>Madheshi</i>	High caste	48	52
	Ethnic	62	38
	Dalit	47	53
	Muslim	49	51

or another, the respondents who were associated with the RPP had the most respondents (70 per cent) who wanted to retain the monarchy. Only one-third of the parliamentarians from the RPP wanted a republic and another one-third wanted the monarchy; the remaining one-third gave non-categorical answers. The MJF's official position is republican, but the majority of respondents associated with this party (53 per cent) wanted Nepal to be a monarchy. Their responses corresponded with the responses of most of the *Madheshi* respondents, who favour the monarchy.

But otherwise, the respondents who had associations with the other political parties or who were representatives of these parties mostly supported the call for a republic. The figures for republican opinion among the respondents associated with different political parties were as follows: the CPN-Maoist (100 per cent), the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP: 81 per cent), the UML (72 per cent) and the NC (64 per cent). The figures for republican opinion among party representatives were more or less the same as the opinions of the respondents who had associations with the different political parties; the figures for republic opinion among the members of parliament were as follows: the CPN-Maoist (100 per cent), the UML (97 per cent), the NSP (83 per cent) and the NC (54 per cent). The NC parliamentarians had a significant proportion of respondents who gave a non-categorical response (35 per cent). The MPs from the NC and

those citizens affiliated with this party came in dead last among the respondent groups that wanted a republic. This finding was not surprising because the party was maintaining an ambiguous stance regarding the monarchy around the time of the 2007 survey. The party's earlier decision to delete the words 'constitutional monarchy' from the party's constitution was not defined categorically as the party's departing from its longstanding position of upholding constitutional monarchy and transforming itself into a party that wanted an out and out republic.

The public's demand for a republic has increased dramatically and exponentially over the three years since the last survey was conducted. During the 2004 citizen survey, the proposal for a republic was endorsed by only 15 per cent of the respondents. That figure went up to 59 per cent in a May 2006 survey conducted by the NCCS. In our citizen survey of 2007, the proportion of respondents who were in favour of Nepal becoming a republic increased to 59 per cent of the total number of respondents.

Table IV.5 shows that the percentage of the respondents who want a republic has increased for all segments of society—whether they be male or female, young or old, rural or urban, educated or uneducated, or *Pahadi* or *Madheshi*. The Muslims had the smallest increment (24 per cent) and the young had the highest increment (49 per cent).


IV.4 Parties' Positions on the Future of the Monarchy

		Republic	Monarchy	Non categorical
All	Parliamentarians	84	6	9
	Commoners	59	41	-
NC	Parliamentarians	54	11	35
	Affiliated	64	36	-
UML	Parliamentarians	97	3	-
	Affiliated	72	28	-
Maoist	Parliamentarians	100	0	-
	Affiliated	100	0	-
RPP	Parliamentarians	33	33	34
	Affiliated	30	70	-
NSP	Parliamentarians	83	17	-
	Affiliated	81	19	-
MJF	Parliamentarians	x	X	-
	Affiliated	47	53	-

The king is needed. Since we are a nation made up of different kinds of people (differentiated by religion, caste/ethnicity and the socio-ecological setup), we need to have a king to prevent conflicts among the people with different religions and cultures. The king has united all of us, and such unity can only be maintained by the king. The monarchy, which has existed in Nepal since long ago, must be retained. There will be uncertainty in the country if the king is removed, and then, I think, the situation will become much worse.


Mr. Rem Lal Pun, Dang

IV.3 Choice: Republic or Monarchy: Citizens and MPs



* The last option was not provided to either citizens or elites. But nine per cent of the elites insisted on going with that answer.


IV.4 Choice : Monarchy or Republic: 2004 and 2007



Some analysts may say that the royal massacre of June 2001, the royal takeovers of October 2002 and February 2005, and the negative images that the present king and the crown prince have among the populace were the main factors that contributed to the rapid decline of the popularity of the institution of monarchy in Nepal. But the present survey shows that these are but secondary matters. Half of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey (50 per cent) who wanted a republic rejected the monarchy on the grounds of principle. They chose the answer, 'I want

a government ruled by the people' when replying to the question 'If you are in favour of a republic, what would you say is the most important reason for the abolition of the monarchy?' A similar response—'monarchy is not necessary in the present age'—was handed in by 17 per cent of the respondents. Twenty-four per cent of the respondents said they wanted a republic because they thought that the king was behind the royal massacre. Nine per cent of the respondents cited the negative images the king and the crown prince had among the people as the reason for their wanting to abolish the monarchy. The sea change brought about by the success of *Jana Andolan II* and the post-*Andolan* political environment in Nepal today have probably contributed to the people's realizing that having a monarchy obviously obviates the people's wishes to see a democracy defined as people's rule. And their reasons for supporting republicanism are not coloured by either their suspicion that the current king had a hand in the palace massacre or by the fact that the current king and crown prince are not widely regarded as popular figures.

IV.5 Reasons for Becoming a Republic: Citizens and MPs



IV.5 Proportion of the Increase in Republican Opinion

		2004	2007	Proportion of increase
Citizen survey	Commoners	15	59	+ 44
Sex	Male	19	66	+ 47
	Female	10	51	+ 41
Age group	Young	19	68	+ 49
	Old	10	38	+ 28
Area	Rural	16	60	+ 44
	Urban	13	49	+ 36
Ecological region	Mountain	21	61	+ 40
	Hill	14	59	+ 45
	Tarai	16	58	+ 42
Development regions	Eastern	14	57	+ 43
	Central	12	54	+ 42
	Western	20	62	+ 42
	Mid-western	19	61	+ 42
	Far-Western		73	+ 54
Education	Illiterate	9	42	+ 33
	Highly educated	30	71	+ 41
Pahadi	High caste	14	62	+ 48
	Ethnic	18	60	+ 42
	Dalit	19	60	+ 41
Madheshi	High caste	16	48	+ 32
	Ethnic	16	62	+ 46
	Dalit	19	47	+ 28
	Muslim	25	49	+ 24

The rejection of the monarchy on the grounds of principle was more evident in the responses made by the parliamentarians in the MP survey. Altogether, 94 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey justified their republican position on four grounds: the establishment of people's rule (51 per cent), the monarchy being an outdated institution (30 per cent), the abolition of feudalism (9 per cent), and the antagonism between the monarchy and democratic rule (4 per cent). The respondents in the MP survey did not give much consideration to the royal massacre and the negative images of the king or his son when espousing their republican opinions.

The respondents who wanted to retain the monarchy had different

reasons for doing so, all of which were equally cited: some supported the monarchy because they believed that the monarchy would provide a continuity with the past and would provide stability in the country; some supported the monarchy because they viewed the institution as the protector of the Hindu religion; and others supported the monarchy because they saw the monarchy as a symbol of national unity and nationalism. But such support, on the grounds given, may be declining by the day because of the increasingly republican environment that's shaping up in the post-*Jana Andolan II* days. And the public opinion will also be influenced by how the transitional period plays out, for the CPN-Maoist, which is one of the key players in the transitional process, is also a staunch republican party.

The people's levels of trust in the CPN-Maoist wasn't very high, though they believed in its transformation into a party that supports multiparty democracy

IV.3

The CPN-Maoist has been very much involved in the peace processes, and it has certainly come a long way: it agreed to the 12-point understanding with the political parties; it coordinated the activities with the political parties against the king in *Jana Andolan II*; it agreed to a ceasefire; the terrorism-charge against the CPN-Maoist was withdrawn and many of its leaders were released from prison; the CPN-Maoist conducted informal and formal negotiations with the SPA; it signed the CPA; it agreed to the UN's being invited for arms management and the activities of UNMIN in Nepal; it was involved in the making of and in the proclaiming of the Interim Constitution; and it is a part of the interim parliament and the interim government.

Out of the total 4,089 respondents of the 2007 citizen survey, 66 per cent

were aware of the CPN-Maoist's decision to profess multiparty democracy. Out of those respondents who knew about the CPN-Maoist's change in stance, two-thirds (a combined figure of 11 per cent for those who said they 'strongly believed' and 56 per cent for those who said that they 'believed') believed that the CPN-Maoist would stick to its changed ideological position. However, a substantial minority, constituting one-third of the respondents (an amalgamation of 22 per cent of the answers for 'disbelieve' and 11 per cent for 'strongly disbelieve'), doubted their commitment. There were fewer citizens, however, who trusted the CPN-Maoist (49 per cent) than there were those who believed in its transformation into a party that would be a part of the multiparty system (67 per cent), suggesting that these two notions were different elements. The trust that people placed in a party is an outcome of

Our party has adopted a resolution on 'development of democracy in the 21st century' and put forward some new theses. Among others, the most important thesis calls for the acceptance of and the organization of multiparty competition within the stipulated constitutional framework, even in the future socialist state. This idea of multiparty competition within a socialist state is a big step forward in the revitalization and development of socialist democracy.

Excerpt from the speech of Prachanda (Chairman of the CPN-Maoist), delivered in "Hindustan Times Leadership Summit 2006" on 18 November 2006.


the people's judgment of the party in its entirety; a party's ideology is just one of several components. There is, however, the possibility that there could be some correlation between these two components.

A higher percentage of parliamentarians than the commoners believed in the CPN-Maoist's commitment to its new ideological position, as 73 percent of the respondents in the MP survey (the combined figure for the 23 per cent of the respondents who said 'strongly believe' and the 50 per cent who said 'believe') responded accordingly. More than one-fourth of the MPs, however, did not think so. And more parliamentarians also trusted the CPN-Maoist than did commoners: 54 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist, whereas only 49 per cent of the citizens said they trusted the CPN-Maoist. Although the parliamentarians and the commoners had different opinions about the CPN-Maoist, the largest majority of respondents in both the citizen and MP

surveys were confident that the CPN-Maoist's transformation from a party that believed in its initial goal of instituting a one-party communist system to its new belief in the multiparty competitive system was genuine.

The disaggregated data given in Table IV.6 shows that except for the *Madheshi* respondents, the majority of respondents from all social segments—males and females, the young and the old, rural and urban dwellers, and the educated and the uneducated—believed that the CPN-Maoist was sincere about its transformation into a party that believed in multiparty democracy. There were more respondents from the Mountain and Hill regions and also from the Mid-western and Far-western development regions who believed that the CPN-Maoist was sincere about its transformation, than there were respondents who did not believe that the case was so. This faith in the CPN-Maoist's transformation accorded with the trust that many people from these ecological and development regions

IV.6 Belief in CPN-Maoist's Transformation and Trust in the Maoists: Citizens and MPs



IV. 6 Trust in the CPN-Maoist and Belief in its Transformation: Citizens and MPs

		Commitment to multiparty system			Trust in the CPN-Maoist		
		Strongly believed	Believed	Combined	A great deal	Some	Combined
MP survey	Parliamentarians	23	50	73	28	26	54
Citizen survey	Commoners	11	56	67	11	38	49
Sex	Male	12	54	66	11	39	49
	Female	10	58	68	10	38	48
Age group	Young	10	55	65	11	42	53
	Old	8	54	62	11	30	41
Area	Rural	12	55	66	11	39	50
	Urban	7	62	69	6	35	41
Ecological region	Mountain	11	63	74	23	31	54
	Hill	12	64	76	11	46	57
	Tarai	10	44	53	8	31	39
Development regions	Eastern	8	52	59	9	32	41
	Central	10	51	61	9	38	47
	Western	11	59	69	8	41	49
	Mid-western	15	65	80	14	41	55
	Far-Western	21	65	86	23	42	64
Education	Illiterate	9	56	65	11	33	44
	Highly educated	8	55	62	7	36	43
Media exposure	No exposure	11	53	64	11	36	47
	High exposure	6	63	69	4	50	54
Awareness	No awareness	6	50	56	8	35	42
	High awareness	12	57	69	12	41	53
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	13	61	75	13	43	57
	<i>Madheshi</i>	8	35	43.0	6	25	30

said they had in the CPN-Maoist. In contrast to respondents from these regions, however, there were fewer respondents from the Tarai and the Eastern, Central and Western development regions who said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist.

Among the various groups of respondents, the young said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist more than the old did; at least half of the respondents from the rural regions said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist, but around three-fifths of the respondents from urban areas said that they distrusted them; the majority of the respondents in the 'high exposure to the media' group and from the 'high awareness' group said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist, whereas the majority of respondents from the 'low exposure to the media' group and from the 'low awareness' group said that they distrusted them; and more *Pahadi* respondents said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist than did the *Madheshi* respondents. The *Madheshi* respondents' scepticism of the CPN-Maoist was distinct. A clear majority of them (57 per cent) said that they did not believe that the CPN-Maoist had truly transformed into a party that supported multiparty democracy. This lack of belief in the CPN-Maoist's transformation corresponded with the finding that the 70 per cent of the *Madheshi* respondents also didn't trust the CPN-Maoist. The *Madhesh* uprising, which happened on

the eve of the 2007 citizen survey, was directed against the CPN-Maoist, which may partly explain why *Madheshis* were pessimistic about and sceptical of the CPN-Maoist.

The party-wise disaggregated data of both the 2007 citizen and MP surveys (table IV.7) show that the perception of the CPN-Maoist was largely split along a sharp divide, depending on where the parties' political affiliations lay—whether they were closer to being communists or non-communists. Among the NC parliamentarians, 53 per cent of the respondents said they did not believe that the CPN-Maoist had transformed their earlier goal to one of multiparty democracy. This contrasted with the opinions of the majority of the respondents associated with the NC (58 per cent) who were optimistic about the CPN-Maoist's changed ideological position. But most of the NC parliamentarians and the commoners associated with the NC said that they did not trust the CPN-Maoist: only 24 per cent of the NC parliamentarians and 38 per cent of the commoners associated with the NC said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist. Among the parliamentarians of the RPP, half of them said that they believed in the CPN-Maoist's commitment to a multiparty system, while the other half said that they did not. And only 44 per cent of the respondents associated with the RPP believed in the CPN-Maoist's acceptance of the multiparty system,

To be sure, the CPN-Maoist has entered into the peace process and has also shared power in the parliament and the government. Yet, it is too early to draw an optimistic conclusion as far as the transformation of the CPN-Maoist is concerned. After all, it is an ultra-left party made of rebels, and such a party has a tendency to seek quick changes and results. The prolonging of the transitional period and the delaying of the process of change have made the members of the party pessimistic. I see that the CPN-Maoist is losing the hope and the confidence that it once had. Its initial assessment about its popularity among the people has been proved wrong. Its quest for a dominant role has been challenged. The CPN-Maoist has come to the conclusion that it cannot gain or regain the popular support and political domination that it had, through the election of the CA. It is, therefore, not optimistic about the outcomes of the CA election. The party has kept its both options open—a pursuance of peaceful means so long as such pursuance will ensure the attainment of the results desired by the party; otherwise the party will turn around and head up another path. There is, therefore, a risk that the confidence that the CPN-Maoist has in the peace process may be lost.

Shankar Pokhrel,
a member of the UML's Central Committee

IV. 7. Trust in the CPN-Maoist and Belief in its Transformation: Political Parties

		Commitment to multiparty system			Trust in the CPN-Maoist		
		Strongly Believed	Believed	Combined	A great deal	Some	Combined
All	Parliamentarians	23	50	73	28	26	54
	Commoners	11	56	67	11	38	49
NC	Parliamentarians	10	37	47	7	17	24
	Affiliated	8	50	58	7	31	38
UML	Parliamentarians	9	69	78	3	45	47
	Affiliated	10	55	65	6	37	43
Maoist	Parliamentarians	63	37	100	95	5	100
	Affiliated	56	44	100	57	43	100
RPP	Parliamentarians	0	50	50	0	0	0
	Affiliated	3	41	44	13	36	49
NSP	Parliamentarians	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Affiliated	17	33	50	6	6	11
MJF	Parliamentarians	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Affiliated	0	23	23	0	12	12

The Madhesh uprising has served as a deterrent against the rising influence of the CPN-Maoist. The first victim of the Madhesh unrest was Ramesh Kumar Mahato, an MJF cadre, who was shot by the CPN-Maoist activists. This event just led to the exacerbation of the anti-Maoist component of the Madhesh movement. There had already been several incidents of bloody encounters between the activists of the Madheshi groups—JTMM and the MJF—and the CPN-Maoist, even before the Madhesh Andolan of the January 2007. The CPN-Maoist and other political parties suspected the hand of reactionary elements and the Hindu fundamentalists of India in the Madhesh Andolan. The CPN-Maoist supremo, Prachanda, publicly demanded that the movement would face coercive measures, which further fuelled the anti-Maoist sentiment of the Madheshi agitators. The Gaur incident in Rautahat district was the climax and the final show of confrontation between the MJF and the CPN-Maoist, in which 27 Maoists were killed. Krishna Hachhethu, “Madheshi Nationalism and Restructuring the Nepali State”, August 2007

which meant that the majority of the people affiliated with the RPP did not believe in the CPN-Maoist's transformation of ideals. But whereas none of the RPP parliamentarians said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist, nearly half of the commoners associated with the RPP said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist. This pattern was more or less the same in the case of the NSP, with all of the NSP parliamentarians saying that they did not trust the CPN-Maoist and only 11 per cent of the commoners associated with the NSP saying that they trusted the CPN-Maoist. Among the commoners associated with the MJF, 77 per cent of them said that they did not believe in the CPN-Maoist's transformation of ideals, and their trust in the CPN-Maoist was also insignificant, with only 12 per cent of them saying that they trusted the CPN-Maoist.

But most of the parliamentarians of the communist parties and the commoners associated with these parties said that they believed in the CPN-Maoist's transformation of ideals. Nearly four-fifths of the UML parliamentarians and close to two-thirds of the commoners associated with this party held a positive view on the CPN-Maoist's transformation. But as far as trust in the CPN-Maoist was concerned, only 47 per cent of the UML parliamentarians and 43 per cent of the commoners associated with this party said that they trusted the CPN-Maoist; this means that the majority of the UML's MPs and commoners associated with this party, just like that the members of the non-communist parties, distrusted the CPN-

Maoist. Among the CPN-Maoist parliamentarians themselves and the commoners associated with the party, however, there was absolutely no doubt about their party's new commitment to the multiparty system.

As stated above, trust or distrust in any organization is an outcome of people's judgments in their entirety. Nearly half of the total respondents of the 2007 citizen survey said they trusted the CPN-Maoist, which is quite a significant number, considering that the CPN-Maoist was until recently an insurgent group that became a mainstream political party only after the success of the April 2006 *Jana Andolan*. At the same time, one should not ignore the fact that the citizens' trust in political parties in general was higher (57 per cent) than in the CPN-Maoist (49 per cent). Obviously there are some factors that contribute to enhancing people's confidence in the CPN-Maoist and there are other factors that contribute negatively. It may be worthwhile to examine some of the findings from our surveys, factors that probably helped to bolster the credibility of the CPN-Maoist. In the 2007 citizen survey, 60 per cent of the respondents consented to the CPN-Maoist's proposal of placing a 'ceiling on landholdings'. Similarly, nearly three-fourths of the respondents agreed with the CPN-Maoist's proposal of integrating the Nepali Army and the People's Liberation Army. The surveyed citizens also ranked the CPN-Maoist at the top when naming the actors who were working for the cause of the excluded groups (see chapter V). And only 7 per

The PLA, with its glorious history of launching the people's war that continued for a decade, has been cared for by the people. Had the PLA not existed, King Gyanendra would have suppressed the political parties. So the PLA's contribution to making Jana Andolan II a success should be considered. We cannot think that the PLA's dissolution, rather than its integration into the Nepal army, would solve the problem.

Krishna KC, a journalist associated with the CPN-Maoist

The integration of the Nepali army and the PLA, at the moment, seems unrealistic and irrational on two simple grounds. One, the Nepali army is after all a national army and its conventional loyalty to the monarchy could be changed through reorienting them in the changed context. But the fighters in the PLA are committed to one particular ideology and are loyal to one particular party. Two, the officers of the Nepali army are well-educated and have been well-trained abroad; they have better academic qualifications and professional training than the soldiers of the PLA do have. So it is better to keep them separate at the moment. Eventually though, both the armies could be combined together, once the Nepali army gives up its loyalty to the monarchy and the PLA gives up its loyalty to the CPN-Maoist.

Khagendra Sangroula, a freelance writer and independent communist

cent of the respondents in the 2007 citizen survey said that they considered the CPN-Maoist as a source of insecurity, which was a much smaller percentage of respondents than the 41 per cent of respondents of the 2004 citizen survey who had blamed the CPN-Maoist for the lack of security in the country.

Let's take a close look at the citizens' and parliamentarians' experiences with the CPN-Maoist. Out of the total 4,089 respondents in the 2007 citizen survey, 44 per cent of the respondents said that they had an experience of meeting the Maoists. That figure, for having met the Maoists, was as high as 90 per cent among the parliamentarians. In a reflection of where the CPN-Maoist had concentrated its activities, more people in the villages (47 per cent) than in the urban areas (22.5 per cent), more people in the Mountain region (62 per cent) and the Hill region (56 per cent) than in the Tarai (27.5 per cent), and more people in the Mid-western region (61 per cent) than in the Eastern region (33 per cent) said that they had met the Maoists.


Among the respondents from the citizen survey who said that they had met the Maoists, 39 per cent said that they had met them during the insurgency and 11 per cent after the end of the insurgency, and 51 per cent of the respondents said that they had met the Maoists both during and after the insurgency. Among the respondents of the MP survey, three per cent of the respondents said that they had met Maoists during the insurgency; 26 per cent said that they had met the Maoists after the insurgency and 71 per cent of the respondents said that they had met the Maoists both during and after the insurgency.

That the Maoists had shifted their activities from the villages to the urban areas after they embarked on the peace process is confirmed by the abrupt increase in the reports of the respondents' meeting the Maoists after the insurgency. Furthermore, while the figures for the rural respondents' meeting

with the Maoists after the insurgency dropped sharply (from 39 per cent during the insurgency to 8.5 per cent after the insurgency), more respondents from the urban areas said that they had met Maoists after the insurgency than they had before (from 29 per cent during the insurgency to 43 per cent after the insurgency).

The respondents had many stories to tell about what happened when they met the Maoists. Among those respondents who had met the Maoists, more than half of them had given donations (30 per cent) or provided accommodation (23 per cent) to the Maoists. These acts might have been performed voluntarily in some cases, but such things happened under compulsion in many cases. Among those respondents who said they were 'close to' the CPN-Maoist, only 22 per cent of the respondents had given donations and 15 per cent of them had provided accommodation to the Maoists. Thus, most of the respondents had probably been compelled to provide donation and accommodation to the Maoists. The proportion of respondents who said that they had positive experiences with the Maoists (i.e. the Maoists helped them or provided them with security, justice etc.) and the proportion of respondents who said that they had negative experiences (i.e. those who reported instances of threat, assault, murder, extortion, forced labour, confiscation of property, and obstruction, on the part of the Maoists) were the same, 18 per cent in each case. The remaining 11 per cent of the

IV.7 Experiences with the Maoists: Citizens and MPs



respondents who had met the Maoists said they had a neutral experience, that is, they said that the Maoists did nothing to them when they met.

In the MP survey, 44 per cent of the respondents said that they had negative experiences with the Maoists. Many of these respondents referred to instances of threat, assault, murder, extortion, forced labour and confiscation of property. Besides, 22 per cent of the parliamentarians said they had given donations to the Maoists. Twenty-eight percent of the MP respondents said that the ‘Maoists did nothing’ when the MPs met them.

The disaggregated data of the citizen survey shows that urban dwellers were less affected than the villagers by matters related to the giving of donation and the providing of accommodation to the Maoists. Similarly, the inhabitants of the

Tarai were less victimized than those living in the Hill and Mountain regions, in this regard. In the Mid-western and Far-western regions, there were more instances of respondents’ giving donation and shelter to the Maoists than in the Eastern, Central and Western regions. And more *Pahadis* than *Madheshis* gave donations to or provided accommodation to the Maoists. The respondents from the cities, the Mountain and Hill regions, and the Central and Mid-western development regions cited more negative than positive experiences with the Maoists, and the *Madheshis* too had similar experiences. Besides the acts of giving donation and providing accommodation to the Maoists, some *Pahadis*, rural dwellers, settlers in the Tarai, and the inhabitants of Eastern, Central and Far-west development regions had more positive encounters with the Maoists than negative ones.

The Maoists don't come around as frequently nowadays as they used before. They used to beat up people in the village. We were very afraid of them. Earlier, we had to pay money to them, but we don't have to do so now. We also had to give them food and shelter. Once, the Maoists stayed in this village for 20 days. They killed a pig here in our house, and killed a goat in the house of a Rai. They asked for rice, but I was unable to give them that. Then, one of my daughters-in-law delivered the rice to them. But I gave them moli. They cooked and ate corn rice.

Ms. Devi Kumari Khadka, Bhojpur

If something happens to me, I think the Maoists will provide better justice than the police can. Also, if someone were to commit an unjust act against me, I will go to the Maoists for justice.

Ms. Sita
Bishwakarma,
Nuwakot

Some of the Maoist leaders at the centre may have changed but the local Maoist leaders haven't. At the local level, it seems that they are intent on keeping the people in fear. In some villages, people still have to feed them and give them money. I meet with the local Maoist leaders regularly these days, and I give donations regularly because of their intimidation and threats. They used to take a fixed amount of money once every 3 months. So we cannot say that the Maoists have changed as long as we are compelled to live with fear and threats.

Mr. Uma Kant Mahara, Dang

IV. 8 Experiences with the CPN-Maoist

Multiple responses converted into 100 per cent

		Donation	Accommodation	Positive	Negative	Did nothing
*MP survey	Parliamentarians	22	0	0	44	28
Citizen survey	Commoners	30	23	18	18	11
Area	Rural	30	24	18	17	10
	Urban	28	4	11	24	33
Ecological region	Mountain	35	19	17	25	4
	Hill	33	29	12	15	11
	Tarai	24	13	28	22	13
Development regions	Eastern	28	18	21	15	18
	Central	26	18	17	26	13
	Western	35	34	13	10	9
	Mid-western	34	24	17	19	6
	Far-Western	19	21	36	16	9
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	30	25	17	16	12
	<i>Madheshi</i>	27	9	26	29	10

* Excluded the Maoist MPs

To sum up, it can be concluded that the CPN-Maoist is transforming its old ideal of instituting a one-party communist state in Nepal into a new ideal that is embracing of multiparty democracy, although not everybody believes it. The progress made by the party in transforming its ideals has generated some hope that the CPN-Maoist may be leaving some of its past behind. But since some of the Maoists have continued to extort money and commit murders and other acts of violence—though not as much as they used to—many people do not trust them yet. And although many people have had many negative experiences with the CPN-Maoist in the past, they have begun

to hope that the party will change for the better, after all. Many issues related to the future of the country, including the transformation of the CPN-Maoist depends on how the present state of transition plays out. And the election of the CA is that central event, that culminating event, which needs to happen in these mercurial times if Nepal is to have a better future. We will next examine the issue of the election of the CA again, but from a different angle—from the standpoints of the people's understanding of the CA, the security situation in the country and the role that the international community has played in Nepal.

The majority of Nepali voters don't understand the meaning of the CA but do have a sense of what it means

IV.4

The election of the CA is a new concept for many people in Nepal since the country has never experienced such elections in the past. Many of the issues associated with the CA are political issues the people have not encountered before, and these issues are obviously unknown to many people in Nepal. Around the time of the 2007 survey, one of the pertinent issues debated was whether the Nepali people would understand the meaning of the CA and other associated subjects. Assuming that the largest number of Nepali voters would not understand some core issues of the CA, some analysts said that it would be necessary to postpone the CA elections, which was originally scheduled for June 2007. The findings of the survey show that that assumption by the analysts was correct, but the people had different ideas about the prescribed suggestion for the postponement of the CA election.

Since the election of the CA and the attendant terminologies are such new


concepts here in Nepal, our survey gauged the people's levels of familiarity with the terminologies that are being used to define the central issues for the CA. The respondents showed that they had different levels of familiarity with the different words, which ranged from the respondents knowing one-third of the terms to two-thirds of the terms. In the 2007 citizen survey, 68 per cent of the respondents had heard the words 'Constituent Assembly' and 72 per cent of the respondents had heard the word 'republic'. But the number of people who had heard the words 'reservation' and 'federalism' constituted only around one-third of the total number of respondents. Eighteen per cent of the respondents said that they thought that they understood the meaning of the word 'Constituent Assembly' and 22 per cent of the respondents said that they thought they understood the meaning of the word 'republic'. And only 11 per cent of the respondents said that they thought they understood the meaning of the word

‘reservation’, while 8 per cent of the respondents said that they thought they understood the meaning of the word ‘federalism’.

The disaggregated data in table IV. 9 A and B show that most of the respondents from the disadvantaged sections of society, such as the women, the elderly, the inhabitants of the Mountain region, and the Dalits of both the *Pahadi* and *Madheshi* communities did not know the meanings of the

words ‘Constituent Assembly’, ‘republic’, ‘reservation’ and ‘federalism’. Their lack of knowledge about these words is probably a reflection of their relatively lower levels of education when compared to the men, the young people, the inhabitants of the Hill region, and the high caste people. The respondents’ knowledge of these terminologies depended largely on their levels of education and media exposure. For instance, only 2 percent of the illiterate respondents understood the meaning of the words ‘Constituent Assembly’, whereas 53 per cent of the highly educated respondents understood the meaning of the words. Among those who were ‘highly exposed to the media’, 78 per cent said they knew what ‘republic’ meant; but only 6 per cent of the respondents from the ‘no exposure to the media’ bracket understood the meaning of ‘republic’. This pattern displayed by the respondents, of their understanding the words based on the levels of education and exposure to the media, was repeated in the respondents’ abilities to understand the meanings of the words ‘reservation’ and ‘federalism’ as well.

IV.8 Familiarity with the CA and Other Important Issues



IV. 9A. People's Understanding of the CA and Associated Issues

		Constituent Assembly				Republic			
		Heard			Not heard	Heard			Not heard
			Under-stand	Don't Understand			Under-stand	Don't Understand	
Citizen survey	Commoners	68	18	51	32	72	22	49	28
Sex	Male	80	26	54	20	83	32	51	17
	Female	57	9	48	43	61	13	48	39
Age Group	Young	79	24	54	21	82	31	50	18
	Old	50	8	41	50	53	10	42	48
Area	Rural	66	16	50	34	70	20	50	30
	Urban	81	25	55	19	80	38	42	19
Ecological Region	Mountain	71	12	59	29	74	12	62	26
	Hill	73	19	55	27	77	24	54	23
	Tarai	62	17	45	38	65	22	42	35
Education	Illiterate	41	2	39	59	46	3	42	54
	Highly educated	94	53	42	6	96	62	34	4
Media Exposure	No exposure	46	4	42	54	52	6	46	48
	High exposure	95	65	30	5	95	78	18	5
Pahadi	High caste	82	24	58	18	84	31	54	16
	Ethnic	69	17	52	31	73	21	52	27
	Dalit	59	11	49	41	64	13	50	36
Madheshi	High caste	50	16	34	49	51	17	34	49
	Ethnic	64	10	54	36	66	16	50	34
	Dalit	35	8	27	65	45	10	34	55
	Muslim	51	15	35	49	58	17	41	42

When the findings from the survey are studied, there can be no doubt that many people didn't understand the meaning of the terminologies used in relation to the CA. This revelation is also confirmed by the nature of answers that respondents gave to one particular question that the surveyors asked to them. When asked what a CA was, 59 per cent of the respondents said, 'I don't know'. But while the 'don't know' and the 'don't understand' responses on answer to the people's knowing the meaning of the terminologies came in at quite a high proportion, these answers do not by themselves determine that the people have no idea about the principles of the CA, a republic, reservation and federalism. In fact, when the surveyors continued probing the respondents further, and continued to engage the people in conversations where the terminologies were used in more simplistic forms, the people now said they had a different take on the questions: for instance, only 15 per cent of the respondents chose the 'don't know' option when they were asked questions about their expectations from

the CA. Similarly, when the issue of republic was framed in a more simplistic form—as in, 'do you want to retain the monarchy or abolish it?'—only 19 per cent of the respondents then said 'don't know'. Furthermore, although only 11 per cent of the respondents said that they understood the meaning of the word 'reservation', as shown by Table 9 B, 90 per cent of the respondents gave their opinions when the question was asked in a way that sought to gauge their opinions on the need for special constitutional provisions for the excluded groups. Similarly, only 8 per cent said that they understood the meaning of federalism (table 9 A), but when the same question was framed in a simpler format, together with an elaboration on what unitary government or federalism meant, 76 per cent of the respondents gave their opinions. In sum, although many Nepali people are unaware about the legal, academic and technical meanings of the words like the CA and the terminologies used for related subjects, they understood all these crucial issues in layman terms and said that the principles that governed the issues reflected their expectations.

IV. 9. B. People's Understanding of the CA and Associated Issues

		Reservation				Federalism			
		Heard			Not heard	Heard			Not heard
			Under-stand	Don't understand			Under-stand	Don't understand	
Citizen survey	Commoners	36	11	25	64	33	8	25	67
Sex	Male	47	17	30	53	46	13	33	54
	Female	25	5	20	75	21	3	18	79
Age group	Young	47	15	32	53	40	10	31	60
	Old	17	5	13	83	16	3	13	84
Area	Rural	34	9	24	66	31	7	24	69
	Urban	49	19	29	51	46	15	31	54
Ecological region	Mountain	24	3	21	76	24	3	21	76
	Hill	35	11	24	65	28	7	21	71
	Tarai	62	17	45	38	39	9	30	61
Education	Illiterate	10	0	10	90	11	-	11	89
	Highly educated	79	49	30	21	71	33	38	29
Media exposure	No exposure	14	1	13	86	13	1	12	86
	High exposure	91	58	33	9	87	41	46	13
Pahadi	High caste	47	15	31	53	40	10	29	60
	Ethnic	29	9	20	71	26	6	20	74
	Dalit	25	5	20	75	22	3	20	77
Madheshi	High caste	34	13	21	66	36	11	25	64
	Ethnic	38	6	32	62	41	5	36	59
	Dalit	21	5	16	79	20	4	16	80
	Muslim	22	9	13	78	26	8	18	74

Thus, given that the people know what they expect out of the CA and the restructuring process that Nepal is to go through, the postponing of the CA elections on account of the people's being ignorant is not a logical solution. The people's levels of knowledge about the CA and related issues can be increased by

launching programmes to educate the people. Besides, an announcement of a prescribed election date would force the political parties and other stakeholders to go to the people and educate them about the principles and processes of the CA and other subjects associated with the CA.

IV.5 Political parties seem sceptical but people do think that it is possible to hold a fair CA election

The YCL is a militant organization of our party. It is a shame that some people of this organization have been occasionally involved in extortion, abduction and the killings of innocent people, and our party condemns these activities. However, it should be known that the media has exaggerated the stories of these incidents, in a planned way to discredit our party. The media doesn't focus much on the constructive work carried out by the YCL, i.e. controlling crime, cleaning cities, constructing roads, and involving themselves in rescuing the victims of floods.
Ganesh Man Pun, Chair of YCL

The problem of security in the country is one of the central problems that needs to be solved as the transition period matures towards the election of the CA. The April 2006 *Jana Andolan II* serves as a cut off point from when the armed conflict ended and the process of conflict transformation began. The peace process that began with the announcement of the ceasefire in April 2006 culminated in the declaration of the end of the war when the CPA was signed on 21 November 2006. So the security situation at present is vastly different from that of the pre-*Jana Andolan II* period. Nevertheless, some people have seriously doubted whether the present security situation is conducive enough for ensuring a free and

fair election of the CA. The activities of the YCL, a militant wing of the CPN (Maoist) consisting of the party's hard-core former guerrillas, have been widely criticized for recreating a milieu of 'terror'. And communal tensions and political disturbances in the Tarai, where more than one dozen small armed groups are active, have created other problems. Furthermore, general strikes, which paralyze the government, are routinely called by all kinds of agitators, irrespective of the strengths of their organizations. People have doubts about whether the state, which is bound by the CPA from mobilizing the army, has the capacity to maintain law and order. A perfect security situation is unachievable,

The state of affairs at present is one of total anarchy. The minimum responsibility of the state is to protect the citizens' life, property, liberty and dignity; but such protection is not being provided at the moment. A lot of things need to be done before the election of the CA. The activities of the YCL and the disturbances in the Tarai have been creating a lot of problems in people's lives. The YCL should stop acting with impunity. The Maoists should come under the law. The eight-party-alliance has to devise a strong security policy.

Arjun Narasingh KC, a member of the NC Central Committee

The present state of affairs is not conducive for the election of the CA. The Maoists have been creating disturbances. They are threatening the people and the members of the mass media to the extent that those who don't comply with the Maoists have to bear grave consequences. As the behaviour of the Maoists does not reflect their words of commitment to peace and democracy, I don't trust them. The state of uncertainty and chaos has been further aggravated by the disturbances in the Tarai. The increasing trend of uncivil agitation has paralyzed the administration. The state security machinery seems helpless in dealing with the deteriorating law and order situation. So creating an environment of peace and security is a must before we hold the election of CA.
Lokendra Bahadur Chand, leader of the RPP and former prime minister

A lot of vested interest groups are active in the Tarai, and their hidden objective is to disrupt the CA election. There are many armed gangs mobilizing for this purpose. So the people in the Tarai have been living in a state of terror. Political parties have not yet been able to conduct their regular functions there. After the massacre in Gaur, the headquarters of Rautahat (a Tarai district), political parties have not yet gained the confidence to organize mass meetings.

C.P. Gajurel, leader of the CPN-Maoist

and so there are some analysts who think that as long as the government can provide at least the minimum level of security that would be required for conducting a free and fair election of the CA, the election, scheduled for June 2007, should be held on the date that was designated.


The 2007 survey was conducted a year after the declaration of the ceasefire and a few months after the *Madhesh* uprising, and the people had differing opinions about whether the CA elections could be held in an environment that was free from fear. The opinions of the commoners and the parliamentarians were sharply divided in this regard. Although a substantial percentage of the citizens (38 per cent) did not think that the environment for conducting the CA elections would be free from fear, nearly two-thirds of the citizens were confident that the CA election could be held in an environment that wasn't tainted by fear; but the finding was just the reverse in the case of parliamentarians, as 61 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey were not sure that the election could be held in an environment free from fear. Only 39

per cent of the respondents of the MP survey were optimistic that the election of the CA could be held in an environment free from fear.

The majority of respondents from almost all segments of society—males and females, the young and the old, the villagers and the urban dwellers, the educated and the uneducated, and the inhabitants of all the three ecological zones (Mountain, Hill and Tarai) and all five development regions (Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western, and Far-western)—were of the opinion that the CA election could be held in an environment free from fear. But the elderly and the inhabitants of the Tarai mostly thought otherwise. A clear majority of the *Madheshi* respondents said that the situation would not be conducive enough for holding the election of the CA.

The respondents' levels of confidence about whether the CA election could be held on schedule (June 2007) was closely tied with their perception of the security situation in the country. In responding to the questions

IV.9 Confidence on the CA Election without Fear: Citizens and MPs



IV. 10. Confidence on Election of the CA without Fear

		Fully sure	Some how sure	Combined	Not very sure	Not sure at all	Combined
MP survey	Parliamentarians	7	32	39	47	14	61
Citizen survey	Commoners	15	47	62	29	9	38
Sex	Male	15	45	60	29	10	39
	Female	13	49	62	29	9	38
Age group	Young	16	48	64	26	9	35
	Old	10	44	54	34	11	45
Area	Rural	15	47	62	29	9	38
	Urban	13	49	62	27	11	38
Ecological region	Mountain	19	54	73	21	5	26
	Hill	16	52	68	25	6	31
	Tarai	12	40	52	34	15	49
Development regions	Eastern	14	45	59	28	12	40
	Central	14	48	62	27	10	37
	Western	11	53	64	27	7	34
	Mid-western	16	41	57	33	9	42
	Far-Western	20	44	64	31	4	35
Education	Illiterate	13	46	59	31	10	41
	Highly educated	14	46	60	27	13	40
Media exposure	No exposure	13	48	61	30	9	39
	High exposure	19	47	66	23	11	34
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	16	49	65	27	7	34
	<i>Madheshi</i>	10	37	47	35	19	54


about the security situation in their own localities, 23 per cent of the 2007 citizen survey said they felt ‘very safe’; 70 per cent said that they felt ‘somehow safe’; and those who said that they felt ‘unsafe’ constituted only 7 per cent of the total number of respondents. Since more people thought that the security situation was good enough in the country, it is not surprising that many people felt confident that the CA election could be held in an environment free from fear. But in the MP survey, more parliamentarians said they felt ‘unsafe’ (25 per cent) than those who said that they felt ‘very safe’ (9 per cent). The percentage of respondents who said that they felt ‘unsafe’ was 18 per cent higher in the MP survey than the percentage of commoners in the citizen survey who said that they felt ‘unsafe’; and the percentage of parliamentarians who said that they felt ‘very safe’ was 14 per cent lower than the percentage of commoners who said that they felt ‘very safe’. So the different perceptions, as exhibited by the commoners and the parliamentarians, regarding the security situation led the respondents of the two surveys to two different conclusions about whether the CA election could be held in a climate that was free from fear: the commoners said yes, the parliamentarians no.

In comparison to the conditions prevailing three year ago, when the first round of survey was taken, there was a clear indication that the security situation


had improved in the country during the period when the 2007 survey was taken. During the 2004 citizen survey, 19 per cent of the respondents had said that they felt ‘very safe’ and 8 per cent of the respondents had said that they felt ‘unsafe’. But those figures changed this time around: in the 2007 citizen survey, the percentage of respondents who said that they felt ‘very safe’ was 4 per cent higher than the percentage of respondents who said the same in 2004; and the percentage of respondents who said that they felt ‘unsafe’ was 7 per cent lower than in 2004.

The view that the security situation had improved in the country over the three years since the last survey was not shared by everyone. The opinions of the urban dwellers and the respondents from the *Madheshi* community were just the opposite of the general pattern of opinions among the respondents, who felt that the security situation had improved. The percentage of urban dwellers who said that they felt ‘very safe’ decreased from 26 per cent in 2004 to 21 per cent in 2007; the percentage of urban dwellers who said that they felt ‘unsafe’ increased from 9 to 15 per cent in the correspondent period. That shift in view on the part of the urban dwellers may be a reflection of the fact that several factors that contribute to the people’s feeling less secure are now manifesting in the cities. The *Madheshi* respondents shared the urban dwellers’ opinions that the security

IV.10 Security Situation: Citizens and MPs



IV.11 Security Situation: 2004 and 2007



IV.11. Security Situation

		Very safe			Somehow safe			Unsafe		
		2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-
Citizen survey	Commoners	19	23	+ 4	67	70	+ 3	14	8	- 6
Area	Rural	17	23	+ 6	68	71	+ 3	15	6	- 9
	Urban	26	21	- 5	65	64	- 1	9	15	+ 6
Ecological Region	Mountain	9	13	+ 4	63	78	+ 15	27	8	- 19
	Hill	20	26	+ 6	69	69	0	11	5	- 6
	Tarai	18	20	+ 2	66	70	+ 4	16	10	- 10
Development regions	Eastern	15	24	+ 9	64	69	+ 5	21	7	- 14
	Central	26	26	0	66	64	- 2	7	9	+ 2
	Western	14	22	+ 8	78	73	- 5	8	5	- 3
	Mid-western	14	17	+ 3	55	76	+ 21	30	7	- 23
	Far-Western		13	- 1		78	+ 23		9	- 21
Social groups	Pahadi	18	23	+ 5	71	69	- 2	11	8	- 3
	Madheshi	23	15	- 8	60	72	+ 12	17	14	- 3


situation was worsening. In the 2004 survey, 23 per cent of the *Madheshi* respondents had said that they felt ‘very safe’; but in the 2007 survey, only 15 per cent of the *Madheshi* respondents said that they felt ‘very safe’. But before we probe why the urban and *Madheshi* respondents feel that the security situation has worsened (that analysis is featured later on in this chapter), let us continue our focus on the findings that most respondents feel that the security situation has improved.

Among the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey, 48 per cent said that they felt ‘more safe’ at present than they did a year ago, and only 10 per cent of the respondents said they felt ‘less safe’ now than they used to in the past. Many of the parliamentarians surveyed too felt that the security situation had become better now than it was in the past. In the MP survey, the number of respondents who said that they felt ‘more safe’ at present in comparison to a year before was almost double (52 percent) than those who said that they felt ‘less safe’ now than they did in the past (26 per cent). Thus, although the overall security situation seems to have changed for the better in comparison to the past, nearly two-thirds of the parliamentarians surveyed felt that the security situation has not improved to the extent that the CA elections could be held in an environment that is free from fear.


That the security situation has improved over the last three years was also further evident from the answers that respondents gave when they were asked to compare the present security situation in their localities with the conditions in the past few/one years. Forty eight per cent of the respondents, a figure that was 36 per cent higher than in 2004, said that they felt ‘more safe’, in the 2007 survey. In the 2004 survey, 55 per cent of the respondents had said that they felt ‘less safe’ than they did a few years ago, but in the 2007 survey, only 10 per cent of the people said that they felt ‘less safe’.

Nationally, the increment in the percentage of respondents who said that they felt ‘more safe’ in the 2007 survey was 48 per cent. Respondents from all localities, from the villages and cities, from all three ecological regions (Mountain, Hill and Tarai), and from all five development regions (Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western, and Far-western), shared this feeling. Both the *Pahadis* and *Madheshis* also echoed these sentiments. But the percentage of urban dwellers (30 per cent) and *Madheshis* (27 per cent) who said that they felt ‘more safe’ was much lower than the national average of 48 per cent; and the percentage of respondents from these groups (22 and 16 per cent, respectively) who said that they felt ‘less safe’ now than they did before was 12 and

IV.12 Security Situation in Comparison to the Past: Citizens and MPs



IV.13 Security Situation in Comparison to the Past: 2004 and 2007



IV. 12 Security Situation in Comparison to the Past

		More safe			Less safe			Same as before		
		2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-
*MP survey	Parliamentarians		52			26			22	
Citizen survey	Commoners	12	48	+ 36	55	10	- 45	33	42	+ 9
Area	Rural	11	51	+ 40	55	8	- 47	30	42	+ 12
	Urban	14	30	+ 16	56	22	- 34	30	48	+ 18
Ecological region	Mountain	1	76	+ 75	59	4	- 55	40	20	+ 20
	Hill	15	57	+ 42	52	6	- 48	33	37	+ 4
	Tarai	10	34	+ 24	58	15	- 43	32	52	+ 20
Development regions	Eastern	9	45	+ 36	59	13	- 46	32	42	+ 10
	Central	17	35	+ 18	51	12	- 39	32	53	+ 21
	Western	11	54	+ 43	56	5	- 51	33	41	+ 8
	Mid-western	7	71	+ 64	52	7	- 45	41	22	- 19
	Far-Western		49	+ 42		6	- 46		45	+ 4
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	12	55	+ 43	50	7	- 43	37	37	0
	<i>Madheshi</i>	11	27	+ 16	57	16	- 41	32	56	+ 24

6 per cent higher, respectively, than the national average of 10 per cent.

The surveys show that the improvement of the security situation was mainly an outcome of the changed political situation. The respondents of both the 2007 citizen and MP surveys who said that they felt ‘more safe’ now than they did a year before pointed out several factors that brought about positive changes in the security situation. Most of the citizens who said they ‘felt safe’ gave credit to the ‘eight-party-alliance’ (41 per cent) and to the ‘resolution of the Maoist conflict’ (22 per cent). The other reasons they gave for the improvement of the security situation were as follows: development (12 per cent), governance (9 per cent), restoration of democracy (7 per cent), decrease of anti-social elements (4 per cent), absence of the Maoists and the


state security forces in their localities (2 per cent for each).

The MPs overwhelmingly said the better security situation in the country was a product of the political changes brought about by the formation of the ‘eight-party-alliance’ (49 per cent) and the ‘resolution of the Maoist conflict’ (37 per cent). The MPs also referred to other contributing factors, but they did not consider these factors to be as important as the major political changes, which they had referred to, in contributing to bring about the change.

Similarly, respondents of all localities, from the cities and the villages, from the Mountain, Hill or Tarai regions, and from both the *Pahadi* and *Madheshi* groups, all said that the changed political situation as a consequence of the ‘eight-party-alliance’ and the ‘resolution of the Maoist conflict’, more than the changes in the non-political arena, i.e. development and governance, were the most important factors that have led to an improvement of the security situation in the country. But more of the *Madheshi* respondents and respondents from the Tarai attributed the improvement in the security situation to the progress made in the non-political arena than did respondents from other categories.

Returning now to the issue of security in relation to the CA elections, we need to address several questions. What are the sources of insecurity? Why

IV.14 Reasons Behind the Improvement of the Security Situation: Citizens and MPs



IV.13 Reasons Behind the Improvement of the Security Situation

Multiple responses converted into 100 per cent

		Eight Party Alliance	Resolution of Maoist conflict	Development	Governance
*MP survey	Parliamentarians	49	37	4	3
Citizen survey	Commoners	41	22	12	9
Area	Rural	41	22	12	8
	Urban	43	21	13	12
Ecological region	Mountain	43	23	15	4
	Hill	43	26	8	7
	Tarai	36	15	17	13
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	40	24	11	8
	<i>Madheshi</i>	30	22	17	13

Responses received on other contributing factors i.e. ‘restoration of democracy’, ‘decrease of anti-social elements’, ‘absence of the Maoists’, ‘absence of the state security forces’, which were reported in insignificant numbers, have been excluded in this table.


did the urban dwellers observe that the present state of security in the country was worse than in the past? Why did the *Madheshis* not feel that the CA elections could be held in an environment free from fear? And why did the parliamentarians feel more unsafe than commoners?

A substantial portion of respondents, 27 per cent of the citizens and 39 per cent of the parliamentarians, said that they did not feel insecure. A reading of the security situation in the country as shown by these respondents is obviously one reason that can be used to argue that the CA election could be held in an environment free of fear. When we re-cluster the various sources of insecurity in two brackets—one political (threat from the Maoists, police/army/bureaucracy, armed rebellion and uncivil agitation), and the other non-political (anti-social elements as a source of insecurity)—the findings are even more encouraging. Before we analyze the data that shows the correlation between the issue of having a secure environment for the CA polls and the relevant variables that can affect the state of security during the CA polls, it must be pointed out that feelings of insecurity arising from factors such as the actions of anti-social elements have no bearing on whether the CA polls can be held without fear. The main determinant of whether the CA polls can be held in an environment free from fear are political in nature. Thus, since 45 per cent of the citizens surveyed said they felt insecure mainly because of non-political factors, and 14 per cent of the parliamentarians

also cited non-political factors for their feeling insecure, these factors cannot be marshalled to support the argument that the CA elections cannot be held because the element of fear is very pervasive. In fact, only 24 per cent of the citizens and 27 per cent of the MPs said the security problem was related to political issues.

But although the political factors that were cited as contributing to insecurity accounted for only one-fourth of the total number of responses concerning the sources of insecurity (including the figures for the response ‘don’t feel insecure on account of anyone’), why didn’t the MPs feel confident that the CA elections could be held in an environment free from fear? There were clearly divergent assessments between the citizens and the MPs in their analyses of the security situation, and probing this finding further could provide a clue. Out of the five given

IV.15 Sources of Insecurity: Citizens and MPs



IV. 14. Sources of Insecurity

		Anti-social elements	Uncivil agitation	Maoist	Armed rebellion	Police/ army/ bureauc-racy	Not inse-cure
*MP survey	Parliamentarians	14	3	6	15	3	39
Citizen survey	Commoners	45	12	7	3	2	27
Area	Rural	46	9	7	3	2	29
	Urban	39	33	6	2	2	16
Ecological region	Mountain	51	7	6	5	2	24
	Hill	46	10	5	2	2	31
	Tarai	43	16	8	3	2	23
Social groups	Pahadi	46	11	5	3	3	29
	Madheshi	41	14	9	3	2	26

The culture that we have developed is one where protesting in uncivil ways, like calling bandhas (general strikes), chakka jams (disallowing the movement of vehicles) and burning tires, is the norm. You are visible if you conduct an andolan and you are invisible if you do not. How do we get away with this political culture? This culture of ours is one of the major obstacles to bringing back an atmosphere of security in the country.

Sapana Pradhan, women rights activist

The security situation in the Tarai at present is so bad that such a situation is unprecedented in the history of Nepal. The state does not exist there. The state of anarchy is such that people are being killed every week, and the state has become helpless. Killing people amounts to nothing. New armed groups are sprouting: the Cobra group, the Tiger group, and there's yet another group that has just come up—the Bisphot (explosion) group. The way things have been going on there will not only destroy the security system of Nepal as a whole, but may also lead to the repeating of a Sri Lanka-like situation in Nepal.

Shyam Shrestha, civil society activist and independent leftist

sources of insecurity, the respondents of the MP survey mainly said that the armed rebellions in the Tarai were the main source of insecurity. This finding may also explain why the majority of *Madheshi* respondents shared the MPs' pessimistic outlook that the CA elections could not be held in an environment that was free from fear. But the citizens surveyed, including the *Madheshi* respondents, ranked the rebellions in the Tarai next to the last in the rankings for sources of insecurity. More citizens than parliamentarians seemed to think that the security situation would be aggravated by 'uncivil agitation'.

The urban dwellers seemed to be more worried about the rising trend of 'uncivil agitation'. This finding accorded with what they had said about the worsening of the security situation compared to the past. The manifestation of the new primary sources of insecurity, instead of the older ones, also explains why the urban dwellers felt differently from others. In the 2004 citizen survey, the Maoists were considered the main source of insecurity by 41 per cent of the respondents, and the police/army was also seen in the same light by 28 per cent of the respondents. Since the urban areas were not directly affected by the armed conflict between the state and the Maoists, the conflict had not hampered the life of the urban residents. So the reduction in the threat from the Maoists and the state's security forces in the changed context after the April 2006 *Jana Andolan* did not have that much of an effect on the routine lives of the urban residents. The main sources of insecurity in the cities today—uncivil agitation and the armed rebellions in the Tarai—were not central issues during the 2004 survey.

Besides the urban dwellers, the other groups of respondents who have been

affected by the new sources of insecurity are the *Madheshis*. The Tarai had been less affected than the Hill region by the CPN-Maoist insurgency, and so the state's security operations had been conducted more in the Hill region. The *Madheshi* respondents did not feel overly threatened by the armed rebellions taking place in the Tarai, and only 3 per cent of the *Madheshi* respondents said that these armed rebellions were adversely affecting the security situation in the *Madhesh*; but that assessment may have been ventured by the *Madheshi* respondents because the main targeted groups by the armed rebels are the people of *Pahadi* origin living in the Tarai. But the debilitating impact of the armed rebellions on the security situation in the Tarai—particularly in the Eastern, Central and Western development regions, where the activists of both the armed and non-armed groups have been active—was distinctly felt by the respondents from the Tarai.

The proportion of respondents from the Tarai who said that they felt 'more safe' than they did in the past—29 per cent in the Eastern region, 21 per cent in the Central region and 31 per cent in the Western region—was much lower than the national average for respondents who said they felt 'more safe' than in the past (48 per cent). The respondents from the Mid-western region and the Far-western region in the Tarai, however, were not as affected by the communal tensions and political disturbances. Thus, more respondents from these two areas in the Tarai said that they felt 'more safe' today than they did in the past—the respective percentages of respondents from these two areas, 61 per cent and 67 per cent, who said that they felt 'more safe' today, was higher than the national average for the number of respondents who said the same thing (48 per cent).

People believe that international supervision would help in ensuring free and fair elections of the CA

IV.6

The international community can help make the security situation better in the country. UNMIN, which has the key responsibility of verifying and supervising the CPN-Maoist combatants, has been involved in the issue of arms management in Nepal. India has been involved proximately in all the negotiations that are being carried out for smoothening the process of transition and conflict transformation. India's pivotal role in reducing the tension in the Tarai has been acknowledged widely. The European Union, the UK and the USA are investing their time and money in the civic education of the population in matters related to the CA and related issues. China and Japan have provided much technical and logistic support in preparing the nation for the CA elections. Other countries and organizations have also increased their activities in the relevant areas.

But the involvement of the international community in Nepal during the present transitional stage is not free from controversy. The roles played by the USA and India, while considered important by many, have also been considered as 'dominating'. There is an apprehension that there will be much external interference and intervention, especially since the donors have begun to openly insist that their views be taken into account by the political actors. These voices of dissension against the highhandedness of the external forces have mostly come from the communist parties. The lack of coordination among the external actors has also been felt. However, despite all these misgivings, the significance of the roles that the international community is playing can be justified on two simple grounds. One, the role of the international community is considered as important for conflict transformation. And, two, people believe

that international supervision would help to ensure the free and fair elections of the CA.

When the literacy rate in Nepal is taken into account, it is not surprising to find that a significant number of respondents of the 2007 citizen survey (47 per cent in aggregate) chose the 'don't know' option when they responded to a question about the significance of the roles that foreign countries and the unions of countries were playing in Nepal (China, India, Japan, the UK, the USA, the European Union, and UNO). But among those who gave a definite answer, around 82 per cent (in aggregate) of the respondents said that the international community was playing a significant role in the processes related to the democratic transition in Nepal. Most respondents said that India was the top contributor (with 91 per cent affirmative responses—a combined figure of the 'very important' and 'important' response) among the list of international actors who had played the most important role in the transition. India was followed by the UN, the USA, China, the European Union, Japan and the UK. And the opinions from the MPs were similar to that of the citizens in expressing appreciation for the roles that the international actors had played in Nepal.

There were divergent opinions among both the citizens of different segments of society and the MPs of the different parties when apportioning credit to the different political actors. The respondents from the Hill region gave more credit to the UN, whereas the respondents from the Tarai said that India had played the most significant role. The geographical proximity the Tarai has with India and the cultural affinity that the *Madheshis* have with the

Foreigners have assisted our country. I think that nothing good will happen without their help. They have helped to provide drinking water and in the construction of inns, schools, roads and old-folks homes. We need their help even for the establishment of peace. I have heard the names of India, China, America, the UNO, getting involved in Nepal. Although, I can't say how much they have helped in the peace process, it is good that they are helping.
Ms. Bhim Kumari Katuwal,
Bhojpur

It is good that the foreigners tell us to work in accordance with the values of democracy. But I am against the big brotherly attitude shown by India and America. If our country is sovereign, how legitimate is their interference that goes as far as in the formation and operation of government. The gripping of and crushing of a small country by a rich country should not be allowed. How can you call yourself the most democratic country in the world when you behave like a dictator, an expansionist and an exploiter? In my thinking, the constant conflicts and fights in our country are due to the interests that India and America have in Nepal. Didn't you see how much effort America expended to block the Maoists from joining the government?
Mr. Bhim Prasad Sharma,
Parbat


Indian people probably played huge roles in shaping the opinions of the *Madheshi* respondents. Most of the *Madheshi* respondents perceived the role that India has played as being the most significant (65 per cent), while only 35 per cent of the *Madheshis* deemed the UN's role as being significant. The *Pahadis*, on the other hand, said that the UN was the most significant actor—the Indians came in two per cent lower, as the second-most important actor.

The party-wise breakdown of the opinions among the parliamentarians also showed differing opinions, as far as ranking the roles of international actors was concerned. For the MPs of the NC, India was the most important international actor, and the UML's MPs placed the UN at the top. The CPN-Maoist's MPs distinctly favoured China's role, in contrast to the opinions of the


MPs from other political parties. The CPN-Maoist's MPs did give lower ratings to other international actors, but the disparity was not all that much, especially in the case of the UN.

The citizens' and parliamentarians' appreciation for the roles that the international community has played in Nepal accorded with their perception that international supervision would help ensure free and fair elections of the CA. Although 43 per cent respondents of the 2007 citizen survey expressed their ignorance on this question, among those who gave definite answers, 84 per cent (the combined figure for the 'great extent' and 'some extent' responses) affirmed that supervision by the international community would ensure free and peaceful elections of the CA. The parliamentarians were more optimistic than the citizens in this regard: 88 per cent of the respondents of the MP survey thought that the international community's involvement would ensure free and fair CA elections. The differences of opinion among respondents that sprang from differences of sex, age, levels of education, caste/ethnicity and places of habitation had nothing to do with their perceptions about the significance of international supervision in ensuring free and fair elections of the CA. The figures for the responses received in this regard from the respondents of different segments of society were more or less close to the national average figure. Similarly,

IV.16 Role of the International Community: Citizens and MPs



IV.17 Significance of International Supervision for a Free and Fair CA Election: Citizens and MPs



IV 15 Grading the Role of the International Community by Answer Category of 'Very Important'

		India	UN	USA	China	European Union	Japan	UK
	Commoners	51	49	38	28	24	19	17
Ecological zone	Mountain	37	38	31	27	14	13	14
	Hill	42	52	37	27	25	21	20
	Tarai	61	47	40	28	24	17	13
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	45	47	35	28	24	19	17
	<i>Madheshi</i>	65	38	39	28	23	18	13
MP survey	Parliamentarians	76	69	54	44	31	9	16
Political parties	NC	86	71	65	37	43	12	28
	UML	81	82	61	38	35	4	15
	Maoist	59	52	30	55	20	5	4
	RPP	75	75	50	25	50	25	50
	NSP	100	50	67	20	-	-	-

irrespective of which party they belonged to, all parliamentarians shared the common opinion that international

supervision would ensure free and fair elections of the CA.

Summing up Till the time of the 2007 citizen survey, the transition happening in Nepal had been on track: the CPA had been signed, the Interim Constitution had been framed, and the CPN-Maoist had joined the interim parliament and government. And the people's expectations for peace, stability and the state restructuring that would follow from the election of the CA were all further ensured by the CPN-Maoist's involvement in the peace process. The transformation of the CPN-Maoist's ideology in support of the multiparty system—though the CPN-Maoist's new philosophy can sometimes seem ambiguous—has been welcomed by the people, but many in the political circles question the CPN-Maoist's new political credentials. The main goal of *Jana Andolan* II—the instituting of a republic—will most probably be achieved, as the calls for the abolition of the monarchy have been growing more vociferous by the day. The prevalence of this line of thought in the days after the March-April 2007 citizen survey would certainly have increased substantially now that the NC, one of the major political parties of Nepal, has formally endorsed the proposal for a republic in a meeting of its *Maha Samittee* (National Congress) in September 2007. But although the goals and the final aims of the transition process have always been clear—restructuring the Nepali state with its three principal ingredients: peace building, along with the mainstreaming of the CPN-Maoist in the multiparty system; the instituting of a republic; and the creation of an inclusive democracy—the date of the CA election was first

rescheduled for November 2007 and postponed again, in response to new political developments.

The speculation that the CA election could be postponed was becoming more pervasive when the citizen survey was being conducted in March-April of 2007. Though the CA election (June 2007) was to have been conducted, according to the earlier schedule, in just a month, the political parties were not launching election campaigns back then, suggesting that parties' leaders had a pre-planned motive for postponing the CA election. Besides, the Election Commission had hinted at its being unprepared for conducting the election on the initial date that had been scheduled (June 2007), on technical, managerial and logistic grounds. Many thought there wouldn't be enough time to educate the people before they were to go to the polls. And the security situation was also seen as a critical factor, although the outlook was much more pessimistic than the conditions warranted. And the communal tensions and political disturbances in the Tarai, which became the most critical problems in Nepal after the January-February 2007 *Madhesh* uprising, led to the increased perception that the state of security for the CA election would not be up to the mark. But in retrospect, the *Madhesh* uprising has at least forced the people and the leaders of Nepal to realize that it is now extremely imperative that they pursue measures to bring about inclusive democracy, thus making inclusive democracy as one of the core elements in the restructuring of the Nepali state.

V Ethnicity and Inclusion

The Civil Code of 1854—the first body of state law in Nepal—classified the Nepali people into three broad categories in descending hierarchical order: (a) *Tagadhari* (the sacred-thread wearing castes) at the top (b) *Matwali* (alcohol drinking ethnic groups) in the middle, and (c) 1. *Sudra* (impure but touchable) and 2. *Achhut* (impure and untouchable) castes at the lowest positions. By putting ethnic groups into the fold of the Hindu hierarchical caste system, the code transmuted the meaning of ethnicity to signify rank. According to the code, a people's place in the caste hierarchy determined how they would be treated by the judicial system and how and whether they would be the beneficiary of state resources. Needless to say, the higher up in the caste category a person was, the better the treatment that would be accorded to that person. The Civil Code of 1854 was replaced by the New Civil Code of 1963, which recognized the universal principle of equality of all people, but the older civil code has remained in effect as customary law.

The state-designed scheme of national integration was created to protect the monarchy and propagate Hinduism and the Nepali language. Before *Jan Andolan II*, the monarchy,

Hinduism and the Nepali language had been projected and promoted as the three pillars of Nepali nationalism. The state hoped to achieve its aim of national integration by instituting a centralized administration, a unitary form of government, an authoritarian culture based on patron-client relations and by adopting the stratagem of planned migration of people from the hills into the Tarai. The scheme weakened multiculturalism, increased the disparity among the peoples of different groups and led to the ethnic groups' losing their control over the territories that they had traditionally inhabited. The overall effect of the national integration policy was that the Hill high caste Brahmins and Chhetris became the dominant and privileged groups while the other groups—the *Janajatis*, *Madheshis* and Dalits—ended up as the marginalized groups.

In the changed context after the restoration of democracy in 1990, those historically excluded groups began to assert their identities and rights. The demands of the ethnic groups pertain to three major themes: an assertion of ethnic identities shorn of the caste-labels that the state slapped on ethnic groups, the sharing of national resources, and a

greater representation of the diverse groups in the political structure. The 1990 Constitution recognized Nepal as a multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual nation, but it did not include provisions that would translate that call to promote diversity into inclusive processes. Nevertheless, the democratic atmosphere that the restoration of democracy in 1990 created proved conducive for ethnic activism and uprising. In this new context, intellectuals, ethnic activists and the CPN-Maoist have brought the issue of ethnic rights to the forefront.

On the politics of ethnic identity, scholars are generally divided between

those who analyze it through the primordial model (Gurung 1998; Bhattachan 1995 and 2000; Lawoti 2005, Burghart 1996; Neupane 2000) and those who analyze it through the instrumentalist model (Sharma 1987 and 1992; Dahal 1995 and 2000, NESAC 1998, Gellner et al eds. 1997; Fisher 2001; Lecomte-Tilouine et al eds. 2003). Thus, although the theoretical basis for framing ethnicity is contested, the prevailing academic discourse, along with media coverage, has contributed to the ethnic cause in two important ways—one, it has helped bring the causes of exclusion to the foreground, and two, it has generated public discussions on strategies of inclusion.

Some concrete decisions made in the post-*Jana Andolan II* period to accommodate ethnic diversity in the political power structure of the country.

- In May 2006, parliament declared Nepal a secular state.
- The Civil Service Bill, passed recently by the interim parliament, has reserved 45 percent of the seats in the civil service for members from the underprivileged sections of society—women, Dalit, *Janajati*, *Madheshi*—and people from remote and backward regions.
- The Interim Constitution of 2007 recognizes all languages of Nepal as national languages and allows mother tongues to be used as official languages in certain regions.
- The Interim Constitution of 2007 states that at least one-third of the committee members of political parties should be made up of women and that there should also be due representation of Dalits. Besides, the Interim Constitution also includes a provision that the selection of candidates by the political parties for elections should be reflective of the principles of inclusive democracy: the parties must include representatives of ethnic groups, Dalits, peasants and labourers, and representatives from the different ecological/geographical areas; and one-third of these representatives must be women.
- The first amendment to the Interim Constitution, made on 9 March 2007, ensures the establishment of a federal system through the election of the CA.
- The Interim Constitution of 2007, by its third amendment, provides that of the 601 members of the CA—240 to be elected by the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system, another 335 to be elected under the PR system and 26 to be nominated—and parties should follow the principle of inclusive democracy when choosing their own candidates.
- The Constituent Assembly Member Election Act (June 2007) provides that for members to be elected from the PR system, the contesting parties must ensure representation of different groups in proportion, as follows: 31.2 per cent for *Madheshis*, 13 per cent for Dalits, 37.9 per cent for *Janajatis*, 4 per cent for backward regions, and 30.2 per cent for others (Hill Brahmin and Chhetri); and at least 50 per cent of the candidates from all groups must be women.

There are now many social organizations lobbying for and championing the cause of the various ethnic and caste groups. The most prominent among them is the NEFIN, which mainly focuses on *Janajati* issues. Dalit and women activists mainly conduct their work through NGOs and INGOs that are backed by donors. The *Madheshis*, on the other hand, are represented by political groups such as the MJF, two groups splintered from the CPN-Maoist—the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)—one led by Jaya Krishna Goit and the other by Jwala Singh—and the long-standing NSP.

The ethnic movement also gained momentum because the issues that were dear to the ethnic groups were taken up by the CPN-Maoist. This former insurgent group capitalized on the psyche of alienation and frustration of the excluded groups, Dalits and *Janajatis* in particular, and took up their causes. The CPN-Maoist did this in order to drum up the support of the marginalized groups for its armed insurgency. Its concerted efforts in blending ethnic rights and class war are evident from the formation of its 11 ethnic and region-based frontier organizations. Furthermore, the CPN-Maoist has proposed a federal structure

to be instituted in the country, with nine autonomous regional governments based on ethnicity and regionalism.

Although the interim government has taken heed of ethnic demands when designing new state policies in the post-*Jana Andolan II* period, the ethnic activists feel that the major political players, the SPA and the CPN-Maoist, have not done enough: the political parties have focused most of their energy on arms management and power sharing among themselves and have been ambiguous on several prominent issues regarding inclusion. In response to the apathetic attitude shown by the political parties, the activists of the excluded groups have thus renewed their movements with new vigour. While the *Janajati*, Dalit and women activists have, for the most part, taken to the streets to seek constitutional remedies against their exclusion, the *Madheshi* movement took a violent turn between January and February of 2007. The *Madhesh* uprising was successful in forcing the transitional authorities to finally take seriously the issues of federalism, redistribution of electoral constituencies on the basis of population size and ethnic-based representation of the CA members to be elected under a PR system.

National identity remains the preference of many citizens, but the trend is towards assertion of ethnic/regional identity

V.1

The largest percentage of the respondents of the citizen survey (43 per cent) identified themselves as Nepali; those who preferred a mixed identity (both Nepali and ethnic) were at 31 per cent; and the ethnic/regional identity was preferred by 26 per cent of the respondents. Among the parliamentarians, 87 per cent of the respondents identified with their Nepali identities,

and only a negligible proportion of them, 3 per cent, preferred ethnic identity.

People of both sexes and across different age groups, areas of habitation (rural and urban) and development regions preferred to identify themselves as Nepali rather than as ethnic or mixed (both national and ethnic). This pattern was more distinct among the urban

The Madhesh bandh (general strike) was called by the MJF, backed by both factions of the JTMM (Goit and Juwala Singh) and participated in by workers of the NSP. Most of the demonstrators were from the age group of 12-25, and the number of demonstrators almost doubled with every passing day. Schools, along with shops, were closed; the movement of all forms of transportation was disallowed, and those drivers attempting to defy the ban had their vehicles destroyed or burnt. Demonstrators carried sticks and organized masal (torch) rallies every evening. Tyre burnings took place at every corner of the city. The police deployed were mostly Madheshis, and they sometimes had to resort to firing. But the police failed to control the situation, instead, the protesters defied the curfew and burnt government offices, banks and some private property. A copy of the Interim Constitution was burnt every day.

'Pahadis out of Madhesh' and 'down with the hill administration' were the main slogans chanted in the rallies. Some shops and a hotel run by Pahadi people were destroyed and burnt. None of the Pahadis were seen on the streets (though they constitute one-fifth of the Janakpur city population) throughout the days of the Madhesh bandh. In public speeches organized at the end of the day—a programme that was held everyday—speakers stressed the following demands: abrogation of the Interim Constitution, declaration of federalism, a census to be taken before the election of the CA, delimitation of electoral constituencies on the basis of population, and inclusion of Madheshis in the state apparatus.

Excerpted from an observation report prepared by Lal Babu Yadav, supervisor of the booster survey on Madhesh, Dhanusha district

dwellers and the inhabitants of the Western and Far-western development regions.

However, disaggregated data by caste/ethnicity show different picture, a clear division between *Pahadis* and *Madheshis*, and differences among the Hill groups. *Pahadis* across caste/ethnicity preferred Nepali identity, whereas *Madheshis* preferred ethnic/regional identities. Among the Hill groups, 64 per cent of the Hill high caste respondents preferred 'Nepali', which is 21 per cent more than the national average of 43 per cent. Among the Hill ethnic groups, 40 per cent of the respondents chose 'Nepali', while 24 per cent of the respondents chose ethnic identity; the margin of difference for responses between the two categories is 16 per cent, much lower than the margin of difference for the same categories among the Hill high caste respondents. The *Madheshi* respondents of different groups (caste, *Janajati*, Dalit and Muslim) gave more weight to ethnic/regional identity (45 per cent in aggregate for all these four groups) than to national identity (18 per cent in aggregate). The *Madhesh* uprising of January-February 2007 was deemed both the cause and the consequence of the rise of ethno-regionalism in the Tarai.

Most of the respondents from the elite and the privileged categories did not favour ethnic identity over national identity. In fact, among respondents of these groups, the tendency of identifying themselves as a 'Nepali' was so strong that 87 per cent of the parliamentarians among the total of 300 respondents of the MP survey preferred to identify themselves as a 'Nepali'. The findings of the citizen survey also show that the respondents' preference for identifying themselves as Nepalis increased with their levels of education, awareness and media exposure. Among the respondents of 'high exposure to the media' group, 69 per cent favoured Nepali identity and similarly 53 per cent respondents from 'high awareness' group also did so. This revelation suggests that the rise of ethnicity in Nepal is not in the form of a

top-down mode; rather, the phenomenon is being shaped from the bottom up.

The findings of the booster survey also show a rising tendency of ethnic assertion: 51 per cent of the Gurungs sampled in Kaski district and 64 per cent *Madheshis* sampled in Dhanusha district accorded with ethnic/regional identity. But there are other factors too beyond caste/ethnicity that have moved the respondents from disadvantaged sections of society to prefer a communal identity, and the findings of the 2007 citizen survey further support this conclusion.

As shown by a cross tabulation of the 2007 survey, the choice of ethnic identity decreased with the increase in educational levels among the respondents, (13 per cent for the highly educated; 16 per cent for the school-level educated; 26 per cent for the literate; and 37 per cent for the illiterate). Similarly, among respondents grouped according to the level of media exposure and level of awareness, the preferences for ethnic/regional identity decreased with increase of the respondents' status and position.

In the last three years, more and more people have started to assert their ethnic identities. In the first survey of 2004, 59 per cent of the respondents had identified themselves as 'Nepali' but in the 2007 survey only 43 per cent did so. The percentage of people choosing a mixed identity increased significantly from 19 per cent in 2004 to 31 per cent in 2007, and choices for ethnic/regional identity also rose from 22 per cent to 26 per cent in the corresponding period. A comparison of the data of the first and second surveys clearly exhibits that some sections of people have changed their preferences, from national identity to ethnic/regional identity. It is important to distinguish which groups of people have changed their preferences.

Table V. 1 shows that many people of the downtrodden strata who have been excluded in one way or another have changed their inclinations from a

national to an ethnic/regional identity. When compared to the study from 2004 the Hill ethnic groups' preferences for a mixed identity went up by 15 per cent (from 21 per cent in 2004 to 36 per cent in 2007) and their preference for national identity went down by 7 per cent (from 47 per cent in 2004 to 40 per cent in 2007). Similarly, among the *Madheshi* respondents, the preference for ethnic/regional identity increased from 29 per cent (aggregate) in 2004 to 47 per cent (aggregate) in 2007 (excluding the figure of Muslim).

Among the states in South Asia, Nepal has been the last one to experience the phenomenon of people's increasingly wishing to identify with their ethnic/regional identity. Since politicization of ethnicity is a new phenomenon here, there is an anxiety about what implications the phenomenon will have on the national integration of the country. Because Nepalis haven't experienced the phenomenon in the past,

they do not know what would be its implication, but this study has revealed that ethnicity and nationality can go hand in hand. Answers to these questions will have to be drawn from the larger context of South Asian history in dealing with such issues, but which best suit the country-specific situation of Nepal.

The overwhelming majority of respondents of the 2007 citizen survey (76 per cent) said that they were proud to belong to their own community. They were equally and even more proud to be Nepali, as shown by the fact that this response scored 83 per cent. These findings confirm the findings of the 2004 survey as well. So the findings of both the first and second surveys clearly suggest that the rise of ethnicity would not contribute to the disintegration of the country. Rather, the surveys show that people can have dual loyalties—to the nation and to their communities—at the same time.

V.1 Preference of Identity


		Nepali			Both Nepali and Ethnic			Ethnic		
		2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-
MP survey	Parliamentarians	X	87	X	X	10	X	X	3	X
Booster	Gurung	X	16	X	X	33	X	X	51	X
	Madheshi	X	3	X	X	33	X	X	64	X
Citizen survey	Commoners	59	43	- 16	19	31	+ 12	22	26	+ 4
Sex	Male	62	47	- 15	19	30	+ 11	18	23	+ 5
	Female	54	39	- 15	18	33	+ 15	27	28	+ 1
Age group	Young	61	47	- 14	17	32	+ 15	22	21	- 1
	Old	56	38	- 18	19	32	+ 13	25	30	+ 5
Area	Rural	56	42	- 14	19	31	+ 12	25	27	+ 2
	Urban	67	50	- 17	17	33	+ 16	16	17	+ 1
Ecological zone	Mountain	63	60	- 3	13	19	+ 6	23	21	+ 2
	Hill	60	49	- 11	20	33	+ 13	20	18	+ 2
	Tarai	58	33	- 25	18	32	+ 14	26	35	+ 9
Development region	Eastern	58	37	- 21	17	27	+ 10	25	36	+ 11
	Central	59	37	- 22	15	34	+ 19	25	29	+ 4
	Western	59	51	- 8	29	36	+ 7	12	13	+ 1
	Mid-western	51	47	- 4	15	27	+ 12	34	26	- 8
	Far-western		57	+ 6		30	+ 15		13	- 21
Education	Illiterate	49	31	- 18	19	32	+ 13	32	37	+ 5
	Highly educated	73	61	- 12	19	26	+ 7	7	13	+ 6
<i>Pahadi</i>	Caste	69	64	- 5	17	24	+ 7	14	12	- 2
	Ethnic	47	40	- 7	21	36	+ 15	32	34	- 8
	Dalit	62	47	- 15	19	29	+ 10	19	24	+ 5
<i>Madheshi</i>	Caste	53	20	- 33	19	33	+ 14	28	47	+ 19
	Ethnic	51	18	- 33	21	45	+ 24	28	37	+ 9
	Dalit	49	17	- 32	21	26	+ 25	30	57	+ 27
	Muslim	X	19	X	X	43	X	X	38	X

'I was surprised to find that in the areas to the east of the Koshi river, all vehicles had paintings of Limbuwan Nepal on both the front and back of the vehicles; such was not the case around last Dashain (September-October 2006), when I left for Kathmandu.'


Mr. Pradeep Kumar Rajbanshi, a surveyor

The citizens often bear more than one identity; these multiple identities do not clash with each other.... The existence of multiple but not necessarily conflicting identities provides more space for democratic negotiations with diversities than has been used by political actors.
SDSA Team. 2008. *State of Democracy in South Asia*. New Delhi: Oxford

V.1 Preference of Identity: Citizens and MPs



V.2 Preference of Identity: 2004 and 2007



Respondents of the citizen surveys of both 2004 and 2007 across sex, age, area, educational attainment and media exposure placed national pride first; they ranked the pride in national identity higher than their own ethnic/regional pride. The pride in being a Nepali is so strong among the members of parliament that 97 per cent of the respondents in the MP Survey said that they felt proud to be a Nepali, whereas 64 per cent said that they felt a pride in belonging to their communities.

There were differences between *Pahadis* and *Madheshis* and among the *Pahadi* groups themselves with regard to how they viewed the concept of pride in their identity. Among the *Pahadis*, all groups—caste, *Janajati* and Dalit—had more respondents claiming that they were more proud of their Nepali identity than of their ethnic identity. But an important difference between the Hill high caste respondents and the Hill *Janajati* respondents should be noted here: in both the 2004 and 2007 surveys, the Hill high castes favoured national identity over ethnic identity by 7-11 per cent, while among the Hill *Janajatis*, the percentage difference for the same criterion in both polls was only 4-6 per cent. The findings show that Hill *Janajatis* have a greater pride in their own ethnicity than Hill castes. Moreover in the 2007 survey, *Madheshi* respondents,

across all categories—caste, *Janajati*, Dalit and Muslim—gave more weight to pride in their own ethnicity (81-85 percent) than to their Nepali identity (78-81 percent). This shows a complete reversal from the opinions of the *Madheshis* in the 2004 survey—back then the *Madheshis*, just like the *Pahadis*, had favoured national identity more.

The booster survey shows more explicitly how ethnic identity is becoming more important for people. In the booster survey, there were more Gurungs who identified with their Gurung identity (89 per cent) than with a Nepali identity (84 per cent). The margin of difference was even more pronounced in the *Madheshi* survey, in which 96 per cent of the *Madheshi* respondents said that they were proud of their ethnicity, whereas only 78 per cent of the *Madheshi* respondents said that they were proud to be Nepali.

In sum, this study has shown that people are proud of both their national and ethnic identities. *Madheshis* and *Janajatis* are increasingly asserting their ethnic/regional identities and will continue to do so in the future. The challenge ahead for the nation is to find a way to strengthen national identity among the people without at the same time downplaying the importance of people's pride in their ethnic identities.

V.2 Pride in being a Nepali and Pride in their Ethnicities

*In mean score point**

		Nepali			Ethnic		
		2004	2007	Proportion of +/-	2004	2007	Proportion of +/-
MP survey	Parliamentarians	X	97	X	X	64	X
Booster	Gurung	X	84	X	X	89	X
	<i>Madheshi</i>	X	78	X	X	96	X
Citizen survey	Commoners	87	83	- 4	77	76	-1
<i>Pahadis</i>	Caste	89	86	- 3	74	71	- 3
	Ethnic	86	84	- 2	82	78	- 4
	Dalit	85	79	- 6	66	65	- 1
<i>Madheshi</i>	Caste	86	78	- 8	79	85	+ 6
	Ethnic	85	78	- 7	79	83	+ 4
	Dalit	86	78	- 8	79	81	+ 2
	Muslim	X	81	X	X	83	X

* Data was converted into a mean score, giving different weight to each of four answer categories, i.e. 1 very proud = 100, 1 proud = 67, 1 not proud = 34 and 1 not at all proud = 1

The rise of ethnicity in Nepal is associated with the problem of exclusion

V.2

The rise of ethnicity in Nepal is associated with the problem of exclusion. This conclusion leads to several important questions. Do people understand which groups of people are included and which are excluded? If yes, then do they know the reasons why certain sections of society have been excluded? Have the conditions of the excluded groups improved as a result of the restoration of democracy and the rise in ethnic activism? What policy measures should be taken to promote inclusive democracy?

The Hill high castes (Brahmin and Chhetri) are generally perceived as included, and others—like the Dalits,

Janajatis, *Madheshis*, Muslims and women—are considered as excluded. The respondents of both the citizen and MP surveys were asked to put these groups in either of these two categories, to see to what extent this generalization applied in the local context.

Eighty eight per cent of the citizens and 91 per cent of the parliamentarians surveyed in 2007 identified the Hill high castes as the included group, and an overwhelming majority of the respondents of both the citizen and MP surveys identified *Janajatis*, *Madheshis*, Muslims, Dalits and women as excluded groups. There is a sense of bitterness against the dominant groups.

Dalits

When we pay shopkeepers, we have to stand at a distance from them, and we have to be careful not to place the money directly in their hands. After we drink tea, shopkeepers take back the glasses that we have used only after the glasses have been 'purified' with fire and water. Many people who take a stand against the practice of untouchability in the public forums don't follow through with their actions in the private domain.

Mrs. Suntali Sunuwar, Nuwakot

Chhetris and Brahmins are rich. Since they have inherited property, they are better off than us in every aspect. They are clever, educated and knowledgeable and have connections with power holders. We Damai, Kami and Sarki have lagged behind. We don't have wealth and don't own farming land; we work hard, but we have to give half of our earnings to our landowners; no matter how hard we work, it is difficult to make ends meet. That is why we have been left behind.

Mrs. Kali Mizar, Nuwakot

Janajatis

The Chettris and Brahmins are rich. One needs a brain if one has to make progress. Brahmins and Chettris have always been brainy people. Rais drink alcohol. After drinking we lose our minds. It is the fate of Rais to lose always, everywhere. Rais are not allowed to enter the kitchens of Brahmins.

Mrs. Dil Maya Rai, Bhojpur

The Brahmins wield a clout everywhere. Who has ever looked after us (Magar)? Everyone despises us because they think we are simple-minded Janajatis. The crooks are doing well for themselves while the simple-minded, lower caste people are straggling behind.

Mrs. Hira Kumari Thapa Magar, Parbat

The Chettris and Brahmins have dominated us. In our financial dealings with them, we are not treated fairly. They beat up Tamangs. If we borrow money from them, they charge a monthly interest rate of five rupees for every hundred rupees borrowed (60 per cent annual interest rate). But Tamangs themselves are also to blame for their predicament because they drink alcohol too much and spend too much money on festivals.

Mrs. Bobby Tamang, Nuwakot

Women

In Jumla, women don't know anything except how to bear children. If a woman cannot produce children, her husband will immediately marry a second wife. I have found that most men here have three or four wives. The men often drink alcohol, and they neither work nor help around the home.

In Dang, when I asked a Tharu woman who she was, she said she was no one. I repeated the question three times and she gave the same response all three times. The local assistant explained to me that the word 'who' is used here to signify only males; females are non-entities.

In Kapilbastu, Muslim women are so conservative that if it so happened that their children were to be bitten by a snake, they would be more concerned with concealing their faces with a burka, (when people showed up to help their children) than with treating the children for the snake bite.

In Nuwakot, men are paid 300 rupees per day, whereas women are paid 150 rupees for the same work. It's the same with education: sons are encouraged to at least pass the SLC, while daughters are sent to school only up to grade five.

From the observation reports of surveyors **Binod Bhattarai** (Jumla), **Chandani Adhikari** (Dang), **Sapana Chand Gautam** (Kapilbastu), and **Krishna Bahadur Dahal** (Nuwakot).

The degrees of inclusion and exclusion as experienced by different groups are for the most part reflective of the caste hierarchy, but is also informed by other factors

Among the excluded groups, who are the most backward? And among the included groups, who are the most advanced? To further differentiate degrees of inclusion and exclusion among the included and excluded groups, the survey teams asked these open-ended questions: *Who would you say are the included groups? Who would you say are the excluded groups?* The responses were ranked in orders of preference.

The 2007 citizen survey shows that respondents placed the Hill high castes at the top among the included groups, and the other groups were placed in ranking order, as follows: the rich, Hill dwellers, the political elite and the *Madheshi* high castes. This generalization was, by and large, shared by respondents across different groups. The only difference in the order of placement was related to who should be placed second in the ranking. Respondents from these categories—men, the 18-30 age group, and the illiterate—ranked the Hill dwellers just below the Hill high castes.

But respondents of these groups—people with higher-level education, urban dwellers, and the respondents in the MP survey—ranked the political elite second among the included groups. The perception among the *Madheshi* respondents was, however, distinctly different, as they placed the Hill dwellers at the top among the included groups, suggesting that the *Madheshi* mindset is primarily informed by the notion of regional divide rather than by caste/ethnicity.

As suggested by the findings of the 2007 citizen survey, Dalits were considered the most excluded group, followed by the Hill *Janajatis*, the poor, the women, and the plains dwellers. There were some divergent opinions among the respondents in determining which group should be ranked as the second most excluded group. As opposed to the aggregated data from the surveys, in which the Hill *Janajatis* were placed next to the Dalits in the rankings for the most excluded groups, respondents from

V. 3 Included Groups and Excluded Groups

Multiple responses converted into 100 percent

		Included					Excluded				
		Hill high caste	Rich	Hill dwellers	Political elite	<i>Madheshi</i> high caste	Dalit	Hill <i>Janajati</i>	Poor	Women	Plains dwellers
MP survey	Parliamentarians	52	12	1	13	1	26	27	14	10	6
Citizen survey	Commoners	48	10	9	8	6	44	14	9	8	7
Sex	Male	49	10	10	9	5	43	16	9	5	9
	Female	47	11	8	7	7	45	12	9	11	6
Age group	Young	49	9	10	8	6	44	13	8	9	8
	Old	42	14	9	10	6	41	12	13	7	6
Area	Rural	48	11	10	7	6	44	13	9	8	7
	Urban	50	8	6	12	5	40	22	10	3	6
Ecological zone	Mountain	38	14	-	11	-	36	11	10	20	-
	Hill	57	12	-	9	-	48	19	12	6	1
	Tarai	41	9	20	7	13	41	10	7	7	14
Education	Illiterate	40	13	15	7	8	45	10	10	8	9
	Highly educated	52	7	7	10	6	43	20	7	5	7
Social groups	<i>Pahadi</i>	58	10	1	8	2	51	16	10	7	2
	<i>Madheshi</i>	25	9	34	5	18	43	3	6	7	19


Other responses received under these two broad categories – included and excluded – which are insignificant in number are excluded in the table.

these groups—the older age groups and the illiterate—ranked the poor as the second most excluded group. Respondents from the Tarai region and *Madheshi* communities ranked the plains dwellers as the second-most excluded group. The *Madhesh* is made up of various groups, and not surprisingly, the opinions among the *Madeshis* were varied too. Respondents from the *Madheshi* caste groups (both Dalits and high castes) said that the Dalits were the most excluded group and that the second-most excluded group was the plains dwellers. *Madheshi Janajatis* and Muslims, on the other hand, said that the *Madheshi Janajatis* were the most excluded group. There was also a difference in the answers between the commoners and the parliamentarians: the respondents from the MP survey said that both Hill *Janajatis* and Dalits were equally excluded.


Table V.3 says a lot about the judgmental criteria that the respondents seem to have used to draw up their conclusions. One, the caste/ethnic status of the groups in question largely determined how they would be placed in both the included and excluded brackets. Thus, the Hill high castes, in their hierarchical orders, were routinely positioned at the top of the list and the Dalits were listed at the bottom. The caste hierarchy was reflected as well in the placing of the Hill high castes as the most advanced and the Dalits as the most backward. Two, some factors other than caste/ethnicity, such as sex, class and region, were also used by respondents to determine how particular sections of society were to be ranked in the included and excluded groups. Sometimes the

respondents’ choices were shaped by multiple factors; when designating the Dalits the most excluded group, for example, both the caste and class status of the Dalits were taken into account by the respondents: Dalits are the poorest groups in society and the lowest castes in the Hindu hierarchical order. Similarly, since the Hill high caste groups occupy the highest positions in the caste system and are the most economically well off and politically dominant groups, they are perceived to be the most advanced among the included groups.

V.3 Included Groups: Citizens and MPs



V.4 Excluded Groups: Citizens and MPs



Several factors have worked together to exclude certain groups

Ever since the time of Gods, our blood has been red and that of the Kami and Damai black. Ganesh Man (an upper caste local inhabitant) married the daughter of a washer-man (Dalit) to make all castes equal. At that time he had asked me to be their nurse-maid, but I refused to take care of that washer-man's daughter.
Ms. Laxmi Chaulagain,
Nuwakot

Several factors such as the caste hierarchy, the force of tradition, regional bias, linguistic discrimination, religious deprivation and state/government policies have worked together to exclude certain sections of society in Nepal.

Table V.4 shows that most respondents thought that three factors—state/government policies, the force of tradition, and the caste hierarchy—played the greatest roles in creating excluded groups; factors like religion, language and region were seen as playing only marginal roles. The disaggregated data, however, suggests that the perception of some respondents deviated from this generalized view; it seems that the opinions of the respondents are also

conditioned by where they live and what their own position is vis-à-vis others. For both Hill and Tarai Dalits, the caste system, with its associated tradition of untouchability, was viewed as the primary factor responsible for the creation of an exclusionary Nepali society. In a similar vein, all the *Madheshi* groups (caste, *Janajati*, Dalit and Muslim), all of whom have their own mother tongues different from Nepali, chose linguistic discrimination as the third-most important factor in creating the problem of exclusion. And 60 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey said that the state/government was to be held primarily responsible for the prevailing situation of exclusion in the country and that the other factors were insignificant.

The conditions of the excluded groups have been improving

The good news is that a majority of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey (55 per cent) felt that the conditions of excluded groups have been improving. In the first survey of 2004, only 35 per cent of the respondents had shared this opinion, suggesting that perceptions have changed regarding the condition of the excluded groups. Respondents across different groups—sex (male and female), age (young and old), habitation (rural and urban), and regions (Mountain, Hill and Tarai)—all proclaimed that the

conditions of the excluded groups had improved.

How did the respondents from both the privileged and disadvantaged groups feel about the changes brought about by democracy? Eighty-five per cent of the respondents in the MP survey said that the conditions of the excluded groups had improved. The better the position of the respondents, in terms of educational attainment, the greater was the claim that the conditions of the excluded groups

V. 4 Factors Leading to the Marginalization of the Groups

		*Caste hierarchy	Tradition	*Regional bias	Linguistic discrimination	Religious deprivation	*State/government	*Others
MP Survey		5	15	6	3	7	60	15
Citizen survey		25	26	15	12	3	29	12
Pahadi	Caste	17	31	8	5	3	31	14
	Ethnic	29	30	5	12	4	26	12
	Dalit	46	32	3	6	8	21	6
Madheshi	Caste	25	13	13	23	2	32	9
	Ethnic	24	16	7	22	1	27	22
	Dalit	37	11	11	17	2	30	8
	Muslim	15	24	11	19	11	41	5


* Amalgamation of similar responses received on two separate questions (*What is the most important factor for the marginalization of a certain group of people? Who can be held the most responsible for such marginalization?*) So the sum of percentages increases more than 100.

had improved. A majority of 63 per cent of the respondents among the ‘high awareness’ group and 66 per cent among the ‘high exposure to the media’ group also thought the same. But the majority of respondents from disadvantaged groups—the illiterate and the inhabitants of the Far-west development region—said that the conditions had remained the same. Fifty-nine per cent of the respondents among the ‘no-awareness group’ and 46 per cent of the respondents from the ‘no exposure to the media’ group shared the opinions of other disadvantaged sections of society. There was also a clear difference of opinion between the *Pahadis* and the *Madheshis*. The majority of the


respondents of Hill origin—caste, *Janajati* and Dalit—said that the conditions of the excluded groups had improved, whereas most *Madheshi* respondents, across all groups—caste, *Janajati*, Dalit and Muslim—said that the situation ‘remained the same’.

By comparing the answers of the 2007 survey with that of the first survey of 2004, it can be concluded that the conditions of the excluded groups have certainly improved with the instituting of democracy. These positive changes have been brought about by the concerted efforts made by a number of institutions, both governmental and non-governmental.

V.5 Improvement of Excluded Groups: Citizens and MPs



V.6 Improvement of Excluded Groups: 2004 and 2007



I would like to acknowledge the judiciary for its role in changing the legal status of women. The proactive decisions made by the judiciary in declaring discriminatory provisions of laws as being unconstitutional and in drawing the attention of the government and parliament to create new Acts regarding gender equality are to be lauded. More than one hundred discriminatory provisions have been changed since the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Sapana Pradhan, women rights activist

In Gorkha, women are not treated as child bearing machines anymore. Women are aware of their rights, have organized against malpractices by men and are earning money through the savings groups that they have formed.

Ms. Sita Bhatta, surveyor

I cannot say much about democracy, but what I do know is that it is much better now than it was before we had democracy. Back then, we had to get off the road if we came across high caste people. It was very humiliating. Even children used to make derogatory comments about us. Such things don't happen now; now when they talk about us, they talk with respect; we are respected now. Democracy probably brought all of these changes. So democracy must be a good system.


Mr. Bir Bahadur Sarki, Bhojpur

V. 5 Improvement in the Condition of Excluded Groups in the Last Few Years

		Improved			Deteriorated			Remain the same		
		2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-
Citizen survey	Commoners	35	55	+ 20	24	6	- 18	41	39	- 2
Sex	Male	36	57	+ 21	26	6	- 20	38	37	- 1
	Female	34	53	+ 19	21	5	- 16	45	42	- 3
Age group	Young	44	57	+ 13	18	6	- 12	38	37	- 1
	Old	32	55	+ 23	28	4	- 14	40	41	- 1
Are	Rural	34	56	+ 22	23	5	- 18	43	39	- 4
	Urban	39	52	+ 13	26	8	- 18	35	40	+ 5
Ecological zone	Mountain	23	58	+ 25	23	7	- 16	55	35	- 20
	Hill	35	61	+ 26	24	2	- 22	41	36	- 5
	Tarai	37	48	+ 11	24	9	- 15	39	43	+ 4
Development region	Eastern	23	53	+ 20	30	8	- 22	47	39	- 8
	Central	46	54	+ 18	22	6	- 14	32	40	+ 8
	Western	36	62	+ 26	22	2	- 20	42	37	- 5
	Mid-western	34	63	+ 29	17	3	- 14	49	34	- 5
	Far-western	34	34	-	17	14	- 3	49	52	+ 3
Education	Illiterate	26	45	+ 19	28	7	- 21	46	48	+ 2
	Highly educated	46	59	+ 13	18	8	- 10	36	32	- 4
<i>Pahadi</i>	Caste	38	65	+ 27	21	3	- 18	40	32	- 8
	Ethnic	35	60	+ 25	25	3	- 22	40	37	- 3
	Dalit	23	53	+ 30	32	8	- 24	45	40	- 5
<i>Madheshi</i>	Caste	35	39	+ 4	30	13	- 17	35	48	+ 13
	Ethnic	17	39	+ 22	30	12	- 18	52	49	- 3
	Dalit	32	35	+ 3	21	14	- 7	47	50	+ 3
	Muslim	32	45	+ 13	52	8	- 44	16	48	+ 32

The CPN-Maoist has been credited the most with working for the cause of the excluded groups


V.7 Institutions Working for the Cause of the Excluded Groups: Citizens and MPs



Respondents of the 2007 Citizen Survey placed the CPN-Maoist at the top of the list among all actors who were deemed responsible for promoting the cause of the excluded groups. Other prominent actors chosen, in preferential order of responses, were: ethnic organizations, political parties, government, regional parties, NGOs/civil society and others. However, the ranking order for answers in this category was different in the MP survey. Parliamentarians, not surprisingly, gave the most credit to political parties for promoting the interests of the excluded groups, followed by the CPN-Maoist, ethnic organizations, and others.

Respondents from different groups, particularly the *Janajatis* from both the Hill and Tarai groups, gave more credit to the CPN-Maoist than to other actors for working for the cause of the excluded groups. But respondents from all the *Madheshi* groups, except for the Tarai *Janajatis*, said that the contributions made by ethnic organizations were the most important of all. The majority of respondents from urban areas and the Eastern development region also said that ethnic organizations had made the most contributions. Respondents from the old-aged and highly educated groups, however, said that political parties had contributed the most towards the ethnic cause.

V.8 Constitutional Provisions for Backward Communities: Citizens and MPs



There is unanimity on the need for constitutional provisions for inclusive measures

Despite the divergent opinions among the respondents of different groups on several questions related to inclusion and exclusion, the respondents were unanimous in proclaiming that constitutional provisions needed to

be drawn up for enacting inclusive measures.

More than 90 per cent of the respondents, across sex, caste/ethnicity, levels of education, and region, said that

V. 6 Actors Contributing to the Promotion of the Cause of the Excluded Groups

		Maoist	Ethnic Organization	Political Parties	Government	Regional Parties	NGO/civil society	Others	No one
MP Survey		25	11	49	1	1	5	5	3
Citizen survey		20	15	13	10	10	7	12	13
Sex	Male	21	14	14	9	12	7	11	13
	Female	20	16	13	12	7	7	13	13
Age	Young	20	15	12		11	15	11	11
	Old	16	11	22	6	6	6	14	16
Education	Illiterate	18	11	13	8	13	5	13	20
	Highly educated	15	17	17	8	8	10	15	9
Area	Rural	22	13	12	11	9	7	13	13
	Urban	11	22	20	8	11	9	8	10
Ecological zone	Mountain	23	12	9	16	-	6	19	16
	Hill	27	13	16	16	-	9	11	8
	Tarai	15	16	12	6	17	6	12	16
Pahadi	Caste	20	12	16	15	1	10	18	8
	Ethnic	26	19	15	14	3	7	8	8
	Dalit	32	16	8	12	5	9	9	8
Madheshi	Caste	4	16	10	2	28	3	8	28
	Ethnic	31	10	14	6	9	8	12	9
	Dalit	2	16	5	0	28	2	10	37
	Muslim	9	10	10	3	37	0	12	18

the Constitution should include special provisions for backward communities. Only 13 to 15 per cent of the respondents, mostly those belonging to the higher-level education group, urban dwellers and Hill caste groups, opposed

the inclusion of such provisions. Respondents of the MP survey and the booster survey, by an overwhelming majority of 95-97 per cent, also affirmed the need for constitutional provisions for backward communities.

If there is to be a real democracy in our country, the state affairs should be conducted by including the Dalits, Madheshis, women and ethnic groups. We say that our country is multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural and that we are geographically diverse, but in practice, only people with long nose and those who wear caps run the country. The profiles of the people in power do not reflect the demography on the ground. How can the government be inclusive and democratic when we keep at bay the women, more than four million Dalits, the ethnic groups, who constitute 37 per cent of total population, and the Madheshis of the Tarai? There has been so much loss of property in the Madhesh due to the government's inability to make the state inclusive. Many people are still restive, even now. People of all castes, classes, ethnic groups, genders, religions and regions should be represented in the various spheres of governance. The dream of making a new Nepal will become a reality only if the state becomes inclusive. Therefore, an inclusive system of government should be established without any delay.

Narayan Neupane, Dang

In the new Nepal that is in the making, we, the Dalits, want to be respected just like everyone else. We want to have pride in our own community identity, just as all the other people have pride in theirs; and we certainly do not want to be regarded as untouchables. We, therefore, need our ownership in the state. Perhaps inclusion through proportional representation on the basis of group population size in all the social, economic and political sectors would help us to meet our goals. But even proportional representation would not be enough for Dalits because we have been denied access to state resources and have been excluded from the political power structure for generations: Dalits must be granted special rights.

Durga Sob, Chair of Federation of Dalit Women Organization

Ethnic/regional assertion for inclusive democracy is associated with some concrete proposals

V.3

Perhaps it would be too simplistic to merely say that there should be constitutional provisions for backward communities. The ethnic/regional assertion for inclusive democracy also carries with it some concrete proposals—making Nepal a secular state, instituting a federal form of government and treating all languages on an equal footing. These

demands are the primary agendas that will help restructure the Nepali state. But is there a national consensus among the general people, among the people across all caste/ethnic and regional divisions, and between the citizens and political leaders on the agendas that have been outlined for restructuring the state?


Citizens want to retain Nepal as a Hindu state, but the demands for a secular state are on the rise

The citizen survey uncovered a paradox: opinions favouring a 'secular state' have increased from 34 per cent in 2004 to 39 per cent in 2007, but 61 per cent of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey still wanted Nepal to be a Hindu state.


The majority of the respondents, across sex, age groups, levels of

educational attainment, and area—rural and urban, all three ecological zones and five development regions—were in favour of retaining Nepal as a Hindu state. Moreover, the choice for retaining Nepal as a Hindu state scored extremely high among the respondents from the Tarai region; in fact, even among the *Madheshi Janajatis*, seven out of ten of

V.9 Choice: Hindu or Secular State: Citizens and MPs



V.10 Choice: Hindu or Secular State: 2004 and 2007



them favoured the proposal. Among the *Madheshi* castes and Dalits, the percentage of respondents favouring the retaining of Nepal as a Hindu state shot up from 76 per cent (in aggregate figures for these two groups) in 2004 to 85 per cent in 2007, a trend that is quite at odds with the general trend of the increasing support for a secular state.

With regard to the question of the state's religious identity, there was a clear division of opinion along caste/ethnic and religious lines. In both the 2004 and 2007 surveys, an overwhelming majority of Hindu high caste respondents (both Hill and Tarai) wanted Nepal to be a Hindu state, whereas a majority of Hill *Janajatis* wanted to see Nepal as a secular state. Such a division of opinion along caste/ethnic lines was exhibited by the findings of the booster survey as well. In the booster survey, 91 per cent of the

Gurungs wanted Nepal to be a secular state, while 95 per cent of the *Madheshis* wanted the country to be a Hindu state.

A cross-tabulation of the data obtained from the citizen survey, by religion, also shows a diversity of views among the respondents. More than two-thirds of the Hindu respondents were for the retention of Nepal as a Hindu state, but those respondents who professed religions other than Hinduism clearly wanted a secular state.

The views of the commoners and elites were sharply divided too. While 61 per cent of the commoners preferred that Nepal remain a Hindu state, 94 per cent of the parliamentarians from the MP survey wanted Nepal to be a secular state, suggesting that there was a consensus among the political parties on this issue.

V. 7 Choice of a Secular or Hindu State

		Secular State			Hindu State		
		2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-
MP survey	Parliamentarians	X	94	X	X	6	X
Booster	Gurung	X	91	X	X	9	X
	Madheshi	X	5	X	X	95	X
Citizen survey	Commoners	34	39	+ 5	66	61	- 5
Sex	Male	35	41	+ 6	65	59	- 6
	Female	32	38	+ 6	68	62	- 6
Age group	Young	37	43	+ 6	63	57	- 6
	Old	29	31	+ 2	71	69	- 2
Are	Rural	34	39	+ 5	66	61	- 5
	Urban	31	40	+ 9	69	60	- 9
Ecological zone	Mountain	46	47	+ 1	54	53	- 1
	Hill	34	48	+ 14	66	52	- 14
	Tarai	31	29	- 2	69	71	+ 2
Education	Illiterate	29	33	+ 4	71	67	+ 4
	Highly educated	57	57	-	43	43	-
Pahadi	Caste	27	34	+ 7	73	66	- 7
	Ethnic	54	58	+ 4	46	42	- 4
	Dalit	34	40	+ 6	66	60	- 6
Madheshi	Caste	26	15	- 11	74	85	+ 11
	Ethnic	20	31	+ 11	80	69	+ 11
	Dalit	27	15	- 12	73	85	+ 12
	Muslim	X	80	X	X	20	X
Religious groups	Hindu	27	32	+ 5	73	68	- 5
	Buddhist	69	78	+ 9	31	22	- 9
	Islam	84	79	- 5	16	21	+ 5
	Kirat	79	85	+ 6	22	15	- 7
	Christian	67	61	- 6	33	39	+ 6
	Others	62	68	+ 6	38	32	- 4

On the proposal for federalism, citizens are divided, but the elites have a consensus


There was an absence of consensus among the respondents on another issue of state restructuring—the replacing of the current unitary form of government by a federal one. Preferences for federalism increased significantly, from 24 per cent in the 2004 survey to 42 per cent in the 2007 survey, but the majority of respondents of both surveys—67 per cent in 2004 and 58 per cent in 2007—wanted Nepal to continue being a unitary state.

A clear majority of respondents across the different groups—across the sexes, habitation (rural and urban dwellers), age groups (the young and the old), regions (inhabitants of all three ecological zones)—preferred a unitary state. Most of the support for federalism came from respondents who had higher levels of education and from people who live in regions where ethnic activism is prevalent, i.e., the Eastern and Central development regions. Similarly, a majority of 57 per cent respondents from


‘high exposure to the media’ group also favoured federalism.

There was also a clear division of opinions between the *Pahadis* and *Madheshis*. Predictably, the *Pahadi* caste groups (high caste and Dalit) favoured a unitary state, but surprisingly, the majority of Hill *Janajati* respondents, in contrast to the demands of the Hill ethnic movements for a federal form of government, favoured a unitary state too. Among the *Madheshis*, on the other hand, most of the groups—Muslim, high caste and Dalit—supported federalism, with 60 per cent, 66 per cent and 74 per cent of the respondents, respectively, choosing federalism. But the *Madheshi Janajatis* shared the opinions of the Hill *Janajatis* on this issue, against federalism. The split in opinions between the Hill and Tarai residents was further confirmed by the findings of the booster survey. The majority of Gurungs were for a unitary state, whereas eight out of ten *Madheshi* respondents favoured federalism.

V.11 Choice: Unitary or Federal State: Citizens and MPs



V.12 Choice: Unitary or Federal State: 2004 and 2007



V. 8 Choice of a Unitary or Federal State

		Unitary State			Federal state		
		2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-
MP survey	Parliamentarians	X	7	X	X	93	X
Booster	Gurung	X	54	X	X	46	X
	Madheshi	X	17	X	X	83	X
Citizen survey	Commoners	67	58	- 9	24	42	+ 18
Sex	Male	63	54	- 9	27	46	+ 19
	Female	72	62	- 10	20	38	+ 18
Age group	Young	64	54	- 10	27	45	+ 18
	Old	73	70	- 3	19	30	+ 11
Area	Rural	67	57	- 10	24	43	+ 19
	Urban	69	58	- 11	24	42	+ 18
Ecological zone	Mountain	37	54	+ 17	50	46	- 4
	Hill	70	64	- 6	19	36	+ 17
	Tarai	64	52	+ 8	30	48	+ 18
Education	Illiterate	73	59	- 14	21	41	+ 20
	Highly educated	52	44	- 8	38	56	+ 18
Pahadi	Caste	69	67	- 2	31	33	+ 2
	Ethnic	64	59	- 5	35	41	+ 6
	Dalit	77	62	- 15	23	38	+ 15
Madheshi	Caste	62	34	- 28	38	66	+ 28
	Ethnic	75	65	- 10	25	35	+ 10
	Dalit	42	26	- 16	58	74	+ 16
	Muslim	X	40	X	X	60	X

There was also a clear division in the opinions of the citizens and the elites. As stated earlier, 58 per cent of the respondents of the 2007 citizen survey favoured a unitary state, whereas 93 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey

wanted federalism. But although all political parties wanted to replace the unitary form of government with a federal one, the parties differed on their choices of the criteria that need to be considered while creating federal units.

Nepal is home to three distinct cultural groups—Khas, Mongol and Madheshi. The people of the first two cultural groups have largely mixed with one another, but the culture of the Madhesh is distinct. Taking this fact into consideration, we should have three large provinces—Mountain province, Hill province and Madhesh province—and the criteria to be used for demarcating the provinces should be a combination of geography and culture. To respect the internal diversity of each of these provinces, we should have 4 to 5 subunits under each province.
Bharat Bimal Yadav, leader of NSP, a Tarai-based regional party

The proposed state restructuring should be based on ethnic federalism, with respect to the principles of collective rights, autonomy and right to self determination, but without entertaining a right to separation. The federal units should be formed on the basis of a combination of three factors—caste/ethnicity, language and territory. The proposal of ‘one Madhesh and one Pradesh’ is not acceptable as it ignores the diversity within Madhesh. The rights of Madheshi Janajatis should be considered a priority when designing the federal units.
Pashang Sherpa, Chair of NEFIN

When designing federal units, geography and administrative division should be taken as the core criteria, and the factors of social homogeneity, in terms of caste/ethnicity, language and culture should be considered.
Chakra Bastola, leader of the NC


Citizens want an end to the monopoly of the Nepali language

The 2007 survey shows that there has been a distinct shift in opinion among the people on the issue of Nepal’s official language. In the 2004 survey, a majority of the respondents were in favour of


retaining Nepali as the only official language, but in the 2007 survey, except for those respondents who spoke Nepali as their mother tongue, most of the respondents favoured bi/multilingualism.

V. 9 Choice of an Official Language

V.13 Choice of a Language Policy: Citizens and MPs



V.14 Choice of a Language Policy: 2004 and 2007



		Uni-language (Nepali only)			Bi-language			Multi-language		
		2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-	2004	2007	+/-
MP survey	Parliamentarians	X	18	X	X	38	X	X	44	X
Booster	Gurungs	X	48	X	X	34	X	X	18	X
	Madheshis	X	2	X	X	55	X	X	44	X
Citizen survey		52	48	- 4	16	27	+ 9	31	25	- 6
Sex	Male	51	46	- 5	17	28	+ 11	32	26	- 6
	Female	54	50	- 4	16	26	+ 10	30	24	- 6
Age group	Young	50	45	- 5	16	27	+ 11	34	28	- 6
	Old	52	52	-	16	29	+ 13	31	19	- 12
Area	Rural	51	46	- 5	17	27	+ 10	32	26	- 6
	Urban	59	58	-1	14	23	+ 9	27	19	- 8
Ecological zone	Mountain	44	52	+ 8	2	27	+ 25	54	21	- 33
	Hill	65	64	- 1	10	17	+ 17	24	19	- 5
	Tarai	40	31	- 9	23	37	+ 14	36	32	- 4
Education	Illiterate	46	45	- 1	20	30	+ 10	34	25	- 9
	Highly educated	60	55	- 5	16	21	+ 5	24	24	-
Pahadi	Caste	73	66	- 7	9	16	+ 7	18	18	-
	Ethnic	45	54	- 9	12	21	+ 9	43	25	- 18
	Dalit	69	62	- 7	8	18	+ 10	23	20	- 3
Madheshi	Caste	26	17	- 9	32	45	+ 13	42	38	- 4
	Ethnic	47	21	- 26	20	53	+ 13	33	26	- 7
	Dalit	18	10	- 8	35	49	+ 14	47	41	- 6
	Muslim	27	7	- 20	22	44	+ 22	51	48	- 3

Among those seeking a change in the language policy, Newar and Tamang speakers had a slight majority of respondents, 55 per cent and 51 per cent respectively, who supported the change. Figures of favour of bi/multi language policy among the minority linguistic groups were: 92 per cent of Maithli, 77 per cent of Bhojpuri, 71 per cent of Awadhi, and 62 per cent of Limbu. But although there was a marked decline in support of the current uni-language policy among all respondents, most urban dwellers and those in the highly educated groups favoured retaining Nepali as the only official language. This opinion was also shared by people in the age group of 60 years and above and by the inhabitants of the Western and Mid-western development regions.

There was a clear division in the opinions of the respondents from the Hill region and the Tarai. Most of the Hill dwellers, including the Hill *Janajatis* whose mother tongue is not Nepali, wanted to maintain the current status quo

on the national language policy. This shift in opinion among the Hill *Janajatis*—in the 2004 survey, most of the hill *Janajati* respondents were in favour of a bi/multi-language policy—may surprise the Hill ethnic activists who have been campaigning for the end of the hegemony of the Nepali language. The *Madheshis* on the other hand, clearly favoured a bi/multi-language policy. Across all *Madheshi* groups—*Janajati*, high caste, Dalit and Muslim—respondents mostly favoured a bi/multi-language policy, with 79 per cent, 83 per cent, 89.5 per cent and 93 per cent of the respondents of these groups respectively, favouring the change. The booster survey also reveals the Hill-Tarai split on language policy: only 52 per cent of the Gurungs wanted a bi/multi-language policy, whereas 98 per cent of the *Madheshis* were in favour of a bi/multi-language policy. The support for instituting a bi/multi-language policy was high among the parliamentarians as well, with 72 per cent of the respondents in the MP survey preferring a bi/multi-language policy.

In Bhojpur, the impact of the Hindu culture and the Nepali language is evident. One can say this is the natural result of Hinduization and Nepalization. The fact that even the elderly don't speak their mother tongue warrants a serious look into the phenomenon.

From the observation report of Abi Chamlagai, supervisor

Summing up Nepal has witnessed a marked rise in ethnicity since 1990, and the awareness of the excluded populations about their status and position in society has contributed significantly to the ethnic groups asserting their ethnicities. In intellectual discourses, caste has been viewed as the single-most determining factor in placing particular groups of people in the included or excluded categories. This trend is also largely true among the common people when they have to decide where they or particular groups fit in the local contexts. Thus at both the micro and macro levels, there is a unanimity in determining who should be regarded as the included and who the excluded; accordingly, the Hill high castes—Brahmin and Chhetri—are considered the included groups and the others—like the Dalit, *Janajati*, and *Madheshi*—are considered the excluded. Nevertheless, the commoners' perception

of inclusion and exclusion is also influenced by other factors—sex, class and region—that when taken into account, expand the meaning and scope of inclusion and exclusion beyond the caste/ethnic factor. Among these, the factors deemed the most responsible for contributing to the backward status of some of the groups are the impacts of the stratification of society along hierarchical caste/ethnic lines, the discriminatory traditions based on caste/ethnicity and the state/government's policies of retaining an ascriptive value system.

Many respondents feel that the interventions by the political parties and non-governmental organizations for improving the situation of the excluded groups over the last few years have had a discernible impact. These interventions, however, are not enough. In order to guarantee a better future for the excluded groups, the new Constitution that will be framed after the elections to the CA

needs to have inclusive measures—an idea that was ignored by all previous Nepali constitutions. The findings of our study suggest that the rise in ethnicity will not prove detrimental to national integration; rather, the findings suggest that a new pluralistic Nepali nationalism must be allowed to develop, one which encourages a harmonizing of the national and ethnic identities. The rise in ethnic identity is associated with the demands for substantive changes in the outdated, feudal and discriminatory current state

structure—the Hindu state needs to be changed into a secular state, the unitary form of government needs to be changed into a federal one, and the current state policy on language, in which only Nepali is considered the national language, needs to be changed so that all languages are promoted. If these state restructuring agendas are implemented by the government, then Nepal will be well on the path to becoming a truly inclusive democracy.

VI Conclusion

Nepal is in a state of transition. The political actors in Nepal must use this transitory period to formulate a vision for Nepal's future, and they must create a road map that will take Nepal to the destination thus envisioned. There is a broad consensus among the various political players about the path that Nepal must now take; they all agree on the national agenda of restructuring the Nepali state through the creation of a new Constitution that will be framed after the election of the CA. Agreeing to the overall vision has not created much of a problem among the political players; the problem does not lie in setting the rules of the game but in the motives of the players.

When it was announced that the CA election would be postponed from its originally scheduled date of June 2007, many observers thought the postponement was nothing to be too alarmed about because the earlier timetable for completing the course of transition in one year has been very ambitious one; sticking with the timetable created earlier meant that several difficult tasks, i.e. arms management, negotiations for power sharing in the legislature and government, the creating of an Interim

Constitution and the laws related to the elections, working out the problems related to security, etc., had to be accomplished in a very short time. But when a similar announcement for postponing the date for the CA polls was made again, against the rescheduled date of the CA election for November 2007, many people thought something was amiss. Most people were of the opinion that the overall environment in the country for holding the CA election seemed to be getting better, and the Election Commission had said time and again that it had prepared itself for conducting the election. Furthermore, most of the other important issues that had been raised during the post-*Jana Andolan II* days were getting resolved: the government had successfully negotiated with the representatives of the various socio-political groups—NEFIN, MJF, CBES, women's groups, Dalit groups and several other groups—which had led to a reduction in the volume of street agitations; the NC's decision to support the calls for a republic, a decision made by its *Maha Samittee* (National Congress) in September 2007, was in accordance with the republican environment that was prevalent in the post-*Jana Andolan II* days. But the issue about the election of

the CA, a culminating event that would cap the progress made thus far, hasn't yet been resolved.

On the face of it, it seems that the announcement of the postponement of the CA election from its rescheduled date (November 2007) was made because one of the coalition partners, the CPN-Maoist, had insisted on reviewing some crucial issues that it, along with the SPA, had already agreed on when the Interim Constitution was framed in late 2006 and the first month of 2007. According to provisions in the Interim Constitution, the fate of the monarchy was to be decided by a majority of the CA members in the first meeting of the CA; the provisions also provided for the adoption of a mixed electoral system. But the CPN-Maoist has gone against the spirit and letter of these provisions by insisting that Nepal be declared a republic and that the country adopt an all-out PR system as a precondition to the election of the CA. Besides ratcheting up its demands, from around August 2007, the CPN-Maoist has also used various political manoeuvres to ensure that its demands are met: the party relinquished its seats in the government on 18 September 2007; it made a Left-alliance with the UML, and consequently, its demands turned into parliamentary resolutions that were passed by a majority of the members of the interim parliament, during a special session of the parliament in October 2007. The NC, which has been leading the coalition government, is against the demands and is sticking with the original constitutional provisions, which outline that the resolutions on Nepal's becoming a republic and the adopting of an all-out

PR system can only be passed by the parliament through an amendment in the Interim Constitution; and that would only be possible if a two-thirds majority of the members of parliament votes in favour of the resolutions. The left parties have a simple majority among the total of 330 members in the interim parliament, but they do not have the numbers to command a two-thirds majority. Unless the NC consents to the demands, things will not move ahead. So now that there is political deadlock that needs to be settled by the end of December 2007 according to the provision in the Interim Constitution. There have thus been marathon sessions of consultations among the political parties to seek a way out of the present stalemate.

But despite the present political stalemate, the transition that Nepal is going through has not gone off track. And given the current political climate, the findings of our surveys have become more relevant for those who want to learn about the facts on the ground. The information collected about what the people said and what the leaders thought on the state of democracy in Nepal and all the other important issues revolving around the question of Nepal's transition towards the election of the CA should prove helpful for anyone interested in the undercurrents that are shaping the current political reality. The findings from the previous chapters are recapitulated below. The main thrusts of the findings are presented in the form of six messages from the respondents that need to be taken heed of and four challenges that the nation needs to overcome.

Six Messages

One The people's adherence to democracy, irrespective of time and context—whether under the monarchical regime in the past, or during the present phase of transition to the election of the CA—has been remarkable. The post-*Jana Andolan* II period has witnessed an increase in social capital

formation, which should surely ensure the sustainability of democracy. The task ahead is to streamline the popular support for democracy and the people's trust in the state and the political institutions by framing a new structure of inclusive governance and by making the state institutions accountable to the

people's needs and aspirations. Peace and economic development are the two major concerns of the people from the success of *Jana Andolan II* and these are the two major areas where they want to see improvements through the outcomes of the CA election.

Two Within a year of the present transitional phase (which itself began with the day that the April 2006 *Jana Andolan II* reached a climactic success), the popular forces had set both the vision and the road map for the future Nepal. The signing of the CPA, the framing of the Interim Constitution, and the constitution of an interim legislature and government with the representatives of the CPN-Maoist were some of the major feats accomplished after *Jana Andolan II*. The processes of arms management and the political/constitutional arrangements for the interim period have gone hand in hand. The leaders' relentless efforts in achieving the many objectives set forth in the road map in such a short span of time have been highly appreciated. Since *Jana Andolan II* was a movement in which huge masses of the Nepali people participated, the people, naturally, do have a lot of hope in the future of the country. But when one takes into account the fact that the date for the CA election—an event that would have marked the end of the transitory phase—has already been postponed twice, one cannot deny the possibility that the current tide of hope could turn into frustration if the transition period gets unnecessarily prolonged.

Three The three main goals that need to be accomplished during the restructuring of the Nepali state—the instituting of a republic, conflict transformation, and the setting up of an inclusive democracy—were deemed the principal goals of *Jana Andolan II* by the coalition of the mainstream political parties and the CPN-Maoist. These aims have been largely endorsed by the people. The public demand for the abolition of the monarchy has been increasing by the day.

The transformation of the CPN-Maoist, with its newly avowed commitment to multiparty democracy, has been welcomed by the people. The people have credited the mainstream parties and the CPN-Maoist for negotiating a settlement to the state of armed conflict and thereby significantly contributing to improvement of the security situation in the country; but in our surveys, the opinions of the commoners and the politicians differed on whether the present state of the security situation in the country was conducive to holding the CA election in a climate free from fear. The challenge before the political leaders is to demonstrate their capacities for translating their collective promises of restructuring the state into policies, as early as possible.

Four For the architects of inclusive democracy in Nepal, one revelation from the surveys that should prove welcome is that there is no dispute among the people of different social segments and also between the commoners and elites as to who the included groups and who the excluded groups are. And there is, indeed, unanimity of opinion about the need for creating special constitutional provisions for the benefit of the disadvantaged sections of society.

Five In Nepal, ethnic identity and national identity largely overlap because people are proud of both their national and ethnic identities. So the rise of ethnicity will not prove detrimental to national integration. However, ethnic identity is more dear to most of the people from the disadvantaged and excluded sections of society than it is to people belonging to the included and advantaged sections of society; so one can conclude that the rise of ethnicity in Nepal is not in the form of a top-down mode; rather, the phenomenon is being shaped from the bottom up. *Madheshis* and *Janajatis* are increasingly asserting their ethnic/regional identities and will continue to do so in the future. The challenge ahead is to innovate with and foster a pluralistic

Nepali nationalism in a way that harmonizes the people's need to maintain both the national and ethnic identities.

Six Perhaps because Nepal has never experienced the trauma of colonization, both the people and the elites do have a lot of faith in the international community—quite apart from the already ingrained sense of appreciation that the people and the leaders have towards the international community for the foreign aid and the

developmental aid they have provided. The people and the leaders believe that the international community has played an important role in conflict transformation and in helping the nation towards creating an environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections to the CA. Such a response from the Nepali people suggests that there is a need for coordinated national and international initiatives to ensure a smooth transition towards peace, stability, democracy and development.

Four Challenges

One The restoration of democracy, along with the restoration of freedom of speech and the freedom to organize, is one dimension of democratic progress, and the expansion of democracy among the people of different social segments and in all areas of the country is another dimension. The deficiency in the second dimension of democracy in Nepal is clearly exhibited by the fact that the majority of the respondents from the downtrodden strata or excluded groups—i.e. the illiterate, the poor, the backward, the people who have 'no exposure to the media', the Dalits, *Madheshis* etc.—appeared indifferent about whether they wanted to see Nepal as a democracy or a dictatorship. Most of the opinions that favoured the retaining of the monarchy also came from the respondents of these groups, opinions that in the context of the post-*Jana Andolan* II period can seem quite anomalous. The levels of trust that the respondents from these groups said that they had in the eight state and political organizations that the surveyors chose to include in the questionnaires were much lower than the levels of trust reported by the respondents from the advantaged and included groups. And the respondents from the disadvantaged groups seemed to know less about the meaning of the CA and the associated issues than did the respondents from other groups. Furthermore, a substantial percentage of the people from the disadvantaged bracket do not have any

expectation from the CA. Thus, a note of caution needs to be sounded here: people from the downtrodden strata of society have not yet benefited from the widening of the democratic spaces in the post-*Jana Andolan* II period, and this scenario needs to be changed.

Two The commoners as well as the MPs of the various political parties do not trust the CPN-Maoist very much. This lack of trust between the parties and the CPN-Maoist was perhaps the principal underlying tension that finally manifested in the current political stalemate. The preponderance of the low levels of trust shown in the CPN-Maoist should serve as a warning for both the CPN-Maoist and the other political parties. The CPN-Maoist, for its part, should take the low levels of trust shown in the party as a sign that it must overcome its ideological ambiguity and its rebellious temperament if it is to earn the trust of the people and the politicians. The political parties, which had initially wanted to align with the monarchy in the tripartite political struggle, but had to ally with the CPN-Maoist because King Gyanendra rejected the parties' overtures, must completely commit themselves to the issues of republic, federalism and inclusion. These issues, though originated as the CPN-Maoist's demands, have taken up by the political parties only because it was politically expedient for them to do so. The partnership between the CPN-

Maoist and the political parties was originally formed as a marriage of convenience, but it is now imperative that the parties and the CPN-Maoist continue to work together to ensure that this current transitory phase carries on unabated, that the conflict transformation is successful and that the election of the CA is held in a free and fair atmosphere. Thus, the issue of building confidence between the CPN-Maoist and everyone else is interlinked with the attempts being made by the various political actors to break the current political impasse.

Three The *Madheshis* are distinctly different from the rest of other social groups in the country. They are unique among all the groups of respondents in our surveys, in that, their opinions on most of the issues that were entertained in the survey were different from the other respondents: most of the *Madheshi* respondents in our surveys favoured retaining the monarchy, in contrast to most of the other respondents who favoured a republic; most of the *Madheshi* respondents preferred that Nepal remain a Hindu state, unlike most of the *Pahadis* who would like Nepal to be secular; most of the *Madheshi* respondents said that they distrusted the CPN-Maoists than did the *Pahadi* respondents; many *Madheshis* support the instituting of a federal form of government, while many *Pahadis* want Nepal to remain a unitary state; many *Madheshis* want a bi/multi-language policy, while many *Pahadis* want only Nepali to remain as the official language. *Madheshis* are increasingly beginning to identify with their ethnic/regional identities, and their feeling of alienation against the hill-dominated establishment was shown by the low levels of trust (much lower than that shown by the *Pahadi* respondents) they said they had in all the eight state and political institutions that were chosen by our survey. When analyzing the causes and consequences of the recent *Madhesh* uprising of January-February 2007, findings like the ones our survey uncovered should be taken into account. A vision of a pluralistic Nepali

nationalism must surely accommodate the uniqueness of the *Madheshis*. The opinions most of the *Madheshis* have about whether Nepal should be a monarchy or a republic and whether Nepal should be a secular or a Hindu state conflicts with certain aspects of the agendas that have been put forward for restructuring the Nepali state; but the *Madheshis*' demands for federalism and a bi/multi-national language policy are in conformity with the rest of the agendas. Thus, working together with the *Madheshis* in restructuring the Nepali state would call for a delicate balancing act; and negotiations with the *Madheshis* must be handled properly, for if they are not, then the problems that are prevalent in the Tarai today could continue for a long time. The present state of political disturbances in the Tarai does not only pose security problems for the CA election, but could also lead to communal violence.

Four Communal tension could also manifest in Nepal because most of the people have different opinions on how the state should be restructured, and these opinions are mainly coloured by the people's identities. The main fault lines along which the Nepalis stand divided are as follows: the majority of the Hindu populace want to retain Nepal as a Hindu state, whereas people of other religions want Nepal to be a secular state; *Pahadis* want to retain Nepal as a unitary state, but *Madheshis* want Nepal to be a federal state; those whose mother tongue is Nepali want only Nepali to be the official language, but most people from other linguistic groups are in favour of having a bi/multi-language policy. There is no consensus among the different social groups about these crucial issues related to state restructuring, and a mishandling of these issues could fuel communal violence. But for those who want to believe that communal violence will rule the day in Nepal, there are two things they need to take note of: one, the opinions in favour of the central agendas of state restructuring—secular state, federalism and bi/multi-language

policy—have increased substantially in the last three years; and two, there is consensus among the political parties on all these agendas of state restructuring. The political parties are unlikely to revert to their former positions on whether or not the fundamental characteristics of the

Nepali state should be changed. And while maintaining their current political positions, the parties must also take it upon themselves to educate and socialize the masses if these changes are indeed to happen.

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Major Political Events in Nepal

- 1768 Nepal is unified by Prithivi Narayan Shah, the king of the Gorkha principality. His hereditary successors will further expand the kingdom through conquests.
- 1846 Jung Bahadur Rana, a courtier, becomes an all-powerful prime minister, and the prime ministership is made hereditary. The Rana regime overshadows the Shah dynasty for 104 years. The regime, marked by internecine feuds, isolates the country from the outside world and suppresses dissents; but the regime finally gives way to the democratic forces, which align with the king after India acts as an intermediary between these political actors.
- 1951 February 1951 sees the advent of democracy in Nepal; the Interim Government Act of 1951 is promulgated; a promise is made that an election of the Constituent Assembly will be held, but the election never happens. The king becomes more powerful, and he forms and dismisses governments one after another, according to his discretion.
- 1959 The NC wins the general elections and forms the government with a two-thirds majority. But the government lasts for only one and a half years, as it is dismissed by the king.
- 1960 King Mahendra arrests representatives of the elected government. The king introduces a new Constitution and the *Panchayat* system in 1962, which are both nurtured by his successor, King Birendra. Active monarchy, a partyless system, development, modernization, decentralization, and nationalism are projected as the principal themes of the *Panchayat* system. The system is constantly opposed by dissident democratic forces, and the public unrest of 1979-80, led mainly by students, forces the king to announce a referendum. The *Panchayat* system, however, continues as the agenda for improving the *Panchayat* system gets 55 per cent of votes, against the 45 per cent for a multiparty system.
- 1990 A mass movement, called jointly by the NC and the ULF, forces the king to lift the ban on political parties. An interim coalition government led by

the NC approves the 1990 Constitution, and the government conducts general elections in 1991.

1991 The general election brings the NC to power, with a majority of seats in the parliament. However, the government calls mid-term polls due to divisions within the ruling party.

1994 The mid-term polls produce a hung parliament. The UML, as the largest party in the parliament, forms a minority government, but the government cannot be sustained for long. The minority government is succeeded by a series of coalition governments.

1996 The CPN-Maoist launches the People's War. There are two unsuccessful negotiations between the government and the CPN-Maoist in 2001 and 2003. When negotiations fail, military operations by both the government and the CPN-Maoist intensify; and the country is kept under a state of emergency.

1999 The NC comes back to power with a majority government after the third parliamentary elections. An internal feud in the party leads to a changing of the leaders of the NC government three times; the intra-party problems eventually lead to a splitting of the NC and a dissolution of the parliament by the then prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba. But the government is subsequently not able to hold elections due to the insurgency.

2002 King Gyanendra—who ascended the throne after the royal massacre of June 2001—dismisses the Deuba government in October 2002 and nominates all successive governments.

2005 Through a proclamation in February 2005, King Gyanendra usurps absolute power and takes up the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The royal regime restricts political freedom, muzzles the media and blocks communication channels with the outside world, and detains political figures.

2006

April An alliance of the SPA and the CPN-Maoist initiates a mass movement, *Jana Andolan II*, against the king's rule, on the basis of a 12-point understanding reached in November 2005. *Jana Andolan II* grows in intensity for 19 days, forcing the king to return power to the reinstated parliament. Girija Prasad Koirala becomes the prime minister of the coalition government. The peace-process begins between the government and the CPN-Maoist.

May The reinstated parliament issues a political declaration that calls for a reduction in the king's powers, the deleting of the 'Royal' title from state institutions, the deeming of the parliament as a sovereign body, and the placing of the army under the government; the declaration also proclaims Nepal a secular state and includes a promise to hold the CA election.

November The signing of the CPA between the government and the CPN-Maoist is followed by arms management—i.e. an end to the war is declared, the Maoist combatants are placed in the cantonments, and their arms are locked up; the Maoist combatants are verified by and supervised by the UNMIN. The signing of the CPA had been preceded by negotiations and several agreements between the government and the CPN-Maoist.

2007

January An interim Parliament, which includes the representatives of the CPN-Maoist, is formed, and the Interim Constitution is promulgated. Protesting against the Interim Constitution, the *Madhesi* movement flares up. The

agitation intensifies, with increased public protests, attacks on the police, destruction of government property, a defying of curfews and an increase in the levels of violence. But the agitation is called off when the prime minister promises to introduce federalism and increase the number of seats in the CA on the basis of population size. Later, 27 Maoists are killed in Gaur by MJF supporters.

- March** The interim legislature amends the Interim Constitution; the amendments ensure the establishment of a federal system through the CA election, and the creation of an Electoral Constituency Delimitation Commission to revise constituencies.
- April** The CPN-Maoist joins the interim government.
- June** The interim legislature amends the Interim Constitution again; the amendments empower the parliament to abolish the monarchy and to remove the prime minister on the strength of two-thirds of the votes in the House. The Constituent Assembly Members Election Bill adopts a mixed (parallel) electoral system. The Bill also ensures a 33 per cent mandatory representation of women in the CA; as for the list part of the mixed system, the Bill makes it mandatory for political parties to ensure the proportional representation of different segments of the population by specifying percentages.
- July** The prime minister presides over the Bhoto Jatra celebrations of Rato Machhindranath at Jawalakhel, in the capacity of the Head of State, replacing the king's religious role for the first time in Nepali history.
- August** The fifth plenum of the CPN-Maoist produces an 18-point charter of proposals demanding that Nepal be declared a republic by the interim parliament and that an all-out PR system be adopted, as pre-conditions for the CA election. Meanwhile, the NC attempts to drum up support for the mixed electoral system, and the provision for a mixed electoral system is included by the party as one of the major provisions in the agreements made separately by the government with the MJF and the NEFIN.
- September** The CPN-Maoist relinquishes its seats in the government. The NC's *Maha Sammittee* (National Council) passes a resolution that supports the declaring of Nepal as a republic.
- October** A special session of the interim parliament passes resolutions for the declaration of Nepal as a republic and for the adoption of an all-out PR system for the CA election; the resolution is supported by a majority of the members in the interim parliament. The passing of the resolution has become possible because a Left-coalition has been forged to work on these issues. The election of the CA that had been rescheduled for November 2007 is postponed, and the MJF and NEFIN revert to their original demand for an all-out PR system. The NC appears amenable to the declaring of Nepal as a republic before the CA election, but it takes a tough stance on sticking with the mixed electoral system.
- December** Based on 23-point agreement made by the mainstream parties and the CPN-Maoist, the interim parliament amends the Interim Constitution, and Nepal is declared as a republic state, but subject to the ratification by the first meeting of the CA. The Constitution retains a mixed electoral system but gives greater weight to the PR system for electing representatives of the CA. Thus the percentage of representatives elected through the various electoral system will be as follows: PR system (56 per cent), FPTP (40 per cent) and the PM's nominees (4 per cent). The CPN-Maoist rejoins the interim government.

Index

- 12-point understanding, 20, 46, 53
1990 Constitution, 19, 74
1990 mass movement, 7, 20, 35, 42
2004 survey, 9, 11, 13, 15, 29, 30, 34, 36, 39, 41, 42, 48, 65, 68, 77, 78, 87, 88, 89
- Amik Sherchan, 41
- Bharat Bimal Yadav, 41, 88
- CA, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 20, 24, 38, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95
CBES, 5, 91
China, 26, 46, 69, 70
citizen survey, 1, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15
Civil Code, 73
civil society, 13, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 68, 84
CPA, 3, 5, 14, 28, 46, 53, 62, 71, 93
- Dhanusha, 9, 12, 76
- eight-party-alliance, 62, 66
Election Commission, 39, 40, 41, 42, 71, 91
elite, 1, 6, 7, 13, 22, 29, 76
European Union, 46, 69
excluded groups, 4, 7, 43, 73, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 89, 93, 94
- federalism, 4, 5, 7, 14, 59, 60, 61, 75, 76, 87, 88, 94, 95
- G.P. Koirala, 4, 28
Gurung, 12, 15, 34, 35, 74, 78
- Hindu state, 85, 86, 90, 95
HOR, 4, 45
- included groups, 7, 80, 81, 89, 93, 94
inclusive democracy, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 71, 74, 85, 90, 93
India, 19, 46, 56, 69, 70
Interim Constitution, 3, 4, 5, 24, 45, 53, 71, 74, 76, 91, 92, 93
interim government, 3, 5, 7, 14, 42, 53, 75
interim legislature, 3, 5, 93
international community, 6, 46, 59, 69, 70, 94
- Jana Andolan* II, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56, 62, 71, 74, 75, 91, 92, 93, 94
- Japan, 46, 69, 70
JTMM, 56, 75, 76
- Kaski, 9, 12, 76
King Birendra, 2
King Gyanendra, 2, 19, 94
King Mahendra, 2
- Madhav Kumar Nepal, 40, 41
Madhesh uprising, 4, 5, 14, 28, 55, 56, 63, 71, 75, 76, 95
Maoist insurgency, 2, 20, 68

MJF, 5, 50, 51, 55, 56, 75, 76, 91
 MP survey, 1, 9, 11, 15

 Narayan Man Bijukchhe, 41
 NC, 4, 19, 20, 37, 38, 40, 41,
 42, 44, 49, 50, 51, 55, 62, 70, 71, 88,
 91, 92
 NEFIN, 5, 75, 88, 91
 Nepal Army, 46
 Nepali nationalism, 73, 90, 94, 95
 NSP, 41, 51, 55, 56, 70, 75, 76, 88
 NWPP, 41

 Pashupati Shamsheer Rana, 41
 PLA, 56
 PR system, 5, 74, 75, 92
 Prachanda, 40, 41, 54, 56

 Ranas, 4
 Rautahat, 4, 56, 62
 republic, 2, 5, 6, 7, 24, 34, 46, 49,
 50, 51, 52, 59, 60, 61, 71, 91, 92, 93,
 94, 95
 reservation, 4, 14, 59, 60, 61
 RJP, 41
 royal coup, 2, 49
 royal massacre, 2, 52, 53

 royal regime, 19, 20, 24, 29, 30
 royal takeover, 13, 19, 25, 29, 52
 RPP, 41, 50, 51, 55, 56, 62, 70

 sampling, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
 secular state, 5, 7, 24, 74, 85, 86, 90, 95
 Sher Bahadur Deuba, 41
 SPA, 3, 5, 6, 14, 20, 45, 46, 47, 53,
 75, 92
 state restructuring, 7, 9, 14, 25, 33, 35, 47,
 48, 71, 87, 88, 90, 95, 96
 Surya Bahadur Thapa, 41

 trust, 6, 14, 15, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 53, 54,
 55, 56, 59, 62, 92, 94, 95

 ULF, 19
 UML, 24, 37, 38, 40, 41, 49, 51, 55, 56, 70,
 92
 UN, 46, 53, 69, 70
 uncivil agitation, 62, 67, 68
 United Kingdom, 46
 UNMIN, 46, 53, 69
 USA, 69, 70

 YCL, 14, 62

Appendix 1

List of Local Level Interviewees

S. No.	Names of Interviewees	Sample VDC/Municipality	Sample Constituency
1	Suk Maya Shrestha	Jarayotar	Bhojpur-1
2	Ram Bahadur Rai		
3	Bhim Kumari Katuwal		
4	Kumari Rai		
5	Netra Prasad Acharya		
6	Damber Kumari Luitel	Kudakaule	
7	Devi Maya Khadka		
8	Goma Devi Adhikari		
9	Dil Maya Rai		
10	Bir Bahadur Sarki		
11	Bakhat Bahadur Ale	Gauribas	Mahottari-1
12	Tilak Kumari Khatri		
13	Ram Pratap Yadav	Bhangaha	
14	Raj Kishor Sah		
15	Sushila Devi Dahal		
16	Sunita Devi Teli		
17	Ram Narayan Chaudhary		
18	Ganga Ram Chamar	Bidur Municipality-1	
19	Mamata Manandhar		
20	Krishna Kumari Bogati		
21	Kaila Mizar		
22	Menuka Pandey		
23	Sita Bishwokarma	Khadakbhanjyang	Nuwakot-3
24	Yadu Kumar Rimal		
25	Bobby Tamang		
26	Suntali Sunuwar		
27	Kabita Subedi		
28	Laxmi Chaulagai	Kurgaha	Parbat-2
29	Shanti Kumari Poudel		
30	Tej Kumari Poudel		
31	Maya Kumari Poudel		
32	Jamuna Bhusal	Horsyangdi	
33	Bhim Prasad Sharma		
34	Hira Kumari Thapa		
35	Padam Bahadur Lamichhane		
36	Narayan Neupane	Kabhre	Dang-2
37	Ishwori Gharti		
38	Top Bahadur Pun		
39	Rem Lal Pun		
40	Uma Kanta Mahara		
41	Prem Sarki	Tribhuvan Municipality	
42	Resham Bahadur Gharti		
43	Krishna Bahadur Pun		
44	Sanjeev Poudel		
45	Tula Ram Rawal Chhettri		
46	Bhuwan Mitra Rana		

Appendix 2

List of National Level Interviewees

S. No.	Name	Representation	Interview Date
1	Arjun Narsingh K.C.	NC	12/07/2007
2	Barsha Man Pun “Ananta”	CPN-Maoist	17/08/2007
3	Bharat Bimal Yadav	NSP	13/09/2007
4	Bimalendra Nidhi	NC	21/08/2007
5	C.P. Gajurel	CPN-Maoist	27/08/2007
6	Chakra Prasad Bastola	NC	03/09/2007
6	Chandi Raj Dhakal	Industrialist	01/07/2007
8	Durga Sob	FEDO	18/07/2007
9	Gagan Singh Thapa	NC	14/07/2007
10	Ganesh Man Pun	YCL	29/07/2007
11	Jhal Nath Khanal	UML	14/08/2007
12	Keshar Bahadur Bista	JSP	31/08/2007
13	Khagendra Sangraula	Columnist	22/08/2007
14	Krishna K.C.	CPN-Maoist	14/07/2007
15	Laxman Lal Karna	NSP	11/07/2007
16	Lila Mani Pokhrel	Jana Morcha Nepal	04/08/2007
17	Lokendra Bahadur Chand	RPP	02/08/2007
18	Mohan Bikram Singh	CPN (Unity Center - Masal)	04/07/2007
19	Mohan Vaidya “Kiran”	CPN-Maoist	12/09/2007
20	Pari Thapa	CPN (United)	07/07/2007
21	Pashang Sherpa	NEFIN	11/08/2007
22	Prem Suwal	NWPP	19/09/2007
23	Ram Kumari Jhankri	UML	06/07/2007
24	Ram Prakash Yadav	Development Planner	19/08/2007
25	Ramindra Chhetri	Nepal Army	14/08/2007
26	Sapana Pradhan Malla	Women Activist	02/08/2007
27	Shankar Pokhrel	UML	07/08/2007
28	Shyam Shrestha	Civil society	12/07/2007
29	Upendra Kumar Jha	MJF	05/07/2007
30	Yub Raj Ghimire	Journalist	11/07/2007

Appendix 3

Frequency Table

V1A How often do you read newspaper for news?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Daily	195	4.8	4.9	289	96.3	96.3
Occasionally	1,162	28.4	29.5	9	3.0	3.0
Never	2,585	63.2	65.6	2	0.7	0.7
Total	3,942	96.4	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	147	3.6		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V1B How often do you listen news on radio?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Daily	1,193	29.2	29.6	292	97.3	97.3
Occasionally	1,856	45.4	46.1	8	2.7	2.7
Never	980	24.0	24.3	0	0.0	0.0
Total	4,029	98.5	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	60	1.5		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V1C How often do you watch news on TV?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Daily	675	16.5	16.9	281	93.7	93.7
Occasionally	1,120	27.4	28.0	19	6.3	6.3
Never	2,201	53.8	55.1	0	0.0	0.0
Total	3,996	97.7	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	93	2.3		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V1D How often do you communicate face to face for news?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Daily	328	8.0	8.3	291	97.0	97.0
Occasionally	1,705	41.7	43.0	9	3.0	3.0
Never	1,931	47.2	48.7	0	0.0	0.0
Total	3,964	96.9	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	125	3.1		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V2 How frequently do you discuss politics with your friends and colleagues?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Usually	254	6.2	6.5	295	98.3	98.3
Occasionally	1,542	37.7	39.2	5	1.7	1.7
Never	2,136	52.2	54.3	0	0.0	0.0
Total	3,932	96.2	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	157	3.8		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V3 Generally, how safe is this village/city?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very safe	891	21.8	22.5	28	9.3	9.3
Normally safe	2,770	67.7	70.0	196	65.3	65.3
Unsafe	298	7.3	7.5	76	25.3	25.3
Total	3,959	96.8	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	130	3.2		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V4 Compared to the situation in this village/city a year before, what changes do you feel now?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
More safe	1,907	46.6	47.9	157	52.3	52.3
Less safe	386	9.4	9.7	78	26.0	26.0
Same as before	1,692	41.4	42.5	65	21.7	21.7
Total	3,985	97.5	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	104	2.5		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V4A If you feel safer, what could be the main reasons for improvement of security?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Eight party alliance	951	49.9	55.6	115	73.2	73.2
Resolution of Maoist conflict	519	27.2	30.4	87	55.4	55.4
Restoration of democracy	153	8.0	8.9	9	5.7	5.7
Governance	207	10.9	12.1	8	5.1	5.1
Develop-ment	278	14.6	16.3	10	6.4	6.4
Decreased anti-social elements	94	4.9	5.5	2	1.3	1.3
Absence of state security forces	47	2.5	2.7	2	1.3	1.3
Absence of Maoists	58	3.0	3.4	0	0.0	0.0
Others	22	1.2	1.3	3	1.9	1.9
Total	1710	89.7		157		
N.O/D.K	197	10.3		0	0.0	
NA	2182			143		
Total	4089			300		

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

NA = Not Applicable

V4B If you think the security situation is worsening, what could be the main reasons behind it?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Political conflict and instability	101	26.2	29.8	10	12.8	12.8
Maoist behaviour	44	11.4	13.0	14	17.9	17.9
Armed group/violent activities in Tarai	25	6.5	7.4	36	46.2	46.2
Uncivil agitation	97	25.1	28.6	3	3.8	3.8
Weak government	72	18.7	21.2	21	26.9	26.9
Economic insecurity	56	14.5	16.5	5	6.4	6.4
Social insecurity	32	8.3	9.4	0	0.0	0.0
Natural calamity	21	5.4	6.2	1	1.3	1.3
Anti-social elements	76	19.7	22.4	9	11.5	11.5
Others	9	2.3	2.7	18	23.1	23.1

Contd.

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Total	337	87.3		78		
N.O/D.K	49	12.7		0	0	
NA	3703			222		
Total	4089			300		

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V5A Do you know about the Jana Andolan II of last year?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Know	2,632	64.4	66.7
Don't know	1,312	32.1	33.3
Total	3,944	96.5	100.0
N.O.	145	3.5	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V5B Do you know about Girija Prasad Koirala becoming the Prime Minister?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Know	3,371	82.4	84.2
Don't know	632	15.5	15.8
Total	4,003	97.9	100.0
N.O.	86	2.1	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V5C Do you know about the peace agreement between the government and Maoists?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Know	3,109	76.0	78.3
Don't know	863	21.1	21.7
Total	3,972	97.1	100.0
N.O.	117	2.9	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V5D Do you know about the Maoist PLA being kept in cantonments?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Know	2,841	69.5	72.0
Don't know	1,106	27.0	28.0
Total	3,947	96.5	100.0
N.O.	142	3.5	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V5E Do you know about the formation of interim legislature/parliament including the Maoists?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Know	2,381	58.2	60.8
Don't know	1,537	37.6	39.2
Total	3,918	95.8	100.0
N.O.	171	4.2	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V5F Do you know about the *Madhesh Andolan*?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Know	2,990	73.1	75.4
Don't know	976	23.9	24.6
Total	3,966	97.0	100.0
N.O.	123	3.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V6 Are you close to any political party?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	934	22.8	23.3
No	3,075	75.2	76.6
Don't want to disclose	3	0.1	0.1
Total	4,012	98.1	100.0
N.O./D.K.	77	1.9	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V6A If yes, which party?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
NC	313	7.7	33.8	74	24.7	24.7
UML	295	7.2	31.9	79	26.3	26.3
CPN-Maoist	143	3.5	15.4	79	26.3	26.3
RPP	47	1.1	5.1	4	1.3	1.3
NSP	20	0.5	2.2	6	2.0	2.0
NCD	19	0.5	2.1	41	13.7	13.7
MJF	16	0.4	1.7	0	0.0	0.0
Jan Morcha	17	0.4	1.8	6	2.0	2.0
NWPP	12	0.3	1.3	4	1.3	1.3
Other	37	0.9	4.0	7	2.3	2.3
Don't want to disclose	7	0.2	0.8	0	0.0	0.0
Total	926	22.6	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O/D.K	8	0.2		0	0.0	0.0
NA	3155	77.2		0	0.0	0.0
Total	3163	77.4				
Total Respondents	4089	100.0		300	100.0	100.0

V7 People understand democracy with different meanings, what is democracy for you?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
People's rule	867	21.2	38.1	203	67.7	67.7
Institution	804	19.7	35.3	140	46.7	46.7
Freedom	741	18.1	32.5	48	16.0	16.0
Justice	111	2.7	4.9	4	1.3	1.3
Peace and stability	316	7.7	13.9	3	1.0	1.0
Basic needs	46	1.1	2.0	5	1.7	1.7
Development	124	3.0	5.4	3	1.0	1.0
State restructuring	49	1.2	2.2	35	11.7	11.7
Negative appraisal	128	3.1	5.6	3	1.0	1.0
Others	76	1.9	3.3	6	2.0	2.0
Total	2277	55.7		300		

Contd.

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
N.O./D.K	1812	44.3		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4089			300		

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V8 On the whole, how satisfied are you with the working of the government formed after the last year's Andolan?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very satisfied	322	7.9	9.9	5	1.7	1.7
Somewhat satisfied	2,057	50.3	63.1	128	42.7	42.7
Somewhat dissatisfied	627	15.3	19.2	116	38.7	38.7
Totally dissatisfied	252	6.2	7.7	51	17.0	17.0
Total	3,258	79.7	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	831	20.3		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V9 With whom do you feel free to discuss politics openly?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Anyone	396	9.7	10.6	279	93.0	93.0
Well known people	919	22.5	24.7	21	7.0	7.0
Close friends and family	978	23.9	26.3	0	0.0	0.0
No one	1,430	35.0	38.4	0	0.0	0.0
Total	3,723	91.0	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	366	9.0		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V10 Have you ever participated in protest/movement?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	1,167	28.5	28.9
No	2,830	69.2	70.2
Could not remember	37	0.9	0.9
Total	4,034	98.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	55	1.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V11 How were you involved in the last year's Jana Andolan?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Interested and participated	846	20.7	23.3
Interested but did not participate	673	16.5	18.5
Not interested at all	2,114	51.7	58.2
Total	3,633	88.8	100.0
N.O./D.K.	456	11.2	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V11AA If you were involved, were you involved in rallies and protest programmes?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	827	20.2	97.8	262	87.3	87.3
No	19	0.5	2.2	38	12.7	12.7
Total	846	20.7	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
NA	3,243	79.3		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V11AB If you were involved, were you involved in mobilizing people?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	317	7.8	37.9	279	93.0	93.0
No	519	12.7	62.1	21	7.0	7.0
Total	836	20.4	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	10	0.2		0	0.0	
NA	3,243	79.3		0	0.0	
Total	3,253	79.6		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V11AC If you were involved, were you involved in defying curfews?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	210	5.1	25.1	228	76.0	76.0
No	625	15.3	74.9	72	24.0	24.0
Total	835	20.4	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	11	0.3		0	0.0	
NA	3,243	79.3		0	0.0	
Total	3,254	79.6		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V11AD If you were involved, were you arrested/imprisoned?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	210	5.1	25.1	228	76.0	76.0
No	625	15.3	74.9	72	24.0	24.0
Total	835	20.4	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	11	0.3		0	0.0	
NA	3,243	79.3		0	0.0	
Total	3,254	79.6		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V11B If you were involved, did you take part on your own interest or did anybody motivate you?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
On my own judgment	729	17.8	87.3
Motivated by other	106	2.6	12.7
Total	835	20.4	100.0
N.O./D.K.	11	0.3	
NA	3,243	79.3	
Total	3,254	79.6	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V12 What do you expect from the success of the last year's *Jana Andolan*?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Peace and reconciliation	2195	53.7	62.1	224	74.7	74.7
Mainstreaming the Maoist	40	1.0	1.1	1	0.3	0.3
Infrastructure development	498	12.2	14.1	15	5.0	5.0
State restructuring	243	5.9	6.9	204	68.0	68.0
Governance	700	17.1	19.8	24	8.0	8.0
Economic development	1220	29.8	34.5	30	10.0	10.0
Social change	179	4.4	5.1	23	7.7	7.7
Negative	48	1.2	1.4	1	0.3	0.3
No expectation	367	9.0	10.4	3	1.0	1.0
Others	21	0.5	0.6	7	2.3	2.3
Total	3531	86.4		300		
N.O./D.K.	558	13.6		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4089					

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V13A How often do you participate in the activities of CBOs/NGOs/Civil Society?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Regularly	279	6.8	7.3	74	24.7	24.7
Occasionally	823	20.1	21.4	208	69.3	69.3
Never	2,738	67.0	71.3	18	6.0	6.0
Total	3,840	93.9	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	249	6.1		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V13B How often do you participate in the activities of Ethnic/Dalit/*Madhesh* organizations?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Regularly	122	3.0	3.2	93	31.0	31.0
Occasionally	478	11.7	12.4	187	62.3	62.3
Never	3,252	79.5	84.4	20	6.7	6.7
Total	3,852	94.2	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	237	5.8		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V13C How often do you participate in the activities of women organizations?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Regularly	225	5.5	5.7	76	25.3	25.3
Occasionally	734	18.0	18.7	201	67.0	67.0
Never	2,958	72.3	75.5	23	7.7	7.7
Total	3,917	95.8	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	172	4.2		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V13D How often do you participate in the activities of political parties?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Regularly	151	3.7	3.9	285	95.0	95.0
Occasionally	694	17.0	17.8	15	5.0	5.0
Never	3,058	74.8	78.3	0	0.0	0.0
Total	3,903	95.5	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	186	4.5		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V14 Which of the following statement is closest to your situation regarding your family income?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
It covers needs well, we can save	265	6.5	6.5	92	30.7	31.3
It covers needs all right, without much difficulty	1,748	42.7	43.0	157	52.3	53.4
It does not cover needs, there are difficulties	2,053	50.2	50.5	45	15.0	15.3
Total	4,066	99.4	100.0	294	98.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	23	0.6		6	2.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V15 How suitable is democracy for Nepal?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very suitable	733	17.9	24.1	239	79.7	81.0
Suitable	2,064	50.5	67.9	49	16.3	16.6
Not suitable	182	4.5	6.0	5	1.7	1.7
Not at all suitable	60	1.5	2.0	2	0.7	0.7
Total	3,039	74.3	100.0	295	98.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,050	25.7		5	1.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V16 Which one of the following three statements do you agree with the most?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	2,073	50.7	66.6	294	98.0	98.0
In certain situation, a dictatorial government can be preferred	179	4.4	5.8	5	1.7	1.7
It doesn't matter to people like me whether we have a democracy or a dictatorship	860	21.0	27.6	1	0.3	0.3
Total	3,112	76.1	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	977	23.9		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V17A What is your level of familiarity with Constituent Assembly?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Have heard and understand as well	682	16.7	17.5
Have heard but couldn't understand	1,972	48.2	50.7
Have not heard	1,233	30.2	31.7

Contd.

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Total	3,887	95.1	100.0
N.O./D.K.	202	4.9	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V17B What is your level of familiarity with reservation?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Have heard and understand as well	407	10.0	10.9
Have heard but couldn't understand	937	22.9	25.1
Have not heard	2,396	58.6	64.1
Total	3,740	91.5	100.0
N.O./D.K.	349	8.5	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V17C What is your level of familiarity with federalism?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Have heard and understand as well	286	7.0	7.7
Have heard but couldn't understand	934	22.8	25.2
Have not heard	2,493	61.0	67.1
Total	3,713	90.8	100.0
N.O./D.K.	376	9.2	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V17D What is your level of familiarity with republic?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Have heard and understand as well	862	21.1	22.3
Have heard but couldn't understand	1,904	46.6	49.3
Have not heard	1,094	26.8	28.3
Total	3,860	94.4	100.0
N.O./D.K.	229	5.6	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V18 What do you think about the monarchy, should it be retained or abolished?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Should be abolished	1,938	47.4	58.7	247	82.3	84.3
Should be retained	1,365	33.4	41.3	19	6.3	6.5
People/CA decide*	0	0.0	0.0	27	9.0	9.2
Total	3,303	80.8	100.0	293	97.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	786	19.2		7	2.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

* The choice was not provided but was insisted on by some MPs

V18A If you are in favor of republic, which one is the most important reason for the abolition of the monarchy?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
The present king and his son are not good	167	4.1	8.9	6	2.0	2.4
Monarchy is not necessary in the present era	314	7.7	16.7	74	24.7	30.0
I want a government ruled by the people	945	23.1	50.2	126	42.0	51.0
I suspect the conspiracy on royal massacre of 1st June 2001	457	11.2	24.3	8	2.7	3.2
Monarchy is against democracy/development*	0	0.0	0.0	10	3.3	4.0
Abolition of Feudalism*	0	0.0	0.0	23	7.7	9.3
Total	1,883	46.1	100.0	247	82.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	55	1.3		0	0.0	0.0
NA	2,151	52.6		53	17.7	
Total	2,206	53.9		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

* The choice was not provided but was insisted on by some MPs

V18B If you would like a continuity of the monarchy, which one is the most important reason?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Monarchy is a symbol of national unity and nationalism	347	8.5	30.7	5	1.7	31.3
Monarchy is the protector of Hindu religion	390	9.5	34.5	1	0.3	6.3
Monarchy ensures continuity and stability	392	9.6	34.7	10	3.3	62.5
Total	1,129	27.6	100.0	16	5.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	236	5.8		3	1.0	
NA	2,724	66.6		281	93.7	
Total	2,960	72.4		284	94.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V19 In your opinion, how the future of the monarchy should be decided?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
By Constituent Assembly	968	23.7	41.1	151	50.3	51.0
By referendum	1,048	25.6	44.5	70	23.3	23.6
By interim parliament	338	8.3	14.4	75	25.0	25.3
Total	2,354	57.6	100.0	296	98.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,735	42.4		4	1.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20A How much do you trust in the government?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	636	15.6	17.4	60	20.0	20.1
Some	1,846	45.1	50.5	179	59.7	59.9
Not very much	663	16.2	18.1	50	16.7	16.7
None at all	514	12.6	14.0	10	3.3	3.3
Total	3,659	89.5	100.0	299	99.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	430	10.5		1	0.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20B How much do you trust in the CPN-Maoist?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	382	9.3	10.6	84	28.0	28.5
Some	1,382	33.8	38.3	77	25.7	26.1
Not very much	714	17.5	19.8	77	25.7	26.1
None at all	1,132	27.7	31.4	57	19.0	19.3
Total	3,610	88.3	100.0	295	98.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	479	11.7		5	1.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20C How much do you trust in the political parties?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	328	8.0	9.4	105	35.0	35.1
Some	1,664	40.7	47.6	155	51.7	51.8
Not very much	767	18.8	22.0	32	10.7	10.7
None at all	734	18.0	21.0	7	2.3	2.3
Total	3,493	85.4	100.0	299	99.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	596	14.6		1	0.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20D How much do you trust in the civil service?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	447	10.9	12.7	38	12.7	12.8
Some	1,801	44.0	51.2	173	57.7	58.4
Not very much	725	17.7	20.6	68	22.7	23.0
None at all	545	13.3	15.5	17	5.7	5.7
Total	3,518	86.0	100.0	296	98.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	571	14.0		4	1.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20E How much do you trust in the police?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	445	10.9	12.4	44	14.7	14.9
Some	1,672	40.9	46.5	163	54.3	55.1
Not very much	737	18.0	20.5	69	23.0	23.3
None at all	738	18.0	20.5	20	6.7	6.8
Total	3,592	87.8	100.0	296	98.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	497	12.2		4	1.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20F How much do you trust in the army?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	606	14.8	17.0	41	13.7	13.9
Some	1,729	42.3	48.5	153	51.0	51.7
Not very much	634	15.5	17.8	67	22.3	22.6
None at all	593	14.5	16.6	35	11.7	11.8
Total	3,562	87.1	100.0	296	98.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	527	12.9		4	1.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20G How much do you trust in the courts?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	864	21.1	26.4	68	22.7	23.0
Some	1,576	38.5	48.2	146	48.7	49.3
Not very much	426	10.4	13.0	60	20.0	20.3
None at all	403	9.9	12.3	22	7.3	7.4
Total	3,269	79.9	100.0	296	98.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	820	20.1		4	1.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V20H How much do you trust in the Election Commission?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal	751	18.4	25.8	106	35.3	35.6
Some	1,511	37.0	51.9	147	49.0	49.3
Not very much	335	8.2	11.5	33	11.0	11.1
None at all	314	7.7	10.8	12	4.0	4.0
Total	2,911	71.2	100.0	298	99.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,178	28.8		2	0.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V21 How would you like to identify yourself?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Percent	Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Percent
Only Nepali	1,434	35.1	36.2	236	78.7	81.4
More Nepali and less ethnic	267	6.5	6.7	16	5.3	5.5
Equal Nepali and ethnic	1,248	30.5	31.5	29	9.7	10.0
More ethnic and less Nepali	529	12.9	13.4	6	2.0	2.1
Only ethnic	479	11.7	12.1	3	1.0	1.0
Total	3,957	96.8	100.0	290	96.7	100.0
Non categorical	0	0.0	0.0	8	2.7	
N.O./D.K.	132	3.2		2	0.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V22 If you or your family member is physically in danger and need help, whom would you approach first?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Percent	Fre-quency	Percent	Valid Percent
Administration	428	10.5	10.9	76	25.3	25.3
Police	1,173	28.7	29.9	67	22.3	22.3
Human rights activists	289	7.1	7.4	14	4.7	4.7
Political Party	78	1.9	2.0	37	12.3	12.3
Maoist	185	4.5	4.7	39	13.0	13.0
Neighbours	1,675	41.0	42.7	35	11.7	11.7
Leaders of the society	26	0.6	0.7	4	1.3	1.3
No one	12	0.3	0.3	6	2.0	2.0
Depends upon situation	19	0.5	0.5	15	5.0	5.0
Others	38	0.9	1.0	7	2.3	2.3
Total	3,923	95.9	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O/D.K	166	4.1		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V23 What are the two major problems/challenges facing this country today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Political conflict	623	15.2	21.6	177	59.0	59.0
Maoist misbehavior	191	4.7	6.6	5	1.7	1.7
Violence in Tarai	33	0.8	1.1	2	0.7	0.7
Exclusion	232	5.7	8.0	37	12.3	12.3
Uncivil agitation	696	17.0	24.1	13	4.3	4.3
Weak government	862	21.1	29.9	155	51.7	51.7
Economic hardship	2022	49.4	70.1	115	38.3	38.3
Social tension	203	5.0	7.0	11	3.7	3.7
Foreign interference	16	0.4	0.6	26	8.7	8.7
Others	79	1.9	2.7	44	14.7	14.7
Total	2884	70.5		300		
N.O/D.K	1205	29.5		0	0.0	
Total	4089			300		

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V24 Do you or your relatives, friends or some one you know have experience of encountering the Maoists?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	1,768	43.2	43.9	198	66.0	89.6
No	2,261	55.3	56.1	23	7.7	10.4
Total	4,029	98.5	100.0	221	73.7	100.0
N.O./D.K./NA	60	1.5		79	26.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V24A If yes, when did it happen?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
During insurgency	663	16.2	38.5	6	2.0	3.0
After insurgency	188	4.6	10.9	51	17.0	25.8
Both times	870	21.3	50.6	141	47.0	71.2
Total	1,721	42.1	100.0	198	66.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	47	1.1		0	0.0	
NA	2,321	56.8		102	34.0	
Total	2,368	57.9		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V24B What did Maoists do?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Took donation	828	46.8	49.7	72	36.4	36.7
Assaulted physically	207	11.7	12.4	60	30.3	30.6
Killed	112	6.3	6.7	52	26.3	26.5
Provided security	210	11.9	12.6	1	0.5	0.5
Provided justice	218	12.3	13.1	0	0.0	0.0
Had food/stayed at night	635	35.9	38.1	1	0.5	0.5
Casual meeting didn't do anything	297	16.8	17.8	92	46.5	46.9
Inductment	60	3.4	3.6	2	1.0	1.0
Took away goods, land and house	21	1.2	1.3	13	6.6	6.6
Took in assembly	19	1.1	1.1	0	0.0	0.0

Contd.

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Forced into labour	57	3.2	3.4	17	8.6	8.7
Obstructed work/travel/school	4	0.2	0.2	1	0.5	0.5
Helped	49	2.8	2.9	5	2.5	2.6
Others	12	0.7	0.7	12	6.1	6.1
Total	1,667	94.3		196	99.0	
N.O/D.K	101	5.7		2	1.0	
NA	2,321			102		
Total Respondents	4,089			300		

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V25 From which one do you feel the most insecure today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Thief/rubbery/gunda	1,771	43.3	45.0	41	13.7	13.7
Rally/bandh/chakka jam	491	12.0	12.5	9	3.0	3.0
Police/army/administration	89	2.2	2.3	8	2.7	2.7
Maoist	264	6.5	6.7	17	5.7	5.7
Armed rebellions	113	2.8	2.9	44	14.7	14.7
Political parties' workers	30	0.7	0.8	2	0.7	0.7
Not insecure from any one	1,073	26.2	27.3	118	39.3	39.3
Other	104	2.5	2.6	21	7.0	7.0
Reactionaries/Monarchists*	0	0.0	0.0	27	9.0	9.0
Anarchists*	0	0.0	0.0	11	3.7	3.7
Total	3,935	96.2	100.0	2	0.7	0.7
N.O./D.K.	154	3.8		0	0.0	0.0
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	100.0

* The choice was not provided but was specified by some MPs

V26 How proud are you with your community identity?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very proud	1,549	37.9	39.0	88	29.3	29.6
Proud	2,020	49.4	50.8	110	36.7	37.0
Not proud	332	8.1	8.4	79	26.3	26.6
Not at all proud	75	1.8	1.9	20	6.7	6.7
Total	3,976	97.2	100.0	297	99.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	113	2.8		3	1.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V27 How proud are you to be a Nepali?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very proud	2,153	52.7	54.3	277	92.3	92.3
Proud	1,673	40.9	42.2	22	7.3	7.3
Not proud	101	2.5	2.5	1	0.3	0.3
Not at all proud	40	1.0	1.0	0	0.0	0.0
Total	3,967	97.0	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	122	3.0		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V28 How sure are you that the upcoming elections to Constituent Assembly will be held in an atmosphere without fear?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Fully sure	434	10.6	14.5	20	6.7	6.7
Somewhat sure	1,411	34.5	47.2	95	31.7	31.7
Not much sure	858	21.0	28.7	143	47.7	47.7
Not sure at all	287	7.0	9.6	42	14.0	14.0
Total	2,990	73.1	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,099	26.9		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V29 To what extent an international supervision will help in ensuring free and fair elections of Constituent Assembly?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great extent	551	13.5	23.9	69	23.0	23.2
Some extent	1,386	33.9	60.0	192	64.0	64.6
Not significant	274	6.7	11.9	31	10.3	10.4
Not at all	98	2.4	4.2	5	1.7	1.7
Total	2,309	56.5	100.0	297	99.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,780	43.5		3	1.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V30A How far the role of China is important on what is going in Nepal today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very important	636	15.6	27.8	131	43.7	44.4
Important	1,164	28.5	50.9	133	44.3	45.1
Less Important	339	8.3	14.8	22	7.3	7.5
Not at all	149	3.6	6.5	9	3.0	3.1
Total	2,288	56.0	100.0	295	98.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,801	44.0		5	1.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V30B How far the role of India is important on what is going in Nepal today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very important	1,338	32.7	50.6	227	75.7	76.4
Important	1,072	26.2	40.5	51	17.0	17.2
Less Important	145	3.5	5.5	8	2.7	2.7
Not at all	91	2.2	3.4	11	3.7	3.7
Total	2,646	64.7	100.0	297	99.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,443	35.3		3	1.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V30C How far the role of Japan is important on what is going in Nepal today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very important	398	9.7	18.7	26	8.7	8.9
Important	1,209	29.6	56.8	205	68.3	70.2
Less Important	388	9.5	18.2	56	18.7	19.2
Not at all	133	3.3	6.3	5	1.7	1.7

Contd.

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Total	2,128	52.0	100.0	292	97.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,961	48.0		8	2.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V30D How far the role of UK is important on what is going in Nepal today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very important	324	7.9	16.2	47	15.7	16.0
Important	1,140	27.9	56.9	208	69.3	70.7
Less Important	374	9.1	18.7	34	11.3	11.6
Not at all	164	4.0	8.2	5	1.7	1.7
Total	2,002	49.0	100.0	294	98.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,087	51.0		6	2.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V30E How far the role of USA is important on what is going in Nepal today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very important	883	21.6	38.2	160	53.3	53.7
Important	1,084	26.5	46.9	82	27.3	27.5
Less Important	209	5.1	9.1	24	8.0	8.1
Not at all	133	3.3	5.8	32	10.7	10.7
Total	2,309	56.5	100.0	298	99.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,780	43.5		2	0.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V30F How far the role of European Union is important on what is going in Nepal today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very important	419	10.2	23.9	93	31.0	31.5
Important	957	23.4	54.7	171	57.0	58.0
Less Important	260	6.4	14.8	29	9.7	9.8
Not at all	115	2.8	6.6	2	0.7	0.7
Total	1,751	42.8	100.0	295	98.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,338	57.2		5	1.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V30G How far the role of UNO is important on what is going in Nepal today?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very important	957	23.4	48.7	206	68.7	69.4
Important	805	19.7	40.9	82	27.3	27.6
Less Important	140	3.4	7.1	7	2.3	2.4
Not at all	64	1.6	3.3	2	0.7	0.7
Total	1,966	48.1	100.0	297	99.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,123	51.9		3	1.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V31A What is your opinion about the integration of Nepal Army and Maoist PLAs?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Should be integrated	2,485	60.8	74.4	168	56.0	58.5
Should not be integrated	857	21.0	25.6	119	39.7	41.5
Total	3,342	81.7	100.0	287	95.7	100.0
N.O./D.K./NA	747	18.3		13	4.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V31B What is your opinion about the land ceiling?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Should be land ceiling	2,222	54.3	61.3	229	76.3	79.2
Should not be land ceiling	1,401	34.3	38.7	60	20.0	20.8
Total	3,623	88.6	100.0	289	96.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	466	11.4		11	3.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V32 Who would you say is the excluded group in Nepal?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Hill caste group	56	1.4	1.7	1	0.3	0.3
Hill ethnic group	640	15.7	19.8	177	59.0	59.4
Dalit	2018	49.4	62.5	171	57.0	57.4
Tarai caste group	79	1.9	2.4	1	0.3	0.3
Tarai ethnic group	215	5.3	6.7	13	4.3	4.4
Muslim	37	0.9	1.1	3	1.0	1.0
Plain dwellers	338	8.3	10.5	42	14.0	14.1
Lower caste	44	1.1	1.4	1	0.3	0.3
Women	352	8.6	10.9	65	21.7	21.8
Rich	10	0.2	0.3	0	0.0	0.0
Poor	428	10.5	13.3	94	31.3	31.5
People residing remote area	67	1.6	2.1	32	10.7	10.7
Marginalized	66	1.6	2.0	27	9.0	9.1
Uneducated/unaware	83	2.0	2.6	11	3.7	3.7
Others	154	3.4	5.3	14	4.6	4.6
No one	26	0.6	0.8	2	0.7	0.7
Total	3227	78.9		298	99.3	
N.O/D.K	862	21.1		2	0.7	
Total	4089			300	100.0	

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V33 Who would you say is the included group in Nepal?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Hill caste group	2096	51.3	67.9	305	101.7	103.4
Hill ethnic group	189	4.6	6.1	51	17.0	17.3
Tarai caste group	261	6.4	8.5	7	2.3	2.4
Hill dwellers	408	10.0	13.2	3	1.0	1.0
Upper caste	106	2.6	3.4	3	1.0	1.0
Men	101	2.5	3.3	4	1.3	1.4
Rich	457	11.2	14.8	72	24.0	24.4
Urban dweller	48	1.2	1.6	5	1.7	1.7

Contd.

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Political elite	353	8.6	11.4	76	25.3	25.8
Educated/awared	112	2.7	3.6	11	3.7	3.7
Others	203	4.5	6.5	47	15.7	15.9
No one	27	0.7	0.9	3	1.0	1.0
Total	3086	75.5		295	98.3	
N.O./D.K	1003	24.5		5	1.7	
Total	4089			300		

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V34A In your locality, which are included and which are excluded groups? a. Hill high caste (Brahmin/Chhetri/Thakuri):

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Included	3,064	74.9	88.0	242	80.7	91.0
Excluded	417	10.2	12.0	24	8.0	9.0
Total	3,481	85.1	100.0	266	88.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	608	14.9		34	11.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V34B In your locality, which are included and which are excluded groups? b. Janajati (ethnic group):

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Included	863	21.1	26.4	52	17.3	19.0
Excluded	2,400	58.7	73.6	221	73.7	81.0
Total	3,263	79.8	100.0	273	91.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	826	20.2		27	9.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V34C In your locality, which are included and which are excluded groups? c. Madheshi:

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Included	302	7.4	15.7	19	6.3	10.4
Excluded	1,627	39.8	84.3	164	54.7	89.6
Total	1,929	47.2	100.0	183	61.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,160	52.8		117	39.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V34D In your locality, which are included and which are excluded groups? d. Muslim:

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Included	305	7.5	17.4	16	5.3	7.8
Excluded	1,452	35.5	82.6	189	63.0	92.2
Total	1,757	43.0	100.0	205	68.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,332	57.0		95	31.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V34E In your locality, which are included and which are excluded groups? e. Dalit:

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Included	217	5.3	6.1	9	3.0	3.1
Excluded	3,330	81.4	93.9	277	92.3	96.9
Total	3,547	86.7	100.0	286	95.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	542	13.3		14	4.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V34F In your locality, which are included and which are excluded groups? f. Women:

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Included	451	11.0	12.4	17	5.7	6.0
Excluded	3,176	77.7	87.6	264	88.0	94.0
Total	3,627	88.7	100.0	281	93.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	462	11.3		19	6.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V35 What changes have you observed in the condition of the excluded groups during the last few years?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Improved	2,043	50.0	55.1	254	84.7	85.2
Deteriorated	215	5.3	5.8	10	3.3	3.4
Remained same	1,447	35.4	39.1	34	11.3	11.4
Total	3,705	90.6	100.0	298	99.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	384	9.4		2	0.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V36 What is your opinion in giving special provision for backward communities in the Constitution?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Should be given	3,331	81.5	91.1	284	94.7	94.7
Should not be given	327	8.0	8.9	16	5.3	5.3
Total	3,658	89.5	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	431	10.5		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V37 Do you know that the CPN-Maoist has changed its course from armed insurgency to peaceful politics and also declared its faith on multiparty democracy?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	2,499	61.1	65.8
No	1,299	31.8	34.2
Total	3,798	92.9	100.0
N.O./D.K.	291	7.1	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V37A If yes, to what extent do you believe on its changed position?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Strongly believe	259	6.3	11.1	68	22.7	23.0
Believe	1,299	31.8	55.8	148	49.3	50.0
Disbelieve	507	12.4	21.8	62	20.7	20.9
Strongly disbelieved	265	6.5	11.4	18	6.0	6.1
Total	2,330	57.0	100.0	296	98.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	161	3.9		4	1.3	
NA	1,598	39.1		0	0.0	
Total	1,759	43.0		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38A To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Amik Sherchan?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	73	1.8	4.8	15	5.0	5.7
Trust	579	14.2	38.4	146	48.7	55.7
Not much trust	364	8.9	24.1	78	26.0	29.8
Not at all	492	12.0	32.6	23	7.7	8.8
Total	1,508	36.9	100.0	262	87.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,581	63.1		38	12.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38B To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Girija Prasad Koirala?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	850	20.8	24.7	88	29.3	31.9
Trust	1,751	42.8	50.9	87	29.0	31.5
Not much trust	408	10.0	11.9	68	22.7	24.6
Not at all	429	10.5	12.5	33	11.0	12.0
Total	3,438	84.1	100.0	276	92.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	651	15.9		24	8.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38C To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Narayan Man Bijukchhe?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	92	2.2	5.7	21	7.0	7.8
Trust	662	16.2	41.2	169	56.3	63.1
Not much trust	383	9.4	23.8	54	18.0	20.1
Not at all	471	11.5	29.3	24	8.0	9.0
Total	1,608	39.3	100.0	268	89.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,481	60.7		32	10.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38D To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Pashupati Shamsheer Rana?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	92	2.2	4.4	9	3.0	3.3
Trust	730	17.9	35.1	50	16.7	18.5
Not much trust	550	13.5	26.4	81	27.0	29.9

Contd.

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not at all	708	17.3	34.0	131	43.7	48.3
Total	2,080	50.9	100.0	271	90.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,009	49.1		29	9.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38E To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Prachanda?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	513	12.5	16.6	88	29.3	32.6
Trust	1,401	34.3	45.4	96	32.0	35.6
Not much trust	486	11.9	15.7	56	18.7	20.7
Not at all	686	16.8	22.2	30	10.0	11.1
Total	3,086	75.5	100.0	270	90.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,003	24.5		30	10.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38F To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Bharat Bimal Yadav?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	99	2.4	6.3	8	2.7	3.1
Trust	559	13.7	35.8	103	34.3	39.9
Not much trust	367	9.0	23.5	83	27.7	32.2
Not at all	536	13.1	34.3	64	21.3	24.8
Total	1,561	38.2	100.0	258	86.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	2,528	61.8		42	14.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38G To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Madhav Kumar Nepal?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	348	8.5	12.5	67	22.3	24.4
Trust	1,428	34.9	51.3	117	39.0	42.5
Not much trust	532	13.0	19.1	66	22.0	24.0
Not at all	474	11.6	17.0	25	8.3	9.1
Total	2,782	68.0	100.0	275	91.7	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,307	32.0		25	8.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38H To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Sher Bahadur Deuba?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	286	7.0	10.1	32	10.7	11.7
Trust	1,302	31.8	46.1	103	34.3	37.6
Not much trust	628	15.4	22.2	77	25.7	28.1
Not at all	609	14.9	21.6	62	20.7	22.6
Total	2,825	69.1	100.0	274	91.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,264	30.9		26	8.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V38I To what extent do you trust upon the political party's top leader: Surya Bahadur Thapa?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Great deal of trust	147	3.6	6.0	7	2.3	2.6
Trust	976	23.9	39.8	64	21.3	23.6
Not much trust	598	14.6	24.4	70	23.3	25.8
Not at all	731	17.9	29.8	130	43.3	48.0
Total	2,452	60.0	100.0	271	90.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	1,637	40.0		29	9.7	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V39 According to your understanding, what is Constituent Assembly?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Making a new constitution	1366	33.4	81.3	391	130.8	130.8
Institution	193	4.7	11.5	10	3.3	3.3
Populism	222	5.4	13.2	38	12.7	12.7
State restructuring	56	1.4	3.3	16	5.4	5.4
Peace and conflict resolution	219	5.4	13.0	2	0.7	0.7
Development/Social change	81	2.0	4.8	3	1.0	1.0
Negative	25	0.6	1.5	0	0.0	0.0
Others	18	0.4	1.1	2	0.7	0.7
Total	1680	41.1		300		
N.O/D.K	2409	58.9		0	0.0	
Total	4089			300		

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V40 What do you expect from the election of the Constituent Assembly?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Framing new political structure	483	11.8	14.0	186	62.0	62.0
Maoist mainstreaming	31	0.8	0.9	0	0.0	0.0
Infrastructure develop-ment	411	10.1	11.9	7	2.3	2.3
State restructuring	246	6.0	7.1	239	79.7	79.7
Governance	2155	52.7	62.3	36	12.0	12.0
Economic development	1279	31.3	37.0	10	3.3	3.3
Social change	144	3.5	4.2	10	3.3	3.3
Negative	38	0.9	1.1	0	0.0	0.0
No expectation	447	10.9	12.9	0	0.0	0.0
Others	27	0.7	0.8	7	2.3	2.3
Total	3460	84.6		300		
N.O/D.K	629	15.4				
Total	4089					

Note: Per cent based on multiple responses.

V41 Which party will you vote in the upcoming elections of the Constituent Assembly?

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
NC	405	9.9	12.5
UML	345	8.4	10.7
CPN-Maoist	363	8.9	11.2
RPP	61	1.5	1.9
NSP	31	0.8	1.0

Contd.

	Citizens		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
NCD	48	1.2	1.5
MJF	55	1.3	1.7
Jan Morcha	23	0.6	0.7
NWPP	13	0.3	0.4
Other	207	5.1	6.4
Don't want to disclose	470	11.5	14.5
Decide later	1212	29.6	37.5
Total	3233	79.1	100.0
N.O./D.K	856	20.9	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0	

V42 What is your opinion about the religious or secular identity of the state?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Should be a Hindu state	2,135	52.2	60.8	16	5.3	5.6
Should be a secular state	1,376	33.7	39.2	271	90.3	94.4
Total	3,511	85.9	100.0	287	95.7	100.0
Non categorical*	0	0.0	0.0	3	1.0	
N.O./D.K.	578	14.1		10	3.3	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

* The choice was not provided but was specified by some MPs

V43 Which one do you like most about the form of government: unitary or federal?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Unitary	1,799	44.0	57.6	20	6.7	6.7
Federal	1,324	32.4	42.4	280	93.3	93.3
Total	3,123	76.4	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	966	23.6		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V44 People belonging to Janjati, Madhesh, Women and Dalit are discriminated. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Agree	2,991	73.1	83.7	268	89.3	89.3
Disagree	582	14.2	16.3	32	10.7	10.7
Total	3,573	87.4	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	516	12.6		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V45 In your opinion, what should be the official language of Nepal?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Nepali only	1,721	42.1	48.0	53	17.7	18.0
Other major languages also	899	22.0	25.1	113	37.7	38.4
Local language at local level	963	23.6	26.9	128	42.7	43.5
Total	3,583	87.6	100.0	294	98.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	506	12.4		6	2.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

V46 In your opinion, which one is the most important reason for marginalization/backwardness?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Language	406	9.9	12.0	10	3.3	3.3
Caste/ethnicity	859	21.0	25.4	17	5.7	5.7
Religion	120	2.9	3.5	8	2.7	2.7
Region	312	7.6	9.2	20	6.7	6.7
Tradition	877	21.4	25.9	45	15.0	15.0
Does not feel backwardness	353	8.6	10.4	1	0.3	0.3
Discrimina-tory state*	0	0.0	0.0	125	41.7	41.7
Economic*	0	0.0	0.0	22	7.3	7.3
Lack of education*	0	0.0	0.0	19	6.3	6.3
Other	456	11.2	13.5	33	11.0	11.0
Total	3,383	82.7	100.0	300	100.0	100.0
N.O./D.K.	706	17.3		0	0.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

* The choice was not provided but was specified by some MPs

V47 Who/which are the most responsible for such backwardness?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Government	1,598	39.1	57.2	236	78.7	79.2
People of upper caste	702	17.2	25.1	14	4.7	4.7
Hill dwellers	177	4.3	6.3	1	0.3	0.3
Exploitation*	0	0.0	0.0	23	7.7	7.7
Monarchy*	0	0.0	0.0	8	2.7	2.7
Education*	0	0.0	0.0	3	1.0	1.0
Other	316	7.7	11.3	12	4.0	4.0
Total	2,793	68.3	100.0	298	99.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	237	5.8		1	0.3	0.3
NA	1,059	25.9		2	0.7	
Total	1,296	31.7		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

* The choice was not provided but was specified by some MPs

V48 Who/which has the greatest sympathy to promote the cause of the backward communities?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Political parties	260	6.4	13.2	143	47.7	49.0
Maoist	400	9.8	20.3	73	24.3	25.0
Regional parties	189	4.6	9.6	3	1.0	1.0
Ethnic organization	290	7.1	14.7	31	10.3	10.6
NGO/Civil society	138	3.4	7.0	15	5.0	5.1
Government	203	5.0	10.3	4	1.3	1.4
Others	236	5.8	12.0	14	4.7	4.8
No one	252	6.2	12.8	9	3.0	3.1
Total	1968	48.1	100.0	292	97.3	100.0
NO/D.K	1033	25.3		8	2.7	
NA	1088	26.6				
Total	2121	51.9				

V49 Which one is the best mean to fulfill the backward communities' demand?

	Citizens			Members of parliament		
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Negotiation with the government	2,656	65.0	94.1	233	77.7	78.2
Protest/rally	99	2.4	3.5	28	9.3	9.4
Violence	13	0.3	0.5	1	0.3	0.3
All of the above*	0	0.0	0.0	7	2.3	2.3
Negotiation & Protest/rally*	0	0.0	0.0	7	2.3	2.3
Other	56	1.4	2.0	22	7.3	7.4
Total	2,824	69.1	100.0	298	99.3	100.0
N.O./D.K.	206	5.0		0	0.0	
NA	1,059	25.9		2	0.7	
Total	1,265	30.9		300	100.0	
Total Respondents	4,089	100.0		300	100.0	

About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance—International IDEA—is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. Its objective is to strengthen democratic institutions and processes.

What does International IDEA do?

International IDEA acts as a catalyst for democracy building by providing knowledge resources and policy proposals or by supporting democratic reforms in response to specific national requests. It works together with policy makers, governments, UN agencies and regional organizations engaged in the field of democracy building.

International IDEA provides:

- assistance with democratic reforms in response to specific national requests;
- knowledge resources, in the form of handbooks, databases, websites and expert networks; and
- policy proposals to provoke debate and action on democracy issues.

Areas of work

International IDEA's key areas of expertise are:

- *Electoral processes.* The design and management of elections has a strong impact on the wider political system. International IDEA seeks to ensure the professional management and independence of elections, the best design of electoral systems, and public confidence in the electoral process.
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knowledge and makes policy proposals for constitution building that is genuinely nationally owned, sensitive to gender and conflict-prevention dimensions, and responds effectively to national priorities.

- *Democracy and gender.* If democracies are to be truly representative, then women—who make up over half of the world's population—must be able to participate on equal terms with men. International IDEA develops comparative analyses and tools to advance the participation and representation of women in political life.
- *Democracy assessments.* Democratization needs to be nationally driven. The *State of Democracy methodology* developed by International IDEA allows people to assess their own democracy instead of relying on externally produced indicators or rankings of democracies.

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Which are International IDEA's member states?

International IDEA's member states are all democracies and provide both political and financial support to the work of the institute. They are: Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ghana, India, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. Japan has observer status.

About International IDEA's Nepal Office

International IDEA had started working in Nepal long before it established its Nepal office in 2006. In 1997, International IDEA assessed the challenges Nepal's nascent democracy faced; in 2004, it started dialogues on constitutional processes. Presently, as part of its project 'Supporting Constitution Building Process in Nepal', International IDEA has been providing training and resource materials to the people of Nepal and conducting political dialogues with national partners to help prepare them for a peaceful, inclusive and participatory constitution building process.

About DSA/Nepal

About the Authors

DSA/Nepal Chapter

Democracy in South Asia/Nepal Chapter has been in existence ever since it was involved, as a regional partner, in conducting a comprehensive study on the *State of Democracy in South Asia*, which was undertaken in 2004. The regional project was coordinated by the Lokniti wing of the Centre for Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi, India. This volume is a continuation of, and a part of, the regional network's collective effort and commitment to conduct periodical assessments of the state of democracy of a particular country or of all the countries in South Asia.

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