



IntegriTAS Threat Assessment System: Factors Guide





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Introduction



Organized crime has become a security and governance threat to most countries in the world. Globalization has contributed to increasing criminal networks' capacity, and criminal networks take advantage of an increasingly globalized world to expand their business and maximize profits (UNODC 2010). Their enlarged power allows these networks to affect societal structures and disrupt democratic political processes by systematically exploiting institutional weakness, affecting the rule of law and distorting transparency in decision-making (Sung 2004; Van Dijk 2007; MacCoun and Reuter 2001; Bailey and Godson 2000; Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009; Lupsha 1996; Cockayne and Pfister 2008: 18).

Understanding the democratic vulnerabilities and criminal activities that contribute to forging and maintaining these linkages in a given context therefore enables governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) to mobilize resources and develop strategies to prevent and mitigate them more effectively. The IntegriTAS Threat Assessment System helps them do so by contextualizing, mapping and monitoring (a) *organized crime activities* and (b) *democratic vulnerabilities* within a specific phase of the electoral cycle. These two dimensions serve as the starting point for the user to identify relevant threat factors and geographically reference them.

This Guide provides information about the methodology used to identify factors and indicators, as well as data collection and analysis techniques. It also provides basic definitions of 21 factors, describes the methodology used to identify them and related indicators of democratic vulnerabilities and criminal activities. The list of factors is not exhaustive, rather an indication of some enablers that typically contribute to the nexus between organized crime and politics. Users can choose those that are relevant to their situation, and complement the list with other factors more specific to their context. For each factor, this Guide includes: (a) its definition and the context in which it can contribute to the crime–politics nexus; (b) two empirical cases to illustrate how the factor contributes to those relations, compiling examples from different countries and regions; and (c) a list of example indicators. Annex A provides a more comprehensive list of potential indicators that can be used to observe each factor.

Once users have collected data on indicators, they can use the IntegriTAS software to build a database and map and generate trend charts. The mapping function allows users to locate the indicators or threat factors throughout the territory using geo-referencing information. It also produces a simple visualization of the threat level by colouring the maps accordingly. Trend charts allow users to monitor the threat factors over time. Both methods are useful, as they simplify and clarify dense quantitative information.



About this Guide

This Guide provides basic definitions of the threat factors used in IntegriTAS and includes an Annex which provides a comprehensive list of potential indicators that can be used to observe each factor. It complements two other Guides: the *IntegriTAS Process Guide* and the *IntegriTAS Prevention and Mitigation Guide*. The IntegriTAS software is also accompanied by a User Manual.

Access the IntegriTAS software and supporting documentation: <<https://www.idea.int/integritas>>.

2. Methodology

Identifying relevant factors and indicators

IntegriTAS uses two analytical dimensions to identify threats: organized crime activities and democratic vulnerabilities (see Table 2.1). This structure draws on a political economy analysis that considers the relevant stakeholders (Molenaar and Smits 2016: 4) and looks at the incentives driving the crime–politics nexus from two perspectives: *political actors* and *organized crime networks* as ‘suppliers’ and ‘recipients’ of benefits to and from each other. The IntegriTAS system therefore focuses on the *democratic vulnerabilities* that create opportunities to provide and receive benefits, as well as the main *organized crime networks* involved in providing and receiving those benefits. Accordingly, the assessment focuses on the enabling factors behind the crime–politics nexus, instead of its benefits or impact.

Table 2.1. Dimensions of the virtual library

Organized crime	Democratic vulnerabilities
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Drug trafficking2. Firearms trafficking3. Human trafficking4. Contraband smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods5. Illicit trafficking in wildlife6. Illegal mining7. Systematic abuse of state resources8. Illegal waste dumping9. Cybercrime10. Protection rackets11. Money and asset laundering	<p>Foundational</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Socio-economic conditions2. Political transition processes3. Geostrategic conditions <p>Institutional</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Rule of law and access to justice2. Political parties3. Legislature4. Public administration5. Electoral system <p>Associated</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Media and civil society watchdogs2. Financial system

The system uses International IDEA’s State of Democracy (SoD) Assessment Framework to identify the most relevant democratic actors, institutions and processes that can be targeted by organized crime to distort politics (International IDEA State of Democracy Assessments, n.d.). The timing of elections is also taken into account in this analysis of vulnerabilities (International IDEA Online Electoral Cycle, n.d.).

The analytical pillars of International IDEA’s SoD Assessment Framework are used to identify factors of democratic practice that are particularly vulnerable to the presence of organized crime under a graduated system that includes foundational, institutional and



associated factors. Foundational factors refer to the wider context (e.g. socio-economic conditions), institutional factors examine the processes and actors directly and officially involved in democratic life (e.g. political parties), and associated factors include other institutions and systems that have a stake in and impact on democratic life (e.g. the financial system). Here, too, users will need to customize the factors that nurture illicit connections in their country. The factors pertaining to organized crime correspond to some of the main trafficking markets and enabling activities currently associated with organized crime as it affects democratic politics, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2015).

The indicators, listed in Annex A, provide markers to identify the existence of each factor (Sustainable Measures 1998). As with the factors themselves, users must customize the set of indicators provided by this guide according to their needs and data availability. An individual indicator usually cannot fully describe the impact of the factor. A robust set of indicators therefore more accurately assesses the threat level. The indicators can be direct or proxied (UNICEF n.d.). While direct indicators are the most desirable, as they target the specific signs or symptoms associated with the factors, for the organized crime dimension, proxy indicators provide useful avenues for users to circumvent the data limitations related to criminal activities that, by nature, are obscure (Andreas and Greenhill 2010; Rawlinson 2007; van Steden et al. 2013: 47–62). Useful criteria to select factors include: relevance, reliability, simplicity and specificity (GI 2015).

Data collection and analysis

Collecting and analysing data on organized crime and democracy entail inherent challenges that IntegriTAS users should be aware of when choosing the factors and indicators to populate the system, and when managing those risks to prevent any unintended side effects when conducting the assessment.

First, both organized criminal activities and political corruption are, by nature, secretive and hidden. Therefore, researchers' attention should be focused on increasing understanding of the phenomenon and identifying the enabling mechanisms for organized crime's influence on politics. That would help users focus their analysis on the data sources that provide proxy indicators about the phenomenon when direct indicators may not accurately reflect the problem.

Second, data may be insufficient in contexts of poor infrastructure—usually in fragile and conflict-affected states—due to a lack of record keeping in key areas of the state and public administration. To supplement scarce data, users may seek to acquire additional information from secondary sources such as official reports from other agencies or international organizations, intelligence notes, media articles or scholarly papers based on ethnographic research (Strazzari 2015). In addition, the user may choose to generate his or her own primary information, for example through popular or expert-perception surveys.

Third, information is not always reliable. Agencies that provide data may have a vested interest in the political nature of such data, which makes it vulnerable to manipulation, distortion, denial and exaggeration (Strazzari 2015). Where existing data may not be reliable, IntegriTAS users should widen and triangulate the sources of information, so that the data can be corroborated by various sources. This may involve interviewing additional people, including journalists, politicians, prosecutors, police officers, community or traditional leaders, religious leaders, military staff, customs and border control officials, academics, diplomats, CSOs and members of the business community. Relatively long and semi-structured interviews provide a good basis for identifying threat factors. In most cases, it is important to follow anonymity protocols in order to ensure the safety of those interviewed.



Forth, differing perceptions of what is legal and not in a society add a layer of complexity to the analysis. When a country's social order is precariously based on different sources of authority encompassing diverging values—as is the case in situations of 'post-conflict hybrid peace, in "ungoverned spaces" or peripheries where the state exerts little effective territorial control' (Strazzari 2015)—different perceptions of criminality emerge. For example, various illicit actors and structures may portray themselves in relation to the central state power wielders not as criminals but as people of order, 'providing services, agreements, dispute-resolution, alliances, cheap access to capital and labour markets, distribution channels, and a safe environment for foreign direct investment that would otherwise be . . . risky' (Strazzari 2015). To address such differing perceptions of legality, the assessment team should have a deep understanding of the local context. This team and the participants in the various stages of the assessment process, particularly the data collection phase, should combine expertise, knowledge and a point of view from different communities and backgrounds in the country to minimize local biases.

3. Factors



Organized crime

1. Drug trafficking

Drug trafficking is a global trade involving the production, manufacturing, distribution and sale of substances that are subject to drug prohibition laws (UNODC 1961; UN 1971; UN 1988: article 3.1, 3.2). Numerous networks dedicated to this activity seek a nexus with political actors to gain protection from prosecution, free movement of their products and avenues to conceal their profits, among other benefits (Soberón Garrido 1997). Given the scale of the drug trafficking business, which according to UNODC (2010) is the most profitable crime activity in the world, the corrupting capacity of these networks creates a governance threat for democratic institutions in the places they operate (Durán Martínez 2007).

Empirical cases

In **Mexico**, the forced disappearance of 43 students in the municipality of Iguala in 2014 unveiled a complicated chain of corruption all the way up to the local mayor, who had linkages to drug traffickers. This operation permeated many institutions within the state apparatus, including the police and other authorities who worked alongside (or sometimes with) gangsters (Grillo 2014).

Afghanistan currently leads the world's opium production. Profits generated from this international market and the corruption required to launder them have been associated with the weak rule of law in Afghanistan. Indeed, evidence suggests that drug traffickers have managed to occupy important positions within the government, establishing patronage networks across the country (Goodman and Sutton 2015).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- International drug conventions and protocols ratified without reservation;
- Legislation and regulations against drug trafficking-related activities (e.g. competences to drug control institutions, criminalization of minor drug offences); and
- Legislation and regulations treating substance addiction and abuse as a public health issue.

Illicit market indicators:

- Number of people arrested for or involved in serious drug trafficking offences;
- Number of seizures, volume, type and street value of narcotic drugs (e.g. cannabis, cocaine, methamphetamine); and
- Area of illicit crops cultivated and grown.

2. Firearms trafficking

The trafficking of illicit firearms involves the unauthorized ‘import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition’ across internal or state borders (UN 2001). The term ‘trafficking’ can also be used to designate the ‘intentional diversion of [firearms] from legal to illegal commerce’ without involving the movement of items across a physical border (Bricknell 2012: 1). Organized crime networks use firearms to protect their own illicit activities, and illegally traffic them to gain material and financial benefits (Carment, Prest and Yiagadeesen 2010). Evidence suggests that the ‘transfer of [Small Arms and Light Weapons] SALW from one country to another requires a network of both international traffickers and corrupt government officials’ (Haken 2011: 26). Indeed, political corruption is key to successfully conducting this trade given its implications for national security (Feinstein, Holden and Pace 2011).

Empirical cases

In **the European Union and neighbouring countries**, mafia groups have taken advantage of the loose borders between the EU and Eastern European countries to get involved in the lucrative arms trade business. Weak oversight and control mechanisms in some of these countries have facilitated the trade (Davis, Hirst and Mariani 2001: 5).

In **Peru**, politicians linked to former President Fujimori’s security chief Vladimiro Montesinos were apparently involved in a complex network of arms smuggling. While the trade is transnational by nature, corruption at the national and local levels was necessary in order to secure the transactions (Transparency International 2011: 22).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- UN Arms Trade Treaty ratified without reservations;
- Standardized licensing requirements for all exporters of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW); and
- Universal licensing requirements for SALW ownership, production and distribution.

Illegal market indicators:

- Number of people involved in firearms trafficking;
- Number of firearms registered in country and neighbouring countries; and
- Volume, value and quantity of firearms (and parts and components) seized.



3. Human trafficking

Human trafficking is usually defined as the recruitment, transportation or receipt of persons, characterized by the threat to use force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception and abuse of power, among others. This type of trafficking exploits people, including through prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (UN 2004: article 3, para. a). Political and other forms of public corruption are needed to conduct these activities. Indeed, 'human traffickers bribe law enforcement, immigration, and judicial officials in both origin and destination countries' (Haken 2011: 10).

Empirical cases

Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are the main sources of people trafficked around the world (OSCE 1999: 5). Corruption is the most important element in facilitating this crime. Police officers in particular have been accused of ignoring the problem or even being actively engaged in exploiting women (UNODC 2011: 11), but the chain goes all the way up to politicians (UNODC 2011: 7–8). Indeed, in South Eastern Europe 'institutional corruption is a catalyst for producing an environment where transnational criminality can flourish. Without the help provided by corrupt law enforcement, consular officials, diplomats, and lawyers the traffic in human beings in the region would virtually cease to exist' (Ovidia Vreja 2005: 55).

In **Bangladesh**, high-level cases have unveiled the support provided by public officials and politicians to human trafficking networks. Most prominently, between 2004 and 2006 eight officials were prosecuted for crimes related to this trade (Holmes 2009: 88).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- International protocols and treaties ratified without reservations (e.g. Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants to the UNTOC Convention and ILO Protocols);
- Bilateral and multilateral partnerships or cooperative frameworks on human trafficking (including migrant recruitment integrity schemes and prevention of sex trafficking); and
- Legislation tackling human trafficking (including establishing minimum labour standards, setting a minimum working age and stipulating age-appropriate limits on hours worked).

Illegal market indicators:

- Number of cases investigated related to human trafficking (including involving labour and recruitment agencies and adoption agencies);
- Number of victims involved in cases of human trafficking; and
- Number of detected incidents of passport fraud facilitated by people smugglers.

4. Contraband smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods

While contraband smuggling generally refers to goods that have been imported or exported illegally, counterfeit goods are those that have been produced, distributed and sold under a

false trademark (INTA 2015). In addition to the economic harm associated with this trade, more pervasive side effects include systematic health hazards posed by counterfeit medicines. Corruption of politicians and public officials ranks high among the driving forces behind these activities (IRACM 2015).

Empirical cases

Nigeria led the world's counterfeit drug market until 2001, a situation facilitated by the systemic corruption of public officials and politicians by counterfeiters. These relations allowed these networks to target manufacturers and gain access to the medicines market. However, in a drastic turn of events, the country began leading global efforts to fight counterfeit drugs, with fighting corruption as one of the main actions taken in this regard (Raufu 2006).

In **the EU and neighbouring Eastern European countries**, the economic exchange between border regions—particularly in small towns—has sustained a market controlled by cigarette traffickers facilitated by corrupt customs authorities with ties to local politicians (Center for the Study of Democracy 2010: 1–17; Villaveces-Izquierdo and Uribe Burcher 2013).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Relevant international protocols ratified without reservation (e.g. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; international standards to measure food fraud);
- Legislation and policies that tackle counterfeiting and enact requirements for the manufacture, export, import, distribution, supply and sale of products (e.g. import procedures that include designating ports of entry for imported goods; standard operating procedures and guidelines for inspectors' licences; and authorized premises); and
- Safeguards by professional associations and multi-sectorial strategies to protect the integrity of products and product flows.

Illegal market indicators:

- Volume of smuggled and counterfeit goods on the market;
- Value placed on smuggled and counterfeit products and the price difference between original and counterfeit products; and
- Entry or exit centres for illegal smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods.

5. Illicit trafficking in wildlife

Wildlife trafficking involves the illegal trade of animals and plants, either within a country's borders or internationally (Traffic 2015). The poaching of tigers and elephants and illegal timber trade in particular are lucrative businesses that threaten environmental sustainability in the countries where the animals and plants are exploited (WWF 2015). Corruption, chiefly among high-level public officials and politicians, is one of the main driving forces behind this trade as it often involves international transactions. For example, corruption facilitates licences and certificates, reduced oversight of patrol and customs officers, impunity by diverting investigations conducted by the police and prosecutors, and manipulation of court decisions, as well as easy routes for money laundering (Martini 2013).



Empirical cases

In much of **East Africa**, particularly **Uganda**, **Congo** and **Sudan**, armed forces have been accused of involvement in the illegal ivory trade, becoming part of the chain all the way up to political elites who have benefited from the exploitation of elephants in those countries (Lawson and Vines 2014: 9; Corruption Watch 2015).

In **East Asia and the Pacific**, particularly **Solomon Islands**, high-level corruption ‘plays a central role in the supply of illegal wood-based products’ (UNODC 2013: viii). These networks require political support, which in the Solomon Islands involves cabinet ministers, to avoid law enforcement efforts to identify illicit timber that is often concealed among otherwise licit timber cargo. This corruptive trickle-down effect reaches primarily the border controls by land, sea and air, as well as authorities dealing with the documentation required to export legal timber (UNODC 2013: 88, 92).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. UNTOC Protocol on Environmental and Wildlife Crimes and UN Convention on Trade in Endangered Species);
- International partnerships for common enforcement of applicable laws, conservation and management measures; and
- Legislation, regulations and policies against trafficking in wildlife (e.g. ‘know-your-customer’ regulations, and sanctions for conducting illegal trade in wildlife, such as fish products).

Illegal market indicators:

- Value and type of seized wildlife intended for trafficking;
- Number of arrests for trafficking in wildlife; and
- Percent of population dependent on income from trafficking in wildlife.

6. Illegal mining

Illegal mining is the ‘absence of land rights, mining license, exploration or mineral transportation permit or of any document that could legitimate the on-going operations’ (Dozolme 2015). As the international price of minerals continues to increase, this crime has become an environmental hazard, often involving deforestation and the use of mercury—which is used in artisanal and small-scale gold mining (Hayman 2013). Corruption of state officials facilitates this business. For example, public officials share information regarding upcoming law enforcement operations to help illegal miners avoid prosecution (Uribe Burcher 2014: 151–54).

Empirical cases

In **India**, numerous scandals have revealed the extent to which this activity is conducted with the apparent active support of government officials. The government decision to terminate the investigation of former congress chief ministers accused of involvement in illegal mining and corruption raised concerns about apparent political involvement in these schemes (*The Guardian* 2013).

In **Indonesia**, the world's leading exporter of tin, reports of massive illegal mining described how corruption was used to maintain this lucrative international network all the way to Singapore and Malaysia. Indeed, the police have been accused of colluding with illicit miners to halt investigations (Rusmana and Sadmoko 2015).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No. 182 1999; Minamata Convention on Mercury 2013);
- Relevant legislation and regulations in the mining sector combatting illegal mining (e.g. 'know-your-customer' regulations and permit schemes); and
- Safeguards by professional associations, alliances and multi-sectoral strategies to protect the integrity of products and product flows (e.g. Fairmined trade Certification; CASM Mineral Certification; and Kimberley Process certificates).

Illegal market indicators:

- Value of illegal mining production;
- Number of people charged with illegal mining; and
- Number of illegal mines and quarries.

7. Systematic abuse of state resources

State resources should benefit all citizens. However, authorities who manage these resources can abuse their power for their own benefit. When conducted in an organized and systemic way, such abuse can become an organized criminal enterprise on its own (Reitano and Hunter 2016). The involvement of politicians and state officials is an intrinsic element of these crimes, which include *procurement misuse*, *subsidy fraud schemes* and *trade-related fraud*. *Procurement misuse* is one of the most common avenues for public officials to abuse their power, pocketing resources when managing public contracts, often through front people such as relatives or associates (Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda 2013). In *subsidy fraud schemes*, complex (often transnational) criminal networks of public officials and private businesses target large-scale government subsidies to extractive industries (Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016). Likewise, *trade-related fraud*, particularly customs fraud, value-added tax (VAT) schemes and abuse of CO₂ trade benefits, are common corruption rackets from within the public administration. Traders often cooperate with customs officials to mislabel traded goods to pay lower customs duties—or even to get taxes back as part of an export promotion scheme. Abusing the VAT system when dealing with transnational trade also creates opportunities for quick criminal gains. For example, 'carousel fraud' involves importing VAT-free goods but selling them with VAT added; the company pockets the VAT charged and disappears (RTvat 2013). In addition, Interpol recognizes carbon-trading crime as an emerging market vulnerable to large-scale criminal abuse through, for example, manipulating measurements to fraudulently claim additional carbon credits and sell carbon credits that either do not exist or belong to someone else (Interpol 2013).

Empirical cases

The Government in **Kenya** subsidized exports of gold in the 1990s, paying exporters in Kenyan shillings 35 per cent over their foreign currency earnings. A corrupt system,



supposedly comprising many government officials, profited as a result, costing the country the equivalent of more than 10 per cent of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) (BBC 2004a, 2004b; Wallis and White 2003).

In **India**, the customs superintendent was apparently involved in a system of fraudulent claims for export incentives. The network procured fake Import Export Code licences and the associated INR 250 million reimbursement—an incentive offered to boost exports in which taxes and duties are repaid. The goods meant for export were labelled as garments but were found to be rags. Their value was then apparently inflated to claim higher drawback (Singh 2009).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. UN Convention against Corruption; OECD Anti-Bribery Convention);
- Regional and international agreements and frameworks to regulate government procurement (e.g. WTO Government Procurement Agreement, NAFTA); and
- Clear, open regulations and procedures in public procurement (e.g. transparency laws, controlled tendering procedures, public notice principles, and internal and external auditing).

Illegal market indicators:

- Revenue loss due to misuse of public resources (e.g. as a result of embezzlement, cost overruns, delays in implementation, and loss of effectiveness);
- Number of reported allegations of misuse of administrative resources by an administration; and
- The extent to which third-party actors (e.g. foundations, think tanks, unions, political action committees) publicly report itemized contributions received and expenditures to an oversight authority.

8. Illegal waste dumping

This crime involves depositing waste larger than litter against regulations, creating hazardous consequences for the environment, particularly when it involves toxic substances (EIA 2008). Since this crime mostly exploits weak enforcement of environmental regulations, public sector corruption is needed to facilitate it, especially for licensing disposal facilities, issuing export notifications and authorizing exports (Martini 2012).

Empirical cases

In **Italy**, 'Ndrangheta, a crime network operating in the southern region of Calabria, has been involved in waste dumping—including radioactive—off the Italian coast, as well as through and in Somalia, Romania and other countries. These operations involved government officials and politicians in Italy and other countries affected by the scheme (Squires 2009).

In **Northern Ireland**, fuel laundering—whereby marker dyes are removed from red and green diesel for further selling, producing waste as a result—is increasingly problematic. The waste is typically disposed of in industrial bulk containers. Criminals, supported by corrupt officials, are involved in illegal waste collection and the provision of skips for illegal

landfilling and burning of the waste. They usually charge the legal going rate to collect and transport waste, and then dispose of it illegally and pocket the profits (*The Irish Times* 2015; *Belfast Telegraph* 2015).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment; and the London Convention Protocol);
- Legislation and regulations that address waste disposal, including the notification of movement document forms of the Basel Convention in the control of transboundary movement of waste; and
- Cross-border partnerships (e.g. to patrol on land and sea as a deterrent to illegal dumping, to make policies and measures compatible).

Illegal market indicators:

- Volume of illicit waste dumped;
- Number of people and companies investigated for illicit waste dumping; and
- Number of cases of hospital or emergency treatment for poisoning by industrial chemicals or other illnesses directly caused by exposure to waste products.

9. Cybercrime

A fast-expanding activity, cybercrime encompasses various forms of crime committed over electronic communications, networks and information systems (Edelbacher, Kratcoski and Dobovsek 2015: 27). These can take many forms, including identity fraud—such as credit card detail theft—technical and commercial espionage, and extortion. Organized crime may be involved in cybercrime either as a criminal objective in itself, or as a means to facilitate other crimes (Eurojust 2014). According to the 2015 *Global Risks* report (World Economic Forum 2015), cyber attacks ‘remain among the most likely high-impact risks’, ranking tenth in the index. Governments and political forces increasingly use politically motivated hacking to advance their interests, and national intelligence agencies are increasingly involved in a grey area of cooperation with international hackers, some of whom are involved in crime networks (Grabosky 2009).

Empirical cases

In **South Africa**, corruption has been linked to the expansion of cybercrimes, which has seriously weakened the security infrastructure as organized crime networks increasingly use these weapons. ‘Corruption-fuelled cyber-crime has resulted in insiders giving cyber criminals access to critical information, as these insiders can easily bypass the security systems that organizations would have put in place’ (Corruption Watch 2014).

In **Morocco**, public officials were accused of creating a network to systematically spy on journalists. One scandal revealed what appeared to be spyware used against a citizen media project critical of the government that originated in the midst of the 2011 Arab Uprisings. The officials apparently implanted a so-called Trojan to ‘take screenshots, intercept email, record Skype chats, and covertly capture data using a computer’s microphone and webcam, all while bypassing virus detection’ (Gallagher 2012; OCCRP 2015).



Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Relevant international and regional treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 2001; ECOWAS Draft Directive 2009);
- Legislation and regulations addressing cybercrime (e.g. sanctions and prosecution mechanisms for crimes, and protection of citizens); and
- Agreements for harmonization cooperation on cybercrime legislation.

Illegal market indicators:

- Number of reported cyberattacks (e.g. distributed denial of service (DDoS), phishing, hacking, fraud, malware, identity theft and botnets);
- Number of reported data breaches (i.e. a type of cyberattack entailing the viewing, stealing and use of information by unauthorized third parties); and
- Level of cyber security (e.g. ranking on the IBM Cyber Security Intelligence Index).

10. Protection rackets

The archetypical activity of organized crime, protection rackets are a form of extortion, most commonly found in gang-controlled urban environments. These rackets involve collecting payment for protection from other criminal groups, and often from the group offering the protection (Volkov 2002: 140). The nexus between protection rackets and the state (particularly the police) is probably the most researched form of organized crime, as protection rackets resemble the structure and competences of the state and its most basic service: protection. Indeed, the police can sometimes create alternative power structures or para-states, with a tacit understanding that citizens—often local businesses—need to pay the authorities to receive special protection (Hirschfeld 2015: 14).

Empirical cases

In **Indonesia**, former President Suharto—in office from 1967 to 1998—was accused of using violence and coercion to maintain order, often blurring the lines between the state and criminality. In regions where its military succeeded in controlling the monopoly on violence, constantly invoking imminent threats and distributing patronage to brokers and clientele apparently allowed him to effectively create a protection racket. In regions where his regime failed to concentrate power, ‘state agencies were able to determine, albeit incompletely, who else could use force and in what circumstances, developing a complex system of subcontracted and state-sanctioned violence and coercion’ (Wilson 2015: 37).

Police authorities on the Gold Coast in **Australia** have been accused by the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission of turning a blind eye to an organized crime protection racket that allegedly generated over AUD 200 million (Willacy and Solomons 2015).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- International organized crime conventions and protocols ratified without reservation (e.g. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters);

- National legislation and regulations that address extortion, racketeering or membership in a criminal organization as an offence (e.g. sanctions and prosecution mechanisms; protection of citizens, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in the USA and national equivalents); and
- Existing protection mechanisms for informers and witnesses.

Illegal market indicators:

- Number of investigation cases or arrests referring to racketeering, extortion or membership in a criminal organization;
- Number of extortion and racketeering cases reported; and
- Value of extortion from local businesses.

11. Money and asset laundering

This crime enables criminal networks to conceal the illegal origins of money and assets, thus integrating them into the legal economy, often using shell companies and brokers (Interpol 2015) and abusing loopholes and vulnerabilities in the international finance system. Countries with high levels of corruption and organized crime activities face a higher risk of money laundering (FATF 2012: 63). Politicians and politically exposed persons (PEPs)—individuals with prominent public functions, such as heads of state or government, senior politicians, judicial or military officials, and important political party officials (FATF 2012: 112–13)—pose a particular risk. They have the capacity to circumvent traditional law enforcement and anti-corruption instruments targeting money laundering (FATF 2013: 3).

Empirical cases

In **Angola**, a case involving Pierre Falcone, a well-known illegal arms dealer with close connections to former Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, was highlighted as an example of poor PEP controls that allowed proceeds from crime to be laundered in the USA. Falcone repeatedly abused his status and connections with the government to avoid oversight, holding numerous accounts at Bank of America to launder money through shell company accounts. He later moved the money across a global network of accounts (United States Senate 2010: 243).

In the **United Kingdom**, various investigations disclosed how banks based in London have been systematically used to launder the proceeds of crime and corruption. In 2008, for example, a student living in London managed to open an account in a London-based bank with around GBP 1 million from a foreign politician and businessman who was related to him. The politician faced charges of ‘large-scale misappropriation of state funds and a court order freezing his assets worldwide’, yet ‘there was no indication... that the bank had identified this relevant adverse information and no evidence of annual reviews being conducted on this account’ (LexisNexis 2011: 10).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Treaties and protocols ratified without reservation on anti-money and asset laundering, particularly related to PEPs (e.g. International Terrorism Finance Convention, international financial transparency conventions); and

- Anti-money laundering, asset seizure and illicit financial flows legislation, regulation and protocols, particularly those targeting PEPs (e.g. license and monitoring requirements for shell companies' service providers).

Illegal market indicators:

- Volume and sources of money and assets laundered;
- Number of completed or active stolen asset recovery cases; and
- Amount of stolen assets recovered as a percentage of estimated illicit flows.

Democratic vulnerabilities: Foundational

1. Socio-economic conditions

Socio-economic conditions include the wealth of a country, the distribution of national income and how public revenues are invested in the overall structure of the state, fundamentally shaping the population's quality of life (Buscaglia and Dijk 2003: 14). Poverty and unemployment, as well as social and economic inequalities, create vulnerabilities across the sectors of the population affected by these conditions, including becoming easy targets for human traffickers or people smugglers. These conditions, and the absence of legal alternatives, create incentives for individuals to engage in criminal activities (Kruijt 2011; World Bank 2011; Batmanglich and Høyer 2013; Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2015). Moreover, when the state fails to provide essential services—due to inefficiency or corruption—poor communities become further marginalized, creating opportunities for organized crime to supply services, which increases tolerance of criminal networks (and sometimes even support) within the local population (Buscaglia and Dijk 2003; Felbab-Brown 2012), and ultimately makes it easier for organized crime to forge alliances with political actors (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014).

Empirical cases

In **Brazil**, the relationship between drug traffickers and favela residents exposes the complexities in the relationship between criminals and local marginalized populations, fuelled by the state's inability to provide basic services. In these favelas 'drug factions have become a recognized socio-political force at the favela level. Their power has been accepted by community populations due to fear and a lack of alternatives. Faction dominance has been based on historically existent structures of social control and protection that were developed into a system of "forced reciprocity" maintained by a double tactic employed by drug traffickers: supportive coercion and repressive violence' (Dowdney 2003: 52).

In **Guatemala**, the crime network controlled by Juan Ortiz (alias 'Chamalé') in the Malacatán municipality—on the border with Mexico—took advantage of the continued absence of state structures to smuggle gasoline, food and other goods, as well as people, drugs and arms to and from Mexico. This alternative power structure positioned the network as the de facto state in the area, to the extent that in the aftermath of natural disasters, Ortiz' network often provided early relief to the population. In turn, the criminal gang enjoyed the collaboration of the local population to protect, for example, their illegal airports. These local factors, among other conditions, have made it easier for these criminals to build strategic alliances with political actors as these illicit activities become normalized and social controls are lax (Dardón and Calderón 2014: 211–21).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- International conventions on socio-economic rights and protocols ratified without reservation (e.g. 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; 1975 UN General Assembly Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; and 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum); and
- Legislation and regulations promoting, restricting or limiting the political participation of minority and marginalized groups (e.g. ethnic and religious minorities, women migrants and other disadvantaged groups).

Performance indicators:

- Minority and marginalized groups:
 - Number of people belonging to an ethnic, religious or other minority group;
 - The extent to which the state grants and protects freedoms evenly across social groups; and
 - Number of people within ethnic, religious and other minority or marginalized groups that have faced restrictions on political participation (e.g. percentage of women in politics—legislative bodies, political parties and elected positions in the administration).
- Economic inequality:
 - Number of people with and without access to minimum living conditions (e.g. access to land or other means of livelihood, housing, employment and minimum wage);
 - Percentage of the population living under the poverty line; and
 - Level of inequality of income or wealth—Gini coefficient.

2. Political transition processes

A fundamental shift in a country's power dynamics, for example due to an ongoing conflict; peace agreements; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform processes; or constitutional reforms can create tensions. When criminal networks exploit political instability, this perpetuates a negative feedback loop (Locke 2012) and allows organized crime networks, politicians and state officials to either forge alliances or reinforce them, as the power structures resulting from this changing dynamic potentially render significant territorial control and market opportunities for these networks (Anderson 1997: 44).

Empirical cases

In **Sierra Leone**, drug trafficking rings took advantage of the country's instability and challenges in controlling its airspace and coastline during and after the 1991–2002 civil war to collude with high-level government officials and secure trading routes. Former Minister of Transportation Ibrahim Kemoh Sesay and his brother Ahmed were apparently involved in transporting 703 kg of cocaine from Venezuela in an airplane with fake Red Cross symbols.



Also, the campaign of former President Joseph Momoh apparently accepted funds from drug trafficking networks (Aning 2010: 6).

The north of **Mali** has experienced great instability fuelled by the separatist ambitions of the Tuaregs, in addition to widespread poverty and marginalization for several decades. This has produced systemic corruption at all levels, fostering a myriad of illicit activities with the direct involvement of state officials (Reitano and Shaw 2015: v).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Constitutional mechanisms to transfer power between governments in an orderly fashion, to provide for checks and balances between the three branches of power, to reform the constitution, and to grant foreign powers and organizations with the capacity to determine important government functions or policies;
- Constitution-building process and referendums; and
- Constitutional provisions or ad hoc regulations that provide special powers to the military (e.g. military coups or military-ruled governments).

Performance indicators:

- Level of intensity of the conflict (conflict-related deaths per 100,000 people);
- Level of implementation of DDR process (e.g. number of weapons handed in, number of combatants demobilized, number of former combatants reintegrated, budget allocated to the programmes); and
- Level of implementation of security sector reform (e.g. reform of the military, police, intelligence services, defence ministry or secretaries).

3. Geostrategic conditions

A country's location, neighbours and natural resources can facilitate crime, particularly transnational organized crime. Indeed, market globalization and a state's inability to control its borders might create opportunities for external actors to use political corruption to advance their business interests within the country (Albanese 2001). A country's borders and ports, and proximity to strategic crime routes, can facilitate illicit operations. Likewise, a country's natural resources and geography can facilitate certain types of crime. Countries with a geography that isolates communities, such as heavy forests or steep mountains, can offer protection for the production of drugs or the extraction of gold or oil. Finally, a country's language connection to other countries or regions can facilitate crime operations. For example, Latin American networks enjoy flexibility given the region's common language. Similarly, diaspora communities involved in crime can use language connections with their home countries to facilitate their businesses, while language barriers in their host countries help them avoid law enforcement operations.

Empirical cases

Timber and logging in **the Amazon** are some of the key drivers of deforestation in the region, 60–80 per cent of which is believed to be illegal. Criminals avoid law enforcement because of the remoteness of the logging locations and the involvement of corrupt authorities (Greenpeace 2005).

In **Benin**, women are trafficked ‘to Belgium, France and Germany, predominantly for the purpose of sexual exploitation’ (UNODC 2006: 11). Relations between traffickers in Benin with diaspora communities in Europe facilitate the trade. Also, corruption among government officials in **West Africa**, particularly within criminal justice agencies, is the key ingredient enabling this crime. State officials are believed to be involved during the transportation and exploitation stages in the origin, transit and destination countries, for example by facilitating false documents and laundering money (UNODC 2006: 16, 24, 27, 57).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Constitutional provisions providing the independence and cooperation of the country in relation to foreign actors and countries, beyond market economies;
- Cooperative border control strategies; and
- Harmonization of legislative standards in regards to criminal activities among border countries.

Performance indicators:

- Regional dynamics:
 - Bordering countries and territories that are producers or manufacturers, or origin or destination countries, of illicit goods and trafficked people and animals, or that are the main countries of origin or citizenship of organized crime groups’ members—per illicit activity;
 - Typical means of transportation used to traffic illicit goods, people and wildlife (e.g. number of seizures of illicit goods smuggled by car or truck, boat or airplane); and
 - Borders and ports most commonly used to traffic illicit goods, people and wildlife.
- Geographical vulnerabilities:
 - Level of state control of major trafficking centres, including ports (e.g. number of trafficking centres visited and inspected by competent authorities, frequency of such visits);
 - Number of natural resources and infrastructure key for the production, distribution and selling of trafficked goods, people and wildlife (e.g. volume of available minerals, biodiversity, important ports, extent of border areas and isolated communities); and
 - Extent of linguistic and ethnic connections to community along important trafficking routes and diaspora communities.

Democratic vulnerabilities: Institutional

1. Rule of law and access to justice

According to the principles of rule of law, the state adheres to the law, governs through the law and ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, providing efficient and impartial



justice and safeguarding human rights (Bleiker and Krupanski 2012). Weakness in the rule of law system therefore erodes institutional accountability mechanisms and makes law enforcement vulnerable to political interests. Two systems are central to the concept of the rule of law: the judiciary and the security sector. The *judiciary* comprises the system of courts and tribunals at different levels, mixed-control agencies and prisons, as well as other institutions responsible for interpreting the law, resolving legal disputes, and determining the legality of legislative or executive actions (Calhoun 2002). Customary and traditional institutions that adjudicate justice may also be part of this system. The *security sector* consists of institutions through which the state provides public safety and state security, including the armed forces and the police, which are responsible for enforcing the law and preventing crime.

When the rule of law is weak in a country, there is little to deter public officials from engaging with organized crime, as the effectiveness of the law is compromised (Kruijt 2011; Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014). Corruption and the reduced independence of the judiciary—which can take many forms, such as the de facto sale of favourable decisions by courts, selective or false investigations and prosecutions, and the abuse of substantive judicial discretion (Karklins 2005; Sung 2004)—are believed to be the most important predictors of the extent of organized crime influence in a territory (van Dijk 2007). Also, regarding the *security sector*, linkages with the police often provide organized crime networks with valuable information on cases under investigation (Kruijt 2011). More broadly, weak institutional mechanisms to ensure safety in a territory often allow organized crime to fill the vacuum by providing their own protection rackets (Kruijt 2011).

Empirical cases

In **Mexico**, organized crime networks' involvement in some judicial agencies and security forces has at times impaired the state's capacity to provide public safety and order. This has been the result of the corrupting power of drug money, as well as inadequate and uncoordinated security policies focusing on military operations (Kenny and Serrano 2012).

A comparative study of 59 countries, including **Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico** and **Ukraine**, analysed some of the ways in which democracy affects (and is affected by) organized crime. The study underscored how democratic avenues to fight organized crime are seriously undermined by judicial corruption (Sung 2004: 29).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- International treaties and constitutional provisions that require the state to abide by due process and fair trial by the law;
- Provisions governing the adjudication and enforcement of the law including customary law, where relevant; and
- Rules governing the appointment, tenure and operation of the judiciary (e.g. nomination of judges by the government or by an independent body).

Performance indicators:

- Level of efficiency of the judicial system (e.g. average duration of investigations and trials, number of courts, average number of cases per court, extent of rule of law in the country);

- Level of free and fair adjudication of the law (e.g. number of cases of discrimination by law enforcement and judicial authorities, number of cases of maltreatment during detentions); and
- Level of capacity of the judicial system to investigate and adjudicate cases related to organized crime per illicit activity (e.g. number of investigations, trials and convictions of high-level organized criminals) and anti-corruption (e.g. number of public officials and high-level politicians investigated, tried and convicted of corruption charges).

2. Political parties

Political parties are broadly defined as organizations amalgamating people with common political ideas to mobilize citizens by, for example, participating in elections and informing public policy (Kemp 2013: 24). There are a wide variety of party systems, from multiparty—commonly found in liberal democratic societies—to one-party systems. Weak political parties that lack sufficient internal democratic mechanisms to regulate their finances, screen their members and candidates, or maintain ethical standards throughout the electoral cycle, as well as proper external oversight, create opportunities for organized crime to collude with them (Villavices-Izquierdo and Uribe Burcher 2013). These relations flourish when parties foster political patronage systems, or when they provide spaces for violent political entrepreneurs and fixers to mobilize popular support (Briscoe and Goff 2016a).

Empirical cases

In **Argentina**, during the 1999 presidential election, money from the Juarez Mexican cartel allegedly reached the campaign of candidate Eduardo Duhalde through a complicated international scheme involving real estate investments by the cartel in Argentinian assets. It is unclear how the operation took place, but one of the main contributing factors was apparently a lack of rules limiting anonymous contributions or requiring candidates and parties to report donations (Ferreira Rubio 2013: 32).

In **Mozambique**, Mohamed Bachir Suleman, who is on the US Department of the Treasury's Foreign Drug Kingpin list for alleged drug operations in Europe, is believed to have given millions of dollars over the years to the ruling FRELIMO party. Local investigations have failed to connect him to the drug business, further sparking allegations of political corruption to protect him from prosecution (Kavanagh 2013: 37).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Regulations providing transparency in party and candidate finance (e.g. public reporting, limits on the amount a party or candidate can spend);
- Restrictions on party or candidate financing, and corresponding sanctions (e.g. limits on amount of donations, prohibition of corporate or anonymous donations); and
- Restrictions on citizens forming political parties.

Performance indicators:

- Level of applicability of political finance regulations to subnational units;



- Extent to which competent institutions receive and investigate the financial reports of political parties or candidates, with the capacity to impose sanctions for violations; and
- Level of transparency of political support (e.g. parties' financial records are published and easily available to journalists and citizens).

3. Legislature

The legislature is responsible for drafting legislation or other regulations at the national and local levels. It is usually comprised of members elected to represent the citizens. Members of the legislature, at both the national and local levels, are usually powerful politicians with connections to law enforcement and the judiciary, making them important brokers for organized crime networks. The main benefits for organized crime of colluding with politicians are usually avoiding prosecution and law enforcement operations. Politicians' power to enact—or not—legal provisions makes them important allies for criminal networks as they hold the key to creating a lax environment for their activities (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014).

Empirical cases

In **Afghanistan** in 2005, the then-governor of Helmand, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, was prosecuted after authorities seized opium from his property. He later became a Member of Parliament, even though there was substantial evidence linking him and other state officials to the drug trade (Reuter 2013: 105).

In **Colombia**, the infamous 'para-politics' scandal that linked members of Congress to paramilitary structures involved in the cocaine business and other illicit activities unveiled how these politicians provided direct and indirect protection to these networks across the country (López Hernández 2010).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Restrictions for the legislature to pass legislation on its own, except for executive veto powers, including limiting legislative control over their own budget;
- Provisions that require external oversight of the legislature, except for ombudsman offices; and
- Provisions enabling the legislative and government agencies (e.g. comptroller general, general prosecutor, ombudsman and auditors) the capabilities to question, investigate, exercise oversight over the executive and impose sanctions.

Performance indicators:

- The extent to which competent legislative audit institutions investigate and monitor the independence, mandate and integrity, reporting obligations and expertise of the legislature, with transparent publishing of findings (e.g. incidence of fraud, malpractice, lack of transparency in expenditure, conflict of interest);
- Frequency of free and fair election of the legislature; and
- Percentage of cases in which the legislature passed legislation with non-governmental expertise (i.e. consultation).

4. Public administration

Public administration involves the government bureaucratic structure that administers the implementation of the law in a country. Three elements of public administration are important when analysing the nexus with organized crime: (a) decentralization, (b) the civil service and (c) public procurement. Coordination and political decision-making power between the different levels of public administration is shaped by the country's degree of decentralization (Bardhan 2002: 185; Rios Contreras 2012: 6), which directly affects the provision of public services. The *civil service* regulates the employment of officials in the public administration, and *public procurement* regulations provide a framework that public authorities must follow in order to conduct business. Many of the benefits that politicians provide to criminals relate to controlling these areas of public administration (Plekhanov 2003: 73–5).

Empirical cases

In **Guyana**, 'political gangs' have apparently used the state apparatus to nurture popular support by distributing posts across their informal networks of influence. Weak procurement and civil service regulations and enforcement have been identified as facilitating factors for these strong patronage linkages at the local level (Walker 2013: 199).

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, a scandal linked a powerful businessman with cocaine dealing from Panama. The scandal furthermore unveiled how he avoided a police operation by receiving confidential information leaked by some of the authorities in charge of the operation (Chêne 2008: 2).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Provisions for restricting elected representatives' ability to determine public policy on their own, except for constitutional provisions granting final approval to the legislature or court review powers;
- Restrictions of military influence over the executive; and
- Mechanisms and institutions for assuring government accountability to the electorate between elections.

Performance indicators:

- The level of public administration transparency (e.g. number of incidents or cases limiting the accessibility of government information to the public, in which secrecy laws protect executive abuse);
- Level of state capacity to recognize and respond to organized crime (e.g. percentage of budget expenditures on combating organized crime); and
- Level of government capacity to protect whistle-blowers and victims of organized crime (e.g. number of reporting and helpline services in place for identification and protection, number of programs to protect victims or whistle-blowers).

5. Electoral system

An electoral system encompasses the regulations to elect public officials. Its design can vary across countries—from majority to bipartisan systems, and even systems where candidates are



indirectly elected (ACE 2017). In parliamentary elections, political parties often have a near monopoly over candidate nominations, while in presidential elections the focus is mostly placed on candidates (ACE 2017). These processes play an important role in the capacity of organized crime to distort politics. Illicit party campaign financing, illegal voter registration, electoral slush funds, vote buying, voter intimidation and improper vote counting are some of practices observed across the electoral cycle which are often linked to organized crime groups. In the worst cases, members of organized crime syndicates have run for public office themselves (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014). Current trends, such as highly competitive and costly elections, alongside the complexities of monitoring political spending, enable the influence of organized crime on politics (Casas-Zamora 2013; Falguera, Jones and Ohman 2014).

Empirical cases

In southern **Italy**, criminal organizations have used violence, ‘from the date of nomination for political offices to the date of elections, to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to influence directly or indirectly an electoral process . . . to make sure that their preferred candidates got elected’ (Sberna 2011: 1).

In **Colombia**, the 2015 local elections were marked by accusations of influence of armed groups and mafia networks over politics. While criminal influence over politics seemed to have diminished, with violence decreasing considerably compared to previous elections, illegal armed groups still apparently used the election to control areas along trafficking routes by becoming directly involved in political blocs or by channelling funds into campaigns (Gagne 2015).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Limitations on suffrage for adults, except non-nationals, criminals and members of the armed forces;
- Restrictions for persons to present their candidacy (e.g. criminal records, membership of minority or marginalized groups); and
- Laws providing equal campaigning opportunities, including for gender, minority and marginalized group members.

Performance indicators:

- To what extent national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are elected through free and fair elections;
- Number of reported intimidation or fraud cases in the voting process; and
- Evidence of bias in the operation or personnel of the electoral commission.

Democratic vulnerabilities: Associated

1. Media and civil society watchdogs

CSOs and investigative journalists have an important role in disclosing corruption cases involving organized crime and political elites. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, the Regional Investigative Journalism Network, the Global Investigative Journalism Network, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and the

Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) continuously report on these dealings, thus hindering the capacity of illicit networks to distort politics. Indeed, there seems to be a direct relationship between the independence and capacity of the media and CSOs, and the capacity of organized crime to corrupt politicians and state officials. Unfortunately, journalists and the media are not always sufficiently widespread or capable—due to a lack of resources or intimidation—of reporting on political corruption and organized crime activities. According to the CPJ (2015), ‘journalists have been attacked while reporting on collusion between crime figures and government officials, and they have been targeted while pursuing crime or corruption stories during times of both peace and war’.

Empirical cases

In **Latvia**, the ‘media capture’ scandal unveiled a scheme whereby oligarchs with linkages to both criminal networks and high-level officials colluded to become majority shareholders of the most prominent media outlet in the country. Their apparent aim was to curb journalists’ ability to report on their corrupt dealings (Villaveces-Izquierdo and Uribe Burcher 2013: 20).

In **El Salvador**, the news site ‘El Faro’ has become a leading institution in disclosing corrupt linkages between gangs and politicians, and their journalists have been threatened as a consequence. Carlos Dada, one of its founders and the author of a report on the ‘Taxis cartel’ that revealed how that networks connected local gangs, prominent businessmen and politicians, has been constantly threatened (233 *grados* 2012).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Restrictions on freedom of expression and protest, except bans on advocacy of violence;
- Provision of freedom of information act; and
- Restrictions on forming professional organizations and trade unions.

Performance indicators:

- Number of complaints for official harassment of journalists, CSOs and peaceful protesters;
- Budget allocated to state agencies in charge of protecting journalists and CSOs; and
- Level of media ownership concentration (ratio of owners to media outlets).

2. Financial system

A country’s banks, funds, insurers and central bank, among other institutions, constitutes its financial system, which provides the platform for economic transactions and investment (IMF 2015). A weak financial system is prone to abuse by transnational criminals, further ‘eroding market integrity, quality, and competitiveness and using financial systems to move, conceal, and increase illicit funds’ (US National Security Council 2015).

Empirical cases

In the **USA**, Semion Mogilevich was accused of ‘fraud, racketeering, and money laundering . . . with involvement in a sophisticated securities fraud and money-laundering scheme, in which they allegedly used a Pennsylvania company, YBM Magnex, to defraud investors of more than [USD] \$150 million’ (US National Security Council 2015).



In **Libya**, a fragile financial system after the revolution that removed Muammar Qaddafi has fuelled organized crime activities and political corruption, particularly in the south. This region's economy is primarily based on cash-in-hand transactions that fall outside official control (Shaw and Mangan 2014).

Example indicators

Standard indicators (legal framework):

- Regulations implementing international financial standards (e.g. the IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial code);
- Existing Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU); and
- Strategy to protect digital infrastructure.

Performance indicators:

- Level of capacity of the FIU and other agencies for detecting, intercepting and investigating illicit financial flows (e.g. budget allocation, incidence of training);
- Budget allocated to protection of digital infrastructure; and
- Average number of Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism checks done on customers by banks.

Annex A. Indicators



These indicators draw on various knowledge sources of organizations working on democracy building and the fight against organized crime. They include *Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide* (Beetham et al. 2008); the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (2016); the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2015); International IDEA's Political Finance Database; Spotting the Spoilers (IPI 2012); the Money, Politics and Transparency project (Global Integrity, Sunlight Foundation and the Electoral Integrity Project 2014); the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study on firearms (UNODC 2015); the Varieties of Democracy project (2017); the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank 2017); the Global Conflict Risk Index (European Commission 2017); the Electoral Risk Management Tool (International IDEA 2017b); van Dijk (2007); Gounev and Bezlov (2010); Schneider and Williams (2013); the Quality of Governance Database (Quality of Government Institute 2017); the Financial Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network 2017); the Corruption Cases Database (StAR 2015); and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Observance of Standards and Codes Database (IMF 2015).

There are many issues related to collecting data on organized crime, given the difficulty of measuring an underground phenomenon whose profitability depends on its invisibility. Therefore, most measurements will be estimates rather than exact numbers (e.g. volume, amount, number of, value and percentage).



Organized crime

1. Drug trafficking

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Producer	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
International drug conventions and protocols ratified without reservation	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	X	X	X	X	X		
Legislation and regulations against drug trafficking-related activities (e.g. competences to drug control institutions, criminalization of minor drug offences)	National legislation	X	X	X			X	X
Legislation/regulations treating substance addiction/abuse as a public health issue	National legislation; UNODC			X			X	X
Performance indicators								
Number of people arrested for, or involved in, serious drug trafficking offences	Expert and public surveys; focus groups; police; justice ministry/secretaries; non-governmental agencies; media and watchdog organizations; UNODC; INCB; NGOs	X	X	X			X	X
Number of people arrested for minor drug trafficking offences		X	X	X			X	X
Number of seizures, volume, type and street value of narcotic drugs (e.g. cannabis, cocaine, methamphetamine)		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Area of illicit crops cultivated or grown		X	X				X	X
Number of drug abuse-related deaths	Health ministries/secretaries; public health-related organizations; hospitals; WHO; UN; police; UNODC; INCB; NGOs; media and watchdog organizations;			X			X	X
Narcotics usage rates		X					X	X
Number of people seeking treatment for drug addiction	Health ministries/secretaries; public health-related organizations; hospitals; WHO; UN			X			X	X
Number of drug abuse-related illnesses				X		X	X	X
Level of disability-adjusted life-years by drug use				X			X	X
Number of Interpol red notices issued involving drug trafficking practices	Police; justice ministries/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations; UNODC; INCB	X	X	X			X	X

2. Firearms trafficking

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Producer	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
UN Arms Trade Treaty ratified without reservations	UN	X	X	X	X			
Standardized licensing requirements for all exporters of SALW	WTO; relevant IGOs and regional bodies; national economic ministries; firearms manufacturers and industry associations	X	X	X			X	
Universal licensing requirements for SALW ownership, production and distribution	Relevant national ministries/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations; firearms manufacturers and industry associations	X	X	X			X	X
Regulations for the marking and traceability of firearms, including unique serial numbers in place		X	X	X			X	X
DDR regulation regarding the percentage of SALWs used in a conflict that must be destroyed before international observers	Agencies/organizations/ministries responsible for implementing DDR programmes	X	X	X			X	
Legislation criminalizing improper and/or neglectful storage of SALW by manufacturers and owners	National legislation	X	X	X			X	
Safety standards for government SALW stockpile management		X	X	X			X	
Performance indicators								
Number of people involved in firearms trafficking	Expert and public surveys; media and watchdog organizations; law enforcement agencies; justice ministry/secretaries	X	X	X			X	X
Number of firearms registered in country and neighbouring countries	Police; industry associations (records and surveys); media and watchdog organizations; law enforcement agencies	X	X	X			X	X
Value and volume of arms produced in the country	Economic ministry; defence ministry; industry associations (reports, surveys); media and watchdog organizations	X					X	
National expenditure on armaments (producing and/or importing)		X		X			X	
Volume, value and quantity of firearms, their parts and components seized	Law enforcement agencies; industry associations (reports, surveys); media and watchdog organizations; UNODA	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Volume and value of firearms exports and imports (disaggregated)	Economic ministry; industry association reports; media and watchdog organizations, UNODA (Global Reported Arms Trade Database)	X	X	X			X	
Number of seized firearms registered in the country in which they were seized (and in neighbouring countries)	Law enforcement agencies	X	X	X		X		
Number of people murdered or injured with non-registered weapons	National health services; police			X			X	X

3. Human trafficking

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Origin	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
International protocols and treaties ratified without reservations (e.g. Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants to the UNTOC Convention; ILO Protocols; UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and all of the Optional Protocols thereof; international protocols and protective regimes for sex workers and victims of sex trafficking; migration and border agreements facilitating safe and lawful migration for legitimate purposes)	UNODC; ILO; UN; mobility agreements; WTO	X	X	X	X	X		
Bilateral and multilateral partnerships or cooperative frameworks on human trafficking (including migrant recruitment integrity schemes and prevention of sex trafficking)	IOM; UNHCR, and national and regional reports			X	X	X		
Legislation tackling human trafficking (including establishing minimum labour standards, setting a minimum working age, stipulating age-appropriate limits on hours worked, limiting employer powers over migrant workers, entitling victims to comprehensive protection)	National legislation; media; NGO and UN investigations; international and regional reporting	X		X			X	
Performance indicators								
Number of trafficked people	Migration agency; expert surveys; focus groups; justice ministry/secretary; law enforcement agencies; IOM; UNHCR; UNODC; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations	X	X	X			X	X
Number of cases investigated involving human trafficking (including labour/recruitment agencies and adoption agencies)		X		X	X	X		
Number of people investigated for human trafficking	Justice ministry/secretary; law enforcement agencies; media and watchdog organizations	X	X	X			X	
Number of victims involved in cases of human trafficking				X			X	X
Number of detected incidents of passport fraud facilitated by people smugglers	Law enforcement agencies; migration agency; IOM; UNHCR; UNODC	X	X	X			X	X
Most common routes and origin of trafficked people		X					X	X
Most common origin of people investigated for human trafficking-related activities		X	X			X	X	X
Percentage of employers hiring illegal migrants	Business surveys			X			X	X
Percent in price and time frame between licit and illicit migration options	Law enforcement agencies; regional organizations	X					X	
Number of complaints for human trafficking	Human rights ombudsperson			X			X	X
Number of Interpol red notices issued involving human trafficking practices	Justice ministry; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations	X		X	X			

4. Contraband smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Origin	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
Relevant international protocols ratified without reservation (e.g. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; international standards to measure food fraud)	Ministry of justice and interior; UNODC; WHO	X	X	X	X	X		
Legislation and policies that tackle counterfeiting and enact requirements for the manufacture, exports, import, distribution, supply and sale of products (e.g. import procedures that include designation of ports of entry for imported goods; standard operating procedures and guidelines for inspectors' licences; authorized premises; supervision of suitably qualified persons; packets and packages requirements to track the origin of the product or if it is legally sold on the domestic market; practical tracking and tracing regime to secure distribution systems; national policy on food safety and consumer protection; policies to increase access to affordable products)	National legislation; WHO; industry associations	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Safeguards by professional associations and multi-sectorial strategies to protect the integrity of products and product flows	Industry associations; media and watchdog organizations; WHO; WTO	X	X	X			X	X
Performance indicators								
Volume of smuggled and counterfeit goods on the market	Public and expert surveys; focus groups; law enforcement agencies (arrest records); media and watchdog organizations; ministry of justice and interior; customs seizure and confiscation reports; industry associations; focus groups; WHO; Interpol	X	X	X			X	X
Value placed on smuggled and counterfeit products		X	X	X				
Price difference between original and counterfeit products				X			X	X
Number of consumers of smuggled or counterfeit products				X			X	X
Target markets for illegal smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods	Law enforcement agencies; industry associations; media and watchdog organizations	X	X		X	X	X	X
Exit centres for illegal smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods		X	X				X	X
Entry centres for illegal smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods			X	X			X	X
Quantity of constantly available stocks for essential life-saving products through licensed distributors, health professionals and aid organizations	Public surveys; stock assessments; media and watchdog organizations			X			X	X

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Origin	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Percent of wholesaler and retailer managerial posts held by suitably qualified persons (e.g. licensed pharmacists) who are responsible for procurement	Business and expert surveys; interior ministry/secretaries; industry associations			X			X	X
Volume and value of seized counterfeit goods	Interpol, justice ministry; law enforcement agencies	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Number of Interpol red notices issued in cases related to smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods		X	X	X			X	
Percent of death rates from diseases for which effective treatment exists	Public and expert surveys; health, justice and interior ministry/secretaries; law enforcement agencies (seizure and confiscation reports by customs); industry associations; focus groups; media and watchdog organizations; WHO; Interpol; hospitals			X			X	X
Percentage of import transactions in which importer has obtained relevant certificates (e.g. the WHO Certification Scheme on the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products moving in International Commerce)				X			X	
Percent of population seeking repeat treatment for diseases with treatments that are often targeted by counterfeiters (e.g. malaria)				X			X	X
Number of deaths and illnesses attributable to counterfeit products (e.g. tobacco, medicines)				X			X	X
Percentage of 'super' strains linked to the use of substandard or falsified pharmaceutical products				X			X	X
Consumer awareness of how to recognize and report counterfeit goods	Consumer surveys; media and watchdog organizations			X			X	X
Number of websites selling falsified products	LegitScript; Interpol; Europol; law enforcement agencies; media and watchdog organizations			X			X	X

5. Illicit trafficking in wildlife

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Producer	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. UNTOC Protocol on Environmental and Wildlife Crimes; UN Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES); 1982 UN Convention; 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement; 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement; 1994 WTO Establishing Agreement)	UNODC; UNEP; FAO; WTO	X	X	X	X	X	X	
International partnerships for common enforcement of applicable laws, conservation and management measures	UNEP; Interpol; FAO; regional organizations; interior ministry	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Legislation, regulations and policies against trafficking in wildlife (e.g. ‘know-your-customer’ regulations; sanctions for conducting illegal trade in wildlife, such as fish products; adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance if the country is a ‘flag State’ and the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System for fish and fisheries products; reduction in subsidies offered to companies with pending or concluded convictions for illegal trafficking in wildlife; provision of alternative livelihoods for communities and species where flora and fauna crimes are prevalent; trade-related initiatives targeting vessels engaging in illegal fishing)	Legislation; justice, environment and interior ministry/secretaries; industry associations; media and watchdog organizations; FAO; UNEP; UNODC; WTO	X	X	X			X	X
Performance indicators								
Value and type of seized wildlife intended for trafficking	Law enforcement agencies (arrest records); justice,	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Number of trafficking in wildlife-related arrests		X	X	X	X	X	X	
Percent of population dependent on income from trafficking in wildlife	environment ministries/secretaries; expert surveys; media and watchdog organizations; UNEP (CITES); NGOs; WTO; FAO (Forest Resources Assessments)	X	X	X			X	X
Volume of illegal fauna and flora products compared to overall populations/stocks	Consumer and expert surveys; law enforcement agencies (seizure reports); media and watchdog organizations; industry associations; UNEP; UNODC; Interpol; CITES; OECD, WWF; EU (TWIX)	X		X	X	X	X	
Value of illicit fauna and flora products compared to licit products		X		X	X	X	X	
Number of illicit environmental products demanded by the public				X			X	X
Number of species whose populations have suffered from illicit trafficking	IUCN Red List	X	X	X	X			
Percent of environmental activists killed and injured	Law enforcement agencies; justice ministry/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations	X		X			X	X

6. Illegal mining

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Origin	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182), 1999; Minamata Convention on Mercury, 2013)	ILO; UNEP; interior ministry; WTO	X	X	X	X	X		
Relevant legislation and regulations in the mining sector combatting illegal mining (e.g. ‘know-your-customer’ regulations; permit schemes; sanctions for conducting illegal and artisanal mining; provision of alternative livelihoods for communities and species where illegal mining is prevalent)	National legislation; justice, mining and interior ministry/secretaries; industry associations; media and watchdog organizations; ILO	X	X	X			X	
Safeguards by professional associations, alliances and multi-sectoral strategies to protect the integrity of products and product flows (e.g. Fairmined/trade Certification; CASM Mineral Certification; Kimberley Process; IFC)	Industry associations; media and watchdog organizations; Global Mining Standards and Guidelines Group (GMSG); International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM); IFC	X		X	X	X	X	
Performance indicators								
Value of illegal mining production	Mining ministry/secretaries; NGOs; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations (reports, surveys); UNEP; UNDP	X					X	X
Tax revenue (government) lost due to illegal mining activities		X					X	
Revenue lost due to illegal mining activities by the legal mining sector		X					X	
Number of illegal mines and quarries		X					X	X
Number of people charged with illegal mining	Law enforcement agencies (arrest records); expert surveys; industry associations; media and watchdog organizations; mining and environment ministry/secretaries; UNEP; NGOs	X	X	X			X	X
Land area affected by illegal mining		X					X	X
Percentage of mineral exports; exports that are illegal	Law enforcement agencies (arrest records); justice ministry/secretaries; NGOs; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations (reports, surveys); immigration offices; Frontex; WTO	X		X	X	X		
Value, volume and type of illegally extracted minerals seized	Law enforcement agencies (arrest records); justice ministry/secretaries; NGOs; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations (reports, surveys)	X	X	X			X	X
Number of illegal mining-related deaths	Hospitals; health ministry/secretaries; law enforcement; justice ministry/secretaries; NGOs	X					X	

7. Systematic abuse of state resources

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Producer	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. UN Convention against Corruption; OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; the Inter-American Convention against Corruption; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption; Convention of Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in the Commonwealth of Independent States – Art. 3(6))	UNODC; OECD; regional international organizations; interior ministry; secretaries of relevant conventions	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Regional and international agreements and frameworks to regulate government procurement (e.g. WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA); NAFTA)	WTO; regional development banks; regional organizations; interior ministry			X	X	X	X	X
Clear, open regulations and procedures in public procurement (e.g. transparency laws; controlled tendering procedures; public notice principles; internal and external auditing; red flagging)	National legislation; OECD; WTO; World Bank; watchdog organizations; Global Integrity (reports)			X	X	X	X	X
Legal mechanisms to provide protection of informers/ whistle-blowers		X	X	X			X	X
Performance indicators								
Revenue loss due to misuse of public resources (e.g. as a result of embezzlement, cost overruns, delays in implementation, loss of effectiveness)	Law enforcement agencies; expert surveys; journalists; watchdog organizations; NGOs; ombudspeople; World Bank; regional development banks			X			X	
Amount of diverted public funds	Expert surveys; journalists; watchdog organizations; NGOs; ombudspeople	X					X	X
Number of reported allegations of misuse of administrative resources by administration in office		X					X	
The extent to which, in practice, third-party actors (foundations, think tanks, unions, political action committees) report itemized contributions received and expenditures to an oversight authority and the information is made publicly available	MPT Database	X		X	X		X	X
Extent to which public sector employees and members of the executive grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements, and how often they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or state resources for personal or family use	V-Dem database	X					X	X
Number of high-level corruption cases investigated	Law enforcement agencies; justice ministries	X	X	X			X	X
Value of irregular payments in public contracts	Global Competitiveness Review (reports)	X					X	X
Extra payments bribes indicator				X			X	
Value of irregular payments in judicial decisions		X					X	

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Producer	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Pervasiveness of political corruption	V-Dem database			X			X	X
Number of high-level corruption convictions	Law enforcement agencies; justice ministries; expert surveys; journalists; watchdog organizations; NGOs	X	X	X			X	
Value of irregular payments in import/export permits	Global Competitiveness Review (reports)	X			X	X		
Level of regular payment by civil servants to political parties	Expert surveys; journalists; watchdog organizations; NGOs; EMBs	X	X	X			X	X
Number of ghost workers (individuals on government payroll but not working) in public administration	Expert surveys; audits; watchdog organizations; NGOs; ombudspeople			X			X	X
Amount of government expenditure on advertising during election campaign	Expert surveys; watchdog organizations; NGOs; industry associations (reports, surveys); EMBs	X	X				X	X
Grey/shadow economy – estimate as percentage of GDP	Friedrich Schneider, <i>The Shadow Economy</i> (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2013)	X					X	

8. Illegal waste dumping

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Origin	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
Relevant treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment; the London Convention Protocol; the 1998 Rotterdam Convention; and the Stockholm Convention)	Basel Action Network; Secretariat of the Basel Convention	X	X	X	X	X		
Legislation and regulations that address waste disposal (including the Notification of Movement document forms of the Basel Convention in the control of trans boundary movement of wastes)	Legislation; the Basel Convention Secretariat	X	X	X			X	X
Cross-border partnerships (e.g. to patrol on land and sea as a deterrent to illegal dumping, to make policies and measures compatible, and to conduct joint monitoring, control and surveillance)	Secretariat of the Basel Convention; interior ministry	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Performance indicators								
Volume of illicit waste dumped	Law enforcement agencies (arrest records, seizures); environment ministry/secretaries; industry associations; expert and public surveys; focus groups; Interpol; Basel Action Network (International Toxic Progress Report Card Ranking)	X	X	X			X	X
Value of illicit waste dumped		X	X	X			X	X
Scale of illicit waste dumped		X	X	X			X	X
Number of people and companies investigated for illicit waste dumping	Justice ministry; law enforcement agencies; environmental ministry; industry associations (insurance agencies)	X	X	X			X	X
Area (land, sea, air) affected by illicit waste dumping	Secretariat of the Basel Convention; environment ministry/secretaries; expert and public surveys; media and watchdog organizations			X			X	X
Cost difference between legal disposal methods and illicit dumping alternatives	Industry and consumer surveys; media and watchdog organizations	X					X	X
Percentage of treated wastewater	Water utilities; media and watchdog organizations			X			X	X
Number of cases of hospital/emergency treatment for poisoning by industrial chemicals or other illnesses directly caused by exposure to waste products	Hospital; health ministry/secretaries; public surveys; industry associations (insurance agencies); media and watchdog organizations			X			X	X
Number of animals affected by illicit waste dumping	Secretariat of the Basel Convention; environment ministry/secretaries; expert and public surveys; media and watchdog organizations			X			X	X

9. Cybercrime

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Origin	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
Relevant international and regional treaties and protocols ratified without reservations (e.g. Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 2001; ECOWAS Draft Directive, 2009; League of Arab States Convention, 2010; UN OP-CRC-SC, 2000; CoE Cybercrime Convention)	National legislation; interior and foreign ministries; secretaries of relevant conventions	X		X	X	X	X	
Legislation and regulations addressing cybercrime (e.g. sanctions and prosecution mechanisms for crimes; protection of citizens; extradition treaties for international cybercriminals and obtaining extra-territorial evidence; cyber security acts and programmes)	National legislation; law enforcement agencies	X		X	X	X	X	
Agreements for the harmonization cooperation on cybercrime legislation (i.e. with other countries for cooperation; multilateral instruments)	National legislation; interior and foreign ministries	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Performance indicators								
Number of reported cyberattacks (e.g. DDoS, phishing, hacking, fraud, malware, identity theft, botnets)	Law enforcement agencies; Interpol; Europol; ENISA; international watchdog organizations; technology protection agencies; industry associations (reports), consumer surveys			X			X	
Number of reported data breaches (i.e. a type of cyberattack entailing the viewing, stealing and using of information by unauthorized third parties)				X			X	
Reported annual loss (financial) from cyberattacks	Expert surveys (e.g. McAfee); Europol; Interpol; international watchdog organizations; technology protection agencies; industry associations (reports)			X	X		X	
Level of cyber security (e.g. ranking on the IBM Cyber Security Intelligence Index)	IBM; watchdog organizations; media	X			X	X	X	
Number of charges related to cyberattacks	Law enforcement agencies (arrest records); ENISA	X			X		X	
Number of unique IP addresses functioning as command and control servers for botnets	Expert surveys; Interpol; Europol; ENISA; international watchdog organizations	X			X	X		
Average number of security attacks detected per organization	Expert surveys; industry associations (reports)			X	X			X
Number of users affected by cyberattacks	Law enforcement agencies (victim reports); industry associations (consumer reports)			X	X		X	X
Amount of stolen or blocked data	Law enforcement agencies, international watchdog agencies; industry associations			X	X		X	

10. Protection rackets

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link			Geographic level			
		Origin	Transit	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators								
National legislation and regulations that address extortion, racketeering, or membership in a criminal organization as an offence (e.g. criminalization of sanctions and prosecution mechanisms, protection of citizens, such as RICO in the USA and national equivalents)	National legislation; law enforcement agencies	X		X			X	X
International organized crime conventions and protocols ratified without reservation (e.g. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; ICC Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion Bribery in International Business Transactions, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention)	National legislation; law enforcement agencies; secretaries of relevant conventions	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Existing protection mechanisms for informers and witnesses	National legislation; justice ministry; law enforcement agencies	X	X	X			X	X
Performance indicators								
Number of investigation cases referring to racketeering, extortion or membership in a criminal organization	Justice ministry; law enforcement agencies	X		X			X	X
Number of arrests for racketeering, extortion, or membership in a criminal organization	Justice ministry; law enforcement agencies; international watchdog organizations	X		X			X	X
Number of extortion and racketeering cases reported	Justice ministry; law enforcement agencies (victim reports); expert surveys	X		X			X	X
Value of extortion from local businesses	UNODC; national fraud authorities; Europol; Interpol; justice ministry; law enforcement agencies	X	X	X			X	X
Extent to which mafia-orientated racketeering and extortion imposes costs on businesses	QoG Database	X		X	X	X	X	X
Extent of corruption at national and local levels (e.g. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index)	Transparency International; World Bank; perception surveys	X		X	X	X	X	X
Number of gang-related arrests	Justice ministry; law enforcement agencies (arrest reports)	X	X	X			X	X
Number of gang-related inmates	Justice ministry; law enforcement agencies	X	X	X			X	X
Percentage of business owners reportedly contacted by a racket	Expert surveys; law enforcement (victim reports)	X					X	X

11. Money and asset laundering

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Link		Geographic level			
		Origin	Destination	International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators							
Treaties and protocols ratified without reservation on anti and asset laundering, particularly related to PEPs (e.g. International Terrorism Finance Convention, international financial transparency conventions)	UN; FATF (recommendations); Tax Justice Network	X	X	X	X		
Intergovernmental and regional partnerships to fight money laundering, particularly targeting PEPs	Regional organizations; media and watchdog organizations; law enforcement agencies; commerce and economy ministry/secretaries; FATF (reports and rankings); Egmont Group and regional associations; World Bank; WTO	X	X	X	X		
Anti-money laundering, asset seizure and illicit financial flows legislation, regulation and protocols, particularly those targeting PEPs (e.g. licence and monitoring requirements for shell companies’ service providers; civilian oversight and reporting mechanisms on money laundering and illicit financial flows; due diligence and ‘know your customer’ banking procedures)	Legislation; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations; banks; national bank regulators; ombudspeople; US Department of State INSCR; FATF (reports and rankings); Egmont Group and regional associations; World Bank; WTO	X	X			X	X
Performance indicators							
Volume of money and asset laundered	Expert surveys; bank regulators; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations; Global Financial Integrity Basel Institute on Governance (score on the AML Index; FATF (ranking); Egmont Group and Regional Money Laundering associations; World Bank (ease of doing business rankings))	X	X			X	
Sources of money and assets laundered		X	X			X	
Number of people laundering money and assets		X	X			X	
Number of completed or active stolen asset recovery cases	StAR Database	X	X	X	X	X	
Number of reports flagging large cash transactions	Banks and financial regulatory authorities; ombudspeople	X	X			X	
Number of money laundering cases investigated	Justice ministry; law enforcement agencies	X	X			X	X
Amount of stolen assets recovered as a percentage of estimated illicit flows	Law enforcement agencies; justice ministry; watchdog organizations; World Bank (Stolen Assets Recovery database); Global Financial Integrity	X	X			X	
Number of shell companies identified	Justice ministry; media and watchdog organizations	X	X	X		X	
Number of Interpol red notices issued involving money laundering practices	Justice ministry; media and watchdog organizations; industry associations	X		X	X		
Percent of cross-border cash transactions	Expert surveys; industry associations; economy ministry/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations						

Democratic vulnerabilities: Foundational

1. Socio-economic conditions

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
International conventions on socio-economic rights and protocols ratified without reservation (e.g. 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; 1975 UN General Assembly Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum)	UN Treaty collection; General Assembly resolutions; national Legislation	X	X		
Legislation and regulations promoting, restricting or limiting the political participation of minority and marginalized groups (e.g. ethnic and religious minorities, women, migrants and other disadvantaged groups). These could include constitutional provisions for inclusivity and impartiality in the procedures for amending the constitution, as well as other regulations distinguishing between partial and full citizenship; limitations on freedom of movement, expression, association and assembly; different criteria in the acquisition of citizenship between men and women; protection against discrimination connected to the right to earn a living; access to basic services (e.g. social security, sanitation and clean water) in the absence of an occupation; and prevention of forced labour or servitude	National legislation			X	X
Minority and marginalized groups: performance indicators					
Number of people belonging to an ethnic, religious or other minority	Ombudsperson's office; statistics agency; Interior ministry/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations; expert and public surveys; Human Rights Watch; UNHCHR			X	X
Number of people discriminated against because of their gender or for belonging to other minority or marginalized groups (e.g. by law enforcement and judicial authorities when investigating or adjudicating cases; by migration authorities when granting citizenship, visas or asylum compared to other applicants; and by employers)	Ombudsperson's office (complain rates); justice ministry/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations; electoral commission (election reports); law enforcement agencies (complaint reports); courts (cases and reports); expert, industry and public surveys; Human Rights Watch; UNHCHR			X	X
The extent to which state grants and protects freedoms evenly across social groups	V-Dem database, watchdog organizations, NGOs, UNDP			X	
Number of people within ethnic, religious, and other minority or marginalized group who have faced restrictions to political participation (e.g. percentage of women in politics—legislative bodies, political parties and elected positions in the administration), the extent of citizen suffrage across these groups, and the extent to which the eligibility of the head of state or government is formally restricted (by ethnicity, race, religion, language or gender)	Ombudsperson's office (complain rates); justice ministry/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations; electoral commission (election reports); expert and public surveys; political parties (reports, surveys); electoral commissions; Human Rights Watch; UNHCHR; national reporting; watchdog organizations; NGO reporting; V-Dem database			X	X

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Number of people benefiting from social measures that promote and integrate minorities and marginalized groups (e.g. number of children belonging to ethnic minorities attending schools in the mother tongue)	Education, labour and other relevant ministries; statistics agencies; ombudsperson's office; media and watchdog organizations; expert, industry and public surveys; UNHCHR; ILO; World Bank (World Development Indicators)			X	X
<i>Economic inequality: performance indicators</i>					
Number of people with/without access to minimum living conditions (e.g. access to land or other means of livelihood; housing/homelessness; employment/unemployment—minimum wage; malnourishment; enrolment/non-enrolment of children in school; literacy/illiteracy; people under the poverty line; access to social security), percentage of the population living under the poverty line	Education, labour and other relevant ministries; statistics agencies; ombudsperson's office; media and watchdog organizations; expert and public surveys; UNHCHR; UNEP; UNDP; ILO; World Bank (World Development Indicators)			X	X
Standard of living – GDP per capita	Welfare, interior and other relevant ministries/secretaries; statistics agencies; World Bank (world development indicators); watchdog organizations; public surveys			X	X
Level of inequality of income or wealth – Gini coefficient	Welfare, interior and other relevant ministries/secretaries; statistics agencies; World Bank (world development indicators); watchdog organizations; public surveys			X	X
Budget provided for social benefit programmes that provide minimum living conditions (e.g. prevention of forced child labour; protection and rehabilitation for victims of human trafficking)	Legislation and regulatory frameworks; budgets; welfare ministries/secretaries; ombudsperson's office	X	X	X	X
Number of firms/enterprises accounting for a large proportion of economic activity (degree of economic concentration)	Commerce ministry; statistics agencies; media and watchdog organizations			X	
The extent to which state resources are equally distributed in society	V-Dem database, UNHCHR, UNDP, national statistics, watchdog organizations, ombudsperson			X	X
Clout of trade unions (e.g. number of trade unions, number of people with membership in trade unions)	Statistics agencies; commerce ministry/secretaries; World Federation of Trade Unions			X	X
Level of dependency on natural resources (e.g. percentage of non-renewable minerals in exports; export ratio of agricultural vs. manufactured goods)	Statistic agencies; commerce, minerals and other relevant ministry/secretaries			X	X
Level of provision of essential services (e.g. security, sanitation, housing, water, education, health)	Welfare, interior and other relevant ministries/secretaries; statistics agencies; World Bank (World Development Indicators); watchdog organizations; public surveys			X	X
Level of commitment of private sector entities (e.g. businesses, corporations, individuals) to social responsible investment (e.g. fair labour practices, fair trade)	Commerce ministry/secretaries; industry association surveys; media and watchdog organizations	X		X	

2. Transition processes

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
Constitutional mechanisms to ensure orderly transfer power from one government to another; to provide for checks and balances between the three branches of power; to reform the constitution; and to grant foreign powers and organizations with the capacity to determine important government functions or policies	National legislation			X	
Constitution-building process and referendums				X	
Constitutional provisions or ad hoc regulations enacted providing specials powers to the military (e.g. military coups or military-ruled governments)	National legislation			X	
Performance indicators					
Level of intensity of the conflict (conflict-related deaths per 100,000 people)	Defence and interior ministry/secretaries; law enforcement agencies; Uppsala conflict database; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research; UNDPKO; UNODC; QoG Database; national statistics			X	X
Level of implementation of DDR process (e.g. number of weapons handed in; number of combatants demobilized, number of former combatants reintegrated; budget allocated to the programmes)	Ombudsperson's office; defence, justice and interior ministries/secretaries; ad hoc peace commissions; expert and public surveys; former combatants and victims' surveys; media and watchdog organizations; UNDPKO; UNDP			X	X
Level of implementation of victims' reparation process (e.g. number of displaced people returned; value of land/property recovered/compensated; number of disappeared people identified; number of symbolic measures conducted)				X	X
Level of implementation of security sector reform (e.g. reform of the military, police, intelligence services, defence ministry/secretaries)				X	X
Level of implementation of transitional justice measures (e.g. number of former combatants prosecuted and convicted; number of historical records collected)				X	
The extent of absence of violence and/or terrorism	WGI ('Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism' index); watchdog organizations; law enforcement agencies	X	X	X	
Level of inclusiveness of the constitutional reform process	Media reports; watchdog organizations			X	
Level of public confidence in the integrity of the security sector (i.e. police, military)	QoG database, perception surveys			X	X
Number of foreign troops present in the country	Media and watchdog organizations; interior and defence Ministry; UNDPKO			X	
Number of foreign peacebuilding organizations present in the country (i.e. NGOs, foundations, agencies)	Media and watchdog organizations; interior ministry	X		X	X
Percentage change of military budget	National reporting; NGOs			X	



3. Geostrategic opportunities

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
Constitutional provisions providing the independence and cooperation of the country in relation to foreign actors and countries (beyond market economies)	National legislation; UNODC; regional organizations	X	X	X	
Cooperative border control strategies		X	X	X	X
Harmonization of legislative standards in regards to criminal activities among border countries		X	X	X	
Regional dynamics: performance indicators					
Bordering countries or territories that are producers or manufacturers, or origin or destination countries, of illicit goods and trafficked people and animals, or that are the main countries of origin or citizenship of organized crime groups' members (per illicit activity)	Defence, justice and interior ministries/ secretaries; ombudsperson's office; law enforcement (seizure records); media and watchdog organizations; expert surveys; UNODC	X	X	X	X
Typical transportation means used to trafficked illicit goods, people and wildlife (e.g. number of seizures of illicit goods smuggled by car or truck, boat, airplane)	Defence, justice and interior ministries/ secretaries; ombudsperson's office; law enforcement (seizure records); media and watchdog organizations; expert surveys; UNODC			X	X
Borders and ports most commonly used for trafficking illicit goods, people and wildlife	Defence, justice and interior ministries/ secretaries; ombudsperson's office; law enforcement (seizure records); media and watchdog organizations; expert surveys; UNODC			X	X
Extent to which important government functions or policies are influenced or determined by foreign powers and organizations	Media and watchdog organizations; expert surveys			X	
Level of international economic dependency (e.g. aid dependency and international indebtedness), net ODA received (as percentage of GNI)	National statistics agency; ministry of economy; OECD; World Bank (External Debt Indicators)			X	
Number of instances of international, bilateral or multilateral cooperation or mutual legal assistance in cases relating to organized crime (per illicit activity)	Justice ministry; law enforcement	X	X	X	
Geographical vulnerabilities: performance indicators					
Level of state control of major trafficking centres (including ports) (e.g. number of trafficking centres visited and inspected by competent authorities; frequency of such visits)	National reporting; media reports			X	X
Number of natural resources and infrastructure key for the production, distribution and selling of trafficked goods, people and wildlife (e.g. volume of available minerals, biodiversity, important ports, extend of border areas, isolated communities)	Energy, minerals and economy ministries/ secretaries; expert and industry surveys; media and watchdog organizations; UNODC			X	X
Extent of linguistic and ethnic connection to community along important trafficking routes and diaspora communities	Culture ministry/secretaries; expert and public surveys; watchdog organizations	X	X	X	X

Democratic vulnerabilities: Institutional

1. Rule of law and access to justice

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
International treaties and constitutional provisions that require the state to abide by due process and fair trial by the law (e.g. due process and fair trial) and offer mechanisms for all citizens to make the state accountable to them (e.g. redress in the event of maladministration or official breaches of the law and access to the ombudsman for all social groups; provisions granting courts constitutional review powers)	National legislation; UN treaty series	X	X	X	
Provisions governing the adjudication and enforcement of the law, including customary law where relevant	National legislation			X	X
Rules governing the appointment, tenure and operation of the judiciary (e.g. nomination of judges by the government or an independent body; restrictions/bans on the appointment of judges, except for limitations on criminal bases and conflict of interests); legislation preventing and punishing organized crime-related activities	National legislation			X	
Provisions granting immunity/indemnity to senior officials or politicians				X	
Specialized bodies to combat corruption and organized crime	National legislation			X	X
Provisions governing the codes of conduct of public officials, elected and non-elected, and their transparency	National legislation			X	
Performance indicators					
Level of efficiency of the judicial system (e.g. average duration of investigations and trials; number of courts; average number of cases per court; extent of rule of law in the country)	Justice ministry/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations; law enforcement agencies (complaint reports); expert and public surveys; media and watchdog organizations; Human Rights Watch; UNHCHR; WGI Rule of Law index			X	X
Level of free and fair adjudication of the law (e.g. number of cases of discrimination by law enforcement and judicial authorities; number of cases of maltreatment during detentions; percentage of citizen access to legal representation and legal aid; number of detentions without trial; number of cases of oppressive or inhuman punishments; death rates in custody)				X	X
Level of capacity of the judicial system to investigate and adjudicate cases related to organized crime per illicit activity (e.g. number of investigations, trials and convictions of high-level organized criminals; percentage of judges and prosecutors who have received specialized training) and anti-corruption (e.g. number of public officials and high-level politicians investigated, tried and convicted of corruption charges)		X	X	X	
Corruption level of the judiciary (e.g. number of judges and prosecutors convicted under corruption charges; percentage of judges replaced and relocated)				X	X
Crime reporting rate	National criminal justice records; law enforcement records	X	X	X	

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Performance on SDG 16.5 (to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms)	SDSN	X	X	X	X
Number of senior officials and politicians involved in drug trafficking investigations	Expert and public surveys; police; justice ministry/secretaries; media and watchdog organizations; UNODC; INCB; NGOs			X	X
Levels of prison overcrowding				X	X
Capacity of frontline officers and/or specialized officers trained and equipped to monitor, survey and investigate complaints of illicit goods, violent crimes, trafficking (of drugs, people and wildlife) (e.g. proportion of officers trained in identification and migrant rights, trained and equipped in recognizing and responding appropriately to sex trafficking, narcotics, fauna and flora crimes, the number of checks and controls undertaken annually by drug enforcement agencies)	National criminal justice records; law enforcement records; budget and reporting; UNTOC implementation	X	X	X	X
The level of transparency of the judicial system and law enforcement (e.g. the extent to which the authority in practice publishes the results and proceedings of investigations or audits in an easily accessible manner, oversight of investigation proceedings, disclosure of the discovery of evidence, disclosure of police tapes and records, access to personnel misconduct files, police misconduct settlements)	MPT database; national criminal justice records; law enforcement records; national reporting; watchdog organizations			X	X
The level of accountability of the judicial system and law enforcement (e.g. the victimization rate of the police, number of discrimination or maltreatment cases of particular social groups within the police/army personnel, number of judges replaced/relocated, number of conflict of interest cases, number of judge recusations)	National criminal justice records; law enforcement records; national reporting; watchdog organizations				
Percentage of victims of organized crime detected annually out of total crime victims	National migration data; IOM; UNHCHR; UNODC	X	X	X	X
The extent to which offenders comply with sanctions imposed	MPT database; watchdog organizations; media			X	X
The extent to which the authority conducts investigations or audits when necessary	MPT database; national criminal justice records; watchdog organizations			X	X
Level of public confidence in the legal system to deliver fair and effective justice	QoG database; perception surveys			X	
Extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings	V-Dem database; watchdog organizations; UNHCHR; NGOs; media			X	
Publicly available data collection on organized crime-related conflict and violence	National statistical authorities; police forces, or other data-gathering bodies; watchdog organizations; health ministries, hospitals	X		X	X
Proportion of population issued with national ID documents	Watchdog organizations, national statistics			X	
Percentage of national and local budget expenditures on combatting drug trafficking, particularly in relation to budget expenditures on development initiatives	National and local budgets and reporting documents	X	X	X	

2. Political parties

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level	
		National	Local
Standard indicators			
Regulations providing for transparency in party and candidate finance (e.g. public reporting, limits on the amount a party/candidate can spend)	National legislation; International IDEA Political Finance Database	X	X
Restriction for party/candidate financing, and corresponding sanctions (e.g. limits on amount of donations, prohibition of corporate, anonymous donations, donations from foreign interests, cash contributions, sanctions for infractions)	National legislation; International IDEA Political Finance Database	X	
Restrictions for citizens to form political parties	National legislation	X	
Public funding regulations, restrictions and sanctions, as well as their application (e.g. ban on donations from corporations with government contracts or partial government ownership to political parties/candidates, ban on state resources being given to or received by political parties or candidates, excluding regulated public funding, ban on state resources being used for/against a party/candidate, requirements to report in-kind contributions to parties/candidates, sanctions for infractions)	International IDEA Political Finance Database, NGOs, media and watchdog organizations	X	
Mechanisms to facilitate internal democracy within parties (e.g. party consultations)	National legislation	X	
Requirement to report loans to political parties/candidates	National legislation; International IDEA Political Finance Database	X	
Performance indicators			
Level of applicability of political finance regulations to subnational units	National legislation; watchdog organizations; justice ministries; EMB	X	
Extent to which competent institution(s) receives and investigates the financial reports from political parties and/or candidates, with the capacity to impose sanctions on cases of violation	Watchdog organizations; media; national reporting; EMB; ombudsperson	X	
Predominant sources for electoral campaigns and party financing	EMB; political parties	X	X
Level of transparency of political support (e.g. parties' financial records are published and easily available to journalists and citizens)	MPT database; EMB; watchdog organizations; media	X	X
The public's trust in political parties	QoG database; perception surveys	X	
The level of restrictions on founding/establishing political parties	EMB; ombudsperson; watchdog organizations; political parties	X	X
Governments' level of capacity to construct stable coalitions of party support	Watchdog organizations; media	X	

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level	
		National	Local
The ideological diversity of parties, and the extent to which they are programmatic (i.e. parties structure their programmes to compete for voters rather than back charismatic leaders; parties organize to facilitate the construction, diffusion and reproduction of their policy platform; low incidence of candidates switching parties)	Political parties; ombudsperson; watchdog organizations; EMB	X	X
Incidence of harassment of party members and officials	Watchdog organizations; media	X	X
Institutionalization of political parties (e.g. the extent to which a party maintains control of government, number of continuous years in power, the frequency of change of parties in power) and control across state territory	Watchdog organizations; media; V-Dem database	X	X
Budget allocated to institutions enforcing political finance regulations	National/local budget	X	X
Level of changes of government between elections	Watchdog organizations; media	X	X

3. The legislature

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level	
		National	Local
Standard indicators for the integrity of the legislature			
Restrictions for the legislature to pass legislation on its own (except for executive veto powers), including limiting legislative control of their own budget	National legislation	X	X
Provisions that require external oversight of the legislature (except for ombudsman offices)		X	X
Provisions enabling the legislature and government agencies (e.g. comptroller general, general prosecutor, ombudsman, auditors) to question, investigate, exercise oversight over the executive, and impose sanctions		X	
Provisions for openness, accountability and transparency of the legislature (e.g. ban on anonymous amendments, regulations on public question periods, publishing the records of bill sponsors, involvement of lobby/interest groups, legislative votes, expenditure, regulation of conflict of interest)		X	X
Provisions for regular election of freely elected national legislative representative		X	X
Provisions (e.g. quotas) for women or minority groups in the legislature		X	X
Provisions for legislator legal protection, including limits to immunity		X	X
Code of conduct for legislators with sanction in case of violation		X	X
Performance indicators			
The extent to which competent legislative audit institution(s) investigate and monitor the independence, mandate and integrity, reporting obligations and expertise of legislature, with transparent publishing of findings (e.g. incidence of fraud, malpractice, lack of transparency in expenditure, conflict of interest)	Watchdog organizations; media; national reporting; ombudsperson; legislative records	X	
Frequency of free and fair election of legislature	Legislative records; media; watchdog organizations	X	
Percentage of cases in which the legislature passed legislation after consulting with non-governmental experts	Legislative records; media; watchdog organizations	X	X
The number of cases in which the executive has been essential to the functioning of parliament/legislature	Media; watchdog organizations	X	X
Number of times the legislature exercised control over policies/legislation proposed by the executive	Watchdog organizations	X	X
Social composition of the legislature (e.g. proportion of seats held by women, minorities and marginalized groups (ethnicity, clan, socio-economic class, religion) in national and local parliaments)	Legislative records; media; watchdog organizations; Global Leadership Project	X	X
Cases of restrictions on members' freedom, whether from government, parliament or party, which prevent them from fulfilling their responsibilities to the electorate	Legislative records; media; watchdog organizations	X	X
Stability of formed coalitions or prevalence of small, precarious majorities	Legislative records; watchdog organizations	X	
An even distribution/balanced MP membership of parliamentary/congress committees	Legislative records	X	X

4. Public administration

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
Provisions to restrict elected representatives' ability to determine public policy on their own (except for constitutional provisions granting final approval to the legislature or court review powers)	National legislation			X	
Restrictions of military influence over the executive				X	
Mechanisms and institutions in place for assuring government accountability to the electorate between elections				X	X
Provisions requiring government transparency and public access to information				X	X
Provisions to prevent and punish public corruption				X	X
Code of conduct regulating the behaviour of public officials (ethical behaviour and independence) – which includes performance indicators				X	X
Performance indicators					
The level of public administration transparency (e.g. number of incidents or cases limiting the accessibility of government information to the public, in which secrecy laws protect executive abuse)	National legislation; watchdog organizations; media; NGOs; surveys			X	X
Level of state capacity to recognize and respond to organized crime —percentage of budget expenditure on combating organized crime, particularly in relation to development initiatives (e.g. practical and frequent anti-corruption training programmes for public officials in place; number of training and capacity building initiatives for ports, customs and staff of financial intelligence units for detection of money laundering, illicit financial flows, cybercrimes; number of initial and in-service trainings for relevant personnel on combating fauna and flora crimes, human trafficking; public strategy in place to identify communities vulnerable to illicit activities, including data collection and dissemination programmes; number of competent protection agencies for the prevention and detection of illicit trafficking, level of expenditure on educational and public awareness campaigns, on combatting illicit activities (illicit crop farming, illegal mining, corruption, sex trafficking); number of checks and controls undertaken by government agencies; number of public–private partnerships created for prevention of illicit activities)	National legislation; national police; custom authorities; media, national and industry reporting; local/national reporting; national budget; communications ministries; watchdog organizations; WGI “control of corruption” index; Transparency International; expert surveys; World Bank; UNDP; UNODC; INDC; NGO reporting	X	X	X	X
Level of government capacity to protect victims and whistle-blowers of organized crime (e.g. number of reporting and helpline services in place for the identification and protection, number of programs to protect victims or whistle-blowers)	National reporting, NGO reporting; World Bank; NGOs; national and industry reporting; law enforcement agencies; police	X	X	X	X
The level of military influence over the executive (e.g. number cases of overruling by military; number of military personnel (current or former) occupying high-ranked political offices)	Watchdog organizations; media; NGOs; parliamentary records			X	X
Number of times the executive exercised veto powers over policies/legislation proposed by the legislature	Watchdog organizations; media; NGOs; parliamentary records			X	X

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Level of legislature accountability (e.g. number and frequency of officials investigated and convicted for corruption; level of capacity (legally and financially) of investigative institutions (i.e. ombudsperson, comptroller general office) to request investigations and issue sanctions, number of investigated cases published, sanctions on officials between elections or removal by citizen petitions)	Watchdog organizations; media; expert surveys; StAR database; law enforcement agencies (records); justice ministry (records); national budgets; national reporting; parliamentary records			X	X
Government capacity to deliver services (e.g. fulfilment of service provision standards and targets, number of cases of expressed dissatisfaction with local and regional government services, number of development projects, level of tax evasion)	WGI ("Government Effectiveness" Index); expert surveys; national reports; watchdog organizations; ombudsperson; tax authorities			X	X
Level of integrity of public officials (e.g. public confidence, number of violations of the public official code of conduct)	Perception surveys; audit office; watchdog organizations; media			X	X
Citizen capacity to influence government (e.g. number of organized protests against policy; CSO confidence in their capacity to influence policy; number of citizen proposal/policy changes in relation to the executive; level of exclusion from consultative processes due to gender, membership of a minority or marginalized group; number of government–citizen consultations)	Perception surveys; watchdog organizations; media; NGOs, trade unions (records)			X	X
Level of independence of parliament/congress in the development of policy (e.g. degree of subordination to lobby groups, number of revolving-door appointments, number of policy initiatives by elected representatives that have been limited, except by their legislature when exercising veto power or by courts when doing constitutional reviews)	Watchdog organizations; media; expert surveys; NGOs			X	X
Degree of decentralization (e.g. degree of local/regional autonomy, accountability to central governments in federal systems, number of localities where the government effectively exercises its authority, level of public subsidies to subnational entities)	National legislation; watchdog organizations; media; expert surveys			X	X



5. Electoral system

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
Limitations on suffrage for adults (except non-nationals, criminals and members of the armed forces)	National legislation; International IDEA Political Finance Database			X	X
Restrictions for persons to present their candidacy (e.g. criminal records, membership of minority or marginalized groups)				X	X
Laws providing equal campaigning opportunities (including for gender, minority and marginalized group members)				X	
Penalties and sanctions for perpetrators of electoral malpractice and violence				X	
Regulation ensuring that all key political offices are subject to some form of electoral authorization or accountability				X	
Regulations for media reporting of elections				X	
Regulations for election finance flows by candidates and parties				X	
Ban on vote buying				X	
Performance indicators					
To what extent are the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority elected through free and fair elections	QoG database; perception surveys; watchdog organizations; media; EMB			X	X
Number of reported intimidation cases in the voting process	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson			X	X
Number of reported fraud cases in the voting process	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson; QoG database			X	X
Evidence of bias in the operation or personnel of the electoral commission	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson			X	X
Percentage of people legally entitled to vote prevented from doing so	V-Dem database; watchdog organization; EMB; media			X	X
Incidence of reported fraud in elections	EMB; ombudsperson; media			X	X
Incidence of voter exclusion				X	X
Voter turnout				X	
Number of candidates with criminal records				X	X
The extent to which campaigns are fair and followed regulations (e.g. number of groups with limited campaigning opportunities; official and informal obstructions on campaigning; inequalities in access to campaign finance/to the media, number of cases of illicit party campaign financing, extent to which sanctions were imposed on violations)	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson; watchdog organizations; media				

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Level of citizen engagement with politics, including the participation of minority groups and women (e.g. direct, such as the percentage of the population that belongs to a political party (except where participation is forced), participation in consultative rule making, use of petitions; and indirect, voter turnout, supporting advocacy groups)	Watchdog organizations; media; national reporting			X	X
Number of threats to the overall security of the election by state or non-state bodies	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson			X	X
The autonomy of the EMB (e.g. degree of separation and institutional independence from executive branches, public perception on impartiality)	V-Dem database; ombudsperson; watchdog organization; media; perception survey; EMB				
The capacity of the EMB (e.g. budget allocation; competent staffing; ability to apply election laws and administration rules impartially in elections)	V-Dem database; ombudsperson; watchdog organization; media; national reporting; EMB			X	X
Percentage of elections in the last 10 years in which non-incumbent parties gained power	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson			X	X
Number of people/groups who have been prevented from holding public office (except non-nationals, criminals and members of the armed forces)	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson			X	X
Proportion of the population of voting age that participated in the last election (except where voting is obligatory)	EMB; police reports; ombudsperson			X	X
Cost of campaigns	EMB; watchdog organizations			X	X
Ratio of registered to eligible voters per region	EMB; national statistics agency			X	X
Presence of national and international observers at national elections	Media; national reporting; watchdog organizations	X	X	X	X



Democratic vulnerabilities: Associated

1. Media and civil society watchdogs

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
Restrictions to freedom of expression and protest (except bans on advocacy of violence)	National legislation			X	
Provision of freedom of information act				X	
Restrictions to form professional organizations and trade unions				X	
Restrictions to ownership of media outlets and non-governmental organizations				X	
Regulations requiring disclosure of media ownership				X	
Political restrictions on access to the Internet				X	
Independent media and watchdog organizations: performance indicators					
Number of complaints for official harassment of journalists, CSOs and peaceful protesters	Watchdog organizations; police reports	X	X	X	X
Budget allocated to state agencies in charge of protecting journalists and CSOs	National/local budget			X	X
Level of media ownership concentration (ratio of owners to media outlets)	Watchdog organizations; communications agency			X	X
Main revenue sources for media (i.e. public, advertising, subscription); media dependence on government or corporate channels	National/local budgets; watchdog organizations			X	X
Number of private media outlets and non-governmental organizations (including human rights organizations)	Communications agency; watchdog organizations	X	X	X	X
Capacity of public administration to protect whistle-blowers and journalists (e.g. number of reporting and helpline services for the identification and protection of victims and whistle-blowers, and number of victims assisted by these means)	Watchdog organizations; NGOs; national/local reporting	X		X	X
Level of freedom of expression, association and free media	WGI's 'Voice & Accountability' Indicator, Freedom House rankings, perception surveys	X	X	X	X
Number of media reports on organized crime activities and political corruption (e.g. extent to which news reports violations/abuses of political financial laws, vote buying, seizure of illicit wildlife)	Regional reporting; NGO reporting, MPT database	X	X	X	X
The extent to which CSOs can access and use objective data/reports produced by journalists, academia, experts	MPT database, watchdog organizations, expert surveys			X	X
Capacity of the media and watchdog organizations: performance indicators					
The incidence of repressive actions against the media (e.g. the extent of political pressures and controls; government or party ownership of media; number of incidents of harassment, intimidation or obstruction of journalists; number of cases of media censorship)	QoD database; communications ministry; watchdog organizations; police reports			X	X

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Effectiveness of the media coverage of state activity	Watchdog organizations			X	X
Level of disproportionate representation of social groups among the media professionals and media	Watchdog organizations; media			X	
Level of civilian oversight and reporting mechanisms to report on money laundering, particularly related to national and foreign PEPs	World Bank; NGOs; national and industry reporting	X	X		
Number of national and international civilian oversight bodies and NGOs established and supported to promote human rights, crime prevention, zero-tolerance attitudes toward corruption, human rights and victim protection	Media reports; national budgets; NGO reporting; national reporting	X	X	X	X

2. Financial system

Indicator (when possible, disaggregate by gender, ethnic group and geographic region, and assign temporal framework)	Source	Geographic level			
		International	Regional	National	Local
Standard indicators					
Regulations implementing international financial standards (e.g. the IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial code; IMF Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems; IOSCO Principles; OECD BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) standards; FATF standards, harmonisation of standards and international cooperation on SAR/STRs (Suspicious Activity Reports and Suspicious Transaction Reports)	National legislation; financial ministries; IMF; IOSCO; OECD; FATF	X	X	X	X
Existing Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)	National legislation			X	
Strategy to protect digital infrastructure				X	X
Legal framework for identifying, tracing and freezing criminal or terrorist assets	FATF; national legislation; fiscal regulatory authorities; law enforcement agencies			X	
Performance indicators					
Level of capacity of the FIU and other agencies for detecting, intercepting and investigating illicit financial flows (e.g. budget allocation, incidence of training)	Media reports; national budgets and reporting; World Bank; WTO			X	X
Budget allocated to protection of digital infrastructure	National budgets			X	X
Average number of AML/CFT checks done on customers by banks	FATF; bank and industry reporting; financial authorities; law enforcement agencies; FIU, IMF			X	X
Level of secrecy and scale of offshore financial activities (e.g. ranking on Financial Secrecy Index, number of oversight actions applied to transactions made in tax havens)	Financial Secrecy Network; watchdog organizations; media reports; fiscal regulatory authorities; FIU	X	X	X	
Extent to which financial institutions obtain and report customer data for suspicious activity reports and suspicious transaction reports	FATF; national legislation; fiscal regulatory authorities; FIU			X	X
Detection and reporting of large transactions to targeted individuals	FIU, IMF			X	
Number of transactions prohibited due to their AML/CFT links	Fiscal regulatory authorities; FIU, IMF			X	
The capacity of financial sector agents and programmes to recognize and respond to cyber and financial threats (e.g. number of trained cyber agents, analysts and forensic examiners with a focus on the financial sector; regular programmes to update current FIU capabilities to address online and mobile banking threats; integrity and transparency programmes in industries and sectors vulnerable to money laundering and illicit financial flows (e.g. real estate, construction); public budget allocation for the FIU)	Law enforcement agencies; financial regulatory authority; World Bank; NGOs; national and industry reporting; public budget			X	X
Financial loss by financial institution due to fraudulent money transfers and counterfeiting of credit cards	Bank reports; FIU			X	

Annex B. Glossary of terms



Democracy

According to International IDEA's definition and under the State of Democracy Assessment Framework, democracy is a process that entails the implementation of two basic principles: (a) popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers and (b) equality in the exercise of this control. These two principles are implemented through seven 'mediating values' in society—participation, authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and solidarity. These values are, in turn, anchored under four analytical democratic pillars: (a) citizenship, law and rights; (b) representative and accountable government; (c) civil society and popular participation; and (d) democracy beyond the state (Beetham et al. 2008: 712). While organized crime can forge alliances with political actors in non-democratic systems, the drivers and dynamics of those relationships are different from those operating in democratic systems. This Guide examines the characteristics of democratic systems that can facilitate political corruption through organized crime activities.

Factors

In this Guide, 'factors' refers to interrelated variables that facilitate forging and maintaining the nexus between organized crime and democratic politics (Vogt and Johnson 2005: 137).

Nexus

A nexus or linkage between organized crime and democratic politics includes both explicit and tacit agreements, mediated by money or influence, which may be forged directly or through intermediaries.

Organized crime

For the purposes of this Guide, organized crime is a wide-ranging concept encompassing illicit activities committed systematically and with continuity, by a group of three or more persons or by a network with a clear division of responsibilities, with the aim of generating a profit or increasing their power or political influence, or both. This definition is partly based on the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, also known as the Palermo Convention (UN 2004). This definition might encompass a myriad of denominations, including street gangs, transnational organized crime, mafias and criminal cartels. This broad definition allows users to customize it to include the activities and type of actors that organized crime conducts in their context and under their legal framework.



Threat assessments

Threat assessments analyse the likelihood—in this case the influence of organized crime on politics—based on the presence of factors that contribute to this nexus, measured using a series of indicators. The IntegriTAS system does not include an impact analysis (i.e. an analysis of the harm that the nexus between organized crime and politics generates), which would produce a risk assessment (Albanese 2001 World Economic Forum 2015: 56). A risk assessment evaluates both the likelihood that an event will take place (threat) as well as its potential consequences (impact) (ECDC 2011: 22).

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About IntegriTAS



Transnational organized crime threatens democracy. Supporting the capacity of national and local institutions to prevent and mitigate the nexus between organized crime and democratic politics is an important part of fighting against these threats. The IntegriTAS Threat Assessment System is a multipurpose data-driven software application that helps national and local institutions identify the threats that organized crime poses to politics. Focusing on the threat—instead of seeking to establish the existence of links between organized crime and politics, or their impact—allows users to map and focus on the factors that contribute to corruption, and to identify strategies to prevent or mitigate the threat.

Modules

IntegriTAS is structured around three interactive modules: (a) a virtual library providing a list of factors that increase the threat that organized crime will distort democratic politics; (b) a software application that helps users easily map, geo-reference, present and visualize different types of democratic vulnerabilities and organized crime activities to build a country-specific model; and (c) a framework that equips users with global good practices and lessons learned for preventing and mitigating organized crime influence on democratic politics.

Documentation

The IntegriTAS software is accompanied by three Guides. The *IntegriTAS Process Guide* describes the process of implementing IntegriTAS and includes a description of the system's structure and its implementation stages. The *IntegriTAS Factors Guide* provides basic definitions of the threat factors used in IntegriTAS and includes an Annex which provides a more comprehensive list of potential indicators that can be used to observe each factor. The *IntegriTAS Prevention and Mitigation Guide* discusses the various prevention and mitigation strategies that can be applied to reduce the undue influence of organized crime on democratic processes. The software is also accompanied by a User Manual and a help file.

Download

Access the IntegriTAS software and supporting documentation:
<<https://www.idea.int/integritas>>

About International IDEA



The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

What do we do?

In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of work.

International IDEA provides analyses of global and regional democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge on good international democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-building on democratic reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.

Where do we work?

Our headquarters is located in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

<<http://idea.int>>

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