Gender-targeted Public Funding for Political Parties
A comparative analysis
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Magnus Ohman
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1. Introduction

1.1. Gender-targeted public funding and gender equality in politics

Gender inequality in the political process remains a major problem in all the countries of the world. Overcoming the obstacles to achieving gender equality in politics will require action in many areas. Financial obstacles are often identified as a major factor. Women often have less access than men to the resources needed to successfully seek a party nomination or stand in an election, and political parties tend to nominate men to winnable positions so that they can benefit from the resources at their disposal.

This report does not discuss the connection between political finance and gender equality in general, or the work done to reduce the challenges that this connection entails (see e.g. Ballington and Kahane 2014; Falguera and Casas-Zamora 2016; Cigane and Ohman 2014). Instead, it focuses on how formal regulations on political finance can be used to help break down the barriers to equal political participation by women and men. More specifically, it focuses on the particular regulations where the provision of public funding (state assistance) to political parties is linked to gender-related activities by those political parties. Such provisions exist today in around 30 countries worldwide, and it is a form of regulation that has become increasingly common in the past two decades (see Figure 1.1). Provisions of this kind now exist in countries in almost all the regions of the world, and in both older and emerging democracies. There are no recorded cases of gender-targeted public funding having been repealed, although a revision of the amounts provided in Italy will significantly reduce the impact of the provisions there (Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2017). Details of the provisions used in different countries can be found in the Annex.
This report reviews the concept of gender-targeted public funding, the introduction of such provisions, the experiences of some countries where it has been used and what can be said about the impact of provisions of this kind. Chapters 2 to 4 discuss key aspects of gender-related public funding, its underlying logic, its relationship to gender quotas and the different types of provision used around the world. Chapters 5 to 9 present case studies on Albania, Croatia, France, Haiti and Portugal, where provisions of this kind have been in place for some time. Chapter 10 provides a comparative analysis of the impact of gender-targeted public funding, discusses its implications and examines the issues to consider to make the system effective.

The concept of gender-targeted public funding is used to denote systems where either the eligibility of a political party to receive some or all of its public funding, or the amount (allocation) of public funding that an eligible political party receives, is formally tied to provisions related to gender, or where some of the public funding is earmarked for gender-related purposes. Provisions can include the relative share of women and men among the candidates presented by a political party in an election, or the balance between women and men among the successful candidates of a party. The intent and underlying logic of different forms of gender-targeted public funding are discussed in Chapter 2. Ultimately, provisions of this kind are successful if more women get involved in politics, are elected to office and, in the longer term, gender inequality in the political process is reduced and political decision-making becomes more gender-sensitive.
1.2. Factors underlying the probability of success of gender-related public funding

This report is based on the hypothesis that three factors have a major influence the probability of success of gender-related public funding. These factors are discussed in the case studies as well as in the discussion of the comparative impact of such provisions.

1. **Party dependency on public funding.** First, although direct public funding of any kind is currently used in over two-thirds of the countries in the world, in many places the amounts provided are so small that they have no impact on party activities (see e.g. Ohman 2014). Where parties rely almost exclusively on private income, earmarking or altering the amounts of public funding is unlikely to have much of an impact.

2. **Strength of connection between public funding and gender equality.** Second, the formal connection made between public funding and gender equality must be large enough to have an impact. If a tiny proportion of the funds is earmarked for activities to support gender equality, or where a party must significantly alter its nomination decisions to receive a very small additional amount of public funding, it is unlikely that gender-targeted public funding will have much of an impact. However, if parties stand to gain a significant additional amount of public funding, or risk losing a large proportion of the funds they would otherwise have received, they have a significant incentive to make even radical changes related to gender equality.

3. **Party perception of societal views on gender equality.** The third factor is more subtle, as it relates to the how party officials view societal opinion on the political participation of women and men. The impact of increased or decreased public funding must be more important to political party leaders than the loss of votes that they fear might arise from nominating women to electable positions. Parties cannot achieve their goals without electoral success, and gender-related public funding provisions must consequently be designed to alter the incentive structure of party officials.

Naturally, there are other factors that also affect the effectiveness of gender-targeted public funding, such as the electoral system and approach to candidate selection within political parties, which are not addressed in this report (see e.g. Ballington and Kahane 2014).

Gender-targeted public funding has been chosen as the topic of this report not because it is argued that this provision alone can remove gender inequality, or
because it will necessarily reduce gender inequality in all situations. Instead, it is argued that gender-targeted public funding could function as a complement or alternative to quotas where non-compliance means that a party’s candidates will not appear on the ballot. Gender-targeted public funding can be seen as a ‘soft option’ to encourage gender equality in political parties, or as one tool of many. These tools must include non-statutory activities such as civic education on gender equality and efforts to encourage, mentor and support women interested in entering politics.
2. Defining gender-targeted funding

2.1. The underlying logic of gender-targeted public funding

As described in detail in Chapter 3, gender-targeted public funding either means that the amount of public funding a political party receives is connected to the level of gender equality among the candidates it puts up for election (or manages to get elected), or that a certain proportion of the public funding a party receives is earmarked for gender-related activities.

This section reviews the aims and underlying logic of gender-targeted public funding. The overarching aim is to address the narrow issue of representation in elected bodies, or a reduction in gender inequality among nominated candidates or elected representatives. A broader aim is to enhance the empowerment of women and the gender balance in political life beyond formal representation in elected bodies. This can also include increased gender sensitivity among political activists and a stronger role for women in political parties. The following subsections provide more detailed analysis of the potential aims of gender-targeted public funding.

Increase gender sensitivity within political parties by earmarking funds

One form of gender-targeted public funding that mainly focuses on the broader aim of improving the gender balance in politics is the earmarking of parts of public funding. Political parties can for example be required to use a certain percentage of the public funds they are provided for outreach activities linked to gender equality, in order to increase the role of women in political parties or to develop a gender action plan.
Gender-targeted Public Funding for Political Parties

In considering the impact on the share of women participating in elections, it is reasonable to expect any impact of earmarked public funding to be long term, especially in comparison with systems where the amount of public funding that political parties receive is related to the level of gender equality among their candidates. While the effect of earmarking a proportion of public funding may be slow, it can nonetheless be fundamental, by affecting the internal structures of political parties and not only their candidate selection decisions. It could be argued that the support provided to women’s wings in the Scandinavian countries was part of such a dynamic by earmarking the recipient rather than the use, and the proportion of female candidates is now very high without the need for legislated quotas. The result of this logic, however, is that we should not expect to see much impact on the number of female members of parliament or even candidates for the first few electoral cycles after earmarked public funding is introduced. Since only a handful of countries have used earmarked public funding for more than two electoral cycles, the result of this reform may not yet be easily detectable.

Impact on candidate selection decisions by political parties
A common aim of gender-related public funding is to incentivize political parties to nominate more female candidates by using financial rewards to connect the amount of public funding provided to the level of gender equality among its candidates, regardless of how the parties use these additional funds. This notion is in line with the logic of how political parties function, and can be effective if well structured. As Pierce has pointed out, ‘political parties in a democratic society, operating through the elections with which they are inevitably associated, are instruments for competition for the exercise of power’ (Pierce 2004: 191). It also forms the thinking behind how gender-targeted public funding can function as an enforcement mechanism for gender quotas (see Section 2.2). Many forms of gender-targeted public funding, however, do not incentivize parties to nominate women in competitive electoral areas. This is a problem that this regulation shares with most quota regulations. Some countries have sought to overcome this problem by relating the amount of public funding provided to the number of female candidates elected by each political party.

Enhance the financial position of female candidates through public funding to parties
The aim of gender-targeted public funding may be to reduce the financial burden for female candidates by ensuring that they receive more money to allow them to compete more effectively in elections, given the gender prejudices within the electorate. This is for example the implicit intention behind the rare cases where legislation states that a certain proportion of the public funding provided to a
political party must be used to support women standing as candidates for a party. This is the case, for instance, in Haiti (see Chapter 7 in this report).

However, there are several reasons why the idea of giving political parties funding for the use of their female candidates might be problematic in many contexts. One is that it is difficult to control how political parties use the public funding that they receive, especially in an electoral context where parties often see the electoral outcome as overshadowing all other considerations (Ballington and Kahane 2014: 318–19). This obstacle can be overcome at least partly by detailed reporting and oversight provisions. In addition, public funding in relation to election campaigns would need to be provided to political parties early enough for the parties to be able to allocate these funds to their female candidates, allowing them to use the added resources for campaigning.

Systems of campaign expenditure reimbursement, used in many countries around the world, are arguably unsuitable for supporting the campaigning of female candidates, even if the money is distributed by the parties to their female candidates after the elections. This is because reimbursement systems require candidates and political parties to raise funds privately ahead of elections and to be reimbursed later, an approach that favours wealthy and incumbent actors. This fact has led organizations such as the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) to argue against reimbursement systems in public funding (Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2010: article 184; Ballington and Kahane 2014: 320).

More problematic is that this notion assumes that women have already been nominated by political parties as candidates in electoral areas or constituencies where they have a chance of being elected. If this is not the case, even large additional amounts of campaign funding will be unlikely to help them win an election. An exception would be countries that use open list systems of proportional representation (PR), since in such cases women with additional funding available to them might be able to compete more effectively against male candidates on the same list.

Gender-targeted public funding might admittedly create an incentive for political parties to nominate women in competitive areas, because the parties will receive additional funding that these female candidates can then use in their campaign. However, no practical examples of parties acting according to this logic have been found. Giving a financial reward to political parties that nominate women, while at the same time requiring that these funds are used for the female candidates that the party nominates, may not be a strong enough incentive for parties to break with established patterns. In many cases, nominating a woman as a candidate means deselecting a male incumbent, and many political parties wish to retain incumbents for reasons of encouraging party loyalty and retaining
expertise. Incumbents also often have close ties to party officials, and can use such ties to protect themselves against deselection.

**Improve the financial position of female candidates by giving them public funding directly**

It would also be possible to give the additional public funding directly to the female candidates running for office, whether in single-member districts or on candidate lists in open PR systems. Such a system does not yet formally exist for national elections in any country, although in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) the additional public funding given to parties that nominate above a set share of female candidates should be disbursed for the expenses of these candidates alone, and there is a similar provision in Haiti (OECD 2016: 160; Ballington and Kahane 2014: 323). Regardless of gender, giving public funding directly to candidates is rare. To be effective, such direct public funding of female candidates would have to be combined with provisions that these funds must not be transferred to the nominating political party. In addition, the same amount would probably have to be provided to all female candidates. This could prove costly or lead to frivolous candidacies aimed at accessing these funds, which would not aid the work towards gender equality. Given how unpopular public funding of political activities is among the electorate in most of the countries where it is used, such a system might not enhance views on efforts of increase gender equality in politics (Nassmacher 2003: 8). A survey in Ghana, where there is currently no public funding, indicated that 95 per cent of respondents opposed state funding of political parties (Adu-Gyamfi 2014: 29).

### 2.2. The relationship between gender-targeted funding and gender quotas

The most commonly discussed type of political regulation to enhance gender equality in elections is gender quotas (see e.g. Larserud and Taphorn 2007; Gender Quota Database). The discussion in this section does not refer to electoral systems with reserved seats, since the connection between such systems and gender-related public funding is much less clear (Krook and Norris 2014: 7). What is the relationship between gender-targeted public funding and gender quotas? It is certainly possible to have one but not the other. Political parties may be required to nominate a certain percentage of candidates from each gender or face non-financial sanctions, and gender-targeted public funding can be used without regulated quotas.

Much of the discussion on the effectiveness of quotas relates to the mechanisms available for punishing non-compliance. One such mechanism automatically ensures compliance with gender quotas—where non-compliance means that the candidates or lists of candidates submitted by a political party are not included on
the ballot. The electoral system plays a major role in this regard, since in a proportional electoral system it is easy to reject candidate lists that do not comply with a set gender quota, while in a single-member-district system the approach is less clear. For a further discussion on the connection between gender quotas and electoral systems see Christensen and Bardall (2014). If among the individual candidates presented by a party the percentage of women is less than the quota, should the nomination of all candidates be rejected until the party submits a set of candidates that comply?

The main arguments used by political parties that fail to nominate female candidates are either that they fear that doing so will harm them electorally, or that they want to retain their male incumbents. However, if the party’s candidates were not allowed to participate in elections at all where the set of candidates does not comply with the quota, these arguments would not apply, and it is likely that very few political parties would fail to comply with the gender quota in such cases. In practice, a system where failure to comply with the quota means that the party candidates do not appear on the ballot might be seen less as a sanctioning mechanism, and more as an amendment to the legal provisions someone has to comply with to be able to become a candidate. Such conditions exist in effectively all electoral processes and normally relate to the legal provisions someone has to comply with to be able to become a candidate. 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Rules of this kind exist in Armenia, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Macedonia, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Timor-Leste and Uruguay (Global Database of Quotas for Women 2017). There are, however, some countries where participating in elections is not required to access parts of the public funding. This means for example that parties that failing to meet the gender quota in Paraguay will not be able to participate in elections, but will receive a portion of some public funding (as this is tied to the registration of a party). However, this form of indirect gender-targeted public funding is arguably less important in these countries, since income from public funding is less important than electoral participation for all but the most opportunistic or marginal of political parties. Participation in elections and gaining representation on elected bodies are key goals for most political parties (Pierce 2004: 191). Countries with a regulation of this kind can still use gender-targeted public
funding to increase the number of female candidates by providing additional funding to political parties that exceed the quota level.

If enforced, the sanction of not including a party’s candidates on the ballot would make non-compliance effectively inconceivable. In comparison, gender-targeted public funding will almost automatically be less effective in ensuring compliance. One report has as a consequence compared the latter to a ‘loophole’ (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015: 6; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008: 34). Such a comparison, however, is problematic. If the intention with a quota is to create direct and full compliance by the political parties, then only making compliance with the quota part of the candidate nomination eligibility criteria will ensure this. If on the other hand the main goal is a gradual increase in the share of female candidates nominated by political parties—and in connection with this a strengthened role for women in political parties and politics more generally—then other measures should be considered, of which gender-targeted public funding is the main example.

Many of the forms of gender-targeted public funding discussed in this report are connected to a predetermined share of female candidates, regardless of whether the term quota is used in the legislation. This applies equally where parties that fail to reach a certain level of parity lose part of their public funding (as in France and Portugal) or where a part of the public funding is only available to parties that reach an identified level of gender representation (such as in Mali and Ukraine). There are some forms of gender-targeted funding that are not connected to a particular gender target. These are the cases where political parties receive a flat rate or proportional increase for every woman candidate fielded or elected (or for every candidate of the underrepresented gender). As described in Chapter 3, Chile, Croatia and Solomon Islands are among the countries that use systems of this kind. One advantage with this approach is that no threshold needs be set regarding what is an ‘acceptable’ level of gender equality. Instead, political parties in these countries continue to be rewarded for standing woman candidates in competitive positions up to a position of full parity. (Indeed, parties in Chile and Solomon Islands continue to receive increased public funding up to the point where they nominate 100 per cent female candidates.)

An interesting approach, not currently much in use, would be to combine a gender quota, where non-compliance means that the party’s candidates do not appear on the ballot, with gender-targeted public funding of the type described above. For example, South Korea introduced a 30 per cent mandatory quota in 2002 combined with additional funding to parties that nominated women above this threshold, but this rule was repealed in 2005 (Soh 2011: 100). Such an approach would mean that if the party exactly meets the quota, its candidates would appear on the ballot, but if the party exceeded the quota threshold by nominating more women, it would be increasingly rewarded financially (see Figure 2.3). It would also be possible to encourage parties to nominate women
above a set quota if they received a reduction in public funding for failing to reach full parity.

Figure 2.3. Combination of quota as candidacy requirement and gender-targeted public funding

The discussion in this chapter has focused on gender-targeted public funding as a shorter-term enforcement mechanism for gender quotas. A broader issue is that such provisions could help to make the gender quotas more effective, or more precisely to complement the overall goal of increasing gender equality in political life. This would apply not only to countries where no formal gender quota exists, but also to the earmarking of parts of public funding for activities that support increased gender sensitivity and equality. Such earmarking can play a role in increasing the role of women in political parties and political life more generally, not just their representation in elected bodies.
3. Types of gender-targeted public funding

It seems that Finland was the first country to introduce gender-targeted public funding, as public funding was first earmarked for activities to enhance gender equality in 1974 (Lyytikkä 2017). In Costa Rica, political parties have been required to spend a proportion of the public funding they receive on women’s political training and participation since the adoption of the Law for the Promotion of Social Equality in 1990 (Roza et al. 2012: 22).

Before going into detail about the introduction and impact of gender-targeted public funding in different countries, it is important to consider the types of gender-targeted public funding that are used around the world. It is not possible to say that one type of regulation is more suitable than another, since suitability depends on a number of factors such as the intended result of the regulation, the electoral system and the political culture. Table 3.1 outlines a proposed classification of gender-targeted public funding systems around the world. This classification is different from that outlined by Ballington and Kahane (2014: 316), which mainly focuses on the relationship between gender-targeted public funding and gender quotas. The focus here is on the various formal types of gender-targeted public funding that are used around the world. The Annex lists all countries known to use gender-targeted public funding in some form as described in this report as of early 2017.
3. Types of gender-targeted public funding

Table 3.1. Proposed classification of gender-targeted public funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of gender-targeted public funding</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeted funding based on eligibility</td>
<td>Some or all of the public funding received by political parties must be used for activities that support gender equality, or to support female candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted funding based on allocation</td>
<td>A portion (sometimes all) of the total public funding is only available to parties that reach a set level of gender equality among candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earmarking the use of parts of public funding</td>
<td>Parties receive additional funding per woman nominated or elected, or the public funding is increased or reduced if the party does or does not reach a given threshold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1. Targeted funding based on eligibility

Targeted funding based on eligibility describes systems in which political parties can only access all or part of the public funding if they comply with certain regulations on gender equality, usually that they achieve a certain level of gender balance among their nominated or elected candidates. In practice, this is commonly done by setting aside a certain proportion of the dedicated public funding, and making this accessible only to parties that have complied with such provisions.

The most extreme version of tying public funding to gender equality is one where parties that do not meet certain criteria receive no public funding at all. Systems that do not allow the candidates submitted by political parties on to the ballot if the party has failed to meet an established gender quota regarding their candidates or candidate lists usually fall within this category.

A related case concerns the small Orthodox Christian party Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party, SGP) in the Netherlands, which until recently refused to nominate any female candidates at all. A 2005 court ruling concluded that the Dutch state must take measures to prevent discrimination against women and forbade the provision of public funding to the party (Ohman 2010: 8; van den Brink and ten Napel 2013: 31). This was reversed in a 2007 ruling by the Dutch Council of State, but the ban on providing public funding was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2008 and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2010. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2012 that the SGP could not exclude women from standing as candidates (European Institute for Gender Equality n.d.). The party has since changed its nomination rules and has on some occasions nominated female candidates.

Kenyan legislation states that political parties where more than two-thirds of national office bearers (internal party leaders) are of either gender are not eligible
to receive any public funding. However, ‘parties that are not serious about gender equality can easily bypass this requirement by simply creating new deputy positions for women that have no real power’ (Ohman and Lintari 2015: 22). Discussions are ongoing about further reforms in line with the gender equality provisions written into the 2010 Kenyan Constitution.

More commonly, eligibility rules are applied only to a portion of the public funding, so that a certain percentage of the total amount set aside for public funding is accessible to parties that reach a prescribed level of gender equality. The size of this proportion is most commonly 10 per cent, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mali, Niger and Ukraine, but only 5 per cent in Colombia.

In Togo, 20 per cent of annual public funding is allocated to parties in proportion to the number of women elected at the most recent general elections, and a further 10 per cent is allocated in proportion to the number of women elected in the local elections. The impact in Togo is unclear, as only one round of elections has been held since these provisions were introduced. In contrast to systems where political parties that reach a certain level receive a certain amount of additional funding, this approach means that parties get more money the more women they nominate or get elected.

Setting aside a small percentage of the overall amount of public funding available for parties with a certain level of female candidates or elected officials does not significantly affect the amount of public funding parties receive if many parties achieve this target. If only a small number of political parties meet the threshold, however, the situation may be very different. In Ukraine in the fourth quarter of 2017, only one party, Samopomich, accessed the 10 per cent of public funding earmarked for parties with at least one-third of elected MPs from either gender. This meant that it received a top-up amounting to 78 per cent of the public funds that the party would otherwise have been eligible to receive (IFES 2017: 6). It is too early to say whether this funding will have any impact on gender equality in Ukraine (12 per cent of Ukrainian MPs were women as of July 2017), since no elections have been held since public funding started to be distributed to Ukrainian political parties.

3.2. Targeted funding based on allocation

The second type of gender-related public funding is one where the allocation of money to political parties depends on the level of gender equality demonstrated by each political party, most commonly the gender balance among the candidates selected by each party. The formal difference is that with eligibility provisions, a certain proportion of the total public funding is only available to parties that achieve a certain level of gender equality, or that parties that do not reach this level are denied public funding altogether. Allocation provisions, by contrast, mean that parties receive more or less public funding depending on the level of
gender equality among their candidates. Allocation provisions can include either the addition or the withdrawal of public funding, and can therefore function as either a carrot or a stick. The difference between eligibility and allocation provisions for political parties and female candidates may in some cases be quite small.

Receiving more money if gender criteria is reached, or per woman nominated or elected

Many countries provide additional funds to parties depending on their degree of gender equality, which is normally related to the proportion or number of female candidates or, in some cases, successful female candidates. The most straightforward system is to provide additional public funding for each woman candidate who is either nominated or elected. In Chile parties receive a flat rate of additional public funding for each woman candidate from that party who is elected. In Croatia parties receive an additional 10 per cent of the amount envisaged for each member of parliament for each woman elected. A temporary measure in Solomon Islands provides for increased public funding to any party that has at least one woman elected to parliament, although only one woman was elected in the most recent election. Less detailed provisions are in place that allow for increased public funding in relation to the number of female candidates nominated by parties in Ethiopia, Romania and South Korea.

It is also possible, albeit unusual, to relate public funding to the share of the vote that female candidates attract. In Papua New Guinea female candidates who gain at least 10 per cent of the vote earn their political parties an additional flat rate in public funding. (This is the only allocation system that uses a threshold, although in this case set as a share of the vote, not of women as candidates.)

Another version of this approach is to provide a relative increase of public funding to political parties that reach a certain level of gender equality among nominated or elected candidates. In Georgia, political parties that receive public funding are entitled to 30 per cent additional funding if their candidate lists have at least 30 per cent of each gender in the first 10 names (with the same principle applying to the next two sets of 10 candidates on a list). As is analysed in the case study on Haiti (Chapter 7), parties that nominate and are successful in electing female candidates also receive additional funding, but the threshold for gaining this additional funding has recently increased.

The country known to have introduced gender-related public funding most recently is Moldova, which introduced legal amendments in July 2017. Political parties that nominate women to at least 40 per cent of their seats in the single-member constituencies can gain access to additional funding. The system is somewhat complicated, in that these parties not only receive an additional 10 per cent of public funding, but are also meant to receive a multiple of the funding for every woman elected, although that multiple is not established in law (Electoral
Gender-targeted Public Funding for Political Parties

Code, article 41.2.2). Such a provision had been advocated by Moldovan civil society groups (Promo-Lex 2016: 23). The threshold for gender-related public funding in Cabo Verde is 25 per cent, but it is not clear how much additional funding parties receive.

The practical difference between providing a flat rate or relative increase, and setting aside a certain proportion of total public funding for parties according to gender criteria—as occurs when gender-targeted public funding is based on eligibility—is often minimal for the political parties, but it does have an impact on the total amount of public funds that the state needs to allocate to political parties. Only with the latter approach is the total amount of public funding needed known in advance.

Receiving less money if target for gender balance not achieved

The reverse situation as an approach to allocation is where public funding is reduced if a party does not meet a set definition of gender equality. The threshold for the proportion of female candidates nominated is 30 per cent in Albania, Burkina Faso and Ireland, and 40 per cent in Italy. Legislation in Ireland anticipates the threshold increasing gradually, but only in relation to general elections. It should be noted that, after 2023, a 40 per cent threshold will be used in Ireland (Brennan and Buckley 2017: 16). In Albania, a variable amount is deducted from the public funding available to each party if it fails to nominate women to at least 30 per cent of seats, while Burkinabe and Irish parties lose half their funding and Italian parties 10 per cent of their funding if they fail to reach the threshold. In Honduras, parties that fail to nominate candidates at full parity in the 2017 elections face a 5 per cent reduction in their campaign public funding.

Another alternative is a reduction in public funding that is proportionally related to the gap between men and women among the party’s candidates. In France, the public funding of any political party is reduced by three-quarters of the gender gap between candidates, where this gap exceeds 2 per cent (in practice 51 per cent men and 49 per cent women). In Portugal, there are several levels of reduction in public funding for parties that do not meet the one-third gender quota introduced in 2006, or that have more than two candidates consecutively of the same gender on a candidate list. The quota does not apply to elections with small electorates (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2008: 15).

While rare, rules can also mean reduced public funding for political parties that fail to perform certain activities. In Honduras, 5 per cent of the public funding provided to a political party is deducted where a party fails to produce a policy on gender discrimination.
3.3. Earmarking the use of parts of public funding

Provisions that specify that a proportion of the public funding provided must be used for specified activities relate to gender equality are also common (see Ballington and Kahane 2014: 322–24). While slightly less common than approaches that vary the allocation of public funding, this is the most common form of regulation used around the world.

In Brazil and Italy parties must use at least 5 per cent of their funds to promote the participation of women. There are also provisions in Brazil that a certain share of the airtime given to each political party must be devoted to promoting political participation by women. Meanwhile, in Chile, Honduras, Panama and South Korea 10 per cent is earmarked for gender-related activities. A more modest provision in Mexico requires parties to use at least 2 per cent of their public funding for such purposes.

In some countries, the provisions are more general. In Colombia, for example, not less than 15 per cent of the funding for each political party must be used to increase the participation of youth, women and ethnic minorities, while 30 per cent must be used for similar purposes in Kenya. An unspecified proportion of the public funding in Ireland must be used to promote women’s participation.

An alternative approach is to earmark some of the public funding for specific recipients within a political party. In Finland, for example, the public funding rules state that not less than 5 per cent of the funding received must be used for activities to enhance gender equality, although in practice most parties allocate the funding to their respective women’s wings. The agreement was previously 10 per cent, but this percentage was lowered as the total public funding increased, leaving the amounts received by the women’s wings the same in absolute terms (Communication with Hanne Lyytikkä). In other countries, such as Sweden, the women’s wings of parties receive separate funding from that given to political parties. The total allocation to the women’s wings of Swedish political parties in 2016 amounted to SEK 15 million, or around USD 2 million (Sveriges Riksdag 2016). Women’s organizations in Slovenia can also obtain state funding linked to the empowerment of women. A similar system is used for the women’s wings umbrella association in Finland. For an analysis of the public funding to women’s wings in Sweden see Utredningen statligt stöd för kvinnors organisering (2004). In Costa Rica, political parties must prove that they have spent an equal amount on training for people of each gender for the money spent on such training to be reimbursed through public funding.

Earmarking a proportion of the public funding provided must not be seen as a mutually exclusive alternative to approaches where the amount of public funding that political parties receive is related to the gender balance among the candidates either nominated or elected. Earmarking can be used even if such approaches are
not, for example to pave the way within political parties for greater internal gender equality. However, earmarking can also be used to ensure that the additional funds provided to political parties are used for gender-related activities. Where the main goal is to incentivize political parties to nominate more women in competitive electoral contests, rather than to strengthen gender equality within parties as such, earmarking the public funding provided can make relating the amount provided to gender equality among candidates less effective. Political parties would not be allowed to use the additional public funding gained from nominating women for the purposes they consider most important, most notably campaigning in marginal electoral areas and reducing the electoral disadvantage that many political parties perceive to be the result of nominating more female candidates.

When earmarking a proportion of public funding for certain purposes, monitoring compliance can be a significant challenge. In Colombia, a proportion of the public funding should be used to support gender equality within political parties, but Falguera and Casas-Zamora have found that: ‘there is concern about the complete lack of legal controls over the effective use of these resources to promote female leadership. The general opinion is that in most cases this pool of money is simply put to other uses by party authorities, including the daily administration of party offices, the celebration of Mother’s Day and even the purchase of flowers for events’ (Falguera and Casas-Zamora 2016: 29).

Table 3.2 summarizes the three main types of gender-targeted public funding, and the countries in which these types of funding have been used. Further information about each country is provided in the Annex. Only countries with specific provisions for gender-targeted public funding are included in these tables.
### 3. Types of gender-targeted public funding

#### Table 3.2. Proposed typology of gender-targeted funding for political parties around the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted funding based on eligibility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Eligibility for part of public funding dependent on having a certain level of gender balance among candidates</td>
<td>10% of the total public funds is distributed to political parties in proportion to the number of female candidates that they nominate</td>
<td>6 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Mali, Niger, Togo, Ukraine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Eligibility for public funding dependent on having a certain level of gender balance among internal party officeholders</td>
<td>At least one-third of internal party office holders must be women for the party to receive public funding</td>
<td>1 (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted funding based on allocation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Parties receive additional flat rate of funding for female candidates</td>
<td>Political parties receive an additional 1,000 dollars for each woman nominated, or each woman elected</td>
<td>7 (Chile, Croatia, Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Romania, Solomon Islands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Additional public funds distributed to parties in relation to the gender balance among candidates</td>
<td>Political parties that have at least 30% of women among their candidates receive an extra 10% of public funding</td>
<td>4 (Cabo Verde, Georgia, Haiti, Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Reduction in public funding if a political party fails to reach given level of gender balance</td>
<td>If a political party has less than 30% female candidates, it will receive 20% less public funding</td>
<td>7 (Albania, Burkina Faso, France, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Portugal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earmarking of public funds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Part of public funding to party earmarked for gender-related activities</td>
<td>15% of the public funding allocated to a political party should be used for activities to reduce gender inequality</td>
<td>12 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Finland, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Panama, Republic of Korea)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. National experiences of gender-targeted public funding

4.1. The introduction of gender-targeted public funding

This chapter uses case studies of selected countries to consider the experience of gender-targeted public funding. First, however, the introduction of such provisions in the various countries where they are used is discussed. The regulation of politics does not occur in a vacuum, and it is valuable to consider the situation in different countries at the time when gender-targeted public funding was introduced.

There would appear to be three groups of countries that have introduced such regulations. The first consists of countries with very low levels of representation of women in parliament (5 per cent or below) at the time the provision was introduced, including for example Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and South Korea. Countries such as Albania, Georgia and Serbia come close to this group but are not included in it because the percentage of women in their respective parliaments at the time of introduction was slightly above 5 per cent.

The second group already had a comparatively high proportion of women in parliament (above 20 per cent) at time gender-targeted public funding was introduced, including for example Croatia, Ethiopia, Italy, Mexico and Portugal. In Italy this applies to the introduction of a reduction in public funding for parties that draw up candidate lists with significant levels of gender inequality. Earmarking was introduced at an earlier date, when only 11% of Italian parliamentarians were women. Countries such as Cabo Verde and Chile come
close to this group but are not included in it because the percentage of women in their respective parliaments at the time of introduction was slightly below 20 per cent.

The third, perhaps less informative, group consists of countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, France and Ireland, where the level of female representation was close to the global average at the time the provision was introduced.

It is worth noting that in the countries that did not have an extremely low number of women in parliament, there had often been a significant increase shortly before the regulation was introduced. In Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia and Niger, the share of women in parliament had more than doubled in the election preceding the introduction of gender-targeted public funding. Romania and South Korea also show a similar pattern. This seems to support the notion that an increase in the representation of women in parliament increases the chances of legislation to support further improvements in this area.

A notable increase in the number of women elected to parliament is often part of a wider movement for gender equality by various actors in a country, as the case studies on Croatia, France and Portugal demonstrate. The Portuguese reform, described as being the ‘culmination of over 30 years of demands’ by different actors, is a particular case in point (Monteiro 2012: 4). The dedicated efforts of women activists and those fighting for increased political pluralism are often an important driving force behind reforms of this kind.

On the other hand, gender-targeted public funding sometimes seems to be a choice favoured by political actors unwilling to introduce a system of gender quotas where non-compliance would mean that the party would not be able to participate in elections. Such a move often coincided with pressure for reform, as was certainly the case in Portugal, and the French solution also followed earlier electoral promises on quotas. It is possible that if a quota had been introduced in France where non-compliance meant that a party would not be allowed to participate in elections, it might have been struck down by the Conseil Constitutionnel in a case such as that discussed in the case study on France (Chapter 6 of this report). Sometimes highly ambitious quota requirements, such as the parity requirements in Haiti and Honduras, have been combined with modest enforcement mechanisms through gender-targeted public funding, which makes these provisions easy to ignore for political parties that wish to do so.

It is also possible that the introduction of gender-targeted political funding in Croatia in 2001 reduced the pressure for a quota to be part of the Act on Gender Equality when this was passed in 2003. Advocates of gender quotas should perhaps be wary of allowing gender-targeted public funding to be adopted first, if this provides an excuse for politicians to reject the introduction of quotas.

The introduction of gender-targeted public funding across the world has not been linear over time, and the number of countries introducing regulations of this
kind seems to have declined in recent years. This may however be a temporary change, and data from the past two or three years is scarce.

One interesting factor is that gender-targeted public funding is significantly more common in countries with list-based systems of PR. While less than 40 per cent of countries worldwide use such a system, nearly 60 per cent of the countries that use gender-targeted public funding do so (International IDEA 2017). Factors such as electoral systems may therefore have a significant impact on the chances of introducing gender-targeted public funding. Earlier research has found that countries with a high level of perceived corruption are more likely to introduce gender-related public funding, although the reason for this correlation is unclear (Ohman 2012: 16).

Not all the initiatives to introduce gender-related public funding have led to legal reform. An initiative by the Constitutional Commission in Turkey in 2009 to earmark 20 per cent of public funding for gender-related activities and for the use of women’s wings in political parties has not yet been implemented (Walecki et al. 2009; Gençkaya 2014).

4.2. Criteria for the selection of case studies

Gender-targeted funding is generally intended to create incentives for political parties to nominate more female candidates to constituencies or list positions where they have a chance of winning. To study the detailed background on how and why such regulations have been introduced, detailed studies of individual countries are needed. In addition, to study the impact on the candidate selection considerations of political parties, especially in the shorter term, it is essential to examine individual cases.

Naturally, it is not possible to analyse all forms of gender-targeted public funding through a limited number case studies. The purpose of the case studies included here is to analyse the introduction, construction and impact of gender-targeted public funding in selected countries, without any claim that the experiences in these countries are representative of all the countries that use gender-targeted public funding.

Nor is a random selection of cases advisable, given the small number of countries using provisions of this kind, and the significant variations between the different countries in many different areas. In selecting the cases to study, we decided to only study countries where the amount of public funding provided is in some way related to the level of gender equality among political parties’ nominated or successful candidates. (Apart from the countries that only use the earmarking of public funding since, as described above, any impact of such provisions is likely to be more longer-term.) To increase the chances of being able to detect any impact of the regulations, only those countries where at least three regular elections have occurred since the rules were introduced have been selected.
Although necessary, this approach unfortunately excluded many of the countries currently using gender-targeted public funding, especially those outside Europe. The selection was also made to include countries with different types of gender-targeted public funding and electoral systems. Finally, to some extent the selection of cases was also guided by the availability of relevant information.

Among the countries chosen as case studies is Albania, which uses a closed-list system of PR and has held three elections since the introduction of gender-targeted public funding. Parties that do not achieve a predetermined degree of gender balance lose part of their public funding, but this relates to public funding specifically related to election campaigns.

Croatia, for the past five elections, has allocated political parties an additional 10 per cent of public funding for each woman candidate elected, using an open-list system of PR. France has held four elections since gender-targeted public funding was introduced. There, parties with a gender gap between its candidates lose part of the funding that they would otherwise have been entitled to. French elections are held to single-member districts using two rounds of first-past-the-post voting. The top two candidates in the first round proceed to the second round unless any candidate won an absolute majority in the first round.

The electoral system in Haiti is very similar to that of France. Those political parties which achieved a certain level of gender equality between their male and female candidates in each of the past three elections would be eligible to receive additional public funding. Haiti also stands out from the case studies for having a very low level of women’s representation in political office when gender-targeted public funding was introduced. Portugal elects its parliament using a closed-list system of PR. As in Albania, parties that do not achieve a predetermined degree of gender balance lose part of their public funding. In the past three elections, political parties that did not nominate an agreed proportion of female candidates lost part of the funding they would otherwise have been entitled to.
5. Gender-targeted funding in Albania

After World War II, Albania languished under a particularly repressive dictatorship until the end of Communist control over Eastern Europe. Since then, the country has undergone several political upheavals. Although a republic, Albania is the only country in these cases studies where the president is indirectly elected by parliament and has limited political power. The single-chamber parliament is elected using a closed-list system of PR. Nine elections have been held since the return of democratic rule.

One report on gender in Albanian politics argues that ‘politics is an area where deep gender differences exist and persist’ (Dragoti et al. 2011: 7). In the first elections after the fall of the dictatorship only 4 per cent of the elected parliamentarians were women. This improved little in the following elections, apart from an increase to 12 per cent in 1996. A new Constitution adopted in 1998 banned gender discrimination, but this had little impact on gender equality in parliamentary representation. Only 6 per cent of the MPs elected in the 2004 elections were women (see Table 5.1).

A number of laws on gender relations followed, but few referred to the political process (Dragoti et al. 2011: 7). The most significant, the Law on Gender Equality in Society of 2004, did not contain provisions to persuade political parties to nominate more women for election. A revised version of this law was passed in 2008. Many actors, such as women’s groups, other civil society actors and media outlets, played a role in placing this reform on the political agenda (see Dhembo 2010). The new provisions require political party steering committees and the lists of candidates nominated for election to contain at least 30 per cent representation of both genders. Political parties are required to identify their own methods for ensuring compliance with these rules. The sanction for non-
compliance took the form of gender-targeted public funding, as the rules mean that public funding is deducted from any party that fails to nominate at least 30 per cent of its candidates from either gender (article 15.3). A stronger sanction for not complying with the 30 per cent threshold was introduced in the Electoral Code, but this was repealed in 2012 (OSCE/ODIHR 2013b: 12).

Political parties in Albania receive a majority of their income from public funding, which means that the country complies with the first of the factors discussed in the introduction as underlying the success of gender-targeted public funding (GRECO 2009: 9). Does this mean that the introduction of gender-targeted public funding changed the candidate selection behaviour of the political parties?

Although some parties failed to meet the 30 per cent target in the 2009 elections, which followed the 2008 reform, the representation of women among candidates increased from just 9 per cent in the 2005 elections to 32 per cent. The number of women elected was much lower than the number of female candidates, however, indicating that many women were nominated far down the candidate lists. Even so, the proportion of women MPs was still more than double that of the preceding parliament (see Table 5.1; Dragotì et al. 2011: 24).

In the 2013 elections the proportion of female candidates reached 40 per cent. Again, many political parties included women at the bottom of the lists in unwinnable positions and as a result, the proportion of women in parliament was significantly lower, at 18 per cent. However, this still represented a small increase compared to the previous elections. Technically, parties were required to place at least one woman in the three places at the top of every list, but the Central Election Commission (CEC) did not make use of a legal provision that civil society activists argued would allow it to rearrange candidate lists to fit this requirement (OSCE/ODIHR 2013b: 12).

The OSCE/ODIHR election report on the 2013 elections noted that ‘the three largest parliamentary parties (DP, SP, and SMI) failed to comply with the gender quota in four, six, and four districts, respectively. Although the CEC provided the parties an opportunity to rectify the gender quota breaches, the parties did not do so’ (OSCE/ODIHR 2013a: 7). At this time, the fine for non-compliance had increased from ALL 30,000 per district (around USD 275) to ALL 1 million (around USD 9200), to be deducted from the public funding that the party was due to receive for the election campaign (OSCE/ODIHR 2013b: 12). Of the ALL 65 million distributed to political parties for the election campaign, ALL 22 million was later deducted from parties for failing to comply with the gender requirement—over one-third of the total amount provided (ODIHR 2013a: 9; BalkanInsight 2013).
Table 5.1. Share of female candidates and MPs in Albanian elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (parliamentary election)</th>
<th>% of female candidates</th>
<th>% of women elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPU 2018.
Notes: In the 2005 elections, some seats were filled through single-seat elections.

In the most recent elections of 2017, women made up 42 per cent of the parliamentary candidates, which is significantly above what the law requires. While still lower than the percentage of female candidates, the proportion of women in the Albanian parliament reached 28 per cent. This is a notable increase on the 7 per cent only ten years before, when gender-targeted public funding was introduced.

Two political parties had public funding deducted for non-compliance shortly after the elections: the winning Socialist party and the third largest party, the Socialist Movement for Integration. A reduction in public funding for these parties was made amounting to ALL 1 million each, for failing to respect the gender quota in the Tirana and Berat districts, respectively (OSCE/ODIHR 2017: 11). The parties had received ALL 28 million (USD 255000) and ALL 7 million (USD 64400), respectively, before the election, so the deduction amounted to 4 per cent and 14 per cent.

After some initial hesitation, the CEC also fined the second largest political party, the Democratic Party, ALL 12 million, which amounted to 57 per cent of the funding that the party received before the elections, for failing to meet the 30 per cent gender quota on some of its electoral lists, and for not including at least one woman among the top three candidates in others (NDI Albania 2017). This is the harshest fine of its kind ever imposed in Albania, although the delay in imposing the fine may have had less to do with its size than the political...
negotiations before the elections to persuade the Democratic Party to participate in the electoral process at all.

In Albania, party dependency on public funding is very high (nearly 90 per cent), and the deduction of public funding for failing to nominate 30 per cent female candidates is also a significant penalty in most cases. Even the largest party would have stood to lose 43 per cent of its public funding in the 2017 elections if it had failed to reach the target in all districts. The second largest party did in fact lose 57 per cent, and all the other parties could have lost their entire public funding allocation (Calculated from OSCE/ODIHR 2017: 9). The third criteria is more difficult to analyse. The fact that only 7 per cent of Albanian MPs were women when the gender-targeted public funding was introduced in 2008 shows that the electorate was not used to seeing women in national politics, and surveys have found a generally conservative view of gender roles in Albanian society as a whole (Dauti and Zhllima 2016). On the other hand, the fact that the Albanian electoral system is based on PR and closed lists means that any potential resistance among the electorate to female candidates that party leaders might fear is likely to have a smaller impact than if the country elected its parliamentarians through single-member constituencies, or even through an open list system.

The failure of the larger parties to reach the set threshold on some lists in the 2017 elections does not detract from the fact that the proportion of women as candidates and the number of elected MPs have significantly increased since the legal reform. Gender-targeted public funding accompanied by a significant impact on non-compliant political parties may have played a role in dramatically changing the landscape for women and men in the Albanian Parliament. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2021. The goal of the Albanian National Strategy and Action Plan on Gender Equality 2016–2020 is that the country will elect women to 40 per cent of the seats in the Albanian parliament (Government of Albania 2016: 23).
6. Gender-targeted funding in Croatia

Croatia is among the countries that have been using gender-targeted public funding for the longest. Croatia became independent in 1991 and has since joined both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Although the president in Croatia is directly elected, she or he is not the head of government and has only limited powers. Croatia elected its first female president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, in 2015. Croatian politics since independence have been largely dominated by the centre-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP).

The country uses an open-list system of PR for most parliamentary seats. It has been argued elsewhere in this report that such electoral systems are especially easy to combine with systems of public funding where political parties receive additional public funding if they reach a predetermined level of gender balance among their candidates (often 30 per cent), or alternatively lose some public funding if they fail to reach such a level. Currently, 140 of the 151 seats are elected using this method, and the remaining seats are elected to special constituencies for ethnic minorities and for Croats living abroad. However, the gender-targeted public funding in Croatia differs from the system used in the other case studies presented here, in that there is a relative increase in the total funding awarded for each candidate of the underrepresented gender elected to parliament.

Unlike in countries such as France, the share of women in parliament was comparatively high when gender-targeted public funding was introduced in 2001: 20 per cent of MPs were women at that time, compared to a European average of 17 per cent per cent. It should be stressed however that this was exclusively the
result of the 2000 elections, since before that date each election since 1991 had produced parliaments with a single-digit percentage representation of women. According to one scholar, the low number of women in Croatian politics until that point was partly related to political factors such as ‘an unconsolidated party system, semi-presidential constitutional framework and one party’s monopoly (president’s party)’ (Siročić 2014: 2).

A major factor in the increased proportion of successful female candidates in the 2000 elections was the electoral success of the SDP, which had the highest percentage of female candidates of the participating parties: either 27 or 31 per cent, depending on the source (Irvine 2012: 15; IRI 2000: 30). Other factors behind the increase in women’s participation in these elections were the concerted efforts of Croatian women’s groups, supported by international actors (Irvine 2012; Glaurdic 2001), and the change of electoral system, when a proportional system replaced the mixed or majoritarian systems used in earlier elections (Siročić 2014: 4).

Within a year of the parliament elected in 2000 starting work, a 2001 change to the Political Parties Law introduced a gender-targeted aspect to the existing system of public funding for political parties. Parliamentary parties receive public funding in proportion to the number of MPs that the party has. The amendment provides political parties with an additional 10 per cent of the envisaged public funding for each candidate elected of the underrepresented gender (Mataković 2011: 10). There are no restrictions on how political parties use the public funding they receive.

The increase in public funding for successful female candidates was not intended to be a stand-alone mechanism, however, and work continued on an Act on Gender Equality covering various areas. While there was significant pressure to include legally binding gender quotas in this Act, the version approved in 2003 only called for parties to ‘determine methods for the promotion of a more balanced representation of women and men in the party bodies, on the lists of their candidates for the Croatian Parliament and bodies of local and regional self-government’ (Siročić 2014: 5). The local government elections held between the 2000 parliamentary elections and the passage of the Act on Gender Equality had not been encouraging, as women made up only 14 per cent of the elected representatives (OSCE/ODIHR 2001: 18).

Three factors are discussed in the introduction to this report as increasing the likelihood of success of gender-related public funding: (a) the financial dependency of political parties on public funding, (b) the strength of the connection between public funding and gender equality, and (c) how party officials view societal opinions on the political participation of women and men. Regarding the first of these, the proportion of total party income derived from public sources is high in Croatia, which should increase the potential impact of relating public funding to gender equality.
According to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) evaluation of political finance transparency in Croatia, funding from the state, regional and local budgets amounted to 66 per cent of total party income in the election year of 2007 (GRECO 2009: 9). As the public funding is provided in equal amounts every year (with the exception of certain types of campaign support), while parties in most countries raise more private funding during election years, it is likely that the share of total party income coming from public sources during non-election years is even higher. That this has been the case in Croatia is shown in Petak (2003: 72). Croatian political parties have only had to submit annual financial reports since 2001, so it is not possible to ascertain their relative levels of dependency on public funding before the gender-targeted rules was introduced (Petak 2001: 30).

Since the introduction of gender-targeted public funding, parliamentary elections have been held in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015, and snap elections in 2016. The proportion of successful female candidates in each of these elections varied quite significantly, which highlights the importance of in-depth analysis to understand the impact of gender-targeted public funding (see Table 6.1).

In the first elections held after the rule was introduced, the proportion of elected women fell from 20 per cent to 18 per cent. While full data on the 2000 elections is not available, it seems that the share of female candidates nominated by parties increased in 2003: 25 per cent of all candidates were women. However, the election results show that many of these female candidates were not placed in electable positions on party lists (OSCE/ODIHR 2003: 11). This is especially important since the gender-targeted public funding in Croatia is related to the number of elected women, rather than the number of female candidates. The return to power of the HDZ and electoral losses for the SDP also affected the number of women in parliament, because of the different approaches these parties take to the nomination of women.

Given the way in which gender-targeted public funding is structured in Croatia, however, political parties can also benefit from increasing the number of female MPs between elections. Such changes are frequent in Croatia, mainly due to MPs resigning (often having been appointed to the executive) and being replaced by women from the same candidate list. This factor was important in the 2003–2007 parliament, when the share of women increased from 18 per cent just after the elections to 22 per cent at the end of the mandate period (OSCE/ODIHR 2008: 15).

Gender equality among elected MPs improved in the elections of 2007 and 2011. In the former, 30 per cent of candidates were women, and the share of elected female MPs increased to 21 per cent. There was a further increase through non-electoral changes to 26 per cent by the end of the mandate period (Knežević 2013: 1).
In 2008 a new Act on Gender Equality introduced gender quotas for parliamentary candidacy lists of 40 per cent. However, the 2008 Act did not include any immediate sanctions for non-compliance with this provision, leaving gender-targeted public funding as the main regulatory incentive to nominate women (articles 12, 15 and 35). The new law only provided that in the third election after the law was passed, political parties that failed to meet the quota would face fines of HRK 50,000 (around USD 6400) for each candidate list that did not meet the threshold.

In 2011, 35 per cent of all candidates were women, as were 24 per cent of the elected MPs—the highest level in Croatia so far, although only 16 per cent of candidate lists were led by a woman (OSCE-ODIHR 2012: 9). Unlike in previous elections, however, the share of female MPs did not increase significantly after the elections, and was still at 25 per cent by the end of the mandate period (OSCE-ODIHR 2015:3). It is notable that 87 per cent of the female MPs represented the two largest parties, the HDZ and the SDP, although these parties together held only 77 per cent of the total seats.

Changes to the parliamentary election law in early 2015 made compliance with the 40 per cent quota a requirement for participation in the elections. However, this change was declared unconstitutional in September 2015 by the Constitutional Court, in a case initiated by the Democratic Party of Women (OSCE-ODIHR 2015: 4). The court found that the provisions had a ‘disproportionately restrictive effect on the freedom of nomination of authorised participants in electoral competition, but also in relation to the general development of a multi-party democratic system as the highest value of Croatian constitutional system’ (Dobrotić 2016: 4).

The 2015 elections saw a significant decrease in the proportion of women elected to parliament, to 15 per cent. In line with previous elections, the share of women in parliament increased significantly through non-electoral changes, to 20 per cent. The parliament elected in 2015 only sat for a short period, so non-electoral changes might otherwise have continued.

Parliament dissolved itself in September 2015 and new elections were held one year later. In these elections, 40 per cent of all candidates were women (IPU 2017: 11). The share of elected women however was much lower, at 13 per cent. As in the previous elections, the election results only show part of the picture. As of August 2017 the share of women in the Croatian Parliament stood at 20 per cent. The majority of seats are held by the HDZ and the SDP, and 20 and 14 per cent or their MPs, respectively, are women.
Given the changing fortunes of women in Croatian elections, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the impact of the gender-targeted public funding. Although the public funding system used focuses on elected women rather than on the gender balance between candidates, the system has failed to persuade political parties to nominate women to electable positions. The share of women nominated remains much higher than the share of elected female MPs. The candidate selection process in Croatian political parties is reportedly fairly centralized and controlled by the party leadership (Leakovic 2017).

However, the share of female MPs has tended to increase significantly between elections, and the gender-targeted public funding encourages increases in the number of female MPs through such non-electoral changes. In contrast, the 2015 Ukrainian legislation did not clarify whether the threshold for gender-targeted public funding applied to the share of women elected, or to the share of each party at the time funding is provided, something that led to significant debate within the country (IFES 2016).

It could therefore be that the gender-targeted public funding in Croatia has more of an impact on non-electoral increases in the share of female MPs than on the candidate nomination decisions of political parties. However, even though the share of women at the end of each mandate period is higher than just after the
election, this does not alter the fact that the share of women in the Croatian parliament has decreased relative to the improvements immediately after the introduction of gender-targeted public funding, and indeed is lower now than before the rule was introduced.

One of the reasons for the limited impact of gender-targeted public funding in Croatia may be the amount of additional funding (10 per cent) parties gain from having women elected as MPs, which does not represent a major change in the total amount of public funding received. Table 6.2 shows the two major parties in the final year of the recent parliamentary mandate periods, when the share of women has tended to be the highest. The table shows that the largest increase in public funding received by the HDZ linked to female MPs was 2 per cent, and in the case of the SDP the increase was never more than 5 per cent. In other words, the system in Croatia does not comply with the second factor discussed in the introduction—that there must be a strong connection between the public funding provided and the gender balance. The system design in Croatia, it seems, is not sufficient to persuade parties to nominate women ahead of elections.

Table 6.2. Public funding related to gender equality in Croatia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/share of female MPs</td>
<td>12 / 19%</td>
<td>15 / 33%</td>
<td>7 / 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total funding</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase linked to gender-targeted funding (% total funding)</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative increase linked to gender-targeted public funding</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/share of female MPs</td>
<td>13 / 43%</td>
<td>19 / 36%</td>
<td>19 / 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total funding</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase linked to gender-targeted funding (% total funding)</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative increase linked to gender-targeted public funding</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data on the number and share of female MPs for each party, and for party share of seats (funding allocation) from Croatian Parliament (2018). Increases in funding are consequent calculations by the author.

Notes: The increase as percentage of total funding shows how many per cent more the party gained due to having women elected as MPs. For example, an increase from 10% to 12% would be an increase of 2%. The relative increase relates the size of the increase to the size of the original amount. In this case, an increase from 10% to 12% would be ((12-10)/10 = 20%). In other words, in relative terms the political party would receive one-fifth more than it would otherwise.
The inability of the gender-targeted public funding to affect the activities of political parties may be exacerbated by political parties’ perception of societal attitudes to gender relations—the third factor discussed in the introduction. In one 2013 discussion on gender equality in Croatian politics, one observer noted that ‘We still live in a patriarchal society, and… women, are socialized to feel grateful if we are promoted, put high on the election lists. This gratitude is usually towards male party leaders, even though in most cases we have earned the position. Our male colleagues do not have that problem’ (UNDP Croatia 2013). Another researcher emphasized how public opinion surveys have highlighted the factors of ‘patriarchy, collectivism and family-orientation’ (Nacevska and Lokar 2017: 410).

The complicated attitude to gender inequality in Croatian politics also applies outside of parliament. While the country elected a woman president for the first time in the 2014–15 elections, women held only three of the 21 ministerial posts at that time (OSCE/ODIHR 2015: 3).

The next general election in Croatia, currently scheduled for 2020, will be of great interest with regard to gender representation and political finance, in part since the financial penalties for failing to reach the 40 per cent quota will come into force (Dobrotić 2016: 4). However, if the fine remains at the very low level set in 2003—a fine of around EUR 6,600—this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the decision-making of Croatian political parties.

In conclusion, Croatia complies with the first of the three factors mentioned in the introduction, as the level of financial dependency on public funding is high. However, the connection between gender equality and public funding is extremely weak, which in practice gives political parties very limited incentives to increase the share of women nominated in order to access these funds. This weak connection is arguably insufficient to overcome the wish among party officials to retain incumbents and the fear of losing votes by nominating women.
7. Gender-targeted funding in France

Another country that was an early adopter of gender-targeted public funding is France. French National Assembly elections take place in single-member districts, and there is a second round between the top two candidates if no candidate receives more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round. The president is directly elected and shares executive power with the prime minister, who is chosen but cannot be dismissed by the president. A woman has never been president of France. The only female prime minister, Édith Cresson, served for less than one year in 1991–92. France has a long history of gender inequality. Women voted for the first time in 1945, and the share of women in the French Parliament did not go above six per cent until 1993 (Raevaara and Taskinen n.d.).

There had long been discussions about the need to improve the gender balance of French politics, since the campaign by President François Mitterrand in 1981 to introduce a 30 per cent quota for women. At the time, some saw this as a threat to ‘Frenchness’. The Observatoire de la Parité was set up in 1995 to make recommendations for reform (Lambert 2001; Wall 2014: 21). Little came of these initiatives, however, and when gender-targeted public funding was introduced in 2000 (Law 2000-493), women represented only 11 per cent of French National Assembly members, below both the global and the European average. Nonetheless, while this was a very low percentage, it represented almost twice the share of women in the National Assembly after preceding elections.

The new legislation followed a 1999 change to the 1958 Constitution, which enabled laws to ‘promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to positions of professional and social responsibility’ (France 1958/1999). In addition, while political parties should be able to be ‘formed and
carry out their activities freely’, they should nonetheless ‘contribute to the implementation of the principle [of gender equality]’. There were many sources of the new legislation but the Observatoire de la Parité was a major factor behind the legal reform pushed through by the Government of President Lionel Jospin (URCIDFF Aquitaine 2010: 2; Wall 2014). The principle of gender equality was later moved to article 1 of the Constitution (in 2008). The 1944 Electoral Law already stated that ‘women have the right to vote and to be elected on the same terms as men’ (Raevaara and Taskinen n.d.).

It soon became clear that strong political forces were opposed to any approach whereby failure to nominate a set percentage of women would result in a party’s candidates being prevented from appearing on the ballot. As the Minister of Solidarity observed, when announcing the creation of the Observatoire de la Parité in 1995, ‘parity must be achieved without binding measures, otherwise it has no effect’ (Vital Durand 1995). Nonetheless, binding quotas were introduced for list-based elections in France, as is discussed further below. The most recent provision was passed as part of Law 2014-873 (article 60). The Minister’s view appears to be in line with that of the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), which in 1982 had invalidated a 25 per cent gender quota law for municipal elections, ‘in the name of the equality of citizens under the law’ (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008: 52). One possible way forward might have been voluntary quotas adopted by the French political parties, but this approach was not pursued by most parties, strengthening the pressure for legal reform (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008: 52).

The 2000 legal reform introduced the concept of gender parity into French legislation, rather than explicit quotas, and the resulting system is sometimes described as a ‘de facto’ quota (Lambert 2001). The provision meant that if the gender gap between all the candidates presented by a political party was larger than 2 per cent (in practice larger than 51 per cent men and 49 per cent women), the public funding received by that party would be reduced. The reduction was originally set at half of that gap, later increased to two-thirds and since 2014 has been 1.5 times the gap (Vital Durand 1995). This means that if a party nominate 60 per cent men and 40 per cent women (a gap of 20 per cent), its public funding is reduced by 30 per cent, and if it were to not nominate any women at all it would forfeit all the public funding that it would otherwise have received.

In contrast to many of the other forms of gender-targeted public funding discussed in this report, the French system means that parties that do not wish, for whatever reason, to nominate candidates according to full gender parity still have a clear financial incentive to ensure that the gap is as small as possible. It is crucial in this context that although French elections are held to single member districts, the candidate selection process is generally highly centralized. For example, when Emmanuel Macron won the 2017 presidential election, his newly
formed party had to scramble to select candidates for the parliamentary election held about a month afterwards (Willsher 2017).

If party activists in each electoral district decided on their candidate, they might not be very interested in the impact of their decision on the public funding given to the party nationally. However, candidate selection in France has been described as a ‘prerogative of the elite’ following a gradual increase of ‘control over the candidate selection process by the central party organisations at the expense of local elites’ (Krouwel 1999: 13). This is gradually changing in the Socialist Party, but this party performed very badly in the 2017 elections (de Luca and Venturino 2016). A 2017 study shows that, in general, ‘candidates for legislative elections are mainly appointed at a central level by bodies closely tied to the leadership of each of the parties in question’ (Achin and Lévêque 2017: 8).

The 2000 gender parity provision and other related reforms introduced at the time have been described as ‘the world’s most ambitious’ legislation to increase the political participation of women (Paxton and Hughes 2017). In addition to the public funding of political parties, male and female candidates who gain at least 5 per cent of the vote and whose financial reports are approved can be reimbursed for not more than 50 per cent of their campaign expenses, excluding any personal contribution to their campaign (GRECO 2009: 7).

Not everyone accepted the provisions connecting public funding to gender equality among candidates when they were introduced. In 2000, a group of French politicians took this issue (with others) to the Conseil Constitutionnel, arguing that the penalties involved were ‘manifestly out of proportion’ to the constitutional objective of achieving gender equality (Ohman 2011: 7). However, the court argued that the provision on gender-targeted public funding was not a punitive measure, and that ‘its purpose is to give these parties and groups an incentive to implement the principle of equal access of women and men to elective functions’, as outlined in the Constitution (Conseil Constitutionnel 2000: 3).

Public funding is a major source of income for French political parties and a reduction in public funding would significantly affect the financial status of a party. France therefore complies with the first criteria discussed in the introduction to this report. On the connection between gender equality and public funding, the gradually increasing penalty for non-compliance aims to increase the impact of the provision on the candidate selection decisions of French parties. The original level was ‘so low that the regulation is broadly ignored’, a weakness that the French Government had recognized as early as 2003 (Piccio 2014: 238).

The first step in addressing whether the introduction of gender-targeted public funding has been accompanied by improvements in the gender balance in French politics is to examine whether the proportion of female candidates and elected parliamentarians has increased. This is certainly the case. For example, in 1973
women held 1 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly, while in 1978 they held 3 per cent of seats. Women made up only 25 per cent of the candidates for the National Assembly in the 1997 elections, which preceded the 2000 legal reform. This increased to 39 per cent in the 2002 elections, and has remained around that level in the three elections since. Table 7.1 also shows an interesting relationship between the proportion of women nominated and the proportion elected in consecutive French elections. In the first election in which gender-targeted public funding was used, the proportion of women elected to the National Assembly, which the reform ultimately aimed to increase, largely remained the same, although this was still much higher than in the elections of 1993 and earlier. This was seen as a ‘great disappointment’ (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008: 17). The 2007 elections saw a major increase to 19 per cent and France exceeded the global average for the first time. In the 2012 elections France even exceeded the European average. In the most recent elections in June 2017, France took another leap to a Scandinavian level of gender equality in the National Assembly, reaching 39 per cent and placing the country 16th in the world as of July 2017 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017).

### Table 7.1. Share of women in the French parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (National Assembly elections)</th>
<th>% of female candidates in France</th>
<th>% of female MPs in France (lower house)</th>
<th>% of female MPs in Europe</th>
<th>% of female MPs in the world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources*: Data on women in parliament from IPU (2017); data on female candidates from Christensen and Bardall (2014) and for the 2017 elections from IPU (2018).

To get a full idea of the nomination decisions by the different French political parties, Table 7.2 shows the share of women nominated and elected by the major political parties in the election before gender-targeted public funding was
introduced and in the elections held since that reform, with the exception of the 2012 elections, for which relevant data at party level was not available at the time of writing).

Table 7.2. Share of female candidates and elected MPs per party in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parti communiste français (Communist Party, PC)</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti socialiste (Socialist Party, PS)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement pour la République (RPR, 1997), Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP, 2002, 2007, 2012), Les Républicains (LR, 2017)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front national (FN)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La République En Marche! (LREM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La France Insoumise (LFI)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: NOM = nominated; ELE = elected; N/A = not available.
Sources: Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2008: 56); Mazoue (2017); Murray (2012); author’s own calculations. LREM and LFI were created in the lead-up to the 2017 elections. FN did not gain any seats in the 2002 and 2007 elections.
Naturally, it cannot be concluded automatically that these increases were the result of gender-targeted public funding. The relative success of left wing parties in the 2007 and especially the 2012 elections had an effect, since left-wing parties in France are more likely to nominate women to electable positions, and the success of the REM in 2012 based on parity in electoral lists also played a role (Lépinard and Lieber 2015: 11).

The Socialist Party, which was in power between 2012 and 2017, sets internal party quotas for its electoral candidates (Venice Commission 2008: 28). However, it has been argued that the Socialist Party has also been reluctant to deselect incumbent MPs, who are mainly men (Murray 2007: 572). For a recent study on the approach to nominating women among right- and left-wing parties, see Durovic, Squarcioni and Tiberj (2017).

The various reforms to enhance gender equality introduced in 2000, including a quota for other types of elections, may also have had an impact on the National Assembly elections. (The quota affects Senatorial elections, and the proportion of women Senators has more than doubled since the legislation was introduced. There have been similar increases in municipal elections.)

In France the allocation of public funding to political parties is based partly on the votes received and partly on seats won. The gender provision is only related to the first aspect and, as Murray has pointed out, it therefore has a major impact on small parties that expect to win few or no seats. The impact is much smaller on larger parties as ‘any losses made from failing to implement parity can be offset if sufficient seats are won. Parties who are rich enough can therefore afford to sidestep the law, whereas poorer parties cannot’ (Murray 2007: 575). This may partly explain why the small far-right National Front nominated 49 per cent female candidates in the 2002 elections, in spite of its open rejection of the parity legislation (Murray 2007: 581). One implication of this is that gender-targeted public funding may help to keep the number of women elected to the National Assembly high even when the political pendulum swings towards right wing parties.

This does not mean that ignoring gender equality among candidates has no financial impact on larger political parties. Between 2002 and 2007, it is calculated that the then dominant UMP lost EUR 4 million (around 10 per cent of its budget) for this reason (Murray 2007: 575). One source suggests that a total of EUR 7 million remained undistributed among all parties for this reason between 2003 and 2007 (GRECO 2009: 6). Another report argues that the UMP lost around EUR 20 million as a result of the low number of female candidates nominated in the 2012 elections (Lépinard and Lieber 2015: 11). The level of public funding provided to French political parties is lower than the European average (which is nearly three-quarters of total income), but it is still the source of an estimated 60 per cent of total party income for French political parties—
according to GRECO, public funding of EUR 75 million was distributed to French political parties in 2009 (GRECO 2009: 5).

There is therefore a high level of financial dependency among political parties on public funding. The financial connection between public funding and gender equality has also become gradually stronger in France, as the penalty for even having a 2 per cent gender gap has increased. The third factor is the expected impact on electoral success, as this is often a key factor in whether political parties decide to nominate male candidates, not least where elections are held to single member districts using an electoral system that is more candidate-focused than many others. In relation to the 2002 elections, an unnamed UMP official claimed that ‘we would probably have lost the elections if we had fielded unknown women in half the constituencies. We still prefer to pay fines than lose elections!’ (Murray 2007: 571). There is also a desire to ‘maintain party unity within an unstable and fragmented party system’ (Murray 2007: 575). Deselecting normally male incumbents risks jeopardizing party unity, especially where incumbents have their own power base, and the candidate selection process is also often part of negotiations between the various French political parties connected to the two-round electoral system (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008: 56).

However, the reluctance by French political parties to select women may be changing. The introduction of gender-targeted public funding initially led to a ‘quick feminisation of the candidacies for the National Assembly, but a slower feminisation of the members elected’ (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008: 55). However, this situation was quickly reversed, as the share of women nominated remained stable at around 40 per cent but the share of elected women increased significantly at each election. This trend was particularly clear in the 2012 elections, when the share of women nominated as candidates declined somewhat compared with the preceding election, but the share of elected women increased significantly.

The implication may be that the increases in the share of nominated women as a result of the gender-targeted public funding have increased the momentum for greater gender equality in other areas of the political process, including female MPs, by ‘normalizing’ the participation of women. More research is required on this issue. One group of scholars has emphasized that: ‘Too often parties justify their reluctance towards parity by the fact that voters prefer having men as [their] MP. This explanation has to be tested seriously and can be different if voters are rightist or leftist, “old school” or favourable to more equal gender roles’ (Durovic, Squarcioni and Tiberj 2017: 20). As the share of women incumbents in the National Assembly increases over time, the impact on gender equality of this unwillingness by political parties to deselect incumbents is also likely to become gradually smaller.
To conclude, the level of financial dependency of French political parties on public funding is high and, unlike Croatia, the connection between gender equality and public funding is strong, which means that France is in line with two of the factors put forward in the introduction to this report as increasing the impact of gender-targeted public funding. It may be that these factors have helped French political parties to follow and strengthen what seems to be a changing trend in societal views on gender equality in French politics.

In sum, there are clear indications that gender-targeted public funding as an implementation mechanism for quotas has played a positive role in France. One report has noted that the quota and its gender-targeted public funding enforcement mechanism ‘has been quite successful in increasing the number of women elected’, while another observer has argued that the strengthened financial sanctions for non-compliance were an important factor behind the increased representation of women among various parties in the 2017 elections (Christensen and Bardall 2014: 20; Mazoue 2017). The longer-term impact of the 2017 elections for the representation of women is difficult to predict, especially given the change resulting from the high level of female MPs from the new La République En Marche! party.
8. Gender-targeted funding in Haiti

The case studies of Croatia and France show the use of public funding in countries where efforts to increase gender equality in politics have already made some headway. Provisions of this kind are also used in countries that are still very far from gender parity. What impact can gender-targeted public funding have in such conditions?

One of the best countries for exploring this question is Haiti, which has undergone three parliamentary elections since gender-targeted public funding was introduced and can therefore function as an interesting test case. The country is still far from gender parity. Only three of the 117 members of the lower house were women as of July 2017 (2.5 per cent). Admittedly, the share of women in parliament is even lower in Solomon Islands (2 per cent), which also uses gender-targeted funding. However, as this provision was first introduced in 2014, since when only one election has been held, there has arguably been insufficient time for this reform to take hold. There is little doubt that Haitian women interested in standing in elections face financial challenges: ‘as women say themselves, it is difficult for them to get access to funding, to register themselves as candidates, to campaign, to pay for their poll-watchers, and to pay lawyers in case they will enter into a contestation process’ (Charles 2016).

The political system has a close resemblance to that of France, with a directly elected president who shares executive powers with a prime minister that the president must choose from the majority party. Parliament has two chambers, and their members are elected to single-member constituencies in a two-round system of voting. Haiti emerged from a period of dictatorship through the 1990 elections, but the transition did not lead to an improvement in gender equality in politics. The proportion of women in both houses of the Haitian parliament has
never exceeded 5 per cent. In the early elections, political parties had little access to funds, and there was no public funding available to the political parties that participated in the 1990, 1995 or 2000 parliamentary elections (IRI 1990: 28; IRI 1995: 25; and OAS 2000: 24–74).

The public funding introduced by the 2005 Electoral Code allocates additional funding to parties that meet certain gender provisions. However, this is only linked to the reimbursement of campaign finance, and only available to political parties, not independent candidates. Regular public funding of political parties does exist, but it has no gender component (Haiti 2014).

Article 240 of the 2005 Electoral Decree stated that any political party that nominated women to at least 30 per cent of the available seats, and that managed to get women elected to at least 20 per cent of the available seats, would receive double the amount of public funding. This provision was retained in the 2008 Electoral Code (article 129). However, a stipulation was added that any party that received such additional funding must use at least half of it for ‘political education of their members and financial support to female candidates in electoral contests’ (article 129.1). In practice, it has been reported that ‘very few female candidates receive support from their party’ (Clergé 2017).

In the 2015 Electoral Decree, a new provision (article 129) again states that parties will receive additional public funding, but only if at least half of the candidates presented are women and the party manages to get at least half of these (25 per cent of all the party’s candidates) elected. The new provision made it more difficult for parties to reach the threshold, while at the same time the resulting increase in public funding to which the party would be entitled was reduced from double to an increase of only 25 per cent.

Unfortunately, there is no information on the level of financial dependency of Haitian political parties on public funding, as there is limited transparency on Haitian political party finance in general. In the 2010 elections, HTG 55 million (around USD 800,000) was distributed to all political parties, which amounted to around USD 0.17 per registered voter (International IDEA Voter Turnout Database 2017). This is the same amount as was distributed in connection with the 2005 elections, when at least one report argued that some political parties were set up solely to access this funding (Francophonie 2006: 8; EU EOM 2006: 15). It has also been reported that the equivalent of around USD 10 million was supposed to be distributed in 2015–16, but it is unclear whether these funds were actually distributed (Clergé 2017).

The connection between the public funding that parties receive and gender equality was strong before the 2015 Electoral Decree, which doubled the amount of public funding. However, the requirements that parties must fulfil to receive this additional funding are exceptionally high, compared to other countries (see the Annex). What impact did these provisions have on the parliamentary elections held in 2006, 2010 and 2015–16?
Table 8.1 indicates that the gender-targeted public funding provisions did not enhance the gender balance of the Chamber of Deputies. Only limited information is available on female candidates in the 2006 and 2010 elections but as only four female candidates were elected in each of these elections—an increase of just one on the previous two elections—it seems clear that the gender-targeted public funding did not have the intended impact. Calculations on the 2010 elections indicate that two political parties may have reached the threshold for gender-targeted public funding (Haiti Référence 2015). However, both these were minor opposition parties that failed to gain any seats in subsequent elections, and hence would not have received the increased public funding.

More information is available regarding the most recent parliamentary elections, but the conclusions seem equally disheartening. No women were elected in the first round of parliamentary elections held in 2015, but three women were elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the second round, which was delayed until November 2016. One woman was elected to the Senate in the same election (IPU 2017). The final choice on who wins a seat in parliament is obviously the voters’, but it seems clear that the political parties did not see nominating female candidates as a major priority. Only 8 per cent of the candidates in the first round were women (IPU 2017).

The low number of women in parliament is even more striking given that a mandatory quota of 30 per cent female candidates was introduced for the 2015 elections. In addition, political parties that nominated at least 30 per cent female candidates benefited from significantly reduced nomination fees. Unfortunately, this quota was not combined with any sanctions, meaning that the only incentive provided for in law was the gender-targeted public funding. However, it seems clear that the Haitian parties did not choose to select women in order to access this additional funding. Only four of the 45 political parties participating in the Chamber of Deputies elections fielded the 30 per cent women mandated by the
quota provision (Mika 2015). It is not clear whether any of these parties reached the 50 per cent female candidates required to receive the targeted public funding, but this is a moot point since none of the parties succeeded in getting a candidate of either gender elected to parliament. This means that no political party accessed the provision for gender-targeted public funding in the 2015 Chamber of Deputies elections. The situation is the same regarding the Senate elections. Although four parties reached the threshold of 50 per cent female candidates, only one woman was elected to the Senate and she was a member of the governing Haitian Têt Kale Party, which was far from the 25 per cent candidate threshold, and so no political party accessed the gender-targeted public funding.

The lack of change in regard to gender inequality in Haitian parliamentary elections is in contrast to the changes made in other areas. In the 2010–11 presidential election, a woman reached the second round where she lost to the incumbent. In addition, 10 of the 23 ministers in the 2011–16 government were women, which represents a very significant 43 per cent share (AlterPresse 2013). However, it is doubtful whether any of these changes can be said to have resulted from the gender-targeted public funding of electoral campaigns. Indeed, this government oversaw the raising of the threshold for accessing gender-targeted public funding and a reduction in the additional amount received. One report notes that the most recent election results indicate that ‘politics continue to reflect a man’s domain’ in the country (International Lawyers Guild and IADL 2017: 3).

Although the available data is limited, it seems that Haiti does not comply with any of the three factors mentioned in the introduction. There are no indications that political parties rely on public funding for their finances, and accessing the additional public funding connected to gender equality is not seen as worth the effort. If political parties are forced to alter the selection of candidates in a significant way (in this case selecting a percentage of women very much higher than the parties had done before), it is likely that they will forego any additional funding. That is not to say that more money is not needed by Haitian parties but if the parties feel that they can attract a sufficient number of male candidates with sufficient access to funds, the parties may not seek female candidates who lack access to private funds, especially if this can only lead to additional public funding if these women are elected.
9. Gender-targeted funding in Portugal

The gender-targeted public funding introduced in Portugal in 2006 is similar to that used in the 2000 French reform. If French women gained the right to vote later than those in many other European countries, the situation was even worse for women in Portugal, where no democratic elections were held at all until after the coup in 1974. Portugal uses a closed list system of PR to elect all of its 230 MPs. The directly elected President of Portugal wields more power than his counterpart (so far only men have held this position) in many other European republics, while the prime minister is in charge of the daily running of the country. Just as in France, there has only ever been one female prime minister, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, who served for about six months in 1979–80.

In the mid-1990s, even before gender-targeted public funding was introduced, the proportion of women in parliament in Portugal was more than twice that of France and above the European average. In fact, even earlier, in the 1976 parliamentary elections in Portugal, 15 per cent of the candidates were women and 9 per cent of the seats were won by women (IPU 1976: 110, 156). The proportion of women in parliament in Portugal went from 13 per cent after the 1999 elections to 19 per cent after the 2002 elections and to 21 per cent in 2005, at which time the European average was 19 per cent (see Table 9.1). The proportion of women standing as parliamentary candidates increased from 11 per cent in 1985 to 30 per cent in 2005 (Jiménez 2009: 244).

The introduction of gender-targeted public funding in the 2006 Parity Act is described by one commentator as ‘the culmination of over 30 years of demands by the representatives of Portuguese women in the official body for equality, the Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality, and in women’s and feminist movements, particularly in women’s departments of left wing parties’ (Monteiro...
Gender-targeted Public Funding for Political Parties

2012: 4). Other observers have emphasized the role of transnational networks (in particular the Socialist International), party elites and women’s groups (Baum and Espírito-Santo 2012: 335–37).

The Parity Act followed a similar legal proposal in 1998, which had been defeated in parliament as parliamentarians were ‘more in favour of alternative solutions, such as the adoption of internal rules by parties’ (Romao 2000). An initial draft of the Parity Act included a rule whereby candidate lists that did not achieve the required gender balance would not be accepted for the electoral competition. This was vetoed by the President of Portugal, however, who claimed that this sanction was ‘excessive’ and ‘would threaten both the freedom of the parties and the dignity of the women elected’ (Baum and Espírito-Santo 2012: 324, 329). A new version of the Act was therefore developed with financial sanctions to encourage compliance.

The only requirement of candidate lists was that they should not contain two candidates of the same gender in consecutive positions on the list. It might seem that such a provision would require parity among party candidates, but in practice the outcome depends on the number and size of electoral districts. For example, Tunisia had a similar system for its 2014 elections but since almost all the candidate lists were headed by men, and parties often only win one seat per district, only 34 per cent of the elected parliamentarians were women (Ohman 2016). Tunisia has 217 parliamentary seats divided into 33 districts, while Portugal has 226 electoral seats in 22 districts.

Two forms of public funding are available to Portuguese political parties. The Portuguese system dates back with some modifications to 1977. Ongoing assistance is allocated annually to all the parties that received at least 50,000 votes in the most recent elections or that gained representation in parliament. Funding to support election campaigns is available to parties that participate in the elections to the European Parliament, stand candidates in a majority of the seats in parliament or gain seats in at least one regional assembly. Of the funding for campaign purposes, 20 per cent is allocated equally among the eligible political parties, while 80 per cent is allocated in proportion to the votes gained (Law No. 13/2003: article 18). The allocation is slightly different for local government elections.

The reduction in public funding linked to gender balance only affects the latter proportional part of campaign funding, which admittedly makes up the bulk of the provision. Political parties with more than 67 per cent of their candidates of the same gender (a 33 per cent quota decided in the Parity Act) lose 25 per cent of the public funding they would otherwise have been entitled to. This penalty increases to a 50 per cent deduction if more than 80 per cent of the candidates standing are of the same gender. Portugal therefore has an unusual two-step sanctioning mechanism (see Baum and Espírito-Santo 2012 for further information).
Public funding has played a major role in political parties’ income for a long time, representing around 80 per cent of the total income of the major Portuguese parties in both the early 1990s and now (Van Biezen 2003: 185f; see also Piccio 2014: 225). A reduction in public funding could therefore seriously impair the activities of a Portuguese political party. This means that the country complies with the first of the three factors discussed in the introduction to this report. The connection between public funding and gender equality (the second factor) is admittedly not as strong as in France. There, a party with 32 per cent of its candidates women would lose 52 per cent of its public funding, compared to 25 per cent in Portugal; and a party with 19 per cent of its candidates female candidates would lose 93 per cent of its public funding, compared to 50 per cent in Portugal. As discussed in the France case study, the sanction is 1.5 times the size of the gap between the genders, if this gap exceeds 2 per cent. Even so, the connection between public funding and gender equality is still stronger in Portugal than in many of the other countries that use gender-targeted public funding (see the Annex for further details).

Three elections have been held in Portugal since gender-targeted public funding was introduced. The 2009 elections showed a significantly enhanced gender balance. While the share of successful female candidates dropped somewhat in 2011, there was another notable increase in the most recent elections of 2015.

**Table 9.1. Share of women in the Portuguese parliament**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (parliamentary elections)</th>
<th>% of female MPs in Portugal</th>
<th>% of female MPs in Europe</th>
<th>% of female MPs in the world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: IPU 2018.*
What is the relationship between these changes and the financial incentives for political parties to nominate women created by the Parity Law of 2006? All five parliamentary parties exceeded the proportion of women among their candidates required to avoid losing public funding in the 2009 elections. This represented a significant change in comparison with the previous election, and the average share of female candidates among all parliamentary parties increased from 30 per cent before the law to 39 per cent afterwards.

The proportion of female candidates was highest among the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Left Bloc. Admittedly, they were least affected by the gender-targeted public funding because, as small parties, they receive the bulk of their campaign public funding from the equal allocation. In addition, both these leftist political parties exceeded the 33 per cent threshold before the law changed. The most dramatic change was seen among the centrist/centre-right parties, the second and third largest parties after the 2009 elections, both of which nearly doubled their share of female candidates (see Table 9.2). In 2005 the 9 per cent increase in female candidates was accompanied by a 7 per cent increase in the proportion of women elected to parliament. The increase in the number of female MPs was not due to changes in the party preferences of voters, since the two parties that dominate Portuguese electoral politics gained a similar number of seats—although, while the PS lost a significant number of seats and its majority in parliament, it remained the largest party and formed government. However, the requirement that political parties alternate men and women on their candidate lists would have increased the proportion and number of women nominated even without gender-targeted public funding. That said, Table 9.2 shows that none of the political parties fully complied with this requirement.

Table 9.2. Share of women among parliamentary candidates in the major Portuguese parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partido do Centro Democrático Social (CDS)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Social-Democrata (SD)</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Socialista (PS)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comissão para a Cidadania e a Igualdade de Género (2011: 146).
The 2011 elections saw further changes in the parliamentary strengths of the main parties, and the PSD became the largest party. The proportion of women nominated increased slightly in relation to the previous election, to 40 per cent, but the number of women elected went down slightly from 63 to 61 (Pordata 2015). In the 2015 elections female candidates represented 43 per cent of the candidates from all political parties (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016: 11). Again, it is notable that the average proportion of women candidates was significantly higher than that required to avoid losing public funding. An OSCE/ODIHR needs assessment mission carried out ahead of the 2015 elections found that political party representatives ‘do not experience difficulties with nominating women as candidates’ (2015: 2). The proportion of women among the elected MPs increased to 31 per cent. Of the 72 female MPs, up from 61 after the 2011 elections, 27 were from the Socialist Part, which leads a minority government, meaning that 31 per cent of their MPs are women. Among the MPs from the two parties that as a coalition gained the most seat in the election, the Social Democratic Party and the People’s Party, 29 of the 102 MPs are women.

Portuguese political parties receive a significant proportion of their income from public funding and risk losing a substantial part of that funding if they do not meet the threshold for the nomination of women candidates. Portugal therefore meets two of the three factors that support the impact of gender-related public funding. On how political parties perceive societal views on gender issues, and the potential to win or lose votes by nominating women, one commentator notes that ‘the parties have not felt any pressure to legislate and act with urgency and assertiveness on equality issues’ (Monteiro 2012: 17). Another, while deploring the ‘lack of female representation in government’, argues that ‘the role that women play in Portugal’s society and economy is currently undergoing a major change’ (Robinson 2015: 49, 56).

It cannot be proved conclusively that the introduction of gender-targeted public funding in 2006 caused the changes in nomination practices that led to an increase in the number of female candidates elected, especially as the requirement to alternate women and men on candidate lists was introduced at the same time. The share of women among candidates nominated by parliamentary parties went from 30 per cent to 39 per cent, and has remained above the legally required threshold ever since. This new law cannot be the only explanation, however, as it does not explain why parliamentary parties in Portugal often nominate a higher proportion of women than they are required to in order to avoid losing public funding. It is possible that the work undertaken within political parties to identify female candidates emphasized the role of women in political parties and created independent pressure for change. As one observer put it, the elected women ‘perform well as MPs and Ministers thus gaining leverage inside national party structures’. However, ‘at the local level there is still a lot to be done. At the local level it is still a “macho man” world’ (de Sousa 2017).
10. The impact of gender-targeted public funding

The question of whether gender-targeted public funding has an impact on gender equality is unfortunately very difficult to answer, even if simple indicators such as the proportion of women in parliament are used to measure gender equality in politics. In most of the countries that have introduced gender-targeted public funding, the number of women in parliament was higher in July 2017 than it was when this rule was introduced. Based on calculations performed for this study, together with Inter-Parliamentary Union data on women in parliament (2017), the average increase was 7 per cent. In only four countries was the proportion of women in parliament lower in July 2017 than at the time of the introduction of public funding. Finland and Costa Rica have been excluded from this calculation as gender-targeted public funding was introduced before the start of the IPU data collection.

However, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this fact, since the proportion of women in parliament is gradually increasing worldwide, albeit painfully slowly, regardless of the political finance regulations in place. Interestingly, the relative increase is broadly similar among the admittedly few countries that have been using gender-targeted public funding for a long time. Among the 11 countries that have been using such provisions for at least 10 years, the average increase in the number of women in parliament is 8 per cent, which can be compared with an average increase globally of six per cent over the past 10 years. However, there are too few cases, and too many potentially impacting variables, to draw conclusions from these statistics.

The number of women in parliament has increased in 24 of the 29 countries using gender-targeted public funding since this regulation was introduced. Again, however, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this fact, as such
increases have taken place in many countries. Of the five countries using gender-targeted public funding where the number has not increased, no elections have been held in Chile and Ukraine since the rule was introduced. In Burkina Faso, the proportion of women in parliament is currently 4 per cent lower than it was when gender-targeted public funding was introduced. Although the proportion increased in the years following the reform, the situation was reversed in the 2015 elections, the first held after the 2014 Burkinabé uprising. The case of Croatia is discussed further in Chapter 6, while no information is available as to why the share of women has fallen from 10 per cent (when gender-targeted public funding was introduced) to 9 per cent as of 2017.

To consider the impact that gender-targeted public funding has had on gender equality, it is necessary to study the situation in individual countries. In some countries, political parties ignore the rules on gender-targeted public funding without any financial implications, and in such cases it cannot be expected that the regulations will have any impact. For example, although Mexican political parties are required to use at least 2 per cent of the public funding they receive to encourage women’s leadership, they fail to report any such activities without apparently facing any sanctions (Roza et al. 2012: 22). The same appears to be the case in Panama (Roza et al. 2012: 26); Ballington and Kahane 2014: 323). Similarly, while Kenya has a higher share of such public funding earmarked for gender and related activities than any other country (30 per cent), no monitoring is carried out of how the public funds are used (Ohman and Lintari 2015: 22). The case study on Haiti shows that the gender-targeted public funding has had no impact on the proportion of female MPs in parliament, while the impact in Croatia is less clear.

In some cases there have been more positive indications. The case study on Portugal indicates that the political parties have complied with the 33 per cent threshold for female candidates in elections since gender-targeted public funding was introduced, and that there have been particularly dramatic changes in political parties that had previously been reluctant to nominate women as candidates. However, any conclusions drawn must consider the rule introduced at the same time that parties must nominate women and men alternatively on their candidate lists. The French case is even more complicated, as many factors play a role in the nomination decisions of political parties, but the fact remains that although there is no legislation forcing political parties to nominate female candidates, the proportion of women in the French parliament has more than tripled since gender-targeted public funding was introduced.

In part, whether gender-targeted public funding should be seen as successful depends on the assumptions behind the question, in particular concerning the relationship between gender-targeted public funding and gender quotas, as discussed above. If gender-targeted public funding is seen as an enforcement mechanism for gender quotas, it will almost inevitably be seen as inefficient, since
it is quite possible for parties to ignore it. The case of Portugal servers as a valuable illustration of this. Portuguese parties have with some exceptions failed to meet the 33 per cent threshold, and the proportion of women in parliament has yet to reach that level. This conclusion would appear to be unavoidable, especially if gender-targeted public funding as a compliance incentive is compared to barring non-compliant lists from electoral competition. If the goal of a quota is that the target level should be the minimum acceptable gender balance, then only such an enforcement mechanism can—and always will—guarantee success. If, on the other hand, gender-targeted public funding in Portugal is seen from the angle of increasing the number of women nominated by political parties, and the number of women elected to parliament, the picture is different. Even though Portuguese political parties can get candidate lists accepted for electoral competition regardless of their gender balance, the proportion of female candidates significantly increased after the 2006 law was passed, as did the number of women in parliament.

The Albanian case seems to confirm these conclusions. While concerns were raised in earlier elections that political parties would be able to ‘circumvent’ the quota by accepting a reduction in public funding, the fact remains that the approach taken in Albania increased the proportion of women in the Albanian parliament from 7 to 28 per cent in only eight years (OSCE/ODIHR 2013: 2).

There are still many countries for which it is too early to judge the impact of gender-targeted public funding. In Solomon Islands, where no women won parliamentary seats in the 2010 elections, a ‘temporary special measures grant’ was introduced in 2014 for parties that successfully returned female candidates. There were 26 women among the 447 candidates in the 2014 elections, and just one successfully entered parliament. Although a step forward, it is not possible to say that the special measures grant had any impact. The number of female candidates was the same in 2014 as in the 2010 and 2006 elections (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2015: 11). Chile introduced gender-targeted public funding in combination with a gender quota in 2015, which means that the first test of the system will be the November 2017 elections (see Schwindt-Bayer 2015: 11). The system in Ukraine has yet to be tested in a parliamentary election.
10.1. Factors likely to increase the impact of gender-targeted public funding

The introduction to this report identified three factors likely to significantly increase the impact of gender-targeted public funding on the gender balance in elections.

1. The share of total party income received from public sources is high
If the goal of gender-targeted public funding is to reduce the financial burden for female candidates, then the relative share of party income that comes from public funding is less important, while ensuring that funding actually reaches the female candidates becomes essential. If, however, the goal of gender-targeted public funding is to incentivize political parties to nominate women as candidates, then the probability of success is likely to depend largely on how much of the income political parties receive comes from public funding. If parties receive almost all of their funding from private sources, they may be unlikely to nominate more female candidates in return for a small increase in their public funding. Where political parties rely predominantly on public funding, however, connecting the amount they receive to the gender balance among candidates could be a highly effective tool. It is important in this context to note that public funding forms the vast majority of party income in Albania, estimated at around 90 per cent for most parliamentary parties (Jano 2016: 25). Of the countries included in the case studies, reliance on public funding is high in all apart from Haiti, where reliable data is lacking but the public funding is likely to be limited.

Table 10.1 shows the proportion of total party income that parliamentary parties receive from public funding. Accurate information is not available for most countries, largely due to the lack of reliable data on income from private-sector sources. For most of the European countries in Table 10.1, the share of total party income derived from public funding is high, which means that connecting this funding to gender equality could be a viable approach. The proportion of their total income that political parties in Mali and Togo receive from public funds, in contrast, is marginal. While data on party income from private sources in Burkina Faso is unavailable, the more than 50 political parties standing in the 2012 elections shared the equivalent of around USD 1 million in public funding—that is, around USD 20,000 each, or 0.2 US cents per potential voter (Trans-Saharan Research Project 2017a). This means that the provision on deductions for failing to field female candidates set out in law, a penalty that was used against several political parties in the 2012 elections, is likely to have had only a limited impact on party campaign finances (Trans-Saharan Research Project 2017b).
Table 10.1. Public funding as a percentage of party income in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of party income from public sources</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>70–90%</td>
<td>Almost all income is from public sources in non-election years, with significant variations between parties in election years</td>
<td>GRECO (2009: 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>Data from 2013 (down from 85% in 2012)</td>
<td>Falguera and Casas-Zamora (2016: 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>Data from the 2007 election year, including both central and subnational public funding</td>
<td>GRECO (2009: 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Amount distributed per voter lowest out of 10 African countries for which data available</td>
<td>Ohman (2014: 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60% / 44%</td>
<td>Estimates from around 2009 and 2012 respectively</td>
<td>GRECO (2009: 6); Van Biezen and Kopecký (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Data from 2010–12</td>
<td>Van Biezen and Kopecký (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>Data from 2011; public funding has since been abolished.</td>
<td>Van Biezen and Kopecký (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>‘low’</td>
<td>No detailed data available</td>
<td>Berrios and Faúndes, (2012: 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Data from 2011</td>
<td>Van Biezen and Kopecký (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
<td>30–40%</td>
<td>Data from 2014, although only for two main parties</td>
<td>OECD (2016: 160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Relates to the 2010 elections</td>
<td>Ohman (2014: 50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, in the first Ethiopian elections after gender-targeted public funding was introduced, most opposition parties reportedly argued ‘that the received amounts were insufficient to conduct an effective campaign’ and ‘repeatedly complained about delays in the disbursement of these funds’ (European Union Election Observation Mission 2010: 18). In relation to African countries using gender-targeted public funding: ‘it is possible that these regulations will have more effect as time goes by, but unless parties are significantly dependent on public funds, rules of this kind are likely to have a mainly symbolic impact. Complementary approaches must be sought to address the particular financial challenges faced by women wishing to enter politics’ (Ohman 2014: 53).
The relative reliance on public funding is also important in countries where public funding has been removed or significantly reduced due to the situation of the public finances, popular dissatisfaction with political parties or political calculations by the incumbent. For example, public funding was repealed in Italy in 2014, to take effect in 2017, which means that the current generous provision (see Table 10.1) will be replaced by a voluntary allocation related to citizens’ income tax. Applying the future calculation to 2015 data indicates that the amount distributed would be around EUR 12 million, compared to the around EUR 180 million previously allocated as reimbursement for the different elections (Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2017: GRECO 2012: 5). The impact on Italian parties in terms of receiving reduced public funding if they fail to meet gender equality targets, and parts of the public funding being earmarked for gender activities, will naturally be significantly reduced by this change. The repeal of public funding in Italy was however not accompanied by other reforms to strengthen gender equality in Italian politics.

In South Korea, where dependency on public funding is higher than in the African countries analysed above but lower than in Europe, connecting public funding to gender equality has not been very effective, partly because the major parties that find it easiest to fundraise nominated fewer female candidates (Soh 2011: 102). The likelihood that gender-targeted public funding has a significantly higher impact on small political parties than large has also been discussed by Ballington and Kahane (2013: 318).

2. There must be a strong connection between the gender balance achieved and the level of public funding provided

Another criterion is that the connection between gender considerations and the amount of public funding provided to political parties must be strong (Ohman 2011: 10). If failure to meet a set threshold of gender equality among candidates results in a party receiving a tiny reduction in its public funding, or if a very small amount is earmarked for gender-related activities, the resulting impact on gender equality is likely to be small. If, on the other hand, the amount of public funds that parties receive will vary significantly depending on the gender balance between candidates, or if a large proportion of the public funding is earmarked, the impact on gender equality should be high.

To illustrate this point, although the dependency of Colombian political parties on public funding is high, Falguera and Casas-Zamora (2016) found that ‘the amounts involved are quite limited’. In Colombia, 5 per cent of the total public funding is allocated according the proportion of women elected, while 15 per cent of the funding provided is earmarked for ‘promotion of the inclusion of women, young people and ethnic minorities in the political process’ (Falguera and Casas-Zamora 2016: 18). A recent study concluded that around 2 per cent of the public funding received was used by Colombian parties for gender-related
purposes, and the limited size of this amount, combined with the challenges in overseeing compliance (discussed above), meant that the impact of the gender-targeted public funding was ‘very much an open question’ (Falguera and Casas-Zamora 2016: 18). The low level of public funding linked to gender equality discussed in the Croatian case study is likely to have significantly reduced the impact of the regulation in that country.

In Mali, where 5 per cent of the total public funding is allocated based on the proportion of female MPs elected by each party, and 5 per cent is allocated based on the proportion of women elected as municipal councillors, accurate data on private and public sector party income is not available. It appears that parties made only limited efforts to include women as candidates in winnable positions, as currently only 10 per cent of MPs and only 9 per cent of councillors are women (Trans-Saharan Research Project 2017c).

In contrast, for some of the political parties (technically parliamentary caucuses) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the public funding allocated in proportion to the share of women elected is a significant amount of the total public funding that they receive. In the House of Representatives in 2016, the HDZ caucus received 24 per cent more public funding through this provision than it would otherwise have done, and the increase was 32 per cent for the Democratic Front-Željko Komšić caucus and for the Croat People’s Caucus in the House of Peoples (Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission 2017). For these political parties/caucuses, there is a significant financial benefit from having women elected (three other caucuses received smaller amounts, while another six caucuses elected no women to the 57-seat parliament). Bosnia and Herzegovina stood at around the European average for women in parliament at the time gender-targeted public funding was introduced (17 per cent in 2006). The percentage grew after the regulatory reform but has since plateaued at around 21 per cent. An even stronger connection between gender equality and public funding was the 78 per cent top-up that the Samopomich party in Ukraine received in 2016 for being the only party to comply with its gender quota provisions. The strength of the connection between gender equality and public funding has been acknowledged by various commentators, such as a 2008 report on gender quotas by the European Parliament which called for financial sanctions for non-compliance to be ‘strong’ (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008: 38).

3. The connection between public funding and gender equality is sufficient to overcome gender prejudices within political parties

The final criterion is that the impact of increased or decreased public funding must be more important to political party leaders than the loss of votes that they may fear from nominating women in electable positions. Political party leaders are unlikely to alter their candidate selection decisions if they feel that this will negatively affect their chances of electoral success. This will be particularly
important in countries that use single-member district electoral systems, which are strongly candidate focused. This factor is likely to be least important in closed-list systems or PR, which tend to be predominantly focused on the political party or coalition rather than on the candidates.

Research indicates that political party leaders are not necessarily wrong in judging that the electorate may prefer men candidates. To give just some examples, in Georgia, ‘both qualitative and quantitative data show that politics is viewed as a man’s job’, while in the Maldives, one 2013 survey indicated that 70 per cent of women respondents believed that women make worse leaders than men (compared to 60 per cent among men respondents) (UNDP Georgia 2013: 47; Ritchie et al. 2014: 24). Gender stereotypes play a significant role in all the case study countries, but are probably strongest in Haiti which has been described as a ‘patriarchal and male chauvinist society’ (Soudnie 2014).

In other countries, however, the situation appears different. For example, in the case of Malawi, Kavuni and Muriaas have stated that ‘if women are able to persuade the selectorate to pick them, the electorate will not discriminate against them at the polls’ (Kavuni and Muriaas 2017: 399). Research from Mexico also indicates that many involved in gender politics consider the public’s objections to parties not complying with gender equality criteria for candidate selection could be a more effective sanction than reduced public funding (Baldez 2004: 248). This would imply that Mexican political party leaders are more fearful of public condemnation for ignoring gender issues than of losing funding. As of October 2017, 43 per cent of Mexican parliamentarians were women.

In countries where political party leaders fear that nominating women as candidates will harm them electorally, gender-targeted public funding may be unable to persuade them to change their nomination decisions, even if the dependency on public funds and the relationship between political funding and gender equality is strong. In some countries, however, gender-targeted public funding could persuade political parties to try to include more women and they might be surprised by the responsiveness of the electorate.

In this regard, there is a very interesting comparison to be made between Albania and France. In both countries, the introduction of gender-targeted public funding led to a significant increase in the proportion of women nominated as candidates, but the trend has since plateaued. The proportion of women winning seats, however, has continued to increase. This phenomenon cannot be explained mathematically through the gender-targeted public funding, since in both countries the system used relates to nominated rather than successful candidates. However, it is possible that the increase in nominations of women supported the momentum for women to compete seriously in elections by being nominated in competitive seats. The case study on Portugal also shows how political parties continued to increase the proportion of women nominated beyond the point where public funding provided financial rewards, possibly for similar reasons.
The likelihood that political parties will seek to overcome cultural obstacles and increase the number of female candidates could also be linked to the efforts needed to access these funds. In the Haitian case study, political parties had to nominate women to at least 50 per cent of the available seats and have half of those women elected in order to access the gender-targeted public funding. In a country where politics is dominated by men, and where parties had before then only nominated a handful of women, these demands may have been more than the political parties are willing to comply with for the reward available. Similarly, political parties in Honduras that fail to achieve full parity between the genders in their nominations for the 2017 elections will see a 5 per cent reduction in their public campaign funding. As only 26 per cent of the MPs in the current parliament are women, political parties may not consider this enough of an incentive to nominate enough candidates to achieve full parity (European Union Election Observation Mission 2014).

Other factors also play a role. The role of the central party leadership in the candidate selection process is also likely to influence the impact of gender-targeted public funding on the number of women selected as candidates. In the many countries where political parties generally have little money, receive little or no public funding and depend on their candidates to pay for their own campaign (and often contribute to the party coffers in the process), gender-targeted public funding may not have a significant impact on the candidate selection process. An earlier study on Kenya found that:

Simply demanding that a certain percentage of candidates should be of each gender is unlikely to work when the party leadership has only partial control over which candidates are chosen in each constituency. Adding public financial incentives for the party leadership to get involved in the process is unlikely to outweigh the loss of income from wealthy aspirants that such interference would probably lead to. Such a measure would only improve the gender balance among candidates if the losses from withheld public support significantly harmed a party’s chances of electoral success (Ohman and Lintari 2015: 22).

The electoral system also plays a role. Open list systems of PR are less dependent on the nomination decisions of political parties than other electoral systems and, in such cases, public funding made available to female candidates can help them to compete more effectively against male candidates on the same electoral list.

10.2. Implications of the analysis of gender-targeted public funding

1. Carefully analyse the causes of gender inequality in the political process in the country in question, and the role that access to financial resources and spending demands play in this inequality. It is important to understand the nature of
gender inequality in the political process, so that the proposed reforms are evidence-based and respond to the existing situation. This could form part of a larger gender audit of the political and electoral process.

2. **Study the role of political parties in elections, especially in the candidate nomination process, as well as the role of women and men in political parties and attitudes to gender equality.** For gender-targeted public funding to be effective, it must take account of how political parties function. Systems that do not consider this issue are unlikely to be successful.

3. **Consider the proportion of total party income that political parties receive from public funding.** If public funding only amounts to a small amount of total party income, it is unlikely that connecting the amount provided will have a significant impact. Earmarking a significant proportion of the public funding for gender-related activities could still strengthen the role of women within political parties in the medium term, and in elected politics in the longer term. However, this may require a significant increase in the amount of funds provided.

4. **Determine whether the main way of achieving enhanced gender equality in politics should be an increased number of women in elected bodies, or a strengthened role for women in political parties.** If public funding only amounts to a small amount of total party income, it is unlikely that connecting the amount provided will have a significant impact. Earmarking a significant proportion of the public funding for gender-related activities could still strengthen the role of women within political parties in the medium term, and in elected politics in the longer term. However, this may require a significant increase in the amount of funds provided.

5. **Understand that gender-targeted public funding can be treated as an enforcement mechanism for a gender quota for candidates in elections, but does not guarantee that the quota will be reached.** It may however be a way to encourage longer-term change within political parties and in their candidate selection processes. Gender-targeted public funding can encourage political parties to comply with quotas but, unlike systems where the quota is made part of the candidate nomination criteria, cannot guarantee compliance. Certain forms of gender-targeted public funding can however incentivize parties to nominate a higher proportion of women in competitive electoral areas than the quota may require.

6. **Consider whether some of the public funding provided, regardless of whether it is related to gender equality among candidates, should be earmarked for gender-related activities.** Earmarking public funding for particular purposes can be seen as an intrusion in internal party affairs, and could potentially
reduce the impact on the gender balance of the candidates nominated by parties. On the other hand, earmarking can help to ensure that public funds are used more in line with public expectations, and strengthen the role of women in political parties.

7. *Ensure effective monitoring of compliance when any provision to earmark the use of public funding is considered.* There may be a significant risk that money earmarked for gender-related purposes is put to other uses, such as for campaigning. Detailed reporting and monitoring requirements may be needed to avoid such abuses.
11. Conclusion

No definite conclusion can be drawn regarding the impact of gender-targeted public funding on gender equality but there are grounds for cautious optimism. In many countries it is still too early to tell whether gender-targeted public funding will have an impact, since only one or two elections have been held since it was introduced. Any impact of such provisions is likely to take more time in most cases, especially in countries where the gender-targeted public funding provisions are limited to earmarking money for activities that support gender equality. One lesson from this report is that in-depth analyses are needed to explore the introduction, use and impact of gender-targeted public funding in individual countries. Focused and detailed interviews with women and men who have experienced running for office, the people in political parties in charge of candidate selection and gender activists will be needed to understand the judgments and decisions people make in practice in relation to gender-related public funding. However, in countries such as France and Portugal, there is reason to suspect that gender-targeted public funding may have been one factor behind the remarkable increase in the number of women elected to parliament.

One reason that gender-targeted public funding may be of particular interest in various countries is its focus on altering the incentive structures within political parties, in particular with regard to the selection of candidates in elections, a process that is central to assisting or holding back improvements in the gender balance in elections (Ballington 2003; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2017: 6–7). Appealing to a political party to enhance its gender balance for its own sake is laudable, but unlikely to have much of an impact, since political parties are ‘the latter-day counterparts of warring baronies, for which the key concept is rivalry’, and ‘if parties produce the benign results [desired, such as increased gender equality], they must do so in the service of satisfying their primary, competitive
urses’ (Pierce 2004: 191). Therefore, as Muriaas and Kayuni have pointed out, ‘it [is] the political party, [given its function as] gatekeeper who has to see women as viable candidates, if women are to be integrated into mainstream politics in a sustainable and meaningful way’ (Muriaas and Kayuni 2014: 401).

These competitive urges can be affected by amending the candidate nomination criteria so that if parties do not meet a set gender threshold, their candidates or lists of candidates will not appear on the ballot. An alternative approach is to relate the amount of public funding that a party receives to the gender balance of its candidates. This approach cannot enforce compliance in the same way as altering the candidate nomination criteria, but it can provide encouragement to political parties to change their approach to gender equality without forcing them to do so through legal provisions. It is possible that such an approach might be more successful in changing the thinking on gender within political parties, which is essential since ‘the long-term success of a quota depends on the extent to which it actually alters intra-party power structures by giving increased influence and leadership positions to women’ (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016b: 10). As noted above, it is also possible to combine these approaches, so that a change in the candidate nomination criteria can make meeting a set threshold of gender equality a requirement for appearing on the ballot, while gender-targeted public funding is used to encourage gender equality among candidates above the quota level.

Countries that are interested in enhancing their gender balance in the political sphere should seriously consider whether gender-targeted public funding can be part of an effective reform package. However, it is essential to grasp the details of such reform. Simply introducing a connection between gender and public funding is unlikely to produce a change by itself, and care should be taken to avoid steps in this direction being solely symbolic. The popularity of public funding of political parties among the general population should also be considered, including the possible negative implication that public hostility to public funding could in some way affect voters’ views of efforts to enhance gender equality. It should be noted however that, in most cases, provisions of this kind will not significantly increase the burden on taxpayers.

Although the focus of this study has been on relating gender-targeted public funding for political parties to the nomination of candidates, and gender education and awareness-raising activities, other options are available that should be considered as complementary or alternative approaches. These might include formal regulations, such as a reduction in candidate nomination fees for female aspiring candidates, or reducing campaign spending pressures by imposing candidate spending limits or bans/restrictions on certain forms of campaigning, such as television advertising. The Canadian system, in which candidates can make tax deductions for childcare and household expenses during election campaigns, is worth considering. The Superior Electoral Court in Brazil will also
11. Conclusion

Air five minutes per day of educational campaigns on radio and television to foster women’s political participation during the election campaign. Non-regulatory activities could also be considered, such as mentoring potential female leaders, providing training on fundraising and cost-efficient campaigning methods, and strengthening the role of women inside political parties.

People who wish to see women empowered and the gender balance in political life strengthened are encouraged to carefully consider whether gender-targeted public funding might be one way to achieve these goals. Such consideration must mean not simply whether gender-targeted public funding should be used, but also which form and design of funding would be most effective at achieving the goals deemed most important.
Annex. Gender-targeted public funding of political parties around the world

Table A.1. details gender-targeted public funding of political parties in selected countries. The types of gender-targeted public funding described are based on the proposed typology in Chapter 3 of this report. The Netherlands is not included in this table since its public funding rules do not contain a gender provision. Sweden and Slovenia are not included as they technically do not use gender-targeted public funding (since funding goes directly to women’s organizations and not to political parties).
### Table A.1. Gender-targeted public funding of political parties in individual countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Type of funding</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year first introduced</th>
<th>% women in lower house when first introduced / in Aug. 2017</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>30% of candidates must be women in all elections. Failure to comply is punishable by fines, which are taken from each party’s respective public funding.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7% / 28%</td>
<td>See Albania case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10% of public funds distributed to parties in proportion to the number of seats held by the ‘less represented gender’.</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17% / 21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>A minimum of 5% of party funds shall be used to promote the political participation of women. 10% of total party air time should be used to promote women’s participation.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9% / 11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Parties that do not nominate at least 30% of either gender will lose half their public funding.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>15% / 11%</td>
<td>Few details available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Subsidies will be awarded to parties or coalitions of parties whose lists (if elected at the national level) contain at least 25% female candidates.</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>18% / 24%</td>
<td>Few details available</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>C*, F</td>
<td>Political parties are eligible to receive an additional amount of state subsidy in relation to the number of women elected to parliament. Female candidates receive additional electoral reimbursements; 10% of public funding received by each party is earmarked for gender activities.</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>16% / 16%</td>
<td>Described in law as temporary provision to cease after 2029 election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>A*, F</td>
<td>5% of public funding is to be distributed according to the number of women elected; 15% of the public funds provided should be used for activities aiming at the inclusion of women, youth and ethnic minorities.</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>13% / 19%</td>
<td>See Falguera and Casas-Zamora (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Parties must certify that an equal amount of resources was used on the training of both genders, or the money spent in that area will not be reinstated.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>N/A / 35%</td>
<td>Only country with this particular provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Electoral system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>C*</td>
<td>For each elected MP representing the underrepresented gender, political parties shall be entitled to compensation of 10% of the amount envisaged for each MP.</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>21% / 19%</td>
<td>See Croatia case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Apportionment on the basis of the number of female candidates nominated by the political parties.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>22% / 36%</td>
<td>Few details available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Parties must use at least 5% of public funding on their women’s wings.</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>N/A / 42%</td>
<td>Voluntary agreement between political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>If the gender difference among candidates is larger than 2%, the public funding is reduced by 1.5 times this difference.</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11% / 39%</td>
<td>See France case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>An additional 30% in funding will be awarded to parties that have 3 women for every 10 candidates.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7% / 16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Any political party, political group or group of political parties that has at least 50% female candidates and succeeds in electing half of these will receive double the public funding.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4% / 3%</td>
<td>See Haiti case study</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>E, F</td>
<td>Political parties that do not nominate at least 40% (50% as of 2015) of each gender will forfeit 5% of election campaign public funding. Parties must create and submit an anti-gender-discrimination to the EMB before each election, or lose 5% of funding. Parties must use 10% of public funding for training and advancement of women.</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5% / 26%</td>
<td>Only country connecting public funding to a gender-discrimination policy. The 50% candidate requirement will first be tested in the 2017 elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>STV</td>
<td>E, F</td>
<td>Parties must allocate part of funding received to activities promoting women’s and young people’s participation. As of 2012, if a party nominates less than 30% (40% as of 2023) of any gender, it loses 50% of its funding. Parties are required to spend general direct public funding promoting women’s participation but this is not further specified.</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>14% / 22%</td>
<td>Significant reforms in recent years that are yet to be tested electorally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex. Gender-targeted public funding of political parties in individual countries

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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>E, F</td>
<td>If a party fields less than 40% of candidates from each gender, they can lose up to 10% of the funds from tax allocations. Parties that do not spend at least 10% of income from this tax on activities that enhance women’s participation in politics are fined 20% of the income. At least 5% of all allocated funds must be spent on activities that increase women’s participation in politics.</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11% / 31%</td>
<td>Public funding was repealed in 2014, effective 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>B, F</td>
<td>A political party shall not be entitled to receive funding from the fund if more than two-thirds of its registered office bearers are of the same gender. At least 30% of the funding should be used to favour the representation of women, persons with disabilities, youth, ethnic and other minorities and marginalized communities.</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10% / 19%</td>
<td>See Ohman and Lintari (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>C, F</td>
<td>Female candidate nomination subsidies are distributed to political parties based on the ratio of National Assembly seats held and the votes polled by female candidates; 10% of public funding to political parties must be used for “the political development of women”.</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6% / 17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>A*</td>
<td>10% of the state funding is proportionately shared among political parties that have women elected as deputies (5%) or municipal councillors (5%).</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10% / 9%</td>
<td>Few details available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Each party must devote 2% of its annual regular public funding to the training, promotion and development of women’s leadership.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>23% / 43%</td>
<td>Smallest amount of earmarking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Parties with 40% women candidates receive additional 10% public funding, plus an unspecified multiple for each woman elected.</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>23%/23%</td>
<td>Legal reform not tested in election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Electoral system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10% of public grant is allocated proportionately to political parties that have women elected at all levels.</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10% / 17%</td>
<td>Few details available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>At least 10% of the public funding is devoted to civic and political education activities. 2.5% shall be channelled solely to support women’s training activities.</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10% / 18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>AV</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Parties receive K7,500 [US$ 7100] or an amount set by the EMB for each woman candidate who wins at least 10% of the vote.</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2% / 3%</td>
<td>Candidates need to win 10% of vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Parties that do not have a balance between the genders of its candidates can lose 25– 80% of their public funding.</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21% / 35%</td>
<td>See Portugal case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>State funding will increase in proportion to the number of seats won by female candidates.</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11% / 21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Temporary grant of $10,000 annually is administered to benefit political parties with female candidates elected to parliament.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2% / 2%</td>
<td>Very recent provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>Type of funding</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year first introduced</td>
<td>% women in lower house when first introduced / in Aug. 2017</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>A*</td>
<td>20% of state financial assistance is given to parties and groups of parties in proportion to the number of women elected at the last election, with a further 10% allocated to parties and groups of parties in proportion to the number of women elected at the last local elections. The nomination fee is reduced by 25% if a party list contains female candidates.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>11% / 18%</td>
<td>Principle further specified in 2013; few details available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A proportion of annual public funds to parties that ensure at least 30% women’s representation among their elected MPs.</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>12% / 12%</td>
<td>See section 3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* provision relates only to elected candidates. AV = alternative vote; FPTP = first-past-the-post; List PR = list proportional representation; MMP = mixed-member proportional; STV = single transferable vote; TRS = two-round system.

Sources: Data on electoral systems taken from International IDEA (2005); data on share of women in parliament taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2017).
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About the author

Magnus Ohman has worked with political finance issues since the 1990s. Serving as Senior Political Finance Advisor for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), he has worked with political finance initiatives in 35 countries, and his writings on political finance have been translated into 19 languages.

His research includes both country analyses and macro-level studies of trends and experiences in political finance. Together with Lolita Cigane, he wrote the IFES White Paper on Political Finance and Gender Equality, and he has analysed the relationship between political finance and the equal participation of women in Kenya and Tunisia for International IDEA.

Dr Ohman was lead writer of the BRIDGE module on political finance and the IFES Political Finance Oversight Handbook, which is part of the Training on Detection and Enforcement curriculum. He also co-edited the International IDEA Handbook Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, and the International IDEA Political Finance Database. His practical work includes assistance to legislators, implementing agencies, civil society, media and political parties. Dr Ohman holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Uppsala, Sweden.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

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Gender inequality in the political process remains an important problem in all countries. Women often have less access than men to the resources needed to successfully seek a party nomination or stand in an election, and political parties tend to nominate men to winnable positions.

This report focuses on the particular political party regulations where the provision of public funding (state assistance) to political parties is linked to gender-related activities by those parties. Such provisions exist today in around 30 countries worldwide and it is a form of regulation that has become increasingly common in the past two decades.

The report explores the concept of gender-targeted funding and its different modalities. Detailed case studies from Albania, Croatia, France, Haiti and Portugal illustrate experiences from different countries and the concluding chapter presents recommendations for countries considering using these methods to increase women’s political representation.