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Acknowledgements

This Guide benefited immensely from the comments and reviews made by International IDEA’s gender and diversity experts, Rumbidzai Kandawasvika-Nhundu and Julian Smith, as well as other International IDEA colleagues, and numerous interns who helped with the initial research. Production of the Guide was overseen by Lisa Hagman from International IDEA’s Publications office.

Special thanks go to Ilona Tip from the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, Richard Atwood from the International Crisis Group, and Sarah Bernasconi and Holliger Pascal from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for providing comments and suggestions on how to improve this Guide.

Note to the second edition
The first edition of this Guide was published in 2013. In 2018, the support documentation for the Electoral Risk Management Tool (including this Guide) underwent a redesign. The document has now been re-formatted, and allocated an ISBN and a digital object identifier (DOI). Links to International IDEA resources have also been corrected. The Guides are living documents and will be continually updated. International IDEA welcomes feedback and user experiences. For more information contact the Electoral Processes Programme (elections@idea.int).
About this Guide

The purpose of this Guide

The *Internal Factors Guide* is a support document to International IDEA’s Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERM Tool). The factors presented in this Guide mirror the list of risk factors that are *internal* (endogenous) to these processes (hereafter referred to as internal factors) as presented in the Knowledge Resources module of the ERM Tool (see Figure 1). This Guide, combined with the *External Factors Guide*, is intended to provide users of the ERM Tool with a broader checklist which can be used to identify risks related to electoral processes in a given country and electoral context.

Figure 1. Overview of ERM Tool support documents

The users of this Guide

This Guide is intended for individuals involved in the context overview and tool customization exercises outlined in the ERM Tool. The context overview involves an assessment of the historical and current dynamics of election-related conflicts and an estimation of the potential risks relating to forthcoming elections (see Alihodžić 2018: section 4.1.1). Customization is a technical exercise and refers to the creation of a country- and election-specific model generated by the ERM Tool software (see Alihodžić 2018: section 4.1.2). It is envisaged that the user’s organization will share a copy of this Guide and other support documents with its staff, partner organizations and external specialists involved in the efforts to ensure that discussion and contributions are focused.
Methodology for identifying relevant factors

Internal risk factors are election-specific and do not exist outside the electoral context. They relate to electoral actors, events, practices and materials which can undermine the credibility of electoral processes or, in the worst-case scenario, trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. The list presented in this document is compiled from different research papers, reports on elections and other relevant publications. These documents suggest links between particular factors, or combinations of factors, resulting in an increase of election-related tensions and outbreaks of election-related violence.

The structure of the Guide and description of the factors

This Guide points to 26 internal factors clustered into seven of the eight phases of the electoral cycle reflecting the phases in the pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral periods (see Figure 2). Each phase, and its associated factors, is covered in a separate chapter. The eighth (post-electoral) phase of the electoral cycle is not included in this Guide. Although there is a possibility that some risks to the consequent electoral processes may already materialize in this phase, the underlying risk factors may not be process-related. Instead, the incident should be examined in the context of the structural risk factors. These are defined in the External Factors Guide (Alihodžić and Uribe Burcher 2018).

Figure 2. The electoral cycle

In addition to a short introduction for each phase of the electoral cycle, the Guide provides a detailed description for each factor, including:

1. Introduction. This section provides a general definition and explanation of the context in which a given factor can represent a risk to electoral processes and, in the worst-case scenario, trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. Less severe consequences, which are not specifically elaborated in the document but are implied,
include the undermined credibility of electoral processes and the results they produce. Therefore, the risk factors described have a broad relevance.

2. Empirical cases and interrelated factors. This section illustrates particular countries and electoral contexts in which the given factor was identified as a trigger or a factor which contributed to triggering election-related violence. Interrelated factors point to the wider context in which violence took place. This includes both internal and external factors. References to the source documents are provided.

3. Observable indicators. This section points to the observable properties of the different factors.

4. Data collection and analysis methodologies. This section suggests data sources, collection techniques and analysis methods. The software includes pre-packed but editable surveying questionnaires which further assist the user(s) with the data collection. Analysis assist bodies, primarily those responsible for ensuring that elections are credible and peaceful, in making informed choices.

Customization of the list of risk factors

The list of risk factors presented in this Guide is not exhaustive. Also, the way in which risk factors are named or described may not fit local terminologies and specific contexts. The tool’s Knowledge Resources module therefore allows the user to rename existing risk factors or to generate and describe new factors which will be included in the country- and election-specific model.
Phase 1: The legal and institutional framework
Introduction: The legal and institutional framework

Electoral legislation is the collection of ‘legal structural elements defining or influencing an electoral process’. These can include:

- the constitution, which is the supreme legislative act in a country;
- national laws, which may take the form of one comprehensive electoral code, or be a set of laws covering different aspects of the electoral process;
- provincial or state laws, which in federal countries may govern processes for provincial or state and local electoral events (as in Australia) or for national electoral events (as in the United States);
- ordinances and regulations made by national or lower-level authorities;
- regulations, proclamations and directives issued by an electoral management body (EMB), if it has powers to do so;
- customary laws and conventions which may be integrated into an electoral law, or EMB regulations or policies, dealing with issues such as separate voter registration and voting arrangements for women and men;
- administrative policies made by an EMB or other bodies; and
- codes of conduct (voluntary or otherwise), some of which may be unspoken and may have a direct or indirect impact on the electoral process, for example, for EMBs, election participants, observers, and election reporting by the media (International IDEA 2006: 43).

The framework can also incorporate international standards from international agreements and frameworks. For example, articles 7 and 8 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) require that state parties take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and to ensure that women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, have the opportunity to represent their governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international organizations. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in clauses 1 and 3 that ‘Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives’ and ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’.

Regardless of the wider institutional framework in a given country, there will always be a body or bodies responsible for electoral management (International IDEA 2014: 5). In emerging democracies, it is common that electoral legal frameworks promote electoral integrity by making EMBs responsible for control over the entire process (International IDEA 2014: 75). However, some functions, such as boundary delimitation, voter registration, the registration and funding of political parties, electoral dispute resolution, the certification and announcement of election results, and voter education and information may also be contracted out by an EMB, or supported by other institutions or civil society organizations (CSOs). If electoral functions are assigned to more than one institution, the legal and policy framework needs to be very clear on each institution’s functional responsibilities, and on the hierarchy of authority and coordination mechanisms between the institutions (International IDEA 2014: 77–78).
1. Contested electoral law

Introduction

The electoral law is made up of one or more pieces of legislation governing all aspects of the process for electing the political institutions defined in a country’s constitution or institutional framework (International IDEA 2006: 330).

Electoral law can exclude individuals and groups from electoral processes by denying them the right to vote or to compete in elections. It can also be designed to favour one party over another. Those who feel that they are being denied an opportunity to participate in electoral processes or that they will be competing on an uneven playing field may resort to violent means to communicate their message or to prevent elections from taking place at all. Similarly, a government or its supporters may also prevent certain groups from participating in elections through violent means.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Zimbabwe

Prior to Zimbabwe’s 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections, the electoral law adopted in 2007 did not stipulate the deadline for the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) to announce the election results. In addition, the timeline for organizing the second round of elections was only 21 days, which was not realistic. Legal inconsistencies led to a delay in the announcement of the election results, raising concerns among the opposition that the elections were being rigged. As tensions rose, the pro-Mugabe supporters started to intimidate people in provinces that were seen as opposition strongholds. Inhabitants of Maniciland Province were intimidated by the heavy presence of youth militias and war veterans known for their brutal methods (IRIN Africa 2008a). For more information see International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008b: 8, 9, 12).

Interrelated factors

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<tr>
<td>1. Poor socio-economic conditions</td>
<td>12. Poor voter information campaign</td>
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<td>5. The presence of non-state armed actors</td>
<td>16. Unequal media access and favouritism</td>
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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
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Côte d’Ivoire

The presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire planned for February 2010 was postponed by the incumbent President, Laurent Gbagbo. The postponement led to violent demonstrations throughout the country which resulted in 14 casualties, including five fatalities (Alston 2010). The 2008 amendment to the electoral law had introduced a provision which obliged the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to pass over the election results to the Constitutional Council for verification. This provision contributed to the triggering of widespread post-election violence, resulting in the deaths of more than 3,000 people. (UN News Centre 2011) President Gbagbo used his influence over the Constitutional Council to block the process of certifying the opposition candidate, Alassane Ouattara, as the winner of the run-off, and this sparked the violence. For more information see International Crisis Group (2010b; 2010d; 2011b: 2, 3, 5, 6) and Human Rights Watch (2011e).

Interrelated factors

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<td>1. Poor socio-economic conditions</td>
<td>22. Problematic election-day operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Presence of non-state armed actors (and neighbouring violent actors)</td>
<td>23. Problematic ballot counting and result tallying</td>
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<td>7. Grievances relating to genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes</td>
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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The level of compliance with regional and international electoral standards and obligations;
2. the extent to which the electoral law is adequate and comprehensive in regulating all aspects of the electoral processes;
3. the level of confidence in the electoral law; and
4. the record of contestations against the electoral law (number of official judiciary and unofficial statements).

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Conduct a specialist overview and analysis of the electoral law and its impact on all groups of people. Analyse potential negative impacts in different regions and among different social groups and political actors. Use maps to point to the regions where the electoral law can lead to heightened risks of violence. Use different markers to distinguish between different categories, e.g. legal provisions of concern, groups and actors affected.
- Conduct periodic surveys among political actors and the general public targeting both men and women to understand their levels of satisfaction with the electoral law. Ensure that all surveys ask respondents their socio-demographic characteristics, including their membership of marginalized groups. These include their age, sex, language, political orientation, ethnicity and religion, location, and any minority group membership they may have. Chart data and observe trends. Create colour-coded maps to indicate regions where dissatisfaction is high.
• Collect information on official complaints filed and resolved at the respective administrative and judicial instances relating to the electoral law. Use maps to mark geographical areas where most complaints were filed and plot charts that reflect complaints submitted throughout the electoral cycle. Distinguish between the groups who submit complaints and disaggregate the complaints on the basis of sex, political affiliation and so on.

• Assess the inclusiveness and transparency of the legislative processes. Mark areas where particular groups are excluded and where processes lack transparency.

• Consider relevant experiences from past elections.
2. An unfit electoral system

Introduction

At the most basic level, the electoral system translates votes cast into seats won by political parties and candidates (International IDEA 2005: 5, 177).

Different electoral systems can aggravate or moderate tensions and conflict in society. Some systems can work well to ensure gender-balanced representation—bearing in mind that gender refers to socially constructed rather than biologically determined roles of women and men, as well as the relationships between them in a given society at a specific time and place, and that the qualities, identities and behaviours expected from men and women are determined through the process of socialization—representation of minority groups and the formation of coalition governments. Others will encourage the formation of strong single-party government. If an electoral system is not considered as inclusive and fair and the political framework does not allow a general feeling that political parties have a chance to win next time around, losers may feel compelled to work outside the system, using non-democratic, confrontational and even violent tactics (International IDEA 2005: 6).

A study published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2009) points to four variables of an electoral system that may trigger conflicts: (a) the formula for determining how votes are translated into seats; (b) district magnitude; (c) the votes-to-seat-ratio; and (d) boundary delimitation.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Lesotho

The first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system triggered violence during Lesotho’s 1998 parliamentary elections due to the perception of it being exclusionary and non-democratic (Jackson Likoti 2008: 3). Public demonstrations led to riots, causing the destruction of several buildings. The conflict only ended after military intervention by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (International IDEA 2005: 92). For more information see Commonwealth Secretariat (1998: 8–12, 16).
Malaysia
Opposition political parties and civil society groups demonstrated for electoral reform before the general elections in Malaysia in 2008. Among other reforms, the demonstrators called for the abolition of the FPTP electoral system inherited from British colonial rule, whereby the winner with a simple majority dominates the parliament. The opposition parties and civil society groups claimed that this system was discriminatory and excluded women and indigenous people. Their demands for a level playing field were met with violence by the police and two opposition supporters were shot in the chest by the police (Gáldu Resource Centre for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007). For more information see Gáldu Resource Centre for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) and Human Rights Watch (2008).

Interrelated factors

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<td>7. Inadequate funding, financing and budgeting</td>
<td>1. The level of inclusiveness of the electoral system; and</td>
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<td>16. Unequal media access and favouritism</td>
<td>2. The degree of accountability ensured by the electoral system.</td>
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<td>18. Provocative party rallying</td>
<td>13. Problematic voter registration</td>
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<td>20. Insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials</td>
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<td>22. Problematic election-day operations</td>
<td>15. Problematic accreditation of domestic and international observers</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The level of inclusiveness of the electoral system; and
2. The degree of accountability ensured by the electoral system.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Conduct expert analysis of the effects of (a) the electoral formula; (b) district magnitude; (c) the votes-to-seat-ratio; and (d) boundary delimitation on representation of all significant groups in political institutions. Use maps to mark areas where the electoral system design heightens the risks of outbreaks of violence. Use different markers to present different risks.
- Conducted surveys among political and non-political actors to obtain their perceptions about the appropriateness of the electoral system. Use maps and charts for data presentation and identification of high-risk geographical areas or increasing risk trends.
- Consider relevant experiences from past elections.
3. Inadequate electoral administrative rules

Introduction

The electoral legal framework includes numerous administrative rules such as ordinances and regulations made by national or lower-level authorities; regulations, proclamations and directives issued by an EMB; customary laws, conventions and codes of conduct; and EMB regulations or policies dealing with various issues. These rules are important as they set a clear and detailed normative framework which can be clearly operationalized.

A lack of legislative and operational clarity may impact negatively on the credibility and transparency of the electoral processes and increase the risk of arbitrary manipulation, with potential to lead to conflicts and violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

The Maldives

Six instances of election-related violence were reported during local council elections in the Maldives in 2011 (Maldivian Democracy Network 2011: 9), all originating from incidents relating to unclear rules and ad hoc instructions. Observers reported that two supporters of the incumbent Maldives Democratic Party (MDP) were injured on the island of Kelaa and taken to hospital after clashing with the police. The incident was triggered by a decision by the Electoral Commission to let everyone queuing to vote cast their ballot, no matter how long it would take (Maldivian Democracy Network 2011: 67). For more information see Maldivian Democracy Network (2011: 23, 25, 26, 38, 41).

Interrelated factors

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<td>1. Contested electoral law</td>
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<td>16. Unequal media access and favouritism</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The level to which legislative acts are made operational through the specific regulations and instructions;
2. the extent to which electoral officials, political actors and citizen groups, including both men and women, are acquainted with and understand the electoral processes; and
3. the electoral actors’ level of confidence in and satisfaction with the various administrative rules and procedures.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Use surveys to measure the level of endorsement for the electoral regulations among the electoral actors. Use charts to show the approval rates. Distinguish between different political actors by asking for survey respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, including location and minority/marginalized group membership.

• Identify political actors who did not endorse particular legal provisions, such as codes of conduct for political parties. Use maps to show areas where this may represent a particular risk.

• Through the same surveys, assess levels of acquaintance with, and understanding of, relevant electoral regulations among electoral officials, political actors and citizen groups, including women and youth groups. Use bar charts to present the results. If there are geographical discrepancies, use maps to illustrate them.

• Consider relevant experiences from past elections.
Phase 2: Planning and implementation
Introduction: Planning and implementation

Once the electoral legal framework is finalized, planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities need to be instigated. This will include developing operational plans for the implementation of the different phases of the electoral cycle, such as voter information; registration of voters, political parties and candidates, and observers; political party campaigning; polling and counting; and result management. Operational plans will point to activities to be implemented, timelines, geographical scope, human resources and training needed, budget and so on. Weakness or controversy in one electoral phase can compromise the integrity of the subsequent phases or the whole electoral process.

When elections are organized in conflict-prone societies, they can exacerbate existing tensions and trigger violent conflicts. On the other hand, existing tensions and violence may spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral actors, events, materials and facilities. It is therefore important that electoral planning is timely, holistic and conflict-sensitive and that it considers both the process and the structural factors of conflict.
4. Poor performance of the electoral management bodies

Introduction

An EMB is an organization or a body which is legally responsible for managing some or all of the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections and direct democracy instruments. These core responsibilities include planning voting operations, determining who is eligible to vote, receiving and validating the nominations of electoral participants (for elections, political parties or candidates), conducting the balloting, counting the votes, and tabulation of the votes. (International IDEA 2006: 330) An EMB may be a stand-alone institution or a unit within a larger institution which has a broader mandate.

There are three broad electoral management models—the independent, governmental and mixed models. For each of these, gender representation on the EMB is fundamental. However, no matter which model is used, it is of the utmost importance that the EMB can ensure the credibility of the electoral process and the legitimacy of the election results. This can be done if the electoral management is constituted and operates under the following fundamental guiding principles: independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness (International IDEA 2006: 22–25).

If any of these constitutive principles are lacking, the EMB’s work may generate more concerns and chaos which can lead to outbreaks of election-related violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Nigeria

During its 2007 elections Nigeria faced widespread violence resulting in the deaths of 200 people. One of the main problems was the poor performance of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The INEC was unable to organize the elections properly and was acquiescent in vote-rigging and other electoral malpractices. According to some observers, poor organization and logistics were part of an overall strategy to rig the elections. Immediately following the announcement of the result, protesters took to the streets as they did not believe that the result reflected the ballots they had cast. The demonstration was violently subdued by the police (ICG 2007: 6). Most of the killings targeted political candidates and their supporters and were carried out by politicians’ armed groups consisting of unemployed or poor adults and adolescents (Alston 2010: 40). For more information see ICG (2006b: 1) and (2007: 2–7, 9, 11).
Interrelated factors

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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
<td>22. Problematic election-day operations</td>
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<td>23. Problematic ballot counting and result tallying</td>
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<td>26. Rejection of election results</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The levels of trust and confidence enjoyed by the EMBs across the country;
2. EMBs’ levels of independence and inclusive composition, including from a gender perspective;
3. the level of impartiality of the EMBs; and
4. the level of transparency of the work conducted by the EMBs.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Conduct an expert overview and analysis of the legal framework which regulates the establishment and the work of the EMBs. If a legal framework is not gender- or conflict-sensitive, e.g. if it does not ensure the representation of different groups comprising men and women, and minority and at times majority groups, use maps to point to the regions where the composition and work of the EMBs may be a factor that can instigate violence.
- Survey and interview political actors and citizen groups in order to measure perceptions of and trust in the EMBs’ work. Conduct surveys on a regular basis. Chart the level of trust across time to understand trends.
- Analyse the EMBs’ working practices relating to inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. Interview political actors and civil society groups, targeting both women and men in these groups on this particular issue or include this in the above survey. Use charts to record/observe trends and maps to point to the regions where this issue creates particular tensions.
- Consider relevant experiences from past elections.
5. An inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes

Introduction

Electoral dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms provide a formalized structure for appeals through which electoral actions or procedures can be legally challenged. Disputes may arise at any point in time throughout the various stages of the electoral process (International IDEA 2010: 37–38). If effective and trusted EDR mechanisms are not put in place from the initial stages of electoral processes, electoral actors may decide to resort to violent means in resolving disputed issues.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Ethiopia

During Ethiopia’s 2005 parliamentary elections the President of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) also acted as the head of the Supreme Court, which had a mandate to rule on electoral disputes. This was strongly contested by the opposition. Electoral complaints were processed in a way which not only prevented opposition parties exercising their electoral rights but exposed them to further violations of their human rights and insecurity. A climate of fear and intimidation marked the entire complaints process and one witness was killed. Security forces and militias were present around the hearings and opposition witnesses were arrested before or after their statements in the hearings (European Union Election Observation Mission [n.d.]: 3, 28). For more information see Human Rights Watch (2005a, 2005b, 2005c).

Interrelated factors

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<td>5. The presence of non-state armed actors</td>
<td>26. Rejection of election results</td>
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<td>7. Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes</td>
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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
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**Observable indicators**

1. The existence of EDR bodies;
2. the degree of accessibility of the EDR bodies;
3. the degree of effectiveness of the EDR bodies;
4. the degree of independence of the EDR bodies;
5. the degree of impartiality of the EDR bodies;
6. the degree of transparency of the EDR bodies; and
7. the level of trust in the EDR bodies.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Conduct surveys and interviews with the political actors and citizen groups to measure the degree of trust in the work of EDR bodies. Use maps to show the level of trust within the different geographical regions. Repeat surveys over time and plot charts to observe trends.

- Obtain figures on the number of election-related complaints received, resolved and pending ruling from the relevant EDR bodies and disaggregate the complaints on the basis of sex. Use charts to display comparative data. Use maps to show geographical regions where EDR bodies underperform.

- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
6. Inadequate operational planning

Introduction

The development of a strategic plan is the basic step in focusing the efforts of an EMB on achieving its legal responsibilities. (International IDEA 2006: 131) Operational planning will help in developing a clear blueprint on the steps that need to be taken towards the organization of credible elections. The plan will include descriptions, timelines, geographical scope of preparation, activities, and human and funding resources needed.

Poor implementation of electoral activities may result in mistakes and delays. If these problems are seen as deliberate tactics aimed to favour certain political options or having a potential to influence electoral outcomes, they can trigger violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Zimbabwe

During the special voting exercise in Zimbabwe’s 2013 general elections, uniformed voters smashed the windows of one polling station and, in a separate incident, forced their way into a polling station, (Nehanda Radio 2013) resulting in anti-riot police being called in to contain the situation (The Herald 2013). By the end of the special voting process, many voters—which included security personnel and civil servants—had not been able to vote. The Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) later issued a public apology and admitted that the special voting exercise had been marred by logistical challenges, which resulted in the ZEC failing to get the ballot papers to polling stations countywide on time. (New Zimbabwe 2013) The ZEC also cited unforeseen legal challenges, which forced them to print the ballot paper much later than planned (Bulawayo 24 News 2013). For more information see Bulawayo 24 News (2013) and The Zimbabwean (2013).

Interrelated factors

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<td>20. Insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials</td>
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<td>21. Lack of transparency of special and external voting</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The existence of guidelines for strategic and operational electoral planning among relevant stakeholders;
2. the existence of strategic plans and operational concepts at the responsible bodies;
3. the level of coherence of the strategic and operational plans;
4. the level of consultation among responsible stakeholders during the planning period and the capacity to implement operational plans; and
5. the existence of monitoring and evaluation procedures and mechanisms.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Obtain operational planning documents from relevant stakeholders at different levels. Analyse the operational plans in terms of quality and sufficiency, feasibility, including resource availability, and timelines envisaged. Point to deficiencies, e.g. potential shortfalls relating to human resources and funds for the implementation of plans, and unrealistic timelines. Use maps to mark geographical areas of particular concern.

- Cross-check harmonization between the documents produced by different stakeholders (e.g. between EMBs and SSAs). Use maps to point to geographical areas where discrepancies are noticed.

- Compare with the plans from the previous electoral processes. Create a map which displays data relating to the historical records of election-related violence and existing incidents of violence. Analyse operational plans in the context of historical and existing violence taking into account gender-based violence.

- Consider other relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.

- Generate risk maps for different electoral phases.
7. Inadequate funding, financing and budgeting

Introduction

Electoral costs can be divided into three categories:

1. Core costs (or direct costs), which are routinely associated with implementing an electoral process in a stable electoral environment.

2. Diffuse costs (or indirect costs), relating to electoral services that cannot be disentangled from the general budgets of agencies that assist with the implementation of an electoral process.

3. Integrity costs, which are necessary to provide security, integrity, political neutrality and a level playing field for an electoral process (International IDEA 2006: 176).

Inadequate funding, financing and budgeting will not trigger violence directly. However, inadequate resources may force EMBs to make compromises which can impact on the integrity and security of electoral processes and thus open them up for disputes which can fuel and trigger violent conflicts.

Core cost deficiencies may affect the technical integrity of the electoral process; lack of diffuse funds will limit the engagement of supporting agencies, most importantly those with the task to provide security; while a lack of integrity funds may harm the legitimacy of the process.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Democratic Republic of the Congo

During the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections in Democratic Republic of the Congo, hundreds of protesters were stopped as they approached the Independent National Election Commission (CENI) headquarters, claiming that the voter registration process was fraudulent and calling for an audit of the electoral register. The clash between opposition party supporters and the police lead to both injuries and arrests (BBC 2011b). According to the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), much of the trouble surrounding the registration process was ‘the consequence of poor planning and inadequate resources rather than corruption’ (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2011). It cites a lack of registration
centres, faulty registration equipment, under-age registration and inexperienced CENI officials. The IWPR also reports that the CENI, in its turn, ‘blames its low budget for the lack of registration centers and the problems experienced during the enrolment process’. (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2011) For more Information see Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2011).

Interrelated factors

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<td>6. Inadequate operational planning</td>
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<td>13. Problematic voter registration</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The adequacy of funds to cover core costs;
2. the adequacy of funds to cover diffuse costs;
3. the adequacy of funds to cover integrity costs; and
4. the level of accountability in the procedures of budget approval and spending.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Conduct an expert analysis that involves cross-checking the operational plans and available funds. Use maps to point to the geographical regions where insufficient funds may have an impact on the quality of electoral activities.
- Conduct an expert analysis of diffuse/indirect costs and integrity costs. Use maps to point to the geographical regions where insufficient funds may negatively impact on the security and legitimacy of electoral processes.
- Compare with the budgets for previous elections and cross-check against violent or non-violent outcomes. Chart differences in expenditures throughout the different electoral phases. Observe if the current budget is in real terms an improvement compared to previous election year budget(s), and in particular if the current budget compensates for previous shortfalls.
- Consider relevant experiences from past elections.
8. Inadequate electoral security arrangements

Introduction

Electoral security entails the protection of electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media, and observers; electoral information such as the results of the vote, registration data, and campaign material; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centres; and electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, damage or disruption. Three broad types of electoral security can be identified: (a) physical security, which concerns protection of facilities and materials; (b) personal security, concerning electoral stakeholders; and (c) information security, which concerns protection of physical ballot papers and ballot boxes, computers and communication systems.

Weaknesses in electoral security, especially in conflict-prone societies and those which experience high levels of violence, will expose electoral stakeholders, information, facilities and events to violence (USAID 2010: 5–6). Electoral security may entail engagement and collaboration between different SSAs such as police forces, intelligence agencies, armed forces, special prosecutors for electoral crimes and so on. Security for women in conflict- and post-conflict contexts deserves special attention.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Bangladesh

During the electoral period for the 2008 parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, a total of 110 incidents of election-related violence were recorded (Asia Foundation 2009: 2). The law enforcement agencies were perceived by international observers to lack an active role in preventing and limiting much of the violence which took place. The perpetrators of the violence were mainly the supporters and leaders of the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) (Asia Foundation 2009: 4, 6). For more information see ICG (2008d: 5, 19, 28).

Interrelated factors

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Kenya
Riots broke out across Kenya in connection with the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 after the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced the election results (ICG 2008a: 9). State officials failed to act on pre-existing or incoming intelligence that warned about a potential for outbreaks of violence. Moreover, the police force reacted improperly and used unjustified force against the demonstrators (Alston 2010: 38). For more information see ICG (2008a: 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19).

**Interrelated factors**

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<td>4. The presence of non-state armed actors</td>
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**Observable indicators**

1. The level of public trust in the SSAs;
2. the level of accountability of SSAs;
3. the existence of training plans for SSAs deployed to safeguard electoral processes;
4. the existence and quality of electoral security operational plans; and
5. the level of collaboration between SSAs and other electoral actors, in particular the EMB.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Conduct periodic surveys among men and women in the population and electoral actors to measure the level of trust in SSAs. Chart data to observe changing trends. Use maps to indicate geographical areas where trust in the SSAs is low.
- Compile and evaluate the comprehensiveness and quality of electoral security training plans for security sector agencies and electoral officials at national and sub-national level. Map possible gaps.
- Conduct an expert review of the adequacy of electoral security operational plans (including resources designated). Cross-check with the EMB operational plans. Use charts to compare the level of security engagements (e.g. timing and number of security personnel involved) with the level of electoral activities (e.g. number of operating electoral facilities such as voter registration centres or polling stations, and the level of expected citizen participation in the respective events) throughout the whole electoral process. Use maps to point to regions where the level of security planning does not correspond with the dimension of electoral activity or the availability of security resources.
- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
Phase 3: Training and education
Introduction: Training and education

Training and education efforts are conventionally focused on (a) training for electoral officials on technical aspects of the preparation and implementation of electoral processes; and (b) educational campaign for registrants and voters about their rights, duties, electoral timelines, and registration and voting procedures.

Deficiencies in the training of electoral officials, and any misunderstanding of electoral processes and wrong perceptions among political actors, the media and the general public, may raise tensions and contribute to deepening conflict and to outbreaks of violence.
9. Poor training for election officials

Introduction

One of the main pillars of professionalism in electoral administration is the proper training and development of: permanent EMB staff; temporary management staff appointed for specific electoral events; and the large number of field staff that may be temporarily engaged for large-scale events (International IDEA 2006: 157).

Poorly trained electoral officials may lack the basic understanding and skills to conduct professional voter registration, voting and counting processes. Technical mistakes committed during voter registration may affect the accuracy of the electoral registers, thus damaging the integrity of the voting processes at the polling stations and thereby the election results.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Cambodia

In connection with Cambodia’s 2013 parliamentary elections, violence broke out during an election protest rally in Phnom Penh between the police and protesters, resulting in one death and several injuries (Radio Free Asia 2013b). The protesters claimed that the election was flawed, citing cases of suspected tampering with election results in several provinces. Before the protest, the Constitutional Council of Cambodia reviewed complaints and ordered staff of the National Election Commission (NEC) to be sanctioned for mishandling secured ballot records. Despite this, it dismissed opposition complaints of irregularities in the national polls. The opposition protested at the court’s verdict, seeing the endorsement of the election results as unacceptable in the light of the tampering with secured ballot records. NEC officials, on the other hand, blamed the irregularities on poor training and low educational levels of polling station staff (Radio Free Asia 2013a).

Interrelated factors

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<td>19. Provocative and violent actions by political parties</td>
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<td>25. Poor management of the final round of electoral appeals</td>
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<td>26. Rejection of the election results</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The existence and the comprehensiveness of operational plans for the training of electoral officials;
2. the existence and quality of training materials;
3. the existence of sufficient numbers of training personnel;
4. the level of skills of training providers;
5. the degree to which the national training programme has been completed; and
6. the level of understanding and skills obtained from the training.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Compile training plans for electoral officials. Use maps to indicate regions which lack adequate plans. Assess the extent to which men and women are represented in the training.
• Conduct an expert review of the training methodology and curriculum. Map regions where the training methodology and curriculum may need to be reassessed in order to overcome language and other barriers. Canvass the extent to which skills are maintained and institutionalized within EMBs.
• Follow up on the pace and the outreach of training efforts. Chart levels/percentages of training implementation. Map regions where training is not meeting deadlines.
• Survey/quiz trained electoral officials. Chart particular topics where trained personnel show lack of understanding. Map regions where training should be repeated.
10. Lack of training for political parties and media

Introduction

Elections are high-stake processes for political parties which compete for popular support and political power. During all phases of an electoral process, the role of the media in facilitating information sharing, in profiling both women and men as candidates, and in discussions on electoral issues is essential.

If politicians and journalists lack basic understanding about the technical aspects of electoral processes—including various procedures, and decision-making and EDR mechanisms—their actions may raise tensions and lead to outbreaks of violence. The media have a responsibility to report rather than make news, and when this is ignored this can also exacerbate tensions and even cause violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Guyana

Throughout the election period of Guyana’s 2001 parliamentary elections, journalists did not feel obliged to investigate rumours spread by political supporters during TV and radio talk shows. During one such broadcast it was suggested that people should invade the homes of party officials: words such as ‘bloodbath’ were mentioned. Following election day, many Guyanese stated that the talk shows provided a platform for hate speech and a raison d’être for the gathering of mobs. Furthermore, it was argued that the talk shows raised fear and tensions during the election period (Commonwealth Secretariat 2001: 23). A talk-show host was arrested twice before election day when he led a crowd near the Election Commissioner’s house (Organization of American States 2001: 2, 18, 19).

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<td>13. Problematic voter registration</td>
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<td>16. Unequal media access and favouritism</td>
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**Observable indicators**

1. The existence of electoral processes-related training programmes for political parties and media which integrate gender issues;
2. the level of implementation of training programmes for political parties and media; and
3. the level of understanding about different aspects of electoral processes, including codes of conduct regulating the behaviour of politicians and journalists, decision making, dispute resolution mechanisms and gender issues among political parties and the media.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Review training plans for political parties and media. Use maps to identify regions where such training is insufficient or does not take place.
- Conduct an expert review of the training methodology and curriculum. Map regions where the training methodology and curriculum may need to be reassessed to overcome language and other barriers.
- Follow up on the pace and outreach of training efforts. Chart levels/percentages of training implementation. Point to political parties and media stakeholders which did not receive training. Generate maps that indicate the number of politicians and journalists trained.
- Survey relevant political party and media stakeholders relating to their understanding of electoral processes and media ethics. Chart particular topics for which lack of understanding is demonstrated. Map regions where training should be repeated or reformulated.
- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
11. Lack of training of security sector agencies

Introduction

The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, has argued that one of the most frequent types of electoral violence is that engaged in by state agents against demonstrators in election-related public gatherings or protests (Alston 2010). Apart from violent acts perpetrated by politically biased police, most of the abuses occur because police officers are not aware of their responsibilities in the electoral process or of the electoral legislation and the other laws involved in the process, such as the regulations concerning the right of assembly and public demonstrations. With regard to the violent policing of demonstrations, Philip Alston has pointed out that, in many cases, violence has occurred because ‘the police lacked the appropriate use of force guidelines, training, experience and equipment to control the crowd lawfully and appropriately’ (Alston 2010: 16).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Nepal

The Nepalese police force deployed over 100,000 security personnel (International Crisis Group 2008c: 11) during the electoral period in connection with the parliamentary election in 2008. However, reports warned about a lack of training of the police in coping with electoral violence. (ICG 2008c: 12) During the pre-election protests an incident took place in which the police started to shoot at the protesters, resulting in one death (CNN 2008). The protesters demonstrated against the killing of the political candidate Rishi Prasad Sharma, a communist candidate. (CNN, ‘Pre-election Violence Flares in Nepal, 7 Dead’) For more information see ICG (2008e: 10, 11).

Interrelated factors

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<td>5. Presence of non-state armed actors</td>
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**Observable indicators**

1. The existence of electoral processes-related training programmes for law enforcement officials that integrate gender awareness training;
2. the level of implementation of training programmes for both male and female law enforcement officials; and
3. the level of law enforcement officials’ understanding of different aspects of electoral processes, including electoral procedures, electoral campaigning methodologies, rights and dispute resolution mechanisms.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Fact finding about specialized electoral training programmes for security sector personnel and the scope of the training (geographical and hierarchical). Use charts to compare level and completion of training through different regions. Use maps to show regions where the process of training is not adequate.
- Fact finding or joint events involving information sharing, discussion and consultations between SSAs and other actors in electoral processes. Use maps to show regions where a lack of information sharing is noticed.
- Survey relevant law enforcement agencies and officials for their understanding of electoral processes and their role. Chart particular topics in which relevant officials demonstrated lack of understanding. Map regions where training should be repeated.
- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
12. A poor voter information campaign

Introduction

A voter information campaign is an effort organized by the relevant EMB to provide the basic information enabling citizens to participate in elections as candidates and as voters. Such information often includes eligibility requirements and timelines, locations and procedures for registration and voting.

Voter information campaigns may be unclear or badly timed and fail to reach all citizens, especially marginalized groups such as women and the elderly (men and women) in rural areas. In most societies of the world, the unequal distribution of power between women and men disadvantages women’s access to information. As a consequence, voters may lack clarity about the eligibility criteria for voter registration, the identification documents required, the designated voting location, the voting procedure and so on. Poorly informed citizens may slow down or disrupt electoral processes, also unnecessarily overburdening EDR mechanisms.

Observable indicators

1. The appropriateness of the timing of a voter information campaign;
2. the geographical scope of the voter information campaign;
3. the level of diversity of voter information media and
4. the quality and social sensitivity of the voter information campaign.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Assess the timelines for voter information and education. Chart timelines of different electoral activities, and observe overlaps and the extent to which the design of the voter information campaign meets the objectives.

• Analyse the geographical coverage of the voter information campaign and its capacity to reach all social groups of people. Take into account sex, age, ethnic, language and religious groups. Consider voters with special needs, such as the disabled. Map the
coverage of all media used to convey information. Identify geographical areas or groups which remain out of reach or who are excluded from the campaign.

• Conduct surveys among recipient and excluded groups measuring the effects of the voter information campaign (level of understanding of campaign messages among citizens). Chart the extent to which information has reached and been understood by different social groups. Map the reach and understanding across different geographical regions.

• Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
Phase 4: Registration
Electoral processes encompass three types of registration:

1. voter registration—the process of verification of a citizen’s eligibility to vote;
2. the registration of political parties and candidates—verification of the eligibility of political parties and candidates to stand for election; and
3. observers’ accreditation—a procedure designed to grant different actors access to observe relevant electoral activities.

All three may have an impact on the credibility and integrity of electoral processes and as such represent potential factors contributing to election-related tensions and violence.
13. Problematic voter registration

Introduction

Voter registration establishes the eligibility of individuals to cast their ballot on election day. As a general rule, eligibility to vote is a precondition for the registration of candidates.

Voter registration is a technically complex and sensitive process. Voters with multiple registrations, electoral registers which contain the names of deceased or non-existent people, rejected voter registration, inaccurate assignment of a voter to the proper polling station and other factors may have potential to influence electoral outcomes. All political actors competing in elections will therefore be very concerned with the quality of voter registration. Manipulation of voter registration, or perceptions that this has happened, may trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Ghana

During the period of registration of voters in Ghana’s presidential and legislative elections 2008, there were major irregularities which resulted in violence. In northern Ghana, the two main political parties, the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), vandalized several voter registration centres. Furthermore, a journalist covering the registration process was attacked by the NPP and the NDC while reporting on under-age voter registration. The illegal registration of minors was of great concern, according to domestic observers (IRIN Africa 2008b). For more information see European Union Election Observation Mission (2009: 12, 13, 14, 19).

Interrelated factors

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<td>7. Inadequate funding, financing and budgeting</td>
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<td>17. Provocative use of media by political parties</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The level of quality of performance of the voter registration centres;
2. citizens’ turnout (data disaggregated by sex);
3. the level of reliability and performance of voter registration technology;
4. the number of successful registrants versus the number of rejected registrations;
5. the appropriateness and the level of actors’ understanding of complaint procedures;
6. the existence of a period for the scrutiny of provisional electoral registers;
7. the number of complaints from both men and women related to the voter registration process; and
8. the places and a number of violent incidents relating to voter registration processes.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Conduct periodic surveys with political parties, civil society organizations and citizens regarding their perceptions about the quality of the ongoing registration process. Obtain their views with respect to the extent to which quality of registration can/will predetermine electoral outcomes. Chart feedback to observe level of risks and changing attitudes. Show level of confidence among different political options, civil society organizations and citizens. Map areas where voter registration is perceived as problematic.

• Check the availability of provisional voter registers and the efficiency of complaint procedures. Map areas where provisional voter registers are not made available.

• Review voter registration logs, records of registration-related appeals at the relevant appeal bodies and the dynamics of case resolution. Chart the number of complaints by region. Create maps indicating number of complaints per region. Colour code maps accordingly.

• Collect data on incidents involving increased tensions and violence relating to registration processes. Colour code risk regions accordingly. Place static markers at the location where incidents took place. Map number of incidents per region.

• Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
14. Problematic registration of political parties and candidates

Introduction

Political parties exist outside the electoral context but compete in elections. They usually require registration with the body in charge of conducting elections. Basic registration requirements may include providing information on party identity, programme documents, evidence of popular support, geographic coverage and financial viability. Basic registration requirements for political party candidates may include proof of eligibility to vote in a given electoral district and additional information (e.g. financial statements).

However, registration requirements can be used as an instrument to exclude groups or individuals from the electoral competition and participation in power sharing. Exclusion from electoral processes through the denial of registration can give incentives to excluded groups to turn to violent means in pursuing their political interests. In many situations, psychological and physical violence is used to prevent candidates standing for elections.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Turkey

Prior to the 2011 parliamentary elections, in December 2009 Turkey’s Constitutional Court decided to ban the Democratic Society Party (DTP), a pro-Kurdish party (European Commission 2010: 7, 21). The Court alleged that the DTP was connected with the terrorist-affiliated Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The DTP’s supporters, mainly of Kurdish origin, perceived the banning of the DTP as a further step in the Turkish government’s repression of the Kurdish minority. This led to demonstrations against the government, mainly in the south-east region of Turkey which is predominately inhabited by a Kurdish population. There were reports of stone-throwing demonstrators clashing with riot police (CNN 2009). For more information see Human Rights Watch (2010a, 2011f, 2011g).

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Russia
The liberal Party of People’s Freedom (PARNAS) was refused party registration before the upcoming parliamentary elections in Russia in 2011. Its members and supporters were intimidated and pressured by government authorities to resign from their posts or to take their names off the party list (CNN 2011). Other members were interrogated by police or security officers as to why they had joined the party and whether they understood that membership could lead to redundancy or the denial of university opportunities for their children (MSNBC 2011). For more information see Human Rights Watch March (2011b, 2011c).

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The Philippines
The election campaign was marred by violence in the 2010 legislative and presidential elections in the Philippines. On one day alone, a group of 57 people, including relatives of local politicians, lawyers and journalists, was abducted by armed men belonging to the private army of a warlord with close ties to the incumbent President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Lakas-Kampi-CMD), and later found dead (ICG 2009: 1). The group, mainly women, were heading towards an election office to declare and file a candidacy for the Deputy Mayor of the town of Buluan before they were abducted and killed (New York Times 2009; ICG 2009: 1). For more information see International Crisis Group (2010a) and Human Rights Watch (2011a).

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Observable indicators

1. The level of difficulty or ease associated with meeting the requirements for party and candidate registration, including:
   a. legal (prior registration of political organization, candidate registration, country of birth, signed statements and so on);
   b. financial (registration deposits, fees, financial declarations and so on);
   c. logistical (timelines, location where registration can be done and so on); and
   d. gender (inclusion of candidates of opposite sex in the candidacy lists);
2. the geographical and social representativeness and inclusiveness of political parties;
3. the number of incidents involving physical and psychological violence against prospective party candidates, disaggregated by sex, during primaries and the registration period;

4. the number of successful party registrations/number of rejected registrations;

5. the number of small parties (e.g. satellite or briefcase parties) in coalition with the ruling party (or main opposition party) that dilute the electoral landscape and erode the opponents’ potential; and

6. the number of complaints, received and processed, related to party and candidate registration.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Conduct an expert overview of the legal framework for registration of political parties and candidates and analyse its impact. Map particular regions where party registration requirements may disqualify particular political, socio-economic or geographic groups such as women and young people from political competitions.

- Review party and candidates registration logs, records of registration-related appeals and the dynamics of case resolution. Chart the number of internal political party complaints submitted by candidates and show by geographical region. Also chart the number of complaints between parties and their registration systems and show by geographical region. Use maps to point to areas where political parties have been denied registration.

- Gather data on violent incidents during primaries and throughout the registration period. Colour code risk regions accordingly. Place static markers at the locations where incidents took place. Map number of incidents per region.

- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
15. Problematic accreditation of domestic and international observers

Introduction

Domestic and international observers often confer legitimacy of an election and might be safeguard against electoral fraud. It is very common that the public places a great deal of trust in their findings.

However, authoritarian regimes will tend to limit international observers’ presence and deny registration to domestic observation groups. In the case of domestic observation, regimes may also resort to intimidation in an effort to influence their reporting. Problematic accreditation can be perceived as a part of preparations to rig the electoral results, which may contribute to increased tensions, rejection of the electoral results or outbreaks of violence (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2013).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Nicaragua

The Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union and the Carter Center were all denied accreditation to monitor Nicaragua’s municipal elections in 2008. Furthermore, domestic observers such as Ethics and Transparency were also denied access to polling stations. Following the announcement of the result, supporters and opponents of the left-wing Sandinista party accused each other of electoral fraud (during the balloting and counting processes). This ended in a violent clash causing eight casualties, including two fatalities. The incumbent government came in for international criticism after not letting international observers monitor the balloting and counting processes. However, the party of the incumbent President Daniel Ortega, which won a majority of the votes, dismissed the criticism and argued that the observers were denied access as they were financed by outside powers (Wall Street Journal 2008). For more information see Human Rights Watch (2006).

Interrelated factors

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<td>4. Gender-based discrimination and violence</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The level of difficulty associated with accreditation of domestic and international observers;
2. the number of accreditations rejected and potential geographical focuses (data disaggregated by sex);
3. the number of complaints related to rejected observations; and
4. the number of incidents of intimidation reported by observers.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Conduct an expert overview of the legal framework for accreditation of domestic and international observers.

• Identify groups and organizations that are denied access to observation. If geographically specific, show on a map. Whenever possible, show the data disaggregated by sex.

• Conduct interviews with national and international observation organizations in relation to their views about the accreditation process. Obtain numbers of deployed observers, events observed and geographical coverage. Use maps to point to the areas of observers’ deployment. Identify potential gaps.

• Survey citizens’ in relation to the level of trust in different electoral observation groups. Chart level of popular trust. Generate geographical maps to present data.

• Review past or real-time reports and materials published by international and domestic observers in relation to intimidation. If geographic region-specific, use maps to point to the region(s) and specific locations where the observers were intimidated.

• Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
Phase 5: Electoral campaign
Political parties use the electoral campaign period to promote their political programmes and confront the political views of other political actors. Campaigning allows citizens to get a better understanding of the different political options and to decide who to vote for. During the campaign period, political parties will use different strategies to reach voters and seek their support. They will organize political rallies and parades, and display promotional materials and media advertisements to increase their profile and visibility. Media appearances are particularly important as it is well established that media debates are important vehicles for winning popular support.

Nevertheless, unequal media access—especially as between women and men and between ruling and opposition political parties—provocative media messages and appearances, and aggressive campaigning and actions have led to outbreaks of election-related violence, including gender-based violence, in many different contexts.
16. Unequal media access and favouritism

Introduction

Political parties use different media during electoral campaigns to send out their messages and appeal for popular support. Although the role and importance of web-based social media have dramatically increased in recent years, traditional media (i.e. radio, TV and print media) are most important in most country contexts.

Favouritism on the part of the state-owned media towards the incumbent candidates and parties—in terms of biased reporting, gender discrimination in the coverage and reporting, media coverage time, discrimination against political opponents, unethical reporting and so on—is often a factor in raising tensions. Private media may adopt the same practices to champion their favourite candidates and become political agitators instead of campaign facilitators. Such a scenario can increase tensions and fuel election-related violence directed against political opponents and journalists.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Cambodia

The majority of the media networks were biased towards the Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) during the parliamentary elections in Cambodia in 2008, thereby directly violating election campaign rules. In addition, a journalist working for Moneaksekar Khmer, an opposition newspaper affiliated with the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), was murdered in Phnom Penh along with his son two weeks before election day. The journalist was well known for his critical articles on governmental corruption. The fact that no one was arrested for the murders was intended as a warning to other journalists and opposition members that the government would act with impunity in dealing with criticism (UNESCO 2008). For more information see European Union Electoral Observation Mission (2008: 1) and COMFREL (2008: 10, 27, 37, 43, 44).
16. Unequal media access and favouritism

Interrelated factors

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<td>24. Poor management of election results</td>
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<td>25. Poor management of the final round of electoral appeals</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The existence and the quality of provisions of the code of conduct for the media during electoral campaigning, both state and privately owned;
2. the operationalization of the provisions of the code of conduct for media;
3. the existence of mechanisms which ensure equal media access to political parties during the campaign period;
4. the level of gender sensitivity of media reporting and coverage;
5. the level of equality in terms of time allocated and the impartiality of reporting; and
6. the number of complaints received by electoral dispute resolution bodies relating to unequal media access and favouritism.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Identify all existing bodies and methodologies for monitoring of the media, including from a gender perspective. Map geographical coverage. Identify potential gaps.

• Identify the relevant legal framework which regulates broader media conduct, and specific documents or provisions that regulate media access during the campaign period. Observe its implementation directly or in partnership with existing media monitoring bodies or organizations. Chart violations of relevant accessibility rules across time. Generate maps to indicate regions where violations occur more frequently and the media involved.

• Review official complaints relating to equal access to the media not just across political parties but as between women and men during the electoral campaign. Chart the number of complaints relating to individual media. Map the geographical spread of complaints and identify whether they are made by particular political and socio-demographic/minority groups.

• Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
17. Provocative use of media by political parties

Introduction

Media campaigning traditionally provides a unique space for different political options to confront the political views of their opponents. In all contexts, including well-established and transitional democracies, political debates facilitated by the media have been essential in informing voters of policy options and winning voters’ support.

Although it is envisaged as a platform for issues-based presentation and confrontation of political arguments, media campaigning often turns into a campaign of derogation and hate speeches. In many societies insults towards women in politics tend to focus on undermining their capacity as leaders as opposed to men, who are assumed to be born leaders. Political parties sometimes abuse campaign opportunities and access to the media to disseminate false statements, and create imaginary threats and a feeling of insecurity in order to mobilize support. Such campaigning has often seen violent outcomes.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Democratic Republic of the Congo

During the campaign for the 2006 presidential and legislative elections in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a number of incidents of hate speeches were reported (ICG 2006c: 5). Two rival political leaders—the incumbent President Joseph Kabila, from the Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et le Development (PPRD), and Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba from the Movement of the Liberation of Congo (MLC)—engaged in hate speech campaigns which had ethnic dimensions. For example, Bemba’s campaign slogan was ‘100 percent Congolese’, which indicated that Kabila was of foreign descent, probably Tanzanian or Rwandan. Bemba’s own television channel also showed images of atrocities allegedly committed by Kabila during the 1963–2008 civil war. The media announcements also encouraged people to attack the head of the election commission. This rhetoric had severe consequences and triggered electoral violence during a political party rally in Kinshasa, where Bemba supporters killed six people, several of them police officers. The Kabila camp used this to their advantage by showing images of the dead police officers on PPRD-affiliated television with the aim of bringing the MLC into contempt (ICG 2006c; Vollhardt, Johanna et al. 2007). For more information see ICG (2006c: 7; 2007c: 6, 7).
**Interrelated factors**

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<td>5. Presence of non-state armed actors</td>
<td>13. Problematic voter registration</td>
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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
<td>23. Problematic ballot counting and result tallying</td>
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**Observable indicators**

1. The extent (geographical and frequency) of provocative media campaigning;
2. the type of media where provocative campaigning is recorded;
3. the type of ownership of media where provocative campaigning is recorded;
4. the political actors involved in provocative media campaigning; and
5. the content of provocative messages, including gender stereotypes and sexist messages.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Conduct extensive media monitoring or establish cooperation with media monitoring agencies and organizations to obtain data about provocative media campaigning by political parties. Use charts and maps to observe trends and point to the geographical dimension of provocative campaigning.
- Distinguish between actors engaged in provocative campaigning in terms of their political affiliation, place in the party hierarchy, gender and geographical influence. Use maps and charts to present data.
- Assess the seriousness of incidents and distinguish in terms of their capacity to increase the risks of election-related violence. Use charts to observe risk trends and maps to point to the most critical geographical regions.
- Review the record of official appeals relating to inappropriate media campaigning by political parties. Examine the efficiency and appropriateness of responses. Chart and map the data.
- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
18. Provocative party rallying

Introduction

Political parties organize rallies during the electoral campaign period to reinforce links between the political leadership, the party activists and the party supporters. Electoral rallies are also demonstrations of strength, unity and power.

In conflict-prone societies where political divides often correspond with social divides and gender discrimination, election rallies may represent high-risk events. The disposition of the crowd, inflammatory rhetoric and hate speeches can inspire violent action, whether it was the organizers’ intention or not. Additionally, actions taken to limit, obstruct or prevent competitors from holding political rallies may trigger violent reactions.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Azerbaijan

During the election campaign period in Azerbaijan in 2003, international observers recorded cases of opposition candidates being denied venues for rallies by the local authorities. The local authorities in the capital, Baku, refused a popular opposition party leader, Isa Gambar of the Musavat party, permission to hold a rally in a cinema. Hundreds of supporters gathered outside the cinema to demonstrate against this decision, de facto showing their support for the candidate. The police used violence to disperse the demonstrations and injured dozens of people, including journalists and civilians (Human Rights Watch 2004: 12). For more information see Human Rights Watch (2003a: 4, 17; 2003b).

Interrelated factors

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<td>1. Poor socio-economic conditions</td>
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Nepal

During the parliamentary election in Nepal in 2008, mass meetings organized by the Nepali Congress in the Tarai region were interrupted by the Madhesi political parties by threats of violence and bombings (Carter Center 2008: 35–6). For more information see ICG (2008e: 10, 11).
### Interrelated factors

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### Observable indicators

1. The scope of political party rallying (parties, events, locations, frequency);
2. the number of prohibitions of party rallies by the relevant authorities;
3. the effectiveness of security arrangements put in place to prevent campaign-related violence;
4. the extent of use of inflammatory language, gender stereotyping and hate speech;
5. the number of violent incidents or clashes following political rallies;
6. the political options involved; and
7. the number of victims (data disaggregated by sex).

### Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Collect data about planned and scheduled political party rallies from the authorities responsible for approving them at different levels. Cross-check with the data from the respective political actors. Use charts to show the dynamics of events throughout the campaign period. Use maps to mark geographical locations where political rallies take place. Identify high-risk events. Use different sizes for markers in order to distinguish the size and scope of the various events.

- Obtain information on and analyse the security sector arrangements surrounding political party rallying. Assess whether the size of the security deployment corresponds with the size of event and whether it sufficiently reflects the risks associated with the event. Use maps to mark the size of security deployment and cross-check with the maps showing the size and risks of political rallies.

- Monitor or liaise with monitoring networks to obtain records of inflammatory rhetoric, gender stereotyping and hate speeches at party rallies.

- Record incidents linked with the political party campaigning, during or after party rallies, including perpetrators and information about the victims, broken down by sex. Obtain official police reports and media reports, deploy fact finding, establish hotlines and utilize crowdsourcing platforms. Use maps to pinpoint related incidents. Cross-check with other data, e.g. distance from the location of a rally and size of event. Use markers of different sizes to present different dimension of incidents.

- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
19. Provocative and violent actions by political parties

Introduction

Electoral processes are supposed to offer a level playing field where the quality of their electoral manifesto will determine parties’ chances of success. In reality, election campaigning and party actions can go beyond the political rhetoric. In some contexts, political actors resort to different forms of psychological and physical violence to ensure that their electoral success is secured prior to election day. Such actions mostly take place during the electoral campaign period. They involve aggressive party activists, recruited thugs or members of party militias who commit acts of harassment, intimidation, assaults, violence against women and girls, destruction of property, political assassinations and other unlawful acts. Actions are directed against political opponents, their supporters, journalists and others. These scenarios are particularly dangerous as a single provocative or violent action may trigger responses and start a vicious circle.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Guatemala

The run-up to the 2011 presidential and legislative elections in Guatemala was marked by violent actions committed by political parties and their supporters, with more than 20 election-related deaths reported (ICG 2011a: 6–7). In February 2011 a mayoral candidate for the National Union for Hope-Grand National Alliance (UNE-GANA) was assassinated in a restaurant. Another, similar murder involved a UNE-GANA mayoral candidate’s son, who was killed in February 2011. The father claims that a politician from the oppositional party Patriot Party (PP) was involved in plotting the murder (ICG 2011a: 7). For more information see ICG (2011a: 9; 2011c).

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<td>5. Presence of non-state armed actors</td>
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<td>6. Presence of organized crime groups</td>
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</table>
19. Provocative and violent actions by political parties

**Observable indicators**

1. Incidents of intimidation, threats, destruction of property, physical harm, kidnappings, assassinations and other violent acts committed against electoral actors, journalists, registrants and voters;

2. psychological and physical violence directed against vulnerable social groups such as women, children, ethnic and religious minorities and so on during the election period; and

3. the extent to which the perpetrators of violence, associated with political parties, are prosecuted.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Obtain official information about incidents of election-related violence. Use police reports, media reports, and civil society network reporting; engage in fact finding; establish hotlines and utilize crowdsourcing technology. Use maps to point to different geographical locations where incidents took place. Distinguish between the perpetrators and victims, including victim subgroups. Chart and show trends in election-related violence, including gender-based violence, throughout the time.

- Obtain information on the number of judicial processes against individuals or groups associated with political parties who committed provocative and violent actions. Compare with the number of incidents obtained from the police, human right activists, observer networks and the media. Indicate any discrepancies. Map regions which may be affected by the problem.

- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
Phase 6: Voting operations and election day
Introduction: Voting operations and election day

Voting operations will in most cases include logistical preparations for election day, the conduct of special and regular voting, the vote counting and the tallying of the result. Critical aspects of voting operations will include logistics and security related to the handling of electoral materials, the integrity and transparency of special and external (out-of-country) voting, real or perceived problems with the integrity of voting on election day, and the technical accuracy and credibility of the counting and result tallying.

If technical operations are executed poorly or in a way which can create perceptions that there has been manipulation and rigging of the result, reactions can be violent.
20. Insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials

Introduction

EMBs are responsible for ensuring that election day goes without complications. One important precondition for successful voting is proper logistical arrangements. These will include the timely and sufficient provision of sensitive and non-sensitive materials to all polling locations and ensuring that these materials are protected at all times.

Failures or delays in supplying essential electoral materials, poor security and lack of transparency in the handling of them, before or after voting and counting, can have a negative impact on perceptions about the credibility and integrity of elections and lead to the rejection of election results. (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network n.d.) This can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Nigeria

The lack of electoral materials during the presidential and parliamentary elections in Nigeria in 2007 was associated with an attempt by government to manipulate the electoral process. Voting operations started late and finished early, mainly due to the shortage of electoral materials such as ballot papers and result sheets. The shortfalls typically occurred in those provinces where the ruling party either was out of power or faced a strong challenge. In some polling districts, electoral materials were not delivered and the elections did not take place at all. Furthermore, the material was often poorly handled, not counted or not registered, thus making it easier to manipulate the ballot papers and result sheets.

Moreover security was very poor throughout the election: there were several cases of political party-affiliated thugs stuffing the ballot boxes with pre-marked ballot papers with no resistance from the presiding electoral officials or the police. On some occasions the police were directly responsible for the fraud. The widespread fraud contributed to outbreaks of violence, resulting in the deaths of 200 people during the electoral process (ICG 2007: 2–4; European Union Electoral Observation Mission 2007: 28; and Alston 2010: 40).
20. Insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials

Interrelated factors

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<td>2. Social and political exclusion</td>
<td>19. Provocative and violent actions by political parties</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The sufficiency of the quantities of electoral materials produced;
2. the appropriateness of timing for the dissemination of non-sensitive and sensitive materials;
3. the level of security of transport and storage premises; and
4. the level of engagement of SSAs.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Verify the feasibility of the plans for the production and dissemination of electoral materials as set by the EMBs. Use maps to indicate transport and dissemination routes. Analyse the appropriateness of designated resources, and timelines for production and dissemination. Map critical regions, transport routes and storage facilities. Use colour codes, numbers and static markers to present and combine different layers of geospatial data.

• Survey the level of confidence in logistical preparations for voting operations among political actors, civil society organizations and the broad electorate. Map geographical areas of concern.

• Assess and evaluate the preparedness and performance of the SSAs responsible for securing electoral materials. Map locations, such as EMB offices and storage facilities, where security was provided/not provided. Use different markers to point to locations of concern.

• Review relevant appeal records for associated complaints.

• Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
21. Lack of transparency of special and external voting

Introduction

Special and out-of-country voting are options for voters who cannot attend regular polling stations on election day. Such voters may be institutionalized or housebound, refugees, diplomatic or military personnel and diasporas. Arrangements are made to allow them to vote on a special day or series of days prior to voting day at special locations, or at mobile polling stations on election day. Votes can be cast in person or by post (International IDEA 2007).

Organizing voting for external populations is more complex than organizing in-country polling, and taking on this logistical and financial burden in a challenging environment, especially in the context of a post-conflict election, is rarely without risks. A large external population could change the outcome of an election, which may not be politically acceptable in-country (Goldsmith n.d.). Moreover, due to complexities associated with special and external voting, political actors or independent observers may not be in position to verify independently the integrity of the special and external voting. All these issues can be disputable in a closely contested election.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Ghana

During the presidential and legislative elections in Ghana in 2008, hundreds of opposition party supporters besieged the headquarters of the Electoral Commission, protesting against a special voting exercise. The protesters tried to enter the Electoral Commission premises but were stopped by riot police. The protesters claimed that the special voting process in the Ashanti region—organized exclusively for security officers and other persons performing special duties on election day—was marked by widespread irregularities. Claims were made that minors and other ineligible persons were allowed to vote, and that some individuals were given three ballot papers to vote (Modern Ghana 2008). For more information see IRIN Africa (2008b) and EU Election Observation Mission 2009: 12, 13, 14, 15, 19).
Interrelated factors

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<td>13. Problematic voter registration</td>
<td>19. Provocative and violent actions by political parties</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The number of special and external voters registered;
2. the effectiveness of the systems in place to manage external voting;
3. the number of special voters voting in person and by mail;
4. the number of political, civil society and international observers accredited to observe special and external voting; and
5. the level of citizens’ and observers’ trust in special and external voting.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Verify voter registration for figures relating to numbers of special voters, including external voters who vote in person and those voting by post. Use charts to show the data disaggregated by sex. Use a world map to point to places and countries where external voting is organized. Indicate countries where observers are accredited to observe these processes.
- Conduct expert analysis to understand the extent to which external votes may influence the distribution of power in the country. Map the geographical regions impacted.
- Identify geographical regions where some or all of the activities associated with special and external voting are not independently verifiable. Map the regions.
- Survey the confidence and general views of political actors and citizens relating to the special and external voting. Chart levels of trust of different actors and in different regions. Map areas of concern and disaggregate the views of women and men.
- Obtain information about special and mobile voting. Map locations visited and travelling routes. Indicate on a map if some of these events will face increased security risks.
- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
22. Problematic election-day operations

Introduction

Election day operations are designed to facilitate the process of casting their ballot for all eligible voters. The level of participation and time constraints make election day operations very complex. In many countries, more than half of the population will exercise its democratic right on election day. This process is to be managed by a large number of male and female electoral management officials and staff and the security sector agencies’ personnel. Political parties, civil society groups and international organizations provide a presence in electoral facilities across the country to scrutinize and testify to the integrity of the voting process.

Problems and irregularities which take place on election day have effects which are difficult to repair afterwards. If the margins for victory are expected to be narrow, even the smallest irregularity or perception of irregularity may spark conflict and violent reactions. Due to the short time in which voting takes place, election-day problems can culminate in the days following the actual voting.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

During municipal elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2000, international observers reported several irregularities during election day. In a number of cases, ballot boxes were destroyed, thereby preventing voters casting their ballot. In the municipality of Debar, all 24 polling stations had to close due to violent incidents such as threats against election officials. In other municipalities voting had to be temporarily suspended in order to restore order (OSCE/ODIHR, 2000: 4). For more information see ICG (2000a: 7, 8, 9, 10, 23; 2000b: 2).

Interrelated factors

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<td>5. The presence of organized crime</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The timely opening of polling stations across all geographical units;
2. waiting time at the polling stations;
3. the number of complaints relating to the voting process (disaggregated by sex);
4. the number of interventions by EMBs;
5. the number of interventions by SSAs; and
6. the number of violent incidents (disaggregated by sex).

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Obtain information about all polling stations in the country. Show all on the map. Use special symbols or colours to point to polling stations that face increased risks.
- Continuously obtain close-to-real-time data from polling stations through the electoral officials or election observers. Mark polling stations which experience problems with opening or with their work.
- Establish hotlines (SMS data crowdsourcing—Ushahidi platform or similar) to obtain information about incidents and irregularities.
- Maintain communication with political actors and map/chart data obtained.
- Obtain figures on complaints filed at the polling stations and with the relevant appeal authorities. Use maps to point to geographical regions where complaints were filed. Use different symbols to distinguish between different types of complaints.
- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
23. Problematic ballot counting and result tallying

Introduction

The vote counting and tallying of the results is an activity which is particularly sensitive and vulnerable to misuse and manipulation. It usually follows immediately after the polling stations close. Vote counting and result tallying are very complex processes and thus prone to human error. In most cases, errors in vote counting and tabulation will disadvantage some parties more than others and it may be hard to establish whether the error is a consequence of human mistake or a deliberate act. If political actors, civil society and international observers are obstructed in their work, suspicions will arise to the point where this can deepen conflicts and lead to violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Mongolia

The vote counting and reporting process was very lengthy in the 2008 parliamentary election in Mongolia, primarily due to the high voter turnout and the large number of voters assigned to each voting station. The delay aroused people’s distrust and created perception of electoral fraud, thus triggering violent protests which resulted in the destruction of the incumbent government’s party headquarters as well as 60 civilian and police casualties, among them five fatalities, during a period of state of emergency (International Republican Institute 2008: 24, 33; Al Jazeera 2008; Reuters 2008). For more information see International Republican Institute (2008: 10, 11, 25).

Interrelated factors

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<td>9. Environmental hazards</td>
<td>3. Inadequate electoral administrative rules</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The number and locations of delayed counting process;
2. the number and type of challenges to the vote counting and result tallying; and
3. number of discrepancies between the number of voters who voted and the number of ballot papers counted.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Obtain close-to-real-time reports from the counting locations through the electoral officials or election observers. Map the counting progress and record delays. Distinguish between regular and disputed counting operations. Change the colour of a polling station marker when results are processed.
• Maintain contacts with political party liaison officers and observer groups. Establish hotlines (use SMS data crowdsourcing platforms).
• Collect data about formal challenges relating to vote counting and tallying. Generate a map that presents numbers per regions. Colour code the map accordingly.
• Collect data relating to different election-related incidents which do not take place at the counting locations. Map incidents and analyse risks.
• Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
Phase 7: Verification of results
Introduction: Verification of results

The body responsible for the conduct of elections is usually responsible for announcing the final election results. The preliminary results provide good indicators about the electoral outcomes and the distribution of political power for the next political term of office.

For an incumbent, admitting defeat and handing over political power to the opponents is difficult. Political leaders who are disappointed with the initial figures will therefore often feel strong incentives to use all available mechanisms to challenge the election results and change them in their favour.

Inconsistencies, delays and lack of transparency on the part of the bodies in charge of the management of electoral appeals and results will create more scope for such challenges. Where elections are zero-sum competitions, political parties may pursue political gains by resorting to violent means.
24. Poor management of election results

Introduction

EMBs are responsible for the compilation of election results from the field, reconciliation of results at the electoral district and central levels, announcement of the preliminary election results and announcement of the final election results.

The imperative is to minimize the time lapse between election day and the announcement of the final election results. Any unnecessary or unexplained delay will feed suspicions about the integrity of the results processing. Whether real or perceived, biased processing of election results will increase the likelihood of outbreaks of election-related violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Mozambique

According to international observers, Mozambique’s Electoral Commission did not follow international standards relating to electoral transparency, nor did it release the official results in a timely manner during the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections (Carter Center 2000b: 33). When it did announce the results, they were regarded as fraudulent by the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). Approximately 100 people died during the violent protests that followed (Teshome-Bahiru 2009: 464). For more information see Carter Center (2000a: 4, 5).

Interrelated factors

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<td>12. Poor voter information campaign</td>
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<td>16. Unequal media access and favouritism</td>
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Kenya

Much of the violence which occurred in Kenya during the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections was due to irregularities taking place after election day ([Kriegler Commission] 2007: 35, 125). After analysing the results from 18 selected constituencies, there was an indication that the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) had conducted a
24. Poor management of election results

Poor tallying process (Kriegler Commission 2007: 129). The allegations of ECK malpractice and fraud following the announcement of the result contributed to triggering election-related violence that led to the deaths of more than 1,100 people by armed individuals or mobs, with the police accused of failing to prevent these killings and being directly responsible for some of them (Alston 2010: 37–8). For more information see ICG (2008a: 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19).

**Interrelated factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Poor socio-economic conditions</td>
<td>4. Gender-based discrimination and violence</td>
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<td>2. The presence of non-state armed actors</td>
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**Observable indicators**

1. The timing of delays in the announcement of the election results;
2. the number and location of particular geographical regions experiencing delays;
3. the type of reasons for delay;
4. the level of trust among political actors in election result management;
5. the level of transparency of the result management at different levels; and
6. the existence of mechanisms for relaying visible, accurate and transparent results to the general public.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Use official and observers’ data to map regions, municipalities and polling stations for which election results are delayed. Change the colour of the regions and static markers when the results are provided.
- Obtain the official reasons for delays and cross-check with independent observers. Map different categories of problems using static markers and number of problems using numerical values. Create a bar chart for different categories.
- Interview relevant political actors, both women and men, about their perceptions of delays in the announcement of the election results. Observe increased risks resulting from increased dissatisfaction or distrust in the process. Generate colour-coded maps to indicate regions where opinions are very critical.
- Assess the transparency of the management of the election results independently and through observers’ perceptions. Map geographical regions where transparency is not satisfactory.
- Obtain data on numbers and type of complaints relating to the management of the election results. Create maps that indicate number and type of complaints per region.
- Consider relevant experiences, including from a gender perspective, from past elections.
25. Poor management of the final round of electoral appeals

Introduction

In most cases, the electoral dispute resolution instances include the EMBs, administrative bodies and judicial institutions. Their mandate and hierarchy may differ across different electoral systems.

Any appeal which is not dealt with, and adequately remedied, may create discontent and may also seriously contribute to the deepening or aggravation of conflicts. In an already tense situation, unresolved issues could become a trigger for conflict and an excuse for violence.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Belarus

Violent demonstrations erupted in Minsk following the announcement by Belarus’ Central Election Commission (CEC) that incumbent President Aleksandr Lukashenko had won the presidential election in 2010 with 79.6 per cent of the vote (OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission 2011: 3). Under the existing legal framework, voters in Belarus cannot challenge the election results of the CEC at the Supreme Court (OSCE/ODIHR 2011: 3). The lack of dispute resolution instruments, and therefore a legitimate outlet for complaints and grievances, contributed to triggering violent protests in Minsk, which resulted in several injuries and the arrest of 725 people for up to 10–15 days for participating in an ‘unsanctioned gathering’ (Human Rights Watch 2011d: 12). For more information see Human Rights Watch (2010c).

Interrelated factors

<table>
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<tr>
<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
<td>16. Unequal media access and favouritism</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Problematic ballot counting and result tallying</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The number of appeals pending ruling after election day;
2. the number of appeals filed in respect to election day, the counting processes and the management of the election results;
3. the number of appeals effectively resolved by the relevant EDR bodies after elections; and
4. the level of satisfaction among the political parties in relation to the performance of the EDR bodies.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Obtain official records of appeals submitted during or after election day. Map appeals by geographical region. Distinguish between different categories.
• Obtain official records on appeal management and resolution and map geographical regions and bodies which fail to process appeals in a timely manner.
• Interview political actors in relation to their satisfaction with the performance and the composition of the EDR bodies. Map critical regions and analyse changing trends.
• Disaggregate and present data on the basis of sex.
26. Rejection of the election results

Introduction

The rejection of the electoral results is an extreme act which may result from a real or perceived lack of integrity and credibility of the electoral process and its outcome. In very broad terms, rejection of the result by a particular party may result in self-exclusion from participation in a democratic institution or process. Very often such a decision may lead to protests with violent outcomes involving protestors or security sector agencies.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Haiti

In connection with the presidential and legislative elections in Haiti in 2010 and 2011, violence erupted after the results of the first round of voting were declared in December 2010. Jude Célestin, the candidate of the party of outgoing President René Préval, came in second place, thus qualifying for the next run-off. The supporters of presidential candidate Michel Martelly, who came third and thus did not qualify for the run-off, were outraged by the fact that he was only one percentage point behind Célestin. They claimed fraud and several thousand people started to protest against what they perceived as a rigged election (UNHCR News Service 2011). Protests escalated and resulted in a large-scale campaign of destruction and the deaths of 13 people, including children. (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2011; UNHCR News Service 2010; New York Times 2010) The Provisional Electoral Council re-examined the ballot papers and announced that Martelly had come second and thus qualified for the run-off (UNHCR News Service 2010). For more information see ICG (2010c: 2) and Human Rights Watch (2010b).

Interrelated factors

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26. Rejection of the election results

Côte d’Ivoire

After the 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire, the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, rejected the results, violence erupted, causing the deaths of 3,000 people and over 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (BBC 2011a; Aljazeera.net 2011). The competing presidential candidate, Alassane Ouattara, received 54.1 per cent of votes (Reuters 2010). Gbagbo refused to step down, which resulted in violent demonstrations and abductions of perceived political opponents belonging to the opposition party, the Rally of the Republicans (RDR), with beatings and torture as a result (Aljazeera.net 2011). For more information see ICG (2010b; 2010d; 2011b: 2, 3, 5, 6)

Interrelated factors

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<td>5. Presence of non-state armed actors</td>
<td>23. Problematic ballot counting and result tallying</td>
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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
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Observable indicators

1. Analysis of historical data relating to disputes over the election results;
2. the number of cases of rejection, or threats of rejection, of the election results;
3. the number of statements about the course of action following the rejection of the results;
4. number of events related to the rejection (protests and other gatherings) and number of participants;
5. the number of incidents of violence perpetrated by protestors;
6. the number of incidents of violence perpetrated by SSAs; and
7. the number and kind of victims and level of destruction.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Obtain data through media monitoring and interviews with political actors relating to the circumstances surrounding the rejection of the results. Chart and observe trends in terms of inflammatory language and threats of violent outcomes.
- Monitor media; deploy or use existing networks and crowdsourcing platforms to obtain close to real time reports about non-violent and violent protests and related events across the country. Map events. Capture and project basic data including size of event, political patronage.
- Obtain data on violent incidents following protests. Map the level of violence by geographical location and disaggregated between the perpetrators and victims on the basis of gender.
References


International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA),


About the authors

Sead Alihodžić is a Senior Programme Officer in International IDEA’s Electoral Processes Programme. His research and work focuses on elections and conflict, with a special emphasis on prevention and mitigation of election-related violence and risk management in elections, and timing and sequencing of transitional elections. He led the design and development of International IDEA’s Electoral Risk Management Tool. In addition to his International IDEA publications, he has published several journal articles on electoral violence, early warning and democracy promotion.

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About the ERM Tool

Understanding and explaining outbreaks of election-related violence is a complex task; predicting whether forthcoming elections will turn violent, which factors may underlie or trigger violence, and what can be done to prevent violence is even more difficult. One way to address the problem is to empower those who have immediate responsibility to prevent and mitigate election-related violence, such as electoral management bodies, security sector agencies and other state and non-state agencies.

The Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERM Tool) is designed to empower people to ensure peaceful and credible elections. The software aims to build the capacities of users to understand, analyse and mitigate electoral risks. Specifically, the ERM Tool can build users’ capacity to understand electoral risk factors; collect and analyse risk data; design prevention and mitigation strategies; and record the results of actions.

Modules

The ERM Tool consists of three integrated modules. First, a knowledge library describes in detail 36 electoral risk factors, both internal and external to electoral processes. Second, an analytical instruments section allows users to create analytical models specific to a country or election, upload data to generate risk maps and trend charts, and create a register of risks and actions. Third, the prevention module consists of a digital library with approximately 100 action points intended to inspire user in designing strategies to prevent and mitigate electoral risks, including election-related violence, at the different phases of the electoral cycle. The software is accompanied by three Guides and an Overview.

Download

To obtain a copy of the ERM Tool, please register via the International IDEA website. Genuine non-for-profit organizations will be granted a download key free of charge.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

What do we do?
In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of work.

International IDEA provides analysis of global and regional democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge of good international democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-building on democratic reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.

Where do we work?
Our headquarters are located in Stockholm, with regional and country offices in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

<http://www.idea.int>
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The software is accompanied by three Guides. This Internal Factors Guide is a support document to the ERM Tool. In conjunction with the External Factors Guide, it provides guidance to the users of the ERM Tool in identifying electoral risks in a given country and electoral context. The Prevention and Mitigation Guide aims to assist and inspire users to tailor strategies and actions for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence.