Electoral Risk Management Tool: External Factors Guide
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Sead Alihodžić and Catalina Uribe Burcher
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Acknowledgements

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Note to the second edition
The first edition of this Guide was published in 2013. In 2018 the support documentation for the Electoral Risk Management Tool (including this Guide) underwent a redesign. The document has now been re-formatted, and allocated an ISBN and a digital object identifier (DOI). Links to International IDEA resources have also been updated. The Guides are living documents and will be continually updated. International IDEA welcomes feedback and user experiences. For more information contact the Electoral Processes Programme (elections@idea.int).
About this Guide

The purpose of this Guide

The External Factors Guide is a support document to International IDEA’s Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERM Tool). It presents factors related to election-related violence that are external to electoral processes. Combined with the Internal Factors Guide (Alihodžić and Asplund 2018a) and other support documents (see Figure 1), this Guide helps users of the ERM Tool navigate a broad checklist which can be useful in identifying risks of election-related violence in a given country and electoral context.

Figure 1. Overview of support documents

The users of this Guide

This Guide is intended for individuals involved in the ERM Tool’s context overview and tool customization exercises. The context overview involves an assessment of the historical and current dynamics of election-related conflicts and an estimation of the potential risks relating to forthcoming elections (see Alihodžić 2018a: section 4.1.1). Customization is a technical exercise and refers to the creation of a country- and election-specific model generated by the ERM Tool software (see Alihodžić 2018: section 4.1.2). It is envisaged that the user’s organization will share a copy of this Guide and other support documents with staff, partner organizations and external specialists involved in the efforts to ensure that discussion and contributions are focused.
Methodology for identifying relevant factors

External factors originate in, and exist outside of, the electoral context and relate to exogenous conditions which can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. The list of factors presented in this document is compiled from research papers, reports on elections and other relevant publications. These documents suggest links between particular factors, or combinations of factors, resulting in an increase of election-related tensions and outbreaks of election-related violence.

Structure of the Guide and description of the factors

This Guide identifies 10 external factors, framed within the human security framework. Each factor is described in greater detail, according to the following format:

1. **Introduction.** This section provides a general definition and explanation of the context in which a given factor can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence.

2. **Empirical cases and interrelated factors.** This section illustrates particular countries and electoral contexts in which the given factor was identified as a trigger or a factor which contributed to triggering election-related violence. Interrelated factors point to the wider context in which violence took place. This includes both internal and external factors. For easy comprehension, interrelated factors are placed in tables, numbered as per order of appearance in respective guides. References to the source documents are provided. The primary source for identifying relevant interrelated factors is the reference document which establishes causality between the factor described and the outbreak of election-related violence. If a primary source does not address the wider context in which election-related violence took place, other sources are consulted. By default, reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG), covering a given country and election year, are used as the secondary source for defining interrelated factors. If no relevant ICG report is available, the reports of Human Rights Watch (HRW) are consulted as the tertiary source documents. If no relevant HRW report is available, various electoral observation and other reports are consulted.

3. **Observable indicators.** This section points to the observable properties of the different factors.

4. **Data collection and analysis methodologies.** This section suggests data sources, collection techniques and analysis methods. The software includes pre-packed but editable surveying questionnaires which further assist the user(s) with the data collection. Analysis assist bodies, primarily those responsible for ensuring that elections are credible and peaceful, in making informed choices.

Customization of the list of factors

The list of factors presented in this Guide is not exhaustive. Also, the way in which factors are named or described may not fit local terminologies and specific contexts. The ERM Tool’s Knowledge Resources module therefore allows the user to rename existing factors or to generate and describe new factors which will be included in the country- and election-specific model.
Description of external factors
1. Poor socio-economic conditions

Introduction

Poverty, inequality and high or increasing unemployment are important factors to consider when assessing the risks of election-related violence occurring. Poverty is a complex concept that has been defined as ‘pronounced deprivation in well-being’, or a situation when a person does not reach a minimum level of well-being to be able to function adequately in society, due to lack of income or capacity for consumption (Haughton and Khandker 2009: 1). According to the United Nations, there are many dimensions to poverty, but mostly they relate to the lack of access to food supplies, adequate education and health, among others. Closely linked to poverty are unemployment, as it contributes to perpetuating its root causes, and inequality, as it jeopardizes the access to opportunities of disenfranchised segments of the population (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs n.d.). There is strong evidence suggesting links between poverty, inequality and political violence, in particular election-related violence (Krug et al 2002: 37). Poverty increases tensions over less serious disputes, such as those concerning electoral procedures, which can lead to violent actions. Moreover, those who have little to lose are easily mobilized to violent action (Laakso 2007: 228–30).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Kenya

During Kenya’s presidential and parliamentary elections, economic frustration and inequalities associated with land ownership, together with unkept promises of job opportunities for young people, have been identified as some of the most important contributors to outbreaks of violence. Its epitome was the 2007 elections with over 1,500 people dead, 3,000 women raped and 300,000 people internally displaced (Roberts 2009; Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique 2008: 2, 11, 172, 202, 227, 228, 369). For more information see ICG (2008a: 9), Alston (2010: 38), Mbeke (2009: 13) and the Independent Review Commission [Kriegler Commission] (2007: 35, 125, 129).

Interrelated factors

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<td>2. Social and political exclusion</td>
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<td>3. Conflict relating to changing power dynamics</td>
<td>17. Provocative use of media by political parties</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24. Poor management of election results</td>
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Liberia
Unemployment in Liberia has affected all electoral processes, and in particular the presidential and legislative elections in 2005. There was a considerable reduction of electoral violence during the pre-electoral period (International Observation Delegations 2005: 1) but this did not result in a peaceful post-electoral phase, as political groups mobilized the young unemployed people in sprees of violence (Carnegie Mellon University 2010: 2). The incidents included intimidation, protests and disruption to traffic in Monrovia, the capital, and threats of violence against targeted political figures and journalists, as well as looting (International Observation Delegations 2005: 26).

Interrelated factors

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<td>3. Conflict relating to changing power dynamics</td>
<td>12. A poor voter information campaign</td>
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<td>5. The presence of non-state armed actors</td>
<td>16. Unequal media access and favouritism</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The level of comprehensiveness of legal instruments to address social and health inequalities.

2. The extent to which access to land, food, resources and other commodities for the population in general, or for the population of particular regions or disenfranchised groups, is restricted.

3. High or increasing levels of unemployment, in particular among young people.

4. The existence of resources and institutional capacity to address social security and implement poverty reduction strategies, in particular within disenfranchised groups and marginalized regions of the country.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Conduct an expert review of the legal instruments that address social inequalities. Consider the impact on different social groups (including young people and women) and map areas where these may represent risk to elections.

- Compile historical and current statistical data on poverty, inequality and high/increasing unemployment and consider how these conditions may trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. Produce and analyse risk maps and trend charts.

- Compile media reports relating to the economic situation and analyse the language used when addressing the economic situation of disenfranchised groups, e.g. if there is any indication of inflammatory language and bullying. Distinguish between different media, geographical coverage, ownership and victims. Map and observe trends and the dimension of the problem.
2. Social and political exclusion

Introduction

The social and political exclusion of minorities and marginalized groups creates potential for conflict. A minority is a group of people sharing an ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic identity that is distinct from that of the majority of the population. One of the main characteristics of minorities is that they are in a non-dominant position, regardless of whether they are a numerical minority or majority. The term minority may also refer to groups of the population that are marginalized by their political affiliation, their sexual orientation or even their physical capacities (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010: 2–3).

The exclusion of a minority or a marginalized group from political processes is often a strong incentive for violence (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010: 13–16). In addition, the characteristics associated with these groups, be it ethnicity, religious beliefs, language, age, geographical location or sexual preferences, have often been used to further stigmatize and alienate these groups before, during and after elections (Laakso 2007: 224–52). The mobilization of ethnic hatred by political elites is often an example (Wilkinson 2004: 1–2).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Zambia

Chinese workers have increased their presence in the Zambian economy in recent years as part of the development of the copper industry, as well as in other sectors, such as textiles, road construction and retail. Frustration within Zambia is on the rise as many consider that Chinese investment has not improved their quality of life. Such frustration was reflected in the highly charged debates during the 2006 election (Schatz 2006; Haglund 2008). As a consequence, post-electoral violence surged in Lusaka, targeting, among others, Chinese populations (The Economist 2009). For more information see European Union Election Observation Mission (2006).

Interrelated factors

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<td>18. Provocative party rallying</td>
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<td>26. Rejection of election results</td>
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Ghana

Ghana hosts a wide array of ethnic groups that have clashed on different occasions over political control of the territory. The northern part of the country has long seen disputes between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis, two groups that have enjoyed the support of two political parties, the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party, respectively (IRIN 2008c). The conflicts between these two have created tensions that contributed to violence, in particular during the 2008 elections. The pre-election period was affected by vandalism in registration centres, shootings, the burning of houses and cars, and attacks on journalists. In addition, three people were killed and many more injured (Jockers 2010; IRIN 2008a, 2008b). For more information see Collier and Vicente (2010).

### Interrelated factors

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<td>3. Conflict relating to changing power dynamics</td>
<td>13. Problematic voter registration</td>
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### Observable indicators

1. The level of exclusion of minorities from citizenship and constitutional and other legal rights enjoyed by dominant community groups;
2. the level of impunity, in particular with offences against minority groups;
3. the existence of adequate and efficient legal instruments for social integration;
4. the existence of long-standing rivalries between different ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural groups that have historically peaked and taken violent expressions during electoral periods; and
5. the use of inflammatory language by politicians, other leaders and media towards minority/marginalized groups.

### Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Conduct an expert review of constitutional and citizenship rights and the legal status of minority and marginalized groups. Identify particular groups which face social and political exclusion of different kinds. Map geographical areas affected.
- Conduct an expert analysis of the resources and capacity of the state institutions to promote an agenda for integration and improvement of conditions for minorities and marginalized groups. Map areas where efforts are focused. Indicate results.
- Gather statistics, reports, maps and other relevant information from recognized organizations (e.g. human-rights NGOs, media organizations) relating to violent and non-violent actions directed against minorities and marginalized groups. Collect data on judicial processes and outcomes. Conduct interviews and surveys among the target groups (for example ethnic, religious or indigenous communities). Map risk regions and locations of incidents and create trend charts to gain insight on critical regions and trends.
- Examine historical and current records of conflict, disputes and tensions between different ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural groups in the country, and their links.
with non-state armed actors. Use reports and media records, and interview experts. Map risk regions and locations of incidents and create trend charts to gain insight on critical regions and trends.

• Conduct media discourse analysis and identify the extent to which minorities/marginalized groups are blamed by political and other leaders for any of the current political or economic challenges faced by the country. Map regions, media, perpetrators and frequency and trends of incidents.
3. Conflict relating to changing power dynamics

Introduction

The balance of power in a country is a delicate feature that can be affected by political processes, such as the implementation of peace agreements; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes; social or legal reforms benefiting or marginalizing groups of citizens; the signing of international trade agreements; and other factors.

Deficiencies in the institutional arrangements in place to address heightened tensions during transitional periods towards a post-conflict environment are likely to produce election-related violence (Sisk 2007:7; Ndulo and Lulo 2010: 160, 165). The biggest risk is that such institutional deficiencies will increase the inherent tensions that any electoral competition generates (Keane 2009; UN Development Programme n.d.; Pastor 1999: 11–14). The timing of any major political process plays a significant role: for example, an early election in combination with a weak DDR process creates a fertile ground for election-related violence (Fischer 2002: 7).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Burundi

Burundi has suffered from a protracted civil war since 1993 that has shifted the balance of power between the two main ethnic groups (the Hutus and the Tutsis) at different times. The country has had to deal with the assassination of different presidents, various military coups, a change of the constitution and various attempts at peace and agreements. In 2009 a new transition period and DDR process began, and had an impact on the 2010 elections (GlobalSecurity.org n.d.; Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2011) By then, the country was dealing with the early stages of a weak and turbulent DDR process. In addition, the state institutions lacked the experience and capacity to provide democratic channels to address those grievances. These were some of the main elements that laid the ground for election-related violence. Major incidents included the boycotting of the elections, grenade attacks, and restrictions on the participation of some political parties and civil society organizations, as well as physical abuse and torture of citizens and politicians (El Abdellaoui 2010; ICG 2011a: I; Amnesty International 2010).
Interrelated factors

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<td>7. Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes</td>
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Timor-Leste

The political situation in Timor-Leste has been unstable for years, mainly related to the conflict with Indonesia and subsequent independence in 2002 (Cutter et al 2004: 11–12). Historical and social factors, such as the country’s colonial past and its political institutions, have contributed to election-related violence (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2009: 1). Violence recorded during the 2007 elections was perpetrated by and against political party supporters, mainly during the post-electoral period. There were 162 incidents of this nature, including two deaths, approximately 100 injuries to persons and 7,000 families displaced (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2009: 3–5). For more information see ICG (2007: 7).

Interrelated factors

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Observable indicators

1. The extent to which a weak transitional framework, such as a DDR programme, a trade agreement or a new constitution, changes key political actors’ relative power;
2. the level of civic support for or resentment of a political decision or actor;
3. the existence and efficiency of mechanisms to promote a culture of political party dialogue; and
4. the level of media freedom.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Conduct an expert review and analyse the effects of the constitution and other relevant legal frameworks which regulate transitional justice, DDR processes or trade agreements. Observe any trends for DDR to relapse or go into reverse. Map critical regions.
- Examine the quality of mechanisms for dispute resolution between political parties. Measure and compare success in reaching and honouring agreements between political parties. Generate risk maps and draw charts to illustrate trends.
- Collect data on levels of support for decisions of political actors or resentment on the part of civic groups against them. Map the intensity of public demonstrations and place static markers where such events occur. Chart data to show trends.
• Investigate links between the military forces and particular political groups. Map and place markers.

• Collect data on number of incidents involving suppression of media freedom, including harassment and attacks on journalists, and their prosecution. Map and chart data including high-risk regions, victims and perpetrators.
4. Gender-based discrimination and violence

Introduction

Gender-based violence is widely defined as the most extreme form of gender-based discrimination, manifested as an act inflicting physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, including threats of such acts (UN General Assembly 1993; Carpenter 2006). When gender-based violence is perpetrated against both women and men, particularly in times of conflict and war, trauma and the public stigmatization of victims are key impediments to the reporting and prosecution of these crimes. For example, according to the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence in Kenya (Waki Report 2008) only 30 women out of the scores of affected victims agreed to testify, while the Commission could not find one single male victim who agreed to testify on cases of gender-based violence perpetrated during Kenya’s post-election violence (see below). Furthermore, when already weak state institutions suffering from rampant corruption, incompetence, lack of public trust and operational capacity are further paralysed by the outbreak of election-related strife and violence, their capacity to prevent and prosecute such crimes and protect the victims of gender-based violence is almost non-existent.

Gender-based violence, predominantly against women and girls, has been a feature of many recent political and ethnic conflicts. In some cases, elections have triggered outbreaks of violence in which women and girls were victimized. In other instances, violence against women has been a tool of political harassment and intimidation of female election candidates. In addition, female voters continue to be disproportionately affected by various forms of election-related violence or threats of violence which has the effect of keeping them away from the polling stations more than male voters (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) 2009). Perpetrators of gender-based violence can be state and non-state actors such as the state and private military personnel, security and police bodies, guerrilla groups, and individuals who have formal or unofficial access to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or are engaged in humanitarian missions.
Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Kenya
Women in Kenya have traditionally suffered from various forms of gender-based discrimination and violence in both the public and the private spheres (Creighton and Yieke 2006: 2–4). In the past decade, while women have increased their share in elected bodies of governance, education and labour force, gender-based stereotypes and harmful traditional practices largely inhibit women from gaining an equal footing with men in various spheres of political and public life (Orchardson-Mazrui 2006).

Reports of violence surrounding the 2007 elections indicated numerous cases of rape, sexual assault and mutilation across various regions (Roberts 2009; Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique 2008). These acts were perpetrated by the police, security forces and militarized gangs aligned with the two presidential contenders, as well as individuals working in IDP protection camps. Even neighbours, relatives and supposed friends were guilty of widespread acts of violence against women and girls of all ethnic origins, predominantly from poor areas. Fewer cases of gender-based violence against men were reported, but they included circumcision and castration of male hostages belonging to rival groups. As various inquiry reports indicated, no proper or adequate investigation took place as state agencies did not have the resolve to instigate investigations of their own members’ activities in these crimes (Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique 2008). For more information see Alston (2010: 38); Mbeke (2009: 13) and the Independent Review Commission [Kriegler Commission] (2007: 35, 125, 129).

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<td>6. Human rights violations</td>
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Guinea

Despite efforts by the government to improve the situation of women and, more broadly, equality between women and men in Guinea in the last few years, women continue to face widespread inequality and discrimination based on gender stereotypes which are deeply entrenched in all spheres of political, public and private life. There are structural barriers to women’s ability to effectively enjoy their political and economic rights and seek justice for instances of discrimination or violence perpetrated against them.

The political unrest in late 2009 was motivated by the failure of the self-proclaimed president, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, who seized power in a coup in late 2008, to hold the elections he had promised. It featured some of the most egregious cases of gender-based violence targeted against women. In a series of violent attacks by the security forces on the opposition leaders and their supporters gathered on a pro-election rally in Conakry on 29 September 2009, over 100 cases of rape and gender-based violence against women protesters were reported (Human Rights Watch 2010d). For more information see UN Development Programme (2010).
Interrelated factors

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Observable indicators

1. The adequacy of constitutional provisions or other legal acts which ensure or promote equality of rights and opportunities between men and women;
2. the existence of legal and policy mechanisms designed to reduce various types of inequalities between women and men in public life, for example, in employment, education and health services;
3. the existence of effective victim protection and crime prosecution mechanisms, particularly for crimes of gender-based violence;
4. the existence of policies within the state agencies, including the law enforcement and security sector agencies (SSAs), which are aimed at protecting and promoting human rights, including women’s rights, and combating gender-based discrimination;
5. the level of female vulnerability to sexual crimes, such as rape and sexual assault, in times of peace;
6. the extent to which perpetrators of gender-based violence in times of conflict and unrest enjoy impunity;
7. levels of stigmatization for victims of gender-based crimes and consequent lack of reporting by the victims;
8. the number of cases of violence and harassment against politicians and civil society organizations advocating better conditions for women, increased participation of women and gender equality reforms;
9. the number of cases or reports of links between political parties or actors and violent groups that use sexual violence;
10. the extent to which the media use derogatory and inflammatory language when referring to advocates of women’s issues and gender equality; and
11. the extent to which gender-based discrimination and violence are omitted from media coverage.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Compile the most important legal frameworks and instruments related to gender equality with focus on (a) access to employment, resources and education for men and women; (b) civil rights for women, in particular concerning marriage, divorce, parental rights, land tenure and related subjects; (c) mechanisms for prosecuting perpetrators of gender-based violence and for the protection of the victims; and (d) gender policies within the public administration, mainly within the security sector.
4. Gender-based discrimination and violence

Analyse legislation to identify any deficiencies. Use maps to mark areas where local legislation is not harmonized or where the existing legal framework is deficient.

• Investigate the implementation of legal provisions and judicial processes involving gender issues. Plot charts to present trends. Indicate regional variations in the implementation of the laws and the prosecution of gender-based discrimination and violence, including cases of impunity, and stigmatization of victims.

• Gather relevant statistics, reports, maps and other relevant facts from recognized organizations relating to gender-based violence and facts about discrimination or exclusion. Conduct focused surveys. Interview key actors in different institutions, such as academics, journalists, and those working in state agencies and civil society organizations, as well as different ethnic and political groups, to obtain relevant information. Create maps to identify regions which face increased gender-based violence and discrimination. Use static markers to pinpoint the places of violence. Create charts to show trends over time.

• Investigate possible links between political parties or actors and violent groups that use sexual violence as a weapon of war. Map incidents and chart data to determine trends.

• Collect data on cases where other state and non-state actors, such as SSAs and the media, have been involved in gender-based discrimination and violence. Map regions and incidents.
5. The presence of non-state armed actors

Introduction

*Non-state armed actors* refers to those individuals or groups that use violence to achieve their objectives but are not acting as part of the state’s regular forces or institutions (Schneckener 2006). They include rebels or guerrilla fighters, militias or paramilitaries, armed clan chiefs, warlords, terrorists, mercenaries and private security companies as well as marauders (Schneckener 2006). The problems related to non-state armed actors are especially acute when they have a direct presence in the country, although their presence in neighbouring countries can also raise tensions (Chuter 2007:6). They do not necessarily respect borders and can use the neighbouring territory to seek shelter or to mobilize materiel. If these groups have a political agenda, they can spread instability in the region.

The presence or influence of non-state armed actors will increase risks of violence during elections (Ferreira et al 2011; ICG 2011c). Irregular armed groups may destabilize the country by engaging in manipulation of elections (Schneckener 2006: 32). In particular, they can resort to intimidation of candidates and voters (Alston 2010: 8). The risk of violence is particularly high when the SSAs do not have the capacity to respond to evolving security challenges or when parts of the security sector are in collusion with militias or paramilitary groups. Such cases are exacerbated when the state does not have complete control over its territory or when porous borders allow illegal transit of armed groups (Schneckener 2006: 33–35).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Colombia

Colombia has been immersed in a violent conflict for more than 50 years, with a broad array of non-state armed actors that range from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) (Sweig 2002: 123; Theidon 2007: 72–73). Both groups have caused major distortions to the political process, often radically modifying historical electoral trends (Organization of American States 2010a: 8, 2010b: 19, 54; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010; López Hernández et al 2010). The 2010 presidential and legislative elections suffered from violence. For more information see Felbab-Brown (2010: 1–12) and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010b).
5. The presence of non-state armed actors

### Interrelated factors

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<td>7. Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes</td>
<td>8. Inadequate electoral security arrangements</td>
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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
<td>22. Problematic election-day operations</td>
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### Afghanistan

The recent history of Afghanistan is marked by political instability and the Taliban still carry out hostilities and attacks against the government and civilians (ICG 2010a). Electoral processes are one of their main targets. During the election in 2009, the Taliban were responsible for numerous threats and terrorist acts in the pre-election period, mainly targeted on the candidates and their staff. In addition, at least 10 Electoral Commission officials, candidates and campaign workers were ab ducted, and 31 people were killed during election day (Alston 2010: 18–19; ICG 2009: 7–8; Human Rights Watch 2009a). For more information see Felbab-Brown (2010) and European Union Electoral Observation Mission (2009b).

### Interrelated factors

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. The presence of non-state armed actors</td>
<td>1. Contested electoral law</td>
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<td>7. Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes</td>
<td>4. Poor performance of the electoral management body</td>
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<td>8. Human rights violations</td>
<td>5. An inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes</td>
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<td>8. Inadequate electoral security arrangements</td>
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<td>13. Problematic voter registration</td>
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<td>23. Problematic ballot counting and result tallying</td>
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</table>

### Observable indicators

1. The presence of non-state armed actors based in the country or infiltrating it from the neighbourhood, the places where they are present and the number of cases of interference by them;
2. the existence and location of territories outside the effective control of the central government;
3. the capacity of the SSAs to effectively neutralize non-state armed groups;
4. the level of flow of, and easy access to, small arms and light weapons;
5. the existence and type of clandestine links between state institutions, government officials or political candidates on the one hand, and non-state armed actors on the other hand; and
6. the number of incidents of non-state actors perpetrating violence.

### Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Gather relevant historical and up-to-date data on the presence and activities of non-state armed actors. Collect statistics, reports, maps and other relevant data from SSAs and other organizations with specific knowledge and data on the presence and actions...
of non-state armed actors. Analyse historical data and compare with the current situation. Chart data to observe trends; create geographical risk maps to indicate regions where non-state armed groups are active. Use static markers to map incidents involving non-state armed groups.

- Conduct an expert overview of the security sector legal framework, available resources and the quality of training programmes to obtain an understanding of the capacities of SSAs to effectively engage and neutralize non-state armed actors. Create geographical risk maps which distinguish between the regions based on the extent to which SSAs have capacity to control the situation effectively.

- Collect data on incidents involving non-state armed actors and the flow of, and access to, small arms. Chart data to observe trends and correlations. Create risk maps and place static markers as appropriate.
6. The presence of organized crime

Introduction

Organized crime is a term used to refer to structured groups that exist for a period of time with the purpose of committing serious crimes or offences for financial or other material gain (UN General Assembly 2001). The most common activities of these organizations include trafficking of humans, migrants, drugs, firearms, environmental resources and counterfeit goods, as well as maritime piracy and cybercrime (UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2010: 1). Organized crime groups affect the state and, particularly, the security forces in a different way than other violent actors. These groups usually seek to ‘capture’ the state, meaning that they take control of the state’s institutions in order to achieve their economic objectives (Hellman et al 2000: 2–4). They do this through corruption (Reed 2009: 9–14) and extortion, among other things (Dobovšek 2008: 637–38). Thus, when the state has been captured and loses the ability to deliver, these groups tend to hollow out the state institutions and political legitimacy (Ferreira et al 2011).

Organized crime networks, while not necessarily having political aspirations, are interested in protecting their ‘territories’. This often translates into having on their side local bureaucracies, the security sector, judges and prosecutors as well as local politicians. In such cases organized crime plays a major role in affecting electoral processes (Ferreira et al. 2011) and can use violence as a tool to achieve or maintain this territorial control (Dunne 2006).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Guatemala

Guatemala has been trying to deal with the problem of organized crime for many years, and the involvement of government officials in the activities of these illegal groups has been exposed in numerous cases. Organized crime is associated with the flow of drugs and weapons from/to Mexico and the United States. Recently, levels of violence increased even beyond those experienced during the 36-year armed conflict (Panner and Beltrán 2010; ICG 2010c: 3–6). Elections in particular represent an opportunity for organized crime to seize control of transit routes by securing alliances with officials elected to key local government posts (Ferreira et al 2011). The violence that surrounded the 2007 elections (Alston 2010: 18–19) was repeated during the 2011 elections. Pre-election period violence included cases of candidates, their families, party activists and electoral staff being murdered (ICG 2011c: 1).
Electoral Risk Management Tool: External Factors Guide

**Interrelated factors**

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<td>11. Lack of training of security sector agencies</td>
<td>19. Provocative and violent actions by political parties</td>
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**Guinea-Bissau**

Organized crime networks, mainly drug traffickers seeking to use Guinea-Bissau as a transit route, have brought a wave of violence and corruption, affecting all areas of governance (UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2007: 5, 2010: 6, 97, 100, 221, 236). This situation spilled over to the 2009 presidential elections held after the president had been killed (Moncrieff 2009). Despite the general orderly development of this political contest (European Commission 2009), a general sense of tension and insecurity surrounded the elections. Incidents such as the killing of one candidate and political party member the day before the start of the campaign, as well as allegations of killings and arbitrary arrests of government officials, were recorded (European Union Election Observation Mission 2009a). For more information see BBC News (2009).

**Interrelated factors**

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**Observable indicators**

1. The existence of adequate legal mechanisms and policies to address the problem of organized crime in the country;
2. the existence of accountability mechanisms for the actions of the security sector;
3. the presence of organized crime groups in the country, and their number and locations;
4. the presence of organized crime groups in a neighbouring country, and their number and locations;
5. the existence and type of clandestine links between organized crime groups on the one hand, and state institutions, including SSAs, government officials and political candidates, on the other hand;
6. the number of violent incidents related to organized crime actors;
7. the numbers of instances recorded where organized crime groups have affected the integrity of electoral processes; and
8. the existence of economic interests of organized crime actors to influence political agendas.
Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Compile and analyse the quality of legal instruments and policies created to address the problem of organized crime in the country, as well as the legal mechanisms for accountability of the security forces. Map regions where laws are not harmonized or implemented.

- Gather relevant historical and current data on the presence and activities of organized crime actors. Collect statistics, reports, maps and other relevant data from SSAs and other organizations with specific knowledge of and data on the presence and actions of organized crime actors. Analyse the historical data and compare with the current situation. Chart data to observe trends, and create geographical risk maps to indicate regions where organized crime actors are active. Use static markers to map incidents involving non-state armed groups.

- Conduct an expert overview of the security sector legal framework, available resources and the quality of training programmes to obtain an understanding of the capacities of SSAs to effectively engage and neutralize organized crime actors. Create geographical risk maps which distinguish between the regions based on the extent to which SSAs have the capacity to address the problem effectively.

- Collect data on incidents involving organized crime actors. Chart data to observe trends and correlations. Create risk maps and place static markers as appropriate.

- Collect data and provide expert analysis of economic interests of organized crime actors and the tactics they use to influence the political agenda. Map regions which experience most influence of organized crime actors, whether through the use of violent means or through state capture.
7. Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes

Introduction

Genocide is an international crime that is committed through the murder of members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as well as through other actions that seriously affect the survival conditions of the group, with the intention of destroying it as a whole or in part. Crimes against humanity are more general, and refer to those actions that are part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. These include murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape and enforced disappearance of persons, as well as forced displacement. War crimes, on the other hand, include grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international and non-international armed conflict, mainly those actions targeted against civilians (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998).

Crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes affect societies in such a way that the electoral process can hardly escape their consequences. In the aftermath of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, the tensions between ethnic groups are usually still on the rise and the chances that elections will fuel further violence are high (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2010). Likewise, internal displacement creates an abnormal situation that has the potential to affect elections (Brancati and Snyder 2012: 26). The relocation of IDPs often brings new conflicts and clashes in their host communities. IDPs are therefore often subject to intimidation and harassment at election time. In addition, if IDPs are able to return, old tensions often surface, with elections fuelling old and new grievances (Brun 2003: 276–97; Norberg and Obi 2007: 7; Mooney and Jarrah 2005: 55).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Rwanda

Rwanda hosts various ethnic groups, with the Hutus (majority) and the Tutsis (minority) as the biggest ones. Hutus and Tutsis have kept up their conflict with outbreaks of violence since colonial times. During the 1994 genocide, approximately 800,000 people were killed and numerous women were raped as part of the attempt to exterminate the Tutsi population.
Grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes

(United Human Rights Council 2011). The political life of Rwanda has since been marked by ethnic tensions that existed long before the genocide but became all the more acute and evident after it (Beswick 2011). This situation was reflected during the elections of 2010 (Garrison 2010). During the pre-election period, the government was accused of tightening control of the media and of any form of opposition. There were also numerous threats to and attacks on opposing party members and journalists, journalists were persecuted, and two presidential candidates were arrested (Kurland 2010; Human Rights Watch 2010b). For more information see IRIN (1999), Commonwealth Secretariat (2010) and Reporters Without Borders (2010).

Interrelated factors

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<td>3. Conflict relating to changing power dynamics</td>
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Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka suffered from a 26-year conflict between government forces and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, causing massive displacement of the population in the north of the country. The final stages of the war were the worst for IDPs and, even though many people have returned, the conditions for IDPs remain a concern (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2011). This has further fuelled the already volatile political situation (ICG 2010b: 2, 17–18; Puddington 2010: 10), with obvious consequences for elections and their peaceful development (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2007: 28, 127–28). In particular, during the pre-election period in 2010, there were numerous violent attacks against candidates, campaigners and political activists (Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence 2010; UN News Centre 2010a). For more information see Commonwealth Secretariat (2010).

Interrelated factors

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Observable indicators

1. The number and locations of recorded instances of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
2. the extent of change of a country’s ethnic and political landscape due to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes;
3. the existence of a legal framework and adequate mechanisms to protect vulnerable populations, such as IDPs and other victims of conflict, and promote their participation in the political life of the country;
4. the existence of criminal justice policy frameworks for addressing crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes;
5. the extent to which prosecutions and trials during an electoral process exacerbate existing grievances between groups;
6. the number and locations of IDPs and refugees;
7. the existence of conditions for return and actual return figures;
8. the number of incidents involving attacks on IDPs and returnees; and
9. the existence and effects of reconciliation programmes.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

• Collect historical data on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Create maps to point to the extent of crimes committed. Label the geographical locations of atrocities by using static markers.

• Collect demographic data at the country and regional levels to understand change in the ethnic and political landscape due to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Map the regions to distinguish significant changes of ethnic and political representation. Chart data to create comparative columns presenting the data before and after atrocities.

• Collect data on the legal framework and existing mechanisms, including the criminal justice system, put in place to protect vulnerable populations, such as IDPs and other victims of conflict, and promote their participation in the political life of the country. Map regions according to the extent to which these mechanisms are implemented and produce effects. Chart trends reflecting increase or decrease of political representation per different groups over time.

• Collect data on numbers of IDPs and refugees, number of returnees to their places of origin, and incidents involving returnee communities and individuals. Create geographical maps pointing to areas where IDPs and returnees are concentrated. Create maps to illustrate the dimension of return processes. Chart data to present trends.
8. Human rights violations

**Introduction**

Human rights are ‘rights inherent to all human beings’ that a state is obliged to protect and promote (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights n.d.). A state violates human rights when it fails to follow the limitations that the law imposes to the use of force, such as the necessity for and the proportionality of the force in relation to the threat (Steiner 2006: 772).

If there are human rights violations in a country and strong rule of law mechanisms and culture are lacking, the risks of violence and further violations of human rights during the electoral period increase significantly (Steiner 2006: 772). For example, during political rallies a lack of appropriate guidelines and training for the police on crowd control and the use of force, in combination with a lack of sound and efficient accountability mechanisms, can lead to violence generated by the security services (Alston 2010: 15).

**Empirical cases and interrelated factors**

**Iran**

Iran has long been criticized for its record of different kinds of human rights violations, including torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (such as flogging and amputations); public executions; lack of due process; repression of the freedom of peaceful assembly and association; and the suppression of the freedom of opinion and expression (UN Human Rights Council 2011b: 4–14). These types of abuses affect the whole spectrum of political activities and elections in particular. The 2009 elections were highly contested and numerous protests followed the announcement of the results (Alem 2011: 52). Clashes between the security forces and protesters resulted in a number of citizens being killed, tortured and arrested without due process (Alston 2010: 16; Human Rights Watch 2010a, 2010c).

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<td>26. Rejection of election results</td>
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Côte d'Ivoire
The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is marked by both human rights abuses and a weak rule of law, in particular since 2002. These abuses have been characterized by excessive use of force by the security forces, as well as regular harassment, extortion and intimidation of the population, with little or no implementation of accountability mechanisms to control these incidents and to prosecute the perpetrators (Human Rights Watch 2005: 1–2).

The abuses were especially acute during the contested 2010 elections, when the incumbent president was defeated but refused to recognize the results. The incidents of violence were particularly grave during the election and post-election period, with several that included intimidation of voters and violent repression of demonstrations, as well as the murder of at least 300 people, abductions, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, enforced recruitment of young people, illegal detentions and the forced displacement of more than 35,000 people (UN Human Rights Council 2011a; ICG 2011b: 1–3; Human Rights Watch 2011). For more information see ICG (2011e: 2, 3, 5, 6), UN News Centre (2011), BBC News (2011b) and Al Jazeera (2011).

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<td>5. The presence of non-state armed actors</td>
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Observable indicators

1. The number of historical and recent recorded instances of human rights violations related to electoral processes and beyond the electoral context, in particular associated with political interests and involving political actors as victims or perpetrators, as well as journalists, civil society activists, intellectuals and others;

2. the existence of an adequate legal framework, procedures and training aiming to secure control of and accountability mechanisms for the actions of security sector; and

3. the extent to which perpetrators of human rights violations are prosecuted, including the ordinary and military penal system.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Collect historical and current situation data including statistics, reports, maps and other relevant information from multiple sources such as governmental sources, civil society and academia. If the data are not comprehensive, organize data collection through surveys and interviews with different social groups. Ensure gender representation. Distinguish between human rights violations which have political, ethnic, religious, gender and other connotations. Create maps to point to the extent of human rights violations. Place static markers to show the geographical location of incidents. Chart and compare trend lines. Present data in columns for respective categories (e.g. victims/perpetrators).

- Collect and analyse legal provisions and procedures defining rules of engagement for the SSAs. Analyse the training of SSAs relating to the understanding of and respect of human rights, in particular rights and obligations relating to electoral processes.
Conduct country-wide and regional population public polls to measure the level of trust that the SSAs and government enjoy. Map areas where SSAs enjoy little trust and where measures taken are not sufficient to ensure that SSAs have the capacity and knowledge to prevent human rights violations.

- Collect data on prosecution of cases of human rights violations through the ordinary and military penal system. Chart figures on cases and outcomes. Map regions where most judicial processes take place. Include data on failure to prosecute human rights violations.
9. Environmental hazards

Introduction

Environmental hazards relate to a situation or state of affairs which poses a threat to the surrounding environment (Smith and Petley 2009). Environmental hazards also encompass threats such as chemical, biological and natural hazards. For instance, a chemical spillage or an HIV/AIDS epidemic or a sudden outbreak of cholera encompasses either a chemical or a biological hazard (Strand 2004). A natural hazard is related to phenomena such as atmospheric, hydrological, geological and wildfire-related incidents. Such severe and intense threats can disrupt social life drastically (Organization of American States 1990), causing loss of life, damage to or loss of properties, disruption of basic services, the collapse of infrastructure and in some cases even forced migration (Annan 1999).

In particular, the multiple layers of disruptions that natural hazards can trigger, ranging from the collapse of infrastructure and communications to the total destruction of villages and cities, have an impact on the political life of a country (Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos 2004). In some cases, these sets of disruptions are an invitation to violence (World Health Organization 2005). Elections in the aftermath of a natural disaster are often very complex as they face not only extraordinary logistical challenges but also a high risk of unrest and violence that can derail the electoral process.

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Haiti

Following the earthquake and cholera outbreak that devastated large parts of the country, Haiti’s political institutions and leadership suffered greatly, and the elections were no exception (ICG 2010d: 1–3; Christian Science Monitor 2010). The volatility of that period, in combination with the numerous flaws in the organization of the events surrounding the electoral process, caused great discontent among the population, triggering violence during the post-electoral period (UN News Centre 2010b; ICG 2011d: 2). For more information see Taft-Morales (2011: 1–3), Solé (2008: 95–100), Human Rights Watch (2010e) and UN Human Rights Council News Service (2011).
9. Environmental hazards

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Uganda

Constant exposure to natural hazards poses a major problem to the stability of Uganda. Landslides and floods caused numerous deaths and outbreaks of disease in 2010 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2010: 4), and placed further stress on the already unstable political situation (Ashanut 2010). Widespread frustration and demands for better service delivery contributed to the violence that surrounded the 2011 elections. Even though the overall situation remained under control, there were allegedly use of force against opposition leaders and their supporters (Amnesty International 2011), attacks against an opposition politician and a journalist, and turmoil in the north of the country (BBC News 2011a; Washington Post 2011). For more information see European Union Election Observation Mission (2011).

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Observable indicators

1. The extent to which a country’s regions are exposed or prone to environmental hazards, such as biohazards (cholera, influenza, HIV/AIDS, malaria); natural hazards (volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and droughts); and chemical hazards (industrial accidents; chemical spillages; pollution of the water supply; accidental release of toxic materials);

2. the number and character of historical consequences of environmental and natural disasters, including political destabilization, humanitarian crises, increased criminality, economic losses, and destruction of infrastructure; and

3. the existence and quality of local, national and regional systems for early warning, risk reduction and responses to environmental and natural disasters.

Data gathering and analysis methodology

- Collect historical data including statistics, reports, maps and other relevant information on environmental or natural disasters. Disaggregate data to identify cycles of occurrences of disasters, seasonal/calendar patterns and regions affected. Create geographical risk maps. Chart trend lines to demonstrate seasonal risks.

- Collect historical data on the consequences of environmental or natural disasters. In particular, analyse instances where a disaster has triggered political instability. Collect data and analyse other effects of disasters on electoral processes such as inability to conduct elections in a particular electoral district or place due to a disaster; and the
negative impact of a disaster on citizens’ participation, in particular if certain groups were affected. Map regions which where disasters have the potential to derail or negatively affect electoral processes.

• Conduct an expert analysis on national and regional capacities and readiness to respond to threats of and actual environmental and natural disasters. Map regions of concern.
Introduction

Ethics involves what is right, equitable, fair, just, dutiful or responsible. Ethical practice is important in media because of high levels of public impact. In conflict-prone societies in particular, unethical media reporting can exacerbate conflict and trigger violence (Rolt 2005: 175–77). Unethical media reporting may be the result of political control and abuse of the media (Frohardt and Temin 2003: 1–4) or irresponsible journalism that pursues sensationalism (Ramadhan 2013). Manifestations of unethical media reporting are particularly dangerous in the context of highly contested electoral processes that take place in conflict-prone societies (Atuobi 2008: 12).

Empirical cases and interrelated factors

Zimbabwe

It is well documented that President Robert Mugabe’s party has used the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) relentlessly to disseminate propaganda (Financial Times 2013), discredit the opposition and enhance the image of the ruling party (Moyce n.d.: 44). Since the 1980s, journalists expressing an independent voice have been harassed, arrested, detained or murdered (Moyce n.d.: 44). During the 2008 general election, the ZBC, which dominates radio and television in Zimbabwe, was heavily criticized by civil society for using hate speech to intimidate the opposition and their supporters. According to a civil society organization monitoring the news during the election, the ZBC endorsed and amplified hate speech in news and current affairs programmes on TV, and in the news and analysis columns of the papers (Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe n.d.: 4). For more information see ICG (2008b: 1, 6, 7) and Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2008).

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Kenya


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<td>4. Gender-based discrimination and violence</td>
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**Observable indicators**

1. The existence of a media code of ethics;
2. the extent to which media houses (national and local) respect the code of ethics; and
3. the degree to which rules and regulations defining media roles and responsibilities in electoral processes are enforced by the relevant agencies.

**Data gathering and analysis methodology**

- Examine historical records of unethical media reporting for the numbers and actors involved. Use relevant reports and media records, and interview experts. Map historical risk regions and locations of incidents, and create trend charts to gain insight on critical electoral phases.
- Cooperate with media monitoring and regulatory bodies and civil society organizations in order to map out areas where unethical media reporting is occurring (local newspapers and radio) as well as where complaints have been received. Generate colour-coded maps to distinguish regions based on the magnitude of a problem. Use cumulative factors to present and monitor number of incidents and complaints received. Generate charts to analyse trends.
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About the authors

Sead Alihodžić is a Senior Programme Officer in International IDEA’s Electoral Processes Programme. His research and work focuses on elections and conflict, with a special emphasis on prevention and mitigation of election-related violence, risk management in elections, and timing and sequencing of transitional elections. He led the design and development of International IDEA’s Electoral Risk Management Tool. In addition to his International IDEA publications, he has published several journal articles on electoral violence, early warning and democracy promotion.

Prior to joining International IDEA in 2008, Alihodžić gained extensive experience in dealing with elections, post-conflict democratization, and security issues through 11 years with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina where he performed Programme Officer and Head of Field Office duties. In 2007, he was awarded the British Government’s Chevening scholarship. He also received two awards for achievements and service in the OSCE. He holds a master’s degree in European Integrations from the University of Essex, United Kingdom.

Catalina Uribe Burcher is a Senior Programme Officer in the Political Participation and Representation Programme. Uribe Burcher focuses on money in politics, integrity, conflict and the threats that transnational illicit networks pose to democratic processes. She has also worked as an independent consultant for the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as coordinator of a programme caring for victims of the armed conflict in Colombia. She is a Colombian and Swedish lawyer with a specialty in criminal law, and holds a master’s degree in international and comparative law from Uppsala University, Sweden.
About the ERM Tool

Understanding and explaining outbreaks of election-related violence is a complex task; predicting whether forthcoming elections will turn violent, which factors may underlie or trigger violence, and what can be done to prevent violence is even more difficult. One way to address the problem is to empower those who have immediate responsibility to prevent and mitigate election-related violence, such as electoral management bodies, security sector agencies and other state and non-state agencies.

The Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERM Tool) is designed to empower people to ensure peaceful and credible elections. The software aims to build the capacities of users to understand, analyse and mitigate electoral risks. Specifically, the ERM Tool can build users’ capacity to understand electoral risk factors; collect and analyse risk data; design prevention and mitigation strategies; and record the results of actions.

Modules
The ERM Tool consists of three integrated modules. First, a knowledge library describes in detail 36 electoral risk factors, both internal and external to electoral processes. Second, an analytical instruments section allows users to create analytical models specific to a country or election, upload data to generate risk maps and trend charts, and create a register of risks and actions. Third, the prevention module consists of a digital library with approximately 100 action points intended to inspire user in designing strategies to prevent and mitigate electoral risks, including election-related violence, at the different phases of the electoral cycle. The software is accompanied by three Guides and an Overview.

Download
To obtain a copy of the ERM Tool, please register via the International IDEA website. Genuine non-for-profit organizations will be granted a download key free of charge.

About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

What do we do?
In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of work.

International IDEA provides analysis of global and regional democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge of good international democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-building on democratic reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.

Where do we work?
Our headquarters are located in Stockholm, with regional and country offices in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

<http://www.idea.int>
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The software is accompanied by three Guides. This External Factors Guide is a support document to the ERM Tool. In conjunction with the Internal Factors Guide, it provides guidance to the users of the ERM Tool in identifying electoral risks in a given country and electoral context. The Prevention and Mitigation Guide aims to assist and inspire users to tailor strategies and actions for the prevention and mitigation of election-related violence.