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**DIVERSITY IN LOCAL POLITICS AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY
AND GOVERNANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL:
THE CASE OF INDONESIA**

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses diversity in Indonesian local politics and how it affects the country's democracy and governance. The analysis assumes that one of the main determinants of the transition to democracy in the local context is the degree of consolidation at the state and society levels. Indonesian local politics vary by location in this respect, according to the degree of political consolidation at the state and society levels and how the channels between these two levels are managed.

The paper explores two principal elements of local democracy that are critically important to the quality of

rule by the people: (1) representative democracy (parties and candidates, elected authorities and elections) and (2) participatory democracy (civil society, forging consensus and civic engagement). This assessment includes institutional aspects (rules, organizations and key actors) as well as processes (types and methods of practice and implementation). The findings show that the varying degrees of local political consolidation in different areas means that the implementation of democracy in this country differs from place to place. As a diverse democracy, Indonesia is better understood from local perspectives.

WHAT DIVERSITY?

INTRODUCTION

The word ‘diversity’ may have several meanings. Most of the time it refers to characteristics of a plural society: religious diversity, ethnic diversity and so forth. In this sense, Indonesia has always been described as a highly diverse country, and many academic studies have portrayed Indonesia’s diversity in terms of religious and ethnic affiliation. This analysis focuses on the diversity of the degree of political consolidation at the local level because this may have been partly affected by local characteristics.

A recent account of Indonesian local political consolidation suggests that the country’s transition to democracy (as well as the decentralisation of politics) has been very much state initiated and controlled (Buehler 2012). Therefore the diversity in the society, and its implications for democracy and governance at the local level, can be better understood from the perspective of the society’s relationship with the state. This relationship determines the dynamics of democracy and governance at the local level. Indonesia’s democracy has thus far benefited in general from a high degree of civic engagement (Lussier and Fish 2012).

This paper discusses the diversity (and political consolidation) of local politics in six Indonesian towns: Aceh Besar, Surakarta, Jombang, Kupang, Parigi Moutong and Manokwari¹. It analyses the degree of local political consolidation at both state and society levels, and how the channels between these two levels are managed. The six towns form the basis of the research for the State of Local Democracy (SoLD) Assessment in Indonesia. The assessments, conducted in the second half of 2011, explored two principal elements of local democracy that are critically important to the quality of rule by the people: (1) representative democracy (parties and candidates, elected authorities and elections) and (2) participatory democracy (civil society, forging consensus and civic engagement). The

research assessed the institutional aspects (rules, organizations and key actors) and processes (types and methods of practice and implementation) of these elements.

POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION

Today good governance is a mantra—a ‘magic spell’ for most democratic states. This spell was started (most likely very intentionally) by the World Bank’s annual reports in the 1990s, which emphasized that many states had failed to generate wealth for their people (Abrahamsen 2000, Pratikno 2007). These reports advanced a new era of government that has less emphasis on the power of ‘government’, but more on the consolidation and interaction of strategic actors in the state and society at large, as well as the intermediary players (Pierre and Peters 2000).

Consolidation is the key word in this mantra. The political actors in the state, intermediaries and civil society have their own interests, as well as their own methods to achieve these interests according to their own orientation and attributes (Lane 2000). The state actors use their formal regulatory powers to control the citizens. The intermediary actors (including the non-governmental organizations, NGOs) develop the advocacy actions to accomplish their missions. Civil society actors work within agreed norms to achieve their common interests. The methods used by the different sectors vary, as do the methods used by actors within each sector. Different interests and perspectives in civil society, for example, may lead to different methods. It is essential, therefore, for these actors to always work together to find a ‘win-win solution’.

The main purpose of political consolidation is to encourage these actors to cooperate and make government work effectively. The push factors should come from both ends of the spectrum: the state and society. These interactions are essential, since the state and the

¹ See Annex 3 for more detail.

society have an interdependent relationship (Shigetomi 2002). Civil society needs to allow the state to work effectively on policy processes, while the state needs civil society to carry out collective action (Seller 2010).

Therefore policy development is not the sole responsibility of the state (at either the national or local levels). The processes might be intervened in, controlled and influenced (and at the same time contributed to) by non-state actors by means of the various consolidation mechanisms. These non-state actors can be intermediary agencies, such as local NGOs and political parties, or agents of society such as religious institutions, community groups, *adat* institutions² and private enterprises. However, this consolidation can only be achieved if both the state and society have settled their internal consolidation agenda. The state needs to make sure that it has accommodated the various political actors, while society has to be able to incorporate various class and social structures into the wider unit on common ground—if not a common agenda. Only a consolidated state and consolidated (or cohesive) society can work together hand in hand.

In many cases, it is the society (rather than the state) that needs to pay more attention to its internal consolidation. Many societies have disjointed elements and suffer from serious conflicts across the board. This is ironic, because according to the Tocquevillian perspective, civil society is one of the main instruments of democratization (Tocqueville 2004), with one condition: that it is highly cohesive and civilized. A strong civil society will be able to push the state at the local level to become more stable and innovative through societal intervention and control. This involvement will prevent the state from becoming authoritarian or illegitimate, because civil society engagement in the policy process is an implicit indication of its support for the state.

Once the state and society are internally consolidated, it is essential to examine both the formal and informal channels that connect them together. Formal channels are those created and managed by the state to facilitate community participation. They sometimes operate as part of the official state policy-making process. The effectiveness of these formal channels, however, depends largely on both state and society actors.

Informal channels are initiated by society; the most effective channels are through autonomous associations (Harris et al. 2004, Tocqueville 2004), which can use extra-parliamentary methods (street protests, media releases and other forms of political communication) to

contribute to policy processes. It is more effective, however, to facilitate dialogue in which actors from the state, intermediary bodies and society can sit down and talk about problems and agendas.

THE SIX TOWNS AND THEIR BASIC DIVERSITY

The six towns used in the study reflect the diversity in Indonesian local politics, including history, society, power relations, degrees of economic prosperity and demographic features (such as density). Aceh Besar, Surakarta, Jombang, Kupang, Parigi Moutong and Manokwari are municipal districts—the third tier in the Indonesian government structure³. There are two types of district government: *kabupaten* (regency government) and *kota* (city government). *Kabupaten* has a rural basis, while *kota* is more urban but smaller. Surakarta and Kupang have *kota* governments, headed by *walikota* (mayor); Jombang, Aceh Besar, Manokwari and Parigi Moutong have *kabupaten* governments, headed by district heads called *bupati*.

The meanings of the terms *bupati* and *kabupaten* have remained relatively unchanged since the days of the old Javanese kingdoms; their use reflects the Javanese domination of Indonesia. The new Indonesian state merely formalized the status of the regency government in accordance with national policy.

Some Indonesian towns can trace their history back hundreds of years to the times of old aristocratic power. To a large extent, many existing local governments are a continuation of those older structures, and were not necessarily designed under the modern Indonesian state. Surakarta (Central Java) and Jombang (East Java) can date the history of their governments as far back as 400 years ago (or even longer). While the walls of the presidential palace in Jakarta display six presidents from Sukarno to Yudhoyono, Jombang displays dozens of its *bupati* in the official residence of the district head, dating back to the pre-Indonesia era.

Other Indonesian towns have shorter histories as local governments—although they have much longer histories as communities. Some of their histories are strongly related to the Dutch colonial government system. Kupang and Manokwari were established as local governments by the colonial government, which took the local community power structure into account. Kupang started with an ‘under-district’ structure during the Dutch era, and gradually gained its current status as a city government from 1955 to 1996. By contrast, Manokwari started with a district structure known as *afdeling* in the Dutch era, and was transformed into

² *Adat* is the set of cultural norms, values and customs in Indonesian local communities.

³ See Annex 2 for more detail.

a *kabupaten* when Papua was integrated into Indonesia in 1963.

Meanwhile, some Indonesian local governments developed historically for different reasons, as they are the products of the splitting up of regions, some of which were very recently established. Prior to 1956, Aceh Besar was part of Kota Banda Aceh. The division of regions reached its peak in the 2000s, following the acceleration of the decentralization policy. Parigi Moutong is part of the mushrooming of new regions throughout the country. This *kabupaten* was established in 2002 and used to be part of *Kabupaten* Donggala.

The six towns also reflect the different relationships between the central and local governments. Aceh Besar and Manokwari belong to regions that have a long history of conflict with the central government. Jombang and Surakarta are Javanese towns that enjoy a much better relationship with Jakarta. These towns also benefit from better infrastructure in Java compared to other islands, and thus enjoy better education and health services, as well as better economic prosperity. Kupang and Parigi Moutong do not suffer from political conflict like Aceh Besar and Manokwari, yet neither do they enjoy the luxury of great education and health services found in the big cities in Java.

More importantly, the six towns are diverse in terms of political consolidation, and therefore in the aspects of democracy analysed in the SoLD Assessment. The following sections will focus on these differences.

DEGREE OF CONSOLIDATION

The elements of political consolidation (state consolidation, society consolidation and the relationship between the two) show diverse levels of attainment in Indonesian local politics. The complexity of the consolidation process, along with social, economic and political challenges, has been a contributing factor. The cases of our six towns will improve our understanding of how these elements work. We will examine three aspects: (1) political consolidation from the state perspective, (2) consolidation of civil society actors and (3) state and society consolidation through both formal and informal channels.

Contest at the local level

The main feature of local government in the six towns is contest. Generally, there is no dominant political actor. Government policies are basically the product of agreement amongst the actors. Some policies can

accommodate the interests of the different actors, while others cannot be implemented effectively because the policy processes have failed to accommodate conflicting interests.

Wealth distribution can be a huge issue in accommodating local actors, as shown in Surakarta, which has segregated communities that are prone to conflict. Economic disparity is a significant problem and has contributed to social tensions from time to time. The city government manages this situation by undertaking intensive communication (mostly informally) with community groups in order to bring them together (i.e., to consolidate them). The current city government tries to reduce the income gap using subsidies, particularly in the health and education sectors (Arif and Ramdhon 2012), and has been successful in achieving this goal.

Similarly, the state at the local level is relatively consolidated in Jombang and Kupang. Both towns are relatively homogenous in terms of religious affiliation: Jombang is predominantly Muslim, while Kupang is predominantly Protestant. This has given the local government clear ideas on engaging with community groups and bringing state actors together on common ground (Anshori and Cahyaningtyas 2012, Rohi and Sayrani 2012). However, these local governments still have to improve their policies on minority groups.

While a shortage of money is certainly a big problem for some local governments in developing countries, a flood of funding for local budgets can also be a problem. In Aceh, Papua and West Papua, this has contributed to the problems of local state consolidation. The three provinces enjoy access to the special autonomy fund as part of the central government's political compensation for secessionist movements.⁴ The local governments have also opened their doors to multinational corporations to invest in these areas, which has contributed to the economic growth and the improvement of infrastructure and government services.

Nevertheless, this situation has revealed the limitations of the state's ability to consolidate its actors. In Manokwari, the local government is too busy with investors (both national and multinational) and is therefore unable to maintain a good participatory relationship with civil society associations, particularly the Church and the *adat* institutions (Suryawan and Banundi 2012). This is a big problem because these two institutions are very influential and are expected to work with the local government to formulate state policies.

⁴ Many observers have expressed their doubt that this special autonomy strategy would effectively solve the separatism problems. As McGibbon (2004, viii) puts it, 'Special autonomy arrangements are exceedingly difficult to entrench as national elites almost always resist demands to devolve political authority and are suspicious of any initiative that may set a precedent for other regions.'

Aceh Besar does not suffer from participation problems because the extra funds available for the provincial government encourage the local government to engage community groups in programme delivery (Fasya and Affiat 2012). However, the government of Aceh Besar shares similar problems with other *kabupaten* and *kota* in Aceh. The most significant glitch is the inability of the local bureaucracy and politicians to manage the new opportunities brought by the influx of funds. Many local politicians were previously combatants in the Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM), and do not have the capacity to run a local government even if they can facilitate community participation in the policy process and programme implementation. In general, however, the local state of Aceh Besar is more consolidated than that of Manokwari, although both share similar problems of central-local conflicts.

Quite predictably, the most unconsolidated of the six areas is Parigi Moutong. This new *kabupaten* is still struggling to improve the relationship between its executive and legislative branches. Conflicts between the two branches have manifested themselves in the boycotting of each others' activities, which has led to serious problems in the policy-making process (Alamsyah 2012). As in Manokwari, job appointments in the local bureaucracy are highly competitive. This has added yet another element to the conflict between state actors at the local level and reduced the state's ability to become more consolidated.

Civil society consolidation

Non-state actors have an effective role to play in controlling the state, including at the local level. This role, however, can only be performed nobly by societies with strong social capital, because this enables them to develop a bargaining position vis-à-vis the state. Societies with weak social capital tend to have an insufficient degree of political consolidation.

Papua displayed the synergy between *adat* institutions, the Church and local government in policy-making processes. However, as mentioned earlier, the government and the political parties are preoccupied by their deals with the investors, causing this synergy to wither away (Suryawan and Banundi 2012). The *adat* institutions and the Church are now relatively disconnected from the state and from each other. Compared to the Church, *adat* institutions are less able to promote cohesive civil society in Papua. While the Church may unite the local community in the name of religion, the *adat* institutions are scattered into smaller groups based on ethnic identities.

In other areas of the country, *adat* institutions hibernated for a long time: at least since the founding of the Indonesian state, if not since the Dutch colonial era. After political reform, some of the *adat* institutions revived themselves in various ways and performed new roles (Davidson and Henley 2007). In Aceh, the *adat* and religious institutions are closely related to each other, since traditional values and tradition in Aceh are strongly based on Islamic teaching. The *adat* institutions (dominated by the religious leaders, *tengku*) are formally accommodated by the local government. However, this does not reflect the level of consolidation in civil society but rather represents more of a co-opting of *ulama* (religious scholars) by the state (Fasya and Affiat 2012).

Kupang tells a similar story. The Church and *adat* institutions have also been co-opted by the state; they are used to legitimize state policy and are not genuine partners in policy making. Even worse, in Parigi Moutong the *adat* institutions play a limited role restricted to ceremonial activities (Alamsyah 2012).

In Java, however, civil society has a different characteristic. Civil society in Jombang and Surakarta is more consolidated than in other areas. Surakarta has two dominant groups (Chinese and Javanese) in the structure of its society; conflict between the two groups can lead to violence in the blink of an eye. However, business and trading interests have bound the two groups together and thus enable society to maintain control over the state.

A bipolar structure also occurs in Jombang. This town is known as a *Kota Santri*, literally the 'town of devout Muslims'. It has at least four major Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) that have a strong influence on the *santri* community. This community co-exists with the more secular community, known as the *abangan* people. Each group develops its own norms and values and basically lives in harmony with each other. Local government or state structures are dominated by the *abangan* group, while society provides an arena for the *santri* community, led by a religious leader known as *kyai*.

Channels between society and the state

Both formal and informal channels between the state and society have the same objective: to engage society in the policy-making process. Commonly in Indonesian local politics, the formal state channels are very unlikely to effectively achieve this goal. Our six towns are no exception.

The main channel provided by the state is the development planning meeting (*Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan, Musrenbang*), which formally brings community groups to a series of meetings, from the village to district levels. However, these meetings work effectively only at the lower tiers of government and become basically moribund at the district level. More often than not, final decisions on district development planning are determined by political deals amongst the elites in the bureaucracy and political parties.

It is not surprising, therefore, that community groups tend to be sceptical about the *Musrenbang* meetings. Many of them prefer to use informal channels to access the policy-making process. In Jombang, community groups bypass the formal procedure and make greater use of the citizens' forum (*forum warga*) at the sub-village level. To make sure that the ideas developed in these meetings reach the decision-making process, they invite the local council members (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD*) to participate. Sometimes personal relationships between council members and community leaders stimulate community engagement in the policy process. Similarly, citizens in Surakarta formed informal forums and groups to encourage the involvement of as broad a section of the community as possible. Some of the informal groups were even created before the *Musrenbang* policy.

Parigi Moutong is a new region and has not yet been able to develop effective associations to promote civic engagement. Such associations also exist in other areas, but may not be working effectively. Kupang had a semi-formal institution called the *Kouncil Kota* (city council), which was promoted by the former *walikota*. It was able to bring academics, ethnic group leaders and religious leaders into intensive participation in policy making during the mayor's term of office. Unfortunately, this lasted only about three years before the DPRD started to criticize the *Kouncil Kota* for taking over its formal role as a representative body.

For societies in specific regions such as Aceh, Papua and West Papua, the formal channels of participation include the *adat* structure. However, these structures function differently in Aceh Besar and Manokwari. As discussed earlier, the *adat* institutions in Aceh Besar have been co-opted by the state to validate its decisions rather than encourage true participation, while in Manokwari the Church and *adat* leaders are left behind as the local government focuses more on the business investments in their area.

DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

We can now ask the ultimate (perhaps fundamental) question: what does this information imply for the implementation of democracy at the local level? To answer this question we must simultaneously examine procedural democracy and participatory democracy at the local level. The first aspect deals with the formal instruments of democracy (parliament, elections and political parties). The second element is related to the basic idea of democracy as 'from the people, by the people, for the people'. Democracy is all about participation in the process of government.

Procedural democracy deals with regulations and electoral systems, but the more fascinating issue to observe is for what purpose (and for whose interests) the procedures are carried out. Democratic procedures in Indonesian local politics may serve various interests. At the same time, people's participation in local government processes varies from one place to the other.

Voter turnout (VTO) in Indonesia is considerably high. At the national level, VTO in the 2009 general elections was as high as 70.99 per cent.⁵ Unfortunately, in many areas popular participation is limited to casting votes on election day, and civil society has not been able to ensure that the electoral processes are fair and free in all cases. Parigi Moutong is a young local democracy in which political participation generally means voting in the elections. Further political participation is basically scattered and not cohesive. Some national and international agencies are present in this area (such as the World Bank's Urban Sector Development Reform Project) and capable of facilitating community participation. However they would need local government support to effectively contribute to participatory democracy. *Adat* institutions also have the potential to be participatory agencies for the community. However, they are either unable to achieve this potential or perceive that they can secure a better position for themselves by letting the local government use the *adat* as merely a tool for building legitimacy for state policies.

In Kupang, only some NGOs are active in maintaining control of the overall process of elections, and there is no cohesive effort to control the electoral process. This is one of the contributing factors to the notion of transparent elections in this area. Similarly in Parigi Moutong, the *adat* institutions are not able to promote cohesive and significant public participation. These institutions are segregated along ethnic lines and can only work effectively within each ethnic group. This ethnic segregation is worsened by the potential conflict

⁵ This is lower than in previous elections, particularly under the authoritarian regime, which claimed VTO of more than 90 per cent. However, compared to other countries, 70 per cent is considered high. A list of the world's VTO is available at <<http://www.idea.int/vt/>>.

between the indigenous ethnic groups and the *pendatang* (migrant, non-indigenous people).

Ideally, the procedures of democracy are expected to contribute to conflict resolution. In fact, one of the main objectives of these procedures has been to absorb conflicts within society and transform them into peaceful political contests. In Indonesian regions with a long history of conflict with the central government, the democratic procedures are used to compensate the demands of secessionist groups. In Aceh Besar (and Aceh province in general) the electoral process has enabled ex-GAM members to gain formal positions in both the executive and legislative bodies. Through the Aceh Party (*Partai Aceh*)⁶, these ex-GAM people control 10 out of 35 seats in Aceh Besar DPRD (local council). The ex-GAM combatants are also now key players in investment activities at the local level. These roles have enabled them to take the place of the *adat* leaders in the community, which leaves only a limited opportunity for local NGOs participation.

Similarly in Manokwari, recent electoral processes have been used by *penduduk asli* (indigenous) Papuans to strengthen their grip on local politics, while at the same time limit the political role of the *pendatang*. Rather than functioning as a method of absorbing various actors and interests into the process, the procedures of democracy in Manokwari operate more as a means of giving the *penduduk asli* more control over their own land, community and resources, in a somewhat discriminatory manner. Ironically, this has to some extent caused a shift in the conflict from the *penduduk asli* and *pendatang* to conflict amongst indigenous Papuans of different ethnic backgrounds. The practice of democracy does not actually absorb conflict; it just transforms it into something else. It is unsurprising that political participation in this area also tends to be segregated along ethnic identity lines.

The burden of absorbing conflict by procedural democracy is not as great in most other areas as in Papua.

Jombang and Surakarta have political parties and electoral processes that are able to recruit legitimate political leaders. Surakarta recently held a successful election that resulted in a legitimate *walikota* with effective powers. The incumbent, Joko Widodo, was re-elected with a huge 90 per cent of the vote, mostly because of his ability to fulfill his campaign promises and reduce economic disparities in his first term of office. He is now an exemplary model of a political leader who is able to maintain civic engagement and lead an effective government. Obviously, every political leader in cities like Surakarta will be under great pressure to facilitate societal participation. The people in Surakarta are comparably highly educated and politically literate, while the civil society organizations are active and connected to national and international networks. Surakarta's long history of radical movements would also discourage political leaders from neglecting popular demands for participation.

In Jombang, the electoral process serves an easier task, as it formalizes the already established power-sharing mechanism between the *santri* (devout Muslim) and *abangan* (nominal Muslim) groups mentioned earlier. The electoral process maintains the existing political arrangement in which the *abangan* leader occupies the *Pendopo* (official residence of the *bupati*); while the four major *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and their *kyai* (religious leaders) play their roles in society that do not conflict with the state's interests. Education services, for example, have long been provided by the *pesantren* (even before Jombang existed as a regency in 1910) without conflicting with state-provided education facilities. While the *walikota* of Surakarta is always under pressure to accommodate the participation of society, the *bupati* of Jombang needs to pay serious attention to the boundaries set by the *santri* and *abangan* power-sharing arrangement. As long as the *abangan* government shows its (financial) support for the religious programs and activities, most of the *kyai* will easily see themselves as being represented in the state's policy.

⁶ In Indonesia, local political parties only exist in Aceh—which is also part of the compensation for the secessionist pressures.

CONCLUSION

Although democracy consists of universal values (including participation and transparency), the implementation may vary from one country to the other. It depends greatly on a number of factors including the characteristics of the state, the society, and the relationship between them. Implementation of the procedures of democracy requires a lot of money and other resources, yet in many countries, the results are not always certain. Indonesian local politics displays wide variations in the degree of political consolidation, which in turn seems to affect the process and achievement of democracy. Countries like Indonesia are under huge pressure to implement democracy and good governance according to the international (Western) trend. This paper has shown that the different levels of political consolidation at the local level make democracy an even more uncertain business.

Starting with an understanding of how procedural and participatory democracy works at the local level, this study identified the factors that likely contribute to democracy in action. While more in-depth research is needed to determine the relationship between the various aspects discussed in this paper, this overview of the six Indonesian towns gives us some early impressions.

In areas with an unconsolidated state and society (such as Parigi Moutong and Manokwari), civil society is either non-participatory or only partly connected to the state policy process. Society is participatory only when it concerns electoral processes. Casting their vote

on election day might constitute the only effective political participation for some people in these societies. Even if they are involved politically, such participation tends to be impulsive and non-cohesive. Political participation sometimes leads to the deepening of segregation within an otherwise heterogeneous community.

In some cases (as witnessed in Aceh Besar and Kupang) the dominant nature of the state tends to co-opt civil society. Effective political participation is limited to elite groups that are prone to being co-opted by the state. For the broader community, political participation remains limited to voting. Connecting the community elite to state policy can sometimes mean blurring the line between the two realms. The problem is that democracy requires a consolidated state and a consolidated society with effective channels to connect the two, not a state and society with a blurred border. When both state and society are consolidated, democracy can work better. In areas with a consolidated state and consolidated society (such as Jombang and Surakarta), channels for political participation are working properly. Democratic procedures can also bring expected results.

These findings imply that the implementation of democracy requires political diversity at the local level. A highly diverse country like Indonesia cannot take a single prescription for democracy and implement it across the whole nation. It needs several different models that are tailored to the local situations.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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ANNEX 1: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


This paper is based on the State of Local Democracy (SoLD) Indonesia project. I would like to thank some people involved in this project and in the writing of this paper. First and foremost, I would like to thank International IDEA for its generous support for the project. It has been a great pleasure to work with Andrew Ellis, Adhy Aman, Mélida Jiménez, Keboitse Machangana and David Rosén from International IDEA.

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ANNEX 2: INDONESIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT



ANNEX 3: THE SIX TOWNS

The six research areas were selected using multiple criteria. The initial criterion was the rank in the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs 2011 scores based on the Annual Report of Accountability and Performance of Local Government. This data ranked local governments from the highest to the lowest performance. Based on this data, the assessment grouped the local governments into 'low', 'medium' and 'high' performance groups.


In the second step, the assessment looked at the power distribution in those areas. They were categorized by the characteristics of their power relationships: monocentric (centralized power relationships) or polycentric (dispersed power relationships). Monocentric refers to the existence of a dominant political actor in an area, such as a bureaucracy, market or traditional leaders. Polycentric refers to multiple political actors in an area. From each group of local governments, two areas were

chosen—one with a monocentric power relationship and one with a polycentric power relationship—in order to take into account the representativeness of areas (western, central and eastern Indonesia).

The processes brought the following district areas to the assessment process:

- Surakarta, Central Java (high, polycentric);
- Jombang, East Java (high, monocentric);
- Aceh Besar, Aceh (medium, polycentric);
- Manokwari, West Papua (medium, monocentric);
- Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara (medium-low, polycentric); and
- Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi (low, monocentric).

ANNEX 4: THE RESEARCH AREAS



Towns	Area (km ²)	Population	Density per km ²	Year of formation	Major mode of production
1. Aceh Besar	2,974.12	388,422	13	1956	Agriculture
2. Surakarta	44.06	500,642	11	[1745] 1950	Trading and small industries
3. Jombang	1,159.50	1,348,199	1,159	[1910] 1950	Agriculture and agribusiness
4. Parigi Moutong	2033.62	373,346	59,91	2002	Farming and plantations
5. Kupang	165.34	336,239	2,034	1996	Trading and service
6. Manokwari	14,488.50	187,591	13	[1957] 1963	Farming



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