INTERNATIONAL IDEA
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE

Digital Microtargeting

Political Party Innovation Primer 1



Digital Microtargeting

Political Party Innovation Primer 1

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE–103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00
Email: info@idea.int
Website: ‹http://www.idea.int›

Design and layout: International IDEA
Cover illustration: © 123RF, ‹http://www.123rf.com›

ISBN: 978-91-7671-176-7

Created with Booktype: ‹https://www.booktype.pro›

Contents

1. Introduction

The use of data to support political campaigns is, and always has been, common practice all over the world. Recently however, advances in technology have significantly changed the amount of information that can be gained from data, especially with regards to digital data from our Internet use.

By analysing specific datasets, political parties can achieve a highly detailed understanding of the behaviour, opinions and feelings of voters, allowing parties to cluster voters in complex groups. Such clusters can subsequently be targeted with online political advertisements that speak to their concerns and that are in line with their opinions. These online messages can only be seen by those voters in the targeted clusters. This is called digital microtargeting.

The more detailed the available information on each voter, the more targeted and micro the political campaigns can become. Microtargeting promises to fundamentally change how a political party communicates with the electorate. At the same time, it brings new legal, ethical and political dimensions into play that ought to be understood and addressed. In particular, digital microtargeting brings campaigning to a whole new level of sophistication and can be used both positively and negatively.

This Primer discusses digital microtargeting by political parties and concentrates on examples of political parties around the world that have used legitimate microtargeting practices in their campaigns. Electoral contexts differ by jurisdiction, and the Primer attempts to show examples that suit different contexts but with a focus on European cases.

2. What is the issue? The rationale of digital microtargeting

The availability and granularity of voter data has become the new cornerstone of political campaigning. Political parties and campaigns, with the help of data-driven communication experts, increasingly use big data on voters and aggregate them into datasets. At the same time, partly thanks to new technologies, social interactions are becoming less mediated and less hierarchical, resulting in a fundamental change in the way that citizens relate to politics and politicians. Consequently, since the 1980s, many political parties in the Western world struggled with dwindling membership and declining citizen involvement (Klaukka, van der Staak and Valladares 2017: 102).

Microtargeting seeks to address the rapidly decreasing engagement between citizens and political parties. More and more, citizens do not opt for 'full' alignment with one political party, but rather veer towards one or the other depending on very specific topics (Klaukka, van der Staak and Valladares: 109). In many countries, politics is becoming more issue-based and less ideology-based; therefore, larger and more precise datasets allow political parties to find out what issues matter the most to voters. With the help of microtargeting, they can reach voters with customized information that is relevant to them.

The practice of targeting and therefore appealing to different segments of the electorate in different ways predates big data analysis, online communication and social media. However, the precision with which it can be conducted in the digital age has revolutionized the process: the digital footprints created by citizens' online activities have increased dramatically, and private companies now collect vast amounts of personal data that could potentially be used for political ends.

3. Perspectives on digital microtargeting

As a relatively new phenomenon, political digital microtargeting is still maturing as a research discipline. Efforts such as the Personalised Communication project of the Institute for Information Law and the Amsterdam School of Communication Research, and the *Internet Policy Review* special issue on political microtargeting (Bodó, Helberger and de Vreese 2017), are leading the way in setting the research agenda and providing a way forward for the understanding of this phenomenon. Much of the existing literature on the topic shared concerns and approaches from other disciplines, as digital microtargeting is not only a political phenomenon, but one that originates in marketing techniques.

A significant part of the academic debate on microtargeting has focused on understanding the different legal contexts and its affordances. Bennett (2016) made a first attempt to extrapolate a mostly US-centred debate to the European context, analysing the different legal setups. Germany, due to its strict data protection laws, has also been a subject of study (Kruschinski and Haller 2017). In addition, the debate has also shed light on how political digital microtargeting is affected by data-protection laws (Bennett 2016) and the current lack of capacity of these laws to fully grasp the impact of digital microtargeting in electoral campaigns. Issues such as political party and campaign finance and the extent to which commercial data regulations can be extrapolated to politically-oriented digital microtargeting (see Bodó, Helberger and de Vreese 2017) are particularly relevant.

Pippa Norris has described how the arrival of television dramatically changed how political campaigns and messaging were conducted (Norris 2000). With the arrival of the Internet, a similar change occurred and so the phenomenon of digital microtargeting can, from a theoretical perspective, be understood in the

same way. Yet, it is only recently that digital microtargeting has reached significant influence and importance, and that is only due to the arrival of companies such as Google and social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and their role in politics (Conway, Kenski and Wang 2015; Dobber et al. 2017).

Yet the most substantial debate is around the confrontation between the negative and positive effects of digital microtargeting in political campaigns, especially the former. The events of the 2016 US presidential campaign and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom have placed increased attention on the role of negative messaging in the electorate, the origins of and mechanisms behind fake news (Subramanian 2017) and the influence of increased polarization (Wang 2014). The issue remains a nascent one, and the coming years will surely allow for much more comprehensive and detailed research on the effects and roles of digital microtargeting in political campaigns.

4. How does microtargeting work?

Targeting voters is about (a) collecting data and dividing voters into segments based on characteristics such as personality traits, interests, background or previous voting behaviour; (b) designing personalized political content for each segment; and (c) using communication channels to reach the targeted voter segment with these tailor-made messages.

These are methods that parties have used for a long time and predate digital aides for campaigning, but big data and digital technology have changed targeting into microtargeting (see Table 1). Today, the widespread use of social media allows parties to efficiently approach narrow groups who share a similar identity with customized political messages. For example, the Labour Party in the UK constructed a personal level scoring system that scored people by percentages on the likelihood of being Labour, voting, having concerns over specific issues and so on. These were used to assess which voters could be persuaded to vote Labour and thus drive marketing campaigns.

Data collection and voter segmentation

The data collection and segmentation process usually stems from three sources of information, the availability of which will vary between countries. From the outset, it is important to note that data collected for microtargeting purposes needs to be aggregated in datasets. If data is collected and stored in 'silos' (and not aggregated), it will seriously limit the potential use of that data.

Table 1. How big data has changed traditional targeting into microtargeting

Traditional targeting	Digital microtargeting
Collecting data	Increased availability of big datasets: collected by parties themselves, government agencies, polling agencies, voter files, as well as consumer data purchased from commercial market research firms Data can be collected more easily: citizens' personal information can be reached more readily online, as can their digital footprint Data can be stored more easily through larger servers. For example, US President Donald Trump's election campaign had 'more than 300 terabytes of data' (Halpern 2017)
Dividing voters into segments based on characteristics such as personality traits, interests, background, or previous voting behaviour	'Predictive analytics': patterns can be recognized more easily with the use of complex algorithms 'Psychological targeting': squaring voter data collected by political parties with consumer data purchased from commercial market research firms; this helps to build a more detailed profile: what people buy, eat or watch in some cases can help to predict how they vote. The impact of psychological targeting is being debated.
Designing personalized political content for each segment	'A/B testing': sending out hundreds of thousands of slightly different versions of the same message to different population segments to test patterns in their responses, such as how quickly they click, how long they stay on a page, what font and colour layout they like
Using communication channels to reach the targeted voter segment with tailor-made messages	Pairing voter profiles with social media user data to reach the right people with the right message

The first and foremost source of data is a person's voter profile, which is based on official records. In certain countries, such as the USA, the names and addresses of voters are generally publicly available. It is also possible to access aggregated information on whether a person voted in previous elections, whether they have worked on political campaigns before or are party members, or whether they have donated money to political parties. In countries such as Germany, data protection and privacy laws are stricter and allow for less voter data to be publicly available.

In addition to public data, political parties collect their own voter data. In the UK, this will be available based on the information political parties have collected, usually by knocking on doors or phoning voters. Another popular way to collect voter data is through websites and via email, whereupon landing on the web page or opening an email, the visitor is asked to fill out personal details and every answer prompts a more detailed question. The foundations for microtargeting in the UK were laid out by some parties ahead of the 2010 general elections with the construction of a comprehensive voter database that combined the electoral register with multiple other data points such as voter ID data gleaned from canvassing.

The third source of data is consumer data. In the UK, political parties have purchased access to marketing databases previously used for commercial purposes, e.g. in targeting advertising for specific products or services. Recently, with more effective ways of analysing big data, such as information collected through search engines, social media use, digital payment information and online behaviour, the importance of more data points has increased significantly. By analysing this data, it becomes possible to construct a distinct social and political profile of an individual voter.

For example, in May 2016, the then newly formed political movement called En Marche (which later changed its name to Le République En Marche!), lacking a comprehensive political platform at the time, launched 'La Grande Marche' (The Grand March) to carry out a diagnosis of the French electorate. They used microtargeting to find areas statistically representative of France as a whole and sent canvassers out to knock on 100,000 doors to have conversations with citizens. The team succeeded in efficiently gathering French citizens' political opinions, gaining valuable visibility as a political contender while also building relationships with the voters (Huffington Post 2016). When the time came to launch Emmanuel Macron's political platform, the canvassing had helped to mobilise support and shape the actual political content.

Another example is the Dutch microtargeting organization E-Canvasser, which carries out postal-code-based political microtargeting (i.e. data segmented to neighbourhood levels) and has developed an algorithm and software to process large datasets, such as election results and census data. This results in colour-coded neighbourhood maps, showing each political party's street-by-street performance. Included in this software is a regression model that shows where and how a party has gained or lost support. This information helps parties discover the location of their strongholds, as well as the 'battle-zones' and 'swing-streets'. On this detailed basis, parties can better decide where to focus their canvassing, and how to tailor their message.

Segmentation depending on the electoral system

In simple terms, voter segmentation means dividing the electorate into smaller blocks, and using different campaign methods for each segment. The differences between electoral systems influence how parties use microtargeting, as well as its potential effectiveness. Microtargeting does not always translate into a simple increase in the overall percentage of votes but can instead lead to a handful of extra votes in electorally important locations. For an overview of different electoral systems see Reynolds et al. (2008: 27–33).

In electoral systems where the electoral results are divided into constituencies with winner-takes-all systems (e.g. first-past-the-post systems), microtargeting will focus on a handful of key segments of society. One such obvious segment in the

USA and other countries is swing voters. These segments might represent the difference between overall victory and defeat, even if their numbers are relatively small compared to the total electorate. US President Barack Obama's 2012 re-election campaign used targeted efforts to encourage early voting and higher turnout, something that was identified as beneficial for the campaign and would help Obama win the Electoral College. In proportional systems, microtargeting might have more difficulty yielding impactful results as tapping into a small segment of the population can only have marginal effects on the total count of votes. However, a significant microtargeting campaign directed to the right sectors of society might be able to tip the balance of an election. For example, using microtargeting to mobilize latent support—for example, targeting citizens who support the views of a party but are identified as being prone to staying at home on election day—can have an impact. In some countries with proportional representation (PR) systems, such as Finland, the central parties are not able to give individual candidates very much support, so resourcing and running the campaign is the responsibility of the candidates, which can make some microtargeting efforts more complicated due to limited resources.

Designing personalized political content

Voter profiles and consumer data combined can be a good predictor of how an individual intends to vote, and what issues the individual cares about. For a political party, this may mean the ability to create hundreds of customized messages for each constituency, each with highly personalized political content, even down to a household level. This way, a political party can talk directly to voters about the topics they care about the most, through the platform they use the most, and with a language that will resonate with them most efficiently. This can be done, for example, through A/B testing, where voter segments are sent slightly different versions of the same messages to gauge which message resonates the most.

Microtargeting does not only change the ability to communicate a message to citizens, but it can also be used for increasing the efficiency with which parties gather input from citizens. By conducting polls with greater accuracy, or by testing the type of message that works best with each segment of the population, microtargeting can inform campaigns which topics the public care about and what messages resonate best with a specific segment of the population. During the 2016 US presidential campaign, the Republican National Committee was gathering survey data of around 1 million contacts every day, and during the primaries Donald Trump's team used message-testing methods that ran an average of 40,000 to 50,000 versions of its advertisements per day to test how they were received in order to refine subsequent ads (Lapowski 2016).

Digital microtargeting is a relatively novel practice and there are many examples of creative ways to utilize the technology, which demonstrates that the potential of microtargeting is in no way exhausted. The Labour Party in the UK used the data they had gathered to model probability indexes, which in turn informed campaign call centres of how likely specific households are to answer the phone. This data also told the canvassers how likely specific households were to be home at different times during the day.

Reach and precision

In general, the reach and precision of digital microtargeting will be determined by two key factors. The legal framework will influence the amount of data any party can obtain, what they can do with it, and the level of detail. The second factor is the investment placed in obtaining, managing and analysing the data, and then delivering the communication outputs.

In the USA, where the main two parties invest heavily (in absolute terms) in microtargeting, and legislation allows parties to acquire extensive data down to an individual level, the reach and precision is very high. In the UK, the conditions are similar but the amount of available data is slightly smaller. In countries like Germany and France, parties have the means to invest heavily but national legislation on privacy and data protection limits its precision and cost-benefit ratio. In Germany, the legally fixed minimal unit of analysis (i.e. the highest degree of precision allowed) is set at six households (meaning there is no data on individual households or voters), effectively limiting the precision of microtargeting efforts. In contrast, microtargeting in France is hampered by national data and privacy laws that don't allow easy access to voting databases or the purchase of commercial databases from third parties such as market researchers.

Delivery methods and communication channels

The delivery method refers to how the data and the information that comes out of the analysis is used. These methods are not mutually exclusive and are often complementary. Experiences from the UK show that it is vital to view microtargeting as a holistic solution, where the social media elements of the campaign inform the ground campaign and vice versa. For example, data from online spaces and polling-based insight can drive the segmentation and subsequent campaign activities such as canvassing and call centre operations. In turn, information gathered on the ground can then be used to enhance the quality of the online communication. That being said, the delivery methods are highly specific to each country: in some countries voters expect political parties to knock on their doors, whereas in others this may be perceived as imposing, or even illegal—as is the case in Japan, under the provisions of the 2016 Public

Offices Election Act (article 138). When choosing between communication channels it is important to understand that each one has its own distinctive features and will affect how it can best be utilized.

Social media

A revolutionary innovation has been to pair voter profiles with social media (e.g. Facebook) user data in order to reach the right person with the right message. The fact that Facebook, among others, keeps detailed profile data of its users is the sole reason parties can use their own data to reach their audience. A wide variety of software now makes such automated profile-pairing possible.

Social media is a broad concept and comes in many forms. One popular distinction is between what is called owned and earned social media on one hand, and paid social media on the other. The former essentially refers to the free usage of these platforms—that is, a user creates their own posts and other users link to pages or spread messages voluntarily. The latter is essentially when you pay for services that leverage your influence on social media.

On an owned/earned level, social media is internal communication—internal to the closed environment in which users exist on social media. Such bounded spheres, sometimes called filter bubbles, form when users of social media mainly get news or information based on their previous online behaviour (e.g. clicks, likes and shares), effectively filtering out information that is deemed irrelevant to them by algorithms, and thus reinforcing their subjective worldviews. The implication for microtargeting is that digital communication on earned/owned social media is not very effective as a persuasion device because views that are in conflict to the users' own do not easily pierce through the filter bubble. However, it might be very effective for mobilizing people on the basis of their conviction and deepening their commitment to a cause or a party. Additionally, this type of communication may also work to dissuade or suppress a voter, decreasing the likelihood of that person exercising their right to vote. In conclusion, this form of social media is much more important for engaging and mobilizing grassroots support—that is, working from below.

Paid social media is quite different. Most social media platforms sell services that allow parties to pay their way out of the filter bubble and target user segments based on attributes such as location, age, education, gender, language and personal interests. These services are highly customizable and allow parties to send timely and accurate information to users, making this form of social media useful for sending targeted advertisements or marketing in a top-down fashion.

Using social media gives an election campaign a new kind of agility, allowing large resources to be shifted from one constituency to the other in a very short time—something that could not be done with, for example, campaign volunteers or leaflets. Therefore, it is important for political parties to have a social media strategy and a rationale for choosing a particular platform.

Mail or email

Direct mail sent either through the post or distributed by volunteers has been a staple of many election campaigns. Microtargeting allows for the production of—in some cases—hundreds of different pieces of direct mail, which can be sent to voters with different profiles. This can also be done through highly personalized emails that have the additional benefit of allowing for analysis of how they are received. For example, based on the individual reaction to the email (e.g. opening a link or answering an attached online survey), future messages could be customized based on this input.

Canvassing and mobilization

Canvassing, or door-to-door campaigning, has been very widely used in many countries. In the past, this was done without prior data analysis (e.g. by knocking on every door on a street). Microtargeting gives parties a very powerful tool to enhance the quality of canvassing. Analysis of datasets can give parties information on the time of day when a voter is likely to be at home, whether they are likely to open the door or not, knowledge of previous voting behaviour of neighbourhoods and where swing voters are likely to live, and thus provide a clearer profile of who the canvassers will meet when out knocking on doors. This effectively limits wasted ground campaigning and enhances the ability to prepare for interactions with voters. Many practitioners argue that microtargeting can be more successful for mobilization, rather than influencing decisions on complex issues.

In the UK, Labour's Momentum movement, described by some as a 'grassroots campaigning network', launched a tool called 'My Nearest Marginal' that helps canvassers find their nearest constituency where Labour has the chance to win a seat in parliament, and at the same time organizes carpools to get there. In short, microtargeting can also have a huge impact on the more 'analogue' activities of a campaign.

Television

Although television is the traditional realm of conventional campaigns, the proliferation of more interactive television, with streaming services, cable subscriptions and online streaming has allowed for a more targeted use of television advertisements. Famously, the Trump campaign targeted viewers of two popular television series—*Navy NCIS* and *The Walking Dead*—in specific geographical locations, as the campaign's data showed a correlation between following these series and support for anti-Obamacare and anti-immigration concerns, respectively (Bertoni 2016).

5. Issues to consider before using microtargeting

Legal considerations

The legal framework of each given electoral setting is a fundamental consideration when parties decide to use microtargeting. The legislation on microtargeting differs between each country, but in general there are many uncovered, new areas. Many of the practices used to carry out microtargeting—particularly the digital ones—are novel instruments that have not been regulated properly, or for which regulation is outdated due to the rapid technological development. Regulations for elections are, in general, restricted to a country's territory, assuming elections take place within the territorial boundaries of that country. Under this assumption, unless a large percentage of its population with voting rights live abroad, the campaign will largely take place inside the country. However, digital microtargeting in particular, opens up the possibility that the related work and expenditure may in fact take place in other jurisdictions outside that country. Therefore when a party or candidate hires a foreign company to provide support and data, particular attention needs to be drawn to compliance with relevant data protection and electoral laws and regulations.

Some of the algorithms, information and data points used in microtargeting are not owned nationally, but rather by global technological corporations like Google or Facebook, making it more difficult for enforcing agencies to track political parties' adherence to the law while using the services of these providers. In the UK, the Information Commissioner's Office has launched an inquiry into such practices during the 2016 Brexit referendum. Some countries have started to introduce legislation to regulate technology corporations. As of 1 January 2018,

social media companies in Germany are required to police themselves for hate-crime violations while in France, President Macron announced the preparation of new anti-fake news legislation.

Current legislation on data privacy is fundamentally nationally derived. However, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will have broad implications for organizations that work with the personal data of EU citizens. The GDPR allows a political party to only process information on members, former members and persons who have regular contact with the party, and also demands that appropriate safeguards are built in. However, the definitions of 'regular contact' and 'appropriate safeguards' especially, remain largely undefined. For instance, it is unclear whether regular contact includes those that attend party meetings, those that follow a party on social media, or those that have voted in party primaries (Bennett, 2016).

Political and financial considerations

Data has an economic cost that might be out of reach for many parties. At the high end of the spectrum, the Trump campaign of 2016 spent between USD 500,000 and USD 1.5 million on digital operations per day in the last month prior to election day (Associated Press 2016). The price of using data for campaigning varies widely, but it most likely will affect the fairness of elections in two ways. On the one hand, simple social media campaigns can be easily targeted and reach large audiences with relatively small budgets. On the other hand, advanced microtargeting services are costly and provided by specialized consultants and companies. This may allow well-funded parties to obtain a significant advantage in campaigning, as they will be able to pour more resources into obtaining better and more accurate data for their campaign, along with employing consultancy services to deliver the output. Additionally, it might be possible for parties to bypass expenditure caps, effectively allowing them to spend more than what is stipulated, since a lot of the expense might take place outside the country, making it more difficult for monitoring agencies to track.

Resources are always going to be an important aspect of campaigning and political communication, but microtargeting can also be successful with relatively small budgets. A campaign can seem big even when the target group is small. This can be achieved by targeting 'influentials', a relatively small group of people but one that can give a ripple effect, and can have huge rewards. When the target group is small enough, the costs for reaching them on multiple channels with multiple messages does not need to be huge, which highlights that parties with smaller resources need to be particularly clever with their strategy.

Ethical considerations

Political parties should be aware of how the data they are considering using has been obtained, and who has collected it. Data mining and the commercialization of such data is common practice. Too often, users are asked to supposedly provide information for one purpose, and only realize later they have also granted permission for much broader use of their data. It can be safely assumed that people do not always fully read what they consent to when signing the 'terms of agreement' for online services. Users might consent to certain companies using their location data or give firms the capacity to obtain and sell one's online activity on their service to undisclosed third parties.

Digital microtargeting also poses threats to honesty in political campaigns and the accountability of campaign promises, as highlighted by a recent report of the London School of Economics. A campaign, for instance, could target particular voters via closed social networks (*unpublished* posts) 'to commit to keeping a local library open, or to widening a local bypass … [I]f such a commitment were to appear in a user's newsfeed or as an ad alongside it could subsequently disappear, or could be deleted by the candidate. It would then be very difficult for the voter to hold the candidate to this commitment should s/he win the election' (Goodman 2016: 20).

The risks of microtargeting

Apart from the ethical risks of digital microtargeting, debate has also arisen over its potential political and legal risks. Among these are:

1. the risk that political representatives collect too much citizen data, or a 'Big Brother' scenario;
2. the risk that sophisticated algorithms manipulate what voters see and read, with a focus on 'divisive' issues, clouding their freedom of choice;
3. the risk that 'safe' voters are marginalized from the flow of information in political campaigns;
4. the risk that data monopolies by early adopters will distort the level playing field between political parties;
5. the risk that microtargeting is used for negative campaigning and voter suppression; and
6. the risk of breaching campaign finance regulations, as it becomes difficult to track who pays for data mining and digital advertisements.

Some microtargeting campaigns have allegedly been used to discourage voters from casting their vote. Online campaigns using data have the potential to identify clusters of the population that might vote for a candidate but are not yet fully convinced. Rival campaigns might be able to identify those people and encourage this group to stay home on election day, which goes against the spirit of democratic elections. Smear campaigns, suggestions of election fraud or false polling data might all be used to discourage voters from exercising their democratic right.

6. Conclusion

Even with the best sets of data, a campaign will still derive its success primarily from its messaging and political content, and it is important to remember that many campaigning tactics were also used in the pre-digital campaigning age. At its core, microtargeting is one of many tools available to a political campaign to get its message across and, just like any other campaigning tool, it can be used constructively or non-constructively.

Many media stories have focused on the negative aspects of microtargeting, but it is important to realise that the core methods have been in use in electoral politics for a very long while and, if properly used, can have positive effects on democratic politics. The fundamental difference is the ability to use technology to gather far more precise data to target voters, giving political parties the potential to engage with voters in a way that was previously unthinkable. With such a powerful tool available and likely to intensify, political parties and regulators have a joint responsibility to use microtargeting in a way that strengthens democratic participation.

References

Associated Press, 'Donal Trump and Hillary Clinton's final campaign spending revealed', *The Guardian*, 9 December 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/09/trump-and-clintons-final-campaign-spending-revealed>, accessed 10 June 2018

Bennett, C. J., 'Voter databases, micro-targeting, and data protection law: can political parties campaign in Europe as they do in North America?', *International Data Privacy Law*, 6/4 (November 2016), pp. 261–75

Bertoni, S., 'Exclusive Interview: How Jared Kushner won Trump the White House', *Forbes*, 20 December 2016, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2016/11/22/exclusive-interview-how-jared-kushner-won-trump-the-white-house/#59945a403af6>, accessed 10 June 2018

Bodó, B., Helberger, N. and de Vreese, C., 'A Manchurian candidate or just a dark horse? Towards the next generation of political micro-targeting research', *Internet Policy Review*, 6/4 (2017), <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/manchurian-candidate-or-just-dark-horse>, accessed 12 June 2018

Conway, B. A., Kenski, K. and Wang, D., 'The rise of Twitter in the political campaign: Searching for intermedia agenda-setting effects in the presidential primary', *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 20/4 (2015), pp. 363–80

Dobber, T., Trilling, D., Helberger, N. and de Vreese, C., 'Two crates of beer and 40 pizzas: the adoption of innovative political behavioural targeting

techniques', *Internet Policy Review*, 6/4 (2017), <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/two-crates-beer-and-40-pizzas-adoption-innovative-political-behavioural-targeting>, accessed 11 June 2018

Goodman, E., Labo, S., Moore, M. and Tambini, D., 'The New Political Campaigning', London School of Economics, Media Policy Brief No. 19 (2017), <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71945/>, accessed 11 June 2018

Halpern, S., 'How he used Facebook to win', *New York Review of Books*, 8 June 2017, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/08/how-trump-used-facebook-to-win/>, accessed 10 June 2018

Huffington Post, 'Emmanuel Macron donne le coup d'envoi de la "grande marche" de son parti "En Marche!"' [Emmanuel Macron kicks off the 'grand march' of his party 'En Marche!'], 5 October 2016, <https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/05/28/emmanuel-macron-porte-a-porte-en-marche_n_10177592.html>, accessed 10 June 2018

Institute for Information Law and Amsterdam School of Communication Research, 'Personalised Communication: Understanding the use and effects of personalised media and their implications for law and policy', <https://personalised-communication.net/>, accessed 11 June 2018

Japan, Public Offices Election Act, 2016, <http://www.houko.com/00/01/S25/100.HTM>, accessed 13 June 2018

Klaukka, G, van der Staak, S. and Valladares, J., 'The changing nature of political parties and representation', in International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), *The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017), pp. 98–118, <https://www.idea.int/gsod/>, accessed 11 June 2018

Kruschinski, S. and Haller, A., 'Restrictions on data-driven political micro-targeting in Germany', *Internet Policy Review*, 6/4 (2017), <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/restrictions-data-driven-political-micro-targeting-germany>, accessed 11 June 2018

Lapowski, I. 'Here's how Facebook *actually* won the Trump Presidency', *Wired*, 15 November 2016, <https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-won-trump-election-not-just-fake-news>, accessed 10 June 2018

Norris, P., *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

A. Reynolds, B. Reilly and A. Ellis (eds), *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005), <https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-system-design-new-international-idea-handbook>, accessed 11 June 2018

Subramanian, S., 'Inside the Macedonian fake-news complex', *Wired,* 15 February 2017, <https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/>, accessed 10 June 2018

Wang, C.-H., 'The effects of party fractionalization and party polarization on democracy', *Party Politics*, 20/5, (2014), pp. 687–99

Further reading

Barocas, S., 'The price of precision: voter microtargeting and its potential harms to the democratic process', PLEAD '12: Proceedings of the First Edition Workshop on Politics, Elections and Data (2012), pp. 31–36, <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2389671>, accessed 11 June 2018

Holt, K., 'Age and the effects of news media attention and social media use on political interest and participation: Do social media function as leveller?', *European Journal of Communication*, 28/1 (2013), pp. 19–34

Johnson-Cartee, K. S. and Copeland, G., *Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age* (Mahwah, New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 1991)

Kreiss, D., *Prototype Politics: Technology-intensive Campaigning and the Data of Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016)

Rubinstein, I., 'Voter privacy in the age of big data', *Wisconsin Law Review* (2014), pp. 861–936

Tucker, J. A., Theocharis, Y., Roberts, M. E. and Barberá, P., 'From Liberation to Turmoil: Social Media and Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, 28/4 (2017), pp. 46–59

Vergeer, M., Hermans, L. and Sams, S., 'Online social networks and micro-blogging in political campaigning: The exploration of a new campaign tool and a new campaign style', *Party Politics*, 19/3 (2011), pp. 477–501

Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. J., 'Singling out people without knowing their names: Behavioural targeting, pseudonymous data, and the new Data Protection Regulation', *Computer Law and Security Review*, 32 (2016), pp. 256–71

Acknowledgements

Many people took part in the drafting of this Primer. We are particularly grateful to Alberto Fernandez Gibaja, Frank Kayitare, Gary Klaukka, Helena Schwertheim, William Sjöstedt, Sam van der Staak, Jorge Valladares and Johannes Wallström for their inputs to several drafts, and to several anonymous party officials who contributed to their review.

About this series

International IDEA's Political Party Innovation Primers are designed to explain emerging trends and practices being adopted by political parties worldwide to reconnect with citizens. Current and forthcoming Primers include:

1. Digital Microtargeting
2. Online Political Crowdfunding
3. Collaboration between Citizen Movements and Political Parties
4. Inclusive Primary Elections

Download the Primers: <http://www.idea.int/publications/categories/primers>.

About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

What do we do?

In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of work.

International IDEA provides analyses of global and regional democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge on good international democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-building on democratic reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.

Where do we work?

Our headquarters is located in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

<http://idea.int>

International IDEA's Political Party Innovation Primers are designed to explain emerging trends and practices being adopted by political parties worldwide to reconnect with citizens.

Each Primer provides guidance to citizens in general, and to members and sympathizers of existing or new parties in particular, on how to introduce innovative ideas and practices in their organizations.

The Primers aim to fill gaps in existing literature on selected topics, and draw on interviews and consultations with party activists and experts who have employed the innovative means in question.

International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE–103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00
Email: info@idea.int
Website: ‹http://www.idea.int›

ISBN: 978-91-7671-176-7 (PDF)