Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the UN
The UN system should follow a common strategy on peacebuilding, state building and democracy building based on a shared political analysis of countries emerging from conflict.
# INTERNATIONAL IDEA AT A GLANCE

## OUR MISSION

In a world where democracy cannot be taken for granted, the mission of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is to support sustainable democratic change through providing comparative knowledge, and assisting in democratic reform, and influencing policies and politics.

In addressing our mission we focus on the ability of democratic institutions to deliver a political system marked by public participation and inclusion, representative and accountable government, responsiveness to citizens’ needs and aspirations, and the rule of law and equal rights for all citizens.

We undertake our work through three activity areas:
- providing comparative knowledge and experience derived from practical experience on democracy building processes from diverse contexts around the world;
- assisting political actors in reforming democratic institutions and processes, and engaging in political processes when invited to do so; and
- influencing democracy building policies through the provision of our comparative knowledge resources and assistance to political actors.

Our work encapsulates two key principles:
- We are exponents of democratic change. The very nature of democracy is about evolving and adapting governance systems to address the needs of an ever changing society.
- We are supporters of change. The drivers of change must come from within societies themselves.

## OUR PROGRAMME

Democracy cannot be import and exported, but it can be supported. And because democratic actors can be inspired by what others are doing elsewhere around the world, International IDEA plays an instrumental role in supporting their initiatives by:
- Providing comparative knowledge and experience in:
  - elections and referendums
  - constitutions
  - political parties
  - women’s political empowerment
  - democracy self-assessments

Assisting political actors in national reform processes:

As democratic change ultimately happens among citizens at the national and local levels we support, upon request and within our programme areas, national reform processes in countries located in:
- Latin America
- Africa and the Middle East
- Asia and the Pacific

Influencing democracy building policies:

A fundamental feature of strengthening democracy building processes is the exchange of knowledge and experience among political actors. We support such exchange through:
- dialogues
- seminars and conferences
- capacity building

Seeking to develop and mainstream understanding of key issues:

Since democratic institutions and processes operate in national and international political contexts we are developing and mainstreaming the understanding of how democracy interplays with:
- development
- conflict and security
- gender
- diversity

## Our approach

Democracy grows from within societies and is a dynamic and constantly evolving process; it never reaches a state of final consolidation. This is reflected in our work: in supporting our partners’ efforts to make continuous advances in democratic processes we work step by step with them with a long-term perspective.

We develop synergies with those involved in driving democratic processes – regional political entities (the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union (AU) for example), policy makers, politicians, political parties, electoral management bodies, civil society organizations – and strategic partnerships with the key, regional, international and multilateral agencies supporting democratic change and different United Nations bodies.

Quintessentially, we bring comprehensive options to the table but do not prescribe solutions – true to the principle that the decision-makers in a democracy are the citizens and their chosen representatives.

International IDEA is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. International IDEA’s Member States are all democracies and provide both political and financial support to the work of the institute. The Member States include Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ghana, India, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. Japan has observer status.

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Special thanks go to Necla Tschirgi, Professor of Practice, Human Security and Peacebuilding, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego, for the support provided for the implementation of this initiative.
Democracy, Peace and Security:
The Role of the UN

Editor: Massimo Tommasoli
Key Recommendations

1. Knowledge, policy and practice related to democracy assistance in post-conflict contexts are evolving rapidly. Emerging lessons must be captured and integrated into practice to promote continual cross-fertilization between research, policy and practice.

2. Democratization in conflict-affected countries is a multidimensional challenge. Implementing democracy-assistance programs requires more sustained and strategic security, political and development support.

3. Democracy grows from within, and external actors can only support it. In view of democracy’s nature as a long-term, complex and highly context-driven process, the UN’s democracy assistance should be grounded in both a deep understanding of local realities and solid comparative knowledge.

4. The UN system must work collaboratively and with other key stakeholders to provide effective support to democratization. Providing effective support will require integrated strategic UN approaches.
Executive Summary

On 1-2 March 2010, the United Nations (UN) Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) convened a two-day round table in New York to review the role of the UN in promoting democracy, peace and security. This summary document highlights the key conclusions and recommendations that were developed by participants at the round table.

The March 2010 International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations brought together more than 80 policymakers, practitioners and academics in New York to review the UN’s work at the intersection of democracy assistance, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The agenda for the event was developed collaboratively by DPA, DPKO, UNDP, and International IDEA. The round table was structured around six thematic sessions that alternated between substantive and procedural challenges in democracy building in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts:

1. Overview of UN Policies and Practices;
2. Elite Accommodation and Leadership Capacities;
3. Sequencing and Prioritization;
4. Democratization, Local Governance and Peacebuilding;
5. Responsive Institutions;
6. Promoting Coordination, Comprehensive Planning and Integrated Approaches.

Case studies covering Afghanistan, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Haiti and West Africa and a discussion paper prepared specifically for the round table were used to help focus the discussions.

In the concluding session of the round table, participants identified key conclusions and recommendations for the UN in terms of how it might address the twin challenge of producing sustainable peace and building a sustainable democracy, democratic governance, and state institutions in fragile and post-conflict recovery contexts.

Key Recommendations

Four key recommendations emerged from the rich and multifaceted discussions at the March 2010 round table on the role of the UN in promoting democracy, peace, and security:

1. Knowledge, policy and practice related to democracy assistance in post-conflict contexts are evolving rapidly. Emerging lessons must be captured and integrated into practice to promote continual cross-fertilization between research, policy and practice.
2. Democratization in conflict-affected countries is a multidimensional challenge. Implementing democracy assistance programs requires more sustained and strategic security, political and development support.
3. Democracy grows from within, and external actors can only support it. In view of democracy’s nature as a long-term, complex and highly context-driven process, the UN’s democracy assistance should be grounded in both a deep understanding of local realities and solid comparative knowledge.
4. The UN system must work collaboratively and with other key stakeholders to provide effective support to democratization. Providing effective support will require integrated strategic UN approaches.
More specific conclusions and recommendations are summarized below. These are organized in three groups:

- the content of the UN’s democracy assistance in conflict contexts;
- the way the UN works in these contexts;
- implications for policy, practice and research.

**The Content of UN Democracy Assistance in Conflict Contexts**

The UN is already engaged in a number of substantive areas in which considerable experience has been gained—among them, political mediation, elections, political and institutional reform, public administration reform and the socio-economic foundations of democracy. At present, however, the consolidation of knowledge at the institutional level is very limited.

Specific recommendations that emerged from the round table with regard to the content of UN democracy assistance in conflict contexts included the following:

- Consolidate knowledge from the UN system as a whole on what works, under what conditions and why. Complement strategies for elite accommodation with socio-economic initiatives to ensure popular support for political agreements among elites.
- Develop and make available options for institutional reform based on the wealth of knowledge and experience accumulated by the UN and other democracy-building actors. Non-prescriptive comparative analysis of different options for institutional design, based on examples from all regions, including from the global South, may prove very effective for local actors committed to reform processes.
- Link various UN agendas in support of democracy, peace and security by facilitating rigorous political analysis, scenario building and contingency planning.

**The Way the UN Works in Conflict Contexts**

The UN’s approach to democracy assistance is largely supply-driven and shaped by institutional mandates, capacities and resources rather than a realistic assessment of needs on the ground. There is often disconnect between policy directions and operational guidelines at the level of the UN headquarters and the day-to-day challenges faced on the ground.

Specific recommendations that emerged from the round table with regard to the way the UN works in conflict contexts included the following:

- Strengthen intra-UN linkages while at the same time ensuring that the UN also engages more effectively with other entities working on democracy assistance in post-conflict contexts.
- Follow a common UN system strategy on peacebuilding, state building and democracy building based on a shared political analysis of countries emerging from conflict. Common processes and tools like the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)/Common Country Assessment, the UN’s Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) and the UN’s Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) should be synchronized to support the development of such a strategy.
- Put into place incentive structures within the UN system to facilitate collaboration
between headquarters policies and mechanisms and country office processes, as well as between different parts of the UN working on democracy assistance. Useful measures could be cross-agency training, more effective dissemination of operational guidelines to strengthen intrasystem collaboration, organization of discussion fora and round tables at the regional level to facilitate greater cross-fertilization of field and headquarters perspectives and to create a common agenda.

- Create a single UN Web platform on democracy, peace and security in order to share information and knowledge across the system and its multiple communities of practice dealing with a range of issues at the intersection of peace, security and democratic governance.
- Make a concerted effort to link UN democracy work into its peace and security work more systematically. The co-sponsors of the round table should move forward to develop a more concrete policy process pertaining to democracy, peace and security.

Looking Ahead: Implications for Policy, Practice and Research

Round table participants shed light on a number of critical issues with implications for policy, practice and research that merit further consideration and follow-up. Those issues are summarized below.

Strategic and Policy-Level Issues

- Map out key principles and specific policy guidance that cut across the various thematic areas addressed in the UN Policy Committee’s decisions on issues such as the rule of law, security sector reform and constitution building, with a view to extracting their implications for democracy assistance as well as for peacebuilding and state building.
- Reflect the UN system’s growing understanding of the complex linkages between democracy assistance and peacebuilding in future policy statements and forthcoming UN initiatives and events.
- More effectively link UN system-wide policy discussions to policy developments in other key international fora, including regional organizations and the bilateral and multilateral donors, for example on issues areas such as funding priorities and good principles for democracy building, peacebuilding and state building in fragile countries.

Operational-Level Issues

- Overcome the disconnect between UN headquarters–level policy decisions and their implementation at the field level through shared analysis and a unified strategy, using instruments that include the UN’s IMPP and ISF.
- Develop evidence-based and clearly articulated guidelines designed to enable practitioners to better integrate the UN’s democracy-related activities and peace and security-related activities, by producing a UN practitioner’s handbook that provides a comprehensive guide or ‘checklist’ on major aspects to be taken into account when faced with the dual challenges of securing peace and stability and furthering democratization.
- Review the UN’s incentive structures (mandates and timeframes for action, human resource issues, financial resources, leadership) in order to address the practical
constraints against translating integrated strategies into effective action.

Issues Related to Research and Analysis

• Keep the UN intellectually engaged in academic and policy debates around the concepts of democracy, peacebuilding and state building through its own analytic work as well as those of its partners globally, in particular International IDEA.

• Bring in diverse perspectives and experiences from around the world with a view to broadening the menu of choices and options available to post-conflict countries grappling with democratic transitions.

• Compile and systematically share the techniques of democratic practice as reflected in the UN’s work as well as the work of other entities working in conflict contexts.

• Identify areas where new research and knowledge need to be generated to address the evolving challenges of democracy building in conflict-affected countries.

• Expand and consolidate the knowledge base of the policies and practices of the UN and its partners on the linkages between democracy, peace and security.
Introduction

On 1-2 March 2010, the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) organized a round table in New York on the UN’s peace, security and development work. The International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations was intended to stimulate an exchange of experiences and perspectives at the cross-section of theory, policy and practice. The concept note for the meeting is presented in Annex 1.

The March 2010 round table on the UN’s role in promoting democracy, peace, and security brought together more than 80 policymakers, practitioners and academics working on different aspects of peace, security and democracy to review the work of the UN at the critical juncture between democracy assistance, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This event was the second in a series of three meetings intended to anchor the issue of democracy within the three pillars of the UN’s work—peace and security, development, and human rights. The first meeting, organized by DPA, UNDP and International IDEA in September 2008, explored the relationship between democracy and development. The third meeting is expected to focus on the links between democracy and human rights.

This summary report highlights the key recommendations and conclusions that emerged from the March 2010 International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations. In light of the fluid nature of the field of democracy assistance, the insights and lessons distilled in this report should be considered as part of a cumulative process of learning rather than definitive conclusions. Indeed, one of the key outcomes of the round table was the identification of important questions and pending issues that require further consideration and follow-up.

Context Analysis and Problem Statement for the Round Table

‘The timing of this round table is particularly apt. Ten years after the benchmark ‘Brahimi report’, which weighed the challenges of UN peacekeeping in the first post–Cold War decade; five years after the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, which is being reviewed this year; and one year since the New Horizon initiative, launched by the Secretariat in search of new peacekeeping dimensions. All these steps have a direct or indirect effect on the UN’s role in building peace, security, and democracy’.

H.E. Ambassador Cesare Maria Ragaglini
Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations (full statement in Annex 3)
conflict settings and to marshal and sustain international attention and resources for post-conflict countries;

- the debate generated within the C-34, the Security Council and the UN General Assembly 10 years after the landmark ‘Brahimi report’ on UN peacekeeping reform (Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations 2000) around the New Horizon Project (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2009) on new challenges to peacekeeping missions in terms of policymaking and decision-making, planning, force generation, deployment, management of peacekeeping missions, exit strategies and peacebuilding, as well as the role of UN peacekeeping operations in supporting and sustaining the political processes crucial for establishing long-term peace;

- the forthcoming 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN Security Council 2000) on women, peace and security and the realization of the diverse roles that women play in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Policy debates in the international community on conflict prevention and peacebuilding revolve around the distinct but intertwined processes aimed at building peace, democracy and the state. In fragile post-conflict contexts, despite the rhetoric of local ownership, alignment to national priorities and donor coherence, processes aimed at building peace, democracy and the state—along with their sequencing and prioritization—pose challenges to both international and local actors. An additional issue is that while gender equality remains a challenge for stable democracies, it is even more daunting in conflict-ridden and post-conflict contexts. In post-conflict contexts, key challenges to peace and security are linked to gender dimensions and therefore require gender-responsive initiatives.

The progress of the different policy agendas has led to organizational rearrangements within aid agencies, the development of strategic frameworks consistent with one or the other overarching goal, and the fine-tuning of analytical frameworks and related early warning systems and assessment frameworks/tools for use by practitioners. Unfortunately, the various frameworks often lack mutual consistency and refer to different time spans (i.e., short, medium and long term) and therefore may contribute to further incoherence of international action. The frameworks also tend to overburden the weak institutions of partner countries, despite the fact that local ownership is invariably defined as a key factor for the achievement of sustainable peace and development through representative and effective democratic institutions and processes that include both men and women. Furthermore, depending on the context, politically polarized domestic actors in post-conflict situations are likely to pose contradictory and mutually inconsistent demands to international actors and UN bodies.

**Objectives and Structure of the Round Table**

DPA, DPKO, UNDP, and International IDEA agreed to convene a round table focused specifically on the range of approaches pursued by UN entities with the objective of bringing greater coherence and integration to the UN’s work at the intersection of peace, security and democracy. The agenda for the March 2010 *International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations* was developed jointly by the
co-sponsoring organizations through extensive consultations. The agenda was structured around five case studies covering Afghanistan, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Haiti and West Africa, with the aim of extracting broader lessons for policy and practice that could enhance the UN’s democracy work in conflict-affected countries. These are summarized in the annotated agenda in Annex 2.

H.E. Ambassador Cesare Maria Ragaglini, Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, opened the March 2010 round table with a welcoming address (Annex 3). Then representatives of the four co-hosting institutions made formal statements to set the scene and present an overview of the current challenges for the UN in building democracy in fragile contexts: Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary General, DPA (Annex 4); Olav Kjørven, Assistant Secretary General and Director, BDP, UNDP (Annex 5); Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, DPKO (Annex 6); and Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer for International IDEA to the UN (Annex 7).

Before the main sessions of the round table got under way, Elisabeth Spehar (DPA) highlighted the expected outcomes of the round table and drew attention to the discussion paper prepared by Necla Tschirgi with Massimo Tommasoli prior to the meeting. The meeting was structured around six thematic sessions that alternated between substantive and procedural challenges in democracy building in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts. The six thematic sessions were as follows:

1. Overview of UN Policies and Practices;
2. Elite Accommodation and Leadership Capacities;
3. Sequencing and Prioritization;
4. Democratization, Local Governance and Peacebuilding;
5. Responsive Institutions; and
6. Promoting Coordination, Comprehensive Planning and Integrated Approaches.

The seventh session of the round table focused on the development of key conclusions and recommendations for the UN in terms of how it might address the twin challenge of producing sustainable peace and building a sustainable democracy, democratic governance, and state institutions in fragile and post-conflict recovery contexts.

This summary report of the March 2010 International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations presents the key recommendations and conclusions that emerged from the meeting. The report is structured along the lines of the seven main sessions at the meeting and also includes several appendices.
'Despite massive public support in favour of democracy and pluralism, we continue to be confronted with the problem of lack of political tolerance virtually everywhere, in developing as well as developed countries. It manifests itself when political leaders refuse to give space to those opposed to them, when political parties do not tolerate dissent from their membership and, more generally, through a rejection of different views….

Over the past 20 years or so, one of the UN’s main preoccupations has been to bring peace and stability to post-conflict countries…. Promoting political tolerance and good governance in those environments is an extremely challenging task’.

B. Lynn Pascoe
UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
(full statement in Annex 4)


The first session at the International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations reviewed key aspects of the UN’s work at the intersection of democracy, peace and security. The UN’s engagement in democracy assistance, unlike its work on peace and security, is relatively recent (see Box 1).

In many conflict-affected and fragile countries today, the UN faces the concurrent challenge of supporting peace and security as well as democratic development. This situation has necessitated serious re-thinking on the part of the extended UN system, including the World Bank.

The World Bank’s mandate prohibits the institution from taking decisions on political grounds or interfering in the political affairs of member states. Nonetheless, the Bank is now engaged in larger debates on democratic governance given their relevance for its core concerns. The Bank focuses primarily on the developmental outcomes of good governance, namely, facilitating the rule of law, implementing popular will, effectively delivering public services, managing resources fairly, creating a predictable and transparent environment, protecting the poor, protecting minorities, and meeting international obligations. Increasingly, the Bank has found the state-building framework, which focuses on state legitimacy, as a useful approach to democratic governance. The Bank’s 2011 World Development Report will address fragility and conflict, focusing on economic and administrative reform, anti-corruption, security sector reform, security action against insurgents, and constitutional and electoral reform.

Evidence indicates that political competition in post-conflict settings can exacerbate violence in the short term while democratic reforms take a long time. Thus, it was argued that in promoting peacebuilding, the international community should focus on norms (such as legitimacy, representation, and accountability) and processes (such as fair elections, public finances, the independence of the judiciary, and civilian control of the security forces) that can contribute to democracy over the long haul. Round table participants recognized that interactions between peacebuilding and state building are complex. State building is a long-term, internally driven process that is often accompanied by violence. Given the range of challenges facing countries in their transition toward peacebuilding, state building and democracy building, round table participants agreed that the international community has an important role to play across these multiple transitions.

The UN has steadily endorsed democracy as a key dimension of
its work since the publication in 1996 of *An Agenda for Democratization* (Boutros-Ghali 1996). Yet participants at the round table noted that the UN’s response to democracy in conflict-affected countries has typically been an ad hoc response. The UN’s task is made harder by the fact that democracy assistance confronts difficult challenges in post-conflict contexts where the UN must maintain active neutrality in support of peace. In such contexts, democratization can contribute to violence, as well as to the capture of political institutions by criminal networks.

Thus, participants at the round table agreed that the UN needs clearer mandates, entry and exit strategies, instruments, and funding to support democratic change in post-conflict contexts. The UN also must recognize that democracy is a slow process, with occasional relapses; it has to be inclusive and continuously nurtured. Yet in many post-conflict situations, the international community prepares for an exit strategy even though the conditions for peace consolidation, including democratic transition, have not been attained. Sustained political and financial support to strengthen local capacities is essential. Moreover, there are particular areas (such as constitution building, liberal education and civic education) where UN support can serve as long-term investments in democracy. Given the importance of constitutional reform in democratic development, round table participants suggested that the UN set up a division for constitution building as a source of technical assistance.

Box 1: The UN’s engagement in supporting democratic governance, peace and security

A growing body of comparative experiences on democracy assistance have led to a number of emerging insights:

- There is no single template for democracy, which must grow organically and reflect local conditions. International support is necessary but not sufficient.
- Democracy has political as well as developmental dimensions. These need to be carefully balanced and firmly be based on an accurate analysis of the country context.
- The socio-economic foundations of democracy encompass issues such as land reform and revenue generation through taxation. Taxes are an important instrument of accountability and legitimacy between the state and its citizens.
- Both peacebuilding and democracy building are highly political. Yet, the international community tends to approach democracy as an area for technical assistance.
- Capacity building is essential for both peacebuilding and democracy building, although international assistance often supplants instead of fostering local capacities.
- Local perceptions of good governance matter and should be heeded by the international community.

These experiences need to be captured systematically. Round table participants proposed that the UN play an important role in developing a strong knowledge base on democracy support in different contexts.

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1 Different parts of the UN system pursue distinct approaches to democracy assistance, a fact that was reflected in the various presentations at the International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations. In this report, however, the focus is on the UN’s democracy work in its totality in order to better capture its interface with the UN’s peace and security work. The various strands of the UN’s democracy work are described further in the discussion paper prepared for the round table.
The second session at the round table reviewed elite accommodation and leadership capacities. Elite accommodation and power sharing are widely recognized as important dimensions of both peacebuilding and democracy building. In many situations, however, they also pose serious problems.

The Nepali case study (see synopsis in the annotated agenda for the round table in Annex 2) provided a good illustration of how polarization among political elites can create setbacks in both peacebuilding and democracy building. Despite the country’s extraordinary achievements, Nepal currently faces the possibility of backsliding to violence as a result of the intense power struggle among its three main political parties. Elite-level conflict and political polarization are undermining the search for national consensus and unity in Nepal that should underpin the peace process and the democratic transition. Yet unless people’s needs for jobs and basic services are addressed, their support for the political process is likely to dissipate.

Round table participants suggested that the international community has been caught up in the elite game in Katmandu. While recognizing the imperative for national ownership of the process, participants suggested several guiding principles for international engagement in such fragile contexts:

- a clear understanding of the reality of a country based on good information;
- support for long-term peace, development and democracy;
- consistency among the key actors and a rational division of labour; and
- minimizing secondary considerations such as personal and institutional interests and ambitions.

The tension between promoting elite accommodation and meeting popular needs—including the need for political participation—was considered a perennial challenge. Round table participants also noted that there are no ready-made strategies to overcome this tension. Elites are not monolithic; some elites actively want democratic change. The support of elites can be essential in creating institutions that enable citizens to have voice and participation. Thus, the international community must pursue a principled stand of impartiality while withholding support from those who threaten to use violence.

Although elite accommodation is essential for long-term sustainability, a strong argument was advanced that it cannot be at the expense of broader societal ownership of both the peace process and democratization. Indeed, it was maintained that the international
community can retard democracy by focusing narrowly on elite accommodation and state building to the exclusion of civil society, the media and other key elements of society. Thus, one of the major challenges facing the UN and other international actors is how to ensure stability by working at the elite level while encouraging inclusive, participatory and accountable political processes in post-conflict, divided societies. It was contended that even when full democratic participation is delayed in post-conflict contexts, a commitment to share the peace dividends more broadly can be an important investment in popular support for the political arrangement among elites. Box 2 shows key incentives supporting elite accommodation.

The discussion demonstrated some of the conflicting requirements that confront democracy assistance and pointed to emerging lessons on elite accommodation.

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<th>Box 2: Key incentives supporting elite accommodation</th>
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<td>Democratic governance is a recent and evolving agenda. UNDP’s first governance paper was issued in 1997. Since then there has been a growing understanding of key incentives that can support elite accommodation:</td>
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<td>• Building public administration as the core of democratic governance. Without a functioning civil service it is difficult to earn public trust.</td>
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<td>• Heavy investments in recovery and reconstruction programs, infrastructure and delivery of public services. Democracies survive more often when governments are able to effectively deliver services and improve everyday lives.</td>
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<td>• Establishing safety and security to enforce peace agreements and to reconstruct the security forces and public order.</td>
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<td>• Strengthening justice and reconciliation for building a culture of democracy.</td>
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<td>• Supporting economic growth by promoting trade, investment and job creation.</td>
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<td>• Providing long-term commitment by donors that does not bypass the government.</td>
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<td>Ultimately, although donors and external actors can help advance democratization, pressure for democracy must come from within— with the middle class, even if small, as an important motor.</td>
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Sequencing and Prioritization

The third session at the round table reviewed sequencing and prioritization of competing priorities in countries emerging from conflict. It is widely recognized that in countries emerging from conflict, there are multiple and often competing priorities for security, stability, democratic governance, economic growth, justice and social reconciliation, among others. As a result, international actors often adopt a sequential approach—privileging security, humanitarian relief, stabilization and early recovery. Democratic governance tends to be considered a second order of business in countries emerging from conflict. Yet there is growing agreement that, beyond the prerequisite of establishing security, sequencing and prioritization need to be context-specific.

West Africa, a region included among the case studies considered by round table participants (see synopsis of the case study in Annex 2), was seen as providing a diverse sample of country experiences and differing responses by the UN system in terms of supporting peacebuilding and democracy building. It was noted by the speakers that in West Africa, eschewing a single model, the UN has adopted different integrated strategies to support country-specific processes based on a joint determination of priorities with local actors. In addition, the UN has been particularly sensitive to the regional dimensions of peacebuilding in West Africa and has promoted a coordinated approach to deal with cross-border problems such as terrorism and drug trafficking. Nonetheless, round table participants thought that there is continued need for more effective strategies for democracy and peacebuilding based on experiences to date.

Round table participants noted that in post-conflict contexts, elections are often given priority to manage power sharing beyond the initial peace agreement. Elections do not necessarily bring stability when powerful elites do not agree on the rules of the game or when certain groups are denied representation through the ballot box. Thus, it is increasingly recognized that electoral processes and cycles—more than single elections—are important for stability as well as democracy building.

Although elections can be a source of legitimacy, democracy must go beyond the electoral process. Legitimacy can derive from economic performance or defending the rights of a minority. Thus, it was contended that understanding the sources of legitimacy is the basis for understanding local demand for democracy. It was argued that peacemaking is about demilitarizing politics and securing political gains while democracy is about institutionalizing uncertainty. The two can be mutually reinforcing when protagonists see democ-
ratization as a way to end conflict.

Round table participants considered it important to better identify the necessary ingredients for democracy beyond elections. Among these ingredients, a sound revenue base through taxation, a functioning state, and political parties were cited as critical. Nonetheless, it was also recognized that sequencing and prioritization had to be context-specific in order to better respond to difficult dilemmas confronting countries emerging from conflict.

Box 3 describes the main dilemmas in addressing post-conflict situations. By definition, dilemmas preclude ideal choices. Nonetheless, various options were proposed by round table participants in dealing with these dilemmas. Thus, for example, it was considered useful to have the broadest inclusivity by providing incentives for participation; thus electoral systems that encourage proportionality were seen as generally more supportive of peacemaking.

It was also suggested that the role of mid-level elites is often critical although there is a lack of understanding of how they can be integrated into the process. Similarly, it was noted that local elections are often underappreciated. Meanwhile, power sharing was highlighted as one of the trade-offs to get peace although it was also recognized that over time power sharing can become dysfunctional or grow into a constraint to the deepening of democracy. In some contexts it can even be detrimental to democracy building when seen as a default option for the losers in an election.

Thus, round table participants suggested that peace agreements should have flexibility to accommodate power-sharing arrangements over time, including through sunset clauses. Noting that there is inadequate understanding of local dynamics, including the incentives of local elites, round table participants recognized that there is a need for improved risk analysis, along with contingency and scenario planning, in peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions on the part of international actors.

The complexity of post-conflict contexts and the need to make hard choices in different circumstances were seen as impediments against a fixed template to prioritize or sequence international assistance in support of democratization and peacebuilding. Nonetheless, round table participants agreed that recent experiences confirm the need for better strategies for short-term, medium-term and long-term interventions, bearing in mind that short-term choices often have an impact on long-term processes.

Box 3: Key dilemmas in conflict-affected countries

Four key dilemmas require difficult choices and trade-offs in conflict-affected countries:

- horizontal dilemma regarding inclusion vs. exclusion in the peacemaking and peacebuilding phases, especially with respect to spoilers;
- vertical dilemma relating to elite accommodation vs. grass roots orientation;
- temporal dilemma with respect to short-term vs. long-term priorities; and
- systemic dilemma involving international vs. local-level dynamics.

In addition, demographic and geographic factors were suggested as posing additional challenges in post-conflict societies. Given the high proportion of young people in many developing countries, elite interests need to be balanced against the needs of the younger generation in its search for education, jobs and opportunities. Similarly, domestic pressures must be balanced against transnational factors such as migration and illicit cross-border trade.
The fourth session at the round table dealt with democratization, local governance and peacebuilding. Increasingly, local governance has come to be seen as an important vehicle to spread democracy and facilitate peacebuilding. The Afghanistan case study considered at the round table (see synopsis in the annotated agenda in Annex 2) provided an interesting case study where the international community supported local-level state-building efforts through the provincial reconstruction teams. Yet it was also recognized by round table participants that local governance interventions are particularly fraught with difficulties in conflict-affected countries.

Various reasons were given by the speakers for promoting local governance:
• to improve participation, accountability, equity and service delivery;
• to allow leaders to emerge naturally from the population;
• to enable communities to engage in co-production of public goods and services;
• to expand women’s involvement;
• to bring politics closer to the people in order to strengthen citizenship, including through tax collection; and
• to accommodate different political interests and diversity.

Nevertheless, recent practice suggests that a focus on local governance can also have drawbacks, including by reproducing or exacerbating conflict at the local level. It was argued that support for local governance should not be ‘top-down’ but should promote organic processes at the local level, as demonstrated in two different projects in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

In the case of South Sudan, it was feared that local tribes would fight each other once the peace agreements were signed. As a result, with the involvement of Sudanese intellectuals, a project was designed to empower and strengthen traditional local structures to prevent a relapse into conflict. In the case of the DRC, a World Bank project to rehabilitate schools included the creation of parent associations. The parent associations did not work as envisaged, but they transformed themselves into local development councils to address development issues more broadly. Eventually, the government suggested that these councils be integrated into local governance structures.

There are innovative examples for designing and implementing local governance processes that have generated useful lessons. These include long-term support for municipal development in Nepal 1982–2010 and Pakistan 1995–2010 as well as initiatives that serve...
as catalysts in Nepal 1991, Pakistan 2001, Afghanistan 2008. It is important not to conflate development project entities with local government entities, as was the case in the Afghan National Solidarity project. In many cases, local governance programs confront implementation problems. They require an effective implementation strategy, including good information systems relevant at the local level. One of the best multidonor information systems was developed in Nepal. Started by UNDP in 1992, it provided all stakeholders with essential information on localities, their populations and territory. Box 4 summarizes the round table participants’ view of emerging lessons about local governance.

These lessons on local governance were echoed in a recent study on how several conflict-affected Arab countries are dealing with local governance programming (El-Kholy and Tschirgi 2010). The study identified four tensions and four risks. The four tensions are between the following:

- local legitimacy and state legitimacy, which are not necessarily in accord;
- local governance and local government, whereby donors support local governments rather than promoting interdependence between local authorities and citizens;
- efficiency and legitimacy; and
- effectiveness and sustainability, bearing in mind that the creation of parallel structures can undercut long-term sustainability.

Because of these tensions, local governance programming can run into several operational risks, including the risk of being too technical and not taking sufficiently into account the political dimensions; being conflict-neutral when the situation demands conflict sensitivity; being too focused on inputs and outputs and not sufficiently focused on processes and outcomes; and working in separate silos such as poverty reduction, governance, etc. The study confirmed the need to strengthen both donor and UN coordination on local governance.

Round table participants recognized that local governance is highly political terrain that requires deep political analysis and knowledge, especially because there are different patterns for administrative decentralization and political devolution, which affect the power relations between central authority and local authorities. In many cases, local revenue capacity does not exist, which means that local governments rely on central government. In post-conflict countries where the central government struggles to exercise control, it was noted that empowering local governance might be particularly problematic and require appropriate strategies to build on the respective capabilities of both levels of government. One useful approach was identified as ‘asset analysis’ (rather than the usual ‘deficit analysis’), which would involve an assessment of existing strengths and capacities.

Round table participants agreed that current approaches to local governance raise many unanswered questions, including the following:

- how best to combine formal and informal structures in state-building processes;
- how to identify traditional leadership;
- how to avoid co-optation of local authority by illegal interest groups such as drug cartels and criminal networks; and
- how to diffuse successful innovations across the country.

Approaches to local governance were identified by round table participants as an evolving area of work that requires much greater examination and investment.
Responsive Institutions

The fifth session at the round table on the UN’s democracy, peace, and security work dealt with the responsiveness of institutions. Institutions responsive to the needs of society are considered essential for democratic governance. Yet inclusive, responsive and accountable institutions are in short supply in conflict-affected societies.

Timor-Leste, the focus of one of the case studies (see synopsis in the annotated agenda in Annex 2), was cited as an example of some of the challenges in this area. Timor-Leste was particularly hard hit following the departure of some 7,000 Indonesian civil servants in the chaos of 1999. The country also suffered from problems in 10 areas that typically confront national liberation movements that become governments: (a) setting new goals; (b) changing tactics from radicalization to consensus building; (c) avoiding armed conflict, which they are best at; (d) reversing their mindset from being a destroyer to being the defender of the system; (e) moving beyond their own support base; (f) moving away from mere promises to being held accountable for policies; (g) moving beyond their own support base; (h) changing internal processes from secretiveness to openness; (i) allowing internal debate; (j) harmonizing internal and external links of their movement; and (j) forgoing Leninism and allowing a system of checks and balances.

Thus, establishing domestic institutions and procedures and building national capacities at all levels have been ongoing challenges in Timor-Leste. In supporting capacity development in the new state, round table participants argued that the international community made two main mistakes—underestimating the available capacities and anticipating a unified Timorese position despite many years of divisions.

In contrast, the task of building responsive institutions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has faced different challenges, including continuing Israeli occupation, absence of an independent state, and the existence of a proto-state in the form of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which provides services to 70 per cent of the population in Gaza and 40 per cent of the population in the West Bank. Under the circumstances, Palestinians have placed high expectations on the UN as a protector of their rights and needs. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority has been pursuing a state-building strategy although its representational legitimacy is highly contested.

Box 5 describes options for institutional design that are appropriate for local circumstances. Accountable and transparent institutions need horizontal, as well as vertical, oversight. In many
cases, sufficient domestic checks and balances are initially not in place. As a result, donors have tended to support official oversight mechanisms and neglected non-state actors and customary institutions, which should also be supported to play a role in oversight and the delivery of services. In fact, however, there are various ways of engaging non-state actors. In Timor-Leste, for example, outsourcing certain tasks (such as health services) to non-state actors provided an effective solution for two years, after which the government was able to take over the responsibility. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the UN provides support to the Palestinian Authority as well as civil society and local government to deliver basic services. Local politicians and civil servants are able to continue delivering public goods because they are held accountable. Meanwhile, the resilience of the population generates productive capacity and private entrepreneurship. It was underscored that in supporting local capacities, the UN must avoid transplanting Western systems and institutions.

Beyond electoral systems, it was acknowledged that other institutional design issues (on federalism, ethnic consociationalism, decentralization, presidential vs. parliamentary systems, political party systems) also have far-reaching consequences. Thus, institutional design should be addressed in a comprehensive and political manner, instead of being delegated to technical experts. Instead, the UN should offer a menu of options outlining their respective implications in order to provide post-conflict countries with alternative models that they can consider according to their needs. Ultimately, institutional reform has to correspond to domestic political realities. It was noted that there is a growing body of country-based knowledge on such diverse issues as the role of diasporas, the political economy of institutional reform and ethnic bases of institutional choices. The UN can assist national actors to match institutional design features to societal needs.

Box 5: Providing options for institutional design

One of the areas where the UN can make an important contribution was identified as providing options for institutional design that are appropriate for local circumstances. The electoral system, for example, is a particularly important tool with far-reaching political consequences in post-conflict countries. Designing electoral systems involves making difficult choices on each of the following areas:

- governability vs. representativeness (i.e. majoritarianism vs. proportionality);
- representativeness vs. national constituencies;
- party coherence vs. voter choice (i.e. closed vs. open lists); and
- simplicity vs. appropriateness.

Understanding the implications of these choices is an important element of institutional design. The compilation and analysis of comparative experiences from different countries can serve as invaluable input into decision-making at all phases of a post-conflict country’s political transition.
Effective coordination, integrated approaches and comprehensive planning are recognized as essential in international assistance to post-conflict countries, yet they remain key challenges for the international community. The sixth session at the round table dealt with promoting these critical elements of international assistance.

The case of Haiti, the focus of one of the case studies (see synopsis in the annotated agenda in Annex 2), was examined as a particularly telling example of successive interventions that failed to adequately address that country’s long-standing problems. Haiti’s devastating January 2010 earthquake was seen as presenting an opportunity to pursue a different strategy.

The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which has been present in Haiti since 2004, can play an important role in supporting a more robust development and reform agenda to address the needs of the great majority of Haitians—people who have not been served by Haiti’s predatory or absent state. Despite their history, Haitians have repeatedly shown great trust in democracy and elections even though election results were sometimes nullified by the force of arms. Box 6 describes the UN’s commitment to mission integration and integrated mission planning.

In light of Haiti’s legacy, round table participants thought that faith in the state and democracy in the country must be sustained by addressing people’s basic needs. Given the desperately poor situation of a large percentage of Haitians—now exacerbated by the devastation of the earthquake—development may be seen as an urgent companion of democracy and elections even though election results were sometimes nullified by the force of arms. Box 6 describes the UN’s commitment to mission integration and integrated mission planning.

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Round table participants thought that the destruction brought by Haiti’s earthquake, despite its tragic consequences, has nonetheless
provided the international community with a new opportunity to redesign an integrated and coherent strategy in the country.

Round table participants observed that not only has the UN made a commitment to integration but a range of international actors have recently adopted the ‘3Cs’ approach to bring greater coherence, complementary and coordination to their efforts in supporting fragile states. The 3Cs focus on results by refining strategy, improving policy and coordination, and strengthening complementarity through a division of labour within individual governments and across the international system.

This modus operandi is enhanced by incorporating the so-called ‘3Ds’—that is, bringing the separate diplomacy, defence and development institutions to work on the basis of a common strategy.

The 3Cs approach sets out policy recommendations in critical areas. All signatories are expected to develop a common strategy, a common language and a unified road map to help set common benchmarks. Its six guiding principles are as follows:

- Strengthen national ownership and national capacity by setting up partnerships to analyze root causes of fragility and identifying priorities.
- Respond in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country as it is imperative that signatories update joint assessments, use comparative advantage, and preserve humanitarian aid neutrality.
- Strengthen mutual accountability of partner countries and international actors as well as the domestic accountability of partner country governments to their citizens and elected representatives.
- Reduce the burden of aid management on partner country capacity.
- Make efficient use of limited resources to avoid duplication and funding gaps.
- Improve and deepen joint learning, training and capacity-development activities and increasing responses.

There was keen recognition at the round table that recent innovations such as the UN’s integrated missions or the 3Cs and 3Ds approaches by different policy communities are important but not sufficient to overcome the chronic problems of international assistance to countries emerging from conflict. Concurrent action was viewed as necessary on multiple fronts, including the design of UN mandates, the need for strong national as well as mission leadership, and greater investments in national capacity building.

‘The expansion of the UN’s capacity for peacemaking and the development of interagency mechanisms of conflict prevention have helped bring about a global decline in violent conflict and a rise in negotiated settlements over the last decade. But high levels of political instability, armed violence and chronic underdevelopment still afflict post-conflict countries. For many, the end of war has not necessarily equated to gains in human development. ‘Good enough’ solutions are simply not ‘good enough’ to address post-conflict fragilities. These situations require new ways of working together to ensure that democratic governance, sustainable peace and security are aligned’.

Olav Kjørven
Assistant Secretary General and Director,
Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
(full statement in Annex 5)
The Role of the UN in Supporting Democracy, Peace and Security: Conclusions and Recommendations

The concluding session of the round table focused on the development of key conclusions and recommendations for the UN in terms of how it might address the twin challenge of producing sustainable peace and building a sustainable democracy, democratic governance, and state institutions in fragile and post-conflict recovery contexts.

The discussions over the two days underscored two key points regarding the UN’s role in supporting democracy, peace and security. One point was that there is need for a rigorous and systematic way of documenting, sharing, comparing and validating emerging lessons. It was acknowledged that the UN’s experience in supporting democracy in post-conflict contexts is of recent origin. Accumulated knowledge is relatively limited and largely fragmented, making it difficult to extract definitive lessons and conclusions. There is a need to improve on ways of developing these. The second point that the round table underscored was that bringing the UN’s democracy, peace and security agendas together under the organization’s current sectoral silo system, remains a major challenge.

Key Recommendations

Four key recommendations emerged from the rich and multifaceted discussions at the International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations:

1. Knowledge, policy and practice related to democracy assistance in post-conflict contexts are evolving rapidly. Emerging lessons must be captured and integrated into practice to promote continual cross-fertilization between research, policy and practice.

2. Democratization in conflict-affected countries is a multidimensional challenge. Implementing democracy assistance programs requires more sustained and strategic security, political and development support.

3. Democracy grows from within, and external actors can only support it. In view of democracy’s nature as a long-term, complex and highly context-driven process, the UN’s democracy assistance should be grounded in both a deep understanding of local realities and solid comparative knowledge.

4. The UN system must work collaboratively and with other key stakeholders to provide effective support to democratization. Providing effective support will require integrated strategic UN approaches.

‘While a great deal of attention has traditionally, and with reason, been placed on the relationship between elections and conflict, efforts at building democracy in post-war contexts should neither be seen as limited to the electoral field, nor considered as an “add-on” at some unforeseen future date, but as a process that is started at different levels in the course of recovery after war. In this respect it is important for the international community to strengthen democratic practice—that is both formal and informal institutional arrangements for collective decision-making and a wide variety of deliberative decision-making processes that incorporate core values of democracy, such as inclusion, consensus building and accountability, in efforts to build and sustain peace’.

Massimo Tommasoli
Permanent Observer for IDEA to the UN (full statement in Annex 7)
The more specific conclusions and recommendations that emerged from the round table on the UN’s peace, security and development work are discussed further below. These are organized in three groups:

- the content of the UN’s democracy assistance in conflict contexts;
- the way the UN works in these contexts; and
- implications for policy, practice and research.

The Content of UN Democracy Assistance in Conflict Contexts

The UN is already engaged in a number of substantive areas in which considerable experience has been gained—among them political mediation, elections, political and institutional reform, public administration reform and the socio-economic foundations of democracy. Currently, however, the consolidation of knowledge at the institutional level is very limited.

In the individual sessions at the round table, participants identified several needs regarding the content of UN democracy assistance in post-conflict contexts. Specific needs and recommendations that emerged are discussed below:

- There is a need to consolidate knowledge from the UN system as a whole on what works, under what conditions and why. Participants at the round table indicated that although power-sharing arrangements are often essential to secure the peace, economic development and redistribution are equally important to sustain the peace over the long haul. In order to ensure popular support for political agreements among elites, strategies for elite accommodation must be complemented by socio-economic initiatives.
- Another need is to develop and make available options for institutional reform based on the wealth of knowledge and experience accumulated by the UN and other democracy-building actors. In designing electoral systems and other political and institutional reforms to support democratization in countries emerging from conflict, the UN can play a significant role by providing a menu of options and various models that can be tailored to the specificities of individual countries. As the experience of International IDEA has shown, non-prescriptive comparative analysis of different options for institutional design, based on examples from all regions, including from the global South, may prove very effective for local actors committed to reform processes.
- There is a need to link various UN agendas in support of democracy, peace and security by facilitating rigorous political analysis, scenario building and contingency planning. In this context, dilemma and tension analysis were strongly recommended to provide policymakers and practitioners with a useful way of identifying and managing difficult choices.

The Way the UN Works in Conflict Contexts

Beyond specific areas of intervention, the way the UN works in post-conflict contexts also attracted considerable attention at the round table. Round table participants repeatedly noted that the UN’s approach to democracy assistance is largely supply-driven and shaped by institutional mandates, capacities and resources rather than a realistic assessment of needs on the ground.
Discussions over the course of the two-day round table underscored the point that there is often disconnect between policy directions and operational guidelines at the level of the UN headquarters and the day-to-day challenges faced on the ground. Presentations from the field made little reference to UN system-wide processes, such as the UN Policy Committee’s decision-making process and IMPP or ISF processes. Moreover, field practitioners repeatedly pointed to implementation challenges on the ground for which there were few concrete solutions.

Although coordination, coherence and integration were seen by round table participants as important principles, these were considered inadequate in translating high-minded goals into practical outcomes on the ground. Nonetheless, there was general agreement that a major obstacle had been overcome in bringing these issues to the foreground and generating a serious discussion among various UN entities on the challenges of linking the UN’s peace, security and democracy work.

- Because the round table on the UN’s peace, security and development work was the first of its kind, participants felt that the conversation had been extremely useful and should be pursued further. In addition, they made various suggestions on how best to strengthen intra-UN linkages while at the same time ensuring that the UN also engages more effectively with other entities working on democracy assistance. In this connection, cross-agency training and more effective dissemination of operational guidelines should be used to strengthen intra-system collaboration. In addition, discussion fora and round tables should be held at the regional level to facilitate greater cross-fertilization of field and headquarters perspectives and to create a common agenda.

- Recognizing the multiple disconnects between different parts of the UN system, round table participants recommended that incentive structures should be put into place to facilitate collaboration between headquarters policies and mechanisms and country office processes, as well as between different parts of the UN working on democracy assistance. In this connection, cross-agency training and more effective dissemination of operational guidelines should be used to strengthen intra-system collaboration. In addition, discussion fora and round tables should be held at the regional level to facilitate greater cross-fertilization of field and headquarters perspectives and to create a common agenda.

- Round table participants noted that the UN currently has multiple communities of practice dealing with a range of issues at the intersection of peace, security and democratic governance. The UN also has some 6,000 websites. Thus, it was proposed that a single Web platform should be created on democracy, peace and security in order to share information and knowledge on these issues across the system.

- Above all, however, the overall sense of participants at the round table on the UN’s peace, security and development work was that the groundwork had now been laid for the UN system to make a concerted effort to link its democracy work into its peace and security work more systematically. It was recommended that co-sponsors of the round table move forward to develop a more concrete policy process pertaining to democracy, peace and security.
Looking Ahead: Implications for Policy, Practice and Research

Round table participants shed light on a number of critical issues with implications for policy, practice and research that merit further consideration and follow-up. Those issues are discussed further below.

Strategic and Policy-Level Issues

• One particularly promising area is to build on the UN Policy Committee’s decisions on relevant thematic/sectoral issues such as the rule of law, security sector reform and constitution building, with a view to extracting their implications for democracy assistance as well as for peacebuilding and state building. Currently, these thematic policy directives tend to be stand-alone documents, focusing on each issue individually. The UN Policy Committee’s decision of 26 June 2008, which confirmed ‘integration’ as a guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office (UN Policy Committee decision No. 2008/24), provides a useful framework to bring these thematic/sectoral issues together. Thus, it would be useful to map out key principles and specific policy guidance that cut across the various thematic areas. This would also serve to identify any tensions, dilemmas and gaps that might exist and that the Policy Committee would need to address.

• A second promising area is to reflect the UN system’s growing understanding of the complex linkages between democracy assistance and peacebuilding in future policy statements and forthcoming UN initiatives and events, such as the 2010 review of the Peacebuilding Commission, the commemoration of the International Day of Democracy on September 15th, the Brahimi Plus 10 review, and the October 2010 event to celebrate 10 years of Security Council Resolution 1325, among others.

• Finally, UN system-wide policy discussions need to be more effectively linked to policy developments in other key international fora, including regional organizations and the bilateral and multilateral donor community. The current policy discussion among donors on funding priorities and good principles for democracy building, peacebuilding and state building in fragile countries are particularly relevant to the UN’s work.

Operational-Level Issues

• The UN has existing instruments such the IMPP and ISF to overcome the disconnect between UN headquarters–level policy decisions and their implementation at the field level through shared analysis and a unified strategy. Democratization must be integrated into the IMPP and ISF, as well as into existing planning processes, including UNDAF.

• The development of evidence-based and clearly articulated guidelines is needed to enable practitioners to better integrate the UN’s democracy-related activities and peace and security-related activities. In that light, it might be useful to develop in partnership with International IDEA a UN practitioner’s handbook that provides a comprehensive guide or ‘checklist’ on major aspects to be taken into account when faced with the dual challenges of securing peace and stability and furthering democ-
ratization. Notwithstanding their strategic importance, policy coherence and institutional coordination do not address the more mundane and practical constraints faced when translating integrated strategies into effective action—such as, for example, limited time frames, inadequate human and financial resources, and weak leadership.

• The UN’s incentive structures, human resource issues and leadership issues should be reviewed to address the practical constraints against translating integrated strategies into effective action, and to foster closer collaboration across the system. These are also seen as indicators of the UN’s own commitment to the principles of good governance, participation and accountability.

Issues Related to Research and Analysis

• Democracy, peacebuilding and state building are evolving concepts that require continual re-examination and clarification. The UN must remain intellectually engaged in academic and policy debates around these concepts through its own analytic work as well as those of its partners globally. International IDEA remains a critical partner in this regard.

• The UN must bring in diverse perspectives and experiences of democratization from around the world with a view to broadening the menu of choices and options available to post-conflict countries grappling with democratic transitions.

• The UN can play a significant role in compiling and sharing the techniques of democratic practice as reflected in its work as well as the work of other entities working in conflict contexts.

• The UN should identify areas where new research and knowledge need to be generated to address the evolving challenges of democracy building in conflict-affected countries.

• As the round table amply demonstrated, while collectively the UN and its partners have gained growing understanding of the linkages between democracy, peace and security, there are important questions that remain pending regarding these interrelated but different processes. It is essential that the knowledge base of UN policies and practices at their intersection continues to grow—both to help improve policy and practice and to test their continued validity.
2. Issues

Policy debates in the international community on conflict prevention and peacebuilding revolve around the distinct but intertwined processes aimed at building peace, democracy and the state. In fragile post-conflict contexts, despite the rhetoric of local ownership, alignment to national priorities and donor coherence, such processes—along with their sequencing and prioritization—pose challenges to both international and local actors. An additional issue is that while gender equality remains a challenge for stable democracies, it is more daunting in conflict-ridden and post-conflict contexts. In post-conflict contexts, key challenges to peace and security are linked to gender dimensions and therefore require gender-responsive initiatives.

Achieving peace may depend on ‘realpolitik’ concerns, and the need to include potential spoilers of peace processes may undermine the legitimacy and long-term sustainability of democratic processes and institutions. On the other hand, democratic competition, typically through post-conflict electoral cycles, may increase the polarization of political actors—in many cases, themselves in a transition from armed groups to political parties—in fragile situations of ‘no-peace-no-war’. In both cases, effective state institutions are generally considered as a prerequisite for the delivery of essential public goods for the attainment of peace and democracy, like security and a public sphere.

The progress of the different policy agendas has led to organizational rearrangements within aid agencies, the development of strategic frameworks consistent with one or the other overarching goal, and the fine-tuning of analytical frameworks and related early warning systems and assessment frameworks/tools for use by practitioners. However, such
frameworks often lack mutual consistency and refer to different time spans (i.e., short, medium and long term) that may contribute to further incoherence of international action. They also tend to overburden the weak institutions of partner countries, despite the fact that local ownership is invariably defined as a key factor for the achievement of sustainable peace and development, through representative and effective democratic institutions and processes that include both men and women. Furthermore, depending on the context, in post-conflict situations politically polarized domestic actors are likely to pose contradictory and mutually inconsistent demands to international actors and UN bodies.

3. Objectives

The objective of the meeting will be to examine the role of democracy and state building in ensuring sustainable peace and security and the role of the UN in supporting those processes. Specifically, the meeting will aim to do the following:

- Confront conventional approaches of the UN to peace and security, and explore the links between the challenge of producing sustainable peace with the challenge of building a sustainable democracy and state institutions in conflict-prone or post-conflict recovery contexts.
- Provide policy-relevant recommendations from an assessment of the impact of democracy and state building on peace and security including gender perspectives, and vice versa, drawn from selected UN operations.
- Examine what this means at a practical level for the UN, in terms of looking at how support mechanisms can be designed to ensure that they counteract rather than exacerbate conflict-prone divisions in a society and establish a basis for long-term as well as short-term stability.

4. Focus

The initiative will focus on some of the key problems faced by practitioners in post-conflict situations in supporting a transition to more pluralistic and accountable models of governance. These include the following:

- What is the appropriate role of external actors in supporting peace, democracy and state building activities in post-conflict environments?
- What (dis)incentives may external actors offer to domestic actors in politically polarized contexts to consolidate peace and democratic governance?
- What is the appropriate sequencing and prioritization of democracy and state building activities in our efforts to build peace in a post-conflict environment?
- What is the potential impact of support provided to processes of decentralization, including multilevel elections, to democratization and state-building efforts?
- How can we reconcile the occasional need for elite accommodation in order to ensure peace and stability in the short to medium term, with the need to promote transparency, plurality and democratic governance?
- How can the activities in support of peace, democracy and state building be combined with the political willingness to gender equality and women’s empowerment?

Analysis of the above issues will be based on a selection of relevant case studies.

5. Partners

The initiative will be co-organized by the
UN’s DPA, DPKO, UNDP (Democratic Governance Group/Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) and Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Resolution), and International IDEA.

6. Structure, Audience and Venue

The initiative will consist of two events, with the conclusions from the first event informing the preparation of the second and folding into the recommendations resulting from the round table:

• A two-day closed-door meeting for about 30-40 expert practitioners from the UN and selected think-tanks to discuss challenges, bottlenecks and opportunities in supporting state building processes in the aftermath of conflict. The meeting will involve practitioners from both the UN and other related organizations. High-level participation would be limited to the follow-up meeting. This meeting will use Chatham House Rules to ensure an open and candid discussion of the challenges faced by the organization. The meeting will take place on 1-2 March 2010 in New York.

• A half-day panel for 60–80 high-level policymakers to be held at the UN headquarters later in 2010 to present recommendations, obtain initial feedback and generate broader debate. Between the first meeting and the panel, a short (five- to six-page) paper outlining key issues and recommendations will be prepared and consulted/ revised amongst partner sponsors in order to consolidate a set of proposal to take the agenda forward.

Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of The United Nations
Opening Remarks: Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, UN DPKO (left), Mr. Olav Kjørven, Assistant Secretary-General and Director, BDP/UNDP (centre-left), Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General, UN DPA (centre-right), Dr. Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer for International IDEA to the UN (right)

H.E. Ambassador Cesare Maria Ragaglini, Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN

Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General, UN DPA

Mr. Olav Kjørven, Assistant Secretary-General and Director, BDP/UNDP

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, UN DPKO

Dr. Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer for International IDEA to the UN

Ms. Elizabeth Spehar, Director, Europe Division, UN DPA

Session 1: Mr. Alastair McKechnie, Director, Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, The World Bank (left), Ms. Teresa Whitfield, Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University (centre), Mr. Kishore Mahbuban, Deputy Political Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN (right)
Mr. Roland Rich, Executive Head, UNDEF

Session 6: Ms. Cristina Hoyos, Head, Conflict Prevention and Transformation Division, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (left), Mr. Reginald Dumas, former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Haiti (centre-left), Dr. Robert Maguire, Professor of International Affairs, Trinity Washington University and Chair, Haiti Working Group, US Institute of Peace (centre-right), Mr. Oscar Fernández-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General, UN DPA (right)

Mr. Reginald Dumas, former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Haiti

Ms. Cristina Hoyos, Head, Conflict Prevention and Transformation Division, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

Dr. Robert Maguire, Professor of International Affairs, Trinity Washington University and Chair, Haiti Working Group, US Institute of Peace

Mr. Oscar Fernández-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General, UN DPA

Dr. Necla Tschirgi, Research Associate, Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa

Mr. Kishore Mandhyan, Deputy Political Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN
ANNEX 2: Annotated Agenda

International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security:
The Role of the United Nations

New York, 1-2 March 2010, Millennium UN Plaza Hotel, One UN Plaza

DAY ONE: MONDAY 1 MARCH 2010

8:30hrs–9:00hrs  REGISTRATION (including light breakfast)
9:00hrs–9:15hrs  WELCOMING ADDRESS
   H.E. Ambassador Cesare Maria Ragaglini, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations
9:15hrs–10:15hrs  PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SETTING THE SCENE
   Representatives from the co-hosting institutions will set the scene and present an overview of the current challenges for the UN in building democracy in fragile contexts. In this light, the purposes and objectives of the workshop will be explained.
   Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General, UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
   Mr. Olav Kjørven, Assistant Secretary-General and Director, Bureau for Development Policy (BDP), UN Development Programme (UNDP)
   Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
   Dr. Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer for International IDEA to the UN
10:15hrs–10:30hrs  STRUCTURE OF THE ROUND TABLE
   DPA Representative will review the structure and expected outcomes of the round table.
   Speaker: Ms. Elizabeth Spehar, Director, Europe Division, DPA
   Rapporteur: Dr. Necla Tschirgi, Research Associate, Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa
10:30hrs–10:45hrs  COFFEE
10:45hrs–13:00hrs  FIRST SESSION: THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY AND STATE BUILDING IN ENSURING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY: UN POLICIES AND PRACTICES
   Chair: Ms. Teresa Whitfield, Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
   Speakers: Mr. Alastair McKechnie, Director, Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, The World Bank
   Mr. Kishore Mandhyan, Deputy Political Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN
   This session will seek to confront conventional approaches of the UN to peace and security, and explore the links between the challenge of producing sustainable peace with the challenge of building a sustainable democracy, democratic governance, and state institutions in fragile and post-conflict recovery contexts.
   The session will focus on some of the key problems faced by practitioners in post-conflict situations in supporting a transition to more pluralistic and accountable models of governance. These include the following:
   What is the appropriate role of external actors in supporting peace, democracy, democratic governance, and state building activities in post-conflict environments?
   How can we reconcile the short to medium term accommodations required to ensure stability, with the long-term priorities required for sustainable peace?
   What is the appropriate sequencing and prioritization of democracy building and state-building activities in our efforts to build peace in a post-conflict environment?
   What guidance does UN policy provide and how does it translate into practice? Where are the gaps between policy and practice?
   How can we promote coordination and integrated approaches in achieving policy and practice coherence?
   How can the activities in support of peace, democracy building and state building be combined with the political willingness to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment?

13:00hrs–14:00hrs LUNCH
14:00hrs–15:30hrs SECOND SESSION: ELITE ACCOMMODATION AND LEADERSHIP CAPACITIES
Chair: Mr. Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, Director and Deputy Head, Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)
Speakers: Mr. Tamrat Samuel, Director, Asia and Pacific Division, DPA
Mr. Kunda Dixit, Editor and Publisher, Nepali Times
Mr. Shabbir Cheema, Senior Fellow, Politics, Governance and Security Program, East West Center

- How can we reconcile the need for elite accommodation in order to ensure peace and stability, with the need to promote transparency, plurality and democratic governance?
- What (dis)incentives may external actors offer to domestic actors in politically polarized contexts to consolidate peace and democratic governance?
- How can we ensure national ownership in conflict and post-conflict settings?

15:30hrs–15:45hrs COFFEE

15:45hrs–17:15hrs THIRD SESSION: SEQUENCING AND PRIORITIZATION
Chair: Mr. Goran Fejic, Senior Advisor, Strategy and Policy, International IDEA
Speakers: Mr. Sam Ibok, Deputy Director, Africa II Division, DPA
Professor James Putzel, Head, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics
Professor Timothy Sisk, The Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver

In a post-conflict environment, the international effort to support peace and longer term participatory democracy is often sequenced to allow resources and political efforts to be focused on priority issues at every phase. The experience has been that soon after conflict, or even while the conflict is ongoing, the emphasis is on security and conflict cessation tasks. Once a degree of security is achieved, the focus moves to urgent humanitarian and confidence-building tasks, including disarmament, reconstruction and the first steps of security sector institution building and re-establishment of the rule of law. Political and judicial processes for national reconciliation and democratic participation follow in the sequence. Finally, the UN has supported efforts of newly established national authorities and structures to build their capacities for good governance and accountability.

Such a sequential approach has yielded rich experiences, both positive and negative, and a more careful and candid analysis is needed of the UN systems’ own efforts to support the sequencing and priority setting in such environments. The degree to which sequencing actually occurs, or is even appropriate, needs further discussion. Political, social, historical and other factors may require that several priority areas be nurtured simultaneously, at least to some degree.

Experiences from West Africa, Haiti, Guatemala and Afghanistan show the limits of linear, sequential thinking. In each country or region, a specific constellation of circumstances may require a quite specific mix of peace-building, state building and democracy support—or at least a far more flexible approach to avoid missing key opportunities to achieve and sustain peace, stability and democratic institution building.

- How to identify priority areas in a post-conflict environment?
- How to involve local actors in the identification process?
- How to avoid both a one-dimensional approach and overburdening the assistance agenda with too many priorities simultaneously?
- How to ensure that the immediate needs for political stability, peace and security do not hamper longer term democracy consolidation efforts?

17:15hrs–17:30hrs WRAP UP

19:00hrs–22:30hrs DINNER

DAY TWO: TUESDAY 2 MARCH 2010

9.00hrs–10:45hrs FOURTH SESSION: DEMOCRATIZATION, LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND PEACEBUILDING
Chair: Ms. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Director, Democratic Governance Practice, Bureau for Development Policy (BDP), UNDP
Speakers: Mr. Paul Lundberg, Independent Expert, Local Governance and Decentralization (Former Chief Technical Advisor, Local Governance and Decentralization, UNDP Afghanistan)
Mr. Jeremias Blaser, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP, Republic of Congo

- How to assist in the design or reform of democratic processes and institutions that will foster peace and reconciliation rather than exacerbate differences and foment divisions?
- What is the potential impact of support provided to processes of local governance, including multilevel elections, to democratization and state-building efforts?
- How to support adequate coordination between local and national levels of government and administration?
10:45hrs–11:00hrs COFFEE

11:00hrs–12:45hrs FIFTH SESSION: RESPONSIVE INSTITUTIONS
Chair: Ms. Eugenia Piza Lopez, Senior Recovery Adviser, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
Speakers: Mr. Patrick Keuleers, Senior Policy Adviser, Bureau for Development Policy (BDP), UNDP
Mr. Roland Rich, Executive Head, United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)
Mr. Roberto Valent, Deputy Special Representative of the UNDP Administrator for the Palestinian Territories

Strengthening institutions’ capacities to respond to the present and future needs of a society is essential for achieving medium and long-term stability, peace and development. To this end, institutions need to be responsive to citizens’ needs and entitlements. Moreover, it is critical to ensure that the voices of excluded vulnerable groups are heard. The alienation of segments of society from the state can exacerbate existing tensions and provoke conflict.

How can we help to create or strengthen public institutions that are capable of delivering for citizens in an efficient and an inclusive manner? How can we support public administration reform to ensure sufficient and equitable delivery of public services?

How do we foster accountable and responsive governing institutions that will facilitate participation and contribute to peacebuilding?

How can participatory governance be integrated into post-conflict institutions?

12:45hrs–13:45hrs LUNCH

13:45hrs–15:30hrs SIXTH SESSION: PROMOTING COORDINATION, COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND INTEGRATED APPROACHES
Chair: Mr. Reginald Dumas, former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Haiti
Speakers: Dr. Robert Maguire, Professor of International Affairs, Trinity Washington University and Chair, Haiti Working Group, US Institute of Peace
Mr. Oscar Fernández-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General, DPA
Ms. Cristina Hoyos, Head, Conflict Prevention and Transformation Division (COPRET), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

How can we reinforce existing mechanisms for integrated planning and coordination to improve effectiveness in delivering comprehensive approaches to democratization and peacebuilding?

What tools and instruments will improve political and context analysis? How to improve translating context analysis into planning processes and generate broad ownership within the system?

15:30hrs–15:45hrs COFFEE

15:45hrs–17:30hrs RECOMMENDATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE UN IN SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, AND STATE BUILDING IN ORDER TO ENSURE SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY
Chair: Mr. Kishore Mandhyan, Deputy Political Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN
Rapporteur: Dr. Necla Tschirgi

Based on the discussions over the two days of the round table, the goal of this session will be to provide practical, policy-relevant recommendations for the UN, in terms of looking at how the organisation can more effectively address the twin challenges of producing sustainable peace with building a sustainable democracy, democratic governance, and state institutions in fragile and post-conflict recovery contexts.
West Africa Case Study

In the last two decades, the UN has responded to crises in West Africa with multiple interventions with varying degrees of success. The cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, in particular, best exemplify the efforts of the international community to assist countries come out of conflict and build sustainable peace in a sequenced manner.

The UN’s interventions in West Africa have been multifaceted and multilayered; the UN has gone from a single-country approach to a regional approach; it has worked as the lead partner in a joint endeavour with a sub-regional organization, as well as the junior partner in the same arrangement. It has worked in consort with extra-regional powers that brought to the effort not only their military capabilities but also their political clout as permanent members of the Security Council. The UN has built a partnership with business interests and non-governmental advocacy groups to address the illegal exploitation of natural resources that were fuelling the conflicts in West Africa, and it has mobilized an international diplomatic effort to discourage spoilers from gaining ground.

The West African case also highlights the successes and failures of the sequenced approach. In Sierra Leone, the UN’s peacekeeping interventions grew from a military observer role to that of a robust peacekeeping mandate with 11,000 troops on the ground at its peak. The effort then transitioned to a peace support and peacebuilding role. In Liberia, a similar intervention benefited from the experiences in Sierra Leone and a robust peacekeeping presence is dialing down to a support for capacity-building and institution-building one to eventual transition to a peacebuilding support one. In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN remains actively engaged in a peace and security role, providing space for political and electoral processes to gain ground and traction. The processes in the three countries are at different stages, and yet the situations remain much interconnected.

Consideration of sequencing and prioritization in each country and regionally may also yield a rich discussion.

Nepal Case Study

In the last three years, Nepal has undergone tremendous political changes that continue to shape the national governance systems. The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN–Maoist) ended a decade-long civil war and paved the way for the conduct of the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections.

Delivering a new constitution and successfully implementing the CPA will require Nepal’s leadership to develop a range of new strategic planning, management and conflict transformation skills. Building the capacities of leaders across different sectors—political parties, government, business, labour and media—to constructively lead Nepal’s transition; successfully negotiate differences; and develop and implement the reform measures necessary to building a more inclusive and responsive state, especially with regard to civil service reform and the delivery of basic services.
Afghanistan Case Study

Afghanistan has been suffering from chronic instability and conflict since the fall of the Taliban administration in 2001. Its economy and infrastructure are in ruins, and many of its people are refugees. A fledgling democratic government faces the challenges of extending its authority beyond the capital and of forging national unity.

With the start of international assistance to Afghanistan in late 2001/early 2002, the capacities available in the country looked bleak. No formal state structures existed, the main infrastructure in urban and rural areas was destroyed, and previously existing systems of service delivery, tax collection and other state activities had been eroded since the mid-1980s.

The international support to Afghanistan, including all state-building efforts under the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, is currently being provided within the broader US Counterinsurgency strategy and NATO strategy. This in turn raises serious questions not only about national/local ownership and aid effectiveness, but also about the kind of sustainable support the UN can provide to support local governance, democratization and peacebuilding in such circumstances.

Timor-Leste Case Study

The outbreak of violence in 1999 following Timor-Leste’s vote for independence led to the departure of about 7,000 Indonesian civil servants. Despite repeated UN interventions, in 2002, the year of Timor-Leste’s independence, local capacities were still not institutionalized, so a large state-institution-building support intervention was initiated.

Nevertheless, Timor-Leste’s nascent institutions remain fragile and are not able to deliver basic services to all societal groups in an equitable manner. This was shown by the violent crisis in 2006, which was driven by allegations of social exclusion, especially by youth groups, and resulted in the national police’s disintegration and the Prime Minister’s resignation. The new government requested defence and security forces from abroad and the establishment of a UN mission to promote political dialogue and reconciliation, the rule of law and a culture of democratic governance through inclusive and collaborative processes.

The UN has learned lessons from the above outlined operations; they are reflected in the Timor-Leste UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009–2013 (UN Development Group 2008c) and in the Country Programme Action Plan for Timor-Leste 2009–2013 (UNDP 2008c) upon which UNDP and the government of Timor-Leste have agreed: ‘It was found that excessive dependence of governance institutions in international expertise has the danger of undermining long-term capacity development’ (UNDP 2008c, p. 8). Consequently, UNDAF Outcome 1 envisages that ‘stronger democratic institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion (be) consolidated’ (UN Development Group 2008c, p. 5), by making state institutions more transparent, equitable, accountable and efficient. This is to be achieved by supporting the government’s administrative reform and by including the civil society through participatory governance mechanisms.
Throughout much of its history, Haiti has been plagued by instability, chronic poverty and weak governance. Since 1993, a series of UN missions have been deployed, most recently the integrated UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004, to restore security. Now the mandate of MINUSTAH must be reviewed in light of the devastating January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which has severely tested the UN capacity to respond.

Successive UN interventions have struggled to foster improvements in overall governance and development in Haiti. Serious governance problems have persisted and many national institutions were discredited despite progress in the security situation. In 2008, several incidents exacerbated the situation: extortionate food and fuel prices triggered violent riots which resulted in a political crisis and four hurricanes hit the country in the same year.

Against this backdrop, a concerted effort was made to reinforce existing integrated planning and coordination amongst UN agencies, MINUSTAH, donors and the Haitian government to regain lost progress. Following the earthquake in January, however, the UN response mechanism was heavily criticized for weaknesses in preparedness and ineffective integration. Critics accused the UN of lack of coordination and leadership. A reconfiguration of the mission’s mandate is likely to include a strong focus on efforts to rebuild the physical and institutional infrastructure of the country and will require an enhanced ‘coordination architecture’.

In 2004, prior to the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti’s transitional government, donors and the UN created the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) (UN Development Group, no date). The ICF operated until the end of 2007. Coordination was further promoted through the establishment of the Core Group on Haiti in Security Council Resolution 1542 (UN Security Council 2004) and endorsed within the UN by the Secretary-General in 2006. In the scope of the ICF, studies, evaluations and analyses had been undertaken to better understand the national context and together with tools and instruments employed by the Haitian government, their results were translated into planning processes to achieve more effective implementation. In 2007, the Haitian government produced a national growth and poverty reduction strategy paper (Haitian Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation 2007), amongst others, with the support of UNDP, which fed into the two-year economic recovery program together with the UN’s 2008 Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and an economic advisory report to the Secretary-General.

The UN Country Team grounded its UN Development Assistance Framework 2009-2011 in these tools, assuring a ‘collective, coordinated and holistic response of the UN to the national strategy in order to pull the country out of the spiral of poverty and misery’ (UN Development Group 2008b, p. 11). National ownership had also been prioritized by an agreement between donors and the government signed in February 2009. In this post-earthquake period—now more than ever—Haitian sovereignty and the need for a single coordinating entity for channelling support should be the basis for reconfiguring an approach, by the UN and international donors, to engagement in countries such as this beleaguered Caribbean nation.
Annex 3: Welcoming Address by H.E. Ambassador Cesare Maria Ragaglini
Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations

It is a pleasure to introduce a round table focused on key issues that, together with human rights and development, are at the core of the United Nations’ mission. I thank the organizers, particularly the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, for their gracious invitation to Italy. I also thank the United Nations, represented here today by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe, UNDP Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Olav Kjøren, and the Director of DPKO’s Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu.

The timing of this round table is particularly apt. Ten years after the benchmark ‘Brahimi report’ (Panel on UN Peace Operations 2000), which weighed the challenges of UN peacekeeping in the first post–Cold War decade; five years after the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, which is being reviewed this year; and one year since the New Horizon initiative launched by the UN Secretariat in search of new peacekeeping dimensions (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support 2009). All these steps have a direct or indirect effect on the UN’s role in building peace, security, and democracy. Despite many difficulties and shortcomings, the United Nations has taken the lead in addressing these issues. The organization’s efforts in support of democracy are sometimes criticized for being supply-driven, guided by the main donors or too often from headquarters in New York rather than on the ground.

Yet the United Nations is still the repository of a strength that no one else can boast: whether a state, coalition of states, or organization. I refer to its universality and its subsequent legitimacy.

Keeping this in mind and as a mere suggestion for the panelists, I would like to single out two of the many ideas that might be discussed to foster the UN role in promoting peace, security and democracy:

• The linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as the strategic entry point of the UN’s commitment to a country emerging from conflict and Italy’s contribution to this approach; and

• The role played by regional organizations in the development of peace, security, and democracy in member and neighboring countries and the example of the European Union’s influence towards central and Eastern Europe’s democratization after the collapse of the bipolar system.

On the first point—the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding—we are at a crossroads. Everyone agrees that the cessation of hostilities is a ‘golden opportunity’ to embark on international assistance to a country in a strategic and farsighted manner. Unfortunately, it is often a missed opportunity! The UN Security Council, usually, manages the crisis, the emergency. Only later, in the hope that the security situation has stabilized, talk of a ‘change in strategy’ and switch to peacebuilding begins.

It is instead during the immediate aftermath of conflict that the United Nations has the opportunity to build a mission that, alongside the Blue Helmets, can sow the seeds of rebuilding and consolidating peace and
rule of law. If the Peacebuilding Commission is involved from the start of a peacekeeping mission, it can act as a catalyst with the international financial institutions, civil society, rule of law experts, and public administration. With such an integrated and coordinated approach, the UN can be perceived by the local authorities as the sole legitimate external reference point in the peace and democratization process.

Italy is particularly receptive to this approach. The deployment model for Italian peacekeepers, especially the Carabinieri, aims to reestablish government control over the territory and thereby improve security conditions. But it is accompanied by an ability to relate to the local population and integrate the civilian components of the mission. The perception of police forces not only as security actors but also as trainers, infrastructure protectors and liaisons with local authorities builds trust in the United Nations. The Italian government’s decision to send a Carabinieri contingent to Haiti—where peace, security, and the road to full democracy has been sorely tested by the earthquake in January—confirms Italy’s commitment, with the ultimate goal of strengthening the role of the United Nations.

The second point is the role of regional organizations in assuring peace and encouraging democratic processes. The European Union (EU) provides a good example. In the past 20 years, it has performed an action of attraction and stabilization vis-à-vis totalitarian regimes that were left behind by the break-up of the Soviet Union. The enlargement of the EU in the 1990s lead the governments of Central and Eastern Europe to adopt a series of political, economic, and social reforms that, in fact, have triggered a virtuous cycle of democratization. Just as the birth of the European Community in the 1950s brought peace to Western Europe after World War II, the expansion of the EU to the East brought peace, stability, and security in the aftermath of the Cold War. It was hardly an accident that the only conflicts in Europe in the 1990s were in the Balkans, and their prospect of accession to the Brussels institutions is the best guarantee today of a future of peace and democracy. What better example of a ‘democratic arena’ than the weekly meetings of the 27 EU member states in Brussels? What other international organization has ever been entrusted with such a significant rate of national sovereignty from its members?

Critics may argue that the European decision-making processes are slow and, despite the Lisbon Treaty, ineffective. But if we measure the EU’s success by the yardstick being used at this round table—namely peace, security, and democracy—are we really so sure that there is any ground for these criticisms? Why not, instead, consider applying this approach with consistency and commitment to other embryos of regional integration, such as the African Union? Africa is characterized by decades-old conflicts that have spread from country to country, crossing artificial borders drawn by colonial powers without regard for ethnicity, religion, geographic characteristics and natural resources. In this framework, every great power adopts an African policy by building bilateral relations with the countries closest to it. This impedes every prospect for the future development of the African countries, which, by themselves, can never achieve the force and the scale needed to build structures that can compete with the rest of the world.

The African Union was born in an effort to build political and economic unity on the continent. It should be encouraged! Economic
aid and humanitarian assistance are indispensable but they are not enough. To build peace, security and democracy in the various countries on the African continent, greater political integration is needed. In this framework, the United Nations plays a crucial role. The organization’s charter provides for cooperation with regional arrangements. We need to show more determination in establishing sure and sustainable financial mechanisms that are not subject solely to the will of donors. The recommendations of the UN-African Union Panel on Peacekeeping move in this direction. We need the political vision and the courage to translate them into policy. Initiatives such as this round table today can contribute to move the process forward.

Greater integration of the UN presence from the immediate aftermath of conflict and more structured partnerships between the UN and regional organizations are only two examples of how the UN can strengthen its role in the maintenance of peace and security and the consolidation of democratic processes. The ultimate responsibility for a more effective UN, however, lies with the membership, and its willingness to invest in the future of the organization. The United Nations itself, despite its universal vocation, suffers from a deficit of representation and democracy in some of its key bodies, such as the Security Council. In Italy’s view, a reform to make it more transparent, representative, and accountable to the general membership would give greater impulse to the role and the mission of the United Nations in the world. Thank you for your attention, and my best wishes for a fruitful discussion.

**ANNEX 4:**
**Statement by Mr. Lynn Pascoe**
**Under-Secretary-General, UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA)**

I am truly delighted to open the *International Round Table on Democracy, Peace and Security: The Role of the United Nations*. When preparing for today, it struck me that with ‘We the peoples’, the very first words of the Charter of the United Nations lay the foundation for the organization’s role in promoting and strengthening democracy around the world.

Democracy has become a fundamental element in the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace and security, to promote social progress and better standards of life, and to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

I am delighted to note that the topic of the round table addresses the very core of the challenging nexus between building democracy and requirements for peace consolidation, between policy direction and practical field implementation.

As an opening speaker, I hope you do not mind me taking the liberty of playing devil’s advocate and calling into question the very premise of the round table: Is democracy really what peoples emerging from conflict desire and require?

An opinion poll conducted in 24 nations last year by WorldPublicOpinion.org and that was sponsored by the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) identified that on average in the countries polled, 90 per cent of respond-
ents said that it was important to live in a democratically governed country (WorldPublicOpinion.org 2010). However, the study also showed that there was a marked discrepancy between global demand for democratic governance and its supply. While 90 per cent said democratic governance was important, in none of the polled countries did a majority of people say they were completely free, including in established democracies. This shows that there remains a lot of work to be done.

I think it’s important for the UN to recognize this strong demand that democracy enjoys around the world. It puts a premium on the work that the UN is doing in democracy promotion. In his message for the second anniversary of the International Day of Democracy, the Secretary-General has called the celebration of this day ‘a reaffirmation of the (international community’s)…commitment to build participatory and inclusive societies’.

But here is the paradox: Despite such massive public support in favour of democracy and pluralism, we continue to be confronted with the problem of lack of political tolerance virtually everywhere, in developing as well as developed countries. It manifests itself when political leaders refuse to give space to those opposed to them, when political parties do not tolerate dissent from their membership and, more generally, through a rejection of different views.

What does it imply for our work in post-conflict societies? Is democracy really the right remedy for a deeply divided society emerging from conflict? Mansfield and Snyder’s research on democratization and war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995) stipulates that statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in the transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. Thus, they are calling into question the very axiom of ‘democracies never fighting wars against each other’.

It is probably true that a world in which more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer. But countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way.

Having visited many countries just emerging from conflict and then having returned to them at later stages of their recovery and transition, I remain convinced that one of the best long-term preventive measures is to help build responsive and accountable institutions and inclusive and tolerant societies.

So, if we as the United Nations want to live up to the strong international demand for democracy, how do we get our assistance right?

The UN has long advocated a concept of democracy that is holistic; encompassing the procedural and the substantive; formal institutions and informal processes; majorities and minorities; men and women; governments and civil society; the political and the economic; at the national and the local levels.

Over the past 20 years or so, one of the UN’s main preoccupations has been to bring peace and stability to post-conflict countries. As most of you well know, these countries are often characterized by a ‘winner-takes-all’ approach to competitive politics. Furthermore, it is often a mix of structural grievances such as extreme poverty, social and economic exclusion or the fight over resources that are the underlying cause of violence. Promoting political tolerance and good governance in those
environments is an extremely challenging task and I feel we have not quite figured out how best to do this.

I know that Nepal is one of the country cases on your agenda. Our peace mission in Nepal actually constitutes one of the most prominent examples of addressing social and political exclusion of women and minorities as a root cause of conflict. The UN’s support to the elections for a Constituent Assembly, which took place last year, focused very much on ensuring that the Constituent Assembly would be representative of Nepal’s ethnic and religious mosaic.

The UN’s commitment to the promotion of good governance is reflected in the mandates of many of its peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, given that there is an inextricable link between democracy and achieving a sustainable peace and security. Central to the mandate of missions in Burundi, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, is the strengthening of democratic institutions and processes and support for good governance. Furthermore, some mission mandates explicitly call for encouraging inclusive national dialogue as essential to reconciliation processes, such as those of the missions in Sudan and Timor-Leste.

Many parts of the UN system are engaged in one or more aspects of democracy assistance. It is therefore critical that coherence among UN initiatives in this area be improved, including interactions with stakeholders, partners and the wider international community.

Better coherence requires an approach that ensures that democracy assistance is more effectively integrated into the three main pillars of the UN’s work—peace and security, development, and human rights.

But of course, this task is not the UN’s alone, and must start with national actors in each country. It is up to political actors around the globe and each society to strive to resolve differences peacefully and to look beyond narrow interests and towards the collective good. In conflict-prone and war-torn societies, this is a particularly daunting challenge. However, only through greater political tolerance and inclusiveness, as well as well-coordinated and adapted international action, will such societies have a chance to heal and to grow.

Let me return to my earlier role as ‘devil’s advocate’: UN democracy assistance, while remaining proactive and innovative, must nevertheless ‘do no harm.’ For example, we have witnessed that ill-timed, and in particular premature elections encouraged by the international community in fragile societies have sometimes entrenched undemocratic, nationalist or extremist groups in power, and radicalized political discourse.

Even worse, the violence erupting in Kenya following the elections in December 2007, demonstrated that elections can actually lead to significant loss of life, and in extreme circumstances to mass atrocities and even genocide.

DPA is currently looking into developing tools and mechanisms to help minimize risks of election-related violence. A poorly conducted election process does not necessarily lead to the outcome being disputed, let alone violence breaking out. However, what is true is that an effective and credible process can reduce the chances that an election—whatever the outcome—will ignite simmering political tensions caused by deep-rooted grievances.

Our analysis indicates that preventing serious election-related violence includes making efforts to address, even in a limited way, underlying grievances before the elections, either by fixing the system or by improving
the electoral process itself. Thus, when the UN establishes a mission right after conflict, tough choices need to be made to get the system and the timing right.

But let me be very clear: elections do not make a democracy. I would argue that the international community sometimes places too much focus on elections and too little attention to the quality of governance. Indeed, with the UN being called upon to support, every year, dozens of electoral processes around the world, we need to ensure that support for elections is complemented by support for good governance and respect of fundamental freedoms.

Thus, I find the topic of the round table eminently timely. If at the end of your discussions you managed to distil policy recommendations on how to better translate policy decisions into field practice, it would be a significant achievement.

Let me close by wishing you vibrant and fruitful discussions. I am very much looking forward to learning more about the outcomes of your deliberations.

ANNEX 5:
Statement by Mr. Olav Kjørven
Assistant Secretary-General and Director, Bureau for Development Policy (BDP), UN Development Programme (UNDP)

In the 21st century, we continue to be confronted with the triple challenge of building or restoring democracies, preserving democracies, and improving the quality of democracies. Key challenges for the UN in this context, as rightly pointed out in the Secretary-General’s Guidance Note on Democracy (UN Secretary-General 2009c), are: ‘how to more effectively promote universally recognized democratic principles, institutions and practices; how to respond, in a consistent and predictable manner, to ruptures with democracy, as triggered by coups d’état or other unconstitutional transfers of power; and how to respond to, or even help to prevent, the slow and gradual erosion in the quality of democracy and the weakening of democratic freedoms, practices and institutions which occur in conflict and post-conflict settings. Needless to say, all these also have profound impact on the peace and security agenda of the UN and the vice-versa.

Yet democracy is a dynamic social and political system whose ideal functioning is never fully ‘achieved’. In fact, securing good governance is often the greatest challenge in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding process. In Sudan, impassable roads, poor communication and destroyed bridges limit intragovernmental dialogue. In Liberia, the destruction of government buildings and the loss of basic office equipment prevented the re-establishment of public agencies. In Timor-Leste, the exodus of 7,000 Indonesian civil servants left a vacuum in the public administration. To quote a UNDP colleague working in Darfur, ‘the loss of governance is the worst impact of the conflict … nothing can be managed.’

Among those countries with the lowest levels of human development, more than half are
in or emerging from violent conflict (World Bank 2009). Democratic governance in such places is both an imperative goal and a tall order, and democratic governance is therefore UNDP’s largest programming portfolio: globally, UNDP supports an election every two weeks, many in post-conflict countries. And for us, election is just the beginning of the cycle, and not an end in itself. Therefore, we are working with national and provincial parliaments and legislative assemblies, national human rights institutions, and accountability bodies to support in many cases nascent democracies.

The expansion of the UN’s capacity for peacemaking and the development of interagency mechanisms of conflict prevention have helped bring about a global decline in violent conflict and a rise in negotiated settlements over the last decade. But high levels of political instability, armed violence and chronic underdevelopment still afflict post-conflict countries. For many, the end of war has not necessarily equated to gains in human development.

‘Good enough’ solutions are simply not ‘good enough’ to address post-conflict fragilities. These situations require new ways of working together to ensure that democratic governance, sustainable peace and security are aligned. Addressing global challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and natural disasters requires new thinking, new programming and new partnerships. With an estimated one billion people living in states recovering from or suffering from conflict or natural disasters, complacency is not an option (Overseas Development Institute, no date).

And so we arrive at the importance of this round table. With field staff, practitioners, external experts and headquarters representatives of numerous UN agencies here, we have a tremendous opportunity to capture a lot of experience and knowledge. This is a chance to move beyond the mere vocabulary of partnership to discuss the realities of delivering as one. Our continued effort to transform UNDP as knowledge organization is therefore a step in the right direction.

Democratization can grant governments the mandate and legitimacy to lead recovery, integrate opposition voices excluded during peace negotiations, and offer the victims of war a forum for their participation. It can begin the process of reconciliation required to consolidate peace and security.

However, the stakes in democratization in post-conflict elections are high and the UN must improve its responses to electoral violence. Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe are a few examples of countries where electoral processes have been persistently plagued by violence. In the most destructive instances—such as the 1992 presidential elections in Angola—electoral violence has escalated into renewed civil war. But it doesn’t have to be that way.

In Ghana, at the request of the government, UNDP helped create district councils, which grew into provincial councils, which, in turn, developed into the country’s National Peace Council. Most international observers credit the National Peace Council for Ghana’s calm and successful elections in 2008. And we also captured these lessons well through rigorous application of conflict-sensitive approach to democratic governance.

That said, our efforts in achieving democratization must extend beyond a focus on elections and polls. By promoting inclusive participation of all members of society, including disadvantaged and marginalized groups, and by helping to build up responsive governing institutions and respect for human rights, it
is possible to mitigate conflict, promote peace and, ultimately, ensure human development.

Paul Collier, in his book *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (Collier 2009), argues that the recent political sea change was the spread of democracy to the 'Bottom Billion' in the world’s most impoverished countries. He argues that we will not have democracy if we think elections alone will lead to the institutions; the 'Bottom Billion' need to hold leaders accountable. Without limits on the power of the winner, or rules of conduct that allow the transfer of power the 'Bottom Billion' will be unable to truly harness the potential of democracy as a force for good. These same institutions will be responsible for delivering other public good and bringing economic and social rights for the 'Bottom Billion'.

The challenge is not only to reconstruct but to transform—not simply to rebuild but also to empower the victims of war. Through broader processes of democratization we can build on the fundamental roles of civil society; women and youth, for example, often marginalized by violence, can contribute to the consolidation of peace.

In Aceh, UNDP has learned that peace-building is all about governance—if grievances related to self-determination, participation and state legitimacy can be addressed, conflict will be significantly reduced. One of UNDP’s main roles besides programme development and implementation is that of a facilitator of communication between the state and citizens, the initiation and coordination of gatherings or meetings, involving a vast number of stakeholders from citizens, governments, donors, non-governmental organizations, and others.

We must also remember to focus not only on national democratization in weak state environments, but also on local level democracy. UNDP did this to positive effect in Liberia, where we worked with integrated UN teams in each of the 15 counties, to support the restoration of local state authority (UNDP 2008d). This support included rehabilitation of infrastructure, capacity development and engagement with networks of civil society and traditional leadership to ensure that local government would be not only effective but also responsive and legitimate.

When these factors are aligned, democratization can leverage improvements in security and consolidate peace. In Iraq, the January 2009 provincial elections produced confidence that the worst of the transitional turbulence had past. With the passage of a new electoral law by the Iraqi Council of Representatives in November 2009, there is a sense that a newly elected government in Iraq will create a window of opportunity for improvements in the security situation and in development. This also implies that democratic institutions need to function as per the law of the land, and, delivery of services would be ensured both at national, provincial, and local levels.

This round table should be action-oriented and focus our attention over the next two days on what we can do together, better. We need to move beyond the deep thinking, reports, and guidance documents to reflect upon how the UN should manage its competing priorities for the betterment of people in fragile countries, and in countries with significant democratic deficit.

UNDP will be with you in our struggle to achieve peace and human development. And I thank you for your commitment to this common cause.
Statement by
Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu
Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

Having read the discussion paper and annotated agenda for the round table, I would simply like to put forward to you a few sets of questions from the peacekeeping point of view—questions we have been asking ourselves based on the experiences we have encountered, and continue to encounter in the field—in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, West Africa, Congo, Sudan, Haiti, Afghanistan, etc.

The issue of democracy building and its link with peace and security is certainly not a new debate. It has been one of the key issues in various policy debates related to peace and state building, conflict management and human security. Policymakers all seem to agree that democratic values are important in making peace and development sustainable, and therefore the overall process of democracy building should indeed be supported and assisted. It is difficult to argue against the basic principle that a system of governance in any country, including those in post-conflict situations, should be inclusive, participatory and representative, even though we also agree that there is no one model of ‘democracy’.

However, from a peacekeeping perspective, there are still many unresolved dilemmas and tensions surrounding democracy, which I hope this round table will address. I say this with full recognition that peacekeepers may not always be democracy builders. Peacekeeping operations are often amongst the first external missions to be deployed in a post-conflict context, normally for a limited period of time. And, democracy building is a long-term process that clearly cannot be completed in the short life span of peacekeeping. I might even say that at times there might be an inherent contradiction between peacekeeping and democracy building: Peacekeeping missions are normally designed to extend state authority, and not limit it, which is typically essential for a democratization process. But, as peacekeeping mandates become truly multidimensional and more complex, strategies taken by a peacekeeping mission at the outset of a peace and state building process in a given country can determine the subsequent course of democracy development and longer term peace and stability in that country. We clearly need to understand the dynamics of democracy building and its link to peace, and become better at designing a strategy from the start.

We have learned some important lessons in past interventions, and consequently made some progress in our policies and strategy. For example, we no longer equate elections with democracy, even though elections are certainly an important milestone in democracy and state building. We have also learned that quick elections can, in some conditions, hamper long-term democratic development, as we saw firsthand in Cambodia and Bosnia. Even though international expectations are higher than ever that a legitimate government be established quickly after a violent conflict, elections held too soon after conflict can further polarize a country by confirming radical actors in political structures.

And, we have been implementing those lessons. The timing of elections in Kosovo or in Afghanistan was more carefully determined against the background of overall political context. Because of the growing
concerns about quick elections and the desire to minimize international administration, transitional authorities have increasingly been put in place as a governing regime while allowing additional time for development of conditions more conducive to restoration of post-war political life, including the formation of political parties.

But as peacekeeping mandates become more ambitious and start to cover the rule of law and institutional reforms—especially in the police, security and justice sectors, which all go directly to the heart of overall political democratization—the story for peacekeepers gets more complicated. I would like to ask three sets of questions for the participants of this round table to consider.

These new peacekeeping mandates effectively mean that we are to transform the systems of how power is exercised in society. So, the first set of questions relates to the overall strategy. How can we have genuine engagement and ownership by the local leadership, when, in fact, the reform exercise itself will probably threaten their power base? What kind of political mediation strategy can we have? What incentives and leverage can external actors use? I ask these questions, because I feel that we are still all too focused on technical aspects of state and democracy building assistance with fragmented sectoral focus. Post-conflict peacebuilding is fundamentally a political process. Even if we have the perfect technical knowledge of how to establish an independent electoral commission, or how to re-write legal frameworks, or to vet, train and mentor security forces, or to strengthen civilian oversight mechanisms, the process probably cannot succeed without a clear political strategy. Do we, the international community, share a common vision and strategy in places such as Afghanistan or Congo today?

My second set of questions relates to whether we have the right knowledge base, expertise and experience for peacebuilding and state-building assistance. We all acknowledge that democracy can take different forms and that there is no one model for democracy. However, the approaches taken so far in UN operations are normally based on highly divisive modern-style elections and democracy building, which may not always be conducive to political cooperation, or supply-driven reform exercises based on donors’ own institutional experiences, rather than driven by the post-conflict country’s own political, economic and social realities. Do we have the right knowledge, expertise and focus in peace and democracy building to assist states that have had weak or insufficient control over their territories? Do we know enough about traditional or customary institutions and the functions they fulfil in societies in places we are deployed to be early peacebuilders? I feel strongly that we, as the UN, or the donor community in general for that matter, are not making sufficient efforts to support, mobilize and utilize expertise from the so-called Global South in state and peacebuilding. The political knowledge and experience that is truly useful in post-conflict democracy and peacebuilding exists in the very countries that have been going through complex processes of democratic reforms and state building. I welcome the approach taken in this workshop of focusing on different regions and country cases, and I hope that we will become better at tapping into the knowledge base that is more relevant to the contexts in which we operate.

My third set of questions relates to the time-frame for peace and state building, the level of expectations and ambitions, prioritization and sequencing, and more rational use of external instruments, including financing.
mechanisms. We have come a long way to acknowledge that post-conflict peace, state and democracy building is a process that takes time. And I believe that the UN has a comparative advantage over other multilateral organizations or bilateral donors in this long-term process, because it is a system that has different instruments of intervention as the situation evolves, from peacemaking and mediation to peacekeeping, and to development cooperation. But, when I look at the timeframe within which peace and state building operations are expected to demonstrate results, I must wonder whether our expectations and ambitions are realistic. I love watching Japanese history dramas on TV, and I am often reminded that it took Japan 22 years to adopt its first modern constitution, which was not even a fully democratic one, after the Meiji Restoration and civil war. When we are in this process with external support, we must identify priorities and sequence support so that we can allow resources and political attention on priorities to be focused in any given stage. This effectively means that we, as peacekeepers, will start tackling urgent priorities relating to overall democracy building in the immediate post-conflict phase, and hand over the efforts to other external actors or to the national government. But how do we determine the priorities? Do we have the right financing instruments over time, so that what is started will indeed be carried through? In addition to the fact that certain institutional reform areas are under-funded, the tendencies are that donors’ political interest, and therefore funding, is not sustained in long-term funding after peacekeeping assessed funding, despite the fact that we all acknowledge that it is a long-term process. If you have USD 10 million to contribute to a country, is it not actually better to disburse USD 1 million over 10 years, rather than USD 10 million in the first year when it is politically sexy?

These are some of the questions it might be useful to ask.

I stressed the political nature of peace and state building. But, in closing, I will contradict myself by saying that political development, or democracy building, is also not a silver bullet. The links to economic and social development, and human rights and justice also cannot be overlooked. In fact, we have learned in many places where we are deployed—Timor-Leste, Liberia, DRC, Haiti—that political development, administrative reforms, socio-economic development and human rights issues are all intertwined, and we need to address these challenges in tandem. Setbacks in one inevitably have implications for the others. I hope that good lessons and recommendations emerge from discussions such as this one, so that we can collectively improve our approaches in this important endeavour towards peace, stability and democracy development.
The current international debate on the linkages between democracy and peace-building is influenced by the wide range of approaches of various communities of policymakers and practitioners that aim at the different, though intertwined, objectives of building peace, democracy and the state. During the turbulent decade of the 1990s, new policy agendas were shaped in the field of conflict and democracy building. There is now widespread agreement that democracy is the best tool for the peaceful management of social and political conflicts and hence lays the most solid foundation for political and economic development. Yet because democratization involves profound changes in the distribution of power and in the relationship between citizens and the state, democracy often generates violence before it becomes able to manage conflict. For societies coming out of conflict, the priority accorded to immediate imperatives like rebuilding state institutions and strengthening security and financial systems can put at risk the need for developing democratic practices serving long-term stability.

In the last 20 years, a fundamental difference with any earlier post-crisis transitional strategy has occurred, based on the integration of some elements of democracy building within peacebuilding. Thus, it is now universally accepted that post-crisis transitions should encompass a strategy to (re)build democratic processes (mainly through elections), along with democratic institutions (parliaments, checks and balances, local governments, etc.) and a democratic public sphere (typically by strengthening civil society organizations and the media).

Moreover, evaluations and policy-relevant research on humanitarian international interventions have consolidated a set of policy orientations in conflict prevention as a key area of work for bilateral and multilateral actors (OECD 2001; Tommasoli 2003). Influential policy analysis during this period ranged from the assessments of the role of international actors in humanitarian crises (Eriksson, 1997) and ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ (Macrae and Zwi, 1994; Nafziger, Stewart and Vayrinen, 2000) to the economic and social consequences of conflict, their impact on development and underdevelopment and the exploration of the role of horizontal inequalities in violent conflict (Stewart and FitzGerald 2001, Stewart 2008). After an initial emphasis on the economic dimensions of civil wars (Collier et al. 2003) and the role of economic agendas of their domestic and international actors (Berdal and Malone, 2000; Ballentine and Sherman 2003), more recent studies and policy statements addressed conflict and fragility in state building (OECD, 2007, 2008 and 2009).

In a conventional peacebuilding perspective, democracy has been challenged as a solution to conflict for many reasons—among them, lack of trust among the stakeholders, the influence of elites who may continue to mobilize on divisive nationalist, ethnic or racial lines, and the weakness or fragmentation of the state, political parties and civil society. Debates in international policy fora focusing on conflict prevention and peacebuilding—sometimes biased by competition among international agencies with overlapping man-

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dates—often missed the fundamental role that democratic institutions and processes play in building sustainable peace.

The underestimation of the potential of democracy building is also linked to the co-existence of contradictory short- and long-term priorities in peacebuilding. On one hand, the short-term need to include potential spoilers of peace processes may undermine the legitimacy of democratic processes and institutions and undercut the long-term sustainability of peace processes, which is critically linked to the capacity to address reconciliation in social, economic and political terms. On the other hand, democratic competition, through post-conflict electoral cycles, may increase the polarization of political actors—in many cases, political actors undergoing the transition from being armed groups to political parties—in fragile situations of ‘no-peace-no-war’. In any case, effective state institutions are often considered a prerequisite for the delivery of essential public goods for the attainment of peace and democracy, like security and a public space.

Paul Collier’s claim that ‘To date, democracy in the societies of the ‘Bottom Billion’ has increased political violence instead of reducing it’ provides a recent example of the ‘realpolitik’ concerns that may drive the engagement of the international community, as well as the effectiveness of democracy building in post-conflict settings. He described the path currently being taken by many countries of the ‘Bottom Billion’ as ‘fake democracy protected by the sanctity of sovereignty’ (Collier 2009, p. 11). He deemed such countries to be ‘too large to be nations and yet too small to be states’ because they ‘lack the scale needed to produce public goods efficiently’ (Collier 2009, p. 229). Collier makes a provocative case for the international provision of some public goods—namely security and accountability.

Although this approach might seem justified in some extreme cases, it is important to emphasize that the international provision of public goods contradicts one of the fundamental lessons of the last decade of democracy building—namely, the importance of home-grown solutions, beyond the rhetoric of national ownership.

An important question that remains is how the UN and other external actors can contribute to home-grown solutions. The following are some implications for the action of the international community, and in particular the UN:

1. Strengthen democratic practice while enhancing the effectiveness of electoral processes. Traditionally, and with reason, a great deal of attention has been placed by the international community on the relationship between elections and conflict. Efforts at building democracy in post-war contexts should be seen neither as being limited to the provision of assistance in the electoral field nor as an ‘add-on’ to be included at some unforeseen future date; instead such efforts should be regarded as ‘a process that is started at different levels in the course of recovery after war’ (International IDEA, 2006, p. 187). Thus, it is important for the international community to strengthen democratic practice through a combination of formal and informal institutional arrangements for collective decision-making and a wide variety of deliberative decision-making processes that incorporate the core values of democracy—such as inclusion, consensus building and accountability—in efforts to build and sustain peace.

2. Go beyond linear transition paradigms. The term ‘transition’ has been applied to the processes of both democratization and peacebuilding. A trend common in both areas in recent years has been the questioning of linear
transition paradigms that influenced much of the initial policy analysis (Carothers, 2002). After more than two decades of work on the intersection of these different (and sometime simultaneous) transitions, we all know that post-conflict situations are fragile; there are no simple and quick political fixes; context matters; and no abstract models of sequencing can be transplanted without taking context into account.

3. Address the challenges of international support. There are many challenges to international action in support of democracy in conflict-prone situations. The most ‘political’ ones are associated with attempts to impose democracy from abroad (primarily by means of electoral and institutional design, but in some controversial cases also through military intervention), or refusals to accept the outcomes of democratic processes from within. Other challenges, though less political in nature, have also affected the credibility and effectiveness of international democracy building efforts, like the short-term horizons of the engagement, lack of coherence, limited coordination, insufficient resources, an inadequate contextualization and prioritization, or a combination of the above.

4. Address the gender dimensions of democracy and peacebuilding. The gap between policies and practice is a major concern of international action in both democracy building and peacebuilding. A good example of this gap is the gap between policies and practice surrounding gender. As remarked in the concept note prepared for this round table, gender equality remains a challenge for stable democracies but is a much more daunting challenge in conflict-ridden and post-conflict situations. In such contexts, key challenges to peace and security are linked to gender dimensions and therefore require gender-responsive initiatives. This year marks the 10th anniversary since the adoption by the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (UN Security Council 2000) on women’s leadership in peacemaking and conflict prevention. We are looking forward to a consideration of how in the last decade women’s experiences of conflict have been taken into account and contributed to shaping democracy and peace and security agendas.

5. Build on the UN’s growing involvement in democracy building as an important dimension of its peacebuilding role. There is a need for a frank and open discussion within the UN on how to advance the democracy and peacebuilding agenda in conflict contexts. This discussion should involve all those engaged in post-conflict situations who work on different dimensions of peacebuilding and democracy building. This will contribute to the process launched within the UN by the adoption in September 2009 by the Secretary-General’s Guidance Note on Democracy (UN Secretary-General 2009c). That guidance note set out ‘the United Nations framework for democracy based on universal principles, norms and standards, emphasizing the internationally agreed normative content, drawing on lessons learned from experience and outlining the areas of support in which the UN has comparative advantages’. Moreover, the guidance note committed ‘the Organization to principled, coherent and consistent action in support of democracy’.

6. Learn from experience. A review of the role of the UN in promoting democracy (Newman and Rich 2004) based on five case studies (two of which, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan, are also included in the agenda of this round table) stressed the importance of three factors that are all relevant to today’s round table.
• The first factor is managing time. The UN works under the pressure of many time-tables, while knowing well that building democratic institutions and processes, and democracy as a political system, requires profound generational changes. And still, the definition of coherent entry and exit strategies remains a crucial element underlying much of the current policy debates.

• The second factor is making trade-offs between universal notions of governance and the realities of local politics and political institutions, between principle and pragmatism, between security and politics, between long-term capacity-building processes and short-term results.

• The third factor is mastering techniques. Although there has been a considerable growth and consolidation at the UN of the body of technical skills related to democracy building, experience has shown the limits of technical approaches to building democracy, especially if such approaches are not informed by an analysis of the political context, and the importance of learning from experience, particularly as regards consultation and deliberative processes.

7. Address the main challenges to a more proactive UN role in democracy and peace-building, including the following:

• Address fragmented approaches. There is a need for a comprehensive and holistic approach to democracy building, throughout UN operations, by means of integrated strategies bringing together different security, political, development, humanitarian, gender dimensions addressed by various parts of the system.

• Build capacities for context analysis. There is a need for stronger capacities to understand local contexts, and address the complex elements of democracy building, going beyond the technical approaches adopted to meet the needs of individual sectors and actors (for example, electoral bodies, constitutional assemblies, legislatures, the judiciary, political parties, civil society institutions and the media).

• Address the inconsistency between short-term and long-term efforts, needs and expectations. There is a need to avoid quick-fix solutions, especially in post-conflict situations. Making peace is urgent by definition, and democracy building is a long-term process by definition. The problem has very practical implications on the ground as the establishment of democratic institutions is becoming a regular item on most peacebuilding agendas. Good examples here are to be found in the use of constitution-building and electoral processes in post conflict situations as part and parcel of a strategic approach to conflict management.

• Address perceptions. Democracy is not a Northern- or Western-driven agenda. There is a need for multilateral non-prescriptive approaches based on best practices, lessons learned, comparative experience, South-South cooperation (including by working with regional organizations), local capacity building and nurturing dialogue for democratic practice.

8. Focus on processes rather than events. A process-oriented approach to electoral assistance is emerging within the democracy-building community, and such an approach is similarly advocated within the peacebuilding community to counter the mainstream event-driven practices. The emergence of a process-oriented approach is particularly noticeable in the field of elections, where donor efforts increasingly tend to spread over
the entire electoral cycle rather than the single electoral event. It is better understood today that it was previously that strengthening the capacity of national electoral management bodies may be more important than electoral observation. Moreover, it is better understood that the credibility of elections depends on activities that commence well before the elections day and continue once the polls have been closed—from the choice of the electoral system, to the building of credible electoral institutions, to the management of elections-related conflict situations, to ensuring the acceptance of the outcome of elections, etc. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan are disheartening examples of huge investments in elections that have not—to say the least—fulfilled expectations as to the improvement of the human rights and democracy situations in the two countries.

The process approach is required not only in the area of electoral assistance but also in other areas—particularly, in the areas of constitution-building and political party assistance. Constitutions, in order to be respected and applied, must gather popular consensus—an aim achievable only if their provisions have been thoroughly discussed among national stakeholders. Some constitutions hastily imposed on those expected to implement them (even if elaborated with the noble goal of stopping an internal conflict) have proved, on the long run, to be poor instruments of democratic governance. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina designed in a secluded group and brought about as an annex to the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, is an eloquent case in point.

Constitution building may be a critical inter-linkage in the policy debate because it is difficult to avoid looking at constitutional governance in either peace consolidation or democratization. If one conclusion is that it is no longer viable to treat peace and democracy separately, then the points of connections should really be ventilated, whether or not they are described in terms of theoretical frameworks as constitution building or elite accommodation and power-sharing agreements. In this, as in other areas, interlinkages may be easily identified but complicated to materialize within integration efforts, the main focus of the sixth session of this round table.

As far as International IDEA is concerned, we stand committed to advancing our strategic partnership with the UN, its entities, agencies and funds—as well as with other international actors—to further clarify the linkages between democracy, peace and security and to nurture a space of dialogue among practitioners from all agencies involved to make our action more effective.
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Abbreviations

3Cs  coherence, complementarity and coordination
3Ds  diplomacy, defense and development
BCPR  Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Resolution (UNDP)
BDP  Bureau for Development Policy (UNDP)
BINUB  United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BONUCA  United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
C-34  Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CA  Constituent Assembly
COPRET  Conflict Prevention and Transformation Division (SDC)
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Accord
CPN (Maoist)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
DAC  Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DESA  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DGG  Democratic Governance Group (BDP/UNDP)
DPA  Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DPI  Department of Public Information (UN)
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
EOSG  Executive Office of the Secretary-General (UN)
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
HC  Humanitarian Coordinators
IDEA  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IMPP  Integrated Missions Planning Process
IPU  Inter-Parliamentary Union
ISF  Integrated Strategic Framework
MINURCAT  United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH  Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
MONUC  United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN)
OLA  Office of Legal Affairs
OPT  Occupied Palestinian Territories
PBC  Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO  Peacebuilding Support Office
RC  Resident Coordinator
SC  Security Council
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>Seven Party Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN HABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission In Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNOGGIS</td>
<td>United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCO</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<td>UNSCOL</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWRA</td>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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</tbody>
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The UN system should follow a common strategy on peacebuilding, state building and democracy building based on a shared political analysis of countries emerging from conflict.
Democracy, Peace and Security:
The Role of the UN