The Impact of the European Union’s Policies on the Role of the State in Democracy Building in the Arab World

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Abstract
In the Arab world, the state has played both a positive and negative role in building democracy. It has helped to determine Arab nations’ economic and social development since independence. Often, Arab regimes have sacrificed political democracy in favour of other goals such as economic development and consolidation of new national institutions. Political power has become the prerogative of privileged elites, and fundamental freedoms and human rights are often violated.

In the beginning, the European Union’s relationships with the Arab world carried great hope, especially for democratic elites aspiring to positive political change. However, these relationships have been dominated by two main goals, both legitimate but both often pursued at the expense of democratization: the improvement of economic relations and the strengthening of security cooperation.

Although the European Union has made important contributions to democratization in the Arab world, its policies have remained handicapped by their own contradictions. While they have sometimes encouraged Arab states to introduce political reforms, they have also contributed to the strengthening of authoritarian regimes in the region.

Summary of Recommendations
The relationships between the European Union (EU) and the Arab world should integrate economic goals with the pursuit of social and political rights and accountability for these rights. The social dimension of democracy may make EU–Arab relationships sustainable and equitable. That could also help to solve thorny problems like illegal immigration from Arab countries. The EU can play a positive role to help the Arab states to reform their public services and improve their efficiency. Instead of being the cause of the decline of these services, the relationships between Europe and the Arab
world could consolidate them. Respectful relationships that promote both economic and social rights will also encourage the commitment of the people of the region to this process.

Cooperation between the EU and the Arab countries to tackle illegal migration and ‘terrorism’ should not sacrifice the commitment to democracy and human rights on which the EU’s foreign policies are, theoretically, founded. The EU can play a positive role in encouraging political reform in the Arab world, provided that the gap between rhetoric and reality is bridged.

1. Introduction

The persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world has generated a rich discussion on the reasons for this ‘democratic exception’ to trends in other parts of the world (see Harik 2006). Indeed, several African countries as well as several former Soviet republics have, since the end of the Cold War, made considerable political reforms. But nothing similar has occurred in the Arab world, where authoritarian regimes are still resisting any move towards democracy.

The authors of the United Nations Development Programme’s 2009 report on human development in the Arab countries asked, rightly, whether the state has been a solution or a problem for peoples of the region (UNDP 2009: 193–5). Although the answer was not given explicitly, it could be easily deduced from this report: Unfortunately, the state has become a real obstacle to any attempt at reform in the Arab world. Several efforts have been made to explain this situation. In this regard, two major phenomena present a challenge to the role of the state in democracy building: the predominance of small hereditary elites, and the rentier basis of their economies.

Some Arab states are governed by monarchies, others by republican regimes. But this difference is mainly one of form; the mechanisms by which they function are almost identical. The alternation in power in several ‘republics’, for example, is governed by the same rules as in monarchies. Larbi Sadiki has shown in a recent study on Egypt, Libya and Yemen that the sons of the presidents of these three republican regimes are potential candidates for the presidency after their fathers’ rule (Sadiki 2009). Many other examples similarly show that political power has always been exercised in the same way in Arab countries, whether they are republics or monarchies. Thus, Habib Bourguiba, president of Tunisia from 1957 to 1987, abolished the monarchy in 1957 but did not hesitate to declare himself president for life in 1975. More recently, the Syrian Constitution was amended, just a few hours after the official announcement of the death of President Hafez Al-Assad on 10 June 2000, in order to allow his son Bashar Al-Assad to be named president (Droz-Vincent 2002: 262–4).

This phenomenon has its origins in the decolonization process that began after the Second World War, which led in most countries to the creation of a centralized national state in which a family, tribe or caste monopolized political power while excluding other components of society. Some Arab states still do not have representative institutions or hold elections. In other states where such institutions do exist, they are a mere façade that hides a completely different reality. Elections, when held at all, only serve to confirm the rule of those in power. Some elections have resulted in a 100 per cent vote in favour of the incumbent president, who is often the sole candidate. Saddam Hussein,
for example, was declared the winner of the 15 October 2002 Iraqi referendum on his continued rule with 100 per cent of the vote.

A key feature of all Arab states is neopatrimonialism, in which the ruling elite uses public institutions to create benefits for a large group of dependent subordinates and thus ensure their support. Clientilism, favouritism and nepotism are therefore key characteristics of Arab regimes. This has created strong obstacles to any attempt at real democratization. Indeed, the *statu quo* is protected not only by the autocrats who confiscate power, but also by other groups who profit from the tyranny and oppression.

The rentier state is another key feature of the Arab states. The rent or source of income differs from one case to another, but the result is always the same. In the oil-producing rentier states represented by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Libya and Algeria, dependence on oil exports can reach 90 per cent of GDP. In other Arab states, the rent has another dimension because it comes mainly from external transfers. This is the case in Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Occupied Territories (POT).

These incomes have offered a solid social basis for authoritarianism. Despite their ideological differences, Arab states since independence have all chosen social policies that emphasize the provision of welfare services. This has improved human development indices in the region. But the welfare system has also been a means to control and dominate Arab societies (Sandbakken 2006). Mahmoud Ben Romdhane (2005: 60–3) analysed ‘the practice of presidential gifts’ in Tunisia, where the granting of social and economic rights has become a means to ensure a wider allegiance to the regime. Everywhere in the Arab world, the welfare system works in the same way. It has allowed even notorious authoritarian regimes to ensure their stability.

However, as rent is fickle by definition, several Arab states have endured the consequences of its crises since the 1980s. The events of this period have proved that the crisis of the state in the Arab world is essentially an economic crisis. Thus, the drop in global phosphate prices in the early 1980s forced Morocco and Tunisia to accept the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Structural Adjustment Programmes and adopt new economic policies. The same phenomenon has occurred in other Arab countries, where the state has been forced to reconsider its economic role and to open its economic monopoly to private actors.

These crises, which have shaken the basis of authoritarianism in several Arab states, have been a main cause of the reforms that have taken place. It appears that the only opportunities to build democracy in the Arab world have come from crises.

It should be mentioned, in this regard, that initial reform attempts have had a purely economic character. Indeed, the World Bank and IMF, which have supported reforms in several Arab states, have no mandate to promote political reforms. These reforms are instead promoted and encouraged by other actors such as the EU.

It would be premature to predict how much the EU will be able to help the Arab states build democracy. However, it has already had a tangible impact on the role of the state in democracy building. This paper will first examine the EU’s political reform project for the Arab world and then discuss its impact.
2. The EU’s Project for the Arab World: Ideals and Reality

The EU’s relationships with the Arab world date back to the 1970s; they focused, in the beginning, on economic cooperation. The launch of the Barcelona Process\(^1\) in 1995 gave these relationships a new dimension and expanded their focus to include areas formerly regarded as the exclusive purview of national governments. Issues related to governance and democracy building have already become an important component of the EU’s relationships with the Arab world.

The EU does not consider the Arab world as a unified entity, but has pragmatically taken into account its political, economic and social diversity. This approach has fostered bilateral and subregional cooperation frameworks for lack of a single regionwide Arab partner. It utilizes three main kinds of instruments for the political reform objectives:

1. Association Agreements (AA), within the framework of the Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, have been concluded with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. Jordan has concluded an AA, although it is not a Mediterranean country; Libya and Syria, both Mediterranean countries, have not concluded AAs, although negotiations between Syria and the EU have been under way for several years.

2. Relationships with the Arab countries of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are governed by a cooperation agreement concluded in 1988.\(^2\) For some time, negotiations between the parties have dragged on to reach a new cooperation agreement.

3. Cooperation with the African Arab states (Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan), which focuses in theory on development, is governed by the 2000 Cotonou Agreement.

Yemen and the POT have special agreements with the EU.

The EU has recently become sensitive to the need for a unified approach to the region. Unfortunately, this trend did not emerge until just after the attacks of 11 September 2001. These tragic events have prejudiced the EU’s perception of the Arab world, and it is in this dark context that the EU’s political reform project for the region must be understood. The project has both good intentions and inherent limitations.

**Good Intentions**

The different instruments of EU policy in the Arab world reflect good intentions that could have a positive impact on the role of the state in building democracy. These

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\(^1\) The Barcelona process, or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, was launched as a framework for bilateral and regional relations between EU member states and 14 of their Mediterranean partner states. The initiative was re-launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean.

\(^2\) The Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the countries parties to the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Agreement no. 21989A0225(01)
intentions are summarized in an important document of the Council of Europe that determines three main objectives of the EU's policy in the region: prosperity, peace and security. This document states: 'The main objective of the EU in its relations with the Arab World is to promote prosperity, peace and stability, thereby not only contributing to the welfare and security of the region but also to its own security' (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 8).

The same objectives were vigorously announced in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and hold a privileged place in the bilateral AAs concluded with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. Additionally, the EU considers democracy to be the foundation on which the achievement of these objectives should be based (e.g., Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Thus, its genuine commitment to strengthening democracy in the Arab world is unquestionable.

The pertinent diagnoses made by the United Nations Development Programme (2002) and the World Bank (2003) on the state of democracy and governance in the Arab world have helped the EU to decide the content of the political reform project for the region. The project supports reforms in three main areas: the rule of law, democratic governance and human rights (European Council 2003: 8–9).

The EU’s project could undoubtedly have a positive impact on the role of the state in building democracy in the Arab world. Indeed, strengthening the rule of law would rationalize political power and discourage authoritarian practices. Support for democratic governance reforms would also allow public institutions to optimize their performance. And the promotion of human rights would enable citizens to enjoy their fundamental rights, which are necessary for the construction of a democratic society.

But none of these precise goals, formalized in several EU documents, are included in bilateral AAs with Arab states. These agreements have not demonstrated the same precision and clarity regarding the political aspects of cooperation that they have for trade cooperation. As a consequence, requirements for the Arab states that are parties to these agreements to introduce political reforms are not binding. Reforms remain dependent on the goodwill of the rulers, who are not in a hurry to implement them. Indeed, there is no obligation under these agreements that would require an Arab state or the EU to carry out democratic reforms.

The EU has chosen to pursue reform proposals in ongoing negotiations with different Arab states during the implementation of the agreements. This might seem to be an effective strategy, given the difficulties in achieving genuine political partnerships with Arab states, but it has come up against some intrinsic limitations in the EU’s policies.

**Intrinsic Limitations**

The limitations to the European project for the Arab world result from the neoliberal nature of the EU’s policies, which are intended to uphold the interests of European capitalism and the principles of free trade. This is not peculiar to relations with the

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Arab world, but is an essential and general feature of the EU’s policies (see Bohle 2006). It has also been observed in the context of EU development agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (Oxfam 2007, 2008).

The EU has often imposed unfair trade rules in its bilateral relationships with Arab states. Its position as representative of the strongest economies in the world contrasts with the weakness of Arab partners who have not established a common strategy to negotiate their relationships with the EU. The League of Arab States has played no role in this regard. In fact, after the end of the second Gulf War (1990–1991), the pan-Arab organisation was so weakened that it had become unable to negotiate on behalf of all Arab states with the EU. The Arab states have long been highly protective of their national prerogatives and subject to mutual mistrust. That has obviously been harmful to their interests, especially in trade negotiations with the EU, in which individual states suffering from enormous economic, political and social problems face a federation of the most powerful economies in the world.

As a result, the partnership agreements binding the EU to some Arab countries since 1995 have given priority to reinforcement of the market. Their main aim is to facilitate the free movement of private capital and to create a favourable environment for European investment. On this subject, the EU has adopted the same policies recommended since the 1980s by the World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organisation, which have led to a decrease of social welfare services in these countries. These policies have been implemented by offering generous tax incentives to encourage European investors, creating free trade zones and abolishing import taxes in order to facilitate unequal trade exchanges. Public companies have been transferred to the private sector, and social transfers have been drastically reduced.

In some Arab countries (particularly Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), the new policies have led to mercantilization and the decline of social welfare services. Hence, the rights to health and education, for example, have become more precarious. Charity and ad hoc assistance projects have also been preferred over welfare systems and redistribution schemes to tackle the problems of poverty and social inequality. Social tensions have increased as a reaction to new policies that have worsened social inequalities and caused the situation of vulnerable and marginalized populations to deteriorate. This in turn has pushed concerned Arab governments into increasing expenditures on repressive security measures to control protest movements. The EU has not only encouraged these policies but also accelerated them (Amato 2000: 42).

In spite of the drastic curtailing of welfare expenditures, the Arab states have never managed to restore their public finances to health. Public deficits, generated by extravagant and corrupt bureaucracies, remain enormous; they reached 11.2 per cent in Lebanon, 8.5 per cent in Egypt and 4.1 per cent in Jordan between 2003 and 2008 (Arab Monetary Fund 2009: 336). Moreover, these states have failed to
build efficient and transparent market institutions. The private sector remains weak and dominated by corrupt businessmen directly affiliated with rulers.

The EU’s neoliberal policies have been harmful to democracy building in the Arab world because they have weakened the commitment of the EU to this goal. Thus, in cases where economic interests are at stake, democracy continues to be sacrificed. Relationships with the GCC states confirm that. The EU has, indeed, preferred to promote its economic interests without taking into account political reforms. Hence, negotiations on human rights have not advanced one iota, while business negotiations are going very well between the two parties. The EU has obviously opted for a pragmatic approach to preserve its interests in a lucrative market, although obstacles to political cooperation with the EU are mostly due to the GCC states’ resistance. In addition, these states have adopted a common negotiating strategy that has enabled them to counterbalance the EU’s position. This is why negotiations between the two parties have dragged on for 20 years without concluding a new cooperation agreement (see Echagüe 2007).

The conclusion of an AA with an Arab state has never required the state’s commitment to introduce democratic reforms. It has always been sufficient for the EU that a state negotiating an AA fulfilled economic conditions such as liberalisation of the economy, standardization of accounting, financial, or tax rules and their alignment with those applied in Europe. As for democratization, the EU has been satisfied with rhetorical statements rather than serious commitments. This is why the EU’s policies has had a paradoxical impact on the Arab countries.

3. The Paradoxical Impact of the EU’s Policies

European policies regarding the Arab world have had a paradoxical impact on the role of the state in democracy building. While supporting the role of the state in this respect, the EU seems also to have contributed to consolidating authoritarian regimes.

Positive Contributions of EU Policies

The EU’s contributions to the role of the state in democracy building in the Arab world are palpable and concrete in the states that have agreed to cooperate. However, some states have resisted genuine cooperation in the political field. This was particularly the case in Tunisia, where the Association Subcommittee on Human Rights was not able to meet until November 2007, almost 10 years after the entry into force of the EU-Tunisian AA in 1998. Other states, such as the GCC countries, have opposed EU interference in their internal political affairs. But this false attachment to national sovereignty hides a desire to preserve the statu quo. Calls for democratic reform are, indeed, perceived as a threat to authoritarian regimes.

Experience has shown that the attitude of Arab states towards political reform programmes depends on their economic and social situations. States that need assistance for development tend to take a more positive approach. The
better a state’s economic situation is, the most reluctant it usually is to adopt political reform.

The states of Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Yemen have accepted ambitious political reform programmes. In these countries, the EU has even intervened (diplomatically) to solve difficult internal political problems. It has contributed to the establishment of peace especially in Comoros and Djibouti. Its support for the peace negotiations and its aid during the execution of the agreements were crucial to putting an end to a long period of serious internal conflicts in these two countries. The EU’s role was also very important for the restoration of democracy in Mauritania after the takeover of 6 August 2008. The EU’s decision to freeze its cooperation with Mauritania on 6 April 2009, as a reaction to the failure of the negotiations to resolve that situation, has forced the new rulers to accept a compromise. Since then, the organization of new presidential elections had become possible.

The EU has also contributed positively to the political development of several Arab states through support for the reform of electoral systems. The aim has been to improve citizens’ participation in political life and to encourage the adoption of new electoral laws ensuring free and fair elections. The EU has also provided support to the electoral process in the form of material assistance in organising elections and supervising missions.

Good governance has also been an EU focus in some Arab countries. In this regard, several programmes intended to improve public services have been launched. The enhancement of accountability has also received significant support through various reform programmes that have benefited several institutions, such as Supreme Audit Institutions. For the same purpose, the creation of national institutions for human rights has been encouraged in order to ensure more respect for fundamental rights and liberties. The EU has contributed to improving the transparency of public institutions as well; this has involved, among other things, programmes intended to fight corruption.

Furthermore, the EU has contributed to the reform of the justice system in some Arab countries. Numerous programmes aimed to develop the administration of justice, to strengthen the independence of judges and to improve their skills have been launched. Local governance has also received important support through efforts to promote decentralization and to improve local councils’ management capacities.

No one could claim that the EU’s policies have achieved optimal democratization in Arab states. Nevertheless their positive impact is undeniable, and some of their effects are felt in citizens’ daily lives. The EU’s policies have allowed the state in several parts of the Arab world to play a positive role in democracy building.
democracy building. The improvement of good governance, political development and
democratization are tangible. These results could not easily have been achieved without
the political and financial commitment of the EU. However, some gaps remain in which
EU policies have led, paradoxically, to the strengthening of authoritarian regimes.

**Strengthening Authoritarian Regimes**

The complex relationships between the EU and Arab countries are not easy to manage
in a perfect way. It is also not easy to implement political reforms in the Arab world.
Arab regimes are very conservative and unwilling to make
political concessions, and democratic forces remain weak
and unable to propel a process of change by their own means.

In this context, EU policies in the Arab world have
sometimes led to the reverse of their intended effect: while
aimed at supporting political reforms, they have led to the
strengthening of authoritarian regimes. These failures are
due to the inadequacy of the democratization programmes and to the conflict between
those programmes and other EU priorities in the region. These two circumstances have
undermined political reforms or at least limited their efficiency.

Civil society and the political opposition in the Arab world consider that the EU is
not doing enough to support democracy. Its actions are seen as rather timid, and it has
often been perceived as too tolerant towards authoritarian regimes. Admittedly, these
actors have sometimes aimed high and have asked the EU to do what is beyond the
nature of its mission. To what extent should the EU be considered responsible for this
tolerance towards authoritarian regimes? There is no categorical answer to this question.
Many factors over which the EU does not have total control
influence its policies in the Arab world. In any case, the
current situation is beneficial only for the authoritarian
regimes, which are the major obstacle to democratic reform.

Authoritarianism benefits not only from the EU’s inertia but
also and especially from its policies in the fields of security
and immigration. Europe has in the last several years faced
serious problems due to unprecedented levels of illegal
immigration mainly from and via the Arab Mediterranean
countries. The threat of “terrorism” has been taken especially seriously since the attacks
in London in 2004 and Madrid in 2005. While the EU’s goals of stemming illegal
immigration and preventing “terrorism” are legitimate, this does not justify the use
of all means to achieve them. Some European states have been less respectful towards
international and European human rights laws. That has been the case, for example, in
Italy and Spain in the implementation of immigration policies, and in Germany and the
United Kingdom in the so-called war against “terrorism”. The actions of these countries
are seen in the Arab world as reflecting not only their own policies but those of the EU
as a whole. Indeed, the EU member states are no longer perceived as free and isolated
actors. Consequently, each state’s actions affect the EU’s image in the eyes of Arab public
opinion. The EU’s attitudes have, indeed, reinforced this conviction. Some European
states, acting in ways that compromise the EU’s commitment to democratization in the
Arab world, have been granted either the support or the acquiescence of the EU.
The impact of these policies on the role of the state in democracy building in the Arab world has been doubly negative. First, the fight against illegal immigration and “terrorism” has promoted security cooperation with authoritarian regimes that do not offer serious guarantees for respect of human rights. This has led, at a minimum, to the strengthening of security agencies that are among the most serious obstacles to political reform in the Arab world. Several cases of illegal extradition of suspected terrorists illustrate the gravity of this policy. The extradited detainees have been victims of dangerous violations of their fundamental rights in their countries of origin. The diplomatic assurances obtained from the Arab states (Egypt, Jordan and Libya) have not prevented the security agencies from torturing the extradited detainees (Amnesty International 2006; International Commission of Jurists 2009: 104–6).

Certainly, the EU member states should be proud of their solid judicial institutions, which have been able to counterbalance the arbitrary actions that have characterized the “war against terrorism”. Comparison with the role of the U.S. judiciary on this particular issue confirms that reality (Aronofsky and Cooper 2009). Nevertheless, Arab public opinion is less aware of the judiciary’s achievements than of actions by the executive authorities, about which more information is available.

The image of the EU has thus been injured by immigration- and “terrorism”-related policies that seem inconsistent with its commitment to democracy building in the Arab world. This negative image will unfortunately not help encourage Arab states to make further efforts to improve governance, rule of law and respect for human rights. The EU needs to show a good example of the democratic model to reach such objectives; otherwise, it will be difficult to convince authoritarian regimes to introduce political reforms. These regimes will seize the contradictions of the EU’s policies as an excuse to further delay reforms.

This reality strengthens the perception that foreign actors, such as the United States and EU, are responsible for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world. Indeed, many Arab regimes would have been unable to resist pressures for political reform without the significant support they have received from these actors. Military and security cooperation under the pretext of fighting terrorism and illegal immigration have given the authoritarian states further reasons to delay democratization indefinitely.

4. Conclusions

The path of democracy building in the Arab world seems beset with difficulties. This does not mean that Arab countries are by nature incompatible with democracy. The difficulties experienced by the Arab world in achieving political reforms are not due to blind fate but to objective historical factors.

In recent years, the EU has made serious efforts to support democracy building in the Arab world. The results remain mixed. The EU’s commitment does not seem strong enough to impel the Arab states to carry out genuine political reforms, and authoritarian Arab regimes have been very efficient in taking advantage of the EU’s
policies. However, the EU has recently reiterated its genuine commitment to support political reforms in the Arab world. To succeed, it must reconsider certain of its policies to ensure the effectiveness of that commitment. The EU’s efforts to support democracy building should be consolidated, and policies that have had negative consequences for democracy building should be revised.

The relationships between the EU and the Arab world should integrate economic and social rights and accountability for these rights. The social dimension of democracy may make these relationships sustainable and equitable. That will help, also, to solve thorny problems like illegal immigration to Europe from Arab countries. Moreover, the EU can play a positive role to help the Arab states to reform their public services and improve their efficiency. Thus, instead of being the cause of decline of these services, the relationships between Europe and the Arab world could strengthen them. Unfortunately, these relationships have been, until now, limited to a technocratic process from which citizens of the region have been completely excluded. Relationships that respect both economic and social rights will therefore encourage the support of the peoples of the region for this process as well.

Cooperation between the EU and the Arab countries to tackle illegal immigration and “terrorism” should also not sacrifice the support for democracy and human rights on which the EU’s foreign policies are, theoretically, founded. The EU could play a positive role in supporting political reforms in the Arab world, provided that the gap between rhetoric and reality can be bridged.

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