Democracy is on trial in the climate crisis. It is charged with having failed—and with continuing to fail—to prevent dangerous climate change. It is indicted on a fundamental breach of a key obligation of legitimate government—to ensure the safety and survival of the people to whom democracies owe their allegiance. Its accusers go so far as to attribute these failures to congenital defects in democracy. To its critics, the very same features of democracy lauded as its defining virtues—popular sovereignty, the accountability and responsiveness of elected officials, public debate and deliberation—are handicaps that fatally impede effective climate action, leading to inexpert and ineffectual judgements, short-termism, and cumbersome and dilatory policy processes. Critically, democracy is damned as a fair-weather regime that is unable to navigate crises—particularly existential crises such as climate change. For some, ‘[d]emocracy is the planet’s biggest enemy’ (Runciman 2019).

This is undoubtedly a trial by fire. It has been strongly argued that authoritarian regimes are needed for the climate crisis. This is a double-barrelled argument as authoritarian regimes are said to be necessary both to effectively mitigate the risks of climate change, and to adapt to its disruptive impacts. Thus, even if humanity survives the climate crisis, the fate of democracies is deeply uncertain. Most clearly, the legitimacy of democracy as a form of government is at stake.

However, this trial is not over and it would not be safe to deliver a verdict at this stage. For one, the case for authoritarian regimes is flawed in both theory and practice (see below) and while the hour
is late for preventing the worst impacts of climate change, there is still a narrowing window—with this decade being the critical one—to provide a climate-safe future (IPCC 2018). Here, it is overwhelmingly democratic nations that are taking the lead (Burck et al. 2021).

This urgent time calls not for pessimism—let alone fatalism—about democracy, but for a deepening of the democratic impulse; specifically, a grounded affirmation of the strengths of democratic institutions that is framed within a clear-eyed view of the enormity and complexity of the challenges posed by the climate crisis, including to democracy itself. In other words, the climate crisis should be grasped fully as a turning point and as a moment of truth that presents extreme dangers but also significant opportunities— for humanity generally and democracy more specifically (Diamond 2019). This is all the more the case since this is clearly not a short-term crisis but a ‘long emergency’ (Wiseman 2021). The climate crisis will be a defining, perhaps the defining, challenge for and to democracy for decades to come. As Figueres and Rivett-Carnac (2021) argue, ‘[i]f democracy is to survive and thrive into the twenty-first century, climate change is the one big test that it cannot fail’.

With this in mind, this Report focuses on democracy and the climate crisis in the Asia-Pacific region. A regional approach based on detailed case studies has been chosen to contextualize the challenges to democracy arising from this crisis. The Asia-Pacific region is significant for various reasons—it is the most populous in the world; it is a region that will be disproportionately affected by climate change and where many countries are considered highly vulnerable; and, as this Report makes clear, it is also a place where there have been vibrant innovations to democratic institutions and practices for dealing with the climate crisis.

Two challenges frame this Report (see Casas-Zamora 2022):

- How can democracy effectively address the climate crisis?
- How can democracy effectively address the threats it faces from the climate crisis?
1.1. HOW CAN DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE CLIMATE CRISIS?

1.1.1. Democracy against a safe climate?
Climate change is a particularly wicked problem for humanity (Dovers 1996; see also Lindvall 2021) because of its:

- **Long-term frames.** The temporal distance between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, as well as between measures taken and their effects, together with the level of urgency, given that dangerous climate change is already occurring and will intensify if sufficient action is not taken.

- **Spatial scale.** The disjuncture between a global problem that transcends national boundaries and an international system based on nation states, and also between the causes (responsibility for) and effects of (vulnerability to) climate change.

- **Limits to human activity.** The recognition that planetary boundaries place limits on economic and demographic growth (Stockholm Resilience Centre n.d.).
• **Connectivity and complexity.** Due to the interaction with and interdependence of natural and human systems that frame the imperative and the difficulty of global collective action.

• **Moral and ethical issues.** Such as intergenerational equity, equity between developed and developing countries and equity within countries.

1.1.2. **Can democracy address climate change in its full complexity?**

Held and Fane-Hervey (2009) argue that four structural characteristics obstruct the liberal democracies of nation states from effectively addressing climate change. First, short-termism attributed to the electoral cycle, as political parties seek re-election every few years and competitive party politics focuses on short-term electoral gain and the immediate interests of voters, and political processes are too responsive to the media cycle. Short-termism works against the long-term frames required to address the crisis and provides a moral outlook that is too narrow to capture intergenerational equity.

Second, self-referring decision making is said to arise from democratic mechanisms, particularly elections, that are underpinned by accountability to the constituents of a nation state and accountability to current voters—a section of the present generation. To this can also be added the politics of self-interest (both sectional and individual). Such processes militate against proper consideration of the interdependence between natural and human systems, equity between countries and intergenerational equity. They may also run counter to fully recognizing the limits to human activity and be linked to weak multilateralism, due to the emphasis placed on national interests. In some contexts, populism will exacerbate these effects (Huber 2020), as populists tend to treat the views of the public as self-vindicating, regardless of their merit, and as opposed to those of the elite, including scientific experts.

Third, weak multilateralism is traced to the self-referring decision making of states based on national interest, as well as disagreements between developed and developing countries and opposition from fossil-fuel-dependent nations (Fiorino 2018). Weak multilateralism most obviously undermines the effectiveness of...
necessary global action. This fact is reflected in the commitments made under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a binding treaty agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which fell far short of its goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C (preferably to 1.5°C) compared to pre-industrial levels (UNEP 2020), even after the UN Secretary-General sounded a ‘code red for humanity’ on the climate crisis (UN Secretary-General 2021). According to the Climate Action Tracker (2021), the Nationally Determined Contributions (pledges made by nations under the Paris Agreement) at the 2021 Glasgow Conference of Parties (COP) would set the planet on a catastrophic pathway to an increase in temperature of 2.1°C by the end of the century, while the dismal current status of policies against pledges would produce an even more disastrous scenario of a 2.7°C increase (Climate Action Tracker 2021). Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg was unequivocal in her condemnation of the Glasgow COP as a ‘failure’ (BBC News 2021; see also Hales and Mackey 2021).

Finally, there is capture by vested interests, which is described by Held and Fane-Hervey (2009) as interest group concentration—specifically, commercial interests. Capture of the policymaking process is enabled by the structural dependence of governments on business for economic growth—what Lindblom (1977) famously characterized as ‘the privileged position of business’. This is brought about directly through lobbying by business interests, and their funding of political parties and election campaigns. Capture by, for example, fossil fuel businesses invariably means the delay—and at times defeat—of the measures required to address the crisis, including the uncoupling of economic growth from increases in greenhouse gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels.

There is no doubt that there has been a concerted effort by fossil fuel companies to bring about such capture. Building on their already considerable economic and political power in many states worldwide, these companies have funded key political parties and organizations in order to obstruct climate action (Holden 2020). A central strategy has been the decades-long campaign by these companies to deny the existence of climate change, principally by sowing doubt about the underlying science (Oreskes and Conway 2010), while internal research dating back at least as far as the 1970s
clearly demonstrated the seriously damaging effects of fossil fuel use (McGreal 2021). The influence of fossil fuel interests was also obvious at the Glasgow COP, and the Climate Pact almost collapsed due to last-minute opposition from China and India to the original draft, which called for a ‘phase-out of unabated coal power’. This opposition succeeded in diluting the text to ‘phasedown’ (see Arima 2021). Not surprisingly, David Attenborough (2020) has suggested that vested interests are ‘the most formidable obstacle’ to the switch to clean energy.

These circumstances of democratic debilitation are compounded by the speed and scale of the changes now needed to effectively address the climate crisis. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society’ are required (IPCC 2018) (see Table 1.1).

There is now a critical need to move beyond the predominant view of societal progress as based on continuous economic growth as measured by gross domestic product. A view that treats the economy as an open system with limitless resources (e.g. capitalism with perpetual growth) will inevitably collide with a global ecosystem enclosed by planetary boundaries (Montt, Fraga and Harsdorff 2018). In the words of the UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘a growth-oriented economy may not be compatible with a climate-safe economy’ (UNFCCC Secretariat 2020). Living in the safe and just space of the ‘doughnut’ between a social foundation that meets the needs of humanity and ecological limits will require a different and more holistic understanding of societal progress (Raworth 2017), such as the one embodied in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN DESA n.d.; United Nations General Assembly 2015).

1.1.3. The flawed preference for authoritarian regimes
Can democracy deal effectively with the complexity of the climate crisis as a policy problem, enacting the scale and depth of societal change required, given the compelling circumstances of democratic debilitation? The answer, according to one school of thought, is an emphatic ‘no’. Since at least the 1970s, democracy has been said to be inherently incapable of addressing environmental problems such as climate change. Rather than democratic regimes based on popular
rule, it has been claimed that authoritarian regimes are required based on the rule of experts—what Ophuls termed ‘ecological mandarins’ (Ophuls 1977; see also Heilbroner 1974). Such thinking has proved persistent, as illustrated by the publication of *The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy* (Shearman and Smith 2007), which calls for governance by experts in order to deal with the climate crisis.

Such authoritarian sentiments have increased in appeal as the climate crisis has been likened to a war. James Lovelock, the distinguished scientist who developed the Gaia theory of Earth as a giant, self-regulating organism, stated that: ‘Even the best democracies agree that when a major war approaches, democracy must be put on hold for the time being. I have a feeling that climate change may be an issue as severe as a war. It may be necessary to put democracy on hold for a while’ (quoted in Hickman 2010). Others have gone further and likened the climate crisis to World War III (McKibben 2016; Stiglitz 2019; Blair, Treagust and McCulloch 2020).

The argument that authoritarian regimes are needed to deal with the climate crisis, however, is flawed in both practice and theory.
In practice, democracies consistently out-perform authoritarian regimes in terms of climate change mitigation policies (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Lindvall 2021). For instance, the climate performance of China is far from compelling (see Box 1.2). Indeed, increased quality of democracy corresponds with stronger climate policies and, to a lesser extent, climate outcomes (Hanusch 2017). These studies align with strong findings that increasing democracy reduces environmental degradation and improves environmental performance (Li and Reuveny 2006).

Likening the climate crisis to a war is false and dangerous (see Box 1.3). More fundamentally, there are fatal difficulties with the arguments in favour of expert rule. These arguments are a potent threat to the legitimacy of democracy and constitute a contemporary version of an argument for a guardianship regime (Holden 2002). Dahl (1989) has observed that a regime that rests on the idea that ‘[r]ulership should be entrusted to a minority of persons who are specially qualified to govern by reason of their superior knowledge and virtue’ has been a ‘perennial alternative to democracy’. As Dahl convincingly argues, however, this places ‘extraordinary demands on

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**Box 1.2. The case of China**

There may be some attraction to treating China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, as the poster child for an effective authoritarian climate regime. In the past decade, China’s leaders have committed the country to a more environmentally and economically sustainable mode of development (Henderson and Joffe 2016), while also positioning China as a global climate leader (Hurri 2020; Wunderlich 2020). China ranked significantly higher than the United States, the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG), in the 2022 Climate Change Performance Index (Burck et al. 2021). On closer inspection, however, the attraction is superficial. While the USA languishes in 55th spot on the Climate Change Performance Index, China is ranked 38th, which is five places below its previous ranking. The Index’s report on China states that it ‘receives a low rating overall, but with mixed ratings across categories—very low for GHG Emissions and Energy Use, medium for Renewable Energy, and high for Climate Policy’. The low score on GHG Emissions and Energy Use is due to China’s high levels of emissions: ‘its coal phase-out [being] too slow’, and its ‘plans to continue building coal-fired power stations because of energy supply concerns’ (Climate Change Performance Index 2022).

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The argument that authoritarian regimes are needed to deal with the climate crisis, however, is flawed in both practice and theory.
the knowledge and virtue of guardians [that] are all but impossible to satisfy in practice’ (Dahl 1989).

This applies as much if not more to the climate crisis, which will see an expansion of the power of the state. No credible answer has been provided regarding how the abuse of such power could be prevented in authoritarian regimes based on expert rule, where the mechanisms of public accountability that apply in democracies are absent. Lord Acton’s aphorism that power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely remains unanswered.

It is not just virtue that is wanting but also knowledge. A deeply mistaken assumption underlying calls for expert rule to address the climate crisis is the characterization of the crisis as a set of technical problems that require technical solutions. This is an illustration of what Pope Francis has characterized as the ‘technocratic paradigm’, or ‘the tendency, at times unconscious, to make the method and aims of science and technology an epistemological paradigm which shapes the lives of individuals and the workings of society’ (Pope Francis 2015).

This paradigm seriously distorts any understanding of the climate crisis: it is not simply—or even predominantly—a technical crisis. It is true that technical expertise, including scientific and technological expertise, is central but other dimensions of the crisis are as salient, particularly its moral complexity, its risks and the trade-offs, including from uncertainties in scientific modelling. These interacting dimensions will traverse the profound political, social and economic changes that are necessary to address the crisis. All of this, moreover, will have to be negotiated and addressed in diverse national and cultural contexts. Given the scale and complexity of the climate crisis, it is absurd to believe that a small minority of guardians, experts or ecological mandarins will have sufficient knowledge to address it.

1.1.4. **Innovation borne of crisis**

The true value of the argument for authoritarian regimes lies, perhaps, in the exposure of key deficiencies in contemporary democracies that adversely affect how the climate crisis is addressed; that is, the circumstances of democratic debilitation. Taking these deficiencies
seriously reminds us that winning the argument against authoritarian regimes is not the same as succeeding in the climate crisis.

A key challenge and opportunity for democracy is to innovate by imagining and implementing a vision of democracy for a safe climate that deepens democracy by disavowing corrosive tendencies. This vision should be based on four pillars—a democratic planning state, a solidaristic ethos, an invigorated multilateralism, and fair and inclusive politics.

Pillar 1. A democratic planning state
The periodic mechanisms of accountability provided by elections do not necessarily have to result in short-termism. There is no democratic reason why those who stand for office cannot be judged on their ability to attend to the long-term goals of a country, including addressing climate change. A solidaristic ethos among the public (see below), for instance, could anchor electoral accountability in the needs of future generations.
Effectively addressing climate change should also involve significant changes to the role of the state, including countering short-termism. The nation state is a critical actor and, in many respects, the critical actor tasked with implementing the necessary and unprecedented transitions required by the climate crisis. As the International Energy Agency (IEA) has noted, ‘underpinning all of these changes [to net zero emissions] are decisions taken by governments’ (IEA 2021: 153). Giddens (2011) has convincingly argued that short-termism can be addressed by a nation state that takes the lead responsibility on:

- **Planning.** In terms of both mitigation and adaptation.

- **Regulation of the economy.** Including instituting the ‘polluter pays’ principle and establishing an economic framework for a low-carbon economy.

- **Coordination and integration.** Between government, the private sector and citizens, as well as different levels of government.

- **Holistic risk mitigation.** Addressing the risks of the climate crisis together with other risks experienced by contemporary societies, including through social protection.

Giddens has stressed that a planning state understood in this way, or a Green State as characterized by Eckersley (2004), will call for more democracy not less. While centrally informed by expert opinion, it will not be a technocratic state but one based on a vision of a climate-safe society that engage...
be seen as a politics-free zone exempt from democratic principles. Rather, the aspiration should be for ‘a process of technological change disciplined by the political wisdom of democracy’ (Winner 2020).

**Pillar 2. A solidaristic ethos**

Democratic accountability, including elections, does not necessarily have to produce a politics based mainly on the interests of voters, let alone their individual interests. Much depends on the moral and political outlook of voters—a politics of self-interest can be countered by a solidaristic ethos.

A solidaristic ethos should be broad and inclusive, encompassing, as Pope Francis (2015) has reasoned, both intergenerational and intra-generational solidarity, as well as solidarity with nature. It is vital to recognize that solidarity is a democratic principle. As International IDEA has explained, solidarity ‘refers to the ties in a society that bind different people to one another, expressing social bonds rather than autonomous individual ties’ (International IDEA n.d.). Viewed from this perspective, voters are not just protectors of their own interests, but also trustees of the public interest (broadly conceived).

This stems from a fundamental truth that democracies are by nature communities. They are not random collections of individuals, but a ‘we’ that considers itself ‘a people’. Democracy is the process of collective self-determination. It is through solidarity that fuller meaning is given to the third, neglected principle of the French Revolution—fraternity. As the Dalai Lama has stressed, fraternity should be at the heart of our response to the climate crisis (Dalai Lama and Stril-Rever 2018). Learning from Indigenous peoples is vital to a solidaristic ethos. As the IPCC puts it:

> Indigenous Peoples around the world often hold unique worldviews that link today’s generations with past generations. In particular, many Indigenous Peoples consider concepts of responsibility through intergenerational equity, thereby honouring both past and future generations. (IPCC 2022a: Chapter 18)
Institutions specifically dedicated to the interests of future generations, such as the Hungarian Ombudsman for Future Generations, the Israeli Knesset Commissioner for Future Generations and the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, might be able to play a role.

Arguably, a positive-sum orientation is integral to a solidaristic ethos on the climate crisis. This entails framing issues in a way that promotes ‘win-win’ situations to address the climate crisis alongside other policy goals, as well as the needs of current and future generations and of the various groups within the current generation, especially those particularly affected by climate change and climate action. An orientation of this nature would be a launch pad for finding policies that can provide synergies between the complex dimensions of the climate crisis, such as through the creation of ‘green’ jobs for those employed in fossil fuel industries (ILO n.d.b). In the words of the IPCC, ‘[c]limate governance is most effective when it integrates across multiple policy domains, helps realize synergies and minimize trade-offs, and connects national and sub-national policymaking levels’ (IPCC 2022b).

Mechanisms that institutionalize solidarity are essential. Central to this proposition is that nation states plan democratically for the future, including for the needs of coming generations, and address the risks of the climate crisis together with other risks experienced by contemporary societies (see above). Mechanisms for deliberative democracy—both specific initiatives such as citizens’ assemblies (Devaney et al. 2020) and initiatives for the political system as a whole (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012), including elections (Thompson 2002)—are also likely to assist in cultivating a solidaristic ethos. By emphasizing the deliberation of matters of common concern, based on reason-giving, reciprocity (mutually justifiable reasons) and equality of recognition and voice, deliberative democracy is centrally focused on recognition of other affected interests (Bächtiger et al. 2018), including those of future generations.

Also vital in terms of solidarity is social dialogue—one of the four pillars of the Decent Work Agenda promulgated by the International Labour Organization (ILO) (ILO n.d.a). Social dialogue is integral to

Central to this proposition is that nation states plan democratically for the future, including for the needs of coming generations.
'the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce', as stipulated in the 2015 Paris Agreement. In its 2015 guidelines, the ILO states that, ‘[s]ocial dialogue has to be an integral part of the institutional framework for policymaking and implementation at all levels’, which requires that ‘[a]dequate, informed and ongoing consultation ... take[s] place with all relevant stakeholders’ (ILO 2015: 5). The European Commission’s European Green Deal similarly emphasizes that, ‘[f]or companies and their workers, an active social dialogue helps to anticipate and successfully manage change’, thereby justifying ‘the role of social dialogue committees’ (European Commission 2019: 21). Policies that reinforce social dialogue ‘work to empower regional and local communities, including energy communities’ (European Commission 2019: 32).

Social dialogue in this context is emphatically democratic. It seeks to give effect to a fundamental principle of the ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia, which calls for processes by which ‘representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare’ (ILO 1944: Annex, emphasis added). This is consistent with long-standing arguments for economic democracy (Dahl 1986) and research findings that consensus-based (corporatist) democracies are more effective at shifting to cleaner forms of energy (Matthews 2001), due to their ability to integrate various policy goals and interests.

Furthermore, a particular imperative should be to ensure a voice for communities vulnerable to climate change and action. The US Green New Deal Bill (US Congress 2019), for instance, mandates that a Green New Deal ‘be developed through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline and vulnerable communities’. This emphasis dovetails with recent research that more egalitarian democracies have higher levels of climate ambition than other democratic types (Povitkina and Jagers 2021).

Pillar 3. Invigorated multilateralism
The obstacles to stronger multilateralism are certainly formidable, as evidenced by the grievously inadequate level of global action to date, but all is not lost. There are silver linings in the outcome
of the 2021 COP 26. Important steps have been taken in relation to climate finance for developing countries (Arora and Mishra 2021). Significantly, the Glasgow Climate Pact recognized, ‘that limiting global warming to 1.5°C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid-century, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases’ (UNFCCC 2022). It called on countries to submit strengthened Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) before COP 27, which was held in Egypt in November 2022 (UNFCCC 2022). The hope was that countries would ratchet up their pledges. As Alok Sharma, President of COP 26, noted:

The 1.5°C limit lives. We brought it back from the brink, but its pulse remains weak. We must steer it to safety by ensuring countries deliver on the promises they have made, and on the expectations set out in this pact to increase climate ambition to 2030 and beyond.

(Sharma 2021)

Democracy has a role to play here. Countering the self-referring mechanisms of nation state democracy facilitates stronger multilateralism. While electoral accountability does not currently apply to global institutions, democratization is possible by giving fuller effect to the principles of deliberative democracy in global climate governance (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014), including deliberative multilateral forums and mechanisms of deliberative accountability—the latter of which includes empowered civil society organizations such as the ‘climate action army’, with which UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has associated himself (United Nations 2021).

**Pillar 4. Fair and inclusive politics**

Although capture by vested interests is a stark feature of contemporary democracies, it is a distortion of democracy not a result of it. This is most clearly reflected in the use of money by such interests to disproportionately influence politics. As the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy & Security (2012), chaired by the late Kofi Annan, stated, ‘[t]he rise of uncontrolled political finance threatens to hollow out democracy everywhere in the world,
and rob democracy of its unique strengths—political equality, the empowerment of the disenfranchised, and the ability to manage societal conflicts peacefully’.

There are established policy options for dealing with capture by vested interests. The Council of Europe (2003) has recommended a whole series of measures to regulate the funding of political parties and election campaigns. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has made a list of recommendations aimed at preventing policy capture (OECD 2017), including through regulation of political finance and lobbying.

Ensuring an adequate voice for Indigenous peoples is essential. As the IPCC states:

Climate change assessment and adaptation should be self-determined and led by Indigenous Peoples, acknowledge the importance of developing genuine partnerships, respect Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing, and acknowledge Indigenous Peoples as stewards of their environment.

—(IPCC 2022a: Chapter 18)

Providing adequate resources and robust freedoms for civil society will be essential for raising awareness of the urgency of climate action, and for reducing the disproportionate influence of vested interests, as has been powerfully illustrated by the youth climate strikes. These strikes also highlight another reform that should be considered in order to broaden representation in democracies—lowering the voting age. The democratic argument here is two-fold—younger people will disproportionately bear the burden of the climate crisis; and their leadership in the crisis makes it more vital to have their input into political decision making (Laybourn-Langton, Emden and Rankin 2019).

The most comprehensive survey conducted in relation to public opinion on climate change and action makes it clear that there is ‘widespread recognition of climate change as a global emergency in every country surveyed’ (UNDP and University of Oxford 2021: 7).
A key democratic priority is to ensure that there are no blockages to this recognition being given effect.

1.2. HOW CAN DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE THREATS IT FACES FROM THE CLIMATE CRISIS?

1.2.1. The threats to democracy from the climate crisis

The analysis here runs in the opposite direction. Rather than focusing on the impact of democracy on the climate crisis, it is the impact of the climate crisis on democracy that is centre stage. The research in this area is asymmetrical; there has been less examination of the impact of climate crisis on democracy than the other way around (Javeline 2014). The threats to democracy result from a cascading series of risks arising from the climate crisis (Wallace-Wells 2019; Lindvall 2021), as risks to natural systems give rise to risks to human systems, which entail risks to democracy (see Figure 1.1).

The risks to democracy are defined as the 3Is—inequality, instability, and insecurity. Insecurity will result from climate disruptions and their impact on lives, livelihoods (jobs), homes, food and water supply. According to Lindvall, food insecurity will fuel public discontent, nationalism and authoritarian populism, and emerge as the ‘one single consequence of the climate crisis that represents the biggest threat to democracy in the future’ (Lindvall 2020).

The climate crisis will also heighten the dynamics of inequality through the uneven impact of climate disruption, the unequal ability and resources to take climate action (mitigation and adaptation), and possibly through climate action itself. This inequality threatens democracy both directly and indirectly—directly where it entails political inequality, and indirectly through a reduction in democratic participation and faith in democracy and solidarity (International IDEA 2017).

Instability will result from climate disruptions. Insecurity and inequality might also contribute to conflicts within and between nations while large increases in forced migration (climate refugees) might also be an acute source of instability. The speed and scale of the transitions necessary to address the climate crisis could also be a source of instability.
Alongside the 3Is are other potential threats to democracy. There is the serious risk of democratic backsliding, or an erosion of the quality of democracy. The climate crisis, particularly the instability that results, might be exploited to institute undemocratic measures. For instance, genuine emergencies linked to extreme weather events might be used as a pretext for disproportionate measures and a prolonged state of emergency, perhaps even a permanent state of emergency justified on the basis of recurring natural disasters. A kind of ‘shock doctrine’ might take shape (Klein 2007), leading to stealth authoritarianism under cover of the climate crisis (Varol 2018). This might even be combined with an economic system based on ‘disaster capitalism’.

Figure 1.1. Cascading risks of the climate crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISKS TO NATURAL SYSTEMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Increases in mean temperature, hot extremes, heavy precipitation, drought and precipitation deficits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increases in sea level rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impact on biodiversity and ecosystems (including species loss and extinction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean oxygen levels and impact on marine biodiversity, fisheries and ecosystems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISKS TO HUMAN SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Human health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Water supply</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Human security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Threats from climate action (mitigation and adaptation)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISKS TO DEMOCRACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Insecurity—particularly food insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inequality (social, economic and political)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Instability—internal conflicts, wars, forced migration (internal and international)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Democratic backsliding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Threats to free and fair elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.
That climate backsliding is not fanciful is suggested by the Covid-19 crisis, and the notion of pandemic backsliding (Kolvani et al. 2021), as autocratic opportunists capitalized on the crisis to weaken democratic institutions (Daly 2021).

Less appreciated as a risk of democratic backsliding is the increased significance of the state in effectively addressing the climate crisis. This will probably mean that the state assumes more of a central role in planning and regulation of the economy, as well as coordination and integration to address the risks of the crisis. Unless measures to institute popular participation and public accountability are integrated into such changes, there will be an overall decline in the quality of democracy. There are also risks of corruption, in particular the abuse of governmental powers to maintain incumbency, including through coercive powers directed at managing climate disruption and through the extensive public investment required for climate action (World Bank 2022).

Finally, there are the threats to free and fair elections. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes that ‘genuine periodic elections’ are a core democratic institution that ‘guarantee[s] the free expression of the will of the electors’ (ICCPR 1966). There are a range of threats here (Asplund, Birch and Fischer 2022). Elections may be more difficult to administer due to climate disruption, including extreme weather events and heat stress. Insecurity, inequality, and instability might bring about a lower level of electoral participation. Inequality is likely to specifically undermine the fairness of elections, as those disproportionately affected by the climate crisis might be the least able to participate in elections. Democratic backsliding in the form of incumbent governments abusing power to remain in office is another clear threat to the fairness of elections. In more extreme scenarios, elections may be suspended or postponed during prolonged states of emergency.

1.2.2. Countering threats by deepening democracy
These are all genuine risks but risks are not inevitabilities. Whether these threats to democracy become a reality will depend on complex causal processes. Some threats can be confidently predicted; for instance, food insecurity and some degree of increased inequality. Others, however, are much more uncertain. These include increased conflicts—both intrastate and interstate—and increased forced
migration (WMO 2021). Centrally determinative, in many instances, will be the choices made by the international community and nation states.

These threats reaffirm the imperative of strengthening the democratic impulse and, in this context, devising an effective risk management regime for the threats to democracy arising from the climate crisis. This regime should reflect the three prongs outlined below:

1. Reduce the risks to democracy.
2. Reduce vulnerability to risks.
3. Promote resilience to risks.

The critical priority of the regime should be mitigation of climate change (see Figure 1.1). Mitigation will reduce the risks to democracy by short-circuiting the cascading risks of the climate crisis (see Figure 1.2). It will also reduce the costs of adaptation to these threats through prongs 2 and 3.

This highlights the profound synergy between effectively addressing the climate crisis and dealing with its threats to democracy, but this synergy goes even deeper. The four pillars discussed above should also anchor the risk-management regime—they are pillars of both democratic innovation and insulation.

Most critical, perhaps, will be including democracy itself within the purview of a planning state. This will require a vision of how democracy should work in the decades to come and ‘back-casting’ that vision to work out appropriate targets and milestones (Giddens 2011). It will necessarily include efforts to reduce the risks to democracy and to enhance its resilience, or ability to adapt to those risks.

Solidaristic mechanisms reduce the risks of insecurity and inequality by providing an assurance of mutual support, including social protection, that reduces the likelihood of such risks spilling over into social conflict. Resilience is also promoted by the positive-sum orientation of a solidaristic ethos, and the problem-solving and social-learning capacities of its mechanisms, including deliberative democracy.
Figure 1.2. Principles of democracy can help us overcome the unique obstacles of the climate crisis

Challenges include:

- **Long time frames**
- **Spatial scale**
- **Limits to human activity**
- **Connectivity & complexity**
- **Moral & ethical issues**

**Democratic planning state**
Nations lead on economic regulation, coordination between government and citizens, and holistic risk mitigation.

**An ethos of solidarity**
A broad and inclusive mindset that encompasses solidarity within and among nations, nature and generations.

**Invigorated multilateralism**
Creates and protects alliances between and within nations to work towards a common goal.

**Fair and inclusive politics**
Facilitates democratic planning, a voice for ‘frontline communities’, free and fair elections, and social dialogue.
1.3. A GROUNDED APPROACH TO DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION IN THE CLIMATE CRISIS

Central to this Report are 10 country case studies on Australia, Bhutan, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The case study approach has been adopted to elaborate on how the challenges to democracy posed by the climate crisis manifest themselves in specific national contexts, and to identify concrete ways to address these challenges through democratic innovation (see section 1.4 for the list of questions generated for the country case studies).

The 10 countries were chosen for their diversity, in terms of climate vulnerability and climate action. Climate vulnerability was given particular emphasis. There are four case studies from Pacific Island nations (Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), in recognition of the extreme climate risk faced by low-lying islands. The case studies are also diverse in terms of democratic regime types and geographic subregions of the Asia-Pacific region. They include the three most populous democracies in the Asia-Pacific—India, Indonesia and Japan (see Table 1.2).

1.4. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

1. What are the key elements of the country’s political system?

2. What are key aspects of its climate vulnerability?
   - How is the country vulnerable to climate impacts, such as increases in mean temperature; increases in sea level rise; impact on biodiversity and ecosystems; and impact on marine biodiversity, fisheries and ecosystems?
   - How does the country’s climate vulnerability compare to other countries? (Please include details from the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2020.)
Table 1.2. Key attributes of country case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Climate vulnerability ranking</th>
<th>Climate change performance</th>
<th>Subregion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Climate Change Performance Index; University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index.

Note: A higher climate vulnerability ranking indicates a lower level of vulnerability (e.g. Australia is ranked 16th out of 182 countries). Conversely, a lower ranking indicates a higher level of vulnerability (e.g. Solomon Islands is ranked 165th out of 182 countries).

3. What are key aspects of its climate action?
   - Is the country committed to key climate change international treaties and/or active in regional and/or international forums addressing the crisis?
   - Does the Constitution address the climate crisis?
   - Is there specific legislation addressing the crisis?
   - Who are the champions of climate action (political parties; cross-party alliances; civil society organizations, including environmental, labour and youth groups)?
   - What has been the role of various levels of government?
   - What has been the role of the courts?
   - How does the country’s climate action compare to other countries? (Please include details from the Climate Change Performance Index, 2021.)
4. What are the key circumstances hindering effective climate action?
   - In the discussion, please include the following circumstances of democratic debilitation: short-termism; self-referring decision-making; weak multilateralism; and capture by vested interests.

5. How has, and how can, democracy in this country innovate to become more effective at addressing the climate crisis?
   - In the discussion, please include the following ways of democratic innovation: a planning state; a solidaristic ethos; invigorated multilateralism; and fair and inclusive political processes.

6. What are the key threats to democracy in this country from the climate crisis?
   - In the discussion, please include the threats of insecurity, inequality, instability, democratic backsliding, and the threats to free and fair elections.

7. How has, and how can, democracy in this country be better insulated from these threats?
   - In the discussion, please include the following ways of democratic insulation: a planning state; a solidaristic ethos; invigorated multilateralism; and fair and inclusive political processes.
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