BUILDING BACK BETTER: A DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY AFTER TYPHOON HAIYAN

Edited by
Edna Estifania A. Co, DPA
Maria Jorica B. Pamintuan
Lea Marie F. Diño
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Published by:
University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies

This report is a product of an assessment of the democratic accountability in service delivery conducted on the basis of International IDEA’s Democratic Accountability in Service Delivery Assessment framework. The report was developed by the Center for Integrative and Development Studies (CIDS) of the University of the Philippines, the Guiuan Development Foundation, Inc. and Politracs with the support and partnership of International IDEA. International IDEA has not participated in the content development nor the research leading to the report. Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members.

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Cover Design: Maria Jorica Pamintuan
Cover Photo: Ladylyn L. Mangada
Printed by: VJ Graphic Arts, Inc.

ISBN: 978-971-742-110-0

Acknowledgements:
Heartfelt appreciation and gratitude is being extended by the Palo Study Team to the local government of Palo, especially to the Local Chief Executive and the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, and to the participants of the focus group discussions and key informant interviews, including the representatives of private donors of housing projects, as well as the internally displaced survivors of Yolanda who are residing in the nine study sites/housing projects.
The book, “Building Back Better: A Democratic Assessment of Service Delivery After Typhoon Haiyan,” is an excellent source of information and understanding of the processes that were undertaken in the delivery of housing units to families in the localities of Guiuan in Eastern Samar and Palo, Leyte whose homes and livelihood had been devastated by Typhoon Haiyan.

Yolanda/Haiyan served as an eye-opener to the Philippines on the ravages that can be wrought by a storm of such magnitude. The recovery and rehabilitation effort, the focus of this book, was a very challenging task, especially the delivery of housing units to the affected population. Myriad of obstacles confronted the joint recovery and assistance effort of agencies in all levels of government. The book provided an insight of the coordination mechanism to respond to disaster needs at all levels including the functions, roles and responsibilities among government agencies, volunteer, donors and private groups.

NDRRMC through the Office of Civil Defense recognized this book as a good reference for monitoring, evaluation, review and improvements on the current disaster risk reduction and management system.

We encourage UP-CIDS to continue this kind of project to spur development and uplift the lives of our countrymen through extensive research programs and scholarly undertaking, contributing to our national effort in building a safer, disaster-resilient adaptive communities throughout our country.

More power to UP-CIDS!

USEC ALEXANDER P. PAMA
Executive Director, NDRRMC and Civil Defense Administrator
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDRRMC</td>
<td>Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Batas Pambansa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC-ANCOP</td>
<td>Couples for Christ-Answering the Cry of the Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Commission on Audit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRPP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBM</td>
<td>Department of Budget and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>Department of Environment and National Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLG</td>
<td>Department of Interior and Local Government</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defense</td>
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<td>DOH</td>
<td>Department of Health</td>
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<td>DOST</td>
<td>Department of Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPWH</td>
<td>Department of Public Works and Highways</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
<td>Emergency Shelter Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAITH</td>
<td>Foreign Aid Transparency Hub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAA</td>
<td>General Appropriations Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>government financial institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GK</td>
<td>Gawad Kalinga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOCC</td>
<td>Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSIS</td>
<td>Government Service Insurance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization on Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Memorandum Circular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDRRM</td>
<td>Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGU</td>
<td>Local Government Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIAC</td>
<td>Local Inter-Agency Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>Local Government Rehabilitation and Recovery Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRRMC</td>
<td>Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRRMO</td>
<td>Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>Marig-on Homeowners Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSWDO</td>
<td>Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBZ</td>
<td>No Build Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDCC</td>
<td>National Disaster Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRRMC</td>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRRMF</td>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRRMP</td>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEDA</td>
<td>National Economic and Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>National Food Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHA</td>
<td>National Housing Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>Office of Civil Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPARR</td>
<td>Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARR</td>
<td>Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDNA</td>
<td>Post-Disaster Needs Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Philippine Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Response Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Republic Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Revised Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAY</td>
<td>Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (Haiyan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDRRMC</td>
<td>Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNAP</td>
<td>Strategic National Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The assessment used the framework developed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) on democratic accountability in service delivery to evaluate the performance of the Philippine Government in the delivery of housing units to families in the localities of Guiuan in Eastern Samar and Palo, Leyte, whose homes and livelihood had been devastated by Typhoon Haiyan. Communities, local government units, and other authorities and stakeholders were interviewed to glean insights on the degree and extent of government accountability based on the principles of “ANSWERABILITY”, “RESPONSIVENESS” and “ENFORCEABILITY”. To assess these three principles, the project reviewed both national and local policies, and the laws that govern service delivery in disaster-affected areas. It also identified the mechanisms and structures through which services are provided. The assessment examined the institutional arrangements and incentives through which duty bearers are able to connect with their claim holders, as well as the availability of mechanisms for connecting such as consultation and citizen feedback or any other mechanism or interaction for highlighting citizens’ voices. Finally, the project examined how accountability is ensured through enforcement processes, either formal or informal, such as sanctions, penalties, the presence of an Ombudsman or access to similar mechanisms that strengthen accountability.

Numerous national policies and laws govern accountability in service delivery in disaster-affected areas. These are complemented by ordinances and executive issuances by local government entities. The most significant legislation at the national level is Republic Act 10121, which calls for the establishment of a local disaster risk reduction and management (LDRRM) office in every province, city, and municipality, and requires
the drafting of an LDRRM plan. Another important policy, Republic Act 10174, created the People’s Survival Fund. In the specific case of Typhoon Haiyan, a presidential order established the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Relief and Rehabilitation (OPARR). These national measures were enacted in accordance with the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005–2015.

National policy also requires every town to have a Municipal Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council (MDRRMC) in order to mitigate the effects of calamities through effective disaster response at the local level. Immediately after Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippine Commission on Audit (COA) reviewed the government’s performance on disaster response, particularly the use of calamity funds. The COA found that despite the urgent need to assist affected communities, the disaster response funds were inadequately utilized at both the national and the local levels. The problems with accountability identified by the COA were linked to procedural lapses and time-consuming processes. However, there were also procurement and contracting issues linked to expedited government action, particularly on relief goods. The CoA also noted lapses in the recording and documentation of donations. The accuracy of inventories was affected by missing information, documents or forms. Above all, the COA emphasized the need for better accountability mechanisms. International, private and donor organizations were enthusiastic, generous and supportive of service delivery but the official duty bearers, such as and including the OPARR, seemed unable to lead and coordinate the relief effort.

At the local level, particularly in the case of Guiuan in Eastern Samar, new mechanisms for local leadership and coordination were introduced. Instead of establishing the legally prescribed MDRRMC, the local government created the Guiuan Rehabilitation and Recovery Sustainable Development Group, which was asked to create a Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan for the municipality. The Plan, however, was never completed. In the meantime, the local Chief Executive, on his own initiative, continued recovery efforts with little consultation with stakeholders and even less with local communities. The municipality also created a mechanism that approximated a Housing Board. It was tasked with framing a Shelter Plan, which is also yet to be completed. At the same time, the National Housing Authority (NHA) pushed the local government to create a Local Inter-agency Committee (LIAC), but with little success. This pattern of the non-creation and recreation of mechanisms, and the non-completion of shelter plans led to confusion over which parties should be held accountable, particularly with regard to ANSWERABILITY for service delivery. Nor did this lack of regard for communities’ opinions, and the absence of mechanisms for interaction between duty bearers and claim holders augur well for RESPONSIVENESS. In addition, there were absolutely no provisions for ENFORCEABILITY as policies and mechanisms were not revisited to ask what penalties and sanctions might be put in place in case of non-implementation.
Palo in the province of Leyte provided a further narrative on service delivery accountability. The municipality had set up shelter-related bodies, and has mechanisms and local policies that define accountability. In spite of the existence of local structures and mechanisms for disaster response and risk reduction, a shelter plan could not be completed before it was overtaken by Typhoon Haiyan. Thus, it was the international organizations and the national agencies that assisted in the formulation of a Risk Reduction and Management Plan for 2013–2017. The appropriate committees that should have taken action on the Plan were not created. Houses were built, but the number fell far short of the total needed by affected communities. Rehabilitation efforts were also considered too slow to accommodate the population that needed shelter. There are some indications of duty bearers’ ANSWERABILITY but much remains to be done.

There are some examples of Duty bearers’ RESPONSIVENESS to claim holders. The Guiuan local government, for example, was quick to take steps to resettle affected communities. The municipal mayor was proactive in pressuring the National Housing Authority and the municipal government secured and shouldered the cost of buying the land. The Guiuan Rehab Group acted quickly to pass the local legislation required to facilitate the rehabilitation efforts, and the first draft of the Guiuan Rehab Plan was disseminated to all department heads and local legislative council members for review. However, claim holders expect a better system of communication to ensure that: (a) there is a good system for identifying the correct beneficiaries for housing services; (b) they can be assured that the completed housing units will be of good quality; and (c) housing policies are more responsive to citizens’ needs. The feedback from the project study identified a need to strengthen the RESPONSIVENESS between donors and the government so that the gap between the agencies that build and those that manage the permanent housing facilities can be reduced. There appears to be a lack of uniform standards for building houses and their design requirements, as well as for granting or obtaining building permits, amenities, costs, and so on. This contributes to variations in the quality of the houses and the length of time it takes to build them. The duty bearers are responsible for smoothing out their procedures in an LDRRM plan, and they must therefore be held accountable for the quality of the housing and how quickly it is built. The lack of RESPONSIVENESS is also indicated in the feedback from citizens that they were not informed about and unaware of the concept of resilient housing design and other standards.

Although there are few provisions on the ENFORCEABILITY of policies in order to enhance accountability, some citizens were informally talking about enforcing penalties on errant duty bearers, for example, by not voting for them at the next election. The local media, however, which could have been a valuable ally in ensuring that duty bearers were held accountable, was not a significant player in extracting greater liability from the government.
Despite the numerous individual failings identified, the project succeeded in highlighting how an assessment tool might strengthen accountability in service delivery. Moreover, the difficulty in relating the responses and analyses of the stakeholders to the three elements of accountability—

- ANSWERABILITY,
- RESPONSIVENESS,
- and ENFORCEABILITY—could help with rethinking how the traditional tools for accountability, such as user outreach, ad hoc user meetings, publication of performance data, structured consultation processes, allowing users membership or voting rights on advisory boards, decision-making and regulatory bodies, citizens’ report cards, retrospective performance or perception surveys, and complaints procedures, could be introduced, and better communicated and disseminated.

The assessment was jointly carried out by the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, the Guiuan Development Foundation, Inc., Upod Pagpauswanghan Eastern Visayas, Inc., and Politracs, Inc.
This book is about accountability and service delivery. Partly inspired by the continuing platform of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) on democracy assessment, it looks into the Philippine government’s delivery of services to victims of Super-typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda). The focus and locus of this assessment is the provision of housing for the vast population of Filipinos rendered homeless by the monster typhoon that hit the central regions of the country in November 2013.

Accountability is not only a technical and financial concern. It is also a field in the social sciences, in so far as it defines a relationship between two parties – namely the government on the one hand as a player in service provision, and the citizens on the other, as the latter hold government officials accountable for their actions.

Service delivery is a crucial arena for examination in accountability, especially in countries such as the Philippines, where the government plays a major role in providing the basic requirements for survival to the citizenry.

This evaluation maps accountability using: a) the rules defined by national and local laws and policies, b) the players’ roles in the execution of these policies, and c) the various accountability mechanisms where the citizens interact with officeholders. This project focuses on two municipalities in the central Philippines—Palo in the province of Leyte and Guiuan in Eastern Samar—which were among the most devastated and badly hit by Typhoon Haiyan.
The Methodology

The assessment works on the premise of accountability - “rules of the game” established by policies, laws, executive orders, local ordinances, and agency agreements that ensure the proper conduct of service delivery. These rules provide a guide by which the extent of government engagement and citizen participation can be measured.

For this review of the delivery of housing services to communities affected by Super-typhoon Haiyan, field researchers visited Guiuan, Eastern Samar and Palo, Leyte over a four month-period, from May to August 2015 to collect primary qualitative data. Key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with members of the local government, humanitarian organizations, and the local offices of national government agencies, while focus group discussions (FGDs) were done to gather insights from housing beneficiaries and storm survivors living in transitional shelters, bunkhouses, and on islands in high-risk areas.

The two case studies in this research were evaluated based on the three main elements of International IDEA’s Democratic Accountability framework: answerability, responsiveness and enforceability.

The study determines the level of answerability ascribed to government offices by laws and policies. It also measures the responsiveness of these offices to the citizens’ needs, given the urgent circumstances under which services needed to be provided. Responsiveness, in this sense, refers to making resources and services available to citizens – it can be likened to the “supply” side of service delivery.

Lastly, this assessment also examines the enforceability of these mechanisms and whether actions, sanctions, or corrective measures are taken by both parties.

This evaluation is divided into three parts. First is a desk report, which pulls in data from the media, official documents and government and private sector reports. It provides an overview of the impact of Super-typhoon Haiyan on the Philippines, as well as the country’s existing legislation and policies on disaster management and response.

The second section consists of two chapters, each outlining a case study of a community that was devastated by the storm. These field reports were done at the community level, and thus involved a number of focus group discussions with affected residents. The researchers also engaged key sources of information such as local authorities and representatives of humanitarian groups and international organizations.

Lastly, a concluding chapter distils the observations noted in the field reports and offers policy recommendations for the improvement of housing service delivery.
Put together, the assessment identifies where the “pain points” of housing service delivery lie, and how accountability is measured using the principles of answerability, responsiveness, and enforceability. The research also evaluates the level of transparency in the delivery process, as well as the transmission of information.

Overall, an assessment on accountability in service delivery under conditions of emergency and urgency highlights the importance of decision-making and leadership, which are characteristics of governance in a calamity-prone country such as the Philippines. The assessment bears implications on policies and practices that address service delivery.

Edna Estifania A. Co
Executive Director, UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies
Impact of Typhoon Haiyan

Typhoon Haiyan, locally known as Yolanda, was one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded. With a wind speed of more than 300 km/h and storm surges of over four meters, the typhoon devastated much of the central Philippines. It made its first landfall on the province of Eastern Samar on Nov. 8, 2013, and then passed through the Visayas region and the island province of Palawan before exiting the Philippine area of responsibility the following day.


Of the devastated regions, the Eastern Visayas—where the two case studies of this assessment, the municipalities of Guiuan and Palo, are located—was the hardest-hit (NEDA 2014). The storm claimed 5,826 lives in the region, injured 29,303, and caused damage and losses amounting to PHP 130.41 billion ($3.01 billion). Nearly a thousand people are still missing over two years after the disaster hit (Cordero 2014).

1 Based on Central Bank of the Philippines Exchange Rate as of 16 July 2014: PHP 43.29 to US$. 
The Government’s Response

Less than two weeks after the storm struck, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) began drafting the government’s rehabilitation and recovery plan. The Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda - Build Back Better (RAY) document was released on Dec. 18, 2013. NEDA developed a second document, the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda-Implementation for Results (RAY-I4R) to accelerate the rehabilitation process. These two documents provided the framework for recovery in four priority result areas: (1) livelihood and business development; (2) housing and resettlement; (3) social services; and (4) infrastructure.

The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) also conducted a needs assessment in December 2013. The agency consulted national government offices, local government units (LGUs), civil society and non-government organizations to identify the reconstruction needs of affected communities, as well as issues in public policy that needed to be addressed. The resulting Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) was presented to President Benigno Aquino III in May 2014.

Meanwhile, the President created the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) through Memorandum Circular No. 62 in
December 2013 to coordinate the national government agencies involved in responding to the humanitarian crisis. The OPARR was tasked to assemble an over-all strategic vision for recovery, including short-term, medium-term, and long-term plans and programs. The office coordinates with the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC) and its member agencies in the formulation of plans and programs for the rehabilitation, recovery, and development of affected areas, the proposal of funding support, and the exercise of oversight over concerned government agencies.

The PARR established five working clusters to unify the efforts of the offices involved in the different aspects of recovery (see figure 1.2).

![Government's Cluster Framework](image_url)

*Figure 1.2 Government’s Cluster Framework
Source: Cordero, Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Efforts (2014)*

Based on these clusters, the OPARR developed the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP), an 8,000-page, 8-volume document which outlines the 18,648 programs, projects and activities that will enable affected communities to rebuild their homes and lives. President Aquino approved the plan in October 2014, roughly a month before the first anniversary of the catastrophic storm.

Local Government Rehabilitation and Recovery Plans (LRRP) were also formulated by provincial governments engaged by the OPARR’s working clusters. The provinces of Cebu, Iloilo, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Palawan, Masbate, Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Negros
Occidental, Biliran, Southern Leyte, and the Dinagat Islands, as well as the charter city of Tacloban, contributed their LRRPs to enrich the CRRP. This framework recognizes the bottom-up approach by enabling LGUs to centrally participate in the rehabilitation and recovery effort.

The OPARR framework and cluster plan (see figure 1.3) is specific and detailed, making it the most appropriate basis of a democratic assessment on the delivery of services relative to Typhoon Haiyan.

**Figure 1.3 Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan**
*Source: Cordero, “Rebuilding After Haiyan “Improving Lives, Building Resilient Communities” (2014)*

**Resources for Recovery and Rehabilitation**
The impact of the typhoon was so strong that the Philippines requires an estimated PHP 170.92 billion to recover from the calamity, while also meeting the targets of the Philippine Development Plan (PDP). The summary of the indicative funding requirements is presented in table 1.
For 2016, another PHP 46 billion has been allocated for rehabilitation and recovery from Typhoon Haiyan. Around PHP 27.3 billion of this amount is lodged in the allocations for various government agencies, while PHP 18.9 billion is earmarked for a dedicated Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program.

As of November 2015, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) has released a total of PHP 93.87 billion in government funds to address the needs of communities devastated by Typhoon Haiyan. These fund releases were charged against various funding sources in 2013, 2014 and 2015 national budgets (DBM 2015a). A detailed list of the DBM’s releases, disaggregated by national agency is presented in Annex 2.

From 2013 to September 2015, the DBM released PHP 27 billion for the construction of 92,554 housing units. Over 80 percent of the projects with funding have already been initiated, though only 17,641 have been completed. The bulk of the housing units, or 42,566 are still being built. The National Housing Authority (NHA) aims to finish all of the projects by December 2016 (DBM 2015b).

**Table 1.1 Summary of Indicative Funding Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Plan</th>
<th>2014-2016</th>
<th>in USD</th>
<th>Funded</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>in USD</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>35.148,634,708</td>
<td>811,934,274</td>
<td>23,213,888,217</td>
<td>10,863,664,191</td>
<td>250,719,894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>26.406,233,815</td>
<td>609,984,611</td>
<td>2,844,529,078</td>
<td>23,561,704,737</td>
<td>544,275,924</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resettlement</td>
<td>75.678,680,000</td>
<td>1,748,179,256</td>
<td>2,438,638,000</td>
<td>73,240,042,000</td>
<td>1,691,846,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood</td>
<td>33.682,884,442</td>
<td>778,075,409</td>
<td>8,923,114,258</td>
<td>24,759,770,184</td>
<td>571,951,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>170,916,432,965</td>
<td>3,948,173,550</td>
<td>37,420,169,553</td>
<td>133,496,263,412</td>
<td>3,083,766,769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on BSP Exchange Rate as of 16 July 2014: PhP 43.29 to US$  
Source: OPARR, Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Efforts (2014)*

**Table 1.2 Status of Housing Projects with Funds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds Released (in billions of pesos)</th>
<th>Number of Housing Units</th>
<th>Initiated</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.382</td>
<td>46,129</td>
<td>44,070</td>
<td>23,523</td>
<td>15,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.999</td>
<td>27,313</td>
<td>25,666</td>
<td>16,434</td>
<td>2,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.300</td>
<td>4,439</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.314</td>
<td>14,673</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>92,554</td>
<td>74,385</td>
<td>42,566</td>
<td>17,641*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*18,169 units now undergoing procurement; 929 units turned-over  
Source: Department of Budget and Management (2015b)*

For 2016, another PHP 46 billion has been allocated for rehabilitation and recovery from Typhoon Haiyan. Around PHP 27.3 billion of this amount is lodged in the allocations for various government agencies, while PHP 18.9 billion is earmarked for a dedicated Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program.
With regard to housing, PHP 25.6 billion was allocated to the NHA for the construction of housing units. Another PHP 992 million and PHP 660 million were included in the respective budgets of the Local Water Utilities Administration and the National Electrification Administration for the installation of water and power lines in affected communities (DBM 2015a).

It is also important to note that the Philippines received PHP 73.31 billion ($1.64 billion) in cash and non-cash aid from foreign donors. According to the most recent data from the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH) fund tracker of the DBM, as of November 2015, only 23.5 percent or PHP 17.23 billion ($0.39 billion) of the total pledges has been received, either by the government (14.35 percent) or by NGOs and multilaterals on the ground (85.65 percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pledges</th>
<th>in USD</th>
<th>Received (Gov’t)</th>
<th>Received (NGOs)</th>
<th>in USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>45,109,273,248.49</td>
<td>1,011,033,311.26</td>
<td>1,202,312,574.78</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Cash</td>
<td>28,198,165,586.87</td>
<td>632,004,966.40</td>
<td>1,269,787,369.01</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>73,307,438,834.36</td>
<td>1,643,038,277.66</td>
<td>2,472,099,943.79</td>
<td>14,761,197,966.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on BSP Exchange Rate: PhP 44.617 to US$  
Source: Department of Budget and Management, Full Report, Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (2015c)

### Disaster Accountability in the Philippines

#### Laws and Policies in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management in the Philippines

The Philippines has a roster of laws regarding disaster risk reduction and management (see Annex 1). The first of these was Presidential Decree 1566, which created the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), the focal organization for disaster management in the country. Enacted in 1978, the law also provided for the establishment of regional, provincial, city, municipal, and barangay disaster coordinating councils.

Decades later, Republic Act 10121, the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act of 2010, was passed. It provides a strong legal and institutional basis for DRRM in the Philippines. The main purpose of the Act is “to strengthen the Philippine disaster risk reduction and management system, providing for the national disaster risk reduction and management framework and institutionalizing the national disaster risk reduction and management plan, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes.” It serves as a general guide “for the development of policies and plans and the implementation of actions and measures pertaining to all aspects of disaster risk
reduction and management, including good governance, risk assessment and early warning, knowledge building and awareness raising, reducing underlying risk factors, and preparedness for effective response and early recovery.”

RA 10121 also required the establishment of a local disaster risk reduction and management (LDRRM) office in every province, city, and municipality, as well as the drafting of a LDRRM plan.

Under the law, the National Disaster Coordinating Council was also renamed the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). The Council was empowered with policy-making, coordination, integration, supervision, and monitoring and evaluation functions.

Other policies on disaster include provisions on climate change adaptation and mitigation, consumer protection during disasters, the role of local government units during disasters, prescribing rules during disasters, health policies and donation-related laws. The country also has a variety of other disaster frameworks, guidelines and plans (see Annex 3).

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) 2011-2028—a road map to effective and efficient disaster relief response and recovery—was also created to facilitate the implementation of RA 10121 (see Annex 4).

Lastly, in 2013, Memorandum Order No. 62 created the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (see Annex 5).

**Philippine Disaster Response Framework**

The NDRRMP provides the legal basis for policies, plans and programs that deal with the requirements of the RA 10121. The NDRRMP covers four thematic areas, which correspond to the structure of the NDRRMC:

1. Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
2. Disaster Preparedness
3. Disaster Response
4. Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery

According to RA 10121, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) is in charge of formulating and implementing the NDRRMP. In addition, the OCD will ensure that the physical framework, social, economic and environmental plans of communities, cities, municipalities and provinces are consistent with the plan.
The NDRRMP serves as the “principal guide to disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) efforts [of] the country.” The plan is consistent with the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework (NDRRMF) that envisions a country of “safer, adaptive and disaster resilient Filipino communities toward sustainable development.” The NDRRMP lays down the expected outcomes, outputs, key activities, indicators, lead agencies, implementing partners and timelines under each of the four distinct yet mutually reinforcing thematic areas. Moreover, “the plan conveys a paradigm shift from reactive to proactive DRRM wherein men and women have increased their awareness and understanding of DRRM, with the end in view of increasing people’s resilience and decreasing their vulnerabilities.”

Figure 1.4 is a graphical illustration of the goals the four thematic areas for the attainment of the country’s overall DRRM vision.

![Figure 1.4 Four Thematic Areas of the PDRRM](source: NDRRMC, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011-2028 (2011))
Financial Resources for DRRM in the Philippines

The Philippines has two major disaster risk financing schemes:

1. **National DRRM Fund (NDRRMF) or the Calamity Fund in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)**

   The fund is used for disaster risk reduction activities and capital expenditures for pre-disaster operations, rehabilitation and other related activities in the following order of priorities:

   - **Priority 1** - For urgent and emergency relief operations, health services, settlement and rehabilitation of affected populations, as well as the emergency repair and rehabilitation of vital infrastructures and lifelines damaged by a disaster or calamity;

   - **Priority 2** - For repair, rehabilitation and reconstruction of other damaged infrastructures or facilities which are not emergency in nature but are necessary for disaster mitigation; and

   - **Priority 3** - For pre-disaster activities outside the regular budgets of line agencies and proposed capital expenditures for pre-disaster operations.

   The Calamity Fund is pre-allocated to concerned national agencies as a standby fund for areas affected by disasters that occur during the budget year (and even in the prior year) in order to normalize the situation and living conditions in these areas as quickly as possible. A part of this fund is funneled into a Quick Response Fund (QRF), which is distinct from the remainder of the Calamity Fund in that it may be used or released without the NDRMMC’s endorsement or the President’s approval. However, when these agencies’ QRF gets depleted, they must request for replenishment from the DBM and seek the approval of the President. The Calamity Fund accounts for 30 percent of the National DRMM Fund.

2. **Local DRRM Fund (LDRRMF)**

   The Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund is made up of no less than five percent of the estimated revenue from regular sources of local government units. Section 21 of RA 10121 stipulates that the fund “shall be set aside as the support for disaster risk management activities such as, but not limited to, pre-disaster preparedness programs including training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and medicines, for post-disaster activities, and for the payment of premiums on calamity insurance.”
Like the National DRRM Fund, 30 percent of the Local DRRM Fund is set aside as a Quick Response Fund, stand-by allocation for relief and recovery programs, so that affected communities can be normalized in the quickest possible time. The remaining 70 percent of the fund covers disaster prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, rehabilitation and recovery (Joint Memorandum Circular 2013-1).

3. The Philippines also has two minor sources of funds—the **Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)**, which provides catastrophe insurance coverage for government-owned assets, and the **People’s Survival Fund**, an emerging source of funds for resilience. Implementing Rules and Regulations have been issued for the latter fund; however, there have yet to be clear guidelines regarding the steps in processing requests, or about the fund’s scoring system. Meanwhile, the GSIS is still refining its insurance instruments regarding local government assets coverage. A Joint Memorandum Circular on the matter is currently being drafted by the Office of Civil Defense.

**The Accountability Assessment**

**Special Audit of the Relief Operations for Typhoon Haiyan Victims**

With the massive impact of Typhoon Haiyan and the consequent release of funds for relief and recovery, the Commission on Audit (COA) immediately issued a resolution for the post-audit of the government’s rehabilitation efforts.

The audit procedures covered the following:

1. Audit scope (national calamity in the provinces of Leyte, Samar, Cebu, Iloilo, Capiz, Aklan, and Palawan)
2. Audit period covered the period of the State of National Calamity
3. Focus areas of the audit were the following:
   - Sources and receipt of foreign aid
   - Release of local funds by the Office of the President, the Department of Budget and Management, the NDRRMC and other agencies involved
   - Inter-agency transfer of funds
   - Procurement and logistics
   - Distribution of goods and services
4. The following agencies were involved in the audit:
   - Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
   - Department of Health (DOH)
   - Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
   - Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Office of Civil Defense (OCD)  
National Food Authority (NFA)

The COA team found that some calamity funds have remained unutilized, both at the national and local levels, despite the pressing need to provide services to affected communities. The audit also found that the delivery of assistance was also delayed by procedural lapses and time-consuming processes. However, on the other side of the spectrum, the COA also documented procurement and contracting issues because of expedited government action, especially with regard to relief goods. The public bidding process in procurement was also skipped because of the urgency of the emergency situation, but strangely, many of the immediately procured items remained undistributed months after they were purchased.

Because of the circumstances, there were also lapses in the documentation and recording of donations, both in cash and in kind. The audit noted that some supplies were moved without the necessary documents, making it difficult to establish actual inventories. In the specific case of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, there were discrepancies in the accounting of food packs between warehouse personnel and DSWD employees that could not be resolved because of missing information and forms.

In sum, the COA team highlighted the need to assess the bureaucratic processes that impede the delivery of social services, especially in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. However, the group also emphasized that the “controls and other accountability mechanisms... ensure the proper use of much needed resources” (COA 2014, 25).

Voices and Participation of Concerned Agencies and Donors

One of the early reports on the response to the Haiyan disaster event was prepared by Oxfam International, with the help of Aksyon Klima Pilipinas (Climate Action Philippines). The paper released in December 2013 outlined the immediate relief and recovery efforts on the ground, and painted a picture of the storm’s impact on local communities (Chughtai 2013).

A mother from a fishing community, for example, told the aid group, “Many storms have passed here. But we did not expect a storm that brought a ‘tsunami’ with it. We only know of rain and wind. We did not expect the sea would devour the land.”

Chughtai (2013) reports that an estimated three million people received food assistance packages consisting of rice, high energy biscuits and other emergency food items. Over 35,000 households also received tarpaulin sheets or tents (particularly in Eastern Samar and Leyte provinces), while tarps for another 478,000 households were already on their way. At the time, about 80 percent of the people still in Tacloban City had access to clean water, and about 60,000 hygiene kits had been distributed.
The immediate aid, which included health care, protection of children and some cash transfers, enabled families to survive, prevented the outbreak of diseases, and helped people start the long road to rebuilding their lives. This quick delivery of emergency assistance was a notable achievement in the relief efforts. However, this is not to say that the recovery drive was an absolute success. Chughtai (2013) also said that millions of people received little aid from NGOs, and little to no aid at all from official sources.

In November 2014—a year after Haiyan struck—a UN assessment of nine municipalities in Leyte province noted that “food appears to be effectively distributed in some [areas] but not effectively or evenly distributed in others... the more remote communities are not notified adequately or are required to walk in for what remains available” (Chughtai 2013).

Inadequate shelter

In terms of rehabilitation, according to Cousins (2014) in an assessment in northwest Leyte, shelter kits distribution met only less than 10 percent of total needs. Lack of or delay in the distribution of shelter materials and the doubling of the prices of these materials caused delays in the rebuilding of homes.

The evacuation centers were overwhelmed by the large population of people left homeless by the storm. Sanitation problems due to lack of proper drainage and waste management and the lack of clean water at these facilities caused disease outbreaks, particularly diarrhea.

The massive displacement of families and the consequent overcrowding at evacuation centers also increased the vulnerability of women and children. A serious problem was the degree to which assistance varied in terms of location. For example, many relief distribution programs were based on official voters’ lists (Cousins 2014). The limited number of vehicles and warehouse facilities also delayed distribution. Many villages in Eastern Samar, including indigenous communities, received no assistance during the first few weeks after the disaster, forcing remote villages to rely on local charities, individual donors and businesses, and churches.

Working with the government

Coordination among government agencies and donors proved to be one of the more difficult aspects of recovery. On the government’s end, the NDRRMC served as the backbone of disaster management, putting all sectors and forces together—from the national and local government, to the armed forces and civil society. Several department heads or cabinet members were dispatched to affected areas to oversee relief operations, and a task force was formed to draft a rehabilitation and recovery plan. However,
in the initial phases of the relief efforts, the government’s response to the calamity was disorganized. Fortunately, the appointment of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) improved the exchange of information among the concerned agencies and private parties. This however, highlights the inadequacy of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council in handling a disaster of Haiyan’s magnitude.

The OPARR provided direction to the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, but it was not given full command in implementing and enforcing the recovery plans. Coordination of government agencies, the private sector, and international organizations was not possible to achieve. Thus, in December 2014, a year after he was appointed, the PARR resigned from his post.

Meanwhile, the local government units also play a significant role in all the phases of service delivery. However, again, coordination between various national and international players and the local government units was problematic.

**Generous donors**

Assistance provided by foreign governments was described by Oxfam to be far more generous than the usual. Within the first two or three weeks, $391 million in humanitarian assistance was received from the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, among other countries.

According to Mark Goldring of Oxfam GB, “While international donors have been swift to respond to the Philippines disaster, that and sufficient humanitarian aid elsewhere is the real test of global decency as 2013 draws to an end.” Substantial donations also came from multilateral organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Commission, the Persian Gulf countries, and countless private individuals.

The UN agencies were mobilized with urgency. The clusters for Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) and Protection were among those that performed exceptionally well. Most outstanding among these agencies was the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Although there was an initial delay due to logistical challenges, the mobilization quickly improved after a couple of weeks.

International NGOs and civil society groups worked efficiently to extend support to both the UN and government authorities. Oxfam alone helped restore water supplies in Tacloban for 80,000 people—a project done in collaboration with the Leyte Metropolitan Water Department and A Single Drop of Safe Water, a Philippine NGO.
The private sector was equally generous. Both small and multinational corporations played an important role in the disaster response effort. Philippine private companies contributed over $45 million in funds and in-kind assistance. The Danish IT office even provided surveillance equipment with video and thermal imaging capabilities that flew over streets blocked by debris.

Continuing Narratives of Communities on Yolanda Service Delivery and Assistance

Two years after Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, survivors continue to raise concerns about permanent homes. In Tacloban City, only 1,128 permanent houses have been constructed by the National Housing Authority (NHA).

According to a report by Leila B. Salaverria on Oct. 23, 2015:

“...residents staying in temporary shelters for the storm survivors are still yearning for permanent homes promised by the government. The government allocated more than P100 billion to efforts toward rehabilitation of devastated areas, and aid came pouring in for the survivors from local and international donors. But the delivery of the promised help and relief seems to be moving slowly. At first glance, the community of temporary shelters, hosting 115 families, looks bucolic. The rows of nipa houses look orderly, the dirt roads are free of trash, and flowers bloom in front of most of the shelters. But while there are roofs over people's heads, the community does not have a regular source of running water and electricity, though water is delivered to residents thrice a week and donors have given them small solar panels just enough to give them light at night.”

In a Senate hearing in October, a senator commented, “This is temporary housing that seems to be becoming permanent.” The same news story reported that housing officials said less than one tenth of the 200,000 houses that were supposed to be built for those affected by Yolanda had been constructed. The delay was due to problems with land acquisition as well as the need to secure various permits to ensure the area was safe.

Other problems such as unsafe shelter, slow use of funds, extensive damage, and the lack of steady sources of income have also been reported by local media.

Rhea Alaga, a 30-year-old mother of two who moved to the area in December last year told the Inquirer, “It's not safe here. Every time it would rain, my son would cling to me and say ‘There's a storm, there's a storm.’”
Speaking to the media, Senator Francis Escudero raised concerns about the availability of funds for Haiyan survivors. He said, “The national treasurer provided a certification that there were available funds for the PHP 100 billion. Where is that? Why is it that our fellow countrymen seemingly do not feel the help from the government?”

Meanwhile, Chaloka Beyani, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons reported that nearly two years after Haiyan struck the Philippines, thousands of survivors still remained in shanties without access to stable electricity or water supply. Beyani said in his report, “While the government is to be commended in terms of its immediate responses, its attention for ensuring sustainable durable solutions for internally displaced (people) remains inadequate to date.”

**Accountability Challenges**

After the immediate response, the greater challenge that now confronts the Philippines is the rehabilitation and recovery of communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan. Poverty and inequality remain hurdles to recovery and development. The country’s experience with Typhoon Haiyan serves as a warning to the world: as disasters are becoming more frequent and more powerful occurrences in many parts of the world, communities are now more vulnerable to climate hazards.

It is therefore important to adapt through adequate planning, improvements to infrastructure, the formulation of disaster risk preparedness and mitigation programs, and the creation of systems for disbursing insurance and compensation for losses, rehabilitation and recovery. A sustained reconstruction strategy is also called for.

On the part of authorities, there may be greater need to scale up investments in disaster risk reduction, including revamped structural designs mechanisms to adequately carry out response and relief with agility and direction. The Philippine experience also sends a signal to the world that global policy agreements such as cutting carbon emissions are significant to addressing the shared problem of climate change.
References


Guiuan is a second-class municipality located at the southernmost tip of the province of Eastern Samar. It is the second largest and the most populous town in the province. The municipality is made up of 60 barangays, 22 of which are coastal, 18 are inland, and 20 are islands (Bayawan 2015).

Because of its geographic location as one of the easternmost points in the country, Guiuan is exposed to a number of natural hazards, including floods, heavy storms, droughts, earthquakes, and typhoons (refer to Annex 6 for more details on Guiuan’s vulnerability to calamities).

When Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in November 2013, it made the first of its six landfalls on Guiuan. It caused massive loss of life and destruction of property in the municipality. In the immediate aftermath of the storm, displaced residents were temporarily housed in a so-called “Tent City,” or a community of makeshift shelters away from high-risk areas. But once the local government was able to acquire land for relocation, three resettlement sites were designated for the construction of permanent housing.

The first of these was Cogon, where 133 families from the Tent City were resettled. Land in two other villages, Tagpuro and Sapao, was also purchased for the rehabilitation of displaced residents, but two years after Haiyan hit, houses in these two sites are still under construction (see figure 2.2). An estimated 281 housing units can be constructed in Tagpuro – 100 of which were supposed to be turned over by October 2015. However,
as of November 2015, none of the units had been finished. Worse still, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources later found that the site is actually located in a hazard zone as the area’s limestone foundation makes it prone to sinkholes. Meanwhile, the Sapao site, which will be able to accommodate over 500 housing units, is still in the development stage.

That said, more than two years have passed since Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, and Guiuan has yet to fully recover from the impact of the storm. The annual typhoon season poses a great risk on the fragile recovery situation of the entire Eastern Visayas region. Those left most vulnerable by the calamity are the families living in bunkhouses or makeshift shelters along coastal areas, which are at high risk of flooding and damage from strong winds. Communities living in the island barangays are also vulnerable to the same problems.

Meanwhile, families who moved further inland are having difficulties coping with the distance from their sources of livelihood. Many of these families had been asked to move from their original homes located in the “No Build Zone” designated by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and defined by the Water Code. Moving away from the coast saddled resettled fisherfolk with additional transportation costs that are pushing them to consider going back to at-risk areas located much closer to their boats and gear. They no longer feel that the “red zone” is unsafe for dwelling.
Figure 2.2 Map of Resettlement Areas on Mainland Guiuan

Source: UN Habitat (2015)
Rather than depend on the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, the municipal government created an entirely separate entity to expedite the recovery process and to provide direction to Guiuan residents in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. The municipality has this crucial office, but it was not functional and played no role in the rehabilitation planning of the local government. The Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Officer was, in fact, physically absent from the recovery efforts. For unexplained reasons, the local disaster risk management officer went to a different island municipality in the province immediately after Haiyan struck and failed to report for duty despite the local government’s calls for him to return.

Thus, a core group, dubbed the Guiuan Rehabilitation and Recovery Sustainable Development Group (Guiuan Rehab Group), had to be assembled to take the place of the non-functional municipal disaster risk management council. The Guiuan Rehab Group was formed through EO No. 21, series of 2013, and was tasked to facilitate the recovery of the municipality.

The group is composed of the secretary of the local legislative council (locally called the Sangguniang Bayan), the Municipal Local Government Operations Officer, the Municipal Planning Development Officer, a representative from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a representative from UN-Habitat. Other non-core members of the group include key department heads and members of citizen groups. Together, the involved officials and community members drafted the Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (Guiuan Rehab Plan), which was divided into four sectors: economic, environment, infrastructure, social and shelter.

For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that the Social and Shelter sector was led by the municipal social welfare and development office and the municipal housing office. Its members include the police, the Municipal Nutrition Action Office, the Office of the Senior Citizens Association, as well as representatives from the Department of Education, UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), International Organization on Migration (IOM), UNICEF, and the Federation of Barangay Senior Citizens Associations.

Unfortunately, the Guiuan Rehab Plan remains an unfinished document. It mainly covers the identification of hazards and vulnerabilities, and barely touches on the rehabilitation...
and recovery of the municipality. Nevertheless, it was submitted to the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery.

Once the Guiuan Rehab Plan was submitted, the local government initially planned to transfer the functions of the Guiuan Rehab Group to the municipal development council. Instead, the local chief executive and the legislative council created another entity, the Municipal Urban Development and Housing Board (Housing Board) was created by the local government in March 2015. The Board was tasked to “oversee not only the implementation of different housing programs in specific barangays... but also to act as a one stop shop for the processing of public concerns regarding shelter and shall be responsible in taking changes and shall be tasked in the formulation of policies relative to shelter and different housing programs of the municipality.”

The Housing Board is headed by the municipal mayor and is composed of 16 members with at least three slots for non-government organizations involved in shelter and housing provision, and one slot for a local homeowners association, which represents the residents of transitional shelters. The Board was only recently created, thus it has yet to craft a comprehensive Shelter Plan. For the moment, the Board, the Municipal Assessor, Municipal Engineer and the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator are jointly working on the identification and acquisition of resettlement sites.

It is important to note that national law mandates the formation of the Housing Board, but it is not actually supposed to be involved in rehabilitation and recovery from a national disaster. Rather, it is primarily tasked with resettling “illegal” or informal settlers. Thus, it can be argued that the Board plays a crucial role in the resettlement of those who were rendered homeless by Haiyan, especially since many of them were informal settlers in no-build zones.

But while the local government had formed a local entity to take charge of the rehabilitation and recovery of the municipality, national programs formed a separate group to perform the same function.

The National Housing Authority, which is the implementing arm of the national government’s resettlement plan, pushed for the creation of a Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC) in Guiuan to ensure a participatory approach in the implementation of resettlement projects. The LIAC should serve as the policy-making and coordinating body to ensure harmonized and efficient implementation of the various programs and activities related to the development of resettlement projects and relocation of affected families. Each LIAC is chaired by the local mayor and co-chaired by the National Housing Authority. Members of the LIAC include representatives from national government agencies—including the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Public Works and Highways, and

The LIAC oversees all activities related to the provision of permanent shelter for affected communities, including beneficiary selection, site selection, relocation, and estate management. Figure 2.3 illustrates the body’s governance structure.

![LIAC Governance Structure](image)

**Figure 2.3 LIAC Governance Structure**

The Guiuan local government resisted the creation of the LIAC because it would be a redundant entity, since the Housing Board already served the same purpose. Thus, it requested that the Housing Board be recognized as Guiuan’s LIAC, but the cluster of national agencies concerned with resettlement has yet to act upon the request.

This multiplicity of agencies fosters redundancy and confusion in the overall rehabilitation and recovery efforts. It is a key problem that needs to be addressed in order to streamline the recovery process and ensure the more efficient delivery of services.

The confusion caused by the presence of multiple agencies explains the difficulty of establishing the “answerability” of supposed duty bearers in the aspect of housing services.
The Guiuan Experience: A Story of Accountability

The Guiuan local government was quick to take steps for the resettlement of affected communities. The municipal mayor, in particular, was proactive in personally pressuring the National Housing Authority to provide housing to the survivors. The municipal government secured and shouldered the cost of the land requirements.

In terms of planning and policymaking, the Guiuan Rehab Group also acted quickly in setting up local legislation needed to facilitate the rehabilitation efforts. In July 2014, the first draft of the Guiuan Rehab Plan was disseminated to all department heads and local legislative council members for review. It was also presented to village captains and to residents who attended assemblies held in town plazas. However, no hard copies of the document were distributed at these assemblies, so those in attendance still were not given the resources needed for them to study the details of the Plan. The Group also failed to facilitate any discussion after the Plan was presented.

However, it is important to note that the audiences at these dissemination assemblies—even the members of the legislative council—were passive observers to the presentation. The Guiuan Rehab Group may not have formally opened a forum for questions, but none of the people in attendance proactively raised questions or concerns either.

The main voice of communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan in Guiuan’s rehabilitation efforts is the Marig-on Homeowners Association (MHA), which is the community representative in the Housing Board. Its members were residents who lost their homes to Typhoon Haiyan, and were sheltered at the tent city erected at a local school campus. They were later transferred to a transitional shelter site.

According to the members and officials of the MHA, while they were still at the Tent City, the office of the mayor and some of the department heads and humanitarian organizations visited to check on their current situation and provide instructions about their transfer to the transitional shelter. However, they failed to communicate any of their demands or preferences for the housing units that would be provided to them because life in the tent city was difficult, and they were content with the knowledge that they would soon be able to leave the flimsy shelters.

Meanwhile, families occupying the bunkhouses and those living near the coast revealed...
that municipal-level politicians did not even visit them. Unlike their counterparts in the tent city, who were at least aware of the Guiuan Rehab Group, they knew nothing about the plans of the local government.

The members of the MHA and bunkhouse dwellers said they could not press the elected leaders to explain the concepts of “building back better” and the “no build zone.” They also complained of the slow pace and disorganized provision of housing. Informants said their demands have largely remained unmet. The homeless and those still living in

Figure 2.4 Housing Units in Cogon, Guiuan
risk areas also commented that the “NHA house is small.” They also mentioned that if need be, they are willing to render sweat equity for a house they would eventually own.

Another problem identified by affected communities was the perceived bias in the selection of beneficiaries. Some of the informants of this study reported that the granting of housing units was largely based on political ties. However, the mayor and the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer affirmed that priority is given to bigger families, especially those with elderly members, children, and persons with disability. It appears this guideline was simply not communicated to affected communities.

A local radio station, which could have been a venue for residents to air their concerns regarding lapses in policy, proved of little use to Haiyan survivors. A politically powerful family owned the station, so comments critical of the municipal administration were not given airtime. Residents, frustrated by the censorship of the media outlet, have joked that the local radio program titled “Radyo Natin” (Our Radio) is actually “Radyo Nira” (Their Radio).

Despite lacking any input from hard-hit communities, the Guiuan Rehab Plan was approved by the local government in late 2014, almost a year after Typhoon Haiyan devastated the municipality. But, considering the mitigating circumstances and the need to expedite the delivery of services, the government’s tenacity and quick action in the recovery efforts are laudable, even if it failed to consult those most affected by the disaster.

Two crucial laws the local council has yet to craft or approve, however, are the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Management Plan and the Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Close to two years after Haiyan struck the municipality, these two laws have yet to be officially drawn up. Thus, local government disaster risk reduction policies, strategies and implementation plans are unclear or nonexistent, even though the municipality has had a designated disaster risk reduction and management officer for over 10 years.

It is perhaps for this reason that some relocation sites—such as St. Genevieve Village in Tagpuro—were later discovered to be unsuitable for long-term dwelling. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources recently found that the land in the St. Genevieve Village area is prone to liquefaction, thus only 50 of the promised housing units have been completed.

Lastly, one other aspect of recovery that needs to be improved upon in Guiuan is its system of checks and balances. While it is a function of the legislative council to formulate and approve laws, most critical decisions are made exclusively by the local mayor. For example, the chief local executive decided on matters related to purchase of lots for resettlement based on availability, cost and safety without informing or consulting the vice mayor and other members of the local council.
Despite having an entity dedicated to the resettlement of Haiyan survivors, implementation of the program has been slow. Two years after the typhoon struck the municipality, only a fraction of the promised housing units have been completed.

Local government officials claim that the reason for the delay is the inability of the contractor to get several crucial documents, such as the site development plan and the environmental certificate clearance from government agencies. Hence, the contractor cannot collect payment from the National Housing Authority, and consequently cannot afford to begin construction on most of the housing units. Curiously, some of the promised shelters were already completed because the contractor was given the green light to start construction even though the company had yet to settle its deficiencies in the requirements for the project.

Fortunately, several humanitarian organizations also provided both temporary and permanent shelters to Haiyan victims. However, the local government has so far failed to coordinate and regulate the rehabilitation projects of these non-government groups, thus allowing many of the donated housing units to be erected in high-risk areas.

Temporary housing was provided by the International Organization for Migration and Catholic Relief Services to families who owned lots outside the no-build zone. Good Shepherd, a church-based organization, gave semi-permanent shelter to families on the island of Manicani, regardless of whether the families’ lots were located within the no-build zone or not. Similarly, Nickel Asia, a private firm, provided transitional shelter to families without considering the safety of the locations where the shelters were to be built. Habitat for Humanity also provided housing units to inhabitants of Victory Island, a very high-risk area.

The organizations that provided permanent housing were more discerning in granting aid to victims of the storm. Cordaid-Build Change distributed housing units to families who lived in the No Build Zone (NBZ) areas, but who also owned lots outside NBZ, where they could build their permanent shelters. Philippine Misereor Partners Inc., through TAO Pilipinas, also provided permanent dwellings to families with lots outside high-risk areas.
Because of the sluggish pace of rebuilding, many are still without appropriate shelter, thereby continuously exposing them to annual weather hazards. Many households have been able to repair their homes, but many of these structures are not strong enough to withstand heavy rainfall during major storms.

Affected communities have enumerated several requirements for suitable housing: potable water connection, electricity, a bigger lot area (20 m by 60 m) to which they own the titles to, permission to make improvements on their temporary shelter, a chapel, health center, a wet market, access to toilets, and most importantly, opportunities for livelihood.

Monitoring of the implementation of the housing projects under the Housing Board has been lax, which may account for the slow rollout of housing services. The legislative council secretary, who is part of the group, said no monitoring initiatives have been conducted due to the lack of necessary instruments.

Notes
David Jonathan Garcia, EnP
Urban Planner, Geographer, and Field Coordinator
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat)

The report is well-thought-out, and the critiques on Guiuan are valid. There are some matters that require clarification, though:

1. I definitely agree that evidence points out to local elite capture of the postdisaster efforts and resources (e.g. radio communications).
2. The GRRP clearly touches on items for recovery and rehabilitation. It has annexes outlining the proposed projects by the municipality. These projects are tied to each Key Result Area (KRA) of the development sectors (envi, social, infra, econ). However, the plan remains unfinished because the agreement with the LGU was that they will continue to update it as conditions change, e.g. as the consensus of the affected communities become clearer.
3. While the LGU had the responsibility of distributing the draft GRRP to all barangay captains, there was concern that many of the village leaders were relatively uncomfortable with digesting a technical plan. There also other handicaps, such as the State not having clear guidance on how to do recovery and rehabilitation planning. By July 2014, it was becoming clearer that Guiuan LGU had problems on governance capacity, and not just resources or data.
4. To help solve such handicap, what our local team did instead was to visit all barangays and talk to them about the maps, hazards, vulnerabilities, and other things on DRRM, and a number of items on the GRRP. We did further fieldwork and mapping, even on islands as far as Victory, Suluan, and Homonhon. We did this deep type of mapping over 3 months of treks, boat trips, GPS mapping, and community conversations. In the end, the community insights were placed in the updated maps. We had the maps laminated and printed in tarp, and brought to the communities for their use. The maps were useful to the communities and their chiefs, particularly when Super Typhoon Ruby passed by last December 2014 (a year after Haiyan).
References


Focus Group Discussions
- Marig-on Homeowners’ Association, Barangay Cogon (1 July 2015)
- Bunk House Residents (1 July 2015)
- Manicani Island Barangay Residents (2 July 2015)
- Sulangan Residents (2 July 2015)
- Barangay Captains/Officials of Brgy. 6, 7, Hollywood (3 July 2015)

Key Informants
Executive
- Hon. Mayor Christopher Sheen Gonzales
- Hon. Vice Mayor Rogelio O. Cablao
- Mr. Rectito Melquiades, SB Secretary and GRRSDG Chair
- Ms. Ma. Nenita S. Ecleo, MPDC
- Mr. Philip Aranas, Housing Board Chair and Executive Secretary
- Ms. Esperanza G. Cotin, Budget Officer
- Mr. Felipe Padual, LDDRMO
- Ms. Zenaida Cunanan, MSWDO
- Dr. Marichu Arganda, MHO
- Engr. Gilbert Labicani, Asst. Municipal Engineer

Legislative
- Hon. Constancio Opana
- Hon. Carlo Cornelio Sison
- Hon. Manuel Velasco

INGO/NGO Shelter and Technical Support Providers
- Ms. Amillah S. Rodil, Cordaid Project Manager
- Ms. Arlyn, TAO Pilipinas
- Mr. Dick Badilla, Volunteer of Philippine Misereor Program and Staff of Good Shepherd Pabahay Program
- Mr. David Garcia, UN Habitat

NGA
- Engr. Robert John Padel, NHA Project Engineer for St Genevieve Village
- Ms. Jam Colas, NEDA
- Ms. Delia Sabulao, South District DepEd Supervisor
- Dir. Pedro Nuval, DILG VIII
- Mr. Mauricio Labado, former MLGOO of Guiuan

Civil Society Organization
- Engr. Wilfredo de la Cruz, OSCA Vice President
Palo, a third-class municipality 12 kilometers to the south of Tacloban City, Leyte was one of the most heavily affected areas when Typhoon Haiyan ravaged the Eastern Visayas region. It has 33 barangays (local term for the smallest administrative division in the country), eight of which are urban and 25 are rural. Of these barangays, five are coastal, namely: San Joaquin, Salvacion, Baras, Cogon, and Candahug. To its east is San Pedro Bay. It is traversed by the four major rivers of Bangon, Malirong, San Joaquin, Binahaan, and Tacuranga. There are numerous creeks: Sambulawan, Binog, Soong, Kiloon, and Atagon. Natural waterways in upstream towns flow through Palo as these drain to the San Pedro Bay (Municipal Profile 2013).

Considering all the bodies of water in and around the municipality, several areas in Palo are highly prone to flooding. Thirty percent of Palo’s barangays are highly susceptible to flooding, 24 percent are moderately susceptible, and 12 percent have low susceptibility. The vulnerability of Palo to inundation was previously the subject of a television feature of GMA, a major local television and radio network, because of a four-day flooding incident in eleven barangays including non-coastal areas that happened in 2011, two years before Haiyan.

Based on the post-Haiyan assessment of the local government of Palo of damages on infrastructure, agriculture, business and investments, the estimates add up to PHP 763,642,700. For resettlement and housing, the municipality’s Revised Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Plan (RAR) proposed a budgetary requirement of PHP 480,000,000 (2015).
However, two years after Haiyan, there are still a lot of questions that beg to be answered, especially in the context of providing temporary shelter and permanent housing to survivors. Despite the significant number of reported shelter and housing-related assistance coming from local private groups, international non-government organizations, and national agencies such as the National Housing Authority, there are gaps in the delivery of services and benefits to survivors of the typhoon and the mandates and plans that guide and assist in this activity.

Twelve resettlement/housing project sites were visited (see figure 3.1). Two are bunkhouses located in Brgy. Tacuranga, and at the Government Center in Barangay Candahug. One is a temporary shelter designed for five years called the Great Love Tzu Chi Village in Sitio Caloogan, Barangay San Jose. Two are permanent housing units constructed on the beneficiaries’ own lots: the Don Bosco Ville in Barangay Candahug, and Dresden Ville in Barangay San Joaquin. One provides permanent housing: the GMA Kapuso Village in Barangay San Jose. The local government unit provided the lot, the National Housing Authority developed the site, and the GMA Kapuso Network, a private group, constructed the buildings. The remaining six are permanent housing units with lots provided by the donors – Pedrosa GK Village (also known as the ACF GK Village), the Rosario Lago Legacy GK Village in Sitio Cannamotong, and the Sambayanan ni San Benito in Barangay Libertad; the Old San Agustin GK Village, and the CFC-ANCOP Village in Barangay Old San Agustin; and Canossian Ville in Barangay Castilla. The units can be used by the beneficiaries as long as they need the shelter.
The permanent resettlement/housing projects are at different stages of completion. The three GK villages as well as CFC-ANCOP have awarded some of their units to beneficiaries who are now occupying the units. Those in own lots are likewise occupying their units which are either constructed by the donor (as in the case of Don Bosco Ville) or by the beneficiaries themselves with cash assistance and building materials from donors (as in the case of Dresden Ville).

Canossian Ville and GMA Kapuso Village have identified beneficiaries but construction of the houses is still ongoing. The Sambayanan site in San Benito also just started its construction phase.

This case study of Palo explores the dynamics of democratic accountability through assessing the aforementioned gaps in the shelter and housing projects for survivors of Typhoon Haiyan. It seeks to draw the perception and the concerns of the internally displaced survivors from the ground in Palo to trace and address the flaws in the process, demand explanation regarding the unfilled gap in permanent housing for them, and have the space to impose sanctions when necessary.
How answerable is the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council to the internally displaced survivors of Haiyan in setting local agenda for the shelter?

Through Republic Act No. 10121 or the “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010,” the Municipal Disaster Coordinating Council was rebranded as Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (MDRRMC)—a name change which denotes a shift in the focus of the council towards disaster-resiliency of communities.

Part II of the pre-Haiyan Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan for 2013-2017 describes the local MDRRMC composition and its tasks: it has 22 members led by the municipal mayor, and a Secretariat of seven staff members, headed by the Sangguniang Bayan (local legislative council) Secretary who is concurrently the Acting Municipal Administrator. While RA 10121 provides that members of the local disaster risk reduction and management councils must include four accredited Civil Society Organizations and one private sector representative, Palo’s MDRRMC has an incomplete set. The full representation is important for wider participation and information sharing with those affected by Yolanda. This is likewise to ensure that the voices of claimholders will not be disenfranchised.

As stated in RA 10121, disaster risk reduction and management at the local government level ensures proper implementation of the local disaster risk reduction and management plans (LDRRMP) and the integration of such to local development plans, adherence to national and local plans and programs, and recommendation of necessary forced or preemptive evacuation of residents.

One of the tasks of MDRRMC is “to recommend the implementation of forced or pre-emptive evacuation of local residents, if any.” It is likewise the duty of its standing committee on Recovery and Rehabilitation to “administer and assist quick reconstruction of damaged roads, bridges and other structures including houses after a disaster” (Palo MDRRM Strategic Plan 2013).

After Haiyan, there has yet to be a reorganization of the MDRRMC. Nevertheless, the members of the pre-Haiyan MDRRMC continue to work and perform their tasks according to the mandates of their respective offices.
On the other hand, the Palo Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Strategic Plan 2013-2017 describes the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (MDRRMO) as designated to “formulate and implement a comprehensive and integrated local disaster risk reduction and management plan in accordance with national, regional, and provincial framework, and policies on DRR in close coordination with the Local Development Council.”

In sum, the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office are the primary duty bearers in the evacuation, shelter, and relocation of the community in times of calamities, as well as the rehabilitation from damage wrought by disasters.

Given the natural hazards in Palo, the MDRRMO and the MDRRMC are expected to be proactive in planning for shelter/housing and relocation/resettlement, more than just eviction, demolition, and evacuation of families in times of disasters. These bodies, which are headed by the local mayor, are logically responsible for the conduct of adequate consultation with the affected communities regarding plans and policies related to permanent housing/resettlement. However, internally displaced survivors report of inadequate consultations made on matters regarding their housing/resettlement needs.

A review of Palo’s shelter-related structures and mechanisms show documents such as plans, municipal resolutions, and ordinances that provide mandates of bodies created and serve as bases for action and the allocation of funds for disaster-related activities. These are the mechanisms that regulate the provision of permanent shelter, but they fall short in providing avenues by which Haiyan survivors, being claim holders, were and are able to voice out their concerns and demand accountability from the public officials.

How answerable is the local council to the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office, and the affected communities in adopting a shelter plan?

In March 2013, the Palo legislative council was set to adopt a Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, pending the approval of the mayor. Unfortunately, it was overtaken by Typhoon Haiyan, particularly during the rescue and recovery phases after the disaster.

The Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan for 2013-2017 was formulated with the assistance of the German International Cooperation (GIZ) and the
Office of Civil Defense (OCD), among others. Part I of the Plan contains seven pages of pictures showing the extent of the March 2011 flooding, connoting its importance in the formulation of the Plan. It also includes a risk profile of Palo, which shows that the municipality has moderate to high degrees of susceptibility to liquefaction and flooding.

In this Pre-Haiyan plan, priority projects were classified into four categories: prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery and rehabilitation. Under the second category, the identification, rehabilitation, and construction of evacuation centers was a priority project. Under the last category, priority was given to the construction of housing and resettlement for individuals and families uprooted from their homes. Activities and initiatives related to resettlement and shelter are integrated into the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, particularly in its recovery and rehabilitation component.

The recovery and rehabilitation aspect of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) for 2011-2028 aims “to restore shelter and other buildings,” provide loans for house repair, and relocate those in hazard prone areas to safe areas. It also aims to rebuild more resilient houses and provide safer sites for housing (NDRRMC 2011, 66).

The Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan of Palo is presently undergoing revision in order to facilitate the integration of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in its local Comprehensive Development Plan and the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP). This time, inputs from the ground are being considered based on informal modes of communication. That is, when the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office, Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office and the Municipal Planning and Development Officer deliver social services to the barangays, people inform them of their sentiments in the hope that these are brought to the planners of local government. Or, when these offices conduct meetings in the barangays for some other purposes, concerns on housing/shelter are brought up.

The Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council could not fully operate and give satisfactory service because of the absence of the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan. But though the local government failed to adopt this crucial legislation, the local mayor was able to ratify a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, which the local council adopted right away. The Recovery and Reconstruction Plan became the fallback disaster risk reduction and management program and procedure for the community.
In accordance with the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) of the national government, which was approved on August 2014, the mayor was enjoined to create a Local Inter-agency Committee (LIAC). The CRRP’s Resettlement Cluster component describes the LIAC as its implementation structure that is meant to ensure a participatory approach in resettlement projects. The committee has four sub-committees namely: beneficiary selection, site selection project implementation, relocation, and estate management and community development. It is noted that the CRRP gives a mandate to the National Housing Authority to initiate the establishment of the LIAC, and for the Local Chief Executive of a municipality or city to correspondingly create the same.

In Palo, the National Housing Authority conducted an orientation on the nature and process of the LIAC organization, but there was no consequent creation of the actual committee. At the same time, the local government unit has been preoccupied with duties that are of similar priority, such as the preparation and release of emergency shelter assistance, the implementation of livelihood projects, and the revision of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan, among others. However, both the claim holders and interest groups are not aware of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan nor of the Local Inter-Agency Committee. Thus, they are not knowledgeable of the spaces by which they can participate and exact accountability of public officials for the delivery of permanent housing.

The evidence taken from primary data shows that there is a gap in permanent housing in Palo. There are around 845 permanent housing units that are at various stages of completion and occupancy. These are provided by the nine housing projects that were visited during the conduct of the Palo study. This is much less than the 2,000 permanent housing units that were supposed to be constructed, according to the Revised Recovery and Reconstruction Plan of 2014. This is also less than the 1,244 permanent housing needs that was reported in the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan and Resettlement Cluster Plan.
Palo, unfortunately, had a high turnover rate among its Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Officers. Over two years after Haiyan struck, the municipality’s current Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Officer is the sixth to hold the position, and has only been in office for around three months. He is active in conducting information dissemination campaigns in the barangays, and he is one of the avenues by which the sentiments of Haiyan-affected households are made known. However, given his short stint, he has yet to effectively bring these concerns to the appropriate bodies for corresponding action.

Haiyan victims have tried to bring their concerns to the local government through the help of an interest group. However, there was no favorable action. They think that they were just “used” by the interest group for the latter’s own motives. These affected individuals also perceive that their local government has become less kind to them.

It is important to note that the municipality’s Recovery and Reconstruction Plan did not have the benefit of a democratic consultation with the households affected by Haiyan. The drafting of the plan was done in an emergency situation, thus the local government unit urgently needed to create a structure to serve as the basis for its actions, more so because national and international aid were already pouring in.

The Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council was also unable to monitor the proper implementation of Batas Pambansa (BP; “national law”) 220 or the Building Code of the Philippines provides for a waiver of building standards on housing for indigent families, which includes donated, low-cost and emergency shelter that may only be used for up to two years, and thus should cover only bunkhouses. This scrapping of standards was, unfortunately, also practiced in the construction of temporary and permanent resettlements.
How responsive is the local council to the affected communities in adopting the shelter/relocation program/plan?

When Typhoon Haiyan hit Leyte, institutions including the local governments were not ready to respond to the wide scale impact on lives, livelihoods and property. Mechanisms and structures were inadequate and insufficient in the context of a disaster. Therefore, the government response was made with few consultations and dialogue, for certain justifiable reasons: time was of the essence, quick actions were needed to prevent more losses, formal institutions were in various stages of collapse, and donors were already quickly responding to the emergency. This was the scenario in the delivery of the social services, including shelter/housing.

Today, however, when these government institutions have largely been rebuilt, it is expected that consultations, feedback and dialogues are in place in order to: (1) ensure the delivery of standard/quality housing units, (2) avoid duplication of awards to beneficiaries, (3) avoid some internally displaced survivors from being left out without a housing unit just because they are not eligible, based on the donors’ criteria; and (4) ensure that the policies are responsive to the beneficiaries’ needs and concerns.

For beneficiaries, many questions remain unanswered. However, they do not explicitly express their dissatisfaction with duty bearers who should be held accountable because of several reasons: the perceived consequence of reprisal, the lack of a leader-advocate, the belief that their voices will not be heard, apathy due to lack of access to information, and other similar reasons.

Right after the November 2013 disaster, the local government of Palo passed resolutions and ordinances that granted certain authority to the mayor, including the responsibility of accepting donations, and the use of the MDRRM Fund (see table 3.1). These have facilitated in the local government’s recovery efforts and the sourcing of assistance for shelter, such as the forging Memorandum of Agreements with donors/sponsors like GMA Kapuso for its permanent housing project in Brgy. San Jose.

After the disaster, the mayor created a Special Task Force Committee to gather data on the extent of damage in the different sectors, and to assess the recovery and reconstruction needs and the corresponding framework for planning and implementation. This was done without an approved and adopted Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan. Thus, the Revised Recovery and Reconstruction (RAR) Plan that resulted from the initial data gathering became the basis for local government action. Housing was included as an item under the Social Services and Livelihoods Program.
Table 3.1 Post-Yolanda Municipal Resolutions/Ordinances Related to Housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipal Resolution or Ordinance No.</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013-71</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>Grants authority to the LCE to accept donations/ funds coming from donors/sponsors as aid to the municipality of Palo which was severely damaged by typhoon Yolanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-06</td>
<td>3 December 2013</td>
<td>An ordinance declaring all easements as “No Build Zones,” providing fines and penalties thereof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-80</td>
<td>17 December 2013</td>
<td>Grants omnibus authority to the LCE to sign MOAs/ MOUs, enter into contracts, deeds and the like that has connection/relationship to the municipality’s recovery and/or rehabilitation initiatives and assistance due to the extreme calamity brought about by the super typhoon Yolanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-03</td>
<td>7 January 2014</td>
<td>Grants authority to the LCE to utilize the current 5% MDRRM Fund and the MDRRMG continuing appropriations/trust fund of prior years for typhoon Yolanda related programs, projects and activities, subject however, to submission to the SB of the list of actual projects implemented and funded there from.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, designs of housing units are provided by the donors. The beneficiaries and/or the LGU cannot influence them to modify the design. The former, however, may decide on how layout inside the core shelter will be installed.

How responsive is the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council to the affected communities in implementing the shelter plan?

Donors are wary about the process of issuing Building Permits, Certificates of Occupancy, and requests for services from the local government such as surveying and clearing services. The Comprehensive Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan, however, if fully followed and translated as a local guide, may provide for the streamlining of procedures.

Beneficiaries are identified based on each donor’s respective set of criteria. Tzu Chi’s priority are the homeless, landless or those within the No Build Zone, and the families with at least five members. These households are taken from the list of survivors in the transitional shelters, particularly those in the Tacuranga and Government Center bunkhouses.
Don Bosco, while it does not require beneficiary families to have a specific number of members, it requires that the household must own the lot where the house will be built. In cases when the lot is not owned, the household will have to show a certificate from the landowner stating that it allows the concerned family to use the land.

For the three GK villages, the beneficiaries are limited to GK members and those who have the intention to apply for GK membership. Priority is given to the homeless, to those from No Build Zones, those who are willing to be relocated, and/or those original beneficiaries of pre-Haiyan GK communities. A similar set of criteria is followed by the CFC.

In Canossa Ville, the beneficiaries are from Barangay Bachao and were selected by the Archdiocese of Palo using their own criteria. At the Dresden Ville, the beneficiaries are the original residents who now own their home lots with the help of generous private individuals.

The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) has the list of Yolanda-affected households. Hence, in almost all the housing projects, donors sought help from the MSWDO by requesting for this list. There were occasions when the MSWDO staff accompanied the donor representatives to the bunkhouses/transitional shelters or sites where potential beneficiaries come from. However, there is no information or feedback from the donors about the beneficiaries who were selected. Hence, the MSWDO was not made aware of whom the beneficiaries were, which explains why it was not able to maintain an updated and complete list of beneficiary families, or monitor any duplication of housing awards. It also failed to accurately determine how many more families/households do not qualify as beneficiaries, and who therefore are swelling the gap in permanent housing.

This scenario creates a deadlock for the local government. There has to be a mutual relationship between the private donors and the public sector, hence, the need for reciprocal actions. If neither of the two will enforce (local government) nor respond (international non-governmental organization) to the needs of one another, then there will certainly be overlapping of authority and deadlock.

The Municipal Engineer’s Office is entrusted to follow the Building Code of the Philippines. One provision on the requirement for a Building Permit states that if the housing design is the same and without alteration, there is no need to secure a Building Permit. But, if the house will be built in the same area but with a different design or style, there is a need to submit the Building Plan. If the house is entirely different, then a Building Permit will have to be secured.
In the case of the housing projects in Palo, the third situation applies. However, not all projects started construction with a Building Permit. There are cases when a Building Permit is secured for the first batch but not for succeeding batches of housing units constructed. Donors complain about the long process and the numerous requirements to be submitted to the Municipal Engineer’s Office—too many vis-à-vis the urgent need for permanent housing.

The local government imposes sanctions through ordinances or national laws that are being followed such as the Building Code. The Municipal Engineer may issue a Notice to Stop Construction for ongoing construction projects that have no Building Permits. However, no such notice has been issued, nor have sanctions been imposed for non-compliance. Some sectors observe that this leniency is due to the perception that donors of permanent housing units may leave the municipality if rules are strictly enforced. The office resorts to the conduct of site inspections and informs the foreman (who is usually the on-site representative of the donor) to comply with the Building Permit requirements as soon as possible.

The office also observed that donors usually ask for Building Permit requirements but do not return to submit them. And in cases when they do come back, the submitted requirements are incomplete. Thus, Building Permits take longer to be issued. Donors who wait for a long time may think that there is no local government mechanism and set of procedures that will facilitate action on their application for Building Permits in the context of recovery and rehabilitation after a disaster. There is no other option but to wait, or to start construction without the permit because beneficiaries urgently need to be awarded with the housing units. Beneficiaries, on the other hand, seem to be unconcerned with the matter on Building Permits, more so, about its implications. The circumstances brought by Haiyan in its rehabilitation stage eases processes and provides for the laxity of roles played by the local government and the private donors, hence, are not properly executed.

Housing units of poorest quality are observed in some projects of private contractors. In one site, beneficiaries complain that the square core shelter has windows on all four walls; hence, the occupants have to stay in the middle of the house when it rains because water gets inside. In some housing units, walls can easily be shaken and septic tanks overflow when it floods. Some have no electrical provisions. Beneficiaries claim that a contractor’s representative made them sign by a document indicating the breakdown of expenses, which amounts to around PHP 225,000.

The beneficiaries believe this amount is too high for the kind of housing unit awarded to them. They had no choice but to sign the document because of the fear that their units will not be finished, or that the contractor will go to another village instead. They are hesitant to bring the matter to the local government because they think that no one will
urgently attend to them. Moreover, there seems to be no one from the local government visiting and monitoring the progress of the housing projects. On the part of the local government, it maintains that it had not issued Certificates of Occupancy. However, five batches of beneficiaries are already occupying their respective housing units.

In the bunkhouses, the quality of housing materials used were temporary and light, as it was expected that occupants will have been able to transfer to permanent housing soon. So, the Government Center bunkhouses are now understandably dilapidated—floors sag, the walls have holes, and roofs leak. Many of the occupants are beneficiaries of the GMA Kapuso Village. Their transfer has been reset three times already.

The lack of feedback from beneficiaries comes from being uninformed and unaware about the resilient housing structural design standards that are provided in the Resettlement Cluster Plan of the Comprehensive Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan. The Local Inter-Agency Committee for Permanent Shelter could have been a medium in this aspect.

The complaints and feedback on the housing projects and the implementation of the revised Recovery and Reconstruction plan (shelter component) of the beneficiaries did not reach the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council nor the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office.

**ENFORCEABILITY**

>To what extent can the internally displaced survivors of Haiyan enforce consequences on the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council for the agenda elevated to the local legislative council?

The internally displaced survivors of Haiyan are generally not aware of the shelter component in the revised Recovery and Reconstruction Plan. However, they resent the inability of the local government to plan for relocation, despite the flooding incident back in 2011.

Yolanda survivors claim that they are not aware of the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan since they do not remember being formally consulted in its formulation. Nonetheless, they are not organized enough to bring their concerns to their representatives in the government, nor are they persistent in their demands, due to the perception that they might earn the ire of public officials. Media and interest groups,
on the other hand, seem to be inactive in pushing for immediate action in response to permanent housing needs.

Survivors who do not qualify as beneficiaries to a housing project go back to the unsafe areas. They are not penalized despite the penalty clause in Municipal Ordinance 2013-16.

There exists no venue for a discussion/dialogue towards a common interpretation of the policy at the local level. Concerned barangay captains do not know how to answer the complaints of its constituents because implementing agencies and the municipal government do not have adequate answers as well. Many times, those who do not qualify for shelter/cash assistance threaten that they will not vote for local officials who will run for elective positions in the coming May 2016 elections.

The lack of spaces for consultation, coordination, feedback, and monitoring on progress, problems, and quality of housing services delivered is visibly evident. Without the Local Inter-Agency Committee, there exists no coordinating body that ensures harmonized and efficient implementation of resettlement/relocation-related programs and activities. The platform for monitoring and feedback is wanting. Emergent problems arise such as: (a) uncoordinated identification of beneficiaries, (b) construction proceeds even without Building Permits, (c) poor quality of housing units constructed, (d) various interpretations of the No Build Zones, (e) gender-blind Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and Recovery and Reconstruction Plans; and (f) flood-prone sites.

To what extent can beneficiaries and communities in high-risk areas enforce consequences on the local council for adopting the shelter plan?

Beneficiaries did not enforce negative consequences on the council as it was quick in adopting the revised Recovery and Reconstruction Plan that includes a shelter component, and in passing housing-related policies.

On the part of claim holders, those who do not qualify are not organized enough to bring their concerns to the local government through solely their own efforts. The leader of the bunkhouse occupants at the Government Center has pledged to find a way to help unqualified occupants in their group. However, other occupants are hesitant to lend support due to some real or imagined fear that implementers and donors will not welcome complaints or feedback.

It follows that the space for opportunities to consult the internally displaced survivors regarding housing-related policies ranged from little to nil. The voices of claim holders
Promoting Democratic Accountability in the Provision of Permanent Housing to Survivors of Typhoon Haiyan in Palo, Leyte

may not have found its way to the revised Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, nor to other policies passed by the local council. However, the local legislative body was always quick to act on these and other documents that were elevated to their level by the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office. In the implementation of the shelter program, complaints and feedback were made through informal channels and modes. These were alternatives to formal processes/means because of the lack of a strong and organized group or media who can bring the matter to the local government and demand for meetings and dialogues.

To what extent can beneficiaries and communities in high-risk areas enforce consequences on the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council in executing the shelter plan?

Beneficiaries threaten not to vote in the upcoming national elections for elective officials who are not responsive to their housing needs and concerns. However, they are not keen on the performance of the current Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Officer, who is the seventh to occupy the post after Haiyan.

The Revised Recovery and Reconstruction Plan contained an enumeration of pledges made by NGOs, adding up to 2,000 units of permanent socialized housing, estimated at PHP 400 million. Of this number, 800 units were pledged by the Ramon Ang Foundation, 500 units by the Filipino Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc., 500 units by Habitat for Humanity, and 200 units by the GMA Kapuso Foundation.

As of the end of July 2015, only the GMA Kapuso Foundation and Habitat for Humanity constructed permanent housing units. The former is almost near completion while the latter is just starting. Nevertheless, other donors for shelter/housing, which were not identified in the Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, have been put up today.

According to the Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, priority will be given to the relocation of internally displaced persons living in the No Build Zone areas and those with permanently damaged houses to permanent resettlement sites. This project will require a budget of PHP 480 million broken down as follows: (a) purchase of a 20-hectare lot for relocation at PHP 1.5 million per hectare, for a total of PHP 30 million; (b) site development which will cost PHP 2.5 million per hectare, for a total of PHP 50 million; and (c) construction of 2,000 permanent socialized housing units at PHP 200,000 per unit, for a total PHP 400 million.
Claim holders do not really articulate their demands and complaints, except in informal interactions that do not ensure that the demands reach the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office, the Local Chief Executive, or any of the concerned offices charged with the delivery of permanent housing services.

They do not enforce negative consequences despite resentments they feel that resettlement and housing was not a priority agenda in the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan even after the experience of the March 2011 flooding. They do not give sanctions to duty bearers whom they know fall short of incorporating their housing needs in the RAR Plan. They resort to telling peers (during informal talks) not to vote for these low-performing public officials in the coming March 2016 elections.
References


“No Dwelling Zones and Relocations.” Presentation. April 2014.


Revised Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (RAR) Plan, Palo. 2014.

The organizational structure, design and mandate of the Disaster Risk and Reduction Management Council (DRRMC) defined by the government gives direction to the role and functions of the Council. It also defines the core functions and interrelatedness of the various thematic pillars of the Philippine DRRM Plan, namely, mitigation, preparedness, relief, rehabilitation and recovery.

The immediate creation of the Government Cluster Framework upon the occurrence of Haiyan, and the establishment of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) were both positive and prompt responses to the situation. What remained unclear was the specific working relationship between the national agencies and the local government units.

The initiative of the Commission on Audit (COA) through a resolution, to audit the funds used for Haiyan disaster relief and rehabilitation assistance was commendable and fairly quick considering the urgency of the responses to the disaster situation. The COA fielded audit teams to the areas, particularly to national government agencies involved in the disaster response efforts. The audit group was able to cover the sources and receipt of foreign aid, the release of funds, the inter-agency transfer of funds, procurement, and the distribution of goods and services, albeit with a limited scope. The reports were made public; however, some communities found the reports could be more meaningful if they were released in the vernacular language and disseminated more widely. An international organization, Oxfam, took the initiative to give an initial assessment of
the disaster response through a briefing note released on its website. Public agencies should have led the dissemination of the report for transparency and accountability.

The reports presented the observation that both national and local agencies were overwhelmed by the lack of facilities in the evacuation centers and relocation sites. They also observed a disorganized response to relief by the national and local agencies, including the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), which should have played a major coordinating role in the relief efforts. However, the OPARR seemed to lack full command over the functions linking international, local, national and private organizations.

There was an appreciation for the generosity of private organizations and the efficient response of international agencies. But the foreign and private aid served to highlight the deficiencies of the government. The public agencies, as prime duty bearers on coordination among various players, were expected to do much more.

Local (Community) Level

Guiuan, Eastern Samar

It is difficult to establish the ANSWERABILITY of duty bearers, such as the Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC), which should be responsible for ensuring the harmonized implementation of resettlement and relocation projects, the coordination of various players, and a participatory approach to disaster response. There was no LIAC to begin with, and the municipality does not have a functioning Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council despite the longstanding presence of a DRRM Officer. This, coupled with the absence of a comprehensive land use plan, left the local government with no clear policies and direction with regard to disaster response. In lieu of a LIAC, the municipality created a Housing Board meant to approximate the DRRMC role. However, the creation of the HB seemed redundant to what is perceived to be the role of an MDRRMC. It also contributed to confusion about the agencies concerned with rehabilitation and recovery.

Regarding the RESPONSIVENESS of the duty bearers and agencies, the local chief executive showed immense enthusiasm and pro-activeness in disaster response, though it was not inclusive of the local council and the affected communities.

Most communities knew nothing of the Mayor’s plan; nor was there a space for the voices and participation of the victims of the typhoon. Although there were complaints on the government’s response to the calamity and the efforts to rebuild that followed, local media did not pick up the feedback.
On ENFORCEABILITY, the local assessment observed an extreme slowness in the implementation of resettlement projects due mainly to the difficulty of sorting out documents, such as the environmental certificate clearance, site development plan, among others. The monitoring by the Housing Board has also been lax and the roll out of housing services continues to be slow.

Despite these obstacles, private donors were still able to provide temporary shelters. Housing service provision is still an unfinished business, as many families still do not have homes, and those who do have no potable water, toilets, health centers, and electricity.

**Palo, Leyte**

On the ANSWERABILITY of the duty bearers, there is an observed difficulty of leadership, direction-setting and policies on disaster response. The municipality had several problems: 1) an incomplete set of members in the Municipal DRRM Council and therefore, no wide representation and limited voices in the council; 2) the municipal DRRM plan was undergoing revision; and 3) the municipal DRRM officer was mainly responsible for implementation and taking action, as opposed to surveying the overall process.

In spite of the National Housing Authority’s initiative to create a LIAC, this did not happen. Instead, the municipality created an Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) group that reviewed the comprehensive land use plan, and carried on implementing livelihood projects.

It was also noted that there has been a high turnover of DRRM officers.

On RESPONSIVENESS, there were no clear criteria for the selection of beneficiaries and therefore assistance to Haiyan victims was left mainly to the private groups. The list of beneficiaries held by the municipal social welfare office is also poorly maintained.

Just like Guiuan, Palo encountered difficulty in the slowness and cumbersome process of procuring building permits.

Moreover, there were no evident voices from the communities, nor representation from among their ranks. The communities expressed dissatisfaction about the housing services but these never get officially registered. The local assessors attribute such weakness to the apathy of Haiyan victims, as well as the lack of access to information, and the lack of leader-advocates.

If responsiveness is about officials taking the opportunities to consult and communicate
with citizens or the claim holders, this is probably a weak element of accountability at the local level. In both towns, there was weak attempt at consultations, public meetings, or surveys among citizens.

On ENFORCEABILITY – with the challenges to leadership and direction, it was not surprising that the quality of housing units was equally problematic. The structures were poorly made, according to beneficiaries. They also claimed that the costs of the housing units were too high, considering the quality of the workmanship.

Meanwhile, the permanent housing projects are in different stages of completion. There are gaps in the permanent housing, with only 845 units completed, against the target of 2,000 units based on the original plan. And yet, no sanctions or penalties are defined in the policies where the plans have either been unenforced, whether wholly or partially, or were changed by the duty bearers.

**Recommendations**

Overall, the challenges and relevant recommendations point towards the following salient points:

1. A strong, capable and empowered disaster risk reduction management body must be established. Management includes greater local access to finances and equipment. The Office of Civil Defense and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council must be reformed to enable proactive disaster management that focuses on prevention, mitigation and preparedness. This would effectively limit casualties and the consequent need for response, rehabilitation and recovery. However, the capacity for response must also be bolstered, since this gives immediate relief to affected communities. One specific measure that could be done by the national government is to augment the disaster funds of local government units, which are cash-strapped, yet vulnerable to geo-hazards.

2. Given the clarity of the law that provides for the creation of a Municipal Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council (MDRRMC), local governments have no reason not to set up the mechanism to respond to disaster needs where government, citizens, and communities are represented and do take action.

3. Coordination is vital to effective relief, rehabilitation and recovery programs, thus communication should be improved at all levels: a) between national agencies and local government units, b) between government agencies and
the private sector and international organizations, including donors, and c) among local authorities, village leaders and community groups.

4. Communities must be made aware of the officials and agencies that are accountable and may be approached for disaster rehabilitation and recovery concerns. Information should be transparent, and the functions, roles and responsibilities among agencies and volunteer and private groups must be clearly defined and delineated to establish the chain of accountability.

5. A new strategic design and planning of communities may have to be adopted beyond terrestrial considerations. The Philippine planning has been too land-based with little recognition for the archipelagic character of the country and climate change hazards. This should challenge scientists, planners, and authorities to redefine or reconsider the planning and design of building zones and communities, especially at the local level. Planning and zoning at the local level should take into consideration not only the land but also the water.

6. At the end of the relief response period, poverty and inequality must be addressed through rehabilitation and recovery measures. Rehabilitation entails providing livelihood, skills development, and continuing education, which are crucial for communities to get back on their feet.

7. Accountability requires transparency in the relief, rehabilitation and recovery efforts. People and agencies should be aware of the needs of affected communities. Relief and assistance must also be easily tracked in times of disaster, similar to the tracking of climate change funds.

8. Continue to build up on earlier investments regarding disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Both government agencies and communities have roles to play in these aspects. The Philippine Development Plan and the Budget Call have already identified 30 provinces that are highly vulnerable, and which may be the focus of disaster risk reduction-related investments.

9. Capacity building plans and programs for local government units and officials should include among others, an understanding of the national and local laws and policies that pertain to disaster response and risk reduction, as well as technical reports based on mapping, so that local policies and plans should align with national promulgations and policies and overall, should uphold the rule of law and establish accountability at various levels.

10. Finally, the governance principles of transparency and accountability, coupled with participation, are emphasized in this assessment on democratic
accountability in the delivery of housing services. Duty bearers and claim holders can learn from the lessons of democratic accountability using these principles in the various phases of public service, such as in planning, policy making, and implementation. Let this exercise on accountability assessment be a modest contribution to an understanding and practice of democratic accountability in service delivery.
Annex 1

List of Laws and Other Policies on Disasters in the Philippines

- Republic Act 10121: Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 and Republic Act 10121 Implementing Rules and Regulations
- Republic Act 9729: Climate Change Act of 2009 and Republic Act 9729 Implementing Rules and Regulations
- Republic Act 10174: An Act establishing the People’s Survival Fund to provide long-term finance streams to enable the government to effectively address the problem of climate change, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 9729, otherwise known as the ‘Climate Change Act of 2009’, and for other purposes
- Republic Act 7581: An act providing protection to consumers by stabilizing the prices of basic necessities and prime commodities and by prescribing measures against undue price increased during emergency situations and like occasions
- Republic Act 7160: Local Government Code of the Philippines
- Presidential Decree No. 1067: Water Code
- Executive Order No. 66, s. 2012: Prescribing Rules on the Cancellation or Suspension of Classes or Work in Government Offices due to Typhoons, Flooding, and other Weather Disturbances, and Calamities
- Executive Order No. 82, s. 2012: Operationalizing the Practical Guide for National Crisis Managers and National Crisis Management Core Manual; Establishing National and Local Crisis Management Organizations; and Providing Funds Therefor
- Executive Order No. 888 Adopting the Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), 2009-2019 and Institutionalizing DRR
- Executive Order No. 832 Creating a Special National Public-Private Reconstruction Commission to Undertake a Study of the Cause, Costs and Actions to be Taken in the Wake of Typhoons Ondoy, Pepeng and Frank, and to Seek Fresh Aid to Fund Reconstruction
- Proclamation No. 303, S. 2011 Declaring a State of National Calamity
- Memorandum Order No. 62 Providing for the Functions of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
- Department of Health Administrative Order No. 14: Policy and Implementing Guidelines on Reporting and Documentation in Emergencies and Disasters
- Department of Health Administrative Order No AO No. 2012-0013: Policy and Guidelines on Logistics Management in Emergencies and Disasters
- Department of Health Administrative Order No. 2012-0005: National Policy on Climate Change Adaptation for the Health Sector
- GPPB Resolution No. 34-2013 – Granting All Concerned Government Procuring Entities the Authority to Resort to Negotiated Procurement Under Sec. 53.2 (Emergency Cases) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA9184
- Title III Chapter II, National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (RA 8424) : Donations
- BIR Ruling No. 165-12 (March 9, 2012): Tax exemption of a transaction shall be on a case to case basis.
- BIR Ruling No. 097-2013 (March 20, 2013): Donation by a VAT-registered person of its ordinary assets is subject to VAT.
- Sec. 34 (H), National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (RA 8424): Deductibility of donations from Income tax.
- 2014 NEDA National Priority Plan
- Sec. 105, Tariff and Customs Code: Conditionally-Free Importations
Annex 2


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<th>Implementing Agency/ LGU</th>
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*Amounts in parentheses in US$ based on BSP Exchange Rate: PhP 47.431 (12 Feb 2016)

Source: Department of Budget and Management (2015)
Annex 3

List of Disaster Framework, Plans and Guidelines Used in the Philippines

- Briefer on the State of National Calamity as Declared by Proclamation No. 303, S. 2011
- Commission on Audit: Accounting and Reporting Guidelines for the Local DRRM Fund of LGUs, NDRRM Fund given to LGUs and Receipts from other sources
- Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), 2009-2019 and Institutionalizing DRR
- Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2013-1: Allocation and Utilization of the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund
- Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2014-1 re: Implementing Guidelines for the Establishment of Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Offices (LDRRMOs) or Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committees (BDRRMCs) in Local Government Units (LGUs)
- Department of Environment and Natural Resources: Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guidelines Incorporating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Concerns under the Philippine EIS System
- Department of Interior and Local Government Seal of Disaster Preparedness in Local Governments
- Department of Interior and Local Government Memo Circular No. 2008-69: Encouraging all local chief executives to implement Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction Measures
- National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Plan
- National Disaster Coordinating Council Memo Circular No. 1 s. 2008 Revised Gawad Kalasag Guidelines 2011 Amendments
- National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council Memo Circular No. 04: Implementing Guidelines on Use of Incident Command System as an On-Scene Disaster Response and Management Mechanism under the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction Management System
- National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council National Disaster Response Plan
- National Economic and Development Authority Guidelines on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Subnational Development Land Use Planning
- Office of Civil Defense Memo Circular for All RDRRMCs and RDs, OCD Regions: Publication/Advocacy of EO 66
- Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation And Recovery Plan
- Joint Memorandum Circular of DENR-DILG-DND-DPWH-DOST Memorandum Circular No. 2014-01 Adoption of hazard zone classification in areas affected by typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and providing guidelines for activities therein.
Annex 4

National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council Member Agencies

Office of the President (OP)
  Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Progress (OPAPP)
  Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO)
  Philippine Information Agency (PIA)
  National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC)
  Philippine Commission on Women (PCW)
  Commission on Higher Education (CHED)

Department of National Defense (DND)
  Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
  Office of Civil Defense (OCD)

Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
  Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA)
  Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS)

Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
  Philippine National Police (PNP)
  Bureau of Fire Protection

Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)

National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

Department of Health (DOH)
  Philippine Health Insurance Corporation(PhilHealth)

Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

Department of Finance (DOF)

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
  Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
  National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)
  Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB)

Department of Agriculture (DA)

Department of Education (DepEd)

Department of Energy (DOE)

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)

Department of Justice (DOJ)

Department of Tourism (DOT)

Philippine Red Cross (PRC)

Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)

Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP)

League of Provinces of the Philippines (LPP)

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP)

League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP)

Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas (LBP)

Philippine Social Security System (SSS)

Source: NDRRMC
Memorandum Order No. 62, Series of 2013 – Providing for the Functions of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

Section 1. The Presidential Assistant shall have the following functions:

- Act as over-all manager and coordinator of rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction efforts of government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities in the affected areas, to the extent allowed by law;
- Coordinate with the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and its member agencies and consult with the concerned local government units (LGUs) in the formulation of plans and programs for the rehabilitation, recovery and development of the affected areas (“the plans and programs”), including an over-all strategic vision and integrated short-term, medium-term, and long-term programs, which shall be submitted to the President for approval;
- Propose funding support for the implementation of the plans and programs;
- Exercise oversight over the relevant government agencies with respect to the implementation of the plans and programs;
- Call upon any department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations (GOCCs), government financial institutions (GFI), LGUs, and request non-government organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and other entities for assistance as the circumstances and exigencies may require in carrying out his mandate;
- Engage the assistance of consultants, experts, and professional advisors whenever necessary, subject to applicable government rules and regulations;
- Submit to the President status reports on the implementation of the plans and programs as often as the President may require; and
- Perform such other functions and activities as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Memorandum Order, or as the President may direct.
Annex 6

Guiuan Hazards Exposure and Sensitivity
(Excerpt from the Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan)

Lying within the Pacific Typhoon Belt and Pacific Ring of Fire, the Philippines as a whole is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Guiuan, a coastal area with mostly flat terrain, (highest elevation at 63 meters) and inherently weak geology, is one of the most highly exposed.

Haiyan demonstrated Guiuan’s vulnerability to climate change-related hazards such as. It is also exposed to changes in average temperature and rainfall, phenomena already observed prior to the typhoon and again being felt at present.

The socioeconomic conditions of the local community further exacerbate their exposure to such hazards and limit their coping mechanisms. That people are still living in tents and bunkhouses, and the lack of evacuation centers, pose further threats and make them more vulnerable to future disasters.

The [local government unit] identified natural and climate change-related hazards present in Guiuan:

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<th>Climate change-related hazards:</th>
<th>Other natural hazards:</th>
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<td>• Tropical cyclones</td>
<td>• Tsunami</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Storm surges</td>
<td>• Earthquake-related hazards</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Flooding</td>
<td>o Earthquake-induced landslides</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increased temperature</td>
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<td>• Sea level rise</td>
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</table>

Exposure to climate geohazards

The geophysical characteristics of the town laid out in the narratives above provide the context of the exposure of the communities to geohazards. First, the geographical location of the town in the Philippine archipelago makes the communities exposed to the direct effects of both tropical cyclones and seismic activities. Then, the karst geomorphology provides one of the primary reasons behind the distribution of the flood-prone areas. The ridges and cliffs, while providing safety against direct wind damage to life and property, are sites of potential mass movement. The soil characteristics of the town make the low-lying areas prone to ground shaking and liquefaction. The lowlands are usually prone to flooding, tsunami, storm surge, and landslide debris.
**Mass Movement**

Places with limestone cliffs are very prone to mass movement, such as landslides, rock fall, and debris accumulation. During earthquakes and very strong winds, the structure of the cliffs are weakened and may collapse. These are the places commonly found in the limestone ridge system mentioned beforehand. For instance, communities in the northeastern barangays such as Bagua, Sapao Pagnamitan, Sulangan, and Suluan are sites of such cliff areas; rock fall and debris accumulation threatens the safety of such communities.

Upland communities in Manicani and Homonhon Islands are also exposed to such hazards of various types of mass movements. The long-term seismic activities in the region and the periodic arrival of tropical cyclones weaken the slopes of the ridges and gullies. Land cover change exacerbates the process. The landslide type of mass movement is commonly produced by such dynamics, as observed in some upland areas in Habag.

**Flooding**

Flooding due to prolonged and heavy rains fills the depressions and channels of the karst geomorphology of the mainland. There are also areas in the inland of the Guiuan peninsula (e.g. Cantahay) that are prone due to the flat terrain and karst topography. Together with other coastal areas in the mainland, barangays in and around poblacion are also prone to floods.

The extremely low-lying areas in the mangroves are also very prone to floods. These places are found in the southern part of the peninsula (Bungtod) and the northwest section of Calicoan (Baras).

Communities that are on floodplains and main trunks of watersheds are very prone to flooding, too. Such communities are common in Homonhon Island, where well-developed fluvial systems drain larger catchment basins. During periods of prolonged and heavy rain, some areas barangays such as Inapulangan are exposed to floods of more than 1.5 meters in height.

**Liquefaction and Ground Shaking**

Low-lying areas in the town are also prone to liquefaction and ground shaking. The hazards, which are manifested during earthquakes, weaken and damage both land and property. The communities that are prone to the hazards are also usually closer to these shoreline, where there are relatively unconsolidated sediments. Inland and low-lying communities such as those in Cantahay are also prone to liquefaction and ground shaking.

**Tsunami and Storm Surge**

Tsunami, which are waves generated by earthquakes, can impact the communities from the seismic zones located north, east, south, and west of the town. Again, the coastal and low-lying communities are exposed to the hazard. The most exposed communities are those without islands without natural barriers, such as Victory Island. While tsunami and storm surges originate from two different sources, the communities exposed the two hazards are similar as wave dynamics follow similar characteristics in coastal geomorphology.

In particular, there were some areas in the northeastern side of the town that were greatly hit by the storm surges. For instance, beach areas in eastern Calicoan island were severely eroded;
there were observed reductions in coastal elevation in some spots (e.g. Surf Camp area). After the cyclone, some sediments were seen redeposited in nearby sandbars such as the area in the surge channel between Calicoan and Leleboon islands.

**Wind Hazard**
The impact of wind hazard on communities is contingent on the following: (1) the cyclone strength; (2) the geographic distribution of natural barriers; (3) the design and material of structures such as shelters; and (4) and the position of the cyclone path with respect to the community.

During the onslaught of ST Haiyan, the effect of the strong winds with respect to natural barriers varied greatly during the shifts in wind direction as the cyclone passed through the area. It was observed that the shelter condition (i.e. design and material) played a more important role in reducing the impact of the strong winds.

**Exposure to climate change-related hazards**
Guiuan, like other areas in the Philippines, has been experiencing the effects of climate change. These include changes in temperature and rainfall patterns, sea level rise, the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, and higher intensity of tropical cyclones, as evidenced by Haiyan.

Mean temperature is projected to increase by 1.1 °C in 2020 and as much as 2.2 in 2050.

Meanwhile, rainfall will increase by as much as 8.1 percent in 2020, but will also significantly decrease during the dry season of the same time period. The same pattern will be evident by 2050, with the amount of rainfall decreasing by as much as 26.8 percent. This would have significant impacts on agricultural activity, water supply, among others.

The number of dry days with maximum temperature above 35°C is likely to decrease from 2006-2035. However, dry days will be thrice as frequent over the next period. Meanwhile, the number of dry days continues to decrease, and the number of days with rainfall above 200mm will significantly increase. This increases the exposure of Guiuan to extreme weather events, places Guiuan higher at risk of its impacts, such as flooding, damage to houses and livelihood impacts.

Climate change exposure assessment further identifies the impacts of climate change drivers in the municipality. It shows how the biophysical effects of climate change have led not only to physical and environmental damage but ultimately would—as they have—social and economic impacts. Findings would help in further analysis of risks, and puts to fore the importance of linking exposure to Such impacts are to be considered in recovery efforts.
Annex 7

Guiuan Shelter Needs

Source: Guiuan Recover and Rehabilitation Plan
Democracy that Delivers – a catch phrase that summarises the hope and expectations many citizens all over the world have in democratic systems. The opportunity to actively participate is seen as a chance to steer political priorities and decision-making processes in the direction of socio economic development for all. In order to provide this for all people, democratic values and principles have to spread from the core government set-up and electoral design to the everyday life of citizens. One of the responsibilities that impact citizens most in their daily routine is the level of service delivery provided by the government. Democratic accountability, in particular, is essential for determining which actors are responsible for service delivery and to which extent they comply with their obligations as well as with the general publics’ demands.

When Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in 2013, the need for disaster emergency relief services was of unforeseen magnitude. This report provides valuable insight as to how the accountability relationships within disaster emergency relief function and analyses how the complicated network of involved actors and their correspondence with the communities can be further strengthened. The assessment focused on the Philippine towns of Palo, Leyte and Guiuan, Eastern Samar, which were severely affected by the typhoon and analysed the delivery of housing and relocation services in these localities.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (INTERNATIONAL IDEA)

At a time when there is so much public cynicism about government efforts to rebuild areas devastated by Typhoon Haiyan, this slim volume provides an incisive look into how accountability in service delivery impacts on the lives of those who are affected the most by calamities: the vulnerable communities. Dr. Edna Co and her team did an excellent job! --- RED BATARIO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR COMMUNITY JOURNALISM AND DEVELOPMENT

Almost three years since the tragedy that was Typhoon Haiyan, rehabilitation and recovery is far from over and victims continue to suffer from its effects. Building Back Better provides a timely assessment of the Philippine government’s delivery of services to victims of the super-typhoon. It also provides fellow researchers a democracy assessment model that can be applied to other areas hit by Haiyan or similar catastrophes. --- RACHEL KHAN, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF MASS COMMUNICATION