IFES HAITIAN ELECTION PROJECT

July 1990 - April 1991

Final Report

International Foundation for Electoral Systems

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was chartered to provide technical election assistance and election commodity procurements for the 1990-91 cycle of elections in Haiti. In this capacity, IFES consultants and staff worked with the Haitian election authority, the Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP) and other support groups in the organization of the elections.

There was no existing system of electing public officials in Haiti at the beginning of 1990. The failed election of 1987, followed by the illegimate election of 1988, left a distinct sense of pessimism about the possibility of success for free and fair elections in Haiti. For the previous three decades, the country was ruled by the Duvalier family, Francois and his son and successor Jean-Claude. Under their regimes, free and fair elections were not held and democratic political activity was suppressed.

The CEP was charged with the responsibility of organizing a national election system from the bottom up. Their responsibilities included staffing, voter registration, civic education, administration, financing, security and procurement.

IFES assistance to the CEP involved the following areas:

1.   technical assistance;
2.   election worker training;
3.   civic education; and
4.   election commodity procurements.

IFES was also charged with the responsibility of recovering the capital equipment deployed in the field. Such an undertaking involved deploying teams of technicians to every communal and departmental office to recover radio

equipment and disassemble the computer hardware for storage. IFES local office furniture and equipment were also warehoused. IFES contractors were successful in recovering nearly all of the equipment.

The general election was held on December 16, 1990 with two run-offs in January 1991. These elections were observed by several groups and official country delegations including the Organization of American States, Caricom, United Nations, National Republican and Democratic Institutes for International Affairs, United States, Canada, France and Venezuela. The published opinions from these observer groups stated that the Haitian election was free and fair and reflected the will of the Haitian people.

In these elections, a presidential contest, representatives to two legislative bodies and local offices were being voted upon.

The security of the voter and observers was the single most important issue in the organization of the election. With the example of 1987 in recent memory, it could be surmised that the Haitian election system would be a fragile one and public participation could be quickly stifled if the violent attacks involving bombings, shootings and arsons were employed again against the election administrators, supporters and voters.

The CEP and election organizers successfully incorporated the Haitian military into the process as election policemen. The United Nations provided security observers, UN military officers, who were teamed with Haitian officers providing a security presence during the elections.

This relationship proved effective in stemming the violence. No serious acts were reported on election day. This new role for the Haitian military was also a factor in suppressing the coup attempt by Roger LaFontant who failed to receive any significant support from the Haitian military in his effort to seize control of the government.

The grant was administered and implemented from IFES staff in Washington D.C. and a staff of consultants employed at a field office in Port-au-Prince. Project supervision of both program activities and finances was initiated in Washington and carried out by a team of co-managers sharing on-site responsibilities in Port-au-Prince. Special consultants were employed to provide technical assistance, training assistance and local office financial management.

The CEP was a provisional body whose existence expired at the end of the election cycle in February 1991. At this writing, it remains for the new president, Jean Bertrand Aristide to appoint a permanent council. This council will be faced with the responsibility of developing a permanent election infrastructure for the country. The components of such an infrastructure include: reestablishing a list of registered voters; identifying a permanent pool of poll workers; refining voting procedures and administrative issues; resolving logistical problems with the distribution of materials; reinforcing the civic education messages which have already been presented to the voters; and establishing a staff of election administrators who will serve as a professional bureaucracy to manage elections on a full-time basis.

II.ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONSEIL ELECTORAL PROVISOIRE

The Haitian Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP) was established in 1990 as a provisional nine-member election tribunal to administer the 1990-1991 cycle of elections in Haiti. It was the fourth such provisional body to be named since 1987. These elections would mean sweeping changes in the way in which political leadership was determined in Haiti and would introduce a new government structure as well as new political traditions involving candidates, parties, and community participation in public decision making.

The CEP was charged with the responsibility of creating an election system from the bottom up by implementing the provisions of a body of election laws established only in July 1990; after several postponements, the elections were held on December 16. The work of the CEP members and staff, as well as that of many others, culminated in the first free and fair elections to be completed in over a century in Haiti.

CEP members were appointed as representatives from particular constituencies, such as universities, cooperatives, and journalists; it was a competent group, but one which had never worked together before.

The scope of the CEP's tasks included:

1.Identification of staff and facilities for 137 BEC offices, nine BED offices, and the CEP's central offices;

2. Creation and implementation of a system-wide set of election procedures to substantiate the published election code;

3. Identification and training of over 50,000 voter registrars and election-day workers;

4.   Creation and implementation of a system of voter registration for
      registering over 2.5 million voters in 22 days;

5. Designing, printing, and distributing ballots for both national and local
      slates of candidates;

6.   Educating both the election worker and the voting public on specific
      voting questions;

7.   Identifying and procuring millions of dollars in election equipment,
      supplies, and services; and

8. Qualifying candidates for ballot certification.

9.   Establishing a security system to provide protection for voters,
observers and the successful completion of the election process.

      The elections were organized against a backdrop of economic and social
problems, tension between supporters and opponents of the election process,
and skepticism within the international community about the odds for success.
 CEP members and staff had little or no personal history or experience with
free and fair elections.   The daily potential for violence loomed over the
entire process.

      Numerous administrative problems stemmed from decisions made by the CEP.
 For example, complex procedures were adopted where simpler versions could
have eased the paperwork pressure on election day.   Further, logistical
problems associated with the distribution of voting materials in Port-au-
Prince can be attributed to the CEP's decentralized system.   Materials were
assembled in batches for polling places at the departmental (BED) or communal
(BEC) level without direct oversight by CEP central office supervisors.
Finally, there was a general lack of long-range planning and realistic

budgeting which made it difficult for assistance organizations to develop their own plans for support.

One critical determination by the CEP was the decision to postpone the elections from October to December. The reasons provided by the CEP were that adequate financing had not yet been put in place for the elections and the CEP was not yet organized for the task. Although observers thought that this was a poor decision at the time which jeopardized the entire process, the extra time was used effectively to put necessary structures and procedures in place, while an October election could have been an absolute organizational failure.

The election system also withstood challenges from presidential hopefuls Leslie Manigat and Roger LaFontant. It was determined that because Mr. Manigat had been living in the United States since 1988, he did not meet the residence requirement to be a presidential candidate. Mr. Manigat attempted a legal challenge to the election system on this point but was unsuccessful. Mr. LaFontant had been associated with the regime of former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier. Article 291 of the Haitian constitution prohibits individuals associated with the former regime from running for office until 1996. Invoking this provision of the constitution would have been a volatile political step, however, and Mr. LaFontant's candidacy was invalidated on other technical grounds such as the use of forged documents in his filing for office.

The success of the 1990-1991 elections contrasted dramatically with the 1987 election, which remains notorious for the acts of violence which ultimately led to its cancellation. It is clear, however, that the events of 1987 had an impact on the organization process in 1990, as concern about the potential for violence was a critical issue which the organizers had to successfully address.

Ultimately, the success or failure of the elections hinged upon how

effectively the issue of violence would be resolved. In 1987, the election
had been stopped because of the violence which resulted from the absence of
police power in the election process. In 1987, the Haitian military was an
outsider to the election process. In 1990, there was a deliberate and
organized program to incorporate the military into the process in the role of
the defenders of democracy. This relationship withstood the aftershock of the
Roger LaFontant coup attempt in early January 1991.

Under a $1.86-million grant from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) mission in Haiti, the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was charged with supporting the
election process in four major areas:

1. technical assistance;
2. election worker training;
3. civic education; and
4. election commodity procurements.

Technical assistance was an open-ended aspect of the IFES job
description. IFES consultants and staff worked on nearly every technical
election question, including polling place configuration, forms design and
control, analysis of the voter registration data entry project, ballot
structure, ink analysis, finance and budgeting.

Election worker training occurred in two phases: 1) training voter
registrars; and 2) training election day workers. Training was an area of
responsibility which some CEP members wanted to oversee directly. However,
because of CEP difficulties with resources and timetables, IFES was invited to
organize a program for the training of trainers of voter registrars. This
group represented the core of the training effort, as they were to be deployed
throughout the country. The program was organized and implemented in about
four weeks. When the question was raised about which group should train the

election day workers, the CEP coordinator was adamant about directly overseeing the program. After lengthy negotiations, IFES' involvement was limited to supplying the CEP with training materials and support services to conduct the training program.

Civic education can take two basic directions: 1) informing the public about the rights and responsibilities of living in a democracy; and 2) educating people on voting-specific issues such as ballot format and how to register. IFES was involved in the development of voting-specific messages communicated through posters, booklets, and radio and video spots.

IFES consultants developed specifications for the procurement of two major technologies for use by the CEP: 1) the computer hardware and software to automate the voter registration lists; and 2) a nationwide radio communications system linking 137 BEC offices, 9 BED offices, and central-office members and staff. IFES staff also designed and coordinated the production of 3.9 million voter registration cards in booklets used as the official registration documents. IFES-sponsored activities also included packing voter registration kits for nationwide distribution.

IFES fulfilled a contingency role by providing eleventh-hour supplies for the December and January elections such as flashlights, batteries, pens, notebooks, voting signs, and helicopter service.

Other countries contributing material to the process were Canada (ballot paper, ballot boxes, voting screens), Venezuela (motorcycles, gasoline, ink), Jamaica (ink), and Germany (video equipment), among others.

Other technical assistance was provided for election organization, political party formation and observer support by the United Nations (UN), Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter Center, and the National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs (NDI, NRI),

among others.

The December elections were observed by several hundred individuals representing the aforementioned organizations and Caricom, CAPEL, IFES, and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State, as well as official delegations from such nations as France, Canada, Venezuela, and the United States.

The published opinions of observers from these groups concluded that the Haitian election was free and fairly reflected the will of the Haitian people. Logistical problems associated with the distribution of election materials in some areas were publicly noted. Otherwise, the balloting was routine and a repeated scenario of violence was avoided.

At this writing, the future membership of the CEP is an open question. At the close of the 1990-91 election cycle, the current nine-member provisional council was disbanded so that a permanent council could be appointed. The next CEP must deal with the challenges of establishing a permanent election infrastructure in the country. Such an infrastructure must include long-term decisions on voter registration lists, the identification and training of a pool of election workers, the development of an administrative bureaucracy for the election council, and the resolution of logistical problems.

III. GRANT AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was awarded a grant totalling $1.8 million in July 1990 by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Port-au-Prince, Haiti to provide technical assistance and procurements for the 1990-91 cycle of elections in Haiti. An additional $59,525 was awarded in September.

Under the grant, IFES responsibilities fell into the following areas:

1. Technical Assistance;
2. Election Worker Training;
3. Civic Education; and
4. Election Commodity Procurements.

The four basic areas of the program represented the essential election issues to be addressed in order to meet the proposed objective, which was to provide operational and technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) so that the 1990 elections could be free and fair. The ultimate aim of the program was to contribute to the beginning of the transition to democracy in Haiti.

The 1990 elections contemplated the establishment of a civilian government through the election of:

1. President of the Republic;
2. Senators;
3. Deputies;
4. Members of the Municipal Councils; and
5. Members of the Administrative Councils of Communal Sections (CASEC).

A. Technical Assistance

In attempting to frame a job description for technical assistance, one USAID administrator stated during a pre-grant assessment meeting that some organization was needed that would serve as a "rapid deployment force" for the 1990-1991 Haitian elections in responding quickly to election-related needs.

While a rapid deployment force is beneficial to the process and IFES embraced this responsibility, open-ended job descriptions can be more difficult to administer and elusive to evaluate than descriptions with more focused guidelines. Nevertheless, the unknowns of the Haitian election formula dictated that some group play that role.

IFES' technical assistance took many forms, most notably working with CEP members and staff to analyze and resolve election administration problems such as the electoral law, forms design, voter registration, the role of the different categories of observers, availability and use of election commodities, selection of the poll workers and their training, education and motivation of the voter, systems management, finance and budgeting, transportation of electoral material, ballot design, security, data processing, polling place procedures, vote counting, and certification of results.

In this role, IFES consultants worked closely with the technical team from the United Nations. Since there was no formal mechanism in place for coordinating the activities of the two technical teams, IFES and UN consultants established informal working relationships to ensure that all critical issues could be analyzed and dealt with without contradiction or unnecessary overlap.

IFES technical support was also extended to the Organization of American States (OAS) team and to the National Republican Institute for International

Affairs (NRI) in relation to their observer missions. IFES representatives met regularly with the OAS coordinators to provide background information for the training of observer teams. The OAS coordinated observer teams not only for the elections but for the registration process in October as well. IFES consultants briefed the NRI observer group at the Villa Creole Hotel.

IFES/Washington staff provided briefing materials for official White House observer team members, and an IFES-produced video was used in the observer orientation session held at the U.S. Ambassador's residence the Friday before the election. IFES also provided office service support for a visiting team of Venezuelan election officials working with the CEP and for the election observer team from CAPEL.

Within the parameters established by the grant and in close cooperation with the CEP, technical assistance in the preparation of the electoral process began in July. The elections had originally been set for the month of October but were later postponed until December 16.

The dates for registration were also postponed due to serious problems in the organization of the registration stage: 1) the lack of financial resources to pay the registrars; 2) the failure to identify registration locations or Bureaux d'Inscription et de Vote (BIVs); and 3) delays in identifying personnel for the Bureaux Electorales Departementales (BEDs) and Bureaux Electorales Communales (BECs).

The first stage of the assistance dealt with voter registration, which occurred from October 5 to 26. In order for the electoral process to be credible, the CEP'S position was that it was necessary to register each voter, since Haiti had neither an up-to-date civil registry nor permanent voting lists. Voters were instructed to go to a registration area (BIV), furnish pertinent information, and, in return, receive an electoral card, which would enabled them to vote.

IFES aided in the design of the registration documents and provided all of the necessary documents and materials. It also organized a system for the distribution and collection of the registration documents for each of the 12,000 BIVs that the CEP had installed throughout the country. BUT THERE WEREN'T THIS MANY BIVs FOR REGISTRATION, WERE THERE? Each BIV had the capacity to register 250 voters.

Despite the possible consequences, the CEP staff did not use the IFES-designed distribution numbering system which would have tied each registration kit to a particular BIV. It was later left for each BED to coordinate the collection and return of its documents to the CEP.

As a result, there were delays associated with the return of the registration records. For example, the period for registration was scheduled for 22 days, but the transmittal of the registration forms to the CEP took practically a month. There was confusion concerning the copies to be sent to the council; in some cases the originals were sent, in others the white or blue copy.

When the period for registration ended, voter lists were drawn up on the basis of the registration. One list was to be affixed to the entrance of each BIV to indicate those who could enter the polling place and another was to be inside the polling place for purposes of control.

In order to generate the voter lists, IFES obtained and installed the necessary computer hardware and software and aided in the preparation and the revision of the lists. The original plan was for the CEP to provide the data entry workers and supervisors to staff the automation of the registration information. However, several days prior to the close of the registration period, the entire data processing department was terminated by the council president, and the CEP was forced to seek an independent contractor to staff

and supervise the data entry project. Computec, the firm providing the system hardware and software, was retained by the CEP for this project.

Although IFES was responsible for procuring only computer hardware and software, it was necessary for IFES to work with the data entry contractor in assuring that the lists were produced. The contractor did not have experience in the creation of such lists and consequently experienced problems. Under the original plan, IFES was to provide the equipment and the CEP was to provide the data entry personnel and supervisor. However, about a week before the commencement of registration, the entire data processing department was terminated by the CEP president, ostensibly on job performance issues. This action meant that there were no human resources remaining within the CEP staffing to conduct the data entry project. The hardware and software vendor successfully pursued a contract with the CEP to provide the personnel and supervision to develop the lists.

The contractor originally estimated that each data entry operator would type 5,000 keystrokes per hour and that there were 50 keystrokes per registration. Neither assumption proved to be valid. IFES consultants investigated the use of an optical character recognition (OCR) system to provide the input from the cards, but this option was too expensive and time consuming to set up.

Generally speaking, two types of errors occurred:

1. Errors in the BIVs at the time of registration which could only be corrected by the CEP returning the registrations to their place of origin. However, no mechanism had been established for this possibility.

2. Errors in the process of entering information into the system. Such problems should have been corrected on the spot, however, logistical problems associated with transporting corrections between election

offices inhibited the correction process.

There was sufficient concern about the quality of the data,entry work that the UN technical team sponsored two on-site visits by a systems analyst to evaluate the process. His concerns included changing the software from Informix to Cobol, batch controls on handling documents, ability to correct source errors and entry errors and document security.

The IFES technical team also made a special assessment of the entry workflow through an analysis by retaining Gonzolo Brenes Camacho, president of Costa Rica's election tribunal, to analyze the process. IFES' recommendations on the data entry process, including reducing the amount of entered data, cut the average entry time in half. Under a request from United States Ambassador to Haiti Alvin Adams, two back-up tapes of each day's work were created. Previous to his request, a single back-up tape had been created. IFES consultants then inquired within the UN mission if it were possible to store one copy in a UN facility. Although there was no initial objection from the mission director, some members of the technical election team were reluctant to take on that responsibility and so no such arrangement was made with the UN. Instead the tapes were stored in two separate office facilities of the data entry contractor.

The high count of registrations entered on the computer system was 3,271,155 voters. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? However, given a voter turnout of around 2 million, the actual number of legimate registrations was lower than that figure. Under this system, multiple registrations by individuals were possible. The election calendar did not permit a comprehensive culling out of all possible multiple registrations. Although registration data was checked and data entered for one level of review, local customs of name use coupled with the absence of a formal system of addresses made a thorough culling process a time-consuming task. Such a systemic weakness posed a credibility concern which had to be resolved.

The use of indelible ink, staining the voter's thumb after voting, is a commonly used practice to prevent multiple voting. It is an easy and visible method of identifying those who have already voted, thwarting the objective of fraudulent multiple registration. Employed as an election procedure in Haiti, the control gaps opened by the potential of multiple registration were closed with the inking procedure.

Census data was also a problem. Using the election council's own figure, some departments showed over 100% of the eligible population as registering. Such an irregularity occurred because of outdated census statistics produced by the Haitian Institute for Statistics.

A question may legitimately be posed about the necessity of voter registration with a system using indelible ink to prevent multiple voting. Interestingly, there was never any debate among Haitian election officials that a formal system of registration was needed. It was widely believed that despite any systemic weakness, formal registration was a necessary feature for election control and credibility. Voter registration had an auxiliary purpose of involving citizens and political parties in the election process during its early stages.

The vendor of the computer system envisioned that the software could be adapted to serve the candidate filing process as well as provide an unofficial tabulation of the vote results. However, the CEP members were concerned about the performance of the vendor on the data entry project and authorized the UN technical team to install a nine-terminal system two days before the election to perform a parallel count of the automated tabulation.

With respect to voting, IFES consultants gave the following technical assistance to the CEP:

1. Design and implementation of systems and work plans for the organization of

all phases of the process;

2. Recommendations on the administrative organization of the CEP;

3. Study and preparation of the documents required by the electoral law for the organization of elections:

a) Proces verbal of the opening and closing of the election;
b) Proces verbal of the vote count;
c) Instructions regarding the voting procedure;
d) Instructions on the transmission of the results;
e) Documents to transmit the results;
f) Instructions on the operation of the BIV; and
g) Regulations for the members of the BIV.

4. Design assistance in formatting the ballots for the election of President, Senators, Deputies, Mayors and Members of the Communal Assemblies. Using such models as the 1989 Nicaraguan ballots, IFES consultants worked with the CEP in designing a ballot which was easy to use and clearly identified candidate selections. There was a ballot for each election; those for President and Senator included photographs of the candidates. In order to facilitate voting, there were five ballot boxes identified by bands of different colors and the reverse of each ballot had a band of the same color as that of the box in which it was to be placed. Approximately 14.0 million ballots were printed for the election of December 16. Ballot specimens are show in Appendix A.

5. Providing a checklist of the materials required by the BIVs on election day (ballot boxes, indelible ink, pens, etc.)

6. Recommendations on the organization of the procurement and distribution of election materials to facilitate delivery to the BIVs.

7.Recommendations on the packing, distribution, and collection of electoral
    documents.

8.Drafting a document for the development of the campaign standards,
    particularly regarding demonstrations and meetings in public places.

9.Analysis of vote tabulation systems and forms. Instructions were drafted to
    facilitate and systematize this task.

10.Design of systems of transmission of data including forms and methods for
    the collection of the reports.

11. Providing technical assistance for the run-off elections in January when
    most other sources of support had been depleted. The second round
support   involved a significant level of procurements of a contingency
nature;   redesign of tabulation forms for easier use; and interacting with
    potential donor sources for any additional commodity procurement which
    might be available from their budgets.

B. Election-Worker Training

Election-worker training was originally budgeted in the grant at $132,700; then removed from the budget as a result of a CEP action; and subsequently restored at CEP request. The first change was the result of a maneuver by a CEP member to have an organization called CRESFED perform voter registrar training. CRESFED was known as a research group with no previous experience in such training programs. As a result, IFES monies budgeted for training were redirected to civic education. Because of doubts as to CRESFED's ability to do the job, some IFES civic education funding was used to create messages to independently inform potential voters about proper procedures, in case the CRESFED-trained workers failed to do so.

About four weeks before the registration period was to start, IFES received a request from the CEP to organize a training program for voter registrars. In line with the grant, this training was carried out in the CEP headquarters, the BEDs, and the BECs.

The following topics were covered in the training sessions:

1. The Provisional Electoral Council and its role;
2. Review of the electoral law;
3. Registration of voters;
4. Overall election procedures;

The training program began in September when the CEP had completed naming the members of the BEDs. The personnel of the BECs and BIVs were about to be selected. Due to the limited amount of time and since registration was scheduled for the month of October, instruction was divided into two phases: the first on registration and the second on the vote.

For the first phase, specialists in training from the CDRH were hired.

IFES coordinated the drafting of a project based on a "multiplier effect" methodology. The project was initially designed to train 26 "formateurs," who in turn were to train 435 "animateurs" so that a total of 6,525 individuals, at least one from each BIV, would be trained.

The program underwent modifications due to the limited time available. Training was given to 47 "formateurs" in two seminars of three days each, which were held from September 21 to 23 in Petit Goave and from September 28 to 30 in Frer IS THIS A TYPO?. These seminars were given by several members of the CEP, members of the UN technical team, CDRH staff members, and the IFES consultant in charge of the program.

The 47 "formateurs" trained 260 members of BECs, who then trained 739 communal delegates and 3,189 members of BIVs.

The training took place in each department of the country for three weeks (September 24 to October 11) in spite of the fact that registration had already opened.

The situation was changed in the training of the election day workers. The CEP training coordinator took an adamant position not to relinquish direct supervision over the training program. IFES consultants could not obtain firm figures on the number of people trained in this second phase. Nevertheless, IFES participated in this phase of the program at meetings with the staff members responsible for training. As a result of these meetings, a memorandum was presented by IFES consultants outlining suggested curriculum including:

1.General provisions of the electoral process;
2.Structure of the electoral bodies;
3.Role of the military;
4.Composition of the BIV;

5. Role of the members of the BIV;

6. Practical organization of the BIVs on election day;

7. Information on the voting process;

8. Explanation and practical exercises on how to fill out the forms;

9. Vote counting procedures;

10. Procedure of reporting the results;

11. Receipt of electoral material in the BIVs;

12. Transportation of electoral material after the election;

13. Role of the representatives of the political parties;

14. International observers roles and responsibilities; and

15. Sanctions for non-compliance of functions or in cases of infractions of the penal law by the citizenry.

The role eventually negotiated for IFES was to supply the CEP with materials to be used in the training process. These materials were in text, audio tape, and video tape formats.

1. Posters

Ten thousand posters were printed which explained the physical organization of the polling place: where each of its members should be, the positioning of the cardboard screens to protect the secrecy of the ballot, the voting tables, and the different ballot boxes.

2. Booklets

a) Guide for the members of the BIVs concerning vote counting, "Gid pou fonksyone ki pral konte vot." (50,000 copies)

b) Instructions to set up the ballot boxes, "Gid pou preparasyon ak jou vot." (22,000 copies)

3.Radio and Television

Nine TV spots were created, which were then adapted for radio, with clear instructions and explanations on how to vote:

a) Motivation for voting

b) Freedom of choice in selecting candidates

c) How to vote for the Presidential candidates

d) How to vote for the Deputorial candidates

e) How to vote for the Communal Section candidates

f) How to vote for the Municipal Council candidates

g) How to vote for the Senatorial candidates

h) Voting procedures in the polling place

i) Consequences of illegal actions

4.Special Video

A special video was also created to explain the vote counting procedure or "depouillement," an especially difficult stage in the Haitian electoral process. The video dealt with the five different ballots and the color-coding of ballot boxes. The council had designed a number of forms (the Process Verbal d'Ouverture, the Proces Verbal de Fermeture, and the Proces Verbal du Depouillement) which created a complicated method of tallying the results. In addition, each had to be filled out in seven copies. This video graphically explained how to open the ballot boxes, organize the ballots for tabulation, and fill out the tally sheets. As a result of IFES recommendations, this process was simplified in the run-off elections.

5.Vehicle Rental

A four-wheel drive vehicle was rented and provided with fuel for four weeks so that the CEP training coordinator could travel in rural areas

monitoring the training.

C. Civic Education

Some elements of the civic education program were intentionally blended with the training program to allow them to be used in both categories. For example, motivational video spots were not only shown on television but were also used in training sessions for election workers and observers.

All the messages involving IFES were "voting specific" in nature, that is, not concerning general democratic themes, but rather dealing with the who, what, and where questions which voters had to know about to understand and participate in the mechanics of the process. Other US-based groups such as the NRI and NDI provided support for political party organization and voter education. In addition, America's Development Foundation helped fund several local groups to provide similar electoral support. These groups included the Centre de Developpment des Ressources Humaines (CDRH), IRHED, and others.

From the beginning, programs on civic education were created to motivate, inform, and instruct the population on each of the stages of the electoral process. The relatively low number of spoiled ballots (5% or less) demonstrates the effectiveness of these messages.

For these purposes, pocket cards, videos, radio spots and posters were prepared and distributed throughout the country. Some of these materials were reprinted by Caricom at its own expense for another distribution through its channels.

1.Pocket Cards

Three different cards were drafted in Creole:

a) Konsey pou Elekte jou Eleksyon (80,000 copies)

    b) Moun Ki Kapab Vote (80,000 copies)

    c) Gid pou elekte ki pral vote (80,000 copies)

2.Posters

    Fifteen thousand posters were printed for December 16 and another 15,000 for January 20, which graphically explained how to use the indelible ink.

3.Flyers

    A flyer, also in Creole, was printed with the list of documents required by citizens for registration. A copy was included in the kit for each BIV along with registration forms. Copies were also provided to civic education groups which distributed them publicly.

4.Radio

    Several announcements were recorded in Creole:

a)Invitation for Haitians to remain united in order to achieve the desired changes; included information on who could and could not vote;
b) Where to register and the valid documents needed to do so;
c) The importance of the electoral card;
d) Information on the BIVs: location, members, powers, etc.; and
e) Procedure for challenging a registration.

    Copies of print and electronic education media as well as other analyses concerning the election are on file at the IFES reference library in Washington, D.C.

D. Procurement

The procurements coordinated and funded by IFES can be separated into two categories: budgeted procurements and contingency procurements.

The budgeted procurements comprised three major items whose purchase represented over 71% IS THIS ACCURATE? of the original grant budget.

Major procurement items were a nationwide radio communications network; the computer hardware and software to automate the voter registration lists; and 3.9 million voter registration booklets and related distribution supplies.

Contingency funding was reserved for eleventh-hour procurements of commodities which may have run low; last-minute logistical assistance; or newly identified needs.

In the original grant budget, indelible ink for use in staining the voters' thumbs after voting was allocated $92,850. However, the OAS mission in Port-au-Prince had 12,000 four-ounce bottles of ink in storage which had not been used during the 1987 election effort. Because of the potential savings that this inventory represented, IFES consultants wrote to the OAS observer mission coordinator in September and requested permission to utilize the existing ink in stock. There was no initial problem with this request, and the ink line item was removed from the budget. However, IFES consultants received a copy of an October communique from the OAS Washington, D.C. office explaining that tests had been run on the stock of ink and the OAS had determined that it was not suitable for use during the 1990 election. The manufacturer's representative was contacted and contradicted this contention, but the OAS position remained firm and the ink was eventually donated to the Boy Scouts.

As a result, it was necessary for IFES consultants to work with the CEP

and identify new sources for the ink. Indelible ink used in the general election and subsequent run-offs was contributed by three countries: Venezuela, Jamaica, and the United Kingdom.

1.Voter Registration Booklets

IFES consultants designed and procured 3.9 million voter registration cards which were used by the CEP. These cards were combined in a booklet form, with each booklet comprising 250 three-part, carbon paper forms. The voter registrar completed the registration form and simultaneously generated a carbon copy for the departmental election office and the card used by the voter. The original was to be retained by the CEP central offices and used as the source document for the creation of the automated registry.

In addition to the booklets, IFES procured paper, notebooks, pens, scissors, and carbon paper and coordinated the packing of distribution kits for a nationwide distribution of registration logs and supplies. The carrying cases used to transport the supplies were procured in Haiti after it was determined that the dimensions of the five-bottle Barbancourt Rum Co. carrying case were suitable for the registration booklets and supplies. 12,000 carrying cases without the Barbancourt logo or colors were acquired to transport the registration materials.

After registration was completed, there was concern that as many as 700,000 registration cards were still in the field and vulnerable to fraudulent use. Prior to the election, however, it was determined that most of them had been stored either at the BED office or, for those cards returned, in the bathroom of a CEP member's office at the Villa D'Acceuil, the building housing the central CEP offices.

2.Computer Hardware and Software

In accordance with the recommendation from USAID/Haiti and an analysis by the UN technical team, it was determined that an automated voter registration list should be established. Potential benefits of such an automation process included an additional level of inspection of source data; a data base of registration data which could be sorted and analyzed; and an enhanced perception of control on the registration process through the introduction of computers.

IFES procured a Data General system with 48 terminals and two printers to service the project. IFES retained a local programmer who created software specific to the registration task.

3. Radio Communications System

Based on a needs analysis performed for the CEP by the UN technical team IFES procured a nationwide radio communications system which linked 137 BECs and nine departmental offices with the CEP central offices. This element of the installation constituted the High Frequency (HF) system. The installations in the provinces were completed by early November. Problems encountered during the installation were primarily environmental in nature. However, it was necessary for the CEP to credential the installation teams in order to stop the *chefs de sections* from halting the vehicles and sometimes taking temporary custody of the equipment. In the Port-au-Prince area, there was an additional Ultra High Frequency (UHF) system used by CEP members and key staff. This system utilized around twenty handheld and about a dozen vehicle-installed mobile units. Both systems were equipped with scramblers to enhance broadcast security. The IFES office staff was equipped with three units. Both systems were used to support the logistics and coordination of the election process. The UHF system also served as an alternative telecommunications system.

The system specifications were also forwarded to OAS coordinators in

Washington, D.C. so that compatible equipment could be used by the observer teams.

Initially, there were training problems associated with the HF system. Many users thought that the system was not functioning properly. However, after tests were run, it was determined that the operators did not have a sufficient understanding of the system to correctly use the equipment. An additional training session was organized, and the vendor provided an additional technician on site to aid with system questions.

In early November, there were several reports of jamming on the UHF frequency on units being used near the CEP. Verbal threats using radio code names of CEP staff were also issued. The vendor's technicians concluded that whomever was jamming the radios was located near the CEP and did not have the capability of jamming the repeater which would have affected the entire UHF system. Only a few handheld and mobile units were interrupted and only at certain locations. Technicians monitored broadcasts for further episodes, but the jamming activity ceased after a couple of days and did not recur.

4. Contingency Procurements

Other procurements which IFES managed were contingency in nature, unbudgeted and drawn from reserves in several line items. The requests for these goods and services were either generated by the CEP or identified by IFES consultants. These procurements included:

a) 20,000 flashlights and batteries for illumination at polling places with no electricity for the general election and run-offs;
b) Nine facsimile machines for receiving transmissions from BED offices at the CEP central offices
c) Rental of _____ helicopters for _____;
d) 14,000 BIV signs for use during the run-off elections;

e)15,000 pens, 14,000 notebooks and 14,000 rolls of adhesive tape for
polling place clerical use.

5.Asset Recovery

Under the grant, IFES was also given the responsibility for recovering
the capital equipment associated with the procurement campaign, that is the
computer system, radio system, facsimile machines, and office furniture. This
recovery was complicated for several reasons. First, no clear directive on
how to organize the recovery was defined at the outset of the project and it
was not until January 1991, after the second round, that IFES project managers
received a final response on what asset recovery option was to be pursued.
Bid solicitations for insurance on the equipment were requested from several
agencies. Since IFES could be held liable for the return and condition of the
equipment, it was felt that if property insurance could be obtained, some
measure of protection from liability could be achieved. However, either the
agency declined to insure or in the case of the one response, Lloyd's of
London, the cost of the premium and ongoing weekly expense exceeded what IFES
could reasonably assume. As a result, IFES was solely responsible for the
return of the deployed equipment on loan to the CEP and because of the
volatile nature of the process was unable to obtain insurance protection for
these assets.

The computer system and office furniture were in fixed locations in the
Port-au-Prince area and did not pose recovery problems. However, the radio
system was a different story. Recoverable radio equipment was installed in
137 BEC offices, nine BED offices, and the CEP central office. Mobile units
were located in the automobiles of CEP members and staff, and handheld radios
were also used by key individuals. IFES solicited bids from computer and
radio firms for the recovery contracts. In addition to the technical
contract, IFES employed the former assistant general manager of the CEP to
facilitate the recovery process by acting as liaison with local election

officials.

The timetable for the recovery of the radio equipment was also problematic. The first plan was to wait until all run-off and make-up elections had been completed before picking up the radio equipment. However, small make-up elections were held in some areas until the first part of February. In other areas, the BECs had closed and equipment was either stored or had been forwarded to the BED offices or the local Catholic church. With the provisional election council evaporating in this uneven pattern, IFES began the recovery of the computer system and radio system. Also, warehouse space had not yet been organized by USAID by the time the first equipment had been retrieved. As a result, the first batch of equipment was stored in the IFES office, with a 24-hour security guard posted. The recovery process lasted around four or five weeks and was largely completed by the last part of March.

The dollar value of the equipment procured was around $. The IFES estimate is that there could be no more than $30,000 in equipment which was either lost or stolen. This means that the estimated recovery rate was at least   %. Recovered equipment is currently stored at the USAID contracted warehouse.

IV.   SECURITY

The security of the voters participating in this election was the pivotal issue upon which the success of the election hinged. The scenario of violence leading up to the 1987 failed elections was of paramount concern to the 1990 organizers. It was apparent that even with communications, computers, technical support, and observation, the opponents of free and elections could cause the process to collapse once again under the weight of violence.

Such opponents of the election process had been concentrated in both the military and in the community of former Ton Ton Macoutes, the former enforcers for the Duvalier regimes. In theory, even if the Macoutes staged assaults, the military, in the role of the police, could step in and protect the process. This system broke down in 1987, though, with the military either not acting to protect the voter or being an accomplice to the violence.

In 1990, in the early stages of election organization, CEP members began meeting with military leaders and incorporating them into the process. The first such meeting was experimental in nature and occurred in September. It continued for a day longer than expected. Starting with this initial rapport between the institutions, other meetings followed, and special military liaisons were appointed to deal with election issues in each of the nine departments.

The United Nations security observers bolstered the local military's compliance through the assignment of uniformed UN officers with the Haitian officers. Moreover, the presence of several hundred civilian observers cannot be discounted as a source of election security for the voting population.

Incidents during the election process included vandalism to election or registration offices, random violence directed at different party supporters,

and the use of verbal threats and intimidation. The single most significant security problem of the campaign occurred on December 5 in front of the St. Pierre market in Petionville. An explosion and shooting at a rally for presidential candidate Jean Bertrand Aristide killed 7 people and wounded over 40. After that incident, a moratorium was placed on further political demonstrations without prior authorization and security.

This new role for the military paid dividends during the January coup attempt by Roger LaFontant. In an attempt to nullify the election result, LaFontant had apparently counted upon more sympathy from within the military to assist him in his coup. This support failed to materialize, and the LaFontant threat was over about 12 hours after it had begun.

By reducing the threat of violence associated with Haitian elections, organizers can focus on improving other logistical, administrative and educational issues which require attention and resources.

V.   PROJECT ADMINISTRATION

The program was implemented through IFES's Port-au-Prince office and staff, with project supervision and grant administration coming from the IFES Washington office. A two person, co-manager system was adopted as a result of the loss of the original field office manager. The CEP president's decision to not work with the local office manager led to the need to restructure the field office and commit the co-managers to a shared full time presence. With the exception of a few days, this commitment was fulfilled from October through the December election.

The permanent field staff was comprised of an office administrator, secretary and driver. Consultants were hired to provide special assistance in the areas of technical support, training, civic education and local financial management.

Job descriptions and a project plan were established at the outset of the project.

The administrative component of this project encompassed more responsibilities than identified at the outset of the project. More attention than anticipated was required for USAID reporting and communications; job performance and evaluations; facility management, equipment maintenance and asset recovery.

Reporting relationships were not always clear between IFES and USAID with some IFES field consultants sometimes taking direction from USAID supervisors. Concerns were registered from some IFES consultants about having "too many bosses".

A field office administrative manual was created outlining office rules and procedures. Although it was created specifically for the Port-au-Prince

office, the guidelines presented in the manual would be applicable to other field office situations.

A local bank account was used for dispersements of $2,000 or less. Two signatures were required on each check. Larger payments were generated from the Washington office.

VI.   FUTURE ISSUES

Once appointed by President Aristide, the new permanent election council will face many challenges in establishing a permanent election infrastructure in the country.

First, the issue of voter registration must be addressed. A decision must be made whether to keep the existing automated list or whether new lists for each election should be produced. There was interest within the UN technical team of working with the new government on the creation of a civil registry to serve several purposes, including voter registration. If the existing list is reused, extensive verification and updating would be necessary. New registration cards would need to be issued. In fact, the expense associated with revitalizing this list may warrant an entirely new list.

The same booklet form of recording registrations used in 1990 could be re-employed in some future effort. The same registration software used for the input of names can be reinstalled for a future registration campaign, however, a software solution to the problem of multiple registrations should be pursued.

In addition, a permanent pool of competent election workers needs to be identified and trained. Each major election could require as many as 60,000 persons serving in the BEDs, BECs, and BIVs. The election council should lay the groundwork for recruitment and training as soon as possible. CEP payroll records can be used as a source for future recruitment. In addition, as political parties become better organized they could be viewed as sources for poll workers.

The human resource issue does not stop with election-day workers alone. There is a substantial need for the training of CEP staff who would become

the professional election administrators for Haiti. Such training could occur through internships, seminars, and involvement in election observer missions in other countries. These administrators could begin developing specialties in specific areas of responsibility such as training, computer systems, voter registration, civic education and public relations, commodities, financing and logistics. By creating a professional team of administrators, there can be consistency in the day-to-day management of the CEP regardless of its membership. Since CEP members represent different constituencies, it is possible that the relations among its members may become contentious at times. However, even in such circumstances it is necessary for the administrative functions of the council to proceed as usual.

By learning election management techniques, these administrators should be able to deliver better organized elections for less money than spent in 1990.

Special attention should be given to the logistical issues associated with the distribution of election supplies. Shipping election commodities requires a special sense of timing. These items have an expiration date and cannot arrive too soon or too late. Using consultants from US-based courier or transport companies to devise distribution plans would address the most significant problem which occurred on December 16, that is, an unreliable distribution of election supplies.

The civic education messages which were disseminated in 1990-91 were presented in a manner to introduce the process to the voter. For future efforts, support could be given to political parties, civic groups and labor and professional organizations to diffuse a new set of messages to citizens. If there are several support groups involved with civic education issues, some communications should be shared among them in order to coordinate the total package and assure that there is neither a lack of coverage in some areas nor an unnecessary overlap in others.

It will be necessary for the next CEP to reconstruct an election system from the bottom up. This time the council will be creating a permanent system. In this case, the process can be developed with greater certainty of success and a better understanding of the issues than was previously true. The model which was constructed was a workable one. Nevertheless, that model does require some streamlining of procedures, more training and a better planning process.

The documentation collected by the CEP, UN and IFES provide the base of knowledge needed to develop the next system building on its strengths of those techniques which were successful and avoiding pitfalls which were identified.

VII. APPENDICES

Appendix A

Political Background

1.   Political Division

The Republic of Haiti is made up of nine departments which are divided into communes and these, in turn, into communal sections, all of which are administrative divisions.

The communal section is the smallest political administrative unit. It is administered by a Council of three members who are elected by universal and direct suffrage for terms of four years.

The commune, a territorial body with administrative and financial autonomy, is administered by a Municipal Council of three members, elected by universal and direct suffrage for terms of four years, and by a Municipal Assembly, with a representative from each of the communal sections.[1] The President of the Municipal Council is the Mayor.

The Department is the largest territorial unit and is administered by a three-member council, elected for terms of four years, and by the Departmental Assembly, with a representative from each Municipal Assembly.[2]

2.   System of Government

The Fundamental Law of the country is the Constitution of the Republic,

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[1] Art. 67 of the Constitution.

[2] Art. 78 of the Constitution.

which was adopted by public referendum in March 1987.

The system of government set out in the Constitution consists of the classical division into three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.

3.   Legislature

Comprises the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, which make up the Parliament. Its members are elected by universal and direct suffrage but must obtain an absolute majority. Under the law, there is a deputy for each electoral district ("circonscription") and three senators for each department, for a total of 83 deputies and 27 senators.

4.   Judiciary

The Judicial Branch comprises the Court of Cassation, the Court of Appeals, the lower courts, the Courts of Peace, and the special courts established by law.

5.   Executive Branch

The Executive Branch comprises the President of the Republic, who is the Head of State, and the Government, headed by a Prime Minister.[3]

The President of the Republic is elected by universal and direct suffrage by an absolute majority for a term of five years; an individual may be reelected once but only after an interval of five years.

The Government is made up of the Prime Minister, who is named by the

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[3] Art. 133 of the Constitution.

President of the Parliament, the Ministers, and the Secretaries of State.[4] However, it is not a parliamentary regime, strictly speaking.

6.   Provisional Government

Until the newly-elected Government took office, the Provisional Government had a Head of State and President, Mrs. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, and a Council of State of 18 members: Dr. Louis E. Roy, Ernst Malebranche, Marc Lamour, Lesly Voltaire, Michel Lominy, Suzie Castor, Chavannes Jeune, Gerard Blot, Venel Remarais, Marc Kernisant, Carl Auguste, Newton Jeudi, Emile Jonassaint, Paul Yves Joseph, Jean Bernadin, Rick Garnier, Edgar Cesar, and Delince Pierre Louis.

7.   Permanent Electoral Council

Title VI of the Constitution deals with "Independent Institutions," and its Chapter 1 establishes the "Conseil Electoral Permanent" (CEP) as an autonomous and decentralized administrative body responsible for the organization of elections. It is the ultimate authority in electoral matters and has national jurisdiction. Each department has a "Bureau Electoral Departemental" (BED), on which depend a Bureau Electoral Communal (BEC) in each of the communes of the departmental electoral district.[5]

The Electoral Council is made up of nine members chosen from lists of three names proposed by each of the Departmental Assemblies: three are selected by the Executive; three by the Court of Cassation; and three by the National Assembly.

At the overthrow of the Avril government (June 1990), in the absence of

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[4] Art. 155 of the Constitution.

[5] Arts. 1-2 of the Electoral Law.

a legitimately constituted National Assembly and executive branch and in application of the transitory clauses of the 1987 Constitution, a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was established with nine members chosen, one each, by the following: the Executive; the Episcopal Conference; the trade unions; the Court of Cassation; human rights organizations; the University Council; the Press Association; the Protestant churches; and the National Council of Cooperatives.

8.   Electoral Structures at the Departmental and Communal Level

The Permanent Electoral Council (CEP) is represented at the departmental level by the Bureau Electoral Departemental (BED) which consists of a President, Vice President, and Secretary, appointed by the CEP from among inhabitants of the district, and at the communal level by the Bureau Electoral Communal (BEC), with the same set of officers and chosen by the BED in accordance with the CEP.

The BEDs and BECs have administrative functions. Each communal section has a Bureau d'Inscription et de Vote (BIV), which is responsible for registration and election day and has a President, Secretary, two clerks and a doorman.

9.   Political Parties

Article 31 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and freedom of association for political ends, while Article 31.1 provides that political parties and groups should participate in the expression of suffrage and that their establishment and the exercise of their activities are subject to the principles of national sovereignty and democracy.

The only norm that deals with political parties is the Decree of July 30, 1986. Many parties have been established under this Decree but they

cannot be considered true parties because they lack a national structure and do not fulfill the ideological conditions to contest an election. This is self explanatory in a country without a tradition of democratic institutions and one that has constantly been under dictatorial governments or states of emergency, which hinder the organization of political parties.

10.   Principal Political Organizations

Comite National du Congres des Mouvements Democratiques (KONAKOM)

Leader: Victor Benoit

Founded in February 1987, KONAKOM had as its goal the union of the democratic left. It began as a pressure group but became a political party at its Second Congress in September 1989. KONAKOM has observer status in the Socialist International.

Front National pour le Changement et la Democratie (FNCD)

Leader: Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Founded in October 1990, the FNCD is composed of populist parties and political groups of leftist intellectuals and a small group of businessmen. It can be said that it is the party of the urban poor, and Aristide, a Salesian priest, is seen by its followers as a symbol of the anti-Duvalierist struggle.

Mobilisation pour le Developpement National (MDN)

Leader: Hubert De Ronceray

Founded in 1986 by Hubert De Ronceray, it openly opposed the Duvalier regime

from early 1980 when De Ronceray was removed as Minister of Internal Affairs. The leader of the party was a candidate for the presidency in the elections of 1987. He also participated in the January 1988 elections in which Manigat was elected.

Mouvement pour l'Instauration de la Democratie en Haiti (MIDH)

Leader: Marc Bazin

This is a conservative party founded in 1986 by Marc Bazin, a former high-level official of the World Bank.

Mouvement Democratique pour la Liberation d'Haiti (MODELH)

Leader: Francois Latortue

Founded in the Dominican Republic by Louis Eugene Athis, who was assassinated in 1987 while participating in the presidential campaign, MODELH holds itself out as a party with a democratic structure. It boycotted the 1988 elections.

Mouvement d'Organisation du Pays (MOP)

Leader: Greger Jean-Louis

A party with populist leanings, founded in 1946 by Daniel Fignole. Its participation in the elections of 1988 and the naming of Gerard Philippe Auguste, its leader, as Minister of Agriculture in the Manigat Government led to an internal division of the party. Greger Jean-Louis was elected leader of the party at the October 1989 Congress by the dissident faction "MOP du Bel Air."

Parti Agricole Industriel National (PAIN)

Leader: Louis Dejoie II

Founded in 1956 by Louis Dejoie, father of the current leader; the son was a presidential candidate in 1987. Boycotted the elections of 1988. The party is important in Les Cayes, Jeremie, Jacmel, and Saint Michel de l'Attalaye.

Parti Nationaliste Progessiste Revolutionnaire Haitien (PANPRA)

Leader: Serge Gilles

Founded in 1986, its president participated in the elections of 1987 as a candidate to the Senate for the "Plateau Central." PANPRA is affiliated with the Socialist International since June 1989.

Mouvement National Patriotique de 28 Novembre (MNP-28)

Leader: Dejean Belizaire

Party of the center-left and a member, with MIDH and PANPRA, of the Alliance pour la Democratie et le Progres (ANDP), which had Marc Bazin as its presidential candidate in 1990.

Parti Democrate Chretien Haitien (PDCH)

Leader: Rev. Sylvio Claude

Rev. Claude, a traditional opponent of the Duvaliers, founded this party in 1979. He was one of the most important candidates in the elections of 1987 and is very popular with the urban masses. He is famous for having

been jailed and beaten by the Duvalier regimes. The party is not
affiliated with the Christian Democrats International.

Parti Social Chretien d'Haiti (PSCH)

Leader: Gregoire Eugene

Founded in 1979, Eugene participated in the elections of 1987 and boycotted
those of 1988. After the coup that deposed Manigat, Eugene became one
of the principal advisors to General Henri Namphy.

Parti Unifie des Communistes Haitiens (PUCH)

Leader: Rene Theodore

Founded in January 1969, PUCH is the political and ideological union of the
pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninist parties. It participated in the armed
conflict against the Duvalier government, which led to the massacre of
the majority of its members. Only after the overthrow of Jean-Claude
Duvalier did the party become public. Rene Theodore was its
presidential candidate in 1987, and it boycotted the elections of 1988.

Parti National du Travail (PNT)

Leader: Thomas Desulme

Founded in 1986 by Desulme, a self-educated man of very humble origins who
played a leading role in the "Revolution of 1946." He originally
supported Duvalier in 1957, but three years later he emigrated to
Jamaica where he made a second fortune. The principal platform of the
party is the massive generation of employment.

<u>Rassemblement des Democrates Nationaux Progressites</u>

Leader: Leslie Manigat

Founded in 1979 by Manigat while in exile after he quarrelled with Jean-Claude
     Duvalier when he realized that Duvalier had dictatorial intentions.
     Manigat returned to Haiti in 1986 and was elected President in the
     elections organized by Namphy in January 1988. He assumed office on
     February 7, 1988 and was deposed four months later. He left the country
     but returned in October 1990 and presented his candidacy for the
     presidency in the elections of 1990. It was not accepted because of the
     restriction against two successive terms. Manigat challenged this
     decision of the CEP to the Court of Cassation but was unsuccessful
     because the CEP is the ultimate authority in electoral matters.

10.   Other Political Parties

RDC –   Rassemblement des Democrates Chretiens
            Leader: Eddy Volel

UDP –   Union des Patriotes Democrates
            Leader: Wilfrid McNally

PARADIS –   Parti Haitien de Dieu
            Leader: Rev. Richard Vladimir Jeanty

UNFD –Union Nationale des Forces Democratiques
            Leader: Lamartiniere Honorat

URH –   Union pour le Renouveau Haitien
            Leader: Dr. Edouard Francisque

PNRD -Parti National Republique Democratique
            Leader: Jean Robert Mathon

UNDH -Union Nationale des Democrates Haitiens
            Leader: Jean L. Theagene

PPSC -Parti Populaire Social Chretien
            Leader: Edouard Tardieu

MOU -   Mouvement Democratie et Unite
            Leader: Maurepas Auguste

PNPH -Mouvement National Populaire Haitien
            Leader: Alphonse Lahens

PAN -   Parti Authentique National
            Leader: Serge Beaulieu

UCH -   Union des Constitutionalistes Haitiens
            Leader: Jean Claude Roy

MKN -   Mouvement Kombite National
            Leader: Dr. Volvick Remi Joseph

CLFD -Comite Liaison des Forces Democratiques
            Leader: Claude Veillard Voltaire

ARC -   Alliance Revolutionnaire de Carrefour
            Leader: Durvi Leonel

PUND -Parti de l'Unite Nationale pour le Developpement
            Leader: Joseph F. Jean Louis Milien Fineus

The Electoral System

Elections in an institutionalized political system are held under electoral laws that are relatively stable since they result from a consensus on the rules of the game. This is not the case of Haiti, where the political system is a synonym for dictatorship and where electoral standards are adapted to the needs of the government in power at the time.

Since the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, Haiti has fluctuated between frustrated attempts to organize the rules of the game and the difficulty of implementing them. Although the country has a Constitution adopted by a referendum, each election or attempt thereat has meant a new electoral law, more or less imposed by the government as a result of compromises of the moment, necessarily precarious, and not the product of a national consensus of the main socio-political forces. The Constitution of 1987 describes the electoral system and its governing principles, which should be implemented by an electoral law and its regulations. This instability of the electoral law runs parallel to that of the electoral power itself: four Electoral Councils in four years is a good example.

The President, the Parliament, and the Communal Administration are elected by universal and direct suffrage, according to the terms of the Constitution. National elections (President, Senators, and Deputies) are uninominal and by absolute majority, while local elections are by list and by plurality. In the event that no candidate in the national elections receives the necessary majority, there is a second round between the two candidates who received the most votes.

Since 1986, the Republic of Haiti has had a series of governments resulting from coups d'etat or from elections that did not meet the conditions

of freedom and legitimacy.

When Duvalier fled in 1986, a National Governing Council, comprised of both civilians and members of the armed forces, took control of the government and promised to make the democratic and economic changes that the country required. Several months later, on March 29, 1987, a new Constitution, which provides for free and clean elections, was approved through a national referendum. A Provisional Electoral Council was named, which drafted an Electoral Law (Law of 1987). It set November 29, 1987 as the date for the first elections and February 7, 1988 as the date for the new democratic government to take office.

The November election was brutally interrupted by a massacre at the polls on Ruelle Vaillant. The government dissolved the CEP on the same day.

A new CEP was later appointed, and elections were held in January 1988 in which Professor Leslie Manigat received a bare majority. They were boycotted not only by most of the electorate (some estimate the turnout for these elections to have been only 5 percent) but also by four of the candidates for the presidency and by some candidates to the Assembly.

In April of that same year, a coup d'etat overthrew Manigat and placed General Namphy once again in the Presidential Palace. He, in turn, was ousted on September 17, 1988 by General Prosper Avril, who named a new CEP and called for elections. This third CEP drafted a new electoral law. Avril governed with extreme harshness for 18 months amidst much skepticism as to his intentions to hold free elections. The CEP III did not enjoy credibility among the people, and there was general discontent. Avril was finally forced into exile by the political and social tension, protest marches and the pressure of political groups and parties, especially the "Assemble de Concertacio" which united twelve of the most important political groups of Haiti.

On March 13 a provisional civilian government was installed under a "Protocole d'Accorde," with Madame Ertha Pascal Trouillot as President and a Council of State of 18 representatives of different sectors of the civilian population, whose principal task was to assure that the President respected the Protocole.

Although this type of government was not provided for in the 1987 Constitution, it arose from a consensus among the different political actors as a way of organizing the State after the departure of Avril. Under this governmental structure a body of election laws was adopted in July 1990 which provided the statutory basis for that year's cycle of elections.

Appendix C

IFES Project Team

Richard Soudriette   Director, IFES

Paige Carlson-Heim   IFES Finance & Admin Officer

Ray Kennedy   IFES Program Officer,
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Marta Maria de Ordonez   Project Co-Manager
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Charles Tardieu   Training Consultant

Anthony Barbier   Assistant Training Consultant

Georges Brunet   Financial Consultant

Deborah Levine Roy   Local Office Administrator

Gussie Georges   Local Office Secretary

Pierre Andre Gilles   Local Driver

Appendix D

Glossary of Election Terms

ARRONDISSEMENT   Deputy district.

ARTICLE 291   Article in Constitution which prohibits a candidate from running for office on the basis of previous association with the Duvalier regime.

BULLETIN DE VOTE   Ballot which includes candidate photograph (for presidential and senate races), campaign colors, party symbol, party acronym and candidate name.

BUREAU D'INSCRIPTION ET   Voter registration site/polling place.
   DE VOTE (BIV)

BUREAU DE VOTE   Polling place.

BUREAU ELECTORAL   Election office on the commune
   COMMUNAL (BEC)   level.

BUREAU ELECTORAL   Election office on the
   DEPARTEMENTAL (BED)   department level.

CIRCONSCRIPTION ELECTORALE   Election district.

CONSEIL ELECTORAL   Independent Provisional Election

PROVISOIRE (CEP)Council.

CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION DESLocal provincial offices for
SECTIONS COMMUNALES (CASEC)which candidates contested.

CONSEIL MUNICIPALLocal municipal offices for
which candidates contested.

DEPARTMENTSenate district.

DEPUTECongressional level offices for
which candidates contested.

ISOLOIRVoting privacy screen.

PROCES-VERBALElection-Day report form.

PROCES-VERBAL DE DEPOUILLEMENTForm used to tally election
results.

SENATEURSenate level offices for which
candidates contested.

URNEBallot box.

This report prepared by

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