



ELECTORAL RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL



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International IDEA
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Risk is a **probability** of threat of damage, injury, liability, loss, or any other **negative occurrence** that is **caused by external or internal vulnerabilities**, and that **may be avoided** through pre-emptive action. (www.businessdictionary.com)

Electoral risks

- Legal
- Political
- Technical
- Operational
- **Security**



- **causes suffering and deaths**
- **destroys communities and infrastructure**
- **harms trust in democratic processes and institutions**

International IDEA:

Strategic decision in 2008

Support conduct of peaceful and credible elections



Electoral Risk Management Tool

ERMTool

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN LEARNING AND DOING

Learn



Analyse



Act



WIDER SOCIAL CONTEXT

- Structural factors of conflict -


terrorism

ethnic and religious conflicts

State building

corruption

poverty



reconciliation

political institutions

justice and rule of law



economic development

organized crime

neighbourhood violence


human security

gender-based violence



Two guides – 36 risk factors

Customizable digital library



Knowledge Resources

Internal Factors

- Internal
- Contested electoral law
- An unfit electoral system
- Inadequate electoral administrative rules
- Poor performance of the electoral management bodies

External Factors

- External
- Cumulative
- Poor socio-economic conditions
- Social and political exclusion
- Conflicts relating to change
- Gender-based discrimination


An Inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes

Introduction

Electoral dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms provide a formalized structure for appeals through which electoral actions and/or procedures can be legally challenged. Disputes may arise at any point in time throughout the various stages of the electoral process.¹⁹ If effective and trusted EDR mechanisms are not put in place from the initial stages of electoral processes, electoral actors may decide to resort to violent means in resolving disputed issues.



Upload data to: create color-coded risk maps, display data, map incidents, chart trends.



A guide with 100 comparative action points

Three layers of action

Throughout 8 phases of electoral cycle

Integrated risk and action register



ERMTool downloads

- Electoral management body (EMB)
- CSO
- IGO
- Other

○ Direct IDEA support



Over 100 user licenses are shared with organizations from 50 countries

Country Implementation Template



6 Phases

ERMT introduction

Training

Customization workshop

Operational planning

Implementation



Evaluation

Introduction of the ERMTool

- Present the ERMTool's concept to an EMB
- Provide information on how it is used
- Answer questions



Technical training




Context Overview Workshop

Participants:

- EMB officials
- security sector agencies
- civil society
- academics


1. Map risk levels



2. Identify risk factors

- Clashes 
- Hate speech 
- Armed groups 
- Small arms 
- Provocative campaigning 
- Problematic voting 

3. Suggest responses




Example Kenya 2011-2013

- 1 Problematic boundary delimitation
- 2 Lack of trust in work of election administration
- 3 Problematic voter registration
- 4 Unequal media access and favouritism
- 5 Provocative and violent party campaign
- 6 Problematic voting operations
- 7 Disputed election results
- 8 Socio-economic conditions
- 9 Social and political exclusion
- 10 Changing power dynamics
- 11 Media conduct
- 12 Grievances relating to previous outbreak of violence
- 13 Gender-based discrimination and violence
- 14 Presence of non-state actors

NOVEMBER 2011



AUGUST 2012



Example Nigeria 2014 - 2015

Mapping Electoral Risk in Nigeria INEC-AU-IDEA Workshop ERM Tool Model




Internal Factors

- Contested electoral law (4)
- Unfit electoral system (5)
- Inadequate electoral administrative rules (6)
- Poor performance of the electoral management bodies (7)
- An inadequate system for the resolution of electoral conflicts (8)
- Inadequate operational planning (9)
- Inadequate funding, financing and budgeting (10)
- Inadequate electoral security arrangements (11)
- Poor training for electoral officials (12)
- Lack of training for political parties and media (13)
- Lack of training of security sector agencies (14)
- A poor voter information campaign (15)
- Problematic voter registration (16)
- Problematic registration of political parties and candidates (17)
- Unequal media access and favoritism (18)
- Provocative use of media by political parties (19)
- Provocative party rallying (20)
- Provocative and violent actions by political parties (21)
- Insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials (22)
- Problematic election-day operations (23)
- Problematic ballot counting and result tallying (24)
- Poor management of election results (25)
- Rejection of election results (26)

External Factors


- Poor socio-economic conditions (27)
- Political and social exclusion (28)
- Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (29)
- Gender-based discrimination and violence (30)
- The presence of non-state armed actors (31)
- The presence of organized crime groups (32)
- Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (33)
- Human rights violations (34)
- Natural / Environmental hazards (35)
- Unethical media reporting (36)

- Customized factors & indicators (37)




Example Myanmar 2015


EMB and SSAs




CSOs and PPs




Resultant map



Operational plan for data collection and analysis





Implementation




1. Make informed and conflict sensitive decisions
2. Coordinate and take timely and effective prevention and mitigation actions

End of Voting Operations and the Start of Result Transmission Risk
Problematic Voting Operations 4 March 2013
 - based on IEBC and Uwiano information -




Risk Levels

- Very High
 - High
 - Medium
 - Low
 - Very Low
-
- No: Delayed delivery of election materials
 - No: of polling stations opening later than 6 a.m.
 - Incidents of election-related violence







Confidence in the work of the BiH Central Election Commission



**CA Election Voting Operation
 and Election Day Phase
 Election-Related Incidents**

2070/06/09 – 2070/08/02

25 September – 17 November, 2013



Risk Level
 High
 Medium
 Low
 No ER incidents reported

Total no of ER incidents

Methodology

First Page:

This risk map projects total no of electoral risks in that particular district within the time span. Directed against electoral actors, events, materials or facilities from the period of 25th September to 14^h November 2013..

Second Page: This risk map projects electoral risks as a function of two interrelated factors: (1) *election-related incidents (physical)* and (2) *election-related incidents (psychological)*. Directed against electoral actors, events, materials or facilities from the period of 12st November to 14^h November 2013.

DATA SOURCE:

- Joint Election Operation Centre (JEOC)
- Security Agency (Nepal Police)
- Media Monitoring Unit of ECN (For the first page map only)
- Media (Nepalnews, Ekantipur, National Dailies)

COLOR CODES

Color coded risk levels are generated for factors (1) and (2) and presented on a scale from 1-4.

District were attributed risk levels as follows:

- 'No ER incidents reported' – 0 incidents;
- 'Low risk level' – 1 to 4 incidents;
- 'Medium risk level' – 5 to 8 incidents; and
- 'High risk level' – 9 or more incidents.

NUMERICAL VALUES

Districts that have experienced election-related incidents either **physical** or **psychological** are mapped using two color coded boxes. Each box includes a numerical value that represents the total number of incidents reported for each district.

DESCRIPTION BOXES

Description boxes relate to physical election-related incidents from 12st November to 14th November 2013.

Analysis

- Significant incident increase in capital city (Kathmandu) and Kapilvastu district since 12th November.
- Very high psychological incidents on 11th November marking the first day of the Strike (Banda) but decreased significantly the next day.
- Both psychological and physical incidents are showing a declining trend potentially due to the arrest and legal actions by the police as well as the anti-banda protest by FNCCI and other Civil Society Organizations.
- Maoist (Baidya fraction) showed their strong presence in Kanchanpur, Kapilvastu, Chitwan, Dang, Parsa, Bara, Sunsari and Kavrepalanchok based on the use of IEDs and act of Arsons since 25th September.

Suggested action points:

Improved Electoral Management and Justice

- ECN should ensure that the designated polling and counting locations provide a safe environment for election officials, observers and voters.
- ECN should re-ensure that ballot casting, counting and result tallying are implemented according to the rules and regulations, accurately and transparently.

Improved Electoral Security

- ECN should request to the Nepal Government to provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations before, during and after election day.


Improved Infrastructure for Peace

- ECN should initiate or sustain peace initiatives and dispute resolution networks during the voting operations phase.

Evaluation

- Internal
 - External
- a) Improved **knowledge** about the phenomenon
 - b) Improved data collection and analysis **capacity**
 - c) Informed and conflict sensitive **decision making**
 - d) Improved **collaboration** among national stakeholders





Thank You