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THE PROTECTING ELECTIONS SELF-ASSESSMENT SURVEY



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
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INTRODUCTION

This self-assessment survey is part of the Integrated Framework for Protecting Elections. It assists users in assessing their own challenges, resources and practices, and consequently their capacity to protect electoral integrity. Such awareness is essential for ensuring that the safeguards of electoral integrity are optimized.

The survey aims to serve electoral management bodies (EMBs) and other organizations that have specific mandates to protect electoral integrity. Researchers and civil society organizations can use it to assess the capacity of EMBs and other relevant stakeholders.

The self-assessment survey's robust methodology ensures that assessment efforts are comprehensive, safe for the organization involved, gender-sensitive and conducive to learning and ownership of the findings.

Where broader collaborative efforts exist to protect electoral integrity—for example, those involving various national stakeholders—comparing, contrasting and discussing the results of individual organizations' self-assessments will help establish a better understanding of a country's capacity to protect electoral integrity.

CONTENT AND METHOD

The self-assessment survey comprises four numbered sections, as follows:

1. Assessing key electoral integrity challenges and organizational mandates

This section introduces eight broad (global) challenges to electoral integrity. It helps users assess whether these challenges are relevant to a given country and electoral context and to identify which organizations have mandates to address specific challenges.

2. Assessing key legal and institutional safeguards

This section introduces legal and institutional electoral safeguards and assesses the extent to which they are sufficient to protect electoral integrity.

3. Assessing key management safeguards

This section introduces key management safeguards—namely risk-management, resilience-building and crisis-management processes—and assesses the extent to which they are sufficiently implemented to protect electoral integrity.

4. Analysing results

This section covers two options—simple and advanced—for the analysis of findings.

Typically, the self-assessment process will require input from different departments/staff across an organization. In order to ensure consistency in instructions and responses, each section introduces essential concepts and terminology.

When answering questions, users can decide to provide simple or advanced answers:

- simple answers (by way of ticking a box or leaving it blank) indicate the presence or absence of an attribute; and
- advanced answers (using ordinal and nominal scales) indicate ratings and rankings concerning specific questions, to produce more insightful results.

Users can provide additional comments to address essential issues not covered in this survey. To simplify analysis and action, users should avoid adding issues that are broadly covered already by the categories proposed.

If the categorization used by this survey does not match that which is familiar in a user's context, users are advised to align their findings and analysis with their local terminology. However, users should consider the need for terminological alignment with other organizations that conduct assessments in the same country or electoral context. Some of the categorization used in this document reflects global and regional norms and standards as well as good practice. This includes the terminology around gender sensitivity and inclusion. In these instances, the categorization can provide benchmarks for advancing the terminology used locally.

Explanatory narrative is kept to a minimum in this survey. Therefore, for better insights into key concepts, we strongly advise that users read *The Protecting Elections Guide: The Guide to Knowing and Using the Integrated Framework for Protecting Elections* alongside this document.

1. ASSESSING KEY ELECTORAL INTEGRITY CHALLENGES AND ORGANIZATIONAL MANDATES

CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY

For the purposes of this self-assessment survey, the definition of ‘electoral integrity challenge’ is anything that can put electoral integrity to the test. It can relate to a risk, a threat or a crisis. The most common challenges to electoral processes globally may be clustered into the following eight categories:

1. Autocratization and undemocratic electoral reforms (‘democratic backsliding’)

These challenges comprise executive and legislative actions that undermine electoral integrity. Increasingly, politicians with autocratic mindsets use democratic elections in well-established democracies to come to power but then direct their attention to eroding democratic laws, institutions and processes to remain in office. This phenomenon is broadly known as democratic backsliding or autocratization. A crucial sign of this phenomenon is the erosion of the institutional independence of EMBs. When democratic institutions, including EMBs, cannot cope with such pressures, electoral integrity may be undermined.

2. Hurdles and malfunctions in electoral management and dispute resolution

These challenges denote paralysing complexities and unintentional failures in elections. The electoral process must cater to the rights and needs of various electoral stakeholders—such as political parties and candidates, their supporters, civil society observers and all eligible citizens, including marginalized individuals and groups. At the same time, the electoral process must adhere to strict procedures and timelines. The scope and complexity of this task mean that things may, and often do, go wrong for a variety of reasons—for example, logistical hurdles, technical and human error, external stresses, shocks and crises, or failures to deal effectively with disputes. Moreover, insufficient resources and funding may leave electoral management bodies understaffed or underfunded, rendering them unable

to function properly. When such hurdles and malfunctions are of significant scale and are not adequately resolved, the integrity of the process may be undermined.

3. Electoral malpractices (including fraud and corruption)

This set of challenges reflects the dishonest actions of electoral stakeholders—national and foreign—aimed at securing electoral advantages. Such malpractices can range from interfering with critical electoral events—for example, committing voter registration fraud or election day fraud—to falsifying election results. Many electoral malpractices rely on corrupt behaviours, including widespread vote buying to bribe voters, or the bribing of poll workers or election administrators. Therefore, illicit and improper financing of, and spending by, political parties—including the abuse of state resources—deserve special attention. Contexts lacking strong oversight agencies and capable civil society organizations are especially vulnerable to widespread electoral malpractices.

4. Violence (including gender-based violence)

Various actors can perpetrate physical or psychological violence in elections for different ends. Election-related violence is often a tactic to secure electoral advantage. Thus, political parties may mobilize or encourage their supporters to commit violence, while incumbent politicians may use their security apparatus to this end. Such acts of violence are directed against political rivals or their supporters, electoral administrators or critical electoral infrastructure and materials. Violence can also be the tactic of groups that do not seek electoral advantages as such but that wish to destabilize the functioning of democratic institutions by derailing electoral processes. Such perpetrators may include terrorist organizations, non-state armed actors, organized crime groups, etc. When elections occur in countries that are already experiencing large-scale communal violence, gender-based violence, terrorist attacks or criminal violence, navigating the electoral process through such violence may be particularly challenging.

Electoral violence often targets women and marginalized individuals and groups, including ethnic and sexual minorities and persons with disabilities. Women and marginalized groups in political and electoral roles often face targeted attacks—physical, psychological, sexual and digital—aimed at reinforcing traditional social and gender roles and deterring their engagement. The risk, threat or experience of such violence can discourage women and marginalized individuals from standing as candidates, serving as election officials or voting, thereby distorting political competition and deliberation. Ultimately, such violence erodes electoral integrity by undermining the principles of equality, inclusiveness and fairness.

5. Malicious online actions

Because online spaces have unique features, malicious online actions are considered a distinct category among challenges to electoral integrity, often forming part of broader, coordinated hybrid campaigns to undermine democratic processes. These threats can be perpetrated by both foreign

and domestic actors, who exploit electoral vulnerabilities to influence voting patterns, destabilize democratically elected governments or erode public trust in the election itself. The tactics employed are varied and increasingly sophisticated. They include coordinated foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) by states or state-linked actors, the deliberate or unintentional spread of false information in disinformation and misinformation campaigns (noting that misinformation can also spread organically because of public anxiety and misperceptions), cyberattacks on critical electoral infrastructure such as voter registration databases, and online harassment and hate speech aimed at intimidating participants. Women, especially candidates and election officials, are disproportionately exposed to these threats through targeted online harassment and gendered disinformation campaigns. As digital technology advances, new risks emerge, with artificial intelligence (AI)—particularly generative AI—providing a powerful tool for malicious actors to create and amplify sophisticated false content at unprecedented scale and speed.

6. Lack of trust and negative public perceptions

A critical aspect of electoral integrity is ensuring that electoral processes—and consequently the results they produce—are broadly trusted. In this respect, popular perceptions are vital. When perceptions of electoral integrity are broadly negative, they may have concrete consequences, leading to challenges to, or the rejection of, electoral results—even if those challenges are based on incorrect information. A lack of trust and negative public perceptions may result from internal process-related weaknesses, media dynamics and public perception that undermine trust in democratic institutions—causing voter apathy—or as a result of intentionally antagonistic efforts.

7. Natural and human-made hazards

Challenges to elections may emanate from natural hazards, such as floods, heatwaves, earthquakes, tropical storms, wildfires and pandemics. Human-made hazards include situations (or conditions) such as wars and nuclear/biological incidents. When of significant scope and intensity, these events can damage or destroy critical infrastructure—national and subnational—for holding elections and cause displacement and hardships, preventing parties and candidates from running campaigns or citizens from casting their votes. Also, a declaration of a state of emergency—as the government’s response to hazards that materialize—can undermine the integrity of the electoral process by limiting citizens’ political rights and opportunities for equal contestation.

8. Exclusion and discrimination

Persistent patterns of exclusion and discrimination continue to limit the meaningful participation and representation of women, youth and marginalized groups—including persons with disabilities and ethnic minorities—in electoral processes. These challenges are often compounded at the intersection of multiple identities; for instance, young women or persons with disabilities belonging to minority communities may face overlapping barriers that further restrict their engagement and voice.

Rooted in systemic inequalities, restrictive social norms, and unequal access to resources and opportunities, such exclusion can occur at every stage of the electoral cycle, discouraging individuals from registering, voting, running for office, or serving as election officials, staff or observers. When large segments of society are disengaged, whether deliberately or not, elections fail to capture the full diversity of voices and experiences within a population, thereby weakening the legitimacy of electoral processes and the results they produce.

One should note that elections often face multiple challenges. Antagonistic actors and external interference, when combined, reinforce one another, requiring significant effort and determination from EMBs, other institutions and societies at large to deal with them. Because challenges do not exist in isolation, neither should the efforts to protect electoral integrity.

The following set of questions examines whether the above-described challenges are relevant to our next elections (question in column A) and whether the mandate of our organization is critical in dealing with these challenges (question in column B).

Instructions

For column A:	For column B (where column A is marked):
For a simple answer YES , tick the relevant box; if NO , leave it blank.	For a simple answer YES , tick the relevant box; if NO , leave it blank.
For advanced answers, include the appropriate number: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 (high relevance) • 3 (medium relevance) • 2 (low relevance) • 1 (very low relevance) 	For advanced answers, include the appropriate number: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 (sole mandate of our organization) • 3 (main mandate of our organization) • 2 (significant mandate of our organization) • 1 (limited mandate of our organization)
If not relevant, leave blank.	If not relevant, leave blank.

Challenge	Column A Are these challenges relevant to our next elections?	Column B (fill in <i>only</i> where column A is also ticked) Is the mandate of our organization critical in dealing with these challenges?
1 Autocratization and undemocratic electoral reforms		
2 Hurdles and malfunctions in electoral management and dispute resolution		
3 Electoral malpractices		
4 Violence		
5 Malicious online actions		
6 Lack of trust and negative public perceptions		
7 Natural and human-made hazards		
8 Exclusion and discrimination		
Other challenges		

Additional details and explanations (for example, explain the role of our organization: whether it has (a) a lead/coordinating role, (b) an implementation/operational role, (c) a support/advisory role, (d) an oversight/monitoring role, (e) no formal role).

2. ASSESSING KEY LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY

Legal safeguards: These are the backbone of electoral integrity. They typically include provisions in a national constitution, election law and other related laws and by-laws. For every electoral challenge defined in Section 1, specific legal safeguards are likely to exist. For example, elections are protected from malpractices, violence and malicious interference by declaring these practices unlawful and defining sanctions for such behaviours. Protecting elections in the face of autocratization is often achieved by ensuring that there are constitutional checks and balances regarding responsibilities to legislate elections, administer elections and resolve electoral disputes. Protecting elections against natural and human-made hazards requires the existence of transparent legal provisions for dealing with such situations in a democratic manner.

Institutional safeguards: These primarily refer to national stakeholders' capacity to uphold electoral integrity in challenging situations. The mandate to organize elections—as defined within the legal framework—can reside with one or more state agencies. Most commonly, EMBs include independent organizations responsible for organizing the registration of voters and political parties, developing election materials, establishing and operating polling stations, managing special voting arrangements, consolidating election results and so on. Other state agencies, responsible for security, anti-corruption, media regulation, contingency and other functions—as well as the judicial branch—may be responsible for providing support and for dealing with specific tasks or resolving disputes. In countries where electoral integrity is inherently threatened, specialized electoral justice institutions have a significant role in protecting elections. In order to perform their duties, these agencies need sufficient resources (human and financial) to support their mandates and to ensure impartiality and effectiveness in dealing with various challenges.

This set of questions examines whether legal safeguards (question in column C) and institutional safeguards (question in column D) are sufficient in relation to identified challenges.

Instructions

For column C:	For column D:
For a simple answer YES , tick the relevant box; if NO , leave it blank.	For a simple answer YES , tick the relevant box; if NO , leave it blank.
For advanced answers, include the appropriate number: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 (insufficient) • 3 (hardly sufficient) • 2 (mainly sufficient) • 1 (sufficient) 	For advanced answers, include the appropriate number: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 (insufficient) • 3 (hardly sufficient) • 2 (mainly sufficient) • 1 (sufficient)
If not relevant, leave blank.	If not relevant, leave blank.

Challenge	Column C Are legal safeguards sufficient in relation to challenges? (Mark only for challenges identified in column A)	Column D Are institutional safeguards sufficient in relation to challenges? (Mark only for challenges identified in column A)
1 Autocratization and undemocratic electoral reforms		
2 Hurdles and malfunctions in electoral management and dispute resolution		
3 Electoral malpractices		
4 Violence		
5 Malicious online actions		
6 Lack of trust and negative public perceptions		
7 Natural and human-made hazards		

8 Exclusion and discrimination

Other challenges

Additional details and explanations (for example, explain the role of our organization: whether it has (a) a lead/coordinating role, (b) an implementation/operational role, (c) a support/advisory role, (d) an oversight/monitoring role, (e) no formal role).

3. ASSESSING KEY MANAGEMENT SAFEGUARDS

This section requires responses in two parts:

- the first assesses management processes to deal with challenges; and
- the second examines their relevant details.

CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY

Management safeguards refer to the processes put in place by EMBs and other organizations to protect electoral integrity. These are important because even the best electoral laws and institutional arrangements will not always be sufficient to prevent an electoral challenge from materializing. Therefore, the ability of electoral administrators to navigate ever-changing landscapes (political, security, etc.) remains of utmost importance for the conduct of credible elections. Whereas safeguarding electoral integrity is entrenched in the general design and management of electoral processes, many EMBs adopt additional measures to deal more effectively with risks, stresses and crises, primarily by putting risk-management, resilience-building and crisis-management processes in place. The definitions below aim to help users of the self-assessment survey to effectively navigate this chapter by developing an understanding of the key concepts and terms.

Electoral risk is the likelihood of an occurrence that can negatively affect the electoral process.

Electoral risk management is a systematic effort to improve knowledge about, and situational awareness of, internal and external risks to electoral processes in order to initiate timely preventive and mitigating action.

Electoral vulnerability is the exposure of the electoral process to harmful situations and actors.

An electoral threat is a situation or actor that can exploit electoral vulnerabilities.

Electoral resilience is the ability of electoral institutions and processes to maintain continuity in the face of stresses and shocks.

Electoral resilience building is a systematic effort to strengthen electoral institutions and processes so they can withstand threats—by resisting (= exhibiting perseverance), adapting (= adopting flexibility) or transforming (= profoundly changing the ways in which things are done).

An electoral crisis is a situation that combines significant threats to electoral integrity, a sense of urgency and high uncertainty.

Electoral crisis management is an effort to prepare for, and respond to, electoral crises, as well as to recover and learn from them.

Electoral integrity remedies are resources—knowledge, training and assessment tools, approaches or methods—developed to address one or several challenges to electoral processes.

Gender sensitivity entails consistent and systematic consideration of gender-based differences and inequalities between women, men and non-binary people, in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of processes and outcomes, with a view to addressing systemic and structural constraints to gender equality, as well as to facilitating the achievement of gender equality and inclusion.

Instructions

For column E:

For a simple answer, tick the box if the statement in the 'Options' column is relevant.

For advanced answers, enter the appropriate number from the adjacent box.

Note: If you implement various (mixed) approaches to managing challenges, indicate all relevant approaches below. In the subsequent section, you will be able to provide specific details.

Options	Column E Which of these processes are in place to deal with relevant challenges as identified in column A?	Advanced answers for column E
A. Ad hoc (informal) processes Only when a situation emerges do we discuss and act on a specific challenge.		If mostly true, enter '4'. If mostly untrue, leave blank.
B. General management processes All managers are required to consider challenges that may affect the implementation of their tasks and take necessary measures to address them.		If mostly true, enter '3'. If mostly untrue, leave blank.
C. Formal risk management processes We have a formal risk-management process in place (for example, a specific risk-management framework, policies, responsibilities, resources and tools).		If mostly true, enter '1'. If mostly untrue, enter '4'.
D. Formal resilience-building processes We have a formal resilience-building process in place (for example, specific strategies, processes, plans or activities that refer to resilience-building).		If mostly true, enter '1'. If mostly untrue, enter '4'.
E. Formal crisis management processes We have a formal crisis-management process in place (for example, specific strategies, processes, plans or activities that refer to crisis management).		If mostly true, enter '1'. If mostly untrue, enter '4'.
F. Other (please indicate)		

QUESTIONNAIRE: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT RESPONSES ENTERED IN SECTION 3

Instructions

For each option selected in Section 3, now answer the following questions (as relevant).

- Answer by writing text under each question.
- Skip any options not ticked in column E.
- Write as much as is needed. (If completing a hard copy of this self-assessment survey, consider continuing on a separate sheet.)
- Consider including examples in your answers.

Option A. Electoral challenges are mostly managed through an ad hoc (informal) process.

- a. What does this process look like in our organization?

- b. Do we find the process sufficiently effective in dealing with all challenges?

- c. Does it include collaboration with other organizations?

- d. Is this process gender-sensitive (and if so, how)?

- e. How do we assess and learn related lessons?

- f. Based on the answers under Option A, how do we assess the overall quality of our ad hoc (informal) practice to manage electoral challenges?

Strong

Moderate

Weak

- g. Provide other relevant details.

Option B. Electoral challenges are mostly managed as part of a general management process.

- a. What does this process look like in our organization?

- b. Do we find the process sufficiently effective in dealing with all challenges?

- c. Does it include collaboration with other organizations?

- d. Is this process gender-sensitive (and if so, how)?

- e. How do we assess and learn related lessons?

- f. Based on the answers under Option B, how do we assess the overall quality of our general management practice in managing electoral challenges?

Strong

Moderate

Weak

- g. Provide other relevant details.

Option C. Electoral challenges are managed as part of a formal risk-management process.

- a. Which documents guide risk-management work in our organization?
(More than one box may be marked.)

Risk-management policy

Various decisions on responsibilities and resources for risk management

Risk-management framework

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- b. Who in our organization has specific risk-management responsibilities?
More than one box may be marked.

Leadership

All senior managers

Designated manager(s)

All mid-level managers

Designated staff

All staff

External consultants

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- c. Is risk management applied to all spheres of our work or specific areas/risks? If specific areas/risks, please indicate them.

- d. Which of the following elements comprise our risk-management process?

☐ Risk identification

☐ Risk assessment

☐ Risk analysis

☐ Risk communication

☐ Action to address risks (prevent and mitigate)

☐ Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- e. How is our risk-management work funded?

☐ Through designated funds

☐ Through generic activities

☐ Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- f. How do we develop and strengthen risk-management capacity and culture across our organization?

- g. Do we collaborate with other organizations as part of risk-management efforts?

- h. Is this process gender-sensitive (and if so, how)?

- i. How do we assess and learn related lessons?

- j. Based on the answers under Option C, how do we assess the overall quality of our risk-management practice in managing electoral challenges?

Strong

Moderate

Weak

- k. Provide other relevant details.

Option D. Electoral challenges are managed as part of a formal resilience-building practice.

- a. Which documents guide formal resilience-building efforts in our organization?

- b. Who in our organization has specific responsibilities that relate to resilience-building? More than one box may be marked:

Leadership

All senior managers

Designated manager(s)

All mid-level managers

Designated staff

All staff

External consultants

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- c. Is resilience-building applied to all spheres of our work or specific areas?
If specific areas/risks, please explain.

- d. Which of the following approaches/strategies are covered in our resilience-building process?

Ability to maintain existing practices in the face of specific threats.

Ability to adapt existing practices in the face of specific threats.

Ability to transform existing practices in the face of specific threats.

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- e. How is a resilience-building effort funded:

Through designated funds

Through generic activities

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- f. How do we develop and strengthen resilience-building capacity across our organization?

- g. Do we collaborate with other organizations as part of resilience-building efforts?

- h. Is this process gender-sensitive (and if so, how)?

- i. How do we assess and learn related lessons?

- j. Based on the answers under Option D, how do we assess the overall quality of our resilience-building practice in managing electoral challenges?

Strong

Moderate

Weak

- k. Provide other relevant details.

Option E. Electoral challenges are managed as part of a formal crisis-management process.

- a. Which documents guide formal crisis-management efforts in our organization?

- b. Who in our organization has specific responsibilities that relate to crisis management? More than one box may be marked:

Leadership

All senior managers

Designated manager(s)

All mid-level managers

Designated staff

All staff

External consultants

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- c. Is crisis management applied to all spheres of our work or specific areas/risks? If specific areas/risks, please explain.

- d. Which of the following approaches/strategies are covered in our crisis-management process?

Preparedness

Responses

Recovery

Learning

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- e. How is the crisis-management effort funded:

Through designated funds

Through generic activities

Other. If this box is marked, please explain.

- f. How do we develop and strengthen crisis-management capacity across our organization?

- g. Do we collaborate with other organizations as part of this process?

- h. Is this process gender sensitive (and if so, how)?

- i. How do we assess and learn related lessons?

- j. Based on the answers under Option E, how do we assess the overall quality of our crisis-management practices in managing electoral challenges?

Strong

Moderate

Weak

- k. Provide other relevant details.

4. ANALYSING RESULTS

Analysing responses can serve three key purposes:

- to consolidate scattered pieces of information to help build a holistic understanding;
- to make the results more presentable; and
- to help with cross-organizational comparison in order to understand overlaps and gaps.

Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 and the annexes provide possible approaches to analysing data.

4.1. ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE ANSWERS

Responses to the questions in this subsection may be used to fill in related sections in the scorecard in Annex B.

The scope of a dedicated effort to protect elections in our country may be considered:

Typical	(select if 0–2 boxes are ticked in Column A)
Heightened	(select if 3–5 boxes are ticked in Column A)
Critical	(select if 6–8 boxes are ticked in Column A)

The importance of our organization in protecting elections in our country may be considered:

Typical (select if 0–2 boxes are ticked in Column B)

Heightened (select if 3–5 boxes are ticked in Column B)

Critical (select if 6–8 boxes are ticked in Column B)

In terms of protecting elections, the legal framework in our country is:

Comprehensive (select if all boxes for identified challenges are ticked in Column C)

Partial (select if not all boxes for identified challenges are ticked in Column C)

Insufficient (select if no boxes for identified challenges are ticked in Column C)

In terms of protecting elections, the institutional framework in our country is:

Comprehensive (select if all boxes for identified challenges are ticked in Column D)

Partial (select if not all boxes for identified challenges are ticked in Column D)

Insufficient (select if no boxes for identified challenges are ticked in Column D)

In terms of protecting elections, our management framework is:

Comprehensive (select if most boxes, including C, D and E, are ticked in Column E)

Partial (select if most boxes, but not all of C, D and E, are ticked in Column E)

Insufficient (select if none of boxes C, D or E are ticked in Column E)

In terms of protecting elections, our:

Ad hoc management practices are:

Strong

Moderate

Weak

General management practices are:

Strong

Moderate

Weak

Risk-management practices are:

Strong

Moderate

Weak

Resilience-building practices are:

Strong

Moderate

Weak

Crisis-management practices are:

Strong

Moderate

Weak

Overall gender sensitivity is:

Strong

Moderate

Weak

4.2. ANALYSIS OF ADVANCED ANSWERS

Advanced analysis uses quantitative answers to questions in columns A, B, C, D and E to generate a visual (radar chart) indicative of the scope of additional efforts that our organization needs to undertake to protect electoral integrity.

In terms of scores:

- The maximum resultant value is 4, denoting the need for extensive additional effort.
- The minimum resultant value is 1, denoting the need for limited additional efforts.

The formula for calculating scores is:

$$\text{Score} = \frac{\text{Sum of numbers in columns}}{\text{Number of boxes marked}}$$

Annex A includes a scorecard template.

Annex B includes an example of a scorecard.

ANNEX A.

PROTECTING ELECTIONS SCORECARD TEMPLATE

Details in the scorecard will indicate any areas requiring additional effort to protect electoral integrity.


Simple analysis

Importance of additional effort in relation to:		High	Medium	Low
Scope of our challenge				
Scope of our mandate				
Legislative strengthening				
Institutional strengthening				
Management strengthening				
Management processes requiring additional strengthening:	Ad hoc management			
	General management			
	Risk management			
	Resilience-building			
	Crisis management			
	Gender sensitivity			

Advanced analysis

Scoring categories for the visual chart	Column	Sum of numbers in the column	Number of boxes marked in the column	Score (divide sum of nos. by number of boxes)
Scope of challenges	A			
Importance of our organization in addressing challenges	B			
Legislative strengthening	C			
Institutional strengthening	D			
Management strengthening	E			

To visualize the scope of an effort, include the scores from the advanced analysis and shade the space in between.



ANNEX B.

PROTECTING ELECTIONS SCORECARD EXAMPLE

Details in the scorecard will indicate any areas requiring additional effort to protect electoral integrity.


Simple analysis

Importance of additional effort in relation to:		High	Medium	Low
Scope of our challenge		X		
Scope of our mandate		X		
Legislative strengthening			X	
Institutional strengthening			X	
Management strengthening		X		
Management processes requiring additional strengthening:	Ad hoc management			X
	General management		X	
	Risk management	X		
	Resilience-building	X		
	Crisis management	X		
	Gender sensitivity		X	

Advanced analysis

Calculate scores using quantitative answers	Questionnaire column	Sum of numbers in the column	Number of boxes marked in the column	Score (divide sum of nos. by numbers of boxes)
Scope of challenges	A	14	4	3.5
Importance of our organization in addressing challenges	B	13	4	3.3
Legislative strengthening	C	9	4	2.5
Institutional strengthening	D	8	4	2
Management strengthening	E	16	4	4

To visualize the scope of an effort, include the scores from the advanced analysis and shade the space in between.



About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with 35 Member States founded in 1995, with a mandate to support sustainable democracy worldwide.

WHAT WE DO

We develop policy-friendly research related to elections, parliaments, constitutions, digitalization, climate change, inclusion and political representation, all under the umbrella of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. We assess the performance of democracies around the world through our unique Global State of Democracy Indices and Democracy Tracker.

We provide capacity development and expert advice to democratic actors including governments, parliaments, election officials and civil society. We develop tools and publish databases, books and primers in several languages on topics ranging from voter turnout to gender quotas.

We bring states and non-state actors together for dialogues and lesson sharing. We stand up and speak out to promote and protect democracy worldwide.

WHERE WE WORK

Our headquarters is in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

OUR PUBLICATIONS AND DATABASES

We have a catalogue with more than 1,000 publications and over 25 databases on our website. Most of our publications can be downloaded free of charge.

<<https://www.idea.int>>

This self-assessment survey is a key component of International IDEA's Integrated Framework for Protecting Elections. It enables electoral management bodies and other organizations to evaluate their own challenges, resources and practices, and to strengthen their capacity to safeguard electoral integrity.

Built on a robust and gender-sensitive methodology, the survey offers a structured, safe and comprehensive approach to understanding organizational strengths and gaps. It guides users through assessing key challenges, legal and institutional safeguards, management processes and analytical tools for interpreting results.

By fostering reflection, collaboration and ownership, the survey supports national stakeholders in enhancing the integrity of electoral processes—and in building more resilient, transparent and trusted elections.