

SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING

Albania's Parliamentary Elections 2025



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Executive Summary

During the 30 days of Albania's 2025 parliamentary election campaign, **April 11 -May 10**, political communication continued to rely heavily on **Meta platforms** (Facebook and Instagram), with political leaders and candidates extensively using images, videos, and paid advertisements to engage voters and target their opponents.

A total of **\$265,985** was spent on political advertising, primarily concentrated in Tirana, with the Democratic Party-led coalition **Alliance for a Great Albania** leading in both the volume of ads and overall expenditure. BIRN Albania's monitoring documented **349 infractions of the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns** during this period, primarily related to the **lack of transparency in political advertising**, the **unethical use of artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content**, and instances of **cyberbullying**.

Additionally, **58 third-party pages** were identified that promoted or attacked candidates without transparency—often using manipulated content, disinformation tactics, and bot-driven engagement.

The findings are based on a multi-layered methodology combining **social media analytics (SentiOne)**, **ad transparency data from Meta and Google**, and **manual content review** for violations of the Code of Conduct. Monitoring covered both candidate-driven activity and third-party influence operations, including instances of campaign violations during electoral silence and diaspora-targeted content.

The report concludes with targeted recommendations for political actors, regulators, platforms, and civil society. These focus on improving ad transparency, regulating AI-generated content, curbing inauthentic engagement practices, and expanding monitoring capacity. The findings underscore the urgent need for a more **ethical, transparent, and accountable digital campaign ecosystem** in Albania.

Main Takeaways

Dominance of Meta Platforms: Political leaders primarily used Facebook and Instagram for campaign communication, favouring photos, videos, and paid ads. Both promotional and attack advertisements were heavily utilized.

Political Ad Spending: A total of **\$265,985** was spent on political ads during the last two weeks of the campaign, alongside **\$2,432** spent by the Central Election Commission for voter education purposes.

Social Media Engagement: Candidates registered **7.5 million** interactions on Facebook and **8.3 million** interactions on Instagram.

Code of Conduct Monitoring: During the last two weeks of the campaign, **349 infractions** of the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns were documented among MP candidates.

Suspicious Third-Party Pages: **58 third-party pages** were detected promoting or attacking candidates without transparency regarding their affiliation in the last two weeks of the campaign.

Notable Phenomena

Breach of Electoral Silence: Political parties and candidates did not respect the period of electoral silence and ran political ads on Election Day.

Bot-Driven Engagement: The use of fake profiles to artificially boost engagement on third-party pages disseminating attack ads against the opposition was observed.

AI-Generated Disinformation: A notable increase in the use of AI-manipulated content and disinformation practices was identified, involving both official political actors and unaffiliated third-party pages.

Context

The May 11, 2025 parliamentary elections in Albania marked the country's 12th general elections since the collapse of its Stalinist-style communist regime in 1991. While Albania has made significant strides toward democratic governance over the past three decades—including joining NATO and starting EU accession talks—challenges with its electoral processes, particularly irregularities during election campaigning, persist.¹

A total of 2,046 candidates competed for 140 seats in Parliament. The 2025 vote was the first in which the Albanian diaspora was granted the right to participate via mail-in ballots. The voter register included 3.7 million eligible voters, with 245,935 registered abroad to vote by post.

The election campaign was largely calm and free of major incidents; however, political discourse was polarized. Political parties relied heavily on social media for communication, while avoiding televised debates between candidates and party leaders. The elections were monitored by more than 300 international observers.

Key campaign themes included Albania's EU accession path, corruption, migration, pension reform, and justice sector reforms—particularly the stance of parties toward the Special Prosecutor's Office against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK), whose high-profile investigations have stirred debate and tension within the country's political and economic elite.

Eleven electoral subjects—comprising eight political parties and three coalitions—registered candidates in the election. The ruling Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, secured a fourth term in power, winning 52% of the 1.43 million ballots cast and securing 83 parliamentary seats. The opposition Democratic Party came in second and will hold 50 seats in the new legislature. Three new parties entered Parliament for the first time: the coalition "Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet", "Lëvizja Bashkë", and "Mundësia".

In March 2025, International IDEA, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) Albania, and the University of Helsinki's Rule of Law Centre, in cooperation with the Central Election Commission, facilitated the voluntary signing of a [Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns](#) by the main political parties ahead of Albania's May 11 parliamentary elections. This initiative was rooted in prior soft-law efforts by International IDEA, addressing online campaign financing and responsible digital campaigning, such as commitments taken by European parties in view of the 2024 European Parliament elections. The Code embodies a forward-looking effort to establish ethical norms for Albania's evolving digital political landscape, particularly by setting boundaries against emerging threats like disinformation and cyberbullying.

¹ https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/f/590598_4.pdf

The Code's substantive provisions are notable for their focus on preserving honesty and fairness in the conduct of digital electoral campaigns. Signatories committed to refraining from employing fake accounts, automated bots, trolls, or AI-manipulated media to distort political reality, alongside providing transparency on political ad spending in the digital sphere. This marked one of the first regional attempts to explicitly prohibit AI-generated manipulations, including deepfakes, within a formalized campaign integrity framework. Additionally, the Code requires immediate removal of any violative content, reflecting a proactive enforcement mechanism aimed at limiting the spread of harmful materials in real time.

Institutionally, the signing represented a broader collaborative governance model: developed through consultative processes, bringing together political parties, civil society, electoral bodies, and international partners to co-create a self-regulatory instrument that complements existing legal provisions. It reflects evolving European norms that balance freedom of expression with the imperative to counter cyber-harm, and signals maturity in the Albanian electoral system's response to digital-era campaign risks.

Despite its voluntary nature, the Code's enactment was accompanied by commitments to monitoring and accountability. In this context, International IDEA enlisted the support of BIRN Albania to monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns commitments during the electoral period. This monitoring exercise offers insights into the use of social media platforms by political actors, including the growing role of non-transparent third-party pages in shaping electoral narratives. While binding legal penalties were not applicable, BIRN's monitoring work—of which this study is part—fosters normative pressure and public scrutiny. It lays the groundwork for a hybrid regulatory ecosystem, combining soft-law, self-regulation with the potential for formal legal codification in future reforms. As such, the Code stands as a pioneering case of adaptive electoral governance aimed at safeguarding democratic integrity in the digital age.

Methodology

This monitoring report analyzed the usage of social media by MP candidates in the electoral campaign for the May 11 parliamentary elections in Albania. The assessment focuses on three main aspects of digital campaigning: (1) candidate engagement and audience interaction on social media; (2) political advertising expenditures and trends on Meta platforms; and (3) the monitoring of violations of the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns—a self-regulatory mechanism signed by political parties ahead of the polls. Additionally, third-party groups were monitored on Facebook and Instagram and public interest dynamics were tracked using Google Trends data.

Monitoring Period and Scope

The monitoring covered the official 28-day campaign window (April 11 to May 9, 2025), the period of electoral silence and Election Day (May 10–11), and the week following the elections. The focus was placed on the public Facebook pages and Instagram business accounts of MP candidates. Third-party pages that actively campaigned for or against candidates or parties were monitored from April 11 to May 11. Data on Meta political advertising expenditures was collected and analyzed for the same timeframe. Monitoring of infractions of the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns extended through May 18, to capture violations occurring in the immediate post-election period. The analysis included content performance, advertising behaviour, and violations of digital campaign norms.

Analysis of Engagement in Social Media

To assess candidate visibility, engagement levels, and audience reactions on Facebook and Instagram, the social media listening and analytics platform SentiOne was employed. The tool was used to:

- identify and track public posts, reels, and videos from official candidate pages on Facebook and business accounts on Instagram of candidates;
- measure key engagement metrics including likes, comments, shares, emoji and hearts on Facebook pages and Instagram accounts of candidates.

Data was downloaded into Excel datasets and analyzed using pivot tables to quantify overall volume, content formats, and engagement trends.

The list of public Facebook pages and Instagram business accounts belonging

to MP candidates monitored during the campaign is provided in Annexes I and II of this report.

Political Advertising Analysis

To evaluate the financial dimension of social media campaigning, data was extracted from the Meta Ad Library, a public repository that provides information about political ads across Meta platforms (Facebook and Instagram). The following parameters were reviewed:

- advertiser names and affiliated political entities;
- total spending per advertiser and per candidate;
- volume, duration, and format of advertisements run during the campaign period;
- geographic targeting and demographic outreach (where available);
- share of spending on political issues, candidates, and parties.

Data was extracted manually and supported by third-party aggregators of Meta Ad Library records for Albania during the monitored period. Analysis was conducted using Excel pivot tables.

Monitoring of the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns

The implementation of the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns was monitored by a team of trained experts, who systematically reviewed the social media posts of parliamentary candidates throughout the election campaign to identify potential violations. Each infraction was recorded in an online database developed using BIRN's Engaged Citizens Reporting (ECR) tool. The data was subsequently exported, aggregated into an Excel dataset, and analyzed using pivot tables to identify patterns and trends in non-compliance.

The following infractions of the Code of Conduct were recorded in the database:

- lack of compliance with existing rules and norms on the principles of fair campaigning and financial transparency;
- the use or dissemination of discriminatory statements and biases against specific groups based on their gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation;
- the dissemination, posting, or promoting of messages that incite violence or hate speech;
- voter dissuasion or disseminating any inaccurate information on the electoral process, such as information about voters, the voting process, and polling stations;
- the dissemination of falsified, fabricated, doxed, or stolen data or material;

- the use of any type of deceptive content using audio, images, or video and generated with or without AI to falsely or deceptively alter or fake candidates, officials, or any electoral stakeholder;
 - the use of fake accounts or automatic bots to manipulate voter opinions;
 - the use of trolling, unfounded accusations, or cyberbullying; and
 - content created and disseminated by actors from outside the country, seeking to erode principles of democracy, freedom, equality, protection of human rights, rule of law, and promoting peace and stability.
-

Third-Party Campaigning

A dedicated team of researchers and journalists monitored and documented the activity of third-party groups, pages, and profiles on social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. Access to TikTok was restricted during the campaign period and was therefore conducted via Virtual Private Network (VPN). As per the monitoring methodology, a page or profile was classified as suspicious if it met one or more of the following criteria:

- not a recognized media outlet;
 - not a known political entity (politician or party) or registered non-governmental organization;
 - explicitly promotes or opposes a specific candidate or political party;
 - lacks transparency, providing insufficient identifying information (e.g., no website, no verifiable contact details).
 - posts content containing disinformation or manipulated materials;
 - uses advertisements to either promote or attack a candidate;
 - employs bot-driven engagement to artificially boost the visibility of attack posts; and
 - runs diaspora-targeted ad campaigns to influence voters abroad.
-

Public Interest Trends (Google Trends)

To contextualize online engagement with public attention, Google Trends was used to monitor fluctuations in search interest for major political figures, and key electoral terms. Search terms were selected based on candidate names and party affiliations, and trends were tracked in Albania from April 11 through May 11th, 2025.

Google Trends data provided relative search interest indexed on a 0–100 scale, which was used to identify peak moments of public attention and correlate them with events such as rallies, controversies, or major advertising pushes.

Limitations

This monitoring excluded personal Facebook or Instagram profiles not publicly accessible through the SentiOne platform. Meta Ad Library data occasionally lacked full demographic or geographic insights. SentiOne does not track video view counts on Facebook or Instagram. Incomplete ad disclaimers and lack of transparency tools on some platforms (e.g. Google) further constrained comprehensive analysis.

Findings from the Monitoring

This section presents the key findings of BIRN Albania's social media monitoring during the 2025 parliamentary election campaign, covering the period from April 11 to May 11. The analysis focuses on how candidates and political parties used Facebook, Instagram, Meta advertising tools, Google platforms, email campaigns, and third-party pages to communicate with voters. The data reveals major trends in online visibility, engagement, spending, and adherence to the voluntary Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns, with particular attention to issues of transparency, ethical campaigning, and artificial amplification.

Social Media Activity of MP Candidates

During Albania's 2025 parliamentary election campaign, spanning from April 11 to May 11, **Facebook** and **Instagram** were the primary platforms for political leaders to reach voters and mobilize support.

The Campaign on Facebook

Facebook played a central role in Albania's 2025 parliamentary election campaign, serving as the primary platform for political outreach by candidates. A total of **136 MP candidates** operated official Facebook pages during the campaign, as tracked through SentiOne monitoring tools. However, this digital activity revealed notable disparities, in terms of both gender balance and party representation.

Among the candidates with Facebook pages, **91 were men (67%)** and **45 were women (33%)**, reflecting a visible gender gap in digital campaigning. This disparity extended to content creation: of the **10,995 posts** published by candidates, **male candidates produced 7,786 (71%)** of them, while **female candidates contributed just 3,209 posts (29%)**. These figures underscore the limited digital visibility of women candidates, despite their formal presence on the ballot.


Candidates relied heavily on visual content to drive voter engagement. Approximately **59% of posts (6,516)** were standard posts (text and image), while **41% (4,479)** were videos—a format increasingly favoured for its reach and ability to generate reactions and shares.

Activity Levels on Facebook

Candidates from the Socialist Party dominated campaign activity on Facebook. With **67 active public pages**, they generated a total of **5,889 posts**, accounting for **53.6%** of all campaign content published on the platform.

Candidates from the Democratic Party-led Alliance for a Great Albania followed with **58 active pages** and **4,397 posts**, representing **40%** of the total. All other political forces combined contributed just over **6%** of the posts published through public Facebook pages, reflecting a **marginal presence** in the digital campaign landscape.

Figure 1: Share of Candidates' Posts on Facebook by Electoral Subject



Engagement Levels on Facebook


While the number of posts offers one dimension of campaign activity, **engagement provides a clearer picture of impact and reach**. During the election period, content shared by candidates across all electoral subjects generated **over 7.5 million interactions** on Facebook—including likes, comments, shares, and emoji reactions.

Candidates from the Socialist Party once again led by a wide margin, generating **4.46 million interactions**, which accounted for **59.3%** of total engagement. They were followed by **candidates from the Democratic Party-led Alliance for a Great Albania**, who attracted **2.61 million interactions**, or **34.6%** of the total. Together, these two blocs dominated the digital landscape.

By contrast, **all other electoral subjects combined accounted for little more than 6%** of total Facebook engagement. Among them, **Mundësia Party** stood out slightly with **243,217 interactions (3.2%)**, while the remaining smaller

parties maintained **only a minimal footprint (2.9%)** in the broader online conversation.

Figure 2: Total Interactions Registered on Facebook by the Public Pages of Each Electoral Subject




Interestingly, some of the smaller or mid-sized parties with limited reach managed to generate relatively strong digital influence scores. The average influence score across all electoral subjects was **7.47**, but the party **Euro-Atlantic Coalition** scored **8.94**, **Mundësia Party** reached **8.72**, and the **Social Democratic Party (PSD)** came in at **8.50**. These numbers suggest that while they lacked volume, their content may have been more targeted, impactful, or effective at reaching a core audience.

Most Engaging Political Figures on Facebook

When examining individual candidates, **Sali Berisha** was the most active figure, publishing **413 posts**, or **3.8% of all campaign content**. He was followed by **Xhelal Mziu** (370 posts), **Blendi Gonxhja** (368), **Edi Rama** (327), and **Damian Gjikhuri** (264). However, activity levels did not always translate into engagement.

The top five most engaging candidates collectively accounted for **half of all campaign interactions**. **Edi Rama** led by a wide margin with **1.85 million interactions**, equivalent to **24.5%** of the total. **Sali Berisha** followed with **1.14 million interactions (15.1%)**, while **Taulant Balla** generated **326,410 interactions (4.3%)**. **Agron Shehaj** and **Belinda Balluku** each captured **around 3%**, confirming their position as high-engagement figures despite fewer posts.

Figure 3: Distribution of Facebook Interactions among Parliamentary Candidates



These figures confirm that the **digital discourse during the 2025 campaign was shaped predominantly by a handful of high-profile politicians**. Their dominance in both visibility and engagement reinforced existing hierarchies within party structures and left little space for lesser-known candidates or smaller parties to gain meaningful traction on Facebook.

The Campaign on Instagram

Instagram played an increasingly important role in the 2025 parliamentary election campaign, with many candidates turning to visually engaging formats to connect with voters—particularly through short-form video content. Using data accessed via the SentiOne platform, BIRN Albania monitored a total of **388 Instagram business accounts** belonging to parliamentary candidates. Due to Meta's privacy restrictions, only business accounts were publicly accessible, meaning the dataset provides a **partial but meaningful** view of candidate activity on the platform.

A **gender gap** was evident in Instagram presence, mirroring broader patterns seen on other platforms: **65% of monitored accounts (253)** belonged to **male candidates**, while only **35% (135)** were managed by **female candidates**, pointing to disparities in both visibility and digital campaign resources.

The **Socialist Party** had the largest number of candidates with business accounts on Instagram, with **140 profiles**, followed closely by the **Democratic Party-led Alliance for a Great Albania** with **129**. Other groupings had a more

limited presence: **Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet** (42), **Euro-Atlantic Coalition** (23), and **Lëvizja Bashkë** (18). Candidates of other smaller electoral subjects had **a combined total of only 56 business profiles**, representing just **14.4%** of all Instagram profiles monitored during the campaign.


During the campaign period, candidates collectively published **22,723 items** on Instagram. A majority of the content took the form of **reels**, with **12,065 videos** posted, making up **53%** of the total. **Static image or carousel posts** totalled **10,658**, or **47%**. This distribution reflects a **strategic shift toward short-form, visually dynamic content**, likely aimed at maximizing reach through Instagram's algorithm and increasing user engagement.

Activity Levels on Instagram

In terms of output, **candidates from the Socialist Party** were by far the most active on Instagram during the campaign, publishing a total of **11,203 posts (49.3%)**, accounting for nearly half of all content generated. They were followed by **candidates from the Alliance for a Great Albania**, who produced **8,302 posts (36.5%)**. Other electoral subjects lagged significantly: **candidates from the Euro-Atlantic Coalition** posted **953 items (4.2%)**, **Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet** candidates published **919 posts (4.0%)**, and **candidates from Mundësia Party** contributed **491 posts (2.2%)**.

All other electoral subjects—combined—accounted for only **3.8% of total posts**, further reinforcing the dominance of the two leading political forces in shaping the Instagram campaign space.

Figure 4: Share of Candidates' Posts on Instagram by Electoral Subject




Engagement Levels on Instagram

Instagram content published by candidates across all electoral subjects generated an estimated **8.3 million interactions**, including both likes (“hearts”) and comments. **Candidates from the Socialist Party** led with **4,640,539 interactions**, representing **55.6%** of total engagement. They were followed by **candidates from the Democratic Party-led coalition Alliance for a Great Albania**, who generated **2,709,749 interactions (32.5%)**.

Other candidates drew more modest engagement: those from **Mundësia Party** registered **413,250 interactions (5.0%)**, **Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet** candidates garnered **272,651 (3.3%)**, and the **Euro-Atlantic Coalition** accounted for **122,743 interactions (1.5%)**. The remaining smaller parties collectively made up **around 2.2%** of total engagement on the platform.

Figure 5: Total interactions registered on Instagram by the public pages of each electoral subject




Most Engaging Political Figures on Instagram

The most engaging candidates on Instagram largely mirrored their performance on Facebook. **Prime Minister Edi Rama** led all candidates by a significant margin, generating **over 1.5 million interactions (18.4%)**, including **28,571 comments** and **1,529,638 likes**. He was followed by **Sali Berisha**, who received **922,539 total interactions (11.1%)**.

Minister Belinda Balluku ranked third with **380,086 interactions (4.6%)**, driven almost entirely by likes. **Agron Shehaj** followed with **343,692 interactions (4.1%)**, while **Zegjine Çausi**—the only non-ministerial woman among the top five—secured **178,216 interactions (2.1%)**.

The remaining **383 candidate accounts** on Instagram collectively generated **4,992,378 interactions**, which represents approximately **59.8%** of the total engagement during the campaign.

Figure 6: Distribution of Instagram Interactions among Parliamentary Candidates



These results underscore both the **concentration of digital attention among a small circle of high-profile candidates** and the **growing centrality of Instagram** in political campaigning, particularly through the use of **reels and algorithm-optimized visual content**.

Advertisement in the Digital Sphere

Advertising on Meta Platforms

During the monitored period of Albania's May 11 parliamentary election campaign, **MP candidates and political parties ran a total of 4,651 political ads** across Meta platforms—namely **Facebook, Instagram, Audience Network, and Messenger**. This figure includes both ads published directly by political parties and those sponsored by individual candidates running under their official electoral lists.

In terms of volume, the **Democratic Party-led coalition Alliance for a Great Albania** dominated digital advertising efforts, accounting for approximately **44%** of all ads. It was followed by the **Socialist Party**, which ran **26.8%**, and the **Euro-Atlantic Coalition**, with **15.2%** of the total ads. The remaining 14% was distributed among other smaller electoral subjects.

A breakdown of the number of political ads per electoral subject is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Number and Share of Political Ads on Meta Platforms by Electoral Subject

Electoral Subject	Number of Ads	% of Total Ads
Alliance for a Great Albania	2,045	44.0%
Socialist Party	1,245	26.8%
Euro-Atlantic Coalition	709	15.2%
Koalicioni Djathtas Për Zhvillim	183	3.9%
Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet	280	6.0%
Mundësia Party	124	2.7%
Other Electoral Subjects	65	1.4%
Total	4,651	100%

The **sponsorship structure** further illustrates the campaign's personalization: a striking **93.8% of all ads (4,361 ads)** were published by **individual MP candidates**, while only **290 ads** were directly sponsored by political parties. This underscores the increasingly candidate-driven nature of digital campaigning in Albania.

When it comes to **spending**, electoral subjects invested a total of **\$265,985** in advertising on Meta platforms during the campaign. Of this amount, **\$64,528** was spent directly by **political parties**, while the remaining **\$201,457** was invested by **individual MP candidates**, underscoring the highly personalized nature of digital campaigning.

The **Central Election Commission** allocated an additional **\$2,432** to run voter education campaigns.

Among the main political forces, the figures below reflect the **combined spending of each electoral subject and its affiliated candidates**:


- **The Alliance for a Great Albania** (including candidates running under its list) spent approximately **\$117,598**, leading all other groups.
- **The Socialist Party**, together with its candidates, followed with **\$54,854** in total spending.
- The **Euro-Atlantic Coalition** and its candidates recorded **\$38,726** in advertising expenditures.

Top Meta Advertisers among Parliamentary Candidates

Among the individual candidates with the **highest recorded ad expenditure** during the campaign was **Agron Shehaj**, leader of the **Mundësia Party**, who spent **\$24,206**. He was followed by **Grigels Muçollari** of the **Democratic Party**, with **\$10,210** in Meta advertising. Other high-spending candidates included **Belind Këlliçi** (\$8,936), **Pëllumb Seferi** (\$8,931), and **Vullnet Ruzhdi**

Sinaj (\$8,287). This concentration of spending among a few high-profile male candidates also reflects the broader gender imbalance observed in campaign financing on social media.

Figure 7: Distribution of Meta Ad Spending among Individual Candidates



Finally, BIRN's monitoring identified **264 political ads published by 223 candidates** that **lacked the required transparency disclaimers**, violating the standards set in the **Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns**. In addition, **11 ads without disclaimers** were published by **8 political parties**, including some of their local offices—highlighting persistent shortcomings in ad transparency across the board.

Advertising on Google Platforms

During the campaign, both the **Democratic Party** and the **Socialist Party** ran political advertisements on **Google platforms**. According to the **Google Ad Transparency Centre**, each party published **five ads**, with the opposition Democratic Party, leading the Alliance for a Great Albania, placing its content through the agency **ACROMAX**, and the Socialist Party using **Faber Media & Production GmbH**.

Both political entities employed a mix of **online banners and video clips** as part of their digital outreach strategies. However, Google's transparency tools do not provide **financial or reach data**, and therefore, the report includes only the number and format of ads published. Due to this **limited transparency**, it cannot be confirmed whether additional political ads—including those potentially sponsored by third parties—were disseminated on Google platforms.

during the campaign period. This highlights a persistent challenge in **fully assessing digital campaign activities** beyond Meta platforms.

Examples of Google Ads

During the campaign, the **ruling Socialist Party** and the **opposition Democratic Party** ran a total of **10 political ads** across Google platforms.



Last shown: Apr 29, 2025

Format: Video



Last shown: May 4, 2025

Format: Video


Google Search Trends

In addition to paid ads, public interest in the two main political parties was also reflected in **Google search behaviour**. **Google Trends** provides data on the relative frequency of specific search terms over time, scaled from 0 to 100, where 100 represents peak interest. This tool does not show absolute search volumes but is useful for identifying comparative trends and geographic focus areas.

During the 30 day campaign, from **April 11 to May 10**, the search term **'PS'** (Partia Socialiste) registered a relative interest of **40/100**, while **'PD'** (Partia Demokratike) scored **31/100**. Focusing on the **second half of the campaign** (April 25–May 10), interest in **"PS"** rose slightly to **45**, while **"PD"** reached **34**.

These results suggest a consistent lead in search interest for the ruling Socialist Party during the campaign period, although the gap narrowed modestly in the final phase.


Figure 8: Search Interest on Google for “PS” and “PD” during the Campaign (April 11–May 10)



Advertising through Email

During the electoral campaign, BIRN Albania’s monitoring identified **two mass email campaigns** conducted by political candidates **Jorida Tabaku** and **Taulanda Jupi**.

While the content of the messages was overtly promotional and aimed at mobilizing support, it remains **impossible to determine the reach or distribution lists** of these campaigns. Likewise, there is **no available data on the financial cost** associated with their deployment, as email outreach is not subject to public disclosure or platform-level transparency tools.



Email sent on May 7, 2025



Zgjidhni guximin për të ndryshuar!

Votoni Taulanda Jupi!

Përshëndetje bashkëudhëtar

Unë, **Taulanda** Jupi, besoj se forca e një kombi qëndron te fuqia e individit, jo e shtetit, te guximi për të ndryshuar, jo te besnikëria ndaj partive.

Vendi ynë meriton më shumë: një shoqëri që i jep zë ideve të reja, që mbështet rininë dhe shpërblen drejt punën e çdo burri e çdo gruaje.

Kam hyrë në politikë për ta bërë ndryshimin vetë, jo për të pritur ndryshimin nga të tjerët.

Së bashku do të ndërtojmë një Shqipëri që nuk përkulet përpara 34 viteve tranzicioni por e ndërton të ardhmen me kuraio.

Më 11 maj, zgjidhni një zë të pakorruptuar për një të ardhme që na bën krenar mes kombeve të zhvilluara.

Zgjidhni çdoimin për të ndryshuar!

Votoni Taulanda, Juni!

Monitoring of the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns


As part of the 2025 parliamentary election campaign monitoring, BIRN Albania systematically tracked adherence to the **Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns**, a voluntary self-regulatory mechanism signed by political parties and candidates ahead of the elections. This framework outlines standards for transparency, ethical behaviour, and accountability in online campaigning.

Between **April 11 and May 11**, BIRN Albania documented a total of **349 infractions** of the Code of Conduct. These infractions were committed by parties and candidates who had voluntarily committed to follow the Code and **do not include** breaches by **unaffiliated social media users, third-party pages, or public institutions**.

Candidates from the **Socialist Party** were responsible for **55%** of infractions, followed by the **Democratic Party-led Alliance for a Great Albania** with **17.5%**, the coalition **Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet** with **10.9%**, and the **Mundësia Party** with **6.3%**. The remaining **10.3%** was distributed among other electoral subjects.

Notably, the number of infractions **increased during the second half of the campaign**, particularly among candidates from the Socialist Party, as Election Day approached.

Figure 9: Distribution of Code of Conduct Infractions by Electoral Subject




Types of Infractions and Platforms Involved

Infractions varied in form and severity. The most frequent ones involved either **non-transparent political advertising** or **problematic content published through Facebook and Instagram**, often by individual candidates. Many of these posts or ads failed to meet the minimum standards of clarity, accountability, or ethical communication laid out in the Code.

When categorized by type, nearly **half of the infractions (47.3%)** related to a **lack of transparency in political advertising**, such as failing to include the required disclaimer identifying the sponsor. Another **43% of infractions** stemmed from the **unethical use of technology**, particularly the distribution of **AI-generated content** that was not appropriately labelled. A smaller but significant share (**9.7%**) involved breaches of **electoral silence, non-inclusive political discourse and other infractions undermining democratic principles**.

Figure 10: Share of Type of Infractions Recorded during the Electoral Campaign



Most infractions occurred on **Facebook**, which remains the dominant social media platform for political communication in Albania. However, infractions were also recorded on **Instagram**, particularly in the form of undisclosed reels and stories sponsored by candidates.


Political parties and candidates also did not observe the **period of electoral silence** ahead of Election Day, continuing to run political ads with campaign messaging on Meta platforms—Facebook and Instagram.

These results indicate that transparency and ethical use of technology remain major challenges in the digital campaign environment.

Examples of Political Ads without Transparency Disclaimers

During the campaign period for the parliamentary elections, **BIRN Albania's monitoring** identified a total of **165 political advertisements** published by political party candidates without the required transparency disclaimers.

These ads, disseminated primarily on Facebook and Instagram, failed to comply with the obligations set out in the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns, which require political ads to clearly disclose the identity of the advertiser.



Started running on May 7, 2025

Platform: Facebook, Instagram

Started running on May 1, 2025

Platform: Facebook, Instagram,
Messenger


Examples of Content Generated with Artificial Intelligence

One of the most striking features of the 2025 campaign was the **growing use of artificial intelligence (AI)** in the creation of visual content. **Prime Minister Edi Rama** frequently used AI-generated imagery and video to portray opposition leader **Sali Berisha**, often in a mocking or satirical light. A recurring theme featured Berisha as an owl—an image that circulated widely through memes and short videos.

However, the use of synthetic content was not limited to the ruling party. **Lulzim Basha** and other opposition candidates also deployed AI-generated materials in their social media campaigns. These cases raise questions about the evolving ethical boundaries of digital campaigning and the need for updated standards that can keep pace with technological change.



AI-generated photo posted
by Edi Rama



AI-generated video posted by
Lulzim Basha

Examples of Political Ads during Period of Electoral Silence

Despite a formal public warning issued by the **State Election Commissioner** on **May 10**, BIRN Albania identified 77 candidates and one political party that ran ads during the **electoral silence period** on May 10 and 11. These ads were disseminated across Facebook and Instagram and included both sponsored content and video-based campaign materials.

This pattern highlights the **limited deterrent effect** of voluntary commitments and weak enforcement capacity when it comes to ensuring respect for rules governing the final phase of the campaign.

Inactive
Library ID: 683560427736987
May 11, 2025 - May 12, 2025 - Total active time 2 hrs
Platforms: Facebook, Instagram
Categories: Political
Estimated audience size: >1M
Amount spent (USD): \$200 - \$299
Impressions: 175K - 200K

Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë
Sponsored • Paid for by Partia Demokratike

Sovrani foli!

Table of election results:

Partia	Numri i votave	Përqindja
PD	72	53.8%
PS	64	48.0%
PP	1	0.7%
SHB	2	1.5%
PSD	1	0.7%

"Ka një rritje të ndjeshme të elektoratit tonë në bastione"

Learn more

Started running May 11, 2025
Platform: Facebook, Instagram

Inactive
Library ID: 1750399985557086
May 11, 2025 - May 12, 2025 - Total active time 4 hrs
Platforms: Facebook, Instagram
Categories: Political
Estimated audience size: >1M
Amount spent (USD): <\$100
Impressions: 70K - 80K

Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë
Sponsored • Paid for by Partia Demokratike

Në 3 ditë votoni për Shqipëri! Votoni numrin 1 për ndryshimin real më 11 maj!

Sot Voto
Koha për ndryshim real
11 Maj

Learn more

Started running May 11, 2025
Platform: Facebook, Instagram

Third-Party Social Media Pages

As part of BIRN Albania's monitoring of the 2025 parliamentary election campaign, special attention was dedicated to the activity of **third-party social media pages**—accounts that were neither official political entities nor verified media outlets, but which engaged in political promotion or attacks during the campaign period.

According to the monitoring methodology, a page was categorized as *third-party* if it met the following criteria:

- it is **not** a recognized media outlet;
- it is **not** a known political actor (party or candidate) or a registered non-governmental organization;
- it **explicitly promotes or opposes** a specific candidate or political party;
- it **lacks transparency**, failing to provide verifiable identifying information (e.g., website, contact information, or legal registration).

During the campaign, BIRN Albania identified **58 third-party pages** that explicitly promoted or attacked political actors. These pages engaged in a range of problematic practices, including:

- dissemination of **disinformation** and **manipulated content**;
- use of **paid advertisements** to influence voter perception;
- deployment of **bot-driven engagement** to artificially amplify the reach of attack content; and
- execution of **diaspora-targeted ad campaigns** intended to influence voters abroad.

The table below presents a selection of monitored third-party pages, their platform presence, and whether they engaged in paid advertising:

For most third-party pages, **spending data was not available**, as their ad campaigns were run without proper disclaimers and were not classified as “social issues, elections, or politics” by the Meta Ad Library. The third-party Facebook page “**Team Edi Rama**” ran a mix of ads without disclaimer and political ads, spending **\$1,222**; the **themuslimvote.al** spent **\$115**; **Gratë votojnë** **Gratë** spent **\$200** and **Shqiperia në BE** spent **€2,663**, targeting the diaspora vote in Italy.

Table 2: Main Third-Party Social Media Pages Monitored

Third-Party Pages	Platform	Paid Ads Identified
Team Edi Rama	Facebook	Yes
themuslimvote.al	Facebook	Yes
Gratë votojnë Gratë	Facebook	Yes
Çunat e Lugines Erzen	Facebook	Yes

Sopata.al	Facebook	No
Edi Rama Nderi i Kombit	Facebook	No
Nisma Sh'Thurje	Facebook	Yes
Kunata	Facebook	No
Pionierja	Instagram	No
Vllaznit Domgjon	Facebook	Yes
Gënjejmë Bashkë	Instagram	Yes
Bashkë me Adriatik Lapaj	Facebook	Yes
Agimi Kuq	Facebook	Yes
Te.mbeshtesim.arlind.qorin	Instagram	Yes
Shqipëria në BE	Facebook	Yes

Examples of Ads and Posts from Third-Party Pages

Below are selected examples of third-party pages that engaged in political promotion or attacks during the campaign, based on BIRN Albania's monitoring. These pages either failed to meet transparency standards or used manipulative tactics, including disinformation, anonymous advertising, and artificial amplification.

Active Library ID: 2492/95594389001
Started running on May 8, 2025
Platforms  

[See ad details](#)

Gënjejmë Bashkë
Sponsored

Shqipëria nuk ndryshohet me statusa që i lexojnë vetëm militantët e tu. Ke nevojë për shumë më tepër se kaq!

Për ide të qarta, njerëz pas teje, dhe mbi të gjitha për vota, shumë vota. Mos e shit ëndrrën si realitet. Të qitthë duam ndryshim, por me 2000 vota nuk ndryshon asgjë.

Instagram.com
Gënjejmë Bashkë

[Visit Instagram](#)

Started running on May 8, 2025
Platform: Facebook, Instagram

Active Library ID: 1212430943887263
Started running on May 5, 2025 · Total active time 16 hrs
Platforms  

[See ad details](#)

Vllaznit Domgjon
Sponsored

Nën një flamur të pandarë! Mirësevini në Lezhë/Të martën 6 maj ora 19.00, shieshi Gjergj Kastrioti në Lezhë/ Aktivistët e shoqërisë civile në mbrojtje të kauzave kombëtare/ Avokati Adriatik Lapaj, Pano Soko, Gjeneral Dede Prenga, Avokat Elton Laska, RiGerta Loku Tushaj, Arilda Lieshi, Erjon Selmani, Andrea Shtjefni/

Instagram.com
Vllaznit Domgjon

Started running on May 5, 2025
Platform: Facebook, Instagram


Visibility and Reach of Suspicious Pages

Although many of the suspicious third-party pages identified during the monitoring had a relatively modest number of followers, their visibility and reach were significantly amplified through the use of political advertising, manipulated content, and artificial engagement techniques.

One example is the Facebook page **“Team Edi Rama”**, which was created shortly before the start of the parliamentary election campaign, on March 19, 2025.

As of May 10, the page had 6,600 followers. However, despite its small audience, it succeeded in achieving a disproportionately large reach, recording **4.6 million video views** and **70,380** total interactions in just under two months.

Figure 11: Video Views on the “Team Edi Rama” Facebook Page (March–May 2025)



The data reveals several notable spikes in activity—particularly in early April, early May, and on the final days of the campaign—indicating coordinated promotion or artificially boosted visibility.

Artificial Amplification Tactics and Bot Engagement


BIRN Albania’s monitoring of the 2025 parliamentary election campaign identified coordinated **artificial amplification strategies** used to inflate engagement on select Facebook pages, particularly those operating outside formal party structures. One of the most notable examples was the third-party

Facebook page “**Team Edi Rama**”, which demonstrated unusually high levels of video viewership and interaction compared to its modest follower base.


This amplification was achieved through a combination of **paid political advertising** and the apparent deployment of **human bot networks**, with many of the interacting accounts appearing to originate from **Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries**. These accounts were used to simulate organic engagement—liking, sharing, and commenting on posts to increase their algorithmic visibility and reach.

Examples of False Profiles Commenting during Live Facebook Video

Artificial amplification tactics were not limited to third-party pages. On **May 9, 2025**, during the **live Facebook broadcast of Prime Minister Edi Rama's final televised interview** on the show *Opinion* with **Blendi Fevziu** (aired on **TV Klan**), BIRN Albania observed the use of **false profiles** to generate inflated comment volume. Many of these accounts displayed signs of inauthentic behaviour, with usernames and profile data suggesting that they originated from **Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia**. The sudden swarm of interactions mirrored earlier amplification patterns seen on the “Team Edi Rama” page.



Fake accounts commenting on Facebook page



Fake accounts commenting on Facebook Page

These findings raise **serious questions about the authenticity of online political engagement**, the coordinated use of third-party infrastructure, and the ease with which online manipulation tactics can bypass existing platform transparency mechanisms.

Recommendations

Based on BIRN Albania's monitoring of the 2025 parliamentary election campaign, it is evident that digital campaigning in Albania continues to face systemic challenges related to transparency, ethical technology use, and information integrity. The unregulated use of artificial intelligence (AI), the lack of transparency in political advertising, and the proliferation of coordinated inauthentic behaviour—particularly by third-party actors—contributed to a fragmented and polarized information space that risks undermining public trust in democratic processes.

To support a more accountable and equitable digital campaign environment, the following recommendations are addressed to political actors, electoral institutions, platforms, civil society, and international partners.

For Political Parties and Candidates

- Ensure full transparency in political ads: Use Meta's disclaimer tools to clearly disclose sponsors of each ad.
- Adopt ethical AI practices: Clearly label AI-generated content and refrain from using manipulated media to attack opponents.
- Respect electoral silence: Cease all campaign advertising during the designated silent period.
- Avoid bot-driven engagement: Discontinue practices that involve fake accounts or artificial amplification of reach.
- Promote gender balance in digital visibility: Allocate equitable resources to male and female candidates to address the gender gap in content and ad spending.
- Limit negative campaigning: Focus on policy-driven discourse and reduce meme-based misinformation and personal attacks.

For the Central Election Commission

- Establish digital ad monitoring infrastructure: Develop partnerships with Meta and Google to access timely ad data and flag violations.
- Sanction violations of electoral silence: Penalize parties or candidates who run ads during the blackout period.
- Publish real-time transparency dashboards: Enable public access to data on campaign ad spending and reported violations.
- Provide ad disclaimer training: Make training on digital ad compliance a requirement for candidate registration.

For Online Platforms (Meta, Google, TikTok)

- Expand ad transparency: Ensure all political and issue-based ads are labelled and publicly accessible, including from third-party pages.
- Limit coordinated inauthentic behaviour: Proactively detect and remove bot networks and coordinated disinformation actors (e.g. foreign engagement farms).
- Improve Application Programming Interface (API) access for researchers: Broaden access to ad data and engagement metrics (including video views) for watchdogs and civil society groups.
- Label AI-generated content: Integrate tools that require disclosure of manipulated or synthetic media.
- Enforce stricter identity verification: Require verified accounts and institutional affiliation for all political advertisers.

For Civil Society and Independent Media

- Continue independent monitoring: Sustain structured social media monitoring using tools, including but not limited to Meta Ad Library.
- Educate the public: Run awareness campaigns on how to identify political disinformation and manipulated content online.
- Push for advertising tech accountability: Advocate for legislation requiring greater transparency from platforms regarding political ad financing and targeting.
- Document electoral violations: Create and maintain databases of digital infractions and disinformation narratives to support accountability reporting.
- Track diaspora-targeted influence operations: Monitor content aimed at expatriate voters and assess its compliance with transparency and ethical standards.
- Monitor gender-based political disinformation: Expand coverage to include the impact of digital disinformation on women candidates.

For International Partners

- Support digital literacy programmes: Fund initiatives that train voters, candidates, and journalists to identify and counteract online disinformation and manipulation.
- Assist regulatory reform: Provide expertise in drafting and implementing modern regulations that cover digital campaigning and AI use.
- Promote international standards: Encourage Albania to align with EU-wide initiatives like the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).
- Strengthen regional response frameworks: Support cross-border

mechanisms to counter transnational disinformation and electoral manipulation.

- Invest in AI oversight capabilities: Equip oversight bodies with the tools and expertise to detect and audit AI-generated campaign content.

Annex I: List of Facebook Accounts Monitored

Candidate	Number of posts
Sali Berisha	413
Xhelal Mziu	370
Blendi Gonxhja	368
Edi Rama	327
Damian Gjikhuri	264
Taulant Balla	247
Gazment Bardhi	214
Mirela Kumbaro Furxhi	209
Aulon Kalaja	199
Lulzim Basha	181
Antoneta Dhima	174
Ardit Bido	166
Belind Këlliçi	162
Adi Qose	162
Asllan Dogjani	158
Ogerta Manastirliu	155
Bledi Çuçi	155
Saimir Korreshi	150
Elisa Spiropali	146
Klodiana Spahiu	142
Akil Kraja	139
Ceno Klosi	138
Anila Denaj	135
Ina K. Zhupa	132
Niko Peleshi	131
Albana Vokshi	130
Agron Shehaj	124
Tomor Alizoti	123
Ulsi Manja	119

Andrea Mano—Deputet i Partisë Demokratike, Qarku Korçë	118
Jorida Tabaku	117
Belinda Balluku	117
Oerd Bylykbashi	114
Aulona Bylykbashi	114
Ledina Alolli	113
Blendi Klosi	112
Evis Kushi	106
Greta Bardeli Gjoni	101
Etilda Gjonaj	99
Milva Ekonomi	94
Enkelejd Alibeaj	94
Pandeli Majko	93
Dashamir Shehi	92
Flamur Hoxha	92
Ervin Demo	91
Kreshnik Osmani	91
Eduart Sharka	89
Gentian Koçi	88
Arbjan Mazniku	87
Salvador Kaçaj	86
Eduard Shalsi	84
Agron Malaj	82
Blerina Gjylameti	82
Erion Braçe	81
Olsi Komici	81
Vullnet Ruzhdi Sinaj	80
Klevis Jahaj	78
Andia Ulliri	76
Plarent Ndreca	74
Myslim Murrizi	74
Ilir Ndraxhi	73
Igli Cara	72
Erisa Xhixho	70

Edmond Haxhinasto	69
Edit Harxhi	68
Klevis Balliu	68
Igli Hasani	64
Elda Hoti	64
Fatmir Mediu	63
Florenc Spaho	62
Etjen Xhafaj	61
Ilir Alimehmeti	60
Hatixhe Konomi	60
Bujar Leskaj	59
Dr. Edmond Stojku	58
Mimi Kodheli	58
Fatmir Xhafaj	55
Arkend Balla	55
Antonela Dedej	53
Olta Xhacka	51
Lindita Nikolla	51
Loer Kume	50
Klotilda Bushka Ferhati	50
Zija Ismaili	49
Pirro Vengu	48
Bardh Spahia	47
Marjeta Neli	47
Xhemal Gjunksi	46
Jozefina Çoba Topalli	46
Lumturi Hasa	45
Arian Jaupllari	44
Viktor Tushaj	43
Luçiano Boçi	41
Xhemal Qefalia	41
Delina Ibrahimaj	41
Arben Çuko	41
Ermonela Felaj Valikaj	39
Edona Bilali	33

Skender Pashaj	31
Nada Daullja	30
Endri Hyseni	30
Silda Anagnosti Çepe	30
Mesila Doda	30
Mario Runa	27
Briseida Çakërri	25
Avokate Dorina Prethi	24
Xhenis Çela	24
Shkelqim Bullari	24
Erjon Meka-Faqja Zyrtare	22
Ylli Shehu	22
Dr. Endrit Shabani	21
Alban Xhelili	20
Lodovik Hasani	18
Atird Hoxha	16
Petrit Malaj	15
Gent Strazimiri	12
Ismail Uka Faqja Zyrtare	11
Elena Kocaqi	10
Ramadan Likaj	10
Ilir Metaj	8
Tom Doshi	8
Silva Hasaj	7
Kristiano Kocibelli	7
Klodian Xhyheri	6
Qani Xhafa—Faqja zyrtare	5
Edlira Durmishaj	4
Julinda Dhame Faqja Zyrtare	4
Genti Çela	3
Isuf Çelaj	2
Tedi Blushi	2
Rivelino Çuno Faqja Zyrtare	2
Petrit Doda	2
Jola Hysaj	2

Erjon Xhili	1
Ευάγγελος Ντούλες—Vangjel Dule	1
Fatmira Kola	1
Grand Total	10,995

Annex II: List of Instagram Profiles Monitored

Candidate (profile)	Number of Posts
Sali Berisha (@saliberisha_faqjazyrtare)	263
Vullnet Sinaj (@vullnetsinaj)	217
Damian Gjikhuri (@damiangjikhuri)	202
Aulon Kalaja (@aulonkalaja)	192
Bledi Çuçi (@bledarcuci)	191
Ardit Bido (@bidoardit)	190
Jorida Tabaku (@jorida.tabaku)	189
Mirela Kumbaro (@mirelakumbaro)	184
Ogerta Manastirliu (@manastirliu.ogerta)	184
Flamur Noka (@nflamur)	182
Belinda Balluku (@belindaballuku)	181
Endri Hasa (@endrihasa.al)	180
Albana Vokshi (@vokshialbana)	179
Edi Rama (@ediramaal)	179
Ethem Aga (@ethem_aga)	177
Antoneta Dhima (@antonetadhima)	176
Gazment Bardhi (@bardhigazment)	175
Taulant Balla (@taulantballaps)	173
Klevis Kaso (@kleviskaso)	166
Dashamir Shehi (@dash.shehi)	155
Saimir Korreshi (@saimir.korreshi)	153
Dorina Laci (@dorina_lacii)	144
Etilda Gjonaj (@etildagjonaj)	144
Klevis Balliu (@klevis_balliu)	144
Adi Qose (@adi.qose)	142
Oerd Bylykbashi (@oerdbylykbashi)	140
Vasil Llajo (@vasil_llajo)	140
AsfloralHaxhiu (@asfloralhaxhiu)	139
Elisa Spiropali (@elisa.spiropali)	139

Ermonela Felaj Valikaj (@ermonelafelaj)	139
Klodiana Spahiu (@spahiuklodiana)	139
Eno Bozdo (@eno_bozdo)	137
Milva Ekonomi (@milva.ekonomi)	137
Akil Kraja (@akil_kraja)	135
Ceno Klosi (@ceno.klosi)	135
Agron Shehaj (@agronshehaj_)	132
Asllan Dogjani (@asllandogjani)	131
Bora Muzhaqi (@boramuzhaqi)	131
Lulzim Basha (@lulzimbasha)	130
Toni Gogu (@tonigogu)	130
Bledi Como (@bledicomo)	129
Adriana Kalaja (@adriana_kalaja)	127
Ulsi Manja (@ulsimanja)	127
Anila Denaj (@aniladenaj)	126
Gentian Koçi (@gentian_koci)	126
Enslemvera Zake (@enizake)	125
Isuf Çelaj (@celajisuf)	121
Matea Rexhepi (@matea.rexhepi)	121
Pirro Vengu (@pirro_vengu)	120
Ardian Islami (@ardian.islami_)	118
Bujar Leskaj (@bujarleskaj)	117
Grigels Muçollari (@grigelsmucollari)	117
Pellumb Seferi (@pellumbseferi)	117
Elton Korreshi (@eltonkorreshi)	116
Flamur Hoxha (@flamurhoxhaal)	116
Xhelal Mziu (@xhelalmziu)	116
Arlind Qori (@arlind.qori)	115
Kliti Hoti (@klitihoti_faqjazyrtare)	114
Aurel Bylykbashi (@aurel_bylykbashi)	112
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Renato Kumrija (@renatokumria)	24
Tritan Shehu (@tritan_shehu)	24
Barbara Doda (@barbara_doda_)	23

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Armonela Marku (@armonela.marku)	11
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Kesjana Iberhasaj (@kesjanaiberhasaj)	11
Luciano Kola (@luciano__kola)	11
Pëllumb Shullazi (@pellumbshullazi)	11
Roy Bashaj-Nallbani (@roy_bashaj)	11
Valbona Myhedin (@valbonamyhedin)	11
Alban Metallari (@alban.metallari)	10
Cara Hasan (@hasan.caraa)	10
Drilon Merturi (@drilonmerturi)	10
Kole Malaj (@kole.malaj)	10
Luljeta Sejko (@luljetasejko)	10

Valentina Haliti Doda (@valihaliti66)	10
Anxhela Nasto (@anxhela.nasto)	9
Halil Koloshi (@halil_koloshi_)	9
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Ervin Toro (@ervin.toro)	8
Kledison Harizaj (@kledisonharizaj)	8
Myzafer Elezi (@elezimyzafer)	8
Pajtim Murrizi (@pajtim_murrizi)	8
Shkurt Lasku (@shkurtlasku)	8
Adnan Shullani (@adnan.shullani)	7
Besmir Skendaj (@besmir.skendaj)	7
Denis Shameti (@denis_shameti)	7
Ervis Paçrami (@ervispacrami)	7
Fatmira Nikolla (@nikolla_mira)	7
Ferdinand Dervishi (@ferdinandervishi)	7
Jetmira Malja (@jetmira_malja)	7
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Oltiana Muharremi (@oltianamuharremi10)	7
Armando Kllogjeri (@armando.kllogjeri)	6
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Erisa Brushulli Mali (@erisa.brushulli)	5
Klajd Bica (@klajd.bica)	5
Redi Muçi (@redmuci)	5
Vitori Çipi (@viki.cipi)	5
Xhensina Ibi (@xhensina_ibi)	5
Mario Alimema (@mario_alimema)	5
Artan Luku (@artanluku)	4
Artur Mekshi (@artur.makeshdedaj)	4
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Suada Kopshti (@sua_ada)	4
Arsen Koza (@arsen.koza)	3
Eriseld Deda (@eriseld_deda)	3
Ervis Çela (@erviscela_)	3
Luan Duzha (@luanduzha)	3

Niko Peleshi (@npeleshi)	3
Seldina Selimi (@seldinaselimi)	3
Anisa Rapo (@anisa.rapo)	2
Demian DM Mrishaj (@demian.mrishaj)	2
Klodjan Kaçani (@klodjankacani)	2
Luana Harizaj (@luanaharizaj)	2
Nasian Matka (@nasianm)	2
Arben Ristani (@avristani)	1
Besnik Ibi (@besnik_ibi)	1
Flavia Osmani (@osmani.flavia)	1
Grand Total	22,723

About the partners

INTERNATIONAL IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with 35 Member States founded in 1995, with a mandate to support sustainable democracy worldwide.

What we do

We develop policy-friendly research related to elections, parliaments, constitutions, digitalization, climate change, inclusion and political representation, all under the umbrella of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. We assess the performance of democracies around the world through our unique Global State of Democracy Indices and Democracy Tracker.

We provide capacity development and expert advice to democratic actors including governments, parliaments, election officials and civil society. We develop tools and publish databases, books and primers in several languages on topics ranging from voter turnout to gender quotas.

We bring states and non-state actors together for dialogues and lesson sharing. We stand up and speak out to promote and protect democracy worldwide.

Where we work

Our headquarters is in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

Our publications and databases

We have a catalogue with more than 1,000 publications and over 25 databases on our website. Most of our publications can be downloaded free of charge.

<<https://www.idea.int>>

Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) Albania

BIRN Albania is a non-governmental media organization established in 2009, dedicated to strengthening transparency, accountability, and democratic governance in Albania through investigative journalism, media monitoring, and policy analysis.

What we do

BIRN Albania conducts high-impact investigations into public administration, corruption, organized crime, and environmental and social issues. It leads comprehensive monitoring initiatives related to media pluralism, electoral processes, political finance, and digital information integrity. Its growing research portfolio offers evidence-based insights for national and international stakeholders.

The organization also offers capacity building for journalists and researchers, and develops tools and databases for transparency, such as the online asset declaration portal and local governance monitoring platforms.

Through its editorial platform Reporter.al, BIRN Albania publishes independent journalism with national and regional reach, and plays a key role in fostering fact-based public debate and watchdog reporting.

Where we work

Based in Tirana, BIRN Albania is part of the regional Network active across the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe. It collaborates with local and international partners, including EU institutions, civil society networks, and multilateral organizations, in projects focused on media freedom, good governance, and rule of law.

Our resources and publications

BIRN Albania produces in-depth research reports, policy briefs, media monitoring publications, and investigative features, available through www.reporter.al and www.birn.eu.com.

Rule of Law Centre, University of Helsinki

The Rule of Law Centre is a joint initiative of the University of Helsinki and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, established to strengthen the rule of law through international cooperation and expert support. The Centre brings together researchers, teachers, students, and practitioners with expertise in the rule of law to contribute to Finland's development policy objectives and global partnerships.

What we do

The Centre's core tasks include:

- supporting rule of law development cooperation by providing training, expert assistance, evaluations, and other forms of support to institutions and stakeholders in partner countries;
- participating in the development and updating of Finland's international rule of law policies, offering expert knowledge and policy recommendations;
- promoting knowledge sharing and interdisciplinary collaboration on rule of law issues within Finland and internationally; and
- organizing events, workshops, and research initiatives that foster dialogue on justice, legal reform, and institutional capacity building.

Where we work

Operating under the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsinki, the Centre engages with partners in Finland and abroad, particularly in countries where Finland supports rule of law development. It plays a bridging role between academia, government, and international cooperation actors.

For more information, visit:

www.helsinki.fi/en/networks/rule-law-centre



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This report presents the findings of a comprehensive social media monitoring effort conducted during Albania's 2025 parliamentary election campaign. It assesses the digital behaviour of political actors across Facebook, Instagram, and Google platforms, focusing on campaign visibility, advertising trends, and compliance with the Code of Conduct on Digital Campaigns. Drawing on advanced social media analytics and direct platform monitoring, the report identifies key challenges related to transparency, the ethical use of campaign technologies, and third-party influence.

Produced in the framework of a regional project on electoral integrity, the report offers data-driven insights and actionable recommendations for political actors, electoral institutions, online platforms, and civil society. It highlights the growing impact of digital campaigning on Albania's electoral landscape and calls for stronger safeguards to ensure fair, accountable, and transparent online political communication.