

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION INITIATIVES IN SUDAN

A Brief Summary



DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION INITIATIVES IN SUDAN

A Brief Summary

Sami Abdelhalim Saeed




International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE-103 34 Stockholm
SWEDEN
+46 8 698 37 00
info@idea.int
www.idea.int

© 2024 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members.

This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of International IDEA and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.



With the exception of any third-party images and photos, the electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well as to remix and adapt it, provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more information visit the Creative Commons website: <<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/>>.

International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE-103 34 Stockholm
SWEDEN
Tel: +46 8 698 37 00
Email: info@idea.int
Website: <<https://www.idea.int>>

Cover illustration: Enough Project, Flickr: <<https://flickr.com/photos/enoughproject/5526669496>>
Design and layout: International IDEA
Copyeditor: Global Commons Research Group

DOI: <<https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2024.27>>

ISBN: 978-91-7671-760-8 (PDF)

Acknowledgements

This Report is part of the Supporting Sudan Democratic Transition Project led by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in Sudan and funded by the European Union. International IDEA extends its appreciation to all individuals who participated in reviewing this Report. We especially thank Sumit Bisarya, head of International IDEA's Constitution-Building Programme, Adem Kassie Abebe, Senior Adviser for Constitution-Building Processes at International IDEA, and Siraj Khan, former Head of Projects and Research Fellow, Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law. We are grateful for their contributions.

Any inquiries or comments regarding this Report can be addressed to its author, Sami Abdelhalim Saeed, via his official email: S.Saeed@idea.int.

Contents

Acknowledgements	4
Abbreviations	7
Executive summary	8
Chapter 1	
Objectives and scope	10
Chapter 2	
The history of DDR arrangements in Sudan	14
2.1. DDR in the Addis Ababa Agreement on the problem of South Sudan, 1972	14
2.2. DDR in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005	15
2.3. DDR in the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement 2007	18
2.4. DDR in the Darfur Peace Agreement 2006	19
2.5. DDR in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur 2011	22
2.6. DDR in the Juba Peace Agreement 2020	23
Chapter 3	
Women and children in Sudan's DDR	29
3.1. Women and girls in DDR programmes	29
3.2. Children and youth in DDR programmes	30
Chapter 4	
Challenges and lessons learned	32
Chapter 5	
Conclusion	36
References	37
About the author	39
About International IDEA	40

Abbreviations

CAAFG	Children associated with armed forces and groups
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	Community Security and Small Arms Control
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DSAIC	Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
ESPA	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
GoS	Government of Sudan
ICP	Integration of Former Combatants Plan
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
JCI	Joint Committee for Integration
JPA	Juba Peace Agreement
NCDDRC	National Council for DDR Coordination
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SDDRP	The Sudan DDR Programme
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSR	Security sector reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMISUN	Mission in Sudan
UNAMID	United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) has remained a complex issue in Sudan's modern history. Sudanese ruling powers and political groups have, since independence, signed six peace agreements, all of which included principles and provisions regarding DDR. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement in Sudan included more detailed provisions compared to the other peace agreements. This Report analyses the legal provisions on the issue of DDR in the six peace agreements to date, so as to assess the success of several experiences with managing and organizing DDR programmes in Sudan. This analysis includes examining the legal and regulatory frameworks governing the DDR of children, youth and women. Furthermore, Chapter 3 gives inputs on how the needs of women, children and local communities were integrated into the planning of previous DDR efforts.

This Report seeks to inform deliberations at this critical juncture in Sudan's political history. Aside from the national army, there are several armed groups and militias in Sudan whose leaders have signed peace agreements, but the security arrangements related to DDR have repeatedly failed to achieve their goal. Armed groups still exist in different regions of Sudan, independently of the national army. The spread of irregular armed groups and militias in Sudan threatens peace and political stability. The situation became more complicated after the outbreak of war in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in 2023. This war broke out after lengthy attempts to find a mutually acceptable agreement on a policy for the integration of the RSF into the national army. The seriousness of the situation in Sudan is further

exacerbated by the fact that all the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement were not subject to the DDR programmes agreed on in it and, in addition, that other movements did not sign a peace agreement with the transitional government.

Chapter 1

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

Despite strong international support from the United Nations and the international donor community, DDR programmes in Sudan have faced numerous technical challenges.

Sudan is currently experiencing a devastating internal war that began in April 2023. This war is part of a long experience of civil wars from its early independence years, resulting in six peace agreements, from the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1972) to the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) (2020), in which DDR programming was included in different frameworks. As efforts to bring the key stakeholders together and silence the guns continue, the issue of DDR will be an important aspect of any comprehensive peace process. In conceptualizing and designing an appropriate DDR process, numerous challenges and lessons must be considered. Despite strong international support from the United Nations and the international donor community, DDR programmes in Sudan have faced numerous technical challenges. Throughout history, DDR programmes in Sudan have shown sluggish progress. Few ex-combatants have been demobilized, and fewer have completed reintegration training. DDR processes are essential to building peace and political stability in Sudan. The peace agreements signed by the Government of Sudan (GoS) with armed opposition movements throughout Sudan's political history included various provisions that established a legal framework for DDR of ex-combatants and those willing to lay down arms and join a peaceful political process. These agreements set the standards and the organizational and administrative frameworks for DDR in Sudan. The following sections provide a brief overview of the experiences of some of these agreements.

Civil war and armed conflicts have continued in Sudan for over 50 years to date. Therefore, the proliferation of ex-combatants and

weapons outside the control of the state has become both a threat to security and peace at the national and regional levels, and a source of concern for government authorities and the international community. Building sustainable peace in Sudan requires adopting strategic policies to assist national authorities in applying a successful DDR strategy and in developing practical methods to integrate ex-combatants into formal security institutions and civilian life.

With the signing of the JPA in Sudan in October 2020, a DDR programme was stipulated, the provisions of which still need to be fully implemented. For the implementation of the DDR programme under the JPA to succeed, it is essential to identify and draw on the lessons and experiences of previous DDR commissions constituted under the previous peace agreements.

Unfortunately, political instability and the continuation of armed conflicts provided a favourable environment for the growth of armed movements which actively opposed the central government. As a result, continued armed conflicts led to the failure to complete the demobilization and integration policies approved in the agreements signed with the Sudanese Government and the international efforts and aid committed by the international community to help Sudan move towards peace and political stability. The war that erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) was a direct result of the failure to manage these processes and to establish peace in the country.

This paper examines the experience with DDR programmes in Sudan by looking at when, where and by whom various DDR programmes were initiated, and discusses the innovative approaches of key actors. It further assesses how the needs of vulnerable community members, such as women and children, were integrated into previous DDR programmes, and which lessons learned from previous DDR processes in Sudan should guide the development of future interventions.

Examining six main Sudanese peace agreements, this paper seeks to illustrate how DDR programmes have been implemented, to examine what the lessons learned as a result of these are, and to identify challenges that must be overcome. The paper will emphasize aspects

For the implementation of the DDR programme under the JPA to succeed, it is essential to identify and draw on the lessons and experiences of previous DDR commissions.

of the DDR frameworks stipulated in peace agreements in Sudan since the country's independence in 1956, within the following peace agreements:

- the Addis Ababa Agreement 1972;
- the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005;
- the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 2006;
- the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) 2007;
- the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) 2011; and
- the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) 2020.

An important and unique aspect of this analysis includes the national and regional DDR commissions' structure, mandates and ability to facilitate DDR policies and plans. It is critical to understand whether the DDR commissions implement DDR policies and manage resources and services, and whether they can make decisions impacting DDR in the peacebuilding process. Furthermore, the paper identifies the types of international support for DDR operations in Sudan, in the context of the political and historical circumstances of the country, analyses the peace agreements in Sudan, and traces the evolution of definitions, concepts and administrative methods and the impact of the agreements on peace processes in Sudan. The mechanisms for integrating ex-combatants into the national regular armed forces will also be analysed, as well as how the peace agreements in Sudan responded to the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly women, youth and persons with disabilities. Concerning this last topic, the paper also discusses the standards adopted by the peace agreements concerning managing diversity and gender in DDR policies.

This Report is structured into five chapters. In this Chapter 1, the paper has briefly discussed examples of the previous DDR arrangements before 2019. Chapter 2 covers the history of DDR arrangements in Sudan. Chapter 3 examines the extent to which DDR programmes have addressed the needs of women and children.

Chapter 4 reviews the challenges that faced the implementation of the DDR programmes in Sudan and the lessons learned from those experiences. The concluding Chapter 5 provides a general evaluation of previous DDR programmes, along with recommendations for future DDR programming.

Chapter 2

THE HISTORY OF DDR ARRANGEMENTS IN SUDAN

It is important to understand when and where past DDR processes in Sudan have been pursued, as well as who has been involved. The ensuing chapter provides a brief overview of the main peace agreements: the Addis Ababa Agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, the Darfur Peace Agreement, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and the Juba Peace Agreement, including the leading actors, stakeholders, legal frameworks, and challenges for each agreement.

2.1. DDR IN THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN, 1972

The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan, also known as the 'Addis Ababa Agreement', was signed in 1972 by the Democratic Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), concluding the First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972). The agreement included temporary arrangements, for the first five years of the agreement, to establish armed forces in the Southern Sudan region consisting of a national force of no more than 12,000 military personnel, called the Southern Command, 6,000 of whom would come from the South and the other 6,000 of whom would come from the other regions of Sudan (Shinn 2004: 243). Besides this agreement, the Southern Regional Self-Government Act 1972 for the southern provinces was the most important legal framework for DDR in Sudan (Shinn 2004: 241).

Chapter 2, article 2 of the Regional Self-Government Act codified the compositional arrangements of the agreement into law. Article 4 of Chapter 2 states that the Joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military officers from each side and that decisions of the Joint Military Commission shall be taken unanimously. In case of disagreement, such matters shall be referred to the Sudanese and South Sudanese authorities. Furthermore, article 3 of Chapter 2 states that the Joint Military Commission must integrate and redeploy combatants of the Anya Nya into the formal national forces. The Anya Nya insurgency in Southern Sudan, led by Joseph Lagu from 1969, started after Gaafar Nimeiry seized power and continued until the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Shinn 2004: 241). The Commission considered the initial separate deployment of troops necessary to achieve a smooth integration into the national forces, to ensure that an atmosphere of peace and confidence prevailed in the Southern region.

A DDR programme was not clearly detailed in the Addis Ababa Agreement, and the integration processes for the Anya Nya were not smoothly implemented. The lack of clear DDR plans, coupled with the lack of political will to execute such plans, led to the failure to demobilize and reintegrate the Anya Nya combatants effectively. Later on, the lack of progress here also led to the resumption of fighting in 1983 and eventually the creation of the Anya Nya II movement (Shinn 2004: 243).

Chapter 2, article 2 of the Regional Self-Government Act codified the compositional arrangements of the agreement into law.

2.2. DDR IN THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT 2005

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending the Second Sudanese Civil War, was signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on 9 January 2005. The CPA provided details of DDR programming for interim institutions, as well as permanent DDR institutions. Article 24 of the CPA stipulated that 'the overarching objectives of the DDR process [were] to contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for human security and to support post-peace agreement social stabilization across Sudan, particularly in war-affected areas'. These objectives were designed to be achieved

through a process of voluntary and comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants of the Sudan People's Liberation Army and special groups, as well as through the promotion of community security and arms control (Mueller 2013: 29).

The Sudan DDR programme (SDDRP) was a key provision of the CPA. The programme started in 2009 and covered mainly the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

The Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP) was a key provision of the CPA. The programme started in 2009 and covered mainly the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The currently ongoing armed conflict in these areas commenced in the lead-up to South Sudan's secession. The lack of democratic elections was addressed in a separate protocol under the CPA (UNDP 2014: 4). National DDR institutions controlled all DRR programme activities. According to article 24.4 of the CPA, no DDR planning, management or implementation activity was to take place outside of the framework of the interim and permanent DDR institutions (Mueller 2013: 29).

In 2006, the UN published its Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) to promote greater coordination and harmonization of its DDR programming. These standards were a response to the fact that in the past DDR programmes had often been pursued in a fragmented manner, due to inadequate coordination and planning, and had been hampered by institutional disagreements and poor coordination (Lamb and Stainer 2018: 3). However, the IDDRS lacked specificity, which is necessary for addressing complex operational environments for DDR. UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005) mandated the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to support and provide assistance to the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Government of South Sudan in planning, developing and implementing the entire DDR programme. It was agreed between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNMIS that disarmament and demobilization support was to be led by UNMIS, and that UNDP would take the lead on reintegration support (Lamb and Stainer 2018: 5).

Regarding DDR management, the agreement provided for establishing three institutions responsible for managing the process:

- the National Council for DDR Coordination (NCDDRC);

- the North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC); and
- the South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC).

The NCDDRC is a joint body for the GoS and the SPLM/A, charged with overall policy formulation, oversight, coordination, evaluation and review of the DDR process. The two commissions of North and South Sudan are regional political bodies with civil society representation and support from the international community, including the UN (Mueller 2013: 29).

There were substantial delays in the DDR processes undertaken after the CPA was signed in early 2005, as the official National DDR Strategic Plan developed by the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Coordination Council (NCDDRC) was concluded and signed in November 2007—almost three years after the signing of the CPA. The national strategic plan outlined that the overarching objective of the DDR process was to support post-peace agreement and social stabilization across Sudan, particularly in war-affected areas (Nichols 2011: 12).

An agreed-upon DDR programme was implemented in a complementary manner alongside the Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSAC) project, which focused on CSAC-related issues at the community level. This DDR programme was more gender-sensitive in comparison to the Addis Ababa Agreement, as it actively encouraged gender equality. The SDDRP succeeded in providing economic reintegration assistance to nearly 24,000 male and female ex-combatants after 2009, the majority of whom became gainfully employed (UNDP 2014: 4).

Due to an absence of agreement between DDR stakeholders, mismanagement and inefficiency, the programme failed to achieve its planned objectives in terms of human security and social stabilization. Ultimately, the programme did very little in terms of the successful demobilization of combatants and collection of weapons. Fewer than a quarter of the planned 180,000 ex-combatants were demobilized and there has been no notable change in the security of communities in South Sudan. In addition, loyalty to the SPLM/A has made many soldiers very reluctant to join the DDR process. The

soldiers felt that the Liberation Army was a symbol of their patriotism, and that belonging to it was a source of pride for the fighters, who continued to work to achieve dignity for their people (Mueller 2013: 29).

The ESPA stipulated that the two parties would agree to integrate the willing and qualified combatants of the Eastern Front into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and other regular forces based on fair eligibility criteria.

2.3. DDR IN THE EASTERN SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT 2007

The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) was signed between the Eastern Front and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in 2007. The Eastern Front is a military faction comprising fighters from the Eastern region of Sudan, engaged in military operations from Eritrean territory against the central government in Khartoum. The Eastern Front's primary demand included justice in the distribution of national wealth and in governance. The ESPA stipulated that the two parties would agree to integrate the willing and qualified combatants of the Eastern Front into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and other regular forces based on fair eligibility criteria. Moreover, the GoS agreed to arrange support and training for combatants, including accelerated training where necessary, to ensure that they met the requirements of their proposed ranks and functions, as well as to provide for their potential promotion. The Agreement also stipulated that former combatants would remain in the SAF and other regular forces for a period of not less than two years, according to the rules of these institutions (article 27, paragraphs 101–105).

The ESPA established the Joint Committee for Integration (JCI) to implement the integration process. The JCI was composed of five GoS representatives and five representatives of the Eastern Front (article 27, paragraphs 106 and 107). The JCI was responsible for:

- the categorization of Eastern Front forces and identification of those willing and qualified to join the SAF and other regular forces;
- the identification of the ranks for integrated combatants in SAF and other regular forces, based on the principle of affirmative action and the rank structure of the relevant institutions (article 27, paragraph 108); and

- the application of disarmament and demobilization arrangements for those combatants who did not or were not willing to meet the integration criteria (article 27, paragraph 117).

The failure to allocate enough resources to successfully disarm and demobilize former combatants was understood to be a risk that could lead to a relapse into conflict, or to the outbreak of low-level criminal activity that could eventually undermine the peace process (Knight 2008: 43). Therefore, the GoS was also mandated to allocate enough resources to support sustainable and long-term reintegration programming, as well as to ensure follow-up, monitoring and continuing support measures as needed (article 27, paragraphs 123 and 124) to protect the DDR programme from failing.

Following the signing of ESPA in 2007, UNDP, in close partnership with the Sudan DDR Commission, initiated the East Sudan Human Security Project Phase II. The project was designed to promote peace, security, and long-term development in East Sudan. More specifically, it aimed at building confidence, supporting security reforms, and demobilizing and reintegrating 1,700 combatants of the Eastern Front.
(UNDP 2014: 3)

With the outbreak of war in Sudan between the SAF and the RSF in mid-April 2023, the Eastern Sudan region once again became vulnerable to security chaos, due to the remobilization and spread of armed tribal groups.

The failure to allocate enough resources to successfully disarm and demobilize former combatants was understood to be a risk that could lead to a relapse into conflict, or to the outbreak of low-level criminal activity.

2.4. DDR IN THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT 2006

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006, also known as the 'Abuja agreement', was the first peace agreement to elaborate a DDR programme for combatants mobilized in Darfur. The DPA established the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), whose mandate was to establish the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission (DSAIC), and/or any subsidiary bodies, for the coordination and implementation of former combatant disarmament and demobilization, as well as for the social and economic

reintegration of former combatants, among other issues (DPA, article 29, paragraph 390).

Paragraph 399 of the Abuja agreement stipulated the establishment of the Technical Integration Committee (TIC) to design, plan, implement, manage and monitor the integration of former combatants. Furthermore, the DPA parties agreed to develop the Integration of Former Combatants Plan (ICP) (paragraph 408) to provide principles for integration processes with reasonable and fair eligibility criteria relating to age and fitness for service. The ICP consisted of:

- integrating 4,000 former combatants from the faction of the [Sudan Liberation Army](#) led by [Minni Minnawi](#) into the SAF;
- integrating 1,000 former combatants from relevant movements into the Sudanese National Police Force and other security institutions; and
- in coordination with the movements, developing education and training programmes to support 3,000 former combatants (paragraph 409).

As per paragraph 424, the DSAIC or other subsidiaries were to develop a plan that specified the timing and sequencing of disarmament and demobilization processes for former combatants. Processes of disarmament and demobilization were to take place so as to include the following:

- awareness orientation, sensitization and training of commanders and their forces on DDR, the peace process, and their respective roles and responsibilities;
- stipulating eligibility criteria for the disarmament of those combatants that were not integrated;
- the storage of weapons in containers at designated locations under dual lock;

- registration, screening and categorization of movement forces prior to demobilization; and
- immediate demobilization and reinsertion of disabled combatants (paragraph 426).

The Abuja agreement provided a plan for the social and economic reintegration of former combatants (paragraph 431). With the assistance of international partners, the two parties agreed that the national government would ensure that all former combatants who wished to return to civilian life or did not meet the eligibility criteria for entry into the SAF and selected security institutions would be properly supported through social and economic reintegration programmes.

The Abuja agreement provided a plan for the social and economic reintegration of former combatants (paragraph 431).

The Sudan DDR Commission and the UNDP succeeded in implementing a Preparatory Support Project (PSP) for DDR in Darfur following the signing of the DPA in 2008. The project's objectives were to build the foundations for a long-term and comprehensive DDR programme, including building national stakeholder capacity, mainly the NSDDRC, to plan and implement a DDR programme in Darfur (UNDP 2014: 3).

The SDDRC demobilized 4,126 ex-combatants, of which only 600 received reintegration assistance by the national government, due to a shortage of financial and technical resources. The UNDP Sudan Office provided technical assistance and capacity-building support to the SDDRC, while the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) provided logistical support for combatant demobilization.

A key lesson learned from this experience is that demobilized combatants who do not receive financial support as part of the reintegration process are likely to rejoin other armed movements or engage in other forms of illegal activities to earn a living. In addition, providing vocational training and entrepreneurial skills to unemployed youth with conflict potential could prevent them from being drawn into conflicts and crime, as evidenced by the findings from the UNDP and UNAMID Community-based Labour-Intensive Projects (CLIPs) (UNDP 2014: 3).

2.5. DDR IN THE DOHA DOCUMENT FOR PEACE IN DARFUR 2011

After the relapse into war and the collapse of the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006), the GoS signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), which was later joined by the Justice and Equality Movement–Bashar Faction (JEM-Bashar) in June 2011. Signed in Qatar, this agreement is also known as the Doha agreement.

Lessons from the Darfur Peace Agreement DPA (2006) indicate that unless alternative livelihood opportunities are provided to combatants, there remains a risk that combatants will rejoin other factions.

'Lessons from the Darfur Peace Agreement DPA (2006) indicate that unless alternative livelihood opportunities are provided to combatants, there remains a risk that combatants will rejoin other factions and further exacerbate the security situation' (UNDP 2014: 2–3). Therefore, under article 66 (Security Measures), the DDPD included stated principles of DDR and objectives. After the failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the continued killing and serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Doha agreement brought new hope for addressing the root causes of the Darfur conflict and bringing peace and stability to the region.

The DDR programme under the DDPD had five interlinked components, activities and outputs, as follows:

- supporting the GoS, the Darfur Ceasefire Commission (CFC), DSAIC and the Strategic Reserve Authority (SRA) in disarmament, small arms and light weapons (SALW) management;
- supporting demobilization and the reinsertion of demobilized male and female armed personnel;
- supporting the economic reintegration of male and female demobilized individual ex-combatants in Darfur;
- supporting socio-economic community infrastructure projects in support of reintegration, small arms control and social cohesion; and
- supporting the capacity building of the GoS, TDRA, and local providers in Darfur (UNDP 2014: 4).

2.6. DDR IN THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT 2020

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) was signed on 3 October 2020 by the GoS and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) coalition of armed movement factions and political groups. This agreement partially succeeded in halting hostilities between the two sides, constituting the Sudanese conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile (2011–2020) and the War in Darfur (2003–2020). The JPA also opened the door to confidence-building and to creating conditions conducive for building political consensus and dialogue. These conditions were recognized as necessary before a sustainable peace could be achieved in Sudan, also following the fall (in 2019) of the ousted President Omar al-Bashir, who headed the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).

The JPA established detailed provisions regulating the DDR of military groups affiliated with the militias and armed movements that signed the JPA with the transitional government. At the writing of this Report, the signatory parties to the agreement have not implemented any parts related to these provisions. The continued proliferation of armed groups without the implementation of DDR processes in relation to these armed groups may, again, have contributed to the collapse of peace and the return to armed conflict in 2023. The process of integrating the armed movements that signed the JPA is of crucial importance, not only for promoting sustainable peace in Sudan but also for building democracy and political stability.

The implementation of the DDR programme in the JPA pertains to the so-called Final Security Arrangements. The process of implementing DDR was supposed to follow upon the completion of Phases One and Two of an overall process. Phase One, after the envisioned continuation of the 'Cessation of Hostilities for Humanitarian Purposes', was to lead to a permanent ceasefire agreement. Further implementation of a permanent peace agreement and other security arrangements, and implementation of the comprehensive programme of integration of former combatants in military establishment institutions and other security services, was supposed to have constituted Phase Two.

The continued proliferation of armed groups without the implementation of DDR processes in relation to these armed groups may, again, have contributed to the collapse of peace and the return to armed conflict in 2023.

2.6.1. Defining DDR in the JPA

The Juba Peace Agreement's Chapter 8 provides a clear definition of DDR. DDR means the process of settling the status of those unfit for military service by disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating them into society through the DDR Commission (article 5, Chapter 8).

For further clarification, Chapter 8 provided for a separate definition of the term 'integration', which meant integrating combatants who were fit for military service according to a timeline to be agreed after the conclusion of the training and military development period in accordance with agreed norms and standards (article 6, Chapter 8).

The ultimate purpose of the integration process was for the SAF to be the only professional national army.

The ultimate purpose of the integration process was for the SAF to be the only professional national army and to integrate all other forces present in Sudanese territory into a unified professional national army.

2.6.2. Principles and values of the DDR Programme

The Juba Peace Agreement stipulated a number of values that were to have been taken into account when implementing the DDR programme. Among these values were those that support equality and women's rights, as well as the need to take into account the inclusion of all marginalized groups in military institutions, with respect to the following:

The JPA ensured the representation of women in structures of the military institutions and other security services/the security sector and in related decision-making entities.

1. *Gender.* The JPA ensured the representation of women in structures of the military institutions and other security services/ the security sector and in related decision-making entities, as well as in the reform, development and modernization of the military establishment and other security services/the security sector (article 9.10, Chapter 8). Parties of the JPA agreed to ensure the participation of women in DDR decision-making processes, and to effectively and appropriately meet the needs and interests of women, including in the representation of women in the Darfur Regional DDR Commission (article 30.8.9, Chapter 8).
2. *Diversity management.* The JPA enshrined principles on promoting geographic and social diversity and equal opportunity employment policies in the membership of the SAF and other security services within the security sector, while applying the

principle of positive discrimination in favour of war-affected areas (article 9.13, Chapter 8).

3. *People with disabilities*. It was clearly defined in the JPA that during DDR processes, the concerned commissions were to be responsible for meeting the special needs of children, women and disabled persons as a priority. The GoS was to mobilize specific resources and budgets to meet the special needs of these groups above all in various phases of the DDR process (article 30.2.8, Chapter 8).
4. *Transparency*. The JPA set an important condition for making all DDR procedures transparent to ensure fairness and equity when deciding on the eligibility of former combatants to receive targeted assistance (article 30.10.3, Chapter 8).

2.6.3. Structure of DDR mechanisms

In terms of organizing the work and structuring the institutions of the JPA, the Juba Agreement stipulated that operations were to be organized on two national and regional levels. The national mechanism included the establishment of the High Council for the DDR and the National Commission for the DDR. The regional mechanisms included only the Darfur Regional DDR Commission (article 30.3, Chapter 8).

National mechanisms

The national mechanisms for DDR were the most important, and they were the ones which were to provide for national DDR policies. The national mechanisms for DDR included the High Council for the DDR and the National Commission for the DDR, as detailed here:

1. *DDR High Council*. The JPA established a Joint High Council chaired by the commander-in-chief of the SAF, and further staffed with the commander of the RSF, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the SAF Chief of Staff, the Director General of the Police, the Director General of the General Intelligence Service, the head of the Military Intelligence Authority and the heads of the armed struggle movements for supervision, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up of the implementation of integrating the forces of the armed movements in the SAF and evaluating the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. The Joint High Council was to hold periodic meetings and was to

form, among other functions, a mechanism to address the issue of war prisoners and missing persons on both sides (article 26.7, Chapter 8).

1. The Council was concerned with setting DDR policies, and with supervising, coordinating and evaluating these policies, as well as with coordinating with the National DDR Commission (article 30.5.1, Chapter 8).
2. *National DDR Commission.* Chapter 8 of the JPA stipulated that the GoS was to establish an independent and qualified National DDR Commission, to assume its duties with regard to DDR processes. The National DDR Commission was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of needs and challenges related to DDR at the national and regional levels, including but not limited to the reintegration of forces of the armed movements and coordination with the DDR High Council. The National DDR Commission was to ensure the representation of women in decision-making process related to DDR, so as to effectively and appropriately meet the needs and interests of women (article 30.6, Chapter 8).

The National DDR Commission jurisdictions were to be undertaken with care and the process, therefore, was to proceed with respect to the following:

- raising awareness of and informing commanders and forces affiliated therewith about DDR and the peace process as well as their roles and responsibilities therein;
- deciding on eligibility criteria for disarmament of the unintegrated combatants;
- deciding on immediately and unconditionally dismissing and releasing all combatant children, if any, as well as groups with special needs and former female combatants, provided that they were handed over to the Joint DDR Committee to be reintegrated;
- applying principles of fairness, transparency, equality and impartiality during the social and economic reintegration of former combatants—furthermore, former combatants were to receive

equal treatment, regardless of their past affiliation with any of the movements;

- ensuring reintegration at a community level so as to benefit the returnees and local communities;
- implementing DDR efforts to ensure as much security and stability in Sudan as possible, in addition to the provision of support, training and job opportunities for former combatants in the short and long terms; and
- conducting reintegration programmes which are sustainable and which include monitoring progress and ongoing support, based on the needs defined by DDR mechanisms (article 30.7, Chapter 8).

Regional mechanism: Darfur Regional DDR Commission

The second level of DDR management which the JPA provided for was the regional level of DDR operations. The regional level included the Darfur Regional DDR Commission, in order to strengthen the unity of the national army and the monopoly of the state on the use of weapons, within the framework of the comprehensive peacebuilding process, and in order to ensure the rule of law in the post-war period and preventing human rights violations. The Regional Commission was to work under the direct supervision of the National DDR Commission (article 30.8, Chapter 8).

International support

The will of the signatory parties to the Juba Peace Agreement in Sudan was that the processes of DDR were to constitute a transparent programme under the supervision of the international community. Article 9(9) of Chapter 8 (Permanent Ceasefire and Final Security Agreement Protocol) stipulated that: 'the Parties shall engage in a transparent and internationally supervised programme for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of forces that will eventually lead to the reintegration of combatants and fighters who have not been included in the integration programme'. Paragraph 11 of article 9.9 further stipulated that 'the Parties shall work together to request from the international community technical, material, and financial assistance necessary for successful implementation of the

Financial, logistical, and technical assistance from the international community and international expertise is important for a peaceful and democratic transition in Sudan.

Cessation of Hostilities for Humanitarian Purposes, a permanent ceasefire, DDR, and peacebuilding’.

Financial, logistical and technical assistance from the international community and international expertise are important for a peaceful and democratic transition in Sudan. Therefore, the international community needs to share ideas and experiences with the Sudanese authorities in drawing up a successful road map for dismantling the JPA signatory armed struggle movements and reintegrating them in the military establishment and security services.

Chapter 3

WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN SUDAN'S DDR

This chapter discusses the role of women and children in DDR programmes in Sudan. Furthermore, the chapter gives inputs on how the needs of women, children and local communities were integrated into previous DDR planning efforts.

3.1. WOMEN AND GIRLS IN DDR PROGRAMMES

Since the Sudan DDR Programme was launched in 2009 following the CPA, the programme has succeeded in assisting around 24,000 ex-combatants, including women. Economic reintegration assistance developed economic alternatives for ex-combatants and offered fair jobs and small projects. As a result, the majority of ex-combatants are now gainfully employed. Furthermore, it built female ex-combatants' capacity, allowing them to contribute to their economic and social empowerment. This is evident in their active participation in various local decision-making institutions within their communities. Both men and women were heavily affected and displaced by armed conflicts. In addition, women have been the victims of gender-based violence (GBV), which is highly taboo in northern Sudan's social culture (STHLM Policy Group 2010: 5).

The DDPD encouraged equity among ex-combatants without discrimination between women and men throughout the DDR process. Vulnerable women and youth were equally involved in the planning and implementation of DDR activities (DDPD article 70, paragraph 412). Moreover, in an effort to support the enhancement of female economic empowerment and household food security, it

The DDPD encouraged equity among ex-combatants without discrimination between women and men throughout the DDR process.

was recommended by the participants in the DDR/CSAC-Community Based Reintegration Orientation Workshop, held on 27 February to 4 March 2013 in Khartoum, that women ex-combatants should have access to market information and financial services as well as opportunities to improve their entrepreneurial skills and abilities.

The following three assumptions are central for gender-sensitive approaches to DDR:

- women have generally been excluded from previous DDR management and processes;
- the protection and reintegration needs of women and girls associated with armed groups are distinct from the protection and reintegration designed in DDR for men; and
- cultural understandings of masculinity and male roles in society have specific implications for the efficacy of disengagement and reintegration programmes (IOM 2019: 74)

The SAF and its supporting paramilitary group, the People's Defense Force (PDF), deny ever having had any CAAFG in their ranks.

3.2. CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN DDR PROGRAMMES

For youth and children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFG), the DDR programme has been a distinct process overseen by the Sudan DDR Commission with ongoing support from UNICEF. The DDR process for children has been entirely separate from DDR for adults. The SAF and its supporting paramilitary group, the People's Defence Forces (PDF), deny ever having had any CAAFG in their ranks. The SPLM/A has been working progressively to identify and demobilize any children in its ranks for several years; about 3,000 were discharged by the late 2000s (Nichols 2011: 26). Moreover, participants of the DDR/CSAC-Community Based Reintegration Orientation Workshop (held in Khartoum on 27 February to 4 March 2013) recommended that, where necessary, targeted reintegration assistance should be extended to at-risk youth alongside ex-combatants to build entrepreneurial capacity for alternative livelihood opportunities.

Future DDR should include enhanced planning and reintegration programmes for children and comply with international standards. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Groups of 2007 provide detailed guidelines for protecting children from recruitment and aiding those already involved in armed groups or armed forces. To prevent the recruitment of children in armed groups and to address the root causes of children's engagement in armed conflict operations, there are four identifiable approaches, as follows:

- providing formal education to children in armed affected areas;
- generating income opportunities for their families to allow parents to provide their children with education and future employment prospects;
- supporting the efforts of civil society organizations to raise awareness of children's rights and the prevention of youth recruitment within communities; and
- providing reintegration and assistance for child soldiers, including vocational training schemes and psychosocial support (IOM 2019: 74).

Chapter 4

CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

This chapter addresses the challenges and lessons learned from previous and current DDR programmes in Sudan. It will explore what has and what has not worked in national DDR processes, as well as the key factors which derailed past DDR efforts or helped them to succeed (e.g. trust-building mechanisms, spoilers, national capacity, etc.), and how ex-combatants benefited from their participation in earlier DDR programmes. In doing so, this chapter aims to guide the development of future tailored interventions. Seven overall major conclusions or lessons learned can be identified:

Building trust between ex-combatants and communities and creating an environment of coexistence are fundamental objectives of DDR programmes.

1. Building trust between ex-combatants and communities and creating an environment of coexistence are fundamental objectives of DDR Programmes. Furthermore, DDR in Sudan has been designed to offer a mechanism for other peace process elements to move forward. DDR programmes in Sudan have managed to help ex-combatants change their habits and identities (Knight 2008: 43).
2. Host communities can help to create a conducive environment for reintegration programmes in post-conflict situations. In a context where atrocities have been committed against communities in conflict, it is crucial for peacebuilding in Sudan also to design DDR programmes that promote social cohesion and peaceful coexistence between ex-combatants and host communities.
3. Based on recommendations, independent reviews, lessons learned and consultations with relevant stakeholders and communities hosting large numbers of ex-combatants, it is evident that there is a need for the SDDRP to shift from an individual reintegration approach to a more inclusive community-

based reintegration approach (UNDP 2014: 4). In addition, recommendations from several workshops have outlined the need for community involvement in the planning, implementation and monitoring of reintegration assistance to ex-combatants to enhance local ownership, social acceptance and the sustainability of reintegration results. As a result, the SDDRC and UNDP decided jointly in 2013 to implement community-based reintegration pilot projects in three war-affected locations in South Kordofan. The pilots' objectives were to test community-based participatory methodologies and tools in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the socio-economic reintegration of both ex-combatants and civilians. These pilots also provide potential lessons on value chain development, marketing and business development services within the context of group livelihood initiatives (UNDP 2014: 6).

4. Based on ex-combatant experience, reintegration assistance may have improved individual livelihoods in the short term. Nevertheless, the national political and socio-economic situation in Sudan led many demobilized ex-combatants to rejoin armed conflict. Finally, challenges related to the mismanagement of DDR programmes, the absence of complementarity in approaches and the lack of coordination among the three programmatic components—that is, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which were each led by different agencies—resulted in asymmetric implementation and processes for reintegration assistance across the southern part of Sudan (IOM 2019: 75).
5. DDR programmes in Sudan have been designed in consultation with the concerned UN agencies in Sudan. The SDDRC has been supported by the national government and other international donors, and has been recognized as a vital component for restoring peace and security in the Republic of Sudan. In light of this, Sudan has extended the mandate of the SDDRC and its oversight body, the National DDR Coordination Council, to include the implementation of the DDPD in Darfur. The body is directly under the presidency and is composed of nine federal ministries (UNDP 2014: 6). This has resulted in the DDR Coordination Council being located at a high level of governance, reflecting the government's political will to implement DDR programmes.
6. DDR programmes under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 presented a range of challenges due to interruptions

The national political and socio-economic situation in Sudan led many demobilized ex-combatants to rejoin armed conflict.

A mapping of opportunities for reintegration should be undertaken as the first step to ensure that reintegration options are designed in line with existing opportunities to ensure sustainability.

and delays related to the CPA processes. Numerous armed groups and pro-government militias then helped and supported their members, and in some cases developed a parallel 'civilian disarmament' process, which was outside of the scope of official frameworks (IOM 2019: 74). Thus, the DDR programme was implemented in a socio-economic environment where the national economy was (and is) underdeveloped, implying minimal opportunities for sustainable economic reintegration of demobilized combatants and supporters (STHLM Policy Group 2010: 5).

7. A mapping of opportunities for reintegration should be undertaken as the first step to ensure that reintegration options are designed in line with existing opportunities to ensure sustainability. Such a mapping would provide opportunities to address issues of livelihood diversification and linkages to natural resource management and energy-saving technologies, especially for women. Market information and financial services should be made accessible to female ex-combatants, as should opportunities to improve their entrepreneurial skills and abilities that could enhance their economic empowerment and household food security (UNDP 2014: 6).

Notwithstanding the points above, there might also be a need to establish an interim stabilization mechanism in case of future developments towards the downsizing of national security forces. Discharge of these active soldiers will need to include the provision of financial assistance which they are entitled to. Furthermore, the SAF would be well advised to provide a minimum of six months of vocational training to soldiers before discharge, to ensure that they are retrained into a new profession (STHLM Policy Group 2010: 10).

For the DDR commissions to achieve their objectives, better support from the international community is needed. The first step is to identify and address outstanding issues related to national ownership and capacity building, such as training needs and the sharing of budget information. Concurrently, the UN and the commissions should continue to focus on improving the technical elements of DDR.

We can see that one pro-government militia group ultimately emerged in the government's formal military, police and security forces under the name of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). All previous peace agreements and national DDR programmes avoided addressing this matter. The DDR programme in Sudan needs to develop security-sector reform (SSR) processes as a main component. Such an attempt would not be an easy task during the transitional period, since SSR is an extremely sensitive issue for the military.

For future DDR programmes, it would be useful to develop a coordinating body within the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations and the Political Missions in the Central African Republic, Congo, Libya, South Sudan and Yemen, with DDR programmes in Sudan. During the last 30 years, militia groups have spread into sub-Saharan Africa and expanded their operations outside Sudan's territories, crossing borders into neighbouring countries. Merging military movements and militias operating outside Sudan into the national DDR programme might prove difficult. International cooperation and coordination in DDR processes are essential for Sudan's DDR programme, and support from neighbouring countries is crucial for assisting the DDR programme in reintegrating militia combatants outside Sudan.

Furthermore, in Sudan's conflict context, there are several informal military groups, such as tribal groups in Darfur, who are not signatory parties to the peace agreements or security measures. Groups such as these usually fight against other tribal groups, and they utilize varying types of military weapons and equipment. In most cases, they are not structurally organized under a military movement. The DDR programme needs to apply a new approach to incorporate these groups in its reintegration processes and to use more attractive programmes to encourage these groups to surrender their weapons and to join national reintegration processes.

Sudan needs to develop Security-sector reform (SSR) processes as a main component. Such an attempt would not be an easy task during the transitional period.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

DDR is critical in any peacebuilding process, and any difficulties or hindrances at any stage in the national DDR process could harm the peace process. Therefore, disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants should be interventions which are designed carefully and after thorough study and research. A failure to do so could lead to a relapse into conflict or to the outbreak of low-level criminal activity that could eventually undermine the peace process (Knight 2008: 43). Therefore, DDR is a vital process for sustaining peace in Sudan.

For Sudan's DDR management, it is nonetheless important to be realistic about what DDR processes can and cannot achieve.

DDR measures are currently being prioritized in international peace and security arrangements and incorporated into national peace efforts. During the history of armed conflict in Sudan and after the signing of six peace agreements in cooperation with the international community, Sudan has shown progress in understanding overall DDR objectives and its role in building peace in Sudan. For Sudan's DDR management, it is nonetheless important to be realistic about what DDR processes can and cannot achieve. National authorities have learned lessons from previous experiences. DDR processes in Sudan can help contribute to improving a challenging security climate in ways that can sufficiently promote confidence-building among warring factions and between ex-combatants and noncombatants. DDR programmes can also foster the separation of combatants and the breakup of command structures of informal armed groups and militias.

References

- Democratic Republic of the Sudan and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, 'Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan', Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 February 1972, <<https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-addisababa-southsudan72>>, accessed 28 March 2024
- Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, 'The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)', Naivasha, Kenya, 9 January 2005, <<https://unmis.unmissions.org/comprehensive-peace-agreement>>, accessed 28 March 2024
- Government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 'Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)', Abuja, Nigeria, 5 May 2006, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_050505_DarfurPeaceAgreement.pdf>, accessed 28 March 2024
- Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Eastern Front, 'Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement', Asmara, Eritrea, 19 June 2006, <<https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/373/Eastern%20Sudan%20Peace%20Agreement>>, accessed 28 March 2024
- Government of Sudan and participants of All Darfur Stakeholders Conference (not signed), 'Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)', Doha, Qatar, 31 May 2011, <[https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/853/Doha%20Document%20for%20Peace%20in%20Darfur%20\(DDPD\)#:~:text=An%20agreement%20that%20provides%20for,causes%20of%20the%20Darfur%20conflict](https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/853/Doha%20Document%20for%20Peace%20in%20Darfur%20(DDPD)#:~:text=An%20agreement%20that%20provides%20for,causes%20of%20the%20Darfur%20conflict)>, accessed 28 March 2024
- International Organization for Migration (IOM), 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Compendium of Projects 2010–2017', Geneva, 2019
- Knight, W. A. 'Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa: An overview', *African Security*, 1/1 (2008), pp. 24–52, <<https://doi.org/10.1080/19362200802285757>>
- Lamb, G. and Stainer, T., 'The conundrum of DDR coordination: The case of South Sudan', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 7/1 (2018), pp. 1–16, <<https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.628>>
- Mueller, K., 'Disturbing the Peace: SALW in Post-Conflict Sudan and South Sudan', Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, 2525 (2013), <https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2525>, accessed 28 March 2024
- Nichols, R., *DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late?*, HSBA Working Paper 24 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2011), <<https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP-24-DDR-in-Sudan.pdf>>, accessed 28 March 2024
- Shinn, D. H., 'Addis Ababa Agreement: Was it destined to fail and are there lessons for the current Sudan peace process?', *Annales d'Ethiopie*, 20 (2004), pp. 239–59

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'Darfur Development Strategy Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, PHASE I&II (2014–2016)', UNDP Sudan, 2014, <<https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/SDN/DDR%20Darfur.pdf>>, accessed 28 March 2024
- STHLM Policy Group, 'South Sudan DDR Program Review', Stockholm, Sweden, 2010, <<https://deanpiedmont.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/attachment-2-south-sudan-ddr-review.pdf>>, accessed 28 March 2024
- Transitional Government of Sudan and Sudan Revolutionary Front, 'Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan', Juba, South Sudan, 3 October 2020, <<https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/sudan-peace-agreement>>, accessed 28 March 2024

About the author

Sami Abdelhalim Saeed, PhD, has been the Head of the International IDEA Programme for Sudan since 2020. In his previous position at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (2006–2020), he delivered numerous analyses and research on legal issues of post-conflict in transformative communities. Saeed's previous experience includes having practised law before the Constitution Court in Sudan; teaching public law; and supporting civil society organizations in developing training on peacebuilding, preventing and countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa and women's political participation in the post-conflict environment.

About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with 35 Member States founded in 1995, with a mandate to support sustainable democracy worldwide.

WHAT WE DO

We develop policy-friendly research related to elections, parliaments, constitutions, digitalization, climate change, inclusion and political representation, all under the umbrella of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. We assess the performance of democracies around the world through our unique Global State of Democracy Indices and Democracy Tracker.

We provide capacity development and expert advice to democratic actors including governments, parliaments, election officials and civil society. We develop tools and publish databases, books and primers in several languages on topics ranging from voter turnout to gender quotas.

We bring states and non-state actors together for dialogues and lesson sharing. We stand up and speak out to promote and protect democracy worldwide.

WHERE WE WORK

Our headquarters is in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

OUR PUBLICATIONS AND DATABASES

We have a catalogue with more than 1,000 publications and over 25 databases on our website. Most of our publications can be downloaded free of charge.

<<https://www.idea.int>>



International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE-103 34 Stockholm
SWEDEN
+46 8 698 37 00
info@idea.int
www.idea.int

Just as the Government of Sudan signed several peace agreements and did not achieve sustainable peace, it also did not succeed in convincing the armed movements with which it signed peace agreements to engage in civilian life and abstain from armed political operations.

This Report discusses the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) policies and programmes adopted in the peace agreements after Sudan's independence in 1956. Since the Addis Ababa Agreement and up to the Juba Peace Agreement, DDR-related policies have witnessed development at the level of legal provisions and relevant institutions. However, practice and application were very weak and not relevant. Therefore, the failure of DDR initiatives has constantly threatened sustainable peace processes in Sudan. As a result of the repeated failure to build successful national policies on issues related to building a just and sustainable peace in Sudan, war has broken out again in Sudan in a more severe manner.

This Report aims to shed light on these agreements and guide public policymakers at the state and international levels about previous experiences and lessons learned.

ISBN: 978-91-7671-760-8 (PDF)