

ONLINE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION IN BRAZIL: TURNING POINTS AND LIMITATIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In Brazil, Internet and social media have been long used by political parties and candidates to campaign, but it was only in 2017 that organic electoral advertising on social media, social media boosting and paid promotion in web search engines were included in the list of permitted electoral campaign expenditures. This was an encouraging move as it not only made an additional tool available for political actors to reach out to voters, but also obliged them to report on campaign spending using those tools. However, certain gaps remain, which this case study explores, in addition to documenting the lessons learned and providing some proposals for consideration of electoral stakeholders.

In the three elections that have taken place since 2017, social media spending on political advertisements has increased consistently, from 2.6 per cent in the 2018 general elections to 3.47 per cent in the 2020 municipal elections to 6.01 per cent in the 2022 general elections. This increase is accompanied by a decrease in the proportion spent on radio, television (audiovisual production) and sound trucks/cars.

One of the legislative weaknesses highlighted in the case study is the ambiguity with regards to prohibited periods of campaigning and their application to organic campaigning. During the 2022 election, more than 80 per cent of the accounts monitored continued to post organic content during prohibited periods of campaigning, possibly because of lack of clarity on the application of rules to virtual environments. Another challenge observed in Brazil is the massive use of instant messaging applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram for campaigning. Although these tools do not permit paid advertising, they have been found to be a crucial part of electoral campaign

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strategies used by candidates, as well as by other third parties. Another trend observed in Brazil is the presence of social media influencers in elections in general, both as candidates and as supporters of candidates. Brazilian legislation allows digital influencers to campaign for their preferred candidate as long as they are not paid to do so. However, owing to the limited and inconsistent nature of transparency standards between different platforms, it has not always been possible to determine if these rules are complied with by political actors.

Based on the analysis of the online campaign finance ecosystem in Brazil, the case study lays out some considerations for the stakeholders:

- Ensure that all paid online political advertisements are identified by either individual or corporate taxpayer number to trace the sponsor of the ad.
- Create laws and guidelines around the issue of organic digital campaigns, including during prohibited periods of campaigning.
- Enforce campaign finance reporting requirements for all candidates, including those who do not win the election.
- Engage in close collaboration with online platforms to ensure that political advertisements are placed only by individuals and the source and beneficiary of the advertisement are clearly identifiable and transparent.
- Encourage civil society to monitor online campaign spending by political actors as a complement to the monitoring efforts of the oversight body.

INTRODUCTION

In Brazil, campaign finance is an ongoing issue that comes into focus with each electoral cycle. In recent history, there have been various different arrangements put into place to fund the electoral process, and the changes made have often reflected the interests of the political elite at the time. Although, in many respects, the Brazilian electoral system has changed little since the first republic (1889–1930),¹ the way in which electoral finance works has never followed exactly the same rules, and each election has seen adjustments in how candidates and parties can raise and spend money.

In 2017, for the first time, organic electoral advertising on social media,² social media boosting and paid promotion in web search engines were included on the list of permitted expenditures for electoral campaigns. The Internet, however, had long been used as a tool to acquire votes, although without the appropriate regulation. Including digital social media as an option for electoral

¹ Brazil is in its fifth republic, which began in 1985.

² Organic electoral advertising on social media is the publication of content without paid promotion.

campaigning by candidates and parties has been beneficial to the electoral system—both in terms of competition, as political actors now have another legal tool through which to reach potential voters, and in terms of transparency, because candidates are now required to account for this type of campaign spending. Nonetheless, there are still matters that require consideration and evaluation—for example, the possibility of an imbalance in the campaign arising from economic disparities in the competition—as the legislation lacks some features, such as a spending limit.

Considering the above, the goal of this case study is to present information on Brazil's current framework for regulating the nexus between digitalization and campaign finance. It focuses on the use of digital tools for political campaigns, the lessons learned and the outstanding regulatory gaps. The discussion concludes with some proposals for electoral stakeholders to take into consideration.

1. POLITICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Brazil has a majority electoral system for executive positions in the municipal, state and federal spheres, as well as for the Federal Senate. In turn, the country operates an open list proportional model for the legislative positions of city councillor, state deputy, district deputy (for the Federal District, Brasília) and federal deputy in the Chamber of Deputies. This means that parties do not put candidates on the list in a particular order; instead, the election results are defined by the voting, with candidates ranked according to the number of votes received from the electors in descending order.

Democracy in Brazil has developed under this framework since the Constitution of 1988. However, this development has not followed a linear path, and there have been various attempts to implement a different system, including a parliamentary system, district voting, verticalization,³ and the possibility of private (corporate) financing of campaigns, to name a few. Regarding money in politics, two dimensions are worth emphasizing: (a) how money gets into politics; and (b) how money can be used in campaigns. In Brazil, both are regulated by electoral legislation and norms developed by the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE). These regulate who can donate to parties and candidates, which then affects the strategies available to the political actors in raising campaign funds, and how much money can be spent on elections, which determines the strategies that can be used to acquire votes.

Having previously been banned, corporate financing was allowed, by Law 8.713/1993, after the PC Farias scandal, which led to the impeachment of the then president, Fernando Collor, in 1992. The law stipulated clearer rules for private sector action in electoral campaigns, including donation limits by

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³ Verticalization refers to a system where all units of the federation adopt the same electoral coalitions.

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both individual donors and legal entities. Corporate financing was banned again after the Mensalão scandal in 2005 and the Lava-Jato scandal in 2014. From these scandals, the notion emerged in the public mind that corporate finance, in addition to undermining the 'one man, one vote' principle of liberal democracy by introducing inequality in democratic participation, was also a significant source of corruption in the country (Campos and Peixoto 2015). While corporate financing of political parties has remained banned since 2015, donations from citizens (individuals) and self-financing by the candidates have both been maintained. A 2018 political reform created the Special Campaign Financing Fund (Fundo Especial Financiamento de Campanha, FEFC), a major provider of public funds to political parties, distributed based on their parliamentary representation. The parties also have access to the Party Fund, a smaller source of public funding created in 1965 (available to parties on an annual basis, including in election years).

2. DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING IN BRAZIL

In every election in Brazil since the year 2000, the use of the Internet in electoral campaigning has intensified but, undoubtedly, this has seen an exponential growth in recent years, alongside the rise in the general use of social media. The TSE regulates the elections using norms, such as resolutions,⁴ in the absence of decisions by the legislative branch. Table 1 provides a summary of the main legal changes in each electoral cycle. In terms of spending on Internet promotion, this was standardized by the TSE in the absence of a legislative process until 2009 and Law 12.034/2009 (Brazil 2009). The Law prohibited paid promotions on social networks and search engines. However, in 2017, paid promotions for electoral campaigning on Internet sites and social media were introduced into the legal system through Law 13.488/2017 (Brazil 2017). Since then, three elections have taken place (2018, 2020 and 2023) wherein political actors have been permitted to mobilize digital media for electoral campaigns.

Table 1. Regulated aspects regarding the use of the Internet in election campaigns

Electoral cycle Regulations

2008	(a) The duration of Internet campaigning allowed around the electoral period; (b) electoral campaigning on websites and blogs; (c) domain specification for webpages; and (d) early advertising on the Internet before the electoral period.
2010	(a) The accountability of candidates and Internet service providers; (b) publication replication; (c) use of sites, blogs, microblogs and social networks; and (d) prohibition of paid promotions on the Internet, except for printed media outlets, which could display up to 10 electoral advertisements.
2018	Paid promotions for electoral campaigns on social networks and search engines.
2022	Accelerating the process of removing fake news from circulation.

Source: Compiled by authors from legal documents.

⁴ Namely, TSE Resolutions 21.610/2004, 22.261/2006, 22.718/2008, 23.191/2010, 23.370/2012, 23.404/2014, 23.406/2014, 23.432/2014, 23.607/2019 and 23.714/2022. TSE resolutions, <<https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res>>.

Brazilian legislation does not set any specific spending limits for online campaigns, aside from the general campaign spending limits (these vary according to the elected office being contested; for a complete table by position in each federation unit, see TSE 2022). In general, there are no limits on the types of expenditure, except for meals for staff providing services to candidates, and automobile rentals, which are limited to 10 and 20 per cent of total campaign expenditure, respectively. Table 2 shows the allowed funding sources, and Table 3 the permitted and prohibited types of expenditure.

Table 2. Allowable sources of funding in Brazil's 2022 elections

Type	Sources
Public	Special Campaign Financing Fund
	Party Fund
	Donations from other parties and candidates
Private	Self-funding by candidates
	Donations from natural persons (direct to candidate or crowdfunding)
	Sales of goods and services (caps, shirts, mugs, event promotion, etc.—subject to restrictions in Table 3)

Source: Compiled by the authors from legal sources.

Table 3. Permitted and prohibited types of expenditure in Brazil's 2022 elections

Permitted	Production of printed materials; advertising and publicity; rental of venues for campaign events; transportation expenses; establishment and operation of campaign committees; correspondence and postage expenses; provision of services; rallies; assembly and operation of sound trucks; production of radio, television, or video clips and programmes; production of jingles, and slogans; polling; Internet site and boosting expenses; fines imposed on parties and candidates up to the election; contributions to other candidates and parties.
Not allowed	Producing or sponsoring shows (entertainment performances) and similar events to promote the candidate; paying fees to performers and entertainers at campaign-related events; manufacturing, purchasing and distributing T-shirts, key chains, food baskets and other campaign gifts (as opposed to for-sale merchandise); paid political advertising on television or radio (paid for time of circulation).

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Parties and candidates must notify the electoral management body, using an electronic reporting system, of the amount spent, provide a description of the expenses, information on the service provider and a copy of the invoice (receipt). Data on electoral spending is drawn from these submitted accounts.

2022 elections

Brazil held elections in 2022, when more than 156 million voters were eligible to vote for the positions of president and vice president, in addition to the positions for governor, vice governor, senator, federal deputy, state deputy, and district deputy, contested by over 28,000 candidates. Approximately 20 per cent of the eligible voters abstained from voting. There were 11 candidates in the presidential race, with 2 ending up in a run-off—Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and Jair Bolsonaro of the Partido Liberal (PL). The former secured a narrow majority of votes and was elected president, making him the first Brazilian president to serve a third term. In addition to the presidential race, 32 parties put forward candidates for other positions. The high number of parties resulted in a Chamber of Deputies consisting of 23 elected parties; that is, elected representatives from across 23 parties occupied the 513 legislative seats as federal deputies.

Of the total funds for electoral campaigns in 2022, around 81 per cent were from public sources (FEFC 73.9 per cent and Party Fund 7.5 per cent). Donations from individuals (citizens) accounted for 12.43 per cent, with 0.32 per cent from crowdfunding. Self-financing accounted for 2.94 per cent, and donations between candidates accounted for 2.96 per cent.

In 2022, the spending limit for the office of president was approximately EUR 16 million for candidates in the first round, plus EUR 8 million for candidates reaching the second round.

Two rules were in force in the 2022 elections regarding prohibited periods for campaigning: (a) two days before the election until election day (30 September to 2 October),⁵ with the prohibition of paid promotions, including on the Internet; and (b) one day before the election until election day (1 to 2 October), with the prohibition of printed materials. The prohibited period for electoral campaigning is ambiguous, since it is not clear whether organic (not paid) advertisements are still permitted, including on social media platforms.

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⁵ Date ranges in this paragraph refer to the first round of the 2022 elections.

los Derechos Civiles (ADC), 171 of the 375 accounts monitored did not comply with the period for paid electoral advertisement in the first round (ADC and FGV-ECMI 2023). Regarding organic advertisement, 306 of the 375 accounts did not comply with the prohibited period in the first round, possibly because the rules were not clear regarding its application to virtual environments. This regulatory gap regarding the permitted period of advertisements social media could potentially give competitive advantage to those parties who do not comply. In addition to clarifying the permitted period of advertising on social media, including paid and organic, it is equally important to carry out effective monitoring, which could be facilitated by the implementation of ID and user information for candidates.

Although the electoral reporting system has a considerable degree of transparency, it is important to note that around 20 per cent of the first-round candidates did not declare their expenses. But because they were unsuccessful, exemptions in Brazil's current system for non-elected candidates relieve them of retrospective reporting obligations.

The main change brought by the TSE's Resolution 23.714/2022, implemented in the middle of the electoral process (20 October 2022), sought to reduce the potential impact of fake news on election results by expediting the process of removing it from circulation. Previously, a lawsuit had to be filed for each link suspected of containing fake news, even if different links had the same content. The resolution enabled legal decisions to be used to target any existing or future link containing the same content.

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Trends in political actors' spending on social media

Based on available TSE data for the 2018 and 2022 general elections and the 2020 municipal elections, the total campaign spending amounted to EUR 730 million, EUR 1 billion and around EUR 695 million, respectively. As shown in Table 4, an increasing amount was spent on social media advertisement with each election: EUR 19 million in 2018 (2.6 per cent of declared spending); EUR 24 million in 2020 (3.47 per cent); and EUR 69 million (6.0 per cent) in 2022.

Table 4. Distribution of candidates' electoral expenditure in 2018 (general), 2020 (municipal) and 2022 (general) elections

Election	Total campaign spending (EUR)	Paid social media advertising (EUR)	Paid social media (%)	Events (%)	Radio, TV, campaign advertising sound truck/ car (%)	Printed advertisement (%)	Jingles (%)
2018	730,847,611	19,017,085	2.6	10.69	11.35	25.96	0.76
2020	695,957,645	24,130,247	3.47	9.84	9.37	29.30	2.01
2022	1,159,851,910	69,701,492	6.01	13.33	7.86	26.74	0.76

Source: Authors, based on TSE, Portal de Dados Abertos do TSE [TSE Open Data Portal], [n.d.], <<https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/?groups=prestacao-de-contas-eleitorais>>, accessed 11 September 2023. Note: Monetary values were deflated by the January 2023 National Broad Consumer Price Index (see Meireles 2018).

Spending on social media has grown with each election at the same time as the proportion spent on radio, television (audiovisual production) and sound trucks/cars has fallen, with the former almost catching up with the latter in 2022. The biggest expense in the three elections is printed advertising (stickers, newspapers, magazines and various printed matter). Events (rallies, street mobilization, candidacy events and others) account for a significant part of candidates' expenses but dipped in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the electoral management body introduced some restrictions on in-person events. In total, direct campaign advertising spending amounts to more than 50 per cent of campaign spending in Brazil.

It is important to note that social networks also include instant messaging apps, such as WhatsApp and Telegram.

Table 5 shows the online paid promotion expenditure broken down by digital platform over the three elections analysed. Taking the three elections into account, the platforms Meta (Facebook and Instagram), Google (Google and YouTube), TikTok and Kwai were used for paid promotions.⁶ Meta was the largest platform for political campaigning, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the expenditure on paid promotions in the 2018 and 2020 elections, dropping to 60 per cent in 2022. In 2022, Google reached 33 per cent of the expenditure on paid promotions, while TikTok and Kwai gained some presence, but did not reach 1 per cent.

Table 5. Online campaign expenditure by platform, 2018, 2020 and 2022 (%)

Elections	Meta	Google	TikTok	Kwai	Other
2018	81.31	8.10	0	0	10.59
2020	86.29	6.80	0	0	6.91
2022	60.76	33.3	0.01	0.60	5.33

Source: Authors, based on TSE, Portal de Dados Abertos do TSE [TSE Open Data Portal], [n.d.], <<https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/?groups=prestacao-de-contas-eleitorais>>, accessed 11 September 2023.

It is important to note that social networks also include instant messaging apps, such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Although these tools do not permit paid advertising, they are part of electoral campaign strategies. As demonstrated by Piaia and Alves (2020), the flow of messages in WhatsApp groups supporting Jair Bolsonaro is by no means spontaneous. Rather, they

⁶ In Brazil, there is no restriction on specific platforms; candidates may have used other platforms, but boosting expenses were only declared for the listed platforms.

reflect the presence of ‘super participants’—individuals accounting for a high percentage of posts and interactions, executing a coordinated strategy. A report published in the newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* shows evidence of millions spent by entrepreneurs in mass messaging services (Campos Mello 2018). If confirmed, this amounts to an illegal strategy since, as mentioned, current regulation prohibits companies from donating to political campaigns.

Role of influencers and digital marketing firms

A frequent strategy in Brazil is the recruitment of influencers (performing artists, television presenters, radio commentators) not only to endorse candidates but also for them to stand as candidates. Called ‘vote pullers’, they have the capacity not only to get themselves elected but also to help other candidates in the same party get elected too. In Brazil, all votes for a candidate count towards the total for their party. Thus, a popular candidate can obtain enough votes to get her- or himself elected as well as others from the party/coalition/federation. For example, suppose that a party needs 1,000 votes to enable one delegate to be elected. If the party has five candidates, and one individual candidate receives 5,000 votes, then all five candidates can be elected.⁷ In this case, four candidates were elected by ‘vote pullers’ (Carlomagno 2016). To remedy the situation, Brazilian legislators adopted a barrier clause to reduce this vote-pulling phenomenon.

Influencers continue to exercise influence over audience behaviours (in this case, voting behaviour), through their accessible, emotive and/or humorous public image. For instance, a survey carried out in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico in 2022 identified that young people aged 16 to 24 are informed about politics through supposedly non-politicized channels and profiles, as they get distanced from traditional politics and its partisan intermediaries (Luminate 2022).

While presenters on traditional broadcast media (such as television or radio) are not allowed to promote electoral candidates, the legislation (Law 13.488/2017; see Brazil 2017) allows digital influencers to campaign for their favourite candidate, as long as they are not paid to do so. Paid electoral campaigns on the Internet are exclusive to the candidates and parties/coalitions/federations involved in the election. Additionally, the TSE Resolution 23.671/2021 prohibits the hiring of individuals or legal entities that circulate paid advertising of a political-electoral nature in the profiles, pages, channels—or more broadly in digital environments—of the political candidates in electoral competitions.

Although there is no evidence of influencers being hired to do electoral campaigning, the 2018 and 2022 elections saw influencers having a massive presence in the campaign generally. For instance, the 2018 election was

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⁷ According to the rules that came into force for the first time in 2018 and are being gradually phased in until the point of full implementation in 2030, parties are required to obtain at least 3 per cent of the valid votes in the previous election, and these must be spread across a minimum of one-third of the federation states, and have at least 2 per cent of the valid votes in each of these states. Only if they reach this threshold are they eligible to receive resources from the Party Fund and the benefit of free access to television and radio broadcasting.

marked by the presence of digital influencers—including some who were elected, such as Joice Hasselmann and Alexandre Frota (Partido Social Liberal São Paulo (PSL-SP)), both new to representative party politics, who emerged amid the demonstrations in June 2013 and the impeachment process of President Dilma Rousseff with an anti-establishment position. This became even clearer in 2022, when parties sought to recruit digital influencers for candidacies and campaigns, such as the candidates for Federal Deputy, Nikolas Ferreira (PL-Partido Liberal Minas Gerais) and André Janones (Avante-Partido Liberal Minas Gerais), both of whom were architects of digital campaigns for Bolsonaro and Lula respectively and were at some point subjected to platform sanctions after flouting the rules for Instagram and Tiktok.

The electoral legislation also establishes transparency requirements—for instance, each electoral advertisement must be identified with the candidates' corporate taxpayer number (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoa Jurídica, CNPJ) and information on the party/coalition/federation. However, the transparency tools for platforms such as Meta and Google do not follow a common standard, which makes it difficult for the electoral management body, citizens, stakeholders, research institutions and civil society to monitor the information.

In addition to this lack of standardization, the monitoring of the 2022 elections carried out by FGV-ECMI and ADC, within the PubliElectoral project, found that the official reports provided to the TSE do not allow the identification of which pages and accounts were boosted; it was only possible to identify which service happened on which platform (ADC and FGV-ECMI 2023). In this context, any legislation improving transparency is welcome, particularly in an electoral system with large amounts of public money in circulation.

Considering that most of the resources spent on campaigns are public, any regulation that makes electoral expenses more transparent is also a step forward in the accountable use of public funds.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Electoral transparency is key for the proper functioning of democracy, especially where systems are unequal. Since 2016, Brazilian electoral campaigns cannot receive funds from legal persons. However, the system is still deeply unequal, due not only to the distribution system of the FEFC but also to the Party Fund: both funds benefit parties with a higher number of representatives from the previous election, which favours those that are already established.

Electoral campaign finance in Brazil enjoys a certain level of transparency overall. However, there is a need to improve the specific regulations for campaigns in digital environments. These improvements could provide more transparency, increasing the legitimacy of the Brazilian democratic process. Considering that most of the resources spent on campaigns are public (from the FEFC and Party Fund), any regulation that makes electoral expenses more transparent is also a step forward in the accountable use of public funds.

The allowing of paid promotions in digital electoral campaigns in Brazil was important for candidates and parties, to enable them to have another tool as they seek votes. However, it was also important for the system's transparency, increasing the level of traceability compared with alternatives that tend to remain under the radar, such as artificial boosting, when bot strategies are used to create a higher volume of interaction and to 'force' the platform algorithm to deliver content to more users.

There are currently at least 42 bills pending with the legislative branch, including Bill No. 2630/2020, known as the 'fake news bill', and Bill No. 9.532/2018, which is also related to norms on potential fake news. The former has advanced further and almost went into a vote in the middle of May 2023, but was removed from the agenda due to negative reactions in several sectors of society. These bills have a direct impact on the electoral process, in terms of both regulating the behaviour of big tech and providing more transparency—for example, the ability to identify who has contracted a specific social media boosting campaign by corporate taxpayer number (CNPJ) or individual taxpayer number (Cadastro de Pessoa Física, CPF).

Bills such as Bill No. 2630/2020 have mobilized some sections of civil society, the private sector and specialists, who have pressured public authorities to ensure that digital environments are democratic spaces. In this way, disputes around the guidelines stated in the legislation gain visibility in the public debate, such as the fight against disinformation and hate speech, the defence of freedom of expression, and policies for the remuneration of journalistic content, as well as transparency in the policies that govern the use of social media networks.

Considerations for the future

In light of the above, electoral stakeholders in Brazil are encouraged to consider the following:

1. Ensure there is traceable identification of paid online promotion—by individual (CPF) or corporate (CNPJ) taxpayer number. It is important to note that more transparency is needed in terms of platforms being able to identify who spent money on social media and online advertisements in elections, through traceable CPF and CNPJ taxpayer numbers.
2. Level the playing field (in terms of prohibited time periods) between organic digital campaigns and traditional, offline campaigns. It is important to create laws that clarify the limits and possibilities for organic digital campaigns, as well as paid promotions. If candidates must comply with a prohibited period for campaigning in the physical world, so that those with more resources are not favoured in the days immediately before the election, the same system must apply to the virtual world, so that those with more funds and/or engagement on each platform are not favoured to the detriment of others.

It is important to create laws that clarify the limits and possibilities for organic digital campaigns, as well as paid promotions.

The TSE efforts can be complemented with participation of civil society in active monitoring of online spending by political actors.

3. Enforce accountability for campaign finance, regardless of whether the candidate wins or loses the electoral contest. Losing candidates are not fully accountable for their electoral finance, hence it should be political parties' prerogative to require candidates to submit their accounts. Since every winning seat in the legislature belongs to the party, they must face sanctions if their candidates are not adequately accountable.
4. Work with digital platforms to block coordinated mass-messaging by 'individual' accounts. As corporate spending is prohibited in the Brazilian electoral system, when it does take place, it is happening under the radar. Therefore, one of the ways to deal with the problem of corporate spending on political advertising is to work in partnership with the digital platforms, to reduce the number of messages that each 'individual' can send during an election period and also to identify the source and destination of massive electoral publicity, so as to block it and implement sanctions, if necessary.
5. Encourage civil society involvement in the monitoring efforts of the electoral management body, the TSE. While the TSE has in-house data processing capacity to monitor spending online, its efforts can be complemented with participation of civil society in active monitoring of online spending by political actors.

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ABOUT THE SERIES

This case study on Brazil was drafted between July and October 2023 and is part of International IDEA's Political Finance in the Digital Age project, which collects empirical information about the ways in which countries adapt to and cope with political finance challenges associated with digitalization. Through the project, members of political finance oversight agencies and civil society organizations, political party officials and legislators can learn about good practices and lessons learned from various countries that can help them devise and implement political reforms to protect the integrity of political processes and institutions against existing and emerging digital risks.

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
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