Democracy and Peacebuilding
A Resource Guide
This Resource Guide is part of a series designed for readers, including students and practitioners, interested in exploring further some of the themes and issues raised in the first edition of *The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience* (International IDEA 2017). The contents of the series reflect the topics of each chapter in the larger report, presenting current and past debates and key concepts related to each topic. This Guide complements Chapter 8, ‘Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states: designing for democracy’s resilience’ (Bisarya et al. 2017).

The Guide provides information and lists resources on sustaining peace in conflict-affected countries and the evolution of ideas regarding democracy as a tool for peacebuilding. First, the Guide summarizes the findings of research on the scale and types of modern armed conflict. Second, it describes the general arc of change in ideas about peacebuilding within the United Nations system. It tracks the shift away from short-term peacekeeping and ‘liberal peace transitions’ towards long-term peacebuilding, and the more recent ‘turn to the local’, in part driven by critical peacebuilding theory as well as increasing evidence of the effectiveness of local drivers of peacebuilding. In addition, it highlights practice-oriented research related to democracy promotion and peacebuilding.

*The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience* aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. The first edition, published in 2017, explores the conditions under which democracy can be resilient and how to strengthen its capacity as a system to overcome challenges and threats.

The full report can be accessed online: [http://www.idea.int/gsod](http://www.idea.int/gsod).

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1. Introduction
To complement the in-depth analysis of inclusivity in constitution-building, electoral design and rebel-to-political-party transformation in Chapter 8, ‘Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states: Designing for democracy’s resilience’ of The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience (International IDEA 2017), this Guide provides further insights on key global trends in modern armed conflict and explains changing ideas about sustaining peace in conflict-affected countries. Armed conflict trends and peacebuilding ideas are interrelated. Over time, changing trends in global armed conflict and the challenges linked to responding to them have shaped the evolution of ideas around the relationship between democracy and international peacebuilding.

The broad range of lessons learned by the international actors involved in global peacebuilding efforts mean that the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognize that peace, inclusive democratic institutions and development are mutually reinforcing. SDG 16, for example, states that, ‘peace, justice and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions are at the core of sustainable development’ (United Nations Knowledge Platform 2017). In this agenda, inclusive democracy stands out as the key concept that links all three processes necessary for sustaining peace and fostering resilient democracy in post-conflict settings.

Overcoming symptoms of state fragility requires democratization because there are few feasible alternatives for legitimizing the state in the wake of war. Inclusive governance, which is clearly described in SDG 16 and in Chapter 8 of the publication, is a necessary precondition for sustaining peace in conflict-affected countries.

2. Data: quantitative approaches to armed conflict and durable peace
The world experienced a decrease in the number of armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War. However, 2006 marked a reversal in the long-running trend towards peace. During the period 1989–2006, the number of democratic states in the world increased and the number of autocracies decreased, while the number of countries in transition with partial or incomplete democracy stayed the same (Marshall and Jaggers 2012). Armed conflict also evolved at this time. Interstate conflict almost died out while civil wars decreased in number but became more internationalized, leading to higher levels of factionalism and fragmentation. Modern armed conflicts now display high levels of fragmentation among armed groups, such as in the cases of Syria, Libya and Mali, as well as extremely protracted criminal violence, such as in the cases of Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Venezuela.

Peace and conflict scholars use multiple typologies of armed conflict to help identify global trends and track change over time. For example, interstate wars have clearly declined over the past 30 years, leaving intra-state warfare as the most prominent type. The majority of armed conflicts today occur within states rather than between them.

In the post-Cold War era, the number of intra-state armed conflicts declined along with the number of battle-related deaths—war became both less common and less deadly. Now, this trend may be reversing. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), in 2015 the number of armed conflict-related deaths rose to its highest level since the end of the Cold War (Dupuy et al. 2016). This is due to the severe escalation of violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Severe escalation in a few cases, however, risks overshadowing positive trends towards peace in other conflict-affected countries and regions. For example, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reports that
'seven of the ten most violent state-based conflicts in 2014 became less violent [in 2015]' (Melander, Pettersson and Themnér 2016: 541).

Closer analysis of global trends identifies different types of intra-state conflict. The UCDP, for example, distinguishes between state-based and non-state based armed conflict. It defines a 'state-based' armed conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year'. In contrast, a 'non-state' armed conflict is defined as 'the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths' (UCDP 2017).

Most of the 97,000 fatalities in 2015 occurred between state militaries and rebel groups, or 'state-based' armed conflicts, such as those in Syria and Ukraine (Melander, Pettersson and Themnér 2016). Non-state armed conflict, in contrast, occurs between groups divided along identity lines rather than between a state and rebel groups, such as inter-tribal clashes in Pakistan, fighting in India between Hindu and Muslim communities, and clashes between Muslim and Christian groups in Nigeria. This conflict type presents a slower-burning but equally persistent global threat. The total number of non-state conflicts increased, 'from 61 in 2014 to 70 in 2015, the highest number recorded in the 1989–2015 period’ (Melander, Pettersson and Themnér 2016: 727). Non-state armed conflict is a global problem. Libya and Yemen are driving the increase in its prevalence in the Middle East (see Figure 2). Historically, however, non-state armed conflict was concentrated in Africa. Between 1989 and 2008, 74 per cent of fatalities were linked to non-state conflicts in Africa (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012: 357).
Beyond typologies of armed conflict, recent research identifies unique qualities of contemporary conflicts that have implications for peacebuilding. For example, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2017) and Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015) indicate that even though there have been fewer active armed conflicts in the past decade, more conflicts became ‘internationalized’ during this period. This means that states that are not directly experiencing warfare are increasingly supporting armed groups engaged in conflict. Increasing internationalization of intra-state wars accompanies increasing factionalism within rebel groups (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). These are important trends. Even if there are fewer armed conflicts, those that remain may be increasingly difficult to resolve. The involvement of more international and local actors in a conflict makes reaching an inclusive, negotiated settlement more complex and thus less likely.

Another important type of armed conflict that research has focused on is ‘political violence onset’, or the outbreak of deadly violence directly related to a process of regime change. This research paints a complex picture. Political violence is less likely in stable autocracies and consolidated democracies, and more likely in states experiencing a transition between autocracy and democracy, or ‘intermediate regimes’. To illustrate, Hegre states that ‘intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change’ (Hegre 2001: 33). This finding has important implications for countries such as Myanmar, which may be at risk of becoming ‘stuck’ in an incomplete democratic system during a transition process. The transition to democracy in Myanmar is creating conditions conducive to scapegoating, hate speech, repression and even direct violence against minority groups—especially the Rohingya Muslim population (Farrelly 2017). The dynamics of democratic transition in Myanmar have

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**FIGURE 2**

Mapping conflicts by region, 1989–2015

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Conflict Encyclopedia (UCDP Database), <http://ucdp.uu.se/>, accessed 24 July 2017

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even caused political resistance to international intervention, and the direct expulsion of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) entities working to build peace in Rohingya communities (Zarni and Cowley 2014).

There is a rich scholarly debate about the nature of the relationship between democratization and the risk of war. Carothers (2002, 2006, 2011), for example, highlights the risk of authoritarian backlash and increasing conflict related to democratization and democracy promotion in the wake of war. Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2007), among others, present a contrasting case that there is no significant relationship between democratization and conflict. When conflict occurs in transitions, they argue, it is due to state fragility or the weakness of the political institutions necessary to support democracy and prevent dangerous identity-based politics (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 2).

Taking this debate forward, Jarstad and Sisk argue that war-to-democracy transitions can have various outcomes because they remain fraught with political dilemmas. Such dilemmas may be divided into: (a) horizontal dilemmas, in which policymakers must choose between the inclusion and exclusion of transitory groups; (b) vertical dilemmas, in which political leaders must balance the legitimacy and efficacy of governance; (c) systemic dilemmas, involving trade-offs between local and international ownership of the processes of peacebuilding, state-building and democratization; and (d) temporal dilemmas, in which policymakers must balance the long- and short-term effects of policies and priorities (Jarstad and Sisk 2008).

In some cases, peacebuilding can even create empowerment dilemmas. In Nepal, for example, high levels of international engagement with the most marginalized social groups during the post-conflict constitution-building process had the intended effect of empowering and mobilizing social groups long excluded from political participation. However, it also had the unintended consequences of increasing identity-based political mobilization, deepening inter-ethnic group hostility and increasing gridlock in the new government, which prevented the development of political institutions (Bogati, Cox, Karki and Sisk 2017). In another type of dilemma, Zürcher et al. argue that peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions often fail to extend democracy and peace because, ‘adopting democracy can be too costly a proposition for domestic elites, and the policies and resources of peacebuilders are rarely able to offset this cost’ (Zürcher et al. 2013: 10).

The debate on political violence during processes of institutional change has inspired another set of research focused on understanding the conditions under which political violence does or does not break out within a war-to-democracy transition. There are a number of major research programmes on democratization in post-war settings. The work of Bermeo (2003), Roeder and Rothchild (2005) and Fortna and Huang (2012), among others, forms the basis for current debates. Among the major research puzzles are ‘conflict recurrence’ following negotiated settlements and the concept of the ‘durability of peace’. For example, the most recent PRIO data analysis presents a very clear finding that war begets war (Gates, Nygård and Trappéniers 2016). Statistically, 60 per cent of armed conflicts reoccur, and post-conflict peace, on average, lasts only seven years. More specifically, Gates, Nygård and Trappeniers find that, ‘of the 259 armed conflicts identified by the UCDP, 159 recurred and 100 involved a new group or incompatibility. 135 different countries have experienced conflict recurrence, and the pattern is deepening’ (2016: 2). In sum, most of the conflicts in the world today are the result of unresolved grievances and deep crises related to prior armed conflicts, which makes new conflict onset less common than recurrent armed conflict.
The persistence of conflict recurrence leads to a critical question: What conditions prevent conflict recurrence or help to extend the duration of peace? This research puzzle identifies a broad set of conditions. First, research suggests that armed conflict creates deep social grievances and long-lasting inter-group fears. Addressing these systematically can resolve security dilemmas and build durable peace (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Booth and Wheeler 2007; Cox and Sisk 2017).

Second, strong formal institutional arrangements within peace processes are essential for durable peace. For example, Fortna argues that ‘mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can . . . impose physical constraints . . . alter incentives . . . reduce uncertainty . . . help prevent and manage unintended violations . . . and provide a credible signal to alleviate fears about enemy intentions’ (Fortna 2004: 3–4).

Third, larger and more inclusive governing coalitions and UN peacekeeping missions, together, help make peace more durable during war-to-democracy transitions. Mason and Joshi, among others, find that UN peacekeeping helps to protect fragile democratic political processes (Joshi and Mason 2011; Joshi 2013). Even though UN peacekeepers have been put under the spotlight for major historical failures such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, and more recent abuses such as the cases of sexual abuse in Haiti and the Central African Republic, there is significant empirical evidence that rejection of, and resistance to, peacekeeping is rare. It works in most cases, helping to reduce violence during wars, protect civilians and make peace agreements last longer (Fortna 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014). Accounting for selection effects (i.e. the fact that the UN usually chooses to intervene only in the most complex and difficult armed conflicts), Fortna argues that the presence of UN peacekeepers reduces the likelihood of conflict recurrence by 80 per cent (Fortna 2008). Caplan and Hoefler’s
recent quantitative analysis of post-conflict stabilization also confirms that, ‘where UN peacekeeping operations are deployed in support of negotiated settlements they do seem to contribute to peace stabilization’ (Caplan and Hoeffler 2017: 1). Overall, the evidence suggests that peacekeeping works well in most cases.

3. International organizations: the evolution of ideas about democracy in the wake of war

Peacekeeping works in many settings, but the UN’s work does not end with the blue helmets. Over time, the UN has built on earlier ideas and lessons learned from various peace processes around the world. Peacekeeping is now moving towards deeper engagement in building and repairing political systems from the ground up. It is also moving towards working to ensure that inclusive political processes not only shape constitutional design and electoral systems (as described in Chapter 8 of The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience), but also shape the allocation of donor resources. This has not always been the case.

Citing UN reports, this section describes the general arc of change within the UN system away from peacekeeping and towards peacebuilding, followed by the more recent ‘turn to the local’ and the prioritization of ‘national ownership’. The evolution of ideas among international organizations, over time, amounts to a huge experiment. There are multiple cases of intervention with highly variable outcomes, which creates a rich dataset to mine for patterns of success and problems leading to failure.

RESOURCES

Key International IDEA publications on conflict and peacebuilding


Four generations of UN intervention

First generation: light footprints and quick fixes

The first generation of peace operations began in the late 1980s with the thawing of Cold War tensions and early successes with ‘light footprint’ interventions with quick exit strategies, usually after the first democratic election. For example, in 1986 the UN helped guide Namibia through a successful, largely non-violent transition to independence from South Africa. This case involved three processes: (a) rapid elections; (b) economic privatization; and (c) support for basic state institutions, involving security sector reform, political reform, electoral system reform and land reform. The UN then used the Namibia experience as a blueprint for peace operations in Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. These efforts also worked well, leading to increased optimism about intervention (Doss 2011). These early cases of successful intervention formed the empirical basis for the emergence of the so-called liberal peacebuilding model, comprising quick elections, economic liberalization and the establishment of basic democratic state institutions as the support structures for post-war transitions (Selby 2013).

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding ideas shifted in line with the changing dynamics of war. Major atrocities in a number of cases eroded the early optimism over UN intervention. During the Cold War, the USA and the Soviet Union propped up autocratic regimes around the world in fighting proxy wars. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, international tensions eased but domestic tensions increased. This global shift led to the emergence of ‘new wars’ and a major shift away from interstate to intra-state warfare (Kaldor 2011). Mass refugee flows associated with internal conflicts, such as the mass genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, created major incentives for international action. Intervention and the management of new wars became an international priority, while the increasing complexity of conflicts made ‘quick fixes’ increasingly less plausible.

Second generation: from keeping peace to settling politics

The second generation of peace operations began around 1991, largely in response to the failures of the liberal peacebuilding model. In Angola, for example, the UN used the same model as in El Salvador and Namibia but the electoral process failed to sustain peace. By unintentionally helping rebel movements mobilize further support, the electoral process ultimately led to full-scale civil war. Critics blamed the UN for rushing to elections as a quick exit strategy, rather than maintaining a full commitment to long-term peacebuilding. Beyond Angola, a series of additional failures in the early 1990s increased scepticism about UN peace operations. The UN and the USA failed to stem the violence in Somalia in 1991, UN peacekeepers failed to act in response to clear early warnings of genocide in Rwanda, and Dutch UN peacekeepers lacking a mandate to engage combatants stood by as the Srebrenica Massacre unfolded during the Bosnian Civil War of 1992–95.

The primary UN report from this era is the Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, written by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992. The document represents a key historical moment in the evolution of ideas about peacebuilding. The Agenda for Peace set up a comprehensive view of peacebuilding that went well beyond the liberal peace model. Paragraph 85 of the report, for example, states that: ‘Reform is a continuing process, and improvement can have no limit. We must be guided not by precedents alone, however wise these may be, but by the needs of the future and by the shape and content that we wish to give it’ (UN 1992). As Doss describes, one of the most important shifts during this era was the expansion of the role...
of peacekeepers to the protection of civilians during active conflicts, rather than only monitoring and enforcing peace agreements after the cessation of hostilities (Doss 2011).

The lessons learned from these cases led the UN to reassess the problems of ‘overreach’ and ‘sequencing’ within peacekeeping operations. The primary lesson was that the UN did not have sufficient capacity to engage in military action to thwart well-organized armed groups. This triggered new forms of ‘hybrid’ forces (e.g. made up of UN and African Union troops) as well as early thinking about the need to tailor interventions to context-specific realities and local contexts (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009).

The initial liberal peacebuilding model led to variations in outcomes, and there was evidence that short-term intervention did not necessarily create conditions conducive to long-term stability and progress towards democracy. These problems led to a turn from ‘helmets to suits’ or so-called field-based special political missions (Kugel 2011). In the late 1990s, the UN established new multilateral political missions in some of the most complex cases of protracted conflict, such as Israel–Palestine (1999), Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003). In these cases, the UN deployed teams of civil technical specialists to conflict settings with medium- to long-term mandates (Kugel 2011). As Gowan describes, ‘while peacekeeping missions rely on troops and police, political missions tend to rely on mediation, good offices, persuasion, and expertise on issues such as constitution making’ (Gowan 2011: 2). This form of intervention has expanded over time to include Lebanon (2007), Libya (2011 to date) and, most recently, Colombia (2016).

**Third generation: addressing deep drivers of conflict—peacebuilding**

The deployment of special political missions to Afghanistan and Iraq, both complex and protracted conflicts, led to another wave of institutional evolution across a third generation of peace operations from 2000 to 2008. These missions encountered challenges related to deep social grievances and fragile state institutions that created conditions for ‘no war, no peace’ (Mac Ginty 2016). Thus, a broad range of new mechanisms for peacebuilding evolved in the 2000s. First, the UN placed increased attention on preventive action and humanitarian action, and expanded its multi-party peacebuilding. Second, new international norms emerged. The most significant new norms were the International Criminal Court (ICC), based on the Rome Statute of 2002 for the prosecution of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, as well as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which served as a basis for coordinated intervention in sovereign states to prevent potential situations of mass, identity-based violence.

Third, the UN shifted its approach to ‘state-building’, fusing political imperatives with peacebuilding imperatives. Initially, the concept of state-building referred to financial

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**RESOURCES**

**Relevant United Nations publications**


assistance for building institutions in fragile, conflict-affected states (Chetail 2009). In 2005, however, the UN formed a new institution within the larger UN peacebuilding architecture: the Peacebuilding Commission. This additional institution was designed to manage coordination problems within complex state-building efforts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and to help manage interagency coordination failures within the UN, which were identified in the ‘Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’ (Brahimi Report, United Nations General Assembly 2000). The Peacebuilding Commission had four initial objectives: (a) to identify countries at risk of state failure; (b) to provide proactive assistance to governments at risk of collapse; (c) to plan transitions from conflict to post-conflict peacebuilding; and (d) to marshal international resources to sustain long-term intervention (Chesterman 2005: 155).

In sum, in response to significant evidence that conflict recurrence was a primary problem, the UN sought to increase its preventive capacity and expanded the number of tools it could use to build states and re-intervene in the event of conflict recurrence. The primary shifts were towards ‘long-termism’, based on the realization that the UN could not change conflict-affected societies quickly, and ‘regionalism’, based on the realization that the UN could not mobilize enough resources alone, and on the need for greater local legitimacy. Regional institutions started to play larger roles in peacebuilding efforts, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS). The most recent review of the UN peacebuilding architecture carries forward these key themes of partnership and intergovernmental cooperation, with renewed attention on broadening inclusion as the basis for the national ownership of peace processes (United Nations General Assembly 2015).

Fourth generation: the local turn
The UN is currently experiencing a fourth shift: away from the international administration of peace processes with international organizations assuming authority over the state, and towards ‘local ownership’ and ‘bottom-up governance’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Unsworth 2009). Mac Ginty and Richmond’s concept of ‘everyday peace’, which is similar to ideas of local ownership and bottom-up governance, highlights how indicators developed by external UN actors on how to measure peace may not be as informative as the factors identified by conflict-affected communities (2013). For example, among the ‘everyday indicators’ are daily security, freedom of movement, social interdependence and cohesion, and even peaceful social norms (Firchow and Mac Ginty 2017). These are all factors that are often overlooked when there is too much ‘top-down’ focus on state institutions or electoral system incentives. Furthermore, even in the absence of strong state institutions, some communities become highly capable of maintaining peace and protecting civilians during wartime. Kaplan’s research on local institutions and civilian protection in Colombia, for example, shows how civil society groups can play powerful roles in reducing violence during armed conflict (Kaplan 2013).

The need for local ownership has long been a major argument in the scholarship on peacebuilding, and even featured in early UN policy documents such as the ‘Agenda for Peace’ (United Nations General Assembly 1992). It is thus not a completely new idea in the peacebuilding policy discourse, but it is now being emphasized more strongly (Chetail 2009). However, principal-agent dilemmas make implementing this change complex for international organizations. While it is important to highlight the positive attributes of peacebuilding, such as the work of Fortna described above, studies of peacebuilding failures and pathologies also help to drive innovation in peace research. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2004) identify a broad range of barriers that have limited the
effectiveness of external actors working to build peace and new democratic institutions in conflict-affected countries (see also Paris and Sisk 2009; Zürcher et al. 2013).

Fearon and Laitin criticize peacebuilding operations as a post–Cold War form of ‘neo-trusteeship’. By this, they refer to cases such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Timor-Leste, in which they identified a systematic international state-building regime. This regime has three dimensions: (a) foreign jurisdiction over both domestic policy autonomy and primary economic functions with regard to multiple and multidimensional actors; (b) a large and rapidly expanding set of legal mandates for intervention; and (c) short-termism as an operational principle. Within this governance structure, they identify four primary policy challenges for external peacebuilders: recruitment, coordination, accountability and exit. For instance, in terms of accountability, international organizations and NGOs operate as ‘agents’ of ‘principal states’ and are thus more accountable to their primary donors than to the local societies with which they engage. Practically, this often causes peacebuilders to spend more time, energy and resources responding to external interests than to the real needs of the state or society, which ultimately leads to highly ineffective engagement and a lack of long-term improvement in state capacity.

The UN has become increasingly involved in a broad range of efforts to prevent and manage various types of armed conflict around the world. This might be a positive development, but there are also risks associated with ‘mission creep’, and trying to do too many things with too few resources (Autesserre 2014). Autesserre’s recent ethnography of international intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for example, suggests that peacebuilding programmes at the local level often create suspicion between international and local actors (2014). This mistrust, in addition to weak and inefficient practices and behaviours, can lead to systematic programme failures. In cases where international donors finance projects implemented by partner countries or NGOs, outcomes can vary. In sum, some cases suggest that inclusive local peacebuilding remains a very strong ideal, but in practice not all local NGOs are very good at it—and many fall short of fostering inclusivity in local peace projects due to pressure from donors to show quick results.

Critical theorists provide even harsher critiques of peacebuilding efforts. Richmond (2009), for example, argues that formal state institutions created with international support in conflict-affected countries may, in reality, have almost no impact on the everyday lives of citizens. Richmond is concerned not only that peace operations do not solve the problems they claim to solve, or help the people they claim to help, but also that Western states have a monopoly on the ‘technology’ of peacebuilding. From his perspective, effective peacebuilding can only be built on ‘the local aspiration to self-determination’ and ‘unscripted conversations’; not on a ‘reproduction of the ideological hegemony of a particular form of liberalism’ (Richmond 2009: 4). According to this approach, UN intervention should not be used to create ‘localized revisions of the [external] state building project’, but instead aim to empower marginalized communities to ensure that they have control over their own peace processes (Richmond 2010: 172).

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict is the primary original source shaping this current, ongoing shift to ‘the local’ (United Nations 2014). It incorporates the new thinking within the UN around how to avoid the dilemmas of external intervention described above. For example, Section II underscores the imperative of ‘national ownership’ as the basis for reducing the risk of conflict recurrence after peacebuilding efforts end (UN 2014). The concept highlights the need for domestic authority over agenda-setting and policymaking processes. It has also
been criticized by peace and conflict scholars, however, for its lack of clarity around who ‘owns’ the process (Donais 2014). For instance, should national elites or civil society drive negotiations and the agenda-setting process?

The ‘fog of war’ makes it very difficult to gather accurate data on civil society inclusivity and ownership in peace processes in general, and peace negotiations in particular. Until recently, there has been very little quantitative analysis of the relationship between inclusivity and peace duration. A UCDP global data set on civic groups and peace agreements has helped to address this problem. Nilsson’s analysis of this data suggests that violence is less likely to re-escalate if peace processes include a broad range of civic organizations (Nilsson 2012). Establishing broadly based, inclusive institutions at the early stage of a post-conflict transition improves bargaining, increases and extends threat monitoring, and helps hold potential spoilers accountable for the use of violence during the transition. From this perspective, inclusive processes ‘anchor peace’. Similarly, Berry’s research on war and the mobilization of women’s groups also suggests that war-to-democracy transitions increase opportunities for women’s participation in politics, as in the case of Rwanda (Berry 2015).

The recent work of the United Nations Development Programme’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP BCPR), a key component of the wider UN peacebuilding architecture, also reflects the ‘local turn’ among international organizations. For example, this logic drives two major agenda-setting reports, on ‘Community Security and Social Cohesion’, and ‘Governance for Peace’, that focus on civil society-based ownership of peace processes (UNDP 2009; UNDP 2012). From this perspective, building national democratic institutions must accompany efforts to devolve power to the local level, increase accountability and build capacity among citizens living in conflict-affected communities. Such efforts are necessary to make local democracy work to develop unique solutions to local social grievances, which often trigger conflict recurrence.

Scholars and practitioners at the cutting edge of peace research are now working to gather data related to highly localized peacebuilding efforts in order to derive new lessons

**RESOURCES**

**Online resources**

Practitioner toolkits, resources from peacebuilding organizations and networks on peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding:

- Everyday Peace Indicators Project: [https://everydaypeaceindicators.org](https://everydaypeaceindicators.org)
- Global Policy Forum: [https://www.globalpolicy.org](https://www.globalpolicy.org)
- International Peace Institute (IPI), Providing for Peacekeeping: [http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org](http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org)
- Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP), [http://ucdp.uu.se](http://ucdp.uu.se)
that go well beyond the initial liberal peace model as a blueprint for peace in all cases. Among the policy-oriented institutions, the 10-year review of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture emphasized inclusivity and sustaining peace in 2015, and the new UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, set out a strategy to focus on conflict prevention in 2017 (UN 2015). Among peace and conflict researchers, the local turn and variations in the peace and conflict dynamic at the local level remain major research problems. Anna Jarstad’s new research programme on ‘varieties of peace’ and Autesserre’s agenda-setting article are just two examples that are now helping to set up and frame new paths for research in the field of peace and conflict studies. These projects aim to better explain local-level variations in the causes of peace, the variable impact of peacebuilding efforts in different localities and the linkages between national peace processes and local outcomes (Autesserre 2014).

4. Conclusions
International actors are more involved in armed conflicts than ever before. As described in this Guide and in Chapter 8 of The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience, international involvement occurs through a broad range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes, such as constitution-making processes, rebel-to-party transitions and electoral system design. It also occurs through other important aspects of peace processes, such as humanitarian intervention, infrastructure and economic recovery projects, security sector reform and demobilization, and disarmament and reintegration programmes. All these efforts matter because ‘state fragility’ remains a primary cause of protracted, intra-state conflict. Even though introducing democracy in post-civil war contexts carries significant risks and faces complex dilemmas (described above), both democratization and peacebuilding are key components of long-term efforts to overcome state fragility and sustain peace. Due to the risk of political violence within states with weak political institutions for supporting democracy, supporting long-term, inclusive transitions to democracy is a powerful way to help build durable peace (Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Hegre 2014).

Overall, the lessons learned from responding to various forms of conflict have helped drive innovation and change among international organizations working to prevent conflict and sustain peace. While there is growing consensus around the relationship between inclusive democratic governance and sustainable peace, many issues in this field of inquiry remain open for further research. The root drivers of violence vary from case to case and the presence of multiple groups with varied interests and grievances, competing for access to resources and new forms of power, creates complex operating conditions. Variable patterns of violence create major challenges for peacebuilders working to build inclusive political and social institutions in the wake of war. Under these conditions, ideas about the relationship between democracy and peacebuilding have evolved to the point where local conflict dynamics, processes of inclusion and exclusion, and ‘domestic–international interactions’ have become critical issues for analysing peacebuilding processes. These dynamics have led to a shift away from short-term peacekeeping and ‘liberal peace transitions’ towards long-term peacebuilding and the more recent ‘turn to the local’, which aims to increase inclusivity and empower civil society actors to lead peacebuilding efforts.
More International IDEA publications on conflict and peacebuilding


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United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), *Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP


