

THE GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY INDICES CODEBOOK

Version 6 (2022)



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INTERNATIONAL IDEA — ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

About this document

The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook, Version 6 presents information about all the variables included in the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices dataset: identifying variables, attributes of democracy, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators. The other two documents that describe the data and data-generation process are The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 6 (Skaaning 2022), which presents the theoretical framework that guided the construction of the Indices, and The Global State of Democracy Indices: Technical Procedures Guide, Version 6 (Tufis and Hudson 2022), which outlines the technical aspects of constructing the Indices.

Version 6 of the GSoD Indices depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2021 but does not provide a single index of democracy. The Indices produce data for 174 countries. The data underlying the Indices is based on a total of 116 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of sources, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.

The Global State of Democracy is a report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the GSoD Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. The first edition of the report (International IDEA 2017), explored the conditions under which democracy can be resilient and how to strengthen its capacity as a system to overcome challenges and threats.

Version 6 of the GSoD Indices can be accessed online:

http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices

Suggested Citation

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Abbreviations

The datasets that are used to build the Global State of Democracy Indices are referred to throughout this codebook using abbreviations or acronyms for the dataset name as follows:

BRRD Regime Types and Regime Changes: A New Dataset

(Bjørnskov and Rode 2021)

CIRIGHTS The CIRIGHTS Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli et al. 2021)

CLD The Civil Liberty Dataset (Skaaning 2010)

FAO United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2016)

ICRG International Country Risk Guide (Howell 2011)

IHME Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME 2020)

LIED Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring

and Bartusevicius 2015)

MFD Global Media Freedom Dataset (Whitten-Woodring

and Van Belle 2017)

Polity V Project: Political Regime Characteristics

and Transitions (Marshall and Gurr 2020)

PTS The Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2021)

V-Dem Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2021)

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO 2020)

Introduction

The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook, Version 6 presents information about all the variables included in the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices dataset: identifying variables, attributes of democracy, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators. The other two documents that describe the data and data-generation process are The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 6 (Skaaning 2022), which presents the theoretical framework that guided the construction of the Indices, and The Global State of Democracy Indices: Technical Procedures Guide, Version 6 (Tufis and Hudson 2022), which outlines the technical aspects of constructing the Indices.

The main objective of the GSoD Indices is to provide systematic data that captures trends at the global, regional and national levels for different aspects of International IDEA's comprehensive understanding of democracy. The Indices turn a broad range of empirical indicators from various datasets into measures of different aspects of democracy that can be used to evaluate the state of democracy at the global, regional and national levels. They can also assist stakeholders, such as policymakers, researchers and civil society actors in their analyses of trends related to different aspects of democracy and identification of priority policy areas.

The GSoD Indices, which were constructed for the first time in 2017 and updated annually, cover 174 countries in the period 1975 to 2021. They are composite measures based on 116 indicators from different kinds of extant data sources. These indicators are assigned to the different subattributes of the conceptual framework and combined in the GSoD Indices.

The GSoD Indices have been produced by a team of International IDEA staff and two external experts. The construction of the GSoD Indices was supervised by an expert advisory board consisting of five leading experts in the field of democracy measurement. Careful justification and documentation of the conceptual distinctions and methodological choices made as well as the use of state-of-the-art procedures were emphasized at all stages in the construction of the Indices. This was done to ensure consistency and transparency, as well as high levels of measurement validity and reliability.

The main section of the Codebook is devoted to presenting information about all the variables included in the dataset. The identifying variables are presented first. The attributes, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators are then presented, grouped by attribute of democracy. Within each attribute, the variables are presented from the highest to the lowest level of aggregation, which means that the attributes are presented first, followed by the corresponding subattributes, the corresponding sub-components (only in the case of the second attribute, fundamental rights) and finally the corresponding indicators.

Identifying variables

ID Country Year (ID_country_year)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	ID_country_year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each combination of country and year (the country—year) in the data set. It has been constructed by concatenating the Correlates of War country code (COWcode) and the year, so that the last four digits of the variable always indicate the year, while the first one to three digits preceding the year represent the COWcode.

ID Country Name (ID_country_name)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	ID_country_year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 174 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the countries included in the data set.
Countries	Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,

INTERNATIONAL IDEA — IDENTIFYING VARIABLES

Countries (cont.)	Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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ID Country Code (ID_country_code)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	ID_country_year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 174 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the Correlates of War numeric country code (COWcode).

ID Year (ID_year)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	ID_year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 47 years included in the data set (from 1975 to 2021).

ID Region (ID_region)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	ID_region
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the five regions in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the regions included in the data set. For more details see Tufis and Hudson (2022).
Regions	Africa, Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Western Asia

ID Subregion (ID_subregion)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	ID_subregion
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 18 subregions in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the subregions included in the data set. For more details see Tufis (2020).
Subregions	Central Africa, East Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, Oceania, South Asia, South-East Asia, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, North/Western Europe, Southern Europe, Caribbean, Central America, South America, Northern America.

1. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Representative Government is the first of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Representative Government.

1 attribute

· Representative Government

4 subattributes

- · Clean elections
- Inclusive suffrage
- · Free political parties
- Elected government

18 indicators

ATTRIBUTE

Representative Government (C_A1)

Data source	GSoD Indices		
Original variable	Constructed variable		
Name in dataset	C_A1		
Definition	The representative government attribute emphasizes contested and inclusive popular elections for legislative and executive offices. This attribute distinguishes among four subattributes. Three of them (clean elections, free political parties and elected government) have been aggregated into a contestation index using Bayesian factor analysis (BFA). The representative government index is obtained by multiplying the contestation index by the fourth subattribute, inclusive suffrage.		
Original scale	Interval		
Citation	Skaaning (2022)		
Data manipulation for aggregation	_		
Indicator of	_		
Aggregation	-		
Indicators included	C_SD11, C_SD12, C_SD13, C_SD14		
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)		
Auxiliary variables	L_A1 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A1 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval		
Coverage	180 160 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10		

SUBATTRIBUTES

Clean Elections (C_SD11)

Data source	GSoD Indices		
Original variable	Constructed variable		
Name in dataset	C_SD11		
Definition	The clean elections subattribute denotes the extent to which elections for national, representative political office are free from irregularities. All of the selected indicators tap into the quality of elections. Two of the indicators reflect free elections more generally, whereas the other indicators capture more specific aspects of this feature, such as irregularities in voter registration and government intimidation. The six indicators have been aggregated into the clean elections subattribute using BFA.		
Original scale	Interval		
Citation	Skaaning (2022)		
Data manipulation for aggregation	_		
Indicator of	1. Representative Government		
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage.		
Indicators included	v_11_01, v_11_02, v_11_03, v_11_04, v_11_05, v_11_06		
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)		
Auxiliary variables	L_SD11 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD11 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval		
Coverage	180 page 140 noo see 140 noo s		

Inclusive Suffrage (C_SD12)

Data source	GSoD Indices		
Original variable	Constructed variable		
Name in dataset	C_SD12		
Definition	The inclusive suffrage subattribute denotes the extent to which adult citizens have equal and universal passive and active voting rights.		
Original scale	Interval		
Citation	Skaaning (2022)		
Data manipulation for aggregation	_		
Indicator of	Representative Government		
Aggregation	Weighted average of the two variables, with suffrage counting twice as much as voter registration. Thereafter multiplication with the contestation index.		
Indicators included	v_12_01, v_12_02		
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)		
Coverage	180 160 140 00 120 120 80 0 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020		

Free Political Parties (C_SD13)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD13
Definition	The free political parties subattribute denotes the extent to which political parties are free to form and campaign for political office. Six indicators, partly based on expert surveys and partly in-house coded, are used to measure how free political parties are. All of them reflect whether political parties generally, and opposition parties in particular, are allowed to organize freely and run in elections. The six indicators have been aggregated into the free political parties subattribute using item response theory (IRT).
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representative Government
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage.
Indicators included	v_13_01, v_13_02, v_13_03, v_13_04, v_13_05, v_13_06
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD13 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD13 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 per 140 left of the period

Elected Government (C_SD14)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD14
Definition	The elected government subattribute denotes the extent to which national, representative government offices are filled through elections. It is operationalized using four indicators from V-Dem, Polity and BRRD. All the indicators have a rather formal focus, which means that they do not assess the quality of elections or fully capture the extent to which reserved domains and undue influence from non-elected groups might in practice restrict elected officials' effective power to govern. The four indicators were aggregated into the elected government subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representative Government
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage.
Indicators included	v_14_01, v_14_02, v_14_03, v_14_04
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD14 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD14 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the state of

INDICATORS

EMB autonomy (v_11_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elembaut
Name in dataset	v_11_01
Definition	Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections? Responses: 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military or another de facto ruling body. 1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial towards the de facto ruling body. 2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election. 3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections. 4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections law and administrative rules. Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 Pa-140 140 150 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 16

EMB capacity (v_11_02)

v2elembcap v_11_02 Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election? Responses: 0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the
Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election? Responses: 0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the
administer a well-run national election? Responses: 0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the
0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the
organization across the territory. 1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country. 2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB. 3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread 4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.
Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections
BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
180 160 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Election other voting irregularities (v_11_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elirreg
Name in dataset	v_11_03
	Question: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties and/or vote fraud?
Definition	Responses: 0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities. 1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but fairly common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country. 2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disadvantaged particular groups. 3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities and many were probably unintentional or did not disadvantage particular groups' access to participation. 4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.
	Clarification: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_electeg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered and the state of
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Election government intimidation (v_11_04)

V-Dem
v2elintim
v_11_04
Question: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence or harassment by the government, the ruling party or their agents?
Responses: 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet. 1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period. 2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic but possibly centrally coordinated harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. 4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents throughout the election campaign period and polling day.
Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections
BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Election free and fair (v_11_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elfrfair
Name in dataset	v_11_05
Definition	Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? Responses: 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e. who became president or who won the legislative majority). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (as defined above). 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and some logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Clarification: The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 120 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Competition (v_11_06)

Data source	LIED
Original variable	competitive elections
Name in dataset	v_11_06
Definition	The chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative body are filled using elections that are characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain power if they were to attract sufficient support from the electorate. This presumes that control over key executive and legislative offices is determined by elections, the executive and members of the legislature have not been unconstitutionally removed and the legislature has not been dissolved. With respect to the electoral process, this presumes that the constitutional timing of elections has not been violated (in more than a marginal fashion), non-extremist parties are not banned, opposition candidates are generally free to participate, voters experience little systematic coercion in exercising their electoral choice and electoral fraud does not determine who wins. With respect to the outcome, this presumes that the declared winner of executive and legislative elections reflects the votes cast by the electorate, as near as can be determined from extant sources. Incumbent turnover (as a result of multiparty elections) is regarded as a strong indicator of competition but is neither necessary nor sufficient. In addition, reports from outside observers (as reported in books, articles and country reports) are used to determine whether the above-mentioned conditions have been met in a given election. Coding for this variable does not take into account whether there is a level playing field, all contestants gain access to funding and the media, media coverage is unbiased, civil liberties are respected or other features associated with fully free and fair elections are present. Competition therefore sets a modest threshold.
Original scale	Nominal
Citation	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries of countrie

Inclusive suffrage (v_12_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elsuffrage
Name in dataset	v_12_01
	Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?
	Responses: Per cent.
Definition	Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100. The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.
Original scale	0% to 100%.
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	1. Representative Government
Aggregation	Weighted average to construct subattribute 1.2 Inclusive suffrage.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Election voter registry (v_12_02)

V-Dem
v2elrgstry
v_12_02
Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?
Responses: 0: No. There was no registry or the registry was not used. 1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double voting and impersonation). 2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes. 3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly. 4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_electeg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Representative Government I.1. Clean elections
Weighted average to construct subattribute 1.2 Inclusive suffrage.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Numper of countries covered to the property of

Party ban (v_13_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2psparban
Name in dataset	v_13_01
	Question: Are any political parties banned?
Definition	Responses: 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. 1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties. 2: Yes. Many parties are banned. 3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned. 4: No. No parties are officially banned.
	Clarification: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Representative Government 1.3. Free political parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 0 120 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Barriers to parties (v_13_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2psbars
Name in dataset	v_13_02
Definition	Question: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a political party? Responses: 0: Parties are not allowed. 1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally). 2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities). 3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities). 4: There are no substantial barriers. Clarification: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Representative Government 3. Free political parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Opposition parties' autonomy (v_13_03)

V-Dem
v2psoppaut
v_13_03
Question: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?
Responses: 0: Opposition parties are not allowed. 1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime. 2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime 4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
Clarification: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government—that is, it has no control over the executive.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Representative Government 3. Free political parties
IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Numper of countries covered with the state of the state o

Elections multiparty (v_13_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elmulpar
Name in dataset	v_13_04
Definition	Question: Was this national election multiparty? Responses: 0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few political parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party). 1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency. 2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained, either legally or informally. 3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory. 4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, or anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Recoded into 20 categories, each of which contains five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Representative Government 1.3. Free political parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 00 120 80 00 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Competitiveness of participation (v_13_05)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	parcomp
Name in dataset	v_13_05
Definition	The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities that are coded unregulated (1) on regulation of participation (PARREG, variable 2.5) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.5 also are not coded on variable 2.6.
	Competitiveness is coded on a five-category scale: 0. Not applicable. 1. Repressed. 2. Suppressed. 3. Factional. 4. Transitional. 5. Competitive.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020).
Indicator of	Representative Government 3. Free political parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the countries of the count
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Multiparty elections (v_13_06)

Data source	LIED
Original variable	multiparty legislative elections
Name in dataset	v_13_06
	Multiparty legislative elections are defined by the existence of two conditions: legislative elections (LEGSELEC) and opposition (OPPOSITION).
Definition	LEGSELEC: A legislative body issues at least some laws and does not perform executive functions. The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is at least partly elected. The legislature has not been closed.
	OPPOSITION: The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is (at least in part) elected by voters facing more than one choice. Specifically, parties are not banned and either more than one party is allowed to compete or elections are nonpartisan (i.e. all the candidates run without party labels).
Original scale	Nominal
Citation	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_electeg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Representative Government 3. Free political parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Elected executive index (v_14_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2x_elecoff
Name in dataset	v_14_01
	Question: Are the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?
Definition	Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly by popular elections or indirectly by a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and whether, in presidential systems with a directly elected president who is also the chief executive, the legislature is directly elected. Note that a popular election is only minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, 'appointment' by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order Indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 0, 0.5, 0.95 and 1.
Indicator of	Representative Government L4. Elected government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 per 140 por 140 po

Competitiveness of executive recruitment (v_14_02)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	xrcomp
Name in dataset	v_14_02
Definition	Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates. If power transfers are coded unregulated ('1') in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, competitiveness is coded '0'. Three categories are used to measure this concept:
	1. Selection: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation or by a combination of both, as in monarchies where the chief minister is chosen by the king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are: rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; and repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties.
	2. Dual / Transitional: Dual executives occur where one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Term also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.
	3. Election: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections involving two or more major parties or candidates.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Recoded 0 and 1 as 0, 2 as 0.5, and 3 as 1. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020).
Indicator of	Representative Government L4. Elected government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 pa 140 pa 140 pa 100 pa 10
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Openness of executive recruitment (v_14_03)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	xropen
Name in dataset	v_14_03
Definition	Recruitment of the chief executive is 'open' to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded unregulated (1) in Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1) or involve a transition to/from unregulated, openness is coded 0. Four categories are used:
	 Closed: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, emirs, who assume executive power by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded 'closed' unless a relative succeeds him as ruler. Dual Executive-Designation: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister. Dual Executive-Election: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister. Open: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election or transitional arrangements between designation and election.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Recoded 0, 1 and 2 as 0; 3 as 0.5; and 4 as 1. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020).
Indicator of	Representative Government 1.4. Elected government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 Per 140 120 September 20 0

Electoral (v_14_04)

Data source	BRRD
Original variable	electoral
Name in dataset	v_14_04
Definition	Does a country have no regular elections, elections in an effectively one- party state, elections with opposition parties but without an actual chance of government change, or full democracy? Alternative democracy indicator capturing degree of multi-party competition (No elections=0, Single-party elections=1, non-democratic multi-party elections=2, democratic elections= 3).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bjørnskov and Rode (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 were coded by International IDEA following Bjørnskov and Rode's (2021) codebook.
Indicator of	Representative Government L4. Elected government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 per 140 per 140 noo 120 sep 100 noo 60 quarter 40 20 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

2. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Fundamental Rights is the second of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes, subcomponents and indicators that comprise the index of Fundamental Rights:

1 attribute

· Fundamental Rights

3 subattributes

- · Access to justice
- Civil liberties
- · Social rights and equality

8 subcomponents

- Freedom of expression
- · Freedom of association and assembly
- · Freedom of religion
- Freedom of movement
- Personal integrity and security
- Social group equality
- · Basic welfare
- Gender equality

60 indicators

ATTRIBUTE

Fundamental Rights (C_A2)

Data	OO-D Indiana
Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_A2
Definition	Fundamental Rights in the form of liberal and social rights support both fair representation and the vertical mechanism of accountability that the first attribute seeks to achieve. This attribute is composed of three subattributes: access to justice, civil liberties, and social rights and equality. The three subattributes were aggregated into the Fundamental Rights index using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	_
Aggregation	-
Indicators included	C_SD21, C_SD22, C_SD23
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_A2 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A2 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 140 00 120 120 80 40 20 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

SUBATTRIBUTES

Access to justice (C_SD21)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD21
Definition	The access to justice subattribute denotes the extent to which the legal system is fair (i.e., citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and have the right to be under the jurisdiction of, and to seek redress from, competent, independent and impartial tribunals without undue delay). It comprises four expert coded variables (V-Dem) that go beyond the independence of courts and an in-house coded CLD measure of the right to a fair trial. The five indicators were aggregated into the access to justice subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality
Indicators included	v_21_01, v_21_02, v_21_03, v_21_04, v_21_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD21 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD21 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Civil liberties (C_SD22)

Olvii liberties (0_0b22)	
Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD22
Definition	The civil liberties subattribute denotes the extent to which civil rights and liberties are respected. The five civil liberties subcomponents are freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, and personal integrity and security, each of which reflects core concepts in the human rights literature. The five subcomponents were aggregated into the civil liberties subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality
Indicators included	C_SD22A, C_SD22B, C_SD22C, C_SD22D, C_SD22E
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries countries and the countries of countr

Social rights and equality (C_SD23)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD23
Definition	The social rights and equality subattribute denotes the extent to which basic welfare (i.e. social security, health care and education) and political and social equality between social groups and genders are realized. The three social rights and equality subcomponents are social group equality, basic welfare and gender equality, each of which reflects core concepts in the human rights literature. The three subcomponents were aggregated into the social rights and equality subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality
Indicators included	C_SD23A, C_SD23B, C_SD23C
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD23 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the first state of t

SUBCOMPONENTS

Freedom of expression (C_SD22A)

	(0_0
Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD22A
Definition	The freedom of expression subcomponent is measured using indicators from V-Dem, CLD and CIRIGHTS. The questions underlying the CLD and CIRIGHTS variables are fairly encompassing, whereas the V-Dem variables are more specific and refer to different aspects of media freedom and to the right to openly discuss political issues and express political opinions outside the mass media (two measure freedom of expression, for men and women respectively). The eight indicators were aggregated into the freedom of expression subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security.
Indicators included	v_22_01, v_22_02, v_22_03, v_22_04, v_22_05, v_22_06, v_22_07, v_22_08
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22A = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22A = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 120 120 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Freedom of association and assembly (C_SD22B)

GSoD Indices
Constructed variable
C_SD22B
Six indicators that directly refer to freedom of association for political and civil groups. These six indicators were aggregated into the freedom of association and assembly subcomponent using IRT.
Interval
Skaaning (2022)
_
Fundamental Rights Civil liberties
BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
v_22_11, v_22_12, v_22_13, v_22_14, v_22_15, v_22_16
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
L_SD22B = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22B = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
180 160 20 140 80 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Freedom of religion (C_SD22C)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD22C
Definition	A separate subcomponent index comprised of two V-Dem general indicators on religious freedom based on expert surveys and two similarly broad in-house coded variables from CLD and CIRIGHTS. The four indicators were aggregated into the freedom of religion subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
Indicators included	v_22_21, v_22_22, v_22_23, v_22_24
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22C = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22C = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Freedom of movement (C_SD22D)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD22D
Definition	Freedom of movement was captured by a general, in-house coded indicator from CLD, two specific in-house coded indicators from CIRIGHTS and three, more specific, expert coded indicators from V-Dem that distinguish between foreign and domestic movement and provide assessments of the latter feature for men and women. The six indicators were aggregated into the freedom of movement subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
Indicators included	v_22_31, v_22_32, v_22_33, v_22_34, v_22_35, v_22_36
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22D = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22D = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 140 20 120 80 40 40 20 1980 1980 2000 2010 2020

Personal integrity and security (C_SD22E)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD22E
Definition	Five indicators capture different types of violations, such as forced labour, torture, and political and extra-judicial disappearances and killings. To capture personal security more broadly, two general indicators on political violence and physical integrity rights were also included, which pertains to different types of human rights violations, conflict and violence and distinguishes between various levels. The seven indicators were aggregated into the personal integrity and security subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Constant of the second of the
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
Indicators included	v_22_41, v_22_42, v_22_43, v_22_44, v_22_45, v_22_46, v_22_47
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22E = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22E = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 per of the part of the par

Social group equality (C_SD23A)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD23A
Definition	Five V-Dem expert-coded indicators and four V-Dem indices were used to measure social group equality, the first of the social rights and equality subcomponents. Four of the underlying questions ask about social class and identity group inequalities with regard to civil liberties and political power distribution. The fifth asks about the representation of disadvantaged social groups. Four indices provide measures of socio-economic, political, social and urban-rural exclusion. One additional indicator from ICRG reflects the extent of religious and/or ethnic tensions. The ten indicators were aggregated into the social group equality subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Social rights and equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare
Indicators included	v_23_01, v_23_02, v_23_03, v_23_04, v_23_05, v_23_06, v_23_07, v_23_08, v_23_09, v_23_10
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD23A = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23A = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Basic welfare (C_SD23B)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD23B
Definition	The provision of basic welfare is measured using standard observable human development indicators: infant mortality rate, life expectancy, kilocalories per person per day, literacy rate and average years of schooling. In addition, two expert-based indicators from V-Dem were included that assess whether everyone in a given society has access to basic education and health care. All the indicators reflect the extent to which the basic needs of the population are being met. The seven indicators were aggregated into the basic welfare subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Social rights and equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare
Indicators included	v_23_21, v_23_22, v_23_23, v_23_24, v_23_25, v_23_26, v_23_27
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD23B = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23B = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries of the first state of the first

Gender equality (C_SD23C)

Constructed variable C_SD23C Three expert-coded indicators from V-Dem were used to operationalize gender equality—power distribution by gender, female participation in civil society organizations and gender-based exclusion—as well as two expert-coded indicators from CIRIGHTS on women's' political and economic rights. Two observational indicators are also included: on the ratio between female and male mean years of schooling (IHME), and the proportion of lower chamber female legislators (V-Dem). The seven indicators were aggregated into the gender equality subcomponent using IRT. Interval Skaaning (2022)
C_SD23C Three expert-coded indicators from V-Dem were used to operationalize gender equality—power distribution by gender, female participation in civil society organizations and gender-based exclusion—as well as two expert-coded indicators from CIRIGHTS on women's' political and economic rights. Two observational indicators are also included: on the ratio between female and male mean years of schooling (IHME), and the proportion of lower chamber female legislators (V-Dem). The seven indicators were aggregated into the gender equality subcomponent using IRT.
Three expert-coded indicators from V-Dem were used to operationalize gender equality—power distribution by gender, female participation in civil society organizations and gender-based exclusion—as well as two expert-coded indicators from CIRIGHTS on women's' political and economic rights. Two observational indicators are also included: on the ratio between female and male mean years of schooling (IHME), and the proportion of lower chamber female legislators (V-Dem). The seven indicators were aggregated into the gender equality subcomponent using IRT.
power distribution by gender, female participation in civil society organizations and gender-based exclusion—as well as two expert-coded indicators from CIRIGHTS on women's' political and economic rights. Two observational indicators are also included: on the ratio between female and male mean years of schooling (IHME), and the proportion of lower chamber female legislators (V-Dem). The seven indicators were aggregated into the gender equality subcomponent using IRT.
Skaaning (2022) —
-
European 2. Fundamental Rights Social rights and equality
BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare
v_23_31, v_23_32, v_23_33, v_23_34, v_23_35, v_23_36, v_23_37
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
L_SD23C = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23C = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Number of countries covered to the first state of t

INDICATORS

Access to justice for men (v_21_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjstm
Name in dataset	v_21_01
Definition	Question: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice? Responses: 0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent. 1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected. 2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems in most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country. 3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed. 4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed. Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and men have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 80 100 60 40 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Access to justice for women (v_21_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjstw
Name in dataset	v_21_02
Definition	Question: >Do women enjoy equal, secure and effective access to justice? Responses: 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent. 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected. 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems occur in most cases or rather unevenly across different parts of the country. 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed. 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed. Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the
	courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and women have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the property of
	0

Judicial corruption decision (v_21_03)

V-Dem
v2jucorrdc
v_21_03
Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay a process or to obtain a favourable judicial decision?
Responses: 0: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Not usually. 4: Never.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
_
Fundamental Rights Access to justice
BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Number of countries of countrie

Judicial accountability (v_21_04)

D .	V.D.
Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juacent
Name in dataset	v_21_04
	Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?
Definition	Responses: 0: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	-
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 Napper of countries countries 100 80 60 40 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Fair trial (v_21_05)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	fairtrial
Name in dataset	v_21_05
Definition	Definition: The indicator specifies the extent to which citizens have the right to a fair trial in practice: they are not subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; and they have the right to recognition as a person before the law; the right to be under the jurisdiction of and seek redress from competent, independent and impartial tribunals; and the right to be heard and to be tried without undue delay if arrested, detained or charged with a criminal offence. Indicator Scale: 1. Severely restricted: Fair trials are very unlikely. The courts are totally subordinated to the will of government or the justice system is profoundly undermined by arbitrary arrests, incompetence, corruption and intimidation. 2. Substantially restricted: Some elements of fair trials exist but the courts are not fully independent of the government and/or the justice system is characterized by widespread corruption, intimidation and inefficiency. 3. Moderately restricted: The courts are generally independent of the government, but the justice system is characterized by moderate degrees of corruption or inefficiency. 4. Unrestricted: All elements of fair trails are respected. No arbitrary arrests take place, the courts are competent, independent and impartial; and hearings and trials generally follow arrest and charge within a reasonable time.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 0 120 80 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Print/broadcast censorship effort (v_22_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mecenefm
Name in dataset	v_22_01
Definition	Question: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?
	Responses: 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nonetheless routine. 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues. 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues. 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.
	Clarification: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs and bribery. Censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion or defamatory speech are not relevant unless used as a pretext for censoring political speech.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 160 140 120 120 80 60 40 0
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Harassment of journalists (v_22_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2meharjrn
Name in dataset	v_22_02
	Question: Are individual journalists harassed; that is, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten or killed, by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?
Definition	Responses: 0: Journalists do not dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur. 1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually forced to stop. 2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time. 3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished. 4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered and services are services and services are services are services and services are services and services are

Media self-censorship (v_22_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2meslfcen
Name in dataset	v_22_03
	Question: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?
Definition	Responses: 0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough. 1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete. 2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues. 3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 pages of countries covered to the contribution of the contribu

Freedom of discussion for women (v_22_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldiscw
Name in dataset	v_22_04
Definition	Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Responses: 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expressing political opinions. 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment. 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment. 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. As a rule, however, there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements. 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is unrestricted. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces, such as restaurants, public transport, sports events or at work, without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. Of interest are restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country where men and women enjoy equal but extremely few rights to freedom of discussion.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Freedom of discussion for men (v_22_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldiscm
Name in dataset	v_22_05
	Question: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?
Definition	Responses: 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinions. 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment. 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment. 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. As a rule, however, there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements. 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is unrestricted.
	Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces, such as restaurants, public transport, sports events or at work, without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. Of interest are restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country where men and women enjoy equal but extremely few rights to freedom of discussion.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 pel 140 100 100 80 0 0 0
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v_22_06)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacfree
Name in dataset	v_22_06
Definition	Question: Are there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues? Responses: 0: Not respected by the public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expression are severely restricted or controlled by the government. 1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression. 2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression. 3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft. 4: Fully respected by the public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 120 120 80 40 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Freedom of opinion and expression (v_22_07)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	freexp
Name in dataset	v_22_07
	Definition: The extent to which individual citizens, groups and the media have freedom of opinion and expression, that is, the right of citizens, groups and the press to hold views freely and to seek, obtain and pass on information on political issues as broadly understood without being subject to limitations or restrictions.
Definition	Component Scale: 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of opinion or expression exists. As a rule, political statements and press coverage independent and/or critical of the government do not exist or are harshly suppressed. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of expression of political opinions and press coverage independent and critical of the government exist but are exposed to numerous interventions and prohibitions. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of opinion and expression, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions and prohibitions on political statements and/or press coverage. 4. Unrestricted. Unhampered freedom of opinion and expression exists.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 plant 100 pl

Freedom of speech and press (v_22_08)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	speech
Name in dataset	v_22_08
	Definition: The extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of restriction that is placed on freedom of the press, speech or expression. Expression may also be in the form of art or music. There are different degrees of censorship. Censorship denies citizens freedom of speech and limits or prevents the media (print, online, or broadcast) to express views challenging the policies of the existing government. In many instances, the government owns and operates all forms of press and media.
Definition	Component Scale: (0) Complete: If the government, in practice, owns all of any one aspect of the media, such as all radio stations or all television stations. (1) Some: The government places some restrictions yet does allow limited rights to freedom of speech and the press. (2) None: "No" censorship means the freedom to speak freely and to print opposing opinions without the fear of prosecution. "None" in no way implies absolute freedom, as there exists in all countries some restrictions on information and/or communication. Even in democracies there are restrictions placed on freedoms of speech and the press if these rights infringe on the rights of others or in any way endangers the welfare of others.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 20 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

CSO entry and exit (v_22_11)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cseeorgs
Name in dataset	v_22_11
Definition	Question: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? Responses: 0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity, such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes or publicly commenting on public officials and policies, are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expediency. 3: Minimal control. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, constitutional provisions exist that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such bans take place within the rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4: Unconstrained. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities that seek to violently overthrow the government.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 page 140 100 80 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

CSO repression (v_22_12)

C30 repression (v_22_	12)
Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csreprss
Name in dataset	v_22_12
Definition	Responses: 0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of CSOs, seeking not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany and Maoist China. 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in opposition CSOs that are not acting unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists such as beatings, threats to family members and destruction of valuable property. Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law and Serbia under Milosevic. 2: Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in response 3, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of CSOs' actions through measures that restrict the association of such organizations with each other or political parties, bar CSOs from taking certain actions or blocking international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s and the late Franco period in Spain. 3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions such as fines, firings and denial of social services, to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new CSOs and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. Examples include Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia. 4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves and criticize the government without fear of government sanction or harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Numper of countries of the countries of

Freedom of peaceful assembly (v_22_13)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2caassemb
Name in dataset	v_22_13
Definition	Question: To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly? Responses: 0: Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them. 1: Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them. 2: Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully. 3: Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully. 4: Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations. Clarification: This question focuses on the ability to assemble publicly in practice. An assembly is 'an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose' (ODIHR and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 120 190 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Freedom of assembly and association (v_22_14)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	freass
Name in dataset	v_22_14
Definition	Definition: The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of assembly and association, that is, the right of citizens to gather freely and carry out peaceful demonstrations as well as to join, form and participate with other persons in political parties, cultural organizations, trade unions or the like of their own volition without being subject to limitations or restrictions. Component Scale: 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of association and assembly exists. As a rule, politically relevant civic organizations and attempts at assembly do not exist or are harshly
	suppressed. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of civic organizations exist, but oppositional organizations of relevance to governance are prohibited, disabled or systematically repressed, and demonstrations critical of the government exposed to numerous interventions and prohibitions. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of association and/or assembly, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions or prohibitions on parties, social organizations or public meetings. 4. Unrestricted. There is unrestricted freedom of association and assembly.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Eundamental Rights Could be a second of association and assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 plant 140 pl
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Freedom of assembly and association (v_22_15)


Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	assn
Name in dataset	v_22_15
Definition	Definition: It is an internationally recognized right of citizens to assemble freely and to associate with other persons in political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, or other groups. This variable evaluates the extent to which the freedoms of assembly and association are subject to actual governmental limitations or restrictions (as opposed to strictly legal protections).
	Component scale: 0: Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens 1: Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups. 2: Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights2.2. Civil liberties2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct sub-dimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 per 140 Numper 140 00 120 80 100 60 40 20 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Workers' rights (v_22_16)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	worker
Name in dataset	v_22_16
Definition	Workers should have freedom of association at their workplaces and the right to bargain collectively with their employers. In addition, they should have other rights at work. The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) agreement of the World Trade Organization requires reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary countries. It states that internationally recognized worker rights include: (A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
	Component scale: 0: Severely restricted: If the government systematically violates the right of association and/or the right to organize and bargain collectively. 1: Somewhat restricted: If the government generally protects the rights to association and collective bargaining, but there are occasional violations of these rights or there are other significant violations of worker rights. 2: Fully protected: If the government consistently protects the exercise of these rights AND there are no mentions of violations of other worker rights.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct sub-dimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered 40

Freedom of religion (v_22_21)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clrelig
Name in dataset	v_22_21
Definition	Question: Is there freedom of religion? Responses: O: Not respected by the public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to the public authorities, which control the activities of religious communities in some detail. 1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized but significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled; voluntary conversions are restricted; and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common. 2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled, however, and/or there are occasional instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups based on their religion. 3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions on proselytizing or hindrances to accessing the construction of places of worship. 4: Fully respected by the public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without use interference. If religious communities have to register, the public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a re
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.C. Freedom of religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).



Religious organization repression (v_22_22)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csrlgrep
Name in dataset	v_22_22
Definition	Question: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations? Responses: 0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China. 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations that have not acted unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists, such as beatings, threats to families and destruction of valuable property. 2: Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade religious organizations from acting or their members from expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict the association of religious CSOs with each other or political parties, bar religious CSOs from taking certain actions or by blocking international contacts. 3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions such as fines, firings or the denial of social services to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or their members from expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registrant on or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious CSOs and side-track them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations. 4: No. Religious CSOs are free to organize, associate, strike or express themselves and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)

Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.C. Freedom of religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 Pal 140 OD 120 Seji 100 60 40 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (v_22_23)

CLD
frerel
v_22_23
Definition: The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of thought, conscience and religion, that is, the right of citizens to have a religion or change their religion or belief of their own volition; and alone or in community manifest their religion or belief in practice, through worship, observance and teaching in private or public, as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to limitations or restrictions.
Component scale: 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. As a rule, any kind of religious practice is controlled by the government and harshly suppressed. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practice exists and is officially recognized, but major religious movements are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions or prohibitions on communities or individual worshippers. 4. Unrestricted. Unhampered freedom of religion exists.
Ordinal
Skaaning (2010)
_
2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of religion
IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.C. Freedom of religion.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Number of Countries Converged August 100 120 120 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Freedom of religion (v_22_24)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	rel_free
Name in dataset	v_22_24
Definition	Definition: This variable indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Citizens of whatever religious belief should be able to worship free from government interference. Additionally, citizens should be able to hold no religion at all. Citizens should be able to freely practice their religion and proselytize (attempt to convert) other citizens to their religion as long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, peaceful manner. Members of the clergy should be able to freely advocate partisan political views, oppose government laws, support political candidates, and otherwise freely participate in politics. Some important questions to consider include: Does the government respect rights including the freedom to publish religious documents in foreign languages? Does religious belief affect membership in a ruling party or a career in government? Does the government prohibit promotion of one religion over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief? Does the government restrict the teaching or practice of any faith? Does the government discriminate against minority religious groups? Component scale: Government restrictions on religious practices are: (0) Severe and Widespread (1) Moderate (2) Practically Absent
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.C. Freedom of religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 pa_140 0 120 septimor of the particle

Freedom of foreign movement (v_22_31)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clfmove
Name in dataset	v_22_31
Definition	Responses: 0: Not respected by the public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from travelling. 1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas. 2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only face minor restrictions. 3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from travelling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family. 4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by the public authorities.
	Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by the public authorities.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 Pal 140 OD 120 80 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Freedom of domestic movement for women (v_22_32)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldmovew
Name in dataset	v_22_32
	Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Responses: 0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g. North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban). 1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement but most do not (e.g. Apartheid South Africa). 2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively, all women enjoy partial freedom of movement. 3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. 4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.
Definition	Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and at night, in public thoroughfares and across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residence where they wish. Note that restrictions of movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely low levels of freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions on movement that are placed on non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions on movement that result from crime or unrest.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	-
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Control liberties Control liberties Control liberties Control liberties Control liberties Control liberties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 pal 140 140 0 0 0 Number of countries 180 pal 20

Freedom of domestic movement for men (v_22_33)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldmovem
Name in dataset	v_22_33
	Question: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Responses: 0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g. North Korea). 1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement but most do not (e.g. Apartheid South Africa). 2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively, all men enjoy partial freedom of movement. 3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. 4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.
Definition	Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime or at night, in public thoroughfares or across regions in a country, and to establish permanent residence where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely low levels of freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered 40

Freedom of movement and residence (v_22_34)

CLD
fremov
v_22_34
Definition: The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of movement and residence, that is, the right of citizens to settle and travel within their country or to leave and return to their country of their own volition without being subject to limitations or restrictions
Component Scale 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of movement exists. As a rule, citizens are not allowed to choose their place of residence or to travel around the country or abroad. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of foreign travel, choice of residence and/or domestic travel exist but numerous individuals, often belonging to specific groups, are exposed to a variety of prohibitions. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of travel and/or residence, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no prohibitions. 4. Unrestricted. There is unrestricted freedom of movement and residence.
Ordinal
Skaaning (2010)
_
2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
180 160 160 140 120 120 120 140 0

Freedom of foreign movement (v_22_35)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	formov
Name in dataset	v_22_35
Definition	Definition: The freedom to leave and return to one's country is a right. There are countries that do not allow citizens to leave at all. Methods used by governments to restrict freedom of movement include withholding and/or delaying the issuing of passports, "exit control" lists to prevent emigration, the requirement of an exit visa or special permits to leave the country, revocation of citizenship, and obstacles to the extension of passport's validity. In addition, there are countries where even if one is allowed to leave, there are restrictions on the duration of one's stay abroad. Citizens can lose their property and other assets if they leave for a very long time; some citizens have to get permission to leave. Others, when they leave, are not allowed to return or the government makes return very difficult. Also, some governments place restrictions on certain groups of people such as opposition political leaders, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, women, human rights activists or monitors, and journalists. Rights to emigration and repatriation without prejudice are also included in freedom of foreign movement and travel. Component Scale Foreign movement and travel is: (0) Severely Restricted: The government restricts all or nearly all the foreign travel of its citizens. This category includes all countries whose governments have policies making it impossible or very difficult for women to travel abroad alone or without their husband's consent, and countries that limit the travel of sizable minority groups. This includes forcing women to receive permission from a man to leave the country with her own child. (1) Somewhat Restricted: The government places modest restrictions on the freedom of foreign movement and travel of its citizens (2) Unrestricted: The government respects the freedom of foreign movement and travel in law and in practice.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 00 120 9i 140 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Freedom of domestic movement (v_22_36)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	dommov
Name in dataset	v_22_36
Definition	Definition: The freedom to travel within one's country is a right. There are governments that do not allow citizens to travel within their own country of birth or that restrict the movement of certain groups for reasons based on political views or activities, religious beliefs, ethnicity, marital status, and gender. For example, some countries strictly curtail the freedom of movement of oppositional political leaders, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, human rights activists or monitors, and journalists. This may take many forms, including government-imposed internal exile and/or intentional bureaucratic/administrative delays to freedom of movement after a prison term has ended. Some countries strictly monitor all or nearly all citizens' internal movements, and citizens are required to notify local officials of their whereabouts or must get their permission to move. In some countries, citizens must carry national identity cards, travel or work permits, or internal passports for any movement outside their immediate village, neighborhood, or province. Some countries use issuance of these cards to restrict movement within the country. Some governments use forced internal resettlement to relocate large numbers of citizens without their consent. Some governments also impose curfew laws and military checkpoints on domestic travel during times of military or civil conflict.
	Component Scale (0) Severely Restricted: The government restricts all or nearly all citizens' freedom of domestic movement, or routinely restricts the movement of a significant number of citizens based on their ethnicity, gender, race, religion, marital status, political convictions, or membership in a group. (1) Somewhat Restricted: The government places modest restrictions on freedom of domestic movement. (2) Unrestricted: The government respects the freedom of domestic movement. "Unrestricted" does not mean the absence of any restrictions and complete freedom of domestic movement at all times and in all places. In many countries, there are minor prohibitions or restrictions imposed on this right.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the contries of

Freedom from forced labour for women (v_22_41)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clslavef
Name in dataset	v_22_41
Definition	Responses: 0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state. 1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice. 2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by the public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups. 3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities. 4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is virtually non-existent. Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to leave a job s/he desires to leave not for reasons of economic necessity, but instead due to employer coercion. This includes labour camps but not work or service that forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women from forced labour. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of constraints and the second

Freedom from forced labour for men (v_22_42)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clslavem
Name in dataset	v_22_42
Definition	Question: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labour? Responses: 0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state. 1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice. 2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by the public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups. 3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities. 4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is virtually non-existent. Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to leave a job s/he desires to leave not for reasons of economic necessity, but instead due to employer coercion. This includes labour camps but not work or service that forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered and the state of

Freedom from torture (v_22_43)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cltort
Name in dataset	v_22_43
Definition	Responses: 0: Not respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of the government. 1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by senior leaders in the government. At the same time, government leaders are not actively working to prevent it. 2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by senior leaders in the government. 3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by senior government leaders. 4: Fully respected by the public authorities. Torture is non-existent. Clarification: Torture refers to the deliberate inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with the aim of extracting information or intimidating victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (the police, security forces, prison guards and paramilitary groups).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 pa-140 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Freedom from political killings (v_22_44)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clkill
Name in dataset	v_22_44
Definition	Responses: 0: Not respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by the senior leaders of the government. 1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and senior government leaders are not actively working to prevent them. 2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by senior government leaders. 3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by senior government leaders. 4: Fully respected by the public authorities. Political killings do not take place. Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of the deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state, including paramilitary groups.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Human rights protection scores (v_22_45)

Data source	Political Terror Scale
Original variable	PTS_S
Name in dataset	v_22_45
Definition	What is the level of political violence and terror? PTS scores based on information contained in the annual human rights reports produced by the US State Department. Reports are scored on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate higher levels of abuse, political terror, or physical integrity rights violations than lower scores.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Gibney et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Gibney et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 160 140 120 190 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Internal conflict (v_22_46)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Internal conflict (D)
Name in dataset	v_22_46
Definition	An assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an ongoing civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (Civil War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, Civil Disorder), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	140 Partial Score of the state

Physical integrity rights (v_22_47)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	physint
Name in dataset	v_22_47
	Definition: Index reflecting the extent to which government respects the prohibition of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearance.
Definition	Component Scale: Ranges from 0 (No government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021). Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries of countrie

Social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v_23_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjust
Name in dataset	v_23_01
Definition	Question: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do? Responses: 0: Poor people enjoy far fewer civil liberties than rich people. 1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people. 2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people. 3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people. 4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.
	Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socio-economic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labour.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 80 90 40 0
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v_23_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clsocgrp
Name in dataset	v_23_02
Definition	Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties? Or are some groups generally in a more favourable position?
	Responses: 0: Members of some social groups enjoy far fewer civil liberties than the general population. 1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population. 2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population. 3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population. 4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.
	Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood as comprising access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labour.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the part of
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Power distributed by socio-economic position (v_23_03)

poorer people have almost no influence. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average wealth or poorer people have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less to wealth people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others but people of average wealth have almost as much influence and poor people have a significant degree of political power. 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic group Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not ogreat. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political power. Original scale Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Citation Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022) Data manipulation for aggregation Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3. Acsocial group equality Aggregation IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality. Final scale Coverage Coverage Coverage	V-Dem
Question: Is political power distributed according to socio-economic position? Responses: 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. People of average wealth an poorer people have almost no influence. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have averstrong hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average wealth nor poorer people have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less to wealth people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others but people of average wealth have almost as much influence and poor people have a significant degree of political power. 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic group Clarification. All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translate into political power. Original scale Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022) Coppedge et al. (2022) Coppedge et al. (2022) Coppedge et al. (2022) Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). 1: Fundamental Rights 2. Social group equality 2. Social group equality 3: Social group equality 4: Social group equality 5: Social group equality 6: Social construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality. Coverage	v2pepwrses
Responses: 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. People of average wealth an poorer people have almost no influence. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average wealth or poorer people have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less to wealth people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others but people of average wealth have almost as much influence and poor people have a significant degree of political power. 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic group Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned on twith the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translate into political power. Original scale Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022) Coppedge et al. (2022) Coppedge et al. (2022) 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality 3.3. Social group equality Aggregation IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality. Final scale Coverage Coverage Coverage	v_23_03
O: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. People of average wealth an poorer people have almost no influence. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average wealth or poorer people have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less to wealth people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others but people of average wealth have almost as much influence and poor people have a significant degree of political power. 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic group Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translate into political power. Original scale Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022) Coppedge et al. (2022) 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality Aggregation IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality. Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).	Question: Is political power distributed according to socio-economic position?
income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translate into political power. Original scale Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022) Data manipulation for aggregation Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3. A. Social group equality Aggregation IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality. Final scale Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage The construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality. Coverage Coverag	 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. People of average wealth and poorer people have almost no influence. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average wealth or poorer people have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less to wealthy people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others but people of average wealth have almost as much influence and poor people have a significant degree of political power.
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Final scale Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). Coverage Coverage Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).	2.3. Social rights and equality
Coverage 180	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Coverage Coverage Description Description	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
0	160 pale 140 so

Power distributed by social group (v_23_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pepwrsoc
Name in dataset	v_23_04
Definition	Responses: 0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. 1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a <i>minority</i> of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. 2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a <i>majority</i> of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. 3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time followed by another group, but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power. 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics. Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socio-economic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways and as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society
0	that are understood by those residing in that society to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 00 120 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Representation of disadvantaged social groups (v_23_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgdsadlo
Name in dataset	v_23_05
	Question: Considering all the disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?
Definition	Responses: 1: They have no representation at all. 2: They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population. 3: They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population. 4: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population. 5: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.
	Clarification: Disadvantage refers to socio-economic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged, members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Social rights and equality Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 page 140 140 80 0 0 120 0

Exclusion by socio-economic group (v_23_06)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlecon
Name in dataset	v_23_06
Definition	Index of (political) exclusion by socio-economic group Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socio-economic group (v2pepwrses), socieconomic position equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), access to public services by socio-economic group (v2peapsecon), access to state jobs by socio-economic group (v2peasjsoecon), and access to state business opportunities by socio-economic group (v2peasbecon). Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 plant 140 pl

Exclusion by political group (v_23_07)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlpol
Name in dataset	v_23_07
Definition	Index of (political) exclusion by political group Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol), and access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbpol).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 plant 140 plant 140 plant 100 pl

Exclusion by social group (v_23_08)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlsocgr
Name in dataset	v_23_08
	Index of (political) exclusion by social group
Definition	Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), access to public services by social group (v2peapssoc), access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc), and access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered 40

Exclusion by urban-rural location (v_23_09)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlgeo
Name in dataset	v_23_09
	Index of (political) exclusion by urban-rural location
Definition	Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo), urban-rural equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl), access to public services by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo), access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo), and access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbgeo).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Social rights and equality Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 pa. 140 pa

Religious Tensions/Ethnic Tensions (v_23_10)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	HorJ
Name in dataset	v_23_10
Definition	Religious Tensions: What is the degree of tension within a country attributable to religious divisions, domination, or suppression? Ethnic Tensions: What is the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions?
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	The variable takes the highest score of the two measures from ICRG, indicating the highest level of tensions, whether they are religious or ethnic.
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40

2000

1980

Infant mortality rate (v_23_21)

Data source	UN statistics
Original name	Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)
Name in dataset	v_23_21
Definition	The probability that a child born in a specific year will die before reaching the age of one, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Expressed as a rate per 1000 live births.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN IGME (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Values for 2019 have been imputed by extrapolating a given country's rate of change for 2017/2018.
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160

Life expectancy (v_23_22)

Data source	UN statistics
Original name	Life expectancy at birth (years)
Name in dataset	v_23_22
Definition	The average number of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UNESCO (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into deciles, ranging from 1 (the lowest decile) to 10 (the highest decile). Values for 2021 have been imputed carrying forward the value from 2020.
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 pe 140 noo 120 sep 100 no 60 quantum 20 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Kilocalories per person per day (v_23_23)

	. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Data source	FAO
Original name	Grand Total - kcal/capita/day
Name in dataset	v_23_23
Definition	Calorie supply per capita is the amount of food available for consumption, measured in kilocalories per capita per day. This figure is reached by dividing the total available food supply for human consumption by the population. This data set tracks the calorie supply per capita in each country for calories available from crop products. Although these figures can be taken as the average supply available for consumption, actual consumption by individuals can vary greatly.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN FAO (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Values for 2020 and 2021 have been imputed by carrying forward values from 2019.
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 pa 140 si 100 to aquini 80 to 60

Literacy (v_23_24)

Data source	UNESCO
Original name	Adult literacy rate, population over 15
Name in dataset	v_23_24
Definition	Percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100. Data on literacy is compiled by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on national censuses and household surveys or, for countries without recent literacy data, using the Global Age-Specific Literacy Projection Model.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UNESCO (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Stine interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	140 Per 120 120 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Mean years of schooling (v_23_25)

Data source	IHME
Original name	Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25, age standardized, both sexes
Name in dataset	v_23_25
Definition	Estimates of average years of educational attainment per capita. This measure is available disaggregated by age and gender and is offered in both age-standardized and population-weighted series. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	IHME (2020b)
Data manipulation for aggregation	The original data were separated by gender. These observations were combined to produce a single measure of the mean years of schooling per country per year, by using the gendered data and correcting for gender ratios in the population. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Numper of countries contries and the second of the second

Educational equality (v_23_26)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2peedueq
Name in dataset	v_23_26
Definition	Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens? Responses: 0: Extreme. Provision of high-quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 1: Unequal. Provision of high-quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but 10–25 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 3: Relatively equal. Basic education overall is equal in quality but 5–10 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. Clarification: Basic education typically refers to schooling between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Namper of countries of the contract of the con

Health equality (v_23_27)

V-Dem
v2pehealth
v_23_27
Question: To what extent is high quality basic health care guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens? Responses: 0: Extreme. Because of poor quality health care, at least 75 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 1: Unequal. Because of poor quality health care, at least 25 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor quality health care, 10–25 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 3: Relatively equal. Basic health care overall is equal in quality but because of poor quality health care, 5–10 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than 5 per cent of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens. Clarification: Poor quality health care can leave citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
180 160 per 140 000 120 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Power distributed by gender (v_23_31)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pepwrgen
Name in dataset	v_23_31
Definition	Question: Is political power distributed according to gender? Responses: 0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power. 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence. 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence. 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women. 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 120 80 100 60 40 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

CSO women's participation (v_23_32)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csgender
Name in dataset	v_23_32
Definition	Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations? Responses: 0: Almost always. 1: Frequently. 2: About half the time. 3: Rarely. 4: Almost never. Clarification: Please pay attention to both: (a) whether women are prevented from participating in CSOs because of their gender; and (b) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries of countrie

Female vs. male mean years of schooling (v_23_33)

Data source	IHME
Original name	Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25 - age standardized; male and female
Name in dataset	v_23_33
Definition	Estimates of average years of educational attainment per capita. This measure is available disaggregated by age and gender and is offered in both age-standardized and population weighted series. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	IHME (2020b)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Created a ratio of gender bias in education by dividing the mean for females by the mean for males. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Fundamental Rights Social rights and equality Social requality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 page of the pa

Lower chamber female legislators (v_23_34)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgfemleg
Name in dataset	v_23_34
Definition	Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?
Deminion	Responses: Percentage
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 140 140 150 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 16

Exclusion by gender (v_23_35)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlgender
Name in dataset	v_23_35
	Index of (political) exclusion by gender
Definition	Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by gender (v2pepwgen), equality in respect for civil liberties by gender (v2clgencl), access to public services by gender (v2peapsgen), access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen), and access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 100 120 120 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Women's political rights (v_23_36)

Data source	s (V_23_36) CIRIGHTS
Original variable	wopol
Name in dataset	v_23_36
Definition	Definition: Women's political rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights include: The right to vote; the right to run for political office; the right to hold elected and appointed government positions; the right to join political parties; the right to petition government officials. The indicator measures extensiveness of laws pertaining to women's political rights; and two, government practices towards women or how effectively the government enforces the laws. Component Scale: (0) None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process. (1) Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in
	practice. Women hold less than five percent of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions. (2) Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold more than five percent but less than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions. (3) Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 pal 140 120 120 80 060 40 07 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120

INTERNATIONAL IDEA — FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 10

Women's economic rights (v_23_37)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	wecon
Name in dataset	v_23_37
	Definition: Women's economic rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights include: Equal pay for equal work; Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent; The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent; Equality in hiring and promotion practices; Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc); Non-discrimination by employers; The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace; The right to work at night; The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous; The right to work in the military and the police force.
Definition	Component Scale: (0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women. (1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women. (2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low level of discrimination against women. (3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 00 120 80 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

3. CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT

Checks on Government is the third of the five attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Checks on Government.

1 attribute

· Checks on Government

3 subattributes

- · Effective parliament
- Judicial independence
- · Media integrity

16 indicators

INTERNATIONAL IDEA CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 10

ATTRIBUTE

Checks on Government (C_A3)

oncors on devermment (o_Ae)	
Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_A3
Definition	Besides regular elections, the exercise of political power needs to be continuously subjected to scrutiny. If the other branches of government (the legislature and the judiciary) or a critical and pluralistic press do not check executive power, they are more prone to be abused for private gain and to biased political decision-making and implementation. Vertical accountability through elections should be supplemented by horizontal accountability between elections. The three subattributes were aggregated into the Checks on Government index using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	-
Aggregation	_
Indicators included	C_SD31, C_SD32, C_SD33
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_A3 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A3 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the contries of countries covered to the contries of countries covered to the contries of countries of countries covered to the contries of con

SUBATTRIBUTES

Effective parliament (C_SD31)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD31
Definition	The effectiveness of parliament subattribute denotes the extent to which the legislature is capable of overseeing the executive. It includes three indicators from the V-Dem experts survey that tap fairly directly into the effectiveness of parliament. Another V-Dem indicator on executive oversight and the executive constraints indicator from Polity are included as they capture relevant aspects of institutional Checks on Government not covered by judicial independence and media integrity. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on Government.
Indicators included	v_31_01, v_31_02, v_31_03, v_31_04, v_31_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD31 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD31 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the first state of t

INTERNATIONAL IDEA — CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 10

Judicial independence (C_SD32)

	(-1)
Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD32
Definition	The judicial independence subattribute denotes the extent to which the courts are not subject to undue influence from the other branches of government, especially the executive. Since our framework places judicial independence under the attribute concerning Checks on Government, it is important to supplement the four judicial independence indicators with two indicators on government compliance with the courts. The six indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on Government.
Indicators included	v_32_01, v_32_02, v_32_03, v_32_04, v_32_05, v_32_06
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	L_SD32 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD32 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries covered and the contract of the contract o

Media integrity (C_SD33)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD33
Definition	The media integrity subattribute denotes the extent to which the media landscape offers diverse and critical coverage of political issues. Media integrity and freedom of expression are related. Nonetheless, the media can do a poor job controlling the government even in a situation of media freedom if they are very one-sided, uncritical, superficial or corrupt. V-Dem offers indicators that reflect these additional circumstances. These indicators are based on expert surveys in addition to an in-house coded indicator from MFD, which indicates whether the media are critical of the government and its officials. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government
Aggregation	IRT of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on Government.
Indicators included	v_33_01, v_33_02, v_33_03, v_33_04, v_33_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD33 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD33 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 140 120 120 120 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

INTERNATIONAL IDEA — CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 11

INDICATORS

Legislature questions officials in practice (v_31_01)

-	. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgqstexp
Name in dataset	v_31_01
Definition	Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials? Responses: 0: No - never or very rarely. 1: Yes - routinely. Clarification: 'Question' means, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain policies or testify.
Original scale	Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Numper of countries contributed by the contributed

Executive oversight (v_31_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgotovst
Name in dataset	v_31_02
	Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavourable decision or report?
Definition	Responses: 0: Extremely unlikely. 1: Unlikely. 2: Very uncertain. 3: Likely. 4: Certain or nearly certain.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 160 120 120 120 100 100 100 100 100 100 10
	20

INTERNATIONAL IDEA CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 11

Legislature investigates in practice (v_31_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lginvstp
Name in dataset	v_31_03
	Question: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavourable to the executive?
Definition	Responses: 0: Extremely unlikely. 1: Unlikely. 2: As likely as not. 3: Likely. 4: Certain or nearly certain.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 160 100 100 80 40 20 0
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Legislature opposition parties (v_31_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgoppart
Name in dataset	v_31_04
	Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?
Definition	Responses: 0: No, not at all. 1: Occasionally. 2: Yes, for the most part.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place.
Indicator of	Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 120 140 20 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

INTERNATIONAL IDEA CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 11

Executive constraints (v_31_05)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	xconst
Name in dataset	v_31_05
Definition	Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any 'accountability groups'. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisers in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and, in many states, a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A sevencategory scale is used: 1. Unlimited authority. 2. Intermediate category. 3. Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority. 4. Intermediate category. 5. Substantial limitations on executive authority. 6. Intermediate category. 7. Executive party or subordination.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries of the contribution of the

High Court independence (v_32_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juhcind
Name in dataset	v_32_01
Definition	Question: When the High Court in the judicial system rules in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect the government's wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record? Responses: 0: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 4: Never.
	Clarification: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without 'merely reflecting' those wishes, in that a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. 'Merely reflect the wishes of the government' means that the court's own sincere evaluation of the record is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.2. Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the contries of

INTERNATIONAL IDEA CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 11

Lower court independence (v_32_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juncind
Name in dataset	v_32_02
	Question: When judges not in the High Court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government's wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?
Definition	Responses: 0: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 4: Never.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Checks on Government Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covering the state of th

Compliance with High Court (v_32_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juhccomp
Name in dataset	v_32_03
	Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the High Court with which it disagrees?
Definition	Responses: 0: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Checks on Government Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Numper of countries countries and the countries countries and the countries countries and the countries countries and the countries are considered as a second of the countries and the countries are considered as a second of the countries are

INTERNATIONAL IDEA CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 11

Compliance with judiciary (v_32_04)

V-Dem
v2jucomp
v_32_04
Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?
Responses: 0: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.
Clarification: We are looking for a judgment on the entire judiciary excluding the High Court. Consider judges in both the ordinary courts and the specialized courts.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Checks on Government Judicial independence
IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
180 plant of countries covered to the countries of countries covered to the countries of countries of countries of countries covered to the countries of countrie

Law and order (v_32_05)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Law and order (I)
Name in dataset	v_32_05
Definition	To what extent is the legal system strong and impartial and to what degree is there popular observance of the law?
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Checks on Government Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	140 pa 120 seith and the second sec

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Independent judiciary (v_32_06)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	injud
Name in dataset	v_32_06
	Definition: This variable indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military. Important questions to consider include: Are judges safe from removal by other government officials? Can actions of other government branches be challenged in the courts? Are court hearings public? Are judicial officials generally free from corruption and intimidation? Are case outcomes protected from governmental interference?
Definition	Component Scale: As an institution, the judiciary is: (0) Not Independent: Active and widespread constraints on the judiciary, including active government interference in the decision of cases or widespread corruption and judicial intimidation from either inside or outside government; (1) Partially Independent: Structural limitations of judicial independence without active government interference or occasional or limited corruption and judicial intimidation from non-governmental actors; (2) Generally Independent: The judiciary has the right to rule on the constitutionality of legislative acts and executive decrees; judges at the highest level of courts have a minimum of a seven-year tenure; the President or Minister of Justice cannot directly appoint or remove judges. The removal of judges is restricted (e.g. allowed for criminal misconduct); actions of the executive and legislative branch can be challenged in the courts; all court hearings are public; judgeships are held by professionals.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Cingranelli et al. (2021)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2018 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Cingranelli et al. (2021).
Indicator of	Checks on Government Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Critical Print/broadcast media (v_33_01)

V-Dem
v2mecrit
v_33_01
Question: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?
Responses: 0: None. 1: Only a few marginal outlets. 2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do. 3: All major media outlets criticize the government, at least occasionally.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
3. Checks on Government 3.3. Media integrity
IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
180 160 140 140 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

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Print/broadcast media perspectives (v_33_02)

V-Dem
v2merange
v_33_02
Question: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?
Responses: 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective. 1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party. 2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society. 3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Checks on Government Media integrity
IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Media bias (v_33_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mebias
Name in dataset	v_33_03
Definition	Question: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates? Responses: 0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage; or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover. 1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage. 2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate. 3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates. 4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness. Clarification: Take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered 'more or less impartial' when the media as a whole presents a mix of positive and negative coverage
Original scale	of each party or candidate. Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.3. Media integrity
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 pal 140 0 120 80 0 1990 2000 2010 2020

INTERNATIONAL IDEA CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT 12

Media corrupt (v_33_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mecorrpt
Name in dataset	v_33_04
	Question: Do journalists, publishers or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?
Definition	Responses: 0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage. 1: Journalists, publishers and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments. 2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments. 3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally without anyone being punished. 4: Journalists, publishers and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Checks on Government Media integrity
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 120 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Media freedom (v_33_05)

Media freedom
v_33_05
The media environments around the world are sorted into three basic categories: 1 — Free: Countries where criticism of the government and government officials is a common and normal part of the political dialogue in the mediated public sphere. 2 — Imperfectly Free: Countries where the social, legal or economic costs related to criticism of the government or government officials limit public criticism, but investigative journalism and criticism of major policy failings can and do occur. 3 — Not Free: Countries where it is not possible to safely criticize government or government officials.
Clarification: In the original data set (Van Belle 2000), there were four categories. Category 4 meant that the government directly controlled all news media, whereas category 3 meant that the government exerted indirect control. Since the end of the Cold War and with the massive growth in information technology, distinguishing between state-operated news media and media controlled by other means became something of a pointless exercise.
Ordinal
Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle (2017)
The scale is inverted so that higher values denote better performance.
Checks on Government 3.3. Media integrity
IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
160 Pe 140 So on the period of

INTERNATIONAL IDEA — IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION 12

4. IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION

Impartial Administration represents the fourth of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index on Impartial Administration:

1 attribute

Impartial Administration

2 subattributes

- Absence of corruption
- · Predictable enforcement

11 indicators

ATTRIBUTE

Impartial Administration (C_A4)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_A4
Definition	The government and the public administration more generally should implement official public policies in an impartial manner. If implementation is unfair and unpredictable, large discrepancies between official laws and policies, on the one hand, and practices, on the other, undermine democratic principles. Thus, democracy is a matter not only of access to power and control of power, but also of the exercise of power. Since Impartial Administration to a large extent overlaps with the concept of the rule of law, this attribute is also rooted in the tradition that emphasizes the liberal aspects of democracy. The two subattributes were aggregated into the Impartial Administration index using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	_
Aggregation	_
Indicators included	C_SD41, C_SD42
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_A4 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A4 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	180 160 200 2010 2020 2010 2020

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SUBATTRIBUTES

Absence of corruption (C_SD41)

Absence of corruption	(0_00 1.)
Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD41
Definition	The absence of corruption subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and the public administration, more broadly, do not abuse their office for personal gain. Four V-Dem indicators explicitly refer to corruption in the government broadly understood, i.e., the executive and public administration more generally (but excluding courts and parliaments). We make use of these and another expert-coded but broader indicator on government corruption from the ICRG data set. The five indicators have been aggregated into the absence of corruption subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration
Aggregation	BFA of 4.1. absence of corruption and 4.2. predictable enforcement to create 4. Impartial Administration
Indicators included	v_41_01, V_41_02, v_41_03, v_41_04, v_41_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD41 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD41 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Numper of countries countries and the countries countries are considered as a second countries and the countries are considered as a second countries and the countries are considered as a second countries and the countries are considered as a second countries are consi

Predictable enforcement (C_SD42)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD42
Definition	The predictable enforcement subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and public officials enforce laws in a predictable manner. To measure predictable enforcement, five expert-coded V-Dem indicators were included: the executive's respect for constitutional provisions, the presence of transparent laws with predictable enforcement, rule-abidingness in the public sector, meritocratic appointment criteria in the state administration and armed forces. To these was added an indicator from the ICRG (also expert-coded) on the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy. The six indicators were aggregated into the predictable enforcement subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration
Aggregation	BFA of 4.1. absence of corruption and 4.2. predictable enforcement to create 4. Impartial Administration
Indicators included	v_42_01, v_42_02, v_42_03, v_42_04, v_42_05, v_42_06
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	L_SD42 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD42 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	Number of countries of the page of the pag

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INDICATORS

Public sector corrupt exchanges (v_41_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2excrptps
Name in dataset	v_41_01
Definition	Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements? Responses: 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time. 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees. 2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times. 3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time. 4: No. Never, or hardly ever. Clarification: When responding to this question, think about a typical person employed in the public sector, excluding the military. If there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core
	bureaucracy and employees working in public service delivery, try to average them out before stating your response.
Original scale	Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.1. Absence of corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Public sector theft (v_41_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2exthftps
Name in dataset	v_41_02
Definition	Question: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?
	Responses: 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their persona or family property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them as personal property. 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others as personal property. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.
	Clarification: When responding to this question, think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in public service delivery, try to average them out before stating your response.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Impartial Administration A.1. Absence of corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 120 120 80 60 40 0

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Executive embezzlement and theft (v_41_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2exembez
Name in dataset	v_41_03
	Question: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?
Definition	Responses: 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. 1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as personal property. 2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them as personal property. 3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others as personal property. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Impartial Administration A.1. Absence of corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v_41_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2exbribe
Name in dataset	v_41_04
	Question: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers) or their agents grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements?
Definition	Responses: 0: It is routine and expected. 1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive. 2: It happens but is unpredictable; those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be required. 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected. 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Impartial Administration A.1. Absence of corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 pe 140 Numper 140 00 120 80 00 60 40 20 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

INTERNATIONAL IDEA IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION 13

Corruption (v_41_05)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Corruption (F)
Name in dataset	v_41_05
Definition	This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licences, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loans. Although this measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favour-for-favours', secret party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	Impartial Administration A.1. Absence of corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	140 Per 120 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Executive respects constitution (v_42_01)

V-Dem
v2exrescon
v_42_01
Question: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?
Responses: 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to without legal consequences. 1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but must respect certain provisions. 2: Somewhere between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences. 3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution and when it happens they face legal charges. 4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
4. Impartial Administration 4.2. Predictable enforcement
IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable enforcement.
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Number of countries covered and services are services and services are services are services and services are services are services and services are services are services and

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Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v_42_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cltrnslw
Name in dataset	v_42_02
Definition	Question: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year and enforced in a predictable manner? Responses: 0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion. 1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion. 2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country. 3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion. 4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion. Clarification: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Impartial Administration 4.2. Predictable enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 pa 140 0 120 80 0 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Rigorous and impartial public administration (v_42_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clrspct
Name in dataset	v_42_03
Definition	Question: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties? Responses: 0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant. 1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread. 2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate. 3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited. 4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rare. Clarification: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike; or, conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and bias (i.e. nepotism, cronyism or discrimination). The question covers the public officials who handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	Impartial Administration 4.2. Predictable enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 pad 140 pa

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Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (v_42_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2stcritrecadm
Name in dataset	v_42_04
Definition	Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?
	Responses: 0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit. 1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
	 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit. 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit. 4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit. Clarification
	Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical de facto (rather than de jure) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.2. Predictable enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the property of
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (v_42_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2stcritapparm
Name in dataset	v_42_05
Definition	Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit? Responses: 0: All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit. 1: Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit. 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit. 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit. 4: None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit. Clarification Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical de facto (rather than de jure) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large dilerences between dilerent branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.2. Predictable enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the condition of the condi

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Bureaucratic quality (v_42_06)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Bureaucratic quality (L)
Name in dataset	v_42_06
Definition	The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.2. Predictable enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	140 Pal 120 Namper of countries coordinates and the second

5. PARTICIPATORY ENGAGEMENT

Participatory Engagement represents the fifth of the five attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. We do not estimate a single value at the attribute level in this case.

This section of the Codebook offers details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise this attribute.

4 subattributes

- Civil society participation
- Electoral participation
- · Direct democracy
- Sub-national elections

11 indicators

SUBATTRIBUTES

Civil society participation (C_SD51)

ivii society participati	Sivil Society participation (C_SDST)	
Data source	GSoD Indices	
Original variable	Constructed variable	
Name in dataset	C_SD51	
Definition	The measurement of civil society participation relies on six V-Dem indicators. They result from an expert survey and consider the extent to which the population is engaged in civil society activities, including political associations and independent trade unions. The six indicators on civil society participation were clearly tapped into a common dimension and aggregated into an index using BFA.	
Original scale	Interval	
Citation	Skaaning (2022)	
Data manipulation for aggregation	_	
Indicator of	_	
Aggregation	_	
Indicators included	v_51_01, v_51_02, v_51_03, v_51_04, v_51_05, v_51_06	
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).	
Auxiliary variables	L_SD51 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD51 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval	
Coverage	Number of countries of countrie	

Electoral participation (C_SD52)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD52
Definition	The level of electoral participation for the adult voting age population (VAP) in the last national election.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	-
Aggregation	_
Indicators included	v_52_01
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	_
Coverage	Number of countries of countrie

Direct Democracy (C_SD53)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD53
Definition	V-Dem offers the only comprehensive data set in the form of the direct democracy index developed by David Altman (2016). It is based on observable variables on the formal opportunities for and actual use of different instruments of direct democracy at the national level. However, it seems pertinent to take into account whether mechanisms of direct democracy are available and used in a context where elections are generally respected as the main source of political power. To do so, the Clean Elections subattribute is also used here. The measure of direct democracy and the Clean Elections subattribute are multiplied to estimate the Direct Democracy subattribute score.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	_
Aggregation	_
Indicators included	v_53_01, C_SD11
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	_
Coverage	180 ped 140 noo 120 septimination of the property of the prope

Local Democracy (C_SD54)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in dataset	C_SD54
Definition	V-Dem is also the only provider of a comprehensive, cross-national data set on subnational elections. The local government index indicates whether the local government is elected and whether it is empowered in relation to the central government, while another indicator assesses the freedom and fairness of subnational elections.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	_
Aggregation	_
Indicators included	v_54_01, v_54_02
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	_
Coverage	Number of constraints and the constraints are already are already and the constraints are already are already and the constraints are already and the constrai

INDICATORS

CSO participatory environment (v_51_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csprtcpt
Name in dataset	v_51_01
Definition	Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)? Responses: 0: Most associations are state-sponsored and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them. 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal. 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 per 140 Noo 120 septimor 100 and 40 No 20 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Engaged society (v_51_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2dlengage
Name in dataset	v_51_02
	Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?
Definition	Responses: 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never, allowed. 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite level is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but infrequent; and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tend to be the same across issue-areas. 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate; these vary with different issue-areas. 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighbourhoods and in the streets. Grassroots deliberation is common and unconstrained. Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifest in discussion, debate and other
	public forums such as popular media.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 120 80 100 60 40 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

CSO consultation (v_51_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cscnsult
Name in dataset	v_51_03
	Question: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?
Definition	Responses: 0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the condition of the condi

Engagement in independent non-political associations (v_51_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2canonpol
Name in dataset	v_51_04
	Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups, or support groups?
Definition	Responses: 0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 0: Virtually no one. 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%). 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %). 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%). 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more). Clarification: Non-political associations include all associations whose main purpose is not the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties, or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting
Original apple	activity or event at least twice a year.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	Number of countries covered to the part of
	1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Engagement in independent political associations (v_51_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2capolit
Name in dataset	v_51_05
Definition	Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?
	Responses: 0: Virtually no one. 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%). 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %). 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%). 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).
	Clarification: Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 120 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Engagement in independent trade unions (v_51_06)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2catrauni
Name in dataset	v_51_06
	Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions?
Definition	Responses: 0: Virtually no one. 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%). 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %). 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%). 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more). Clarification: An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10

Electoral participation (v_52_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elvaptrn
Name in dataset	v_52_01
	Question: According to official results, what percentage (%) of the adult voting age population (VAP) cast a vote in this national election?
	Responses:
Definition	Percentage
Delilition	Clarification: The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, VAP values can surpass 100, which is not an error but reflects such conditions.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent AND the Bjørnskov and Rode (2021) Electoral variable is also coded as 0, indicating that no elections took place. A small number of cases had values higher than 100. For each of these cases the International IDEA Voter turnout database was checked and these were coded as either 100 (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections was close to 100%) or missing (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections was not close to 100%).
Indicator of	-
Aggregation	_
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 Pa 140 120 Sonot 120 140 150 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 16

Direct democracy (v_53_01)

Data source	V-Dem					
Original variable	v2xdd_dd					
Name in dataset	v_53_01					
Definition	Question: To what extent are direct popular votes utilized? Clarification: Direct popular votes are institutionalized processes by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. The term is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums and plebiscites, as they are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Similarly, it does not apply to elections for representatives.					
Original scale	Interval					
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2022)					
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent.					
Indicator of	5.3. Direct Democracy					
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_53_02					
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).					
Coverage	180 160 140 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10					

Local government index (v_54_01)

Data source	V-Dem						
Original variable	v2xel_locelec						
Name in dataset	v_54_01						
	Question: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level? Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local						
Definition	governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.						
Original scale	Interval						
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2022)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as 0 if no regular local elections, as stipulated by election law, are held (if V-Dem indicator v2elffelrbin_ord = 0).						
Indicator of	5.4. Subnational elections						
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_54_02						
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage	180 per 140 Noo John 190 100 80 John 100 8						

Subnational elections free and fair (v_54_02)

Data source	V-Dem				
Original variable	v2elffelr				
Name in dataset	v_54_02				
Definition	Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average? Responses: 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office). 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome (who won office). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office). 4: Yes. There were a certain amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Clarification: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. 'Free and fair' refers to all aspects of the election process except the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (which is				
Oviginal apple	measured separately). Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.				
Original scale Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2022)				
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as 0 if no regular local elections, as stipulated by election law, are held (if V-Dem indicator v2ellocelc = 0).				
Indicator of	5.4. Subnational elections				
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_54_01				
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).				
Coverage	160 pa 140 120 so 100 120 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020				

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About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

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The Global State of Democracy is a report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices), in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world.

This document presents revised and updated information about all the variables included in the GSoD indices data set that enabled the construction of Version 6 of the GSoD Indices, which depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2021.

The data underlying the GSoD Indices is based on a total of 116 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.

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