


The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook

Version 3 (2019)





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Claudiu D. Tufis

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About International IDEA

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About this document

The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook, Version 3 is the third in a series of documents prepared by International IDEA to present the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices. The Codebook presents information about all the variables included in the dataset: identifying variables, attributes of democracy, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators. The other two documents are *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 3* (Skaaning 2019), which presents the theoretical framework that guided the construction of the Indices, and *The Global State of Democracy Indices Guide, Version 3* (Tufis 2019), which outlines the technical aspects of constructing the Indices.

Version 3 of the GSoD Indices depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2018 but does not provide a single index of democracy. The Indices produce data for 158 countries. The data underlying the Indices is based on a total of 97 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.

The Global State of Democracy is a biennial report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the GSoD Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. The first edition of the report (International IDEA 2017), explored the conditions under which democracy can be resilient and how to strengthen its capacity as a system to overcome challenges and threats.

Version 3 of the GSoD Indices can be accessed online: http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices

Introduction

The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook, Version 3 is the third in a series of documents prepared by International IDEA to present the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices. The Codebook presents information about all the variables included in the dataset: identifying variables, attributes of democracy, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators. The other two documents are *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 3* (Skaaning 2019), which presents the theoretical framework that guided the construction of the Indices, and *The Global State of Democracy Indices Guide, Version 3* (Tufis 2019), which outlines the technical aspects of constructing the Indices.

The main objective of the GSoD Indices is to provide systematic data that captures trends at the global, regional and national levels for different aspects of International IDEA's comprehensive understanding of democracy. The Indices turn a broad range of empirical indicators from various datasets into measures of different aspects of democracy that can be used to evaluate the state of democracy at the global, regional and national levels. They can also assist stakeholders, such as policymakers, researchers and civil society actors in their analyses of trends related to different aspects of democracy and identification of priority policy areas.

The GSoD Indices, which were constructed for the first time in 2017 and updated in 2018 and 2019, cover the 158 independent countries with more than one million inhabitants in the period 1975 to 2018. They are composite measures based on 97 indicators from different kinds of extant data sources. These indicators are assigned to the different subattributes of the conceptual framework and combined in the GSoD Indices.

The GSoD Indices have been produced by a team of International IDEA staff and two external experts. The construction of the GSoD Indices was supervised by an expert advisory board consisting of five leading experts in the field of democracy measurement. Careful justification and documentation of the conceptual distinctions and methodological choices made as well as the use of state-of-the-art procedures were emphasized at all stages in the construction of the Indices. This was done to ensure consistency and transparency, as well as high levels of measurement validity and reliability.

The main section of the Codebook is devoted to presenting information about all the variables included in the dataset. The identifying variables are presented first. The attributes, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators are then presented, grouped by attribute of democracy. Within each attribute, the variables are presented from the highest to the lowest level of aggregation, which means that the attributes are presented first, followed by the corresponding subattributes, the corresponding subcomponents (only in the case of the second attribute, fundamental rights) and finally the corresponding indicators.

Identifying variables

ID Country Year (ID_country_year)

Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	ID_country_year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each combination of country and year (the country–year) in the data set. It has been constructed by concatenating the Correlates of War country code (COWcode) and the year, so that the last four digits of the variable always indicate the year, while the remaining one to three digits preceding the year represent the COWcode.

ID Country Name (ID_country_name)

Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	ID_country_name
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 158 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the countries included in the data set.
Countries	Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austraia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania,Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

ID Country Code (ID_country_code)

Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	ID_country_code
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 158 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the Correlates of War country code (COWcode).

ID Year (ID_year)

Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	ID_year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 44 years included in the data set (from 1975 to 2018).

ID Region (ID_region)

Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	ID_region
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the six regions in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the regions included in the data set. For more details see Tufis (2019).
Regions	Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and Iran, Europe

ID Subregion (ID_subregion)

Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	ID_subregion
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 19 subregions in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the subregions included in the data set. For more details see Tufis (2019).
Subregions	East Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, North Africa, Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, South America, North America, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, Oceania, Middle East and Iran, East-Central Europe, Eastern Europe/Post-Soviet Europe, North and West Europe, South Europe

1. Representative Government

Representative Government is the first of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Representative Government.

1 attribute

• Representative Government

4 subattributes

- Clean elections
- Inclusive suffrage
- Free political parties
- Elected government

18 indicators

Attribute

Representative Government (C_A1)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_A1
Definition	The representative government attribute emphasizes contested and inclusive popular elections for legislative and executive offices. This attribute distinguishes among four subattributes. Three of them (clean elections, free political parties and elected government) have been aggregated into a contestation index using Bayesian factor analysis (BFA). The representative government index is obtained by multiplying the contestation index by the fourth subattribute, inclusive suffrage.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	
Aggregation	
Indicators included	C_SD11, C_SD12, C_SD13, C_SD14
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	L_A1 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A1 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	

Subattributes

Clean Elections (C_SD11)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD11
Definition	The clean elections subattribute denotes the extent to which elections for national, representative political office are free from irregularities. All of the selected indicators tap into the quality of elections. Two of the indicators reflect free elections more generally, whereas the other indicators capture more specific aspects of this feature, such as irregularities in voter registration and government intimidation. The six indicators have been aggregated into the clean elections subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	1. Representative Government
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage.
Indicators included	V_11_01, V_11_02, V_11_03, V_11_04, V_11_05, V_11_06
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	L_SD11 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD11 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	10^{-1}

Inclusive Suffrage (C_SD12)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD12
Definition	The inclusive suffrage subattribute denotes the extent to which adult citizens have equal and universal passive and active voting rights.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	1. Representative Government
Aggregation	Weighted average of the two variables, with suffrage counting twice as much as voter registration. Thereafter multiplication with the contestation index.
Indicators included	V_12_01, V_12_02
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score)
Auxiliary variables	L_SD11 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD11 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $

Free Political Parties (C_SD13)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD13
Definition	The free political parties subattribute denotes the extent to which political parties are free to form and campaign for political office. Six indicators, partly based on expert surveys and partly in-house coded, are used to measure how free political parties are. All of them reflect whether political parties generally, and opposition parties in particular, are allowed to organize freely and run in elections. The six indicators have been aggregated into the free political parties subattribute using item response theory (IRT).
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	1. Representative Government
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage.
Indicators included	v_13_01, v_13_02, v_13_03, v_13_04, v_13_05, v_13_06
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD13 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD13 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $

Elected Government (C_SD14)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD14
Definition	The elected government subattribute denotes the extent to which national, representative government offices are filled through elections. It is operationalized using four indicators from V-Dem, Polity and BRRD. All the indicators have a rather formal focus, which means that they do not assess the quality of elections or fully capture the extent to which reserved domains and undue influence from non-elected groups might in practice restrict elected officials' effective power to govern. The four indicators were aggregated into the elected government subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	1. Representative Government
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage.
Indicators included	v_14_01, v_14_02, v_14_03, v_14_04
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD14 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD14 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $


Indicators

EMB autonomy (v_11_01)


V-Dem						
vzelembaut						
Vzelenibaut						
V_11_01						
Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?						
 Responses: o: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military or another de facto ruling body. 1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial towards the de facto ruling body. 2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election. 3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections. 4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections law and administrative rules. Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections. 						
Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.						
Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)						
Coded as o if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent.						
1. Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections						
BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.						
Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
160						

EMB capacity (v_11_02)

Data source	V-Dem						
Original variable	vzelembcap						
GSoD name	V_11_02						
Definition	Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well- run national election? Responses:						
	 o: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory. 1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country. 2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB. 3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread. 4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election. 						
Original scale	Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.						
Citation							
citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as o if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent.						
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections						
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage	160 100 100 100 100 100 100 100						
	1975 1985 1995 2005 2015						



Election other voting irregularities (v_11_03)



Election government intimidation (v_11_04)

Election free and fair (v_11_05)

Data source	V-Dem						
Original variable	v2elfrfair						
GSoD name	V_11_05						
Definition	Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? Responses: o: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e. who became president or who won the legislative majority). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (as defined above). 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and some logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Clarification: The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).						
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.						
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as o if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent.						
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections						
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage	160 100 100 100 100 100 100 100						

Competition (v_11_06)

Data source	LIED						
Original variable	competitive elections						
GSoD name	v_11_06						
Definition	The chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative body are filled using elections that are characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain power if they were to attract sufficient support from the electorate. This presumes that control over key executive and legislative offices is determined by elections, the executive and members of the legislature have not been unconstitutionally removed and the legislature has not been dissolved. With respect to the electoral process, this presumes that the constitutional timing of elections has not been violated (in more than a marginal fashion), non-extremist parties are not banned, opposition candidates are generally free to participate, voters experience little systematic coercion in exercising their electoral choice and electoral fraud does not determine who wins. With respect to the outcome, this presumes that the declared winner of executive and legislative elections reflects the votes cast by the electorate, as near as can be determined from extant sources. Incumbent turnover (as a result of multiparty elections) is regarded as a strong indicator of competition but is neither necessary nor sufficient. In addition, reports from outside observers (as reported in books, articles and country reports) are used to determine whether the abovementioned conditions have been met in a given election. Coding for this variable does <i>not</i> take into account whether there is a level playing field, all contestants gain access to funding and the media, media coverage is unbiased, civil liberties are respected or other features associated with fully free and fair elections are present. Competition therefore sets a modest threshold.						
Original scale	Nominal						
Citation	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as o if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent.						
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections						
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean elections.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage							
	1975 1985 1995 2005 2015						

Inclusive suffrage (v_12_01)

Data source	V-Dem						
Original variable	vzelsuffrage						
GSoD name	V_12_01						
Definition	Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?						
	Responses: Per cent.						
	Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100. The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.						
Original scale	0% to 100%.						
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2019)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as o if the electoral regime (vzx_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent.						
Indicator of	1. Representative Government						
Aggregation	Weighted average to construct subattribute 1.2 Inclusive suffrage.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $						

Election voter registry (v_12_02)

Data source	V-Dem						
Original variable	vzelrgstry						
GSoD name	V_12_02						
Definition	Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used? Responses: o: No. There was no registry or the registry was not used. 1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double voting and impersonation). 2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes. 3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly. 4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.						
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.						
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as o if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent.						
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.1. Clean elections						
Aggregation	Weighted average to construct subattribute 1.2 Inclusive suffrage.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage							

Party ban (v_13_01)

Data source	V-Dem					
Original variable	vzpsparban					
GSoD name	V_13_01					
Definition	Question: Are any political parties banned?					
	 Responses: o: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. 1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties. 2: Yes. Many parties are banned. 3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned. 4: No. No parties are officially banned. Clarification: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds. 					
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.					
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)					
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).					
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.3. Free political parties					
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.					
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).					
Coverage	10^{-1}					

Barriers to parties (v_13_02)


Data source	V-Dem						
Original variable	vzpsbars						
GSoD name	V_13_02						
Definition	Question: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a political party?						
	 Responses: o: Parties are not allowed. 1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally). 2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities). 3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities). 4: There are no substantial barriers. 						
	Clarification: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits as well as harassment.						
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.						
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)						
Data manipulation for	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).						
aggregation							
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.3. Free political parties						
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage							
	1975 1985 1995 2005 2015						

Opposition parties' autonomy (v_13_03)

Data source	V-Dem					
Original variable	vzpsoppaut					
GSoD name	V_13_03					
Definition	Question: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime? Responses: o: Opposition parties are not allowed. 1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co- opted by the ruling regime. 2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. Clarification: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government—that is, it has no control over the executive.					
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.					
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)					
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).					
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.3. Free political parties					
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.					
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).					
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$					

Elections multiparty (v_13_04)

Data source	V-Dem						
Original variable	vzelmulpar						
GSoD name	V_13_04						
Definition	Question: Was this national election multiparty? Responses: o: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few political parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party). 1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency. 2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained, either legally or informally. 3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (<i>de jure</i> or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory. 4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. farright/left extremist parties, or anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).						
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.						
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Recoded into 20 categories, each of which contains five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent.						
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.3. Free political parties						
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage	160						




Competitiveness of participation (v_13_05)

Multiparty elections (v_13_06)

Data source	LIED						
Original variable	multiparty legislative elections						
GSoD name	v_13_06						
Definition	Multiparty legislative elections are defined by the existence of two conditions: legislative elections (LEGSELEC) and opposition (OPPOSITION).						
	LEGSELEC: A legislative body issues at least some laws and does not perform executive functions. The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is at least partly elected. The legislature has not been closed.						
	OPPOSITION: The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is (at least in part) elected by voters facing more than one choice. Specifically, parties are not banned and either more than one party is allowed to compete or elections are nonpartisan (i.e. all the candidates run without party labels).						
Original scale	Nominal						
Citation	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015)						
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as o if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent.						
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.3. Free political parties						
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free political parties.						
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).						
Coverage							

Elected	executive	index	(v_	_14_	01)
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Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2x_elecoff
GSoD name	V_14_01
Definition	Question: Are the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?
	Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly by popular elections or indirectly by a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and whether, in presidential systems with a directly elected president who is also the chief executive, the legislature is directly elected. Note that a popular election is only minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, 'appointment' by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order Indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 0, 0.5 and 1.
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.4. Elected government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160



Competitiveness of executive recruitment (v_14_02)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	xropen
GSoD name	V_14_03
Definition	 Recruitment of the chief executive is 'open' to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded unregulated (1) in Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1) or involve a transition to/from unregulated, openness is coded o. Four categories are used: 1. Closed: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, emirs, who assume executive power by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded 'closed' unless a relative succeeds him as ruler. 2. Dual Executive-Designation: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister. 3. Dual Executive-Election: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister. 4. Open: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election or transitional arrangements between designation and election.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2019: 22)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Recoded 0, 1 and 2 as 0; 3 as 0.5; and 4 as 1.
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.4. Elected government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160

Openness of executive recruitment (v_14_03)

Electoral (v_14_04)

Data source	BRRD
Original variable	electoral
GSoD name	V_14_04
Definition	Does a country have no regular elections, elections in an effectively one- party state, elections with opposition parties but without an actual chance of government change, or full democracy? Alternative democracy indicator capturing degree of multi-party competition (No elections=o, Single-party elections=1, non-democratic multi-party elections=2, democratic elections= 3).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bjørnskov and Rode (2018)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	1. Representative Government 1.4. Elected government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $

2. Fundamental Rights

Fundamental Rights is the second of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices.

This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes, subcomponents and indicators that comprise the index of Fundamental Rights:

1 attribute

• Fundamental Rights

3 subattributes

- Access to justice
- Civil liberties
- Social rights and equality

8 subcomponents

- Freedom of expression
- Freedom of association and assembly
- Freedom of religion
- Freedom of movement
- Personal integrity and security
- Social group equality
- Basic welfare
- Gender equality

46 indicators

Attribute

Fundamental Rights (C_A2)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_A2
Definition	Fundamental Rights in the form of liberal and social rights support both fair representation and the vertical mechanism of accountability that the first attribute seeks to achieve. This attribute is composed of three subattributes: access to justice, civil liberties, and social rights and equality. The three subattributes were aggregated into the Fundamental Rights index using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	
Aggregation	
Indicators included	C_SD21, C_SD22, C_SD23
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_A2 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A2 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	

Subattributes

Access to justice (C_SD21)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD21
Definition	The access to justice subattribute denotes the extent to which the legal system is fair (i.e., citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and have the right to be under the jurisdiction of, and to seek redress from, competent, independent and impartial tribunals without undue delay). It comprises four expert coded variables (V-Dem) that go beyond the independence of courts and an in-house coded CLD measure of the right to a fair trial. The five indicators were aggregated into the access to justice subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality
Indicators included	V_21_01, V_21_02, V_21_03, V_21_04, V_21_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD21 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD21 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	

Civil liberties (C_SD22)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD22
Definition	The civil liberties subattribute denotes the extent to which civil rights and liberties are respected. The five civil liberties subcomponents are freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, and personal integrity and security, each of which reflects core concepts in the human rights literature. The five subcomponents were aggregated into the civil liberties subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality
Indicators included	C_SD22A, C_SD22B, C_SD22C, C_SD22D, C_SD22E,
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	

Social rights and equality (C_SD23)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD23
Definition	The social rights and equality subattribute denotes the extent to which basic welfare (i.e. social security, health care and education) and political and social equality between social groups and genders are realized. The three social rights and equality subcomponents are social group equality, basic welfare and gender equality, each of which reflects core concepts in the human rights literature. The three subcomponents were aggregated into the social rights and equality subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality
Indicators included	C_SD23A, C_SD23B, C_SD23C
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD23 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $

Subcomponents

Freedom of expression (C_SD22A)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD22A
Definition	The freedom of expression subcomponent is measured using indicators from V-Dem and CLD. The question underlying the CLD variable is fairly encompassing, whereas the V-Dem variables are more specific and refer to different aspects of media freedom and to the right to openly discuss political issues and express political opinions outside the mass media (two measure freedom of expression, for men and women respectively). The seven indicators were aggregated into the freedom of expression subcomponent using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security.
Indicators included	V_22_01, V_22_02, V_22_03, V_22_04, V_22_05, V_22_06, V_22_07
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22A = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22A = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD22B
Definition	Three indicators that directly refer to freedom of association for political and civil groups. These three indicators were aggregated into the freedom of association and assembly subcomponent using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
Indicators included	V_22_08, V_22_09, V_22_10
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22B = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22B = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	160

Freedom of religion (C_SD22C)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD22C
Definition	A separate subcomponent index comprised of two V-Dem general indicators on religious freedom based on expert surveys and a similarly broad in-house coded variable from CLD. The three indicators were aggregated into the freedom of religion subcomponent using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
Indicators included	V_22_11, V_22_12, V_22_13
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22C = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22C = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	160

Freedom of movement (C_SD22D)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD22D
Definition	Freedom of movement was captured by a general, in-house coded indicator from CLD and three, more specific, expert coded indicators from V-Dem that distinguish between foreign and domestic movement and provide assessments of the latter feature for men and women. The four indicators were aggregated into the freedom of movement subcomponent using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
Indicators included	v_22_14, v_22_15, v_22_16, v_22_17
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22D = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22D = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	

Personal integrity and security (C_SD22E)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD22E
Definition	Five indicators capture different types of violations, such as forced labour, torture, and political and extra- judicial disappearances and killings. To capture personal security more broadly, a general indicator on political violence was also included, which pertains to different types of conflict and violence and distinguishes between various levels. The six indicators were aggregated into the personal integrity and security subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security
Indicators included	v_22_18, v_22_19, v_22_20, v_22_21, v_22_22, v_22_23
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22E = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22E = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$

Social group equality (C_SD23A)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD23A
Definition	Five V-Dem expert-coded indicators were used to measure social group equality, the first of the social rights and equality subcomponents. Four of the underlying questions ask about social class and identity group inequalities with regard to civil liberties and political power distribution. The fifth asks about the representation of disadvantaged social groups. The five indicators were aggregated into the social group equality subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	 Fundamental Rights Social rights and equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare
Indicators included	v_23_01, v_23_02, v_23_03, v_23_04, v_23_05, v_23_06, v_23_07
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD23A = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23A = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 \\ 120 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\$

Basic welfare (C_SD23B)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD23B
Definition	The provision of basic welfare is measured using standard observable human development indicators: infant mortality rate, life expectancy, kilocalories per person per day, literacy rate and average years of schooling. In addition, two expert-based indicators from V-Dem were included that assess whether everyone in a given society has access to basic education and health care. All the indicators reflect the extent to which the basic needs of the population are being met. The seven indicators were aggregated into the basic welfare subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	 Fundamental Rights 3. Social rights and equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare
Indicators included	v_23_08, v_23_09, v_23_10, v_23_11, v_23_12, v_23_13, v_23_14
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD23B = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23B = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 \\ 120 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\$

Gender equality (C_SD23C)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD23C
Definition	Two expert-coded indicators from V-Dem were used to operationalize gender equality—power distribution by gender and female participation in civil society organizations—as well as three observational indicators on the ratio between female and male mean years of schooling (GHDx), the proportion of lower chamber female legislators (V-Dem)and the proportion of women in ministerial-level positions (V-Dem). The five indicators were aggregated into the gender equality subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare
Indicators included	v_23_15, v_23_16, v_23_17, v_23_18, v_23_19
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD23C = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD23C = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $

Indicators

Access to justice for men (v_21_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjstm
GSoD name	V_21_01
Definition	Question: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice? Responses: o: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent. 1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected. 2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems in most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country. 3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed. 4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed. Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and men have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.1. Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	10^{-1}

Access to justice for women (v_21_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjstw
GSoD name	V_21_02
Definition	Question: >Do women enjoy equal, secure and effective access to justice?
	 Responses: o: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent. 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected. 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems occur in most cases or rather unevenly across different parts of the country. 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed. 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed. Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and women have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for me and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.1. Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	

Judicial corruption decision (v_21_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2jucorrdc
GSoD name	V_21_03
Definition	Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay a process or to obtain a favourable judicial decision? Responses: o: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Not usually. 4: Never.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.1. Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $


Judicial accountability (v_21_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juaccnt
GSoD name	V_21_04
Definition	Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined? Responses: o: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.1. Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 140 \\ 120 \\ 00 \\ 100 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 1975 \\ 1985 \\ 1995 \\ 2005 \\ 2015 \\ 2015 \end{array} $


Fair trial (v_21_05)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	fairtrial
GSoD name	V_21_05
Definition	 Definition: The indicator specifies the extent to which citizens have the right to a fair trial in practice: they are not subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; and they have the right to recognition as a person before the law; the right to be under the jurisdiction of and seek redress from competent, independent and impartial tribunals; and the right to be heard and to be tried without undue delay if arrested, detained or charged with a criminal offence. Indicator Scale: Severely restricted: Fair trials are very unlikely. The courts are totally subordinated to the will of government or the justice system is profoundly undermined by arbitrary arrests, incompetence, corruption and intimidation. Substantially restricted: Some elements of fair trials exist but the courts are not fully independent of the government and/or the justice system is characterized by widespread corruption, intimidation and inefficiency. Moderately restricted: The courts are generally independent of the government, but the justice system is characterized by moderate degrees of corruption or inefficiency. Unrestricted: All elements of fair trials are respected. No arbitrary arrests take place, the courts are competent, independent and impartial; and hearings and trials generally follow arrest and charge within a reasonable time.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.1. Access to justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
	1910 1980 GRBI GIRI GIRI






Harassment of journalists (v_22_02)




Media self-censorship (v_22_03)


Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2meslfcen
GSoD name	V_22_03
Definition	Question: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive? Responses: o: Self-censorship is complete and thorough. 1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete. 2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues. 3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of expression
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.A. Freedom of expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	




Freedom of discussion for women (v_22_04)



Freedom of discussion for men (v_22_05)




Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v_22_06)



Freedom of opinion and expression (v_22_07)


CSO entry and exit (v_22_08)


Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	vzcseeorgs
GSoD name	v_22_08
Definition	Question: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? Responses: o: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity, such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes or publicly commenting on public officials and policies, are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expediency. 3: Minimal control. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, constitutional provisions exist that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such bans take place within the rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4: Unconstrained. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities that seek to violently overthrow the government.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	 Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).



CSO repression (v_22_09)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csreprss
GSoD name	V_22_09
Definition	Question: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations?
	 Responses: o: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of CSOs, seeking not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany and Maoist China. 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in opposition CSOs that are not acting unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists such as beatings, threats to family members and destruction of valuable property. Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law and Serbia under Milosevic. 2: Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in response 3, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of CSOs' actions through measures that restrict the association of such organizations with each other or political parties, bar CSOs from taking certain actions or blocking international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s and the late Franco period in Spain. 3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions such as fines, firings and denial of social services, to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new CSOs and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. Examples include Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia. 4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves and criticize the government without fear of government sanction or harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	 Fundamental Rights Civil liberties S.e. Freedom of association and assembly
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).






Freedom of assembly and association (v_22_10)


Freedom of religion (v_22_11)


Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clrelig
GSoD name	V_22_11
Definition	 Question: Is there freedom of religion? Responses: Not respected by the public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to the public authorities, which control the activities of religious communities in some detail. Weakly respected by the public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized but significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled; voluntary conversions are restricted; and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common. Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled, however, and/or there are occasional instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups based on their religion. Mostly respected by the public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions on proselytizing or hindrances to accessing the construction of places of worship. Fully respected by the public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, the public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration. Clarification: This indicator specifies the exte
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of religion
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.C. Freedom of religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).



Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csrlgrep
GSoD name	V_22_12
Definition	Question: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?
	 Responses: o: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China. 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations that have not acted unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists, such as beatings, threats to families and destruction of valuable property. 2: Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade religious organizations from acting or their members from expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict the association of religious CSOs with each other or political parties, bar religious CSOs from taking certain actions or by blocking international contacts. 3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions or their members from expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious CSOs and side-track them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations. 4: No. Religious CSOs are free to organize, associate, strike or express themselves and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of religion
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.C. Freedom of religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Religious organization repression (v_22_12)






Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (v_22_13)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clfmove
GSoD name	V_22_14
Definition	 Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration? Responses: Not respected by the public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from travelling. Weakly respected by the public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas. Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only face minor restrictions. Mostly respected by the public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from travelling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family. Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by the public authorities. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by the public authorities.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $

Freedom of foreign movement (v_22_14)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldmovew
GSoD name	V_22_15
Definition	Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?
	 Responses: o: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g. North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban). 1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement but most do not (e.g. Apartheid South Africa). 2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively, all women enjoy partial freedom of movement. 3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. 4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.
	Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and at night, in public thoroughfares and across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residence where they wish. Note that restrictions of movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely low levels of freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions on movement that are placed on non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions on movement that result from crime or unrest.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 140 120 100 80 60 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 4

Freedom of domestic movement for women (v_22_15)




Freedom of domestic movement for men (v_22_16)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	fremov
GSoD name	V_22_17
Definition	 Definition: The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of movement and residence, that is, the right of citizens to settle and travel within their country or to leave and return to their country of their own volition without being subject to limitations or restrictions. Component Scale Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of movement exists. As a rule, citizens are not allowed to choose their place of residence or to travel around the country or abroad. Fairly restricted. Some elements of foreign travel, choice of residence and/or domestic travel exist but numerous individuals, often belonging to specific groups, are exposed to a variety of prohibitions. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of travel and/or residence, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no prohibitions. Unrestricted. There is unrestricted freedom of movement and residence.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of movement
Aggregation	BFA to construct subdimension 2.2.D. Freedom of movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	

Freedom of movement and residence (v_22_17)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clslavef
GSoD name	v_22_18
Definition	 Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labour? Responses: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state. Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice. Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by the public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups. Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities. Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is virtually non-existent. Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to leave a job s/he desires to leave not for reasons of economic necessity, but instead due to employer coercion. This includes labour camps but not work or service that forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women from forced labour. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (o) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $


Freedom from forced labour for women (v_22_18)



Freedom from forced labour for men (v_22_19)

Freedom from torture (v_22_20)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cltort
GSoD name	V_22_20
Definition	Question: Is there freedom from torture? Responses: o: Not respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of the government. 1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by senior leaders in the government. At the same time, government leaders are not actively working to prevent it. 2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by senior leaders in the government. 3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by senior government leaders. 4: Fully respected by the public authorities. Torture is non-existent. Clarification: Torture refers to the deliberate inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with the aim of extracting information or intimidating victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (the police, security forces, prison guards and paramilitary groups).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	 Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	




Freedom from political killings (v_22_21)

Data source Political Terror Scale Original variable PTS_S GSoD name V_22_22 Definition What is the level of political violence and terror? PTS scores based on information contained in the annual human rights reports produced by the US Department of State. Reports are scored on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate higher levels of abuse, political terror, or physical integrity rights violations than lower scores. Original scale Ordinal Citation Gibney et al. (2018) Data ___ manipulation for aggregation Indicator of 2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security Aggregation IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security. Final scale Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). Coverage 160 140 Number of Countries Covered 09 00 00 07 00 08 00 20 0 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015


Human rights protection scores (v_22_22)

Internal conflict (v_22_23)


Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Internal conflict (D)
GSoD name	V_22_23
Definition	An assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an ongoing civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (Civil War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, Civil Disorder), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of o points. A score of 4 points equates to very low risk and a score of o points to very high risk.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	 2. Fundamental Rights 2.2. Civil liberties 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.2.E. Personal integrity and security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160



Social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v_23_01)




Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v_23_02)




Power distributed by socio-economic position (v_23_03)


Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pepwrsoc
GSoD name	V_23_04
Definition	 Question: Is political power distributed according to social groups? Responses: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a <i>minority</i> of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a <i>majority</i> of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a <i>majority</i> of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time followed by another group, but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power. All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics. Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways and as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood by those residing in that society to be different, in ways that may be politically re
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.A. Social group equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.A. Social group equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Power distributed by social group (v_23_04)





Representation of disadvantaged social groups (v_23_05)



Religious Tensions/Ethnic Tensions (v_23_06)

Infant mortality rate (v_23_08)

Data source	UN statistics
Original name	Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)
GSoD name	v_23_08
Definition	The probability that a child born in a specific year will die before reaching the age of one, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Expressed as a rate per 1000 live births.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN IGME (2017)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$

Life expectancy (v_23_09)

Data source	UN statistics
Original name	Life expectancy at birth (years)
GSoD name	V_23_09
Definition	The average number of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN DESA (2017)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into deciles, ranging from 1 (the lowest decile) to 10 (the highest decile).
Indicator of	 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00$

Kilocalories per person per day (v_23_10)

Data source	FAO
Original name	Grand Total - kcal/capita/day
GSoD name	V_23_10
Definition	Calorie supply per capita is the amount of food available for consumption, measured in kilocalories per capita per day. This figure is reached by dividing the total available food supply for human consumption by the population. This data set tracks the calorie supply per capita in each country for calories available from crop products. Although these figures can be taken as the average supply available for consumption, actual consumption by individuals can vary greatly.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN FAO (2016)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160

Literacy (v_23_11)

Data source	UNESCO
Original name	Adult literacy rate, population over 15
Oliginatinalite	Adult illeracy rate, population over 15
GSoD name	V_23_11
Definition	Percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100. Data on literacy is compiled by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on national censuses and household surveys or, for countries without recent literacy data, using the Global Age-Specific Literacy Projection Model (GALP)
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UNESCO (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160

Mean years of schooling (v_23_12)

Data source	IHME
Original name	Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25, age standardized, both sexes
GSoD name	V_23_12
Definition	Estimates of average years of educational attainment per capita. This measure is available disaggregated by age and gender and is offered in both age-standardized and population-weighted series. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	IHME (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 140 \\ 120 \\ 00 \\ 100 \\$

Educational equality (v_23_13)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	vzpeedueq
GSoD name	V_23_13
Definition	Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?
	 Responses: o: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but 10–25 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 3: Relatively equal. Basic education overall is equal in quality but 5–10 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 4: Equal. Basic education typically refers to schooling between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 140 120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	1975 1985 1995 2005 2015

Health equality (v_23_14)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pehealth
GSoD name	V_23_14
Definition	Question: To what extent is high quality basic health care guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?
	 Responses: o: Extreme. Because of poor quality health care, at least 75 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 1: Unequal. Because of poor quality health care, at least 25 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor quality health care, 10–25 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 3: Relatively equal. Basic health care overall is equal in quality but because of poor quality health care, 5–10 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens their political rights as adult citizens their political rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.B. Basic welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.B. Basic welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 140 120 0 100 100 100 100 100 100
	1975 1985 1995 2005 2015

Data source V-Dem Original v2pepwrgen variable GSoD name V_23_15 Definition Question: Is political power distributed according to gender? **Responses:** o: Men have a near-monopoly on political power. 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence. 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence. 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women. 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power. **Original scale** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Citation Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019) Data Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 manipulation (the highest five percentiles). for aggregation Indicator of 2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality Aggregation IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality. Final scale Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). Coverage 160 140 20 0-1975 1985 1995 2005 2015

Power distributed by gender (v_23_15)

CSO women's participation (v_23_16)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csgender
GSoD name	V_23_16
Definition	Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations? Responses:
	 almost always. Frequently. About half the time. Rarely. Almost never.
	Clarification: Please pay attention to both: (a) whether women are prevented from participating in CSOs because of their gender; and (b) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Data source	IHME
Original name	Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25 - age standardized; male and female
GSoD name	V_23_17
Definition	Estimates of average years of educational attainment per capita. This measure is available disaggregated by age and gender and is offered in both age-standardized and population weighted series. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	IHME (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 \\ 100 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 00 \\ 0$

Female vs. male mean years of schooling $(v_{23_{17}})$

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgfemleg
GSoD name	V_23_18
Definition	Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?
	Responses: Percentage
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$

Lower chamber female legislators (v_23_18)

Election women in the cabinet $(v_{23_{19}})$

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	vzelwomcab
GSoD name	V_23_19
Definition	Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (%) of the ministers was female?
	Clarification: A "minister" is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure
	Responses: Percentage
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values.
Indicator of	2. Fundamental Rights 2.3. Social rights and equality 2.3.C. Gender equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subdimension 2.3.C. Gender equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$

3. Checks on Government

Checks on Government is the third of the five attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Checks on Government.

1 attribute

• Checks on Government

3 subattributes

- Effective parliament
- Judicial independence
- Media integrity

15 indicators

Attribute

Checks on Government (C_A3)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_A3
Definition	Besides regular elections, the exercise of political power needs to be continuously subjected to scrutiny. If the other branches of government (the legislature and the judiciary) or a critical and pluralistic press do not check executive power, they are more prone to be abused for private gain and to biased political decision-making and implementation. Vertical accountability through elections should be supplemented by horizontal accountability between elections. The three subattributes were aggregated into the Checks on Government index using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	
Aggregation	
Indicators included	C_SD31, C_SD32, C_SD33
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_A3 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A3 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	

Subattributes

Effective parliament (C_SD₃₁)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD31
Definition	The effectiveness of parliament subattribute denotes the extent to which the legislature is capable of overseeing the executive. It includes three indicators from the V-Dem experts survey that tap fairly directly into the effectiveness of parliament. Another V-Dem indicator on executive oversight and the executive constraints indicator from Polity are included as they capture relevant aspects of institutional Checks on Government not covered by judicial independence and media integrity. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on Government.
Indicators included	V_31_01, V_31_02, V_31_03, V_31_04, V_31_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD31 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD31 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$

Judicial independence (C_SD32)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD32
Definition	The judicial independence subattribute denotes the extent to which the courts are not subject to undue influence from the other branches of government, especially the executive. Since our framework places judicial independence under the attribute concerning Checks on Government, it is important to supplement the three judicial independence indicators with two indicators on government compliance with the courts. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on Government.
Indicators included	v_32_01, v_32_02, v_32_03, v_32_04, v_32_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD32 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD32 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 140 \\ 120 \\ 100 $

Media integrity (C_SD₃₃)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD ₃₃
Definition	The media integrity subattribute denotes the extent to which the media landscape offers diverse and critical coverage of political issues. Media integrity and freedom of expression are related. Nonetheless, the media can do a poor job controlling the government even in a situation of media freedom if they are very one-sided, uncritical, superficial or corrupt. V-Dem offers indicators that reflect these additional circumstances. These indicators are based on expert surveys in addition to an in-house coded indicator from MFD, which indicates whether the media are critical of the government and its officials. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on Government.
Indicators included	V_33_01, V_33_02, V_33_03, V_33_04, V_33_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD33 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD33 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	


Indicators

Legislature questions officials in practice (v_31_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgqstexp
GSoD name	V_31_01
Definition	Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?
	Responses: o: No - never or very rarely. 1: Yes - routinely.
	Clarification: 'Question' means, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain policies or testify.
Original scale	Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $

Executive oversight (v_31_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgotovst
GSoD name	V_31_02
Definition	Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavourable decision or report? Responses: o: Extremely unlikely. 1: Unlikely. 2: Very uncertain. 3: Likely. 4: Certain or nearly certain.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 140 \\ 120 \\ 100 $



Legislature investigates in practice (v_31_03)

Legislature opposition parties (v_31_04)


Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgoppart
GSoD name	V_31_04
Definition	Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition? Responses: o: No, not at all. 1: Occasionally. 2: Yes, for the most part.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 140 \\ 120 \\ 100 $

Data source	Polity
	Polity
Original variable	xconst
GSoD name	V_31_05
Definition	Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any 'accountability groups'. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisers in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and, in many states, a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used: 1. Unlimited authority. 2. Intermediate category. 3. Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority. 4. Intermediate category. 5. Substantial limitations on executive authority. 6. Intermediate category. 7. Executive party or subordination.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2019: 24)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values.
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.1. Effective parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$

Executive constraints (v_31_05)

High Court independence (v_32_01)

Data source	V-Dem		
Original variable	v2juhcind		
GSoD name	V_32_01		
Definition	Question: When the High Court in the judicial system rules in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect the government's wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record? Responses: o: Always. 1: Usually. 2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 4: Never. Clarification: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without 'merely reflecting' those wishes, in that a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. 'Merely reflect the wishes of the government' means that the court's own sincere evaluation of the record is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view.		
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.		
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)		
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).		
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.2. Judicial independence		
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.		
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).		
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $		



Lower court independence (v_32_02)

Compliance with High Court (v_32_03)


Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	vzjuhccomp
GSoD name	V_32_03
Definition	Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the High Court with which it disagrees? Responses: o: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.2. Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	vzjucomp
GSoD name	v_32_04
Definition	Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees? Responses: o: Never. 1: Seldom. 2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 4: Always. Clarification: We are looking for a judgment on the entire judiciary excluding the High Court. Consider judges in both the ordinary courts and the specialized courts.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.2. Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $


Compliance with judiciary (v_32_04)

Law and order (v_32_05)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Law and order (I)
GSoD name	V_32_05
Definition	To what extent is the legal system strong and impartial and to what degree is there popular observance of the law?
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of:	3. Checks on Government 3.2. Judicial independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $



Critical Print / broadcast media (v_33_01)



Print / broadcast media perspectives (v_33_02)

Media bias (v_33_03)

Data source	V-Dem			
Original variable	v2mebias			
GSoD name	V_33_03			
Definition	 Question: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates? Responses: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage; or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover. The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage. The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate. The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates. The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness. Clarification: Take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered 'more or less impartial' when the media as a whole presents a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate. 			
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.			
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)			
Data manipulation for aggregation				
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.3. Media integrity			
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Coverage				
	1975 1985 1995 2005 2015			

Media corrupt (v_33_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mecorrpt
GSoD name	V_33_04
Definition	Question: Do journalists, publishers or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?
	 Responses: o: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage. 1: Journalists, publishers and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments. 2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments. 3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally without anyone being punished. 4: Journalists, publishers and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.3. Media integrity
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
	1975 1905 1995 2005 2015

Media freedom (v_33_05)

Data source	MFD			
Original variable	Media freedom			
GSoD name	V_33_05			
Definition	The media environments around the world are sorted into three basic categories: 1 — Free: Countries where criticism of the government and government officials is a common and normal part of the political dialogue in the mediated public sphere. 2 — Imperfectly Free: Countries where the social, legal or economic costs related to criticism of the government or government officials limit public criticism, but investigative journalism and criticism of major policy failings can and do occur. 3 — Not Free: Countries where it is not possible to safely criticize government or government officials. Clarification: In the original data set (Van Belle 2000), there were four categories. Category 4 meant that the government directly controlled all news media, whereas category 3 meant that the government exerted indirect control. Since the end of the Cold War and with the massive growth in information technology, distinguishing between state-operated news media and media controlled by other means became something of a pointless exercise.			
Original scale	Ordinal			
Citation	Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle (2017)			
Data manipulation for aggregation				
Indicator of	3. Checks on Government 3.3. Media integrity			
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media integrity.			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Coverage				

4. Impartial Administration

Impartial Administration represents the fourth of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index on Impartial Administration:

1 attribute

• Impartial Administration

2 subattributes

- Absence of corruption
- Predictable enforcement

9 indicators

Attribute

Impartial Administration (C_A4)

Data source	GSoD Indices				
Original variable	Constructed variable				
GSoD name	C_A4				
Definition	The government and the public administration more generally should implement official public policies in an impartial manner. If implementation is unfair and unpredictable, large discrepancies between official laws and policies, on the one hand, and practices, on the other, undermine democratic principles. Thus, democracy is a matter not only of access to power and control of power, but also of the exercise of power. Since Impartial Administration to a large extent overlaps with the concept of the rule of law, this attribute is also rooted in the tradition that emphasizes the liberal aspects of democracy. The two subattributes were aggregated into the Impartial Administration index using BFA.				
Original scale	Interval				
Citation	Skaaning (2019)				
Data manipulation for aggregation					
Indicator of					
Aggregation					
Indicators included	C_SD41, C_SD42				
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).				
Auxiliary variables	L_A_4 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_A_4 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval				
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $				

Subattributes

Absence of corruption (C_SD41)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
GSoD name	C_SD41
Definition	The absence of corruption subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and the public administration, more broadly, do not abuse their office for personal gain. Four V-Dem indicators explicitly refer to corruption in the government broadly understood, i.e., the executive and public administration more generally (but excluding courts and parliaments). We make use of these and another expert-coded but broader indicator on government corruption from the ICRG data set. The five indicators have been aggregated into the absence of corruption subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration
Aggregation	BFA of 4.1. absence of corruption and 4.2. predictable enforcement to create 4. Impartial Administration
Indicators included	v_41_01, V_41_02, v_41_03, v_41_04, v_41_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD41 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD41 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval
Coverage	10^{-1}

Predictable enforcement (C_SD42)

Data source	GSoD Indices		
Original variable	Constructed variable		
GSoD name	C_SD42		
Definition	The predictable enforcement subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and public officials enforce laws in a predictable manner. To measure predictable enforcement, three expert-coded V-Dem indicators were included: the executive's respect for constitutional provisions, the presence of transparent laws with predictable enforcement and rule-abidingness in the public sector. To these were added an indicator from the ICRG (also expert-coded) on the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy. The four indicators were aggregated into the predictable enforcement subattribute using IRT.		
Original scale	Interval		
Citation	Skaaning (2019)		
Data manipulation for aggregation			
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration		
Aggregation	BFA of 4.1. absence of corruption and 4.2. predictable enforcement to create 4. Impartial Administration		
Indicators included	v_42_01, v_42_02, v_42_03, v_42_04		
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).		
Auxiliary variables	L_SD42 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD42 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval		
Coverage	10^{-1}		


Indicators

Public sector corrupt exchanges (v_41_01)

Data source	V-Dem			
Original variable	vzexcrptps			
GSoD name	V_41_01			
Definition	Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements?			
	 Responses: o: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time. 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees. 2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times. 3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time. 4: No. Never, or hardly ever. 			
	Clarification: When responding to this question, think about a typical person employed in the public sector, excluding the military. If there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in public service delivery, try to average them out before stating your response.			
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.			
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)			
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).			
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.1. Absence of corruption			
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Coverage				

Public sector theft (v_41_02)

resources for personal or family use? Responses: o: Constantly. Public sector employees at property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are res personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector emp public resources as they are to treat then 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees others as personal property.	ees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources al or family property. question, think about a typical person employed by the public sector, the discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the te level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in them out before stating your response.
Definition Question: How often do public sector em resources for personal or family use? Responses: o: Constantly. Public sector employees at property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are res personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector employees others as personal property. 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees others as personal property.	s act as though all public resources were their personal or family responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as mployees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected nem as personal property. Sees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources al or family property. question, think about a typical person employed by the public sector, the discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the te level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in them out before stating your response.
resources for personal or family use? Responses: o: Constantly. Public sector employees at property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are res personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector emp public resources as they are to treat them 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees others as personal property.	s act as though all public resources were their personal or family responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as mployees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected nem as personal property. Sees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources al or family property. question, think about a typical person employed by the public sector, the discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the te level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in them out before stating your response.
 c. Constantly. Public sector employees ar property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are res personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector employees or bublic resources as they are to treat then 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees others as personal property. 	responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as mployees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected nem as personal property. sees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources al or family property. question, think about a typical person employed by the public sector, re discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the te level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in them out before stating your response.
and keep them separate from personal o Clarification: When responding to this qu excluding the military. If there are large o	neasurement model
Original scale Ordinal, converted to interval by the mea	icusurement mouch
Citation Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)	
Data Recoded into 20 categories, each contair manipulation (the highest five percentiles). for aggregation	aining five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20
Indicator of4. Impartial Administration4.1. Absence of corruption	
Aggregation IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence	nce of corruption.
Final scale Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to a	to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	




Executive embezzlement and theft (v_41_03)

Data source	V-Dem			
Original variable	vzexbribe			
GSoD name	v_41_04			
Definition	Question: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers) or their agents grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements? Responses: o: It is routine and expected. 1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive. 2: It happens but is unpredictable; those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be required. 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected. 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.			
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.			
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)			
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).			
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.1. Absence of corruption			
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\$			


Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v_41_04)

Corruption (v_41_05)


Data source	ICRG			
Original variable	Corruption (F)			
GSoD name	v_41_05			
Definition	This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licences, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loans. Although this measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favour-for-favours', secret party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.			
Original scale	Ordinal			
Citation	Howell (2011)			
Data manipulation for aggregation				
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.1. Absence of corruption			
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of corruption.			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Coverage	160			



Executive respects constitution (v_42_01)



Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v_42_02)



Rigorous and impartial public administration (v_42_03)

Bureaucratic quality (v_42_04)

Data source	ICRG			
Original variable	Bureaucratic quality (L)			
GSoD name	V_42_04			
Definition	The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.			
Original scale	Ordinal			
Citation	Howell (2011)			
Data manipulation for aggregation				
Indicator of	4. Impartial Administration 4.2. Predictable enforcement			
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable enforcement.			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Coverage	160			

5. Participatory Engagement

Participatory Engagement represents the fifth of the five attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices.

This section of the Codebook offers details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise this attribute.

4 subattributes

- Civil society participation
- Electoral participation
- Direct democracy
- Sub-national elections

8 indicators

Subattributes

Civil society participation (C_SD51)

Data source	GSoD Indices			
Original variable	Constructed variable			
GSoD name	C_SD51			
Definition	The measurement of civil society participation relies on three V-Dem indicators. They result from an expert survey and consider the extent to which the population is engaged in civil society activities. The three indicators on civil society participation clearly tapped into a common dimension and were aggregated into an index using BFA.			
Original scale	Interval			
Citation	Skaaning (2019)			
Data manipulation for aggregation				
Indicator of				
Aggregation				
Indicators included	V_51_01, V_51_02, V_51_02			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Auxiliary variables	L_SD51 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD51 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval			
Coverage				

Direct Democracy (C_SD53)

Data source	GSoD Indices			
Original variable	Constructed variable			
GSoD name	C_SD ₅₃			
Definition	V-Dem offers the only comprehensive data set in the form of the direct democracy index developed by David Altman (2016). It is based on observable variables on the formal opportunities for and actual use of different instruments of direct democracy at the national level. However, it seems pertinent to take into account whether mechanisms of direct democracy are available and used in a context where elections are generally respected as the main source of political power. To do so, the electoral indicator from BRRD is also used here.			
Original scale	Interval			
Citation	Skaaning (2019)			
Data manipulation for aggregation				
Indicator of				
Aggregation	Multiplication of the two variables			
Indicators included	V_53_01, V_53_02			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Auxiliary variables	L_SD51 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD51 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval			
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $			

Local Democracy (C_SD54)

Data source	GSoD Indices			
Original variable	Constructed variable			
GSoD name	C_SD54			
Definition	V-Dem is also the only provider of a comprehensive, cross-national data set on subnational elections. The local government index indicates whether the local government is elected and whether it is empowered in relation to the central government, while another indicator assesses the freedom and fairness of subnational elections.			
Original scale	Interval			
Citation	Skaaning (2019)			
Data manipulation for aggregation				
Indicator of				
Aggregation	Multiplication of the two variables			
Indicators included	v_54_01, v_54_02			
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).			
Auxiliary variables	L_SD51 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD51 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval			
Coverage	$160 \\ 100 $			


Indicators

CSO participatory environment (v_51_01)

Data source	V-Dem				
Original variable	v2csprtcpt				
GSoD name	V_51_01				
Definition	Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)? Responses: o: Most associations are state-sponsored and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them. 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal. 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.				
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.				
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)				
Data manipulation for aggregation					
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation				
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.				
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).				
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 100 $				

Engaged society (v_51_02)

Data source	V-Dem				
Original variable	v2dlengage				
GSoD name	V_51_02				
Definition	Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?				
	 Responses: o: Public deliberation is never, or almost never, allowed. 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite level is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but infrequent; and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tend to be the same across issue-areas. 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate; these vary with different issue-areas. 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighbourhoods and in the streets. Grassroots deliberation is common and unconstrained. Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifest in discussion, debate and other public forums such as popular media. 				
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.				
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)				
Data manipulation for aggregation					
Indicator of	5.1. Civil society participation				
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 5.1. civil society participation.				
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).				
Coverage	160 100 100 100 100 100 100 100				



CSO participatory environment (v_51_03)

Electoral participation (v_52_01)

Data source	V-Dem				
Original variable	vzelvaptrn				
GSoD name	V_52_01				
Definition	Question: According to official results, what percentage (%) of the adult voting age population (VAP) cast a vote in this national election?				
	Responses: Percentage				
	Clarification: The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, VAP values can surpass 100, which is not an error but reflects such conditions.				
Original scale	Interval				
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2019)				
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as o if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as o, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent. A small number of cases had values higher than 100. For each of these cases the International IDEA Voter turnout database was checked and these were coded as either 100 (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections was close to 100%) or missing (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections).				
Indicator of					
Aggregation					
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).				
Coverage	$ \begin{array}{c} 160 \\ 140 \\ 120 \\ 100 $				

Direct democracy (v_53_01)

Data source	V-Dem				
Original variable	v2xdd_dd				
GSoD name	V_53_01				
Definition	Question: To what extent are direct popular votes utilized?				
	Clarification: Direct popular votes are institutionalized processes by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. The term is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums and plebiscites, as they are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Similarly, it does not apply to elections for representatives.				
Original scale	Interval				
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2019)				
Data manipulation for aggregation					
Indicator of	5.3. Direct Democracy				
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_53_02				
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).				
Coverage					

Electoral (v_53_02)

Data source	BRRD				
Original variable	Electoral				
GSoD name	V_53_02				
Definition	Does a country have no regular elections, elections in an effectively one- party state, elections with opposition parties but without an actual chance of government change, or full democracy? Alternative democracy indicator capturing degree of multi-party competition (No elections=0, Single-party elections=1, non-democratic multi-party elections=2, democratic elections= 3).				
Original scale	Ordinal				
Citation	Bjørnskov and Rode (2018)				
Data manipulation for aggregation					
Indicator of	5.3. Direct Democracy				
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_53_02				
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).				
Coverage					

Local	government	index	(v_54_01)
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Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xel_locelec
GSoD name	V_54_01
Definition	Question: Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level? Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	5.4. Subnational elections
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_54_02
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	vzelffelr
GSoD name	V_54_02
Definition	 Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average? Responses: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office). Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office). Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome (who won office). Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office). Yes. There were a certain amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Clarification: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. 'Free and fair' refers to all aspects of the election process except the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (which is measured separately).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2019) Coppedge et al. (2019)
Data manipulation for aggregation	
Indicator of	5.4. Subnational elections
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_54_01
Final scale	Scaled to range from o (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Coverage	160

Subnational elections free and fair (v_{54}_{02})

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About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

International IDEA's vision is firmly anchored in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and considers that democratic principles are core to and important enablers for the realization of the entire 2030 Agenda.

What do we do?

In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitutionbuilding processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of work. International IDEA provides analyses of global and regional democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge on good international democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-building on democratic reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.

International IDEA also contributes to the democracy debate through analysis of democratic trends through its Global State of Democracy initiative, which includes the biennial *Global State of Democracy Report*, the Global State of Democracy Indices (http://www.idea.int/gsod.indices) and the *Global State of Democracy In Focus* briefings.

Where do we work?

Our headquarters is located in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in Africa and West Asia, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

<http://idea.int>

The Global State of Democracy is a biennial report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices), in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world.

The second edition of the report provides a health check of democracy and an overview of the current global and regional democracy landscape.

This document presents revised and updated information about all the variables included in the GSoD indices data set that enabled the construction of Version 3 of the GSoD Indices, which depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2018.

The data underlying the GSoD Indices is based on a total of 97 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.

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