

First edition

The Global State of Democracy

Exploring Democracy's Resilience



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Foreword

Recent media reports and public opinion polls have warned about the apparent growing threats to democracy. They suggest, with pessimism, that democracy is in decline. There are certainly reasons to be concerned.

All countries must address complex challenges that, whether originating within or outside of their borders, have a global reach: from food scarcity to conflict, from climate change to terrorism and organized crime, and from populism to corruption. However, in my opinion, this is an incomplete overview of the problem. It is easy to lose sight of the long-term gains the world has made in maintaining democracy. By and large, public institutions today are more representative and accountable to the needs and desires of women and men of all ages. Over the past several decades, many states have become democratic and, notwithstanding obstacles and some setbacks, most of them have maintained that status. Today, more countries hold elections than ever before. Crucially, most governments respect their international commitments to uphold fundamental rights, more individuals are able to freely cast their votes, and civil society and its leaders can mobilize and engage in dialogue with political leaders. All in all, democracy has produced a domino effect, growing and spreading across the planet.

Governments should build on this strong foundation in order to reduce the risk of backsliding towards authoritarianism. Regrettably, in too many cases electoral results are not respected or institutions and rules are manipulated to keep leaders in power indefinitely. This prevents citizens from accessing the basic elements of freedom and equality that democracy champions.

International IDEA's new publication, *The Global State of Democracy*, offers a comprehensive global analysis of the challenges facing democracy and the policy options to tackle them. The text contrasts recent democratic reversals with longer-term positive trends, providing a nuanced fact-based perspective and proposing solutions to questions that are often overly politicized. The publication discusses complex, critical and politically sensitive problems facing the world today, such as how to provide migrants with opportunities to participate politically in their home and destination communities. It also addresses how money improperly influences the political system, the risks that rising inequality levels pose to democracies and their potential impact on future generations, and the strategies to create or strengthen inclusive political instruments after conflict.

In addition, International IDEA provides valuable insights on the important role women play in strengthening political institutions, how young people can be engaged in politics, and how innovations in technology and the media are changing the way politics is done today. The publication contains a rich summary of best practices and case studies from around the world, focusing on the changing political dynamics of democracies traditionally defined as 'consolidated' and 'emerging'.

The publication draws attention to both the positive and negative forces that influence democratic systems, and offers a useful set of policy recommendations and options. While

there are no easy solutions, these ideas should help all of us who are involved in building democratic societies to reinvigorate our relations with our fellow citizens.

In short, at a time when joining forces to safeguard democracy is more important than

ever before, International IDEA provides us with key elements to analyse and suggestions to act on. This makes the publication exceptionally timely.

Michelle Bachelet
President of Chile

Preface

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is pleased to present the first edition of *The Global State of Democracy*. The theme for this edition is 'Exploring Democracy's Resilience'.

When assessing the state of democracy from 1975 onwards, the global and regional trend analysis based on the GSoD indices shows an expansion of democracy in all parts of the world and advances in key areas such as representation, fundamental rights, checks on government and political participation

International IDEA is the only intergovernmental organization with a global mandate solely focused on democracy and elections. With 30 member states from all continents, International IDEA supports the development of stronger democratic institutions and processes and fosters more sustainable, effective and legitimate democracy around the world.

Support for democratic reform has become more challenging since the founding of International IDEA in 1995. In contrast to the optimism of the 1990s, today's democracy is influenced by the effects of globalization, geo-political power shifts, the changing role and structure of (supra) national organizations and institutions, and the rise of modern communications technologies. These developments are complicated by the dynamics of conflict and development, citizenship and state sovereignty, and increasing inequalities and marginalization of groups of people within and between societies. Some of these dynamics and related challenges have contributed to a widely expressed view, particularly in the mainstream media, that democracy is in decline.

Against this backdrop, this publication analyses global and regional democracy trends and challenges based on International IDEA's newly developed Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices, which capture global and regional democratic trends between 1975 and 2015. In an effort to bridge the gap between academic research, policy development and democracy assistance initiatives, it offers recommendations

and problem-solving approaches to support democratic reform, and to inform policymakers and democracy practitioners worldwide. This first edition explores democracy's resilience based on a detailed analysis of the impact of the process of democratic backsliding on the quality of democracy as well as key challenges to democracy such as the crisis of representation, the increasing influence of money in politics, rising inequalities, migration and democratic transitions in the wake of conflict.

The times we live in warrant a critical analysis of democracy's strengths and weaknesses, and an open debate about what undermines (and strengthens) democracy. As such, this publication explores the health of the world's democracies, acknowledging that many regions and countries have recently seen reversals or declines in the quality of their democracy. When assessing the state of democracy from 1975 onwards, the global and regional trend analysis based on the GSoD indices shows an expansion of democracy in all parts of the world and advances in key areas such as representation, fundamental rights, checks on government and political participation. The data indicate that the state of democracy at the global level in the last decade has been one of trendless fluctuations—showing upturns and downturns in certain regions and individual countries, but with no clearly visible tendencies of progress or decline.

This publication acknowledges that challenges to democracy persist at the regional and country levels, but contests the current pessimistic view

that democracy is fragile and in decline. Instead, it argues that democracy continues to be in demand and has shown resilient properties over time given the challenges that characterize the 21st century, thanks to its inherent qualities of adaptation, recovery, flexibility and innovation.

The analysis is based on International IDEA's broad and inclusive definition of democracy, which is underpinned by two fundamental principles—popular control and political equality. The Institute acknowledges that there is no single and universally applicable model of democracy, that democracy comes in multiple forms, and that these forms are in constant evolution. However, democracy's advancement—and indeed its survival—is never guaranteed. Democracy needs constant care and protection, and there is no end to

improving it: every generation must safeguard and reclaim democracy. This means that looking towards the future, channelling all our efforts to achieve progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals requires a broad-based recognition of the fact that democracy is core to (and a wider enabler of) the entire 2030 development agenda.

I am grateful to all those who contributed to making this first edition of *The Global State of Democracy* a reality. It is our hope at International IDEA that this publication will serve as a source of inspiration, reflection and guidance for a new generation committed to making democracy stronger and more resilient.

Yves Leterme
Secretary-General
International IDEA

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Abbreviations

AAP	Aam Aadmi Party (India)
AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BFA	Bayesian Factor Analysis
CDA	Constitutional Drafting Assembly (Libya)
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GSoD	Global State of Democracy
FN	Front National (France)
FPTP	First Past The Post
GRECO	Group of States against Corruption
International IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IRT	Item-Response Theory
MENA	Middle East/North Africa
MP	Member of Parliament
OAS	Organization of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAC	Political Action Committee
PCME	Program for Mexican Communities Abroad
PR	Proportional Representation
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance Party)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SoD	State of Democracy
STV	Single Transferable Vote
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UKIP	UK Independence Party
UN	United Nations
WLB	Women's League of Burma

Introduction

Democratization processes over the last four decades have created many opportunities for public participation in political life. More people today live in electoral democracies than ever before. However, numerous countries grapple with challenges to democracy, contributing to the perception that democracy is in ‘decline’ or has experienced ‘reversals’ or ‘stagnation’. Some of these challenges relate to issues of corruption, money in politics and policy capture, inequality and social exclusion, migration or post-conflict transition to democracy. Many leaders and democratic actors continue to manipulate democratic processes and institutions, which often contributes to democratic backsliding in their respective countries.

Written by
Armend Bekaj

Governments, parliaments and political parties are increasingly viewed by their electorates as unable to cope with complex policy problems. Many see a crisis of legitimacy in democratic institutions and processes, coupled with a creeping erosion of public trust, which exposes democracies as fragile and vulnerable. Even mature democratic systems can corrode if they are not nurtured and protected. There is evidence of a growing disconnect between politicians and the electorate. Transnational challenges related to inequality, migration and globalization are complex problems that challenge democratic institutions to respond effectively to public concerns, causing a decline in trust and legitimacy in democratic governance.

It is thus no coincidence that populist and extremist political parties and leaders are successfully exploiting their electorates’ insecurities. Exclusionary rhetoric occupies more space in public discourse than before and can influence the outcome of elections. If the recent rise of populism with authoritarian tendencies is unopposed, it could undermine democracy from within, using democratic tools.

It is thus natural to wonder whether the best of what democracy has to offer is in the past. The so-called third wave of democracy expansion that began in the 1970s was a good omen of things to come. With the fall of communism, Central and Eastern European countries enthusiastically embraced democratic values and principles. There was further hope that the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings would trigger a new wave of democratization that would be embraced by countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Such expectations were quickly dashed, however, as (with the exception of Tunisia) new autocracies and terrorist groups filled the void left behind by deposed dictators. In countries such as Hungary, the Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela, extremism, populist leadership and autocratic tendencies continue to challenge democracy.

Considering these developments, is there reason to believe that democracy is in trouble, or do recent events simply constitute a temporary downward fluctuation? Are sceptics overreacting to the alarmist daily headlines, and therefore losing sight of democracy’s numerous benefits over the last few decades? And under what conditions is democracy resilient?

International IDEA defines democracy as a political system that is based on popular control and political equality. One of the Institute’s core principles is that democracy is a universal value for citizens and a globally owned concept for which there is no universally applicable model

About this publication: definitions, methodology and structure

This first edition of *The Global State of Democracy* explores current challenges to democracy and the enabling conditions for its resilience.

Definitions

As an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide, International IDEA defines **democracy** as a political system that is based on popular control and political equality. One of the Institute's core principles is that democracy is a universal value for citizens and a globally owned concept for which there is no universally applicable model. Democracy is an ideal that seeks to guarantee equality and basic freedoms, empower ordinary people, resolve disagreements through peaceful dialogue, respect differences, and bring about political and social renewal without economic and social disruption. Hence, International IDEA's broad concept of democracy encompasses more than just free elections; it has multiple dimensions, including civil and political rights, social and economic rights, democratic governance and rule of law.

International IDEA's broad understanding of democracy overlaps with features emphasized by different traditions of democratic thought associated with the concepts of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy and participatory democracy. This concept of democracy reflects a core value enshrined in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that the 'will of the people' is the basis for the legitimacy and authority of sovereign states. It reflects a common and universal desire for peace, security and justice. Democracy reflects the fundamental ethical principles of human equality and the dignity of persons, and is thus inseparable from human rights.

International IDEA defines **resilience** as the ability of social systems to cope with, innovate, survive and recover from complex challenges

and crises that present stress or pressure that can lead to systemic failure. This publication explores democracy's resilience: its ability as a political system to recover, adapt and/or flexibly address such complex challenges and crises.

Based on this definition, International IDEA has constructed new Global State of Democracy indices (GSoD indices) based on its State of Democracy assessment framework (a tool designed for in-country stakeholders to assess the quality of democracy). The indices were developed by International IDEA staff with the support of external experts and the supervision of an expert advisory board consisting of five leading experts in the field of democracy measurement. The GSoD indices examine 155 countries over the period 1975–2015 and provide a diverse data set and evidence base for analysing global and regional trends. The GSoD indices data sets start in 1975 to ensure a high reliability and quality of secondary data sources.

Methodology

Both the indices and the analysis contained in this publication respond to the lack of analytical material on democracy building and the quality of democracy at the global and regional levels; most studies focus on the national level. It strives to bridge the gap between academic research, policy development and democracy assistance initiatives. It is intended to inform policymakers and decision-makers, civil society organizations and democracy activists, policy influencers and think tanks, and democracy support providers and practitioners.

As an Institute-wide project, the publication employs a mixed methodology. It incorporates input from staff members across the headquarters and regional offices, including external contributors. It was peer reviewed by an editorial review board and a group of external substantive experts and practitioners. Building on International IDEA's regional presence and expertise in the field of democracy, the publication draws on the Institute's in-depth regional knowledge of democratic trends

in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and Iran, and North America. An overview of International IDEA's geographical division of regions and countries can be found in the Annex.

The publication analyses the period between 1975 (to coincide with the third wave of democratization) and 2017, and explores the conditions under which democracy is resilient in different time spans and regions. It has adopted a modular approach: the chapters can be read independently, yet form an essential part of the publication as a whole. The publication analyses a number of key challenges to democracy, and explores the conditions under which democracy is resilient to such challenges.

Structure

The chapters complement each other, both methodologically and empirically. The publication is structured as follows:

Chapter 1, 'The global state of democracy, 1975–2015', provides an overview of the democratic landscape stemming from global and regional trends for the period 1975–2015, based on the GSoD indices. To capture recent events there is a focus on trends for the period 2005–15.

Chapters 2 to 8 provide qualitative analyses of the impact of the process of democratic backsliding on the quality of democracy, and key challenges and crises affecting democracy. They also explore policy options conducive to enabling democracy's resilience.

Chapter 2, 'Democracy's resilience in a changing world', explores current challenges and crises that impact democracy based on International IDEA's definition of democracy's resilience and its characteristics.

Chapter 3, 'Threats from within: democracy's resilience to backsliding', reviews the concept of 'democratic backsliding' and its effect on other aspects of democracy, as well as development

and stability. The chapter explores why backsliding is a particular threat to democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, and highlights how it can be tackled with bottom-up citizen support and existing systems of checks and balances.

Chapter 4, 'The changing nature of political parties and representation', evaluates some of the contemporary challenges of representation, such as citizen movements, digital engagement and the decision-making powers that lie outside national borders. It explores how such conditions can weaken politicians' ability to deliver, and may erode the people's trust in politics, and offers policy recommendations.

Chapter 5, 'Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected?', stresses that money is a necessary ingredient that enables democratic actors to perform their tasks. When money is poured into a system that lacks sufficient transparency and accountability, this may trigger suspicions of corruption and malfeasance. Such a situation may lead to policy capture by special interests, which can be detrimental to democracy and its legitimacy. This chapter examines the role of 'big money' in politics, and assesses whether political finance regulations can adequately address its negative effects.

Chapter 6, 'Mind the gap: can democracy counter inequality?', highlights some of the difficulties in discerning the relationship between economic inequality and democracy. Given the rising trends of economic inequality and social exclusion, the chapter explores how democracy can deliver under such conditions, particularly for youth.

Chapter 7, 'Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism', analyses the impact of migration on democracy with a focus on citizenship rules, voting rights, representation and political parties. It showcases how well countries politically integrate immigrants, and how this relates to their quality of democracy, as well as the

potential and controversies surrounding the political engagement of emigrants and their role as agents of democracy. It highlights key dilemmas of the migration debate for policymakers, and suggests policy approaches to tackling the migration challenge.

Chapter 8, 'Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states: designing for democracy's resilience', examines post-conflict inclusion mechanisms in three key transitional processes: constitution-building, rebel-to-party transformation and electoral system design. It highlights that these processes are some of the most fundamental in state-building, as they

determine the rules of the new state, who can participate in that state and the nature of the levers of that participation.

The Annex describes how International IDEA's GSoD indices methodology was constructed. It contains snapshots of indices data from 1975 to 2015 on the state of a selection of countries' democracies based on International IDEA's definition of democracy and attributes of its resilience.

Each chapter is accompanied by a resource guide that provides further background reading.

Chapter

1

The global state of democracy,
1975–2015





The global state of democracy, 1975–2015

Has the global state of democracy declined over the past ten years? What are the major global trends in different aspects of democracy since the beginning of the third wave of democratization in 1975? Based on the newly developed Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices, this chapter presents global and regional assessments of the state of democracy from 1975 to 2015. The global-level assessments show that, while there is much room for improvement in democracy around the world and many countries have experienced democratic decline, democracy overall has made considerable progress over the last 40 years, especially regarding free elections, respect for fundamental rights and control of government. The current situation is more positive than suggested by an increasingly gloomy view presented by many scholars, public intellectuals and practitioners who claim that democracy has been in decline for the last ten years or more. The GSoD indices demonstrate that this period appears to be one of trendless fluctuations in which gains and downturns in individual countries tend to balance each other out at the global level.

Democracy overall has made considerable progress over the last 40 years, especially regarding free elections, respect for fundamental rights and control of government

Written by
Svend-Erik Skaaning¹ and Mélida Jiménez

1.1. Introduction: a systematic health check of democratic progress and resilience

This chapter provides an overview of the global state of democracy in the period 1975–2015. It analyses global and regional trends based on International IDEA's new Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices (see Box 1.1). This 'health check' shows that democracy faces many challenges, that the resilience of democracy cannot be taken for granted, and that there is much room for improvement in virtually all aspects of democracy. However, the situation is better than suggested by increasingly pessimistic views regarding the prevalence and resilience of contemporary democracy (see Box 1.2 for a summary).

This is not to say that democracy advocates should relax their efforts. Several countries, including some major regional powers, merit special attention because their problems have become increasingly serious. Nonetheless, democracy has not experienced an overall global decline, even as progress has slowed down and in some places halted. Most aspects of democracy have improved since 1975, and most democracies are resilient over time. Moreover, recent democratic regressions have generally been short, and followed by recovery when the internal democracy-friendly forces unite to push back against leaders with authoritarian tendencies. Hence, this overview gives nuanced empirical backing to Carothers and Youngs (2017), who have recently argued that the 'tendency to view global developments through the lens of antidemocratic counterrevolution provides a distorted picture'.

¹ Svend-Erik Skaaning is Professor of Political Science at Aarhus University, Denmark.

This chapter discusses some of the current challenges for democratic progress and resilience, and then assesses the global state of democracy. It first provides a brief overview of democratic trends based on a dichotomous, purely electoral understanding of democracy, and subsequently by a more elaborate and fine-grained overview of trends in the five dimensions of International

IDEA's broad understanding of democracy measured by the GSoD indices: Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement. The conclusion brings together the findings and discusses how they should affect assessments of the global state of democracy.

Democracy faces many challenges, and the resilience of democracy cannot be taken for granted

BOX 1.1

International IDEA's Global State of Democracy indices

Overview: International IDEA's new GSoD indices measure different aspects of democracy during the period 1975–2015 in 155 countries around the world.

Definition: Democracy is defined as popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers, and political equality between citizens in the exercise of that control.

Attributes of democracy: The indices measure five main attributes of democracy, which contain a total of 16 subattributes. They tap into five features emphasized by various traditions of democratic thought that are associated with the concepts of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy and participatory democracy:

Attribute 1: Representative Government

Subattributes: Clean Elections, Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties, Elected Government

Attribute 2: Fundamental Rights

Subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, Social Rights and Equality

Attribute 3: Checks on Government

Subattributes: Effective Parliament, Judicial Independence, Media Integrity

Attribute 4: Impartial Administration

Subattributes: Absence of Corruption, Predictable Enforcement

Attribute 5: Participatory Engagement

Subattributes: Civil Society Participation, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy, Subnational Elections

Sources: The data rely on a range of sources, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures on 98 indicators.

Units of observation: The GSoD data set includes country–year data for 155 countries that have at least 1 million inhabitants. In the calculations of regional and global averages, the scores are not weighted by population size.

Scales: All indices range from 0 (lowest democratic achievement) to 1 (highest democratic achievement); 0 generally refers to the worst performance in the whole sample of country–years (covered by a particular index), while 1 refers to the best country–year performance in the sample.

Aggregation: The construction of indices relies mainly on item response theory modelling and Bayesian factor analysis. In a few cases, the aggregation is calculated by taking the mean or multiplying various indicators.

Further details about the GSoD data set and associated indices can be found in Skaaning, S-E., *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017), <<http://www.idea.int/gsood>>.

Autocracies, including several major regional powers, are developing and refining counter-strategies to democracy promotion

1.2. Challenges to democracy

The current landscape of democracy around the world is influenced by many complex processes, such as the dynamics of economic growth and inequality, violent conflict (including terrorism), the innovation and the spread of new technologies, geopolitical power shifts, migration and climate change (Ercan and Gagnon 2014; Grugel and Bishop 2014; Merkel 2015). Many democracies face major challenges, including decreasing and changing forms of political engagement (McCaffrie and Akram 2014), low levels of trust in political institutions (Dalton 2004; van der Meer 2017), dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy (Norris 2011; Stoker 2006), support for populist movements (Mudde 2016), and undemocratic forms of government (Norris 2011).

It is difficult to create resilient, high-quality democracies (see e.g. Diamond 2015; Fukuyama 2015; Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014; Møller and Skaaning 2013a). Electoral manipulation, corruption and restrictions on fundamental human rights—such as physical integrity, freedom of expression, fair trials and gender equality—are found in all corners of the world. Although many countries have achieved democratic progress, others have experienced democratic backsliding—that is, government efforts to undermine the political institutions that sustain democracy, such as independent media, academic institutions and courts (Bermeo 2016).

Democracy still has a relatively strong standing as the most legitimate form of government, but it is continuously being questioned, and the view that non-democracies can face current challenges better than democracies is at times given serious credence (see, e.g., Bell 2015; Brennan 2016). Many countries that lack relatively free, regular elections have governments that are engaged in state propaganda and the spread of misinformation (Herpen 2015; Simon 2015; Treisman 2017). Furthermore, autocracies, including several major regional powers, are developing and refining counter-strategies to

democracy promotion (Chou, Pan and Poole 2017; Tansey 2016; Whitehead 2014).

Therefore, there is a need to evaluate whether democracy is indeed in retreat at the global and regional levels, or whether it is generally resilient and able to withstand such challenges. Some observers contend that several decades of remarkable improvement in the state of democracy since the mid-1970s were followed by a slowdown or halt in democratic progress (Levitsky and Way 2015; Lührmann et al. 2017; Møller and Skaaning 2013b; Schmitter 2015). Others claim that there has been a significant decline in the global level of democracy for more than a decade, and note clear signs of a reverse wave of democratization (Diamond 2016; EIU 2017; Klaas 2016; Kurlantzick 2014; Puddington and Roylance 2017; Rich 2017).

However, such negative perceptions of the state of democracy are often based on unbalanced accounts with a biased focus on recent negative examples, or rely on data sets that lack transparency and are constructed using questionable procedures (see Coppedge et al. 2011; Munck 2009). Moreover, although such worries about a general democratic decline have become more frequent and prominent in recent years, they are not new (see Merkel 2010, 2015). People are generally too pessimistic when assessing progress in human development because they are predisposed to think things are worse than they are, and they overestimate the likelihood of hardship (Norberg 2016). This deep-seated negativity bias (see Ito et al. 1998; Rozin and Royzman 2001) is reinforced by the media's tendency to focus on crises and negative events rather than positive developments (Altheide 2002; Niven 2001; Soroka and McAdams 2015).

The popular notion that democracy is regressing could still be valid, but there appears to be a current tendency to focus too heavily on the past and to exaggerate and oversimplify current negative examples, while overlooking positive developments (see Carothers and Youngs 2017; Levitsky and Way 2015). Against this backdrop,

this chapter offers an empirical analysis, based on new data, of the following questions: Has the global state of democracy declined over the past ten years? What have been the major global trends in democracy since the beginning

of the third wave of democratization? What patterns are displayed by various dimensions and subdimensions of democracy? How do the different regions of the world fare? Box 1.2 presents the key findings.

BOX 1.2

An overview of the global state of democracy: key findings, 1975–2015

- There has been much global progress in almost all aspects of democracy since 1975, but the positive trends have flattened out since the mid-1990s. **The current global state of democracy is one of trendless fluctuations.** This means that there are upturns and downturns in individual countries, but no broad tendencies of progress or decline, and signifies democratic steadiness at the highest level in world history.
- **The majority of electoral democracies established after 1975 have survived,** and almost none of the more established electoral democracies have experienced reversals. Since 2005, there have been 24 democratic reversals and 39 democratic transitions. While some countries became electoral democracies for the first time, most of the recent transitions to democracy happened in countries with previous democratic experience.
- The number and proportion of countries that are considered **electoral democracies** have increased during the period. In 1975, competitive elections determined government power in as few as 46 countries (30 per cent); **this number had grown to 132 (68 per cent) by 2016.** One-third of countries are still under autocratic rule.
- In the period 1975–2015 substantial global progress was made in four out of five dimensions emphasized by **International IDEA's comprehensive definition of democracy** (i.e. Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Participatory Engagement), while the global level of Impartial Administration has changed little since 1975.
- Positive trends in the **Representative Government** dimension can be seen in all subdimensions (*Clean Elections, Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected Government*) and all regions. However, stark regional differences remain. On average, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America have higher degrees of representative government than countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific and, especially, the Middle East and Iran. Many countries have formal democratic institutions, but substantial deficiencies in democratic practices.
- The **Fundamental Rights** dimension has witnessed global progress since 1975 in all of its subdimensions (*Access to Justice, Civil Liberties and Social Rights and Equality*). Developments in social rights and equality follow a positive, linear trend, while the trend for access to justice and civil liberties has gone from gradual improvement, to steep progress around 1990, to another period of gradual improvement, to relative stability after 2005. Gender equality has gradually increased in all regions, but at different speeds and starting at different levels.
- The **Checks on Government** dimension (capturing *Effective Parliaments, Judicial Independence and Media Integrity*) has shown substantial improvement since 1975. Progress seems to have come to a halt, as most countries had similar levels of checks on government in 2015 as they did in 2005. There are still notable differences in the extent to which such checks are exercised in various regions, largely following patterns similar to those for representative government.
- The global average of the **Impartial Administration** dimension (covering *Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement*) demonstrates no significant change between 1975 and 2015. Corruption and predictable enforcement are as big a problem today as they were in 1975. Implementing the rule of law in public administration tends to be difficult to change in the short and medium terms. This could partially explain the dissatisfaction with democracy seen in many electoral democracies emerging after 1975.
- Opportunities for—and the realization of—**Participatory Engagement** have generally gained ground, as reflected in each of the four subdimensions related to citizen involvement (*Civil Society Participation, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy and Subnational Elections*). A global increase in civil society participation reflects the fact that restrictions on civil society's right to organize have been lifted. Autonomous groups now generally have better working conditions than before, although some countries still uphold (and in some cases have even increased) restrictions on civil society organizations. A global increase in electoral participation in national elections mainly reflects the replacement of non-electoral regimes with electoral regimes. Yet turnout has decreased in several countries with longer traditions of regular, competitive elections. There has been a slight increase in the availability and use of direct democracy mechanisms. However, they are rarely implemented in any region. Opportunities to participate in free and fair subnational elections have increased substantially, with considerable variations between regions.
- The **different aspects of democracy take time to develop.** They are subject to political negotiations, compromises and institutional reform processes. Changes are sometimes abrupt and characterized by major events that demarcate sudden and clear democratic progress or regress, while at other times they are more gradual.

Currently, there are more electoral democracies than autocracies globally, and the largest share of the world's population resides in electoral democracies


1.3. A first approximation: the spread and resilience of electoral democracies

One way to address some of these questions is to use a narrow (exclusively electoral), crisp (either/or) understanding of democracy and then count how many countries fulfil a given set of criteria for electoral democracy in different years. If the focus is on democratic transitions and reversals, including key events such as founding elections or coups d'état, an electoral and crisp understanding of democracy can be valuable (Collier and Adcock 1999). Figure 1.1 shows the number and proportion of countries considered electoral democracies in the period 1975–2016. It is based on the updated competitive elections indicator from the Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius 2015). This indicator is an attempt to operationalize Schumpeter's (1974: 269) prominent definition of

democracy as 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote'. The measure captures whether an electoral regime is on track (meaning that elections take place on a regular basis and are not interrupted, for instance, by a coup d'état) and whether multiparty elections are sufficiently free to allow the opposition to win government power, as judged by country-specific sources such as election reports and studies by recognized country experts. Figure 1.1 demonstrates that the number of electoral democracies has been growing since the late 1970s. In 1975, competitive elections determined government power in as few as 46 countries (30 per cent); this number had grown to 112 (68 per cent) by 2016. Until 1988, the increase was gradual, but between 1989 and 1995 there was an abrupt increase

FIGURE 1.1

Global number and percentage of electoral democracies and share of world population living in electoral democracies, 1975–2016



Notes: The percentage of electoral democracies is affected by the fact that more independent countries emerged during the period. The figures for population size used to calculate the share of the global population living in electoral democracies are taken from the World Development Indicators and Gapminder.

Source: Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015) (Competitive Elections Indicator).

in the share of electoral democracies from 42 per cent to 55 per cent when several Eastern European and sub-Saharan African countries transitioned to democracies. Since then, there have been more electoral democracies than autocracies globally, and the largest share of the world's population has resided in electoral democracies.

A closer look at the last ten years reveals that there is little evidence of a substantial, global decline in democracy. Instead, the number of electoral democracies has increased. The patterns are virtually identical if the sample is restricted to the 155 countries covered by the GSoD indices.

Almost one-third of countries are still under autocratic rule, including major regional powers with large populations such as China, Egypt, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, there have been 24 democratic reversals since 2005 in countries such as Fiji, Mali, Niger and Thailand. This strongly indicates that some new democracies are not resilient. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that democratization has always involved a mixture of gains and losses (Møller and Skaaning 2013a: Ch. 5). These reversals do not add up to a global decline. With the exception of Venezuela, no countries with over 40 years of continuous electoral democracy have suffered from democratic reversal, and the majority (56 per cent) of electoral democracies created after 1975 have not experience any reversals, such as Benin, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, and most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe. Moreover, 39 democratic transitions have taken place since 2005. Some countries, such as Bhutan and Tunisia, became electoral democracies for the first time. Most of the transitions to democracy happened in countries with previous democratic experience, such as Honduras, Mali, Nepal and Sri Lanka. When restricting the sample to the countries covered by the GSoD indices, there have been 32 democratic transitions and 22 reversals since 2005.

Moreover, when electoral democracies turn autocratic, they often democratize again after a few years (Bermeo 2016), as in the Central African Republic, Georgia, Haiti, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali and Nepal. Thailand has experienced four democratic transitions and four reversals since 1975. Many of these countries seem to lack sufficient democratic resilience to avoid such cycles of regime change. Yet based on a narrow focus on the prevalence and resilience of electoral democracies, the evidence does not support the existence of a global, large-scale democratic regression. The question is whether this still applies when undertaking a broad and continuous analysis of the global state of democracy.

1.4. A broad and continuous understanding of democracy

Assessing the state of democracy requires the employment of a more comprehensive understanding of democracy than what is captured by dichotomous, electoral measures. International IDEA (Beetham et al. 2002; Beetham et al. 2008; Landman 2008) advocates a comprehensive definition in its State of Democracy (SoD) framework, which is a tool designed for in-country stakeholders to assess the quality of democracy. The GSoD indices build on a revised version of the SoD conceptual framework to facilitate a multifaceted and nuanced understanding of the global and regional contours of democratic developments (Skaaning 2017).

International IDEA (Beetham et al. 2008: 10–11) defines democracy as 'popular control over decision-makers and political equality of those who exercise that control'. The democratic ideal 'seeks to guarantee equality and basic freedoms; to empower ordinary people; to resolve disagreements through peaceful dialogue; to respect difference; and to bring about political and social renewal without convulsions' (Landman 2008: 17).

Hence, democracy is understood in broader terms than just free elections, and has multiple dimensions. They overlap with features

A closer look at the last ten years reveals that there is little evidence of a substantial, global decline in democracy. Instead, the number of electoral democracies has increased

emphasized by the different traditions of democratic thought associated with the concepts of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy and participatory democracy (see Coppedge et al. 2011; Cunningham 2002; Held 2006; Møller and Skaaning 2011). The Annex to this report presents a matrix demonstrating which components of the GSoD framework are shared with each of these traditions.

The democratic principles of popular control and political equality are compatible with different political institutions in the form of electoral systems (proportional–majoritarian), government systems (presidential–parliamentary) and state structure (federalist–unitary) at the national, local and supranational levels. They are thus open to a context-sensitive implementation of universal standards of democratic governance around the world.


Since democratic systems can be organized in a variety of ways, countries can build their democracy in different ways, and therefore may fulfil these principles to varying degrees. Figure 1.2 illustrates the five dimensions of democracy covered by the GSoD indices.

Representative Government covers the extent to which access to political power is free and equal as signified by competitive, inclusive and regular elections. It has four subdimensions: clean elections, inclusive suffrage, free political parties and elected government.

Fundamental Rights captures the degree to which civil liberties are respected, and whether people have access to basic resources that enable their active participation in the political process. This dimension, which significantly overlaps with the international covenants on human rights, has three subdimensions. Two

FIGURE 1.2

Conceptual framework: The Global State of Democracy



of them (fair trials and civil liberties) relate to the concept of liberal democracy, while the third (social rights and equality) relates to the concept of social democracy.

Checks on Government measures the effective control of executive power. It has three subdimensions that are related to the concept of liberal democracy: judicial independence, effective parliament and media integrity.


Impartial Administration concerns how fairly and predictably political decisions are implemented, and thus reflects key aspects of the rule of law. This dimension is related

to the concept of liberal democracy, which prescribes that the exercise of power must be rule abiding and predictable. This dimension has two subdimensions: absence of corruption and predictable enforcement.

Participatory Engagement concerns the extent to which instruments for political involvement are available, and the degree to which citizens use them. It is related to the concept of participatory democracy and has four subdimensions: civil-society participation, electoral participation, direct democracy and subnational elections.

FIGURE 1.3

Degree of Fundamental Rights fulfilment, 2015



Notes: Darker shades indicate high scores and light shades reflect low scores. Austria is light due to the lack of data on this dimension.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Fundamental Rights Index).



Since these dimensions, and their respective subdimensions, reflect a broad definition of democracy (see Annex and Skaaning 2017), the indices capture many aspects of popular control and political equality that go beyond the presence of free elections. Moreover, it is assumed that the more the respective dimensions are fulfilled, the more democratic a political system is. Accordingly, the different aspects of democracy can be fulfilled to varying degrees. Figure 1.3 illustrates this point and depicts variations in the extent to which different countries safeguard fundamental human rights. For example, Mongolia, Senegal and Uruguay performed better on this parameter than their neighbours, as indicated by the darker green.

1.5. Assessing the state of democracy worldwide

Scholars have long debated the extent to which free elections, civil liberties, horizontal accountability, the rule of law and popular participation follow parallel trends, and whether some of these features are harder to achieve than others (e.g. Fukuyama 2015; Møller and Skaaning 2011, 2014; O'Donnell 2010). Studies have emphasized that even though many countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean have successfully introduced relatively free elections, their democracies are in many cases deficient regarding checks on government, respect for fundamental rights or impartial administration (e.g. Merkel et al. 2006; O'Donnell 2007; Zakaria 2003).

The number of hybrid or 'grey-zone' regimes has also increased since 1975. These regimes have formal democratic institutions, primarily multiparty elections, but substantial deficiencies persist regarding the integrity of elections or in other dimensions (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Merkel 2004; Morlino 2012). Some of them barely meet the criteria for electoral democracies, while electoral integrity in others is so low that they are more accurately described as multiparty electoral autocracies (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013).

Even in what many consider to be the modern world's first electoral democracy—the United States—there are long-standing and noteworthy shortcomings, including low turnout rates, manipulation of electoral districts (gerrymandering), skewed funding of political campaigns and unequal access to justice (e.g. Braml and Lauth 2011; Dahl 2003; Norris 2017). Studies of democracy and power distribution in the Scandinavian countries—often praised as blueprint democracies—have also identified a number of shortcomings. These include the indirect translation of material resources (large businesses and interest organizations) into political influence, and biases regarding who participates in elections and joins political parties (under-representation of young people, relatively poor people with low levels of education and ethnic minorities) (Østerud and Selle 2006; Togeby et al. 2003; Petersson 1991).

These examples underline the importance of assessing degrees of democracy and degrees of change when identifying patterns of progress and regress in democracy trends over the last ten years (e.g. Diamond 2016; Levitsky and Way 2015; Merkel 2010; Møller and Skaaning 2013b). Far from all democratic improvements and setbacks are abrupt. Not all changes are characterized by major events that demarcate sudden and clear democratic progress or regress. For example, it took struggles over several generations, temporary setbacks and adjustments before countries such as Costa Rica, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the USA reached their current levels of democracy. The different aspects of democracy take time to develop, and are subject to political negotiations, compromises and institutional reform processes. These factors are essential for cultivating a well-functioning democracy.

The GSoD indices provide a nuanced perspective on democratic developments by identifying varying degrees of change on the multiple dimensions of democratic governance. Ultimately, the descriptive comparison of global and regional trends can indicate the circumstances under which various aspects of

democracy move in the direction of (or away from) the democratic ideals they represent. Since democracy is a multifaceted concept, the framework does not collapse all the scores for the different dimensions into a single score.

In addition, all overviews based on the GSoD indices only use countries as the main unit of measurement (i.e. large and small countries are weighted equally). Additional analyses (not shown) demonstrate that the global trends largely remain the same if countries are assessed based on their population, although some of the upturns tend to be less pronounced and the levels a bit lower, because large countries have, on average, undergone fewer democratic changes and are somewhat less democratic in most dimensions.

A nuanced, short-term perspective on democratic resilience from 2005 to 2015

This section uses the GSoD indices to determine how many countries experienced substantial positive or negative changes in the five dimensions of democracy from 2005 to 2015.


Figure 1.4 demonstrates that most countries' performance did not change substantially on the Representative Government dimension: those placed on the diagonal received the same score in 2005 and 2015. The countries showing the largest declines are Bangladesh, Burundi, Syria, Thailand and Turkey. The most substantial improvements can be seen in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia.

Note, however, that none of the cases with substantial increases are close to the level of the best-performing cases, such as France and Uruguay. Tellingly, Myanmar has recently experienced significant liberalization and a democratic opening (Barany 2016), but there are still problems with voter registration and violence. In Angola, where election quality is even lower, the improvement is due to the fact that no elections were held between the onset of civil war in 1992 and 2008 (KAS 2008).

The GSoD indices provide a nuanced perspective on democratic developments by identifying varying degrees of change on the multiple dimensions of democratic governance

FIGURE 1.4

Changes in country performance on the Representative Government dimension, 2005–15



Notes: The vertical interval from the dots to the diagonal signifies the scale of the change from 2005 to 2015. Countries above the diagonal have improved their scores, while those below have regressed. Countries placed directly on the diagonal have kept the same score. The cases demonstrating the largest changes are labelled with the country names.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index).

Many of the countries that have exhibited the most progress in checks on government have also made progress in the other dimensions


While the Fundamental Rights dimension demonstrates even greater stability, some countries—Burundi, Mauritania, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen—demonstrate substantial regression. Several of these have recently experienced fierce political struggles in the form of coup attempts, harassment of opposition members or civil wars. Major improvements have been made in Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Tunisia. However, although the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2010 led to an improvement in civil liberties, the civil war in Libya is currently pulling the country in the opposite direction (HRW 2017). Despite recent gains, the other cases mentioned also leave considerable room for further improvements, as indicated by the countries shaded light green in Figure 1.3.

The general trend concerning checks on government (i.e. the effective control of executive power) reinforces the pattern described above. Most countries' levels of checks on government remained relatively

unchanged between 2005 and 2015. According to Figure 1.5, those experiencing the most significant losses were Burundi, Ecuador, Macedonia, Nicaragua, Thailand and Turkey. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas under the leadership of President Daniel Ortega have gradually undermined control of the executive, which signifies a partial return to their style of rule in the 1980s (Shifter 2016; Thaler 2017). Recep Tayyip Erdogan's concentration of power, appointment of loyal supporters in the courts and public sector media, mass detention of critics and dismissal of critical public employees (including many university professors) in Turkey has also made many international headlines. The decreases in checks on government under the former VMRO-DPMNE government in Macedonia (Gjuzelov 2015) and under the former president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa (Conaghan 2016; Fleischman 2016), are less well known. Many of the countries that have exhibited the most progress in checks on government have also made progress in the other dimensions. They

FIGURE 1.5

Changes in country performance on the Checks on Government dimension, 2005–15




Notes: The vertical interval from the dots to the diagonal signifies the scale of the change from 2005 to 2015. Countries above the diagonal have improved their scores, while those below have regressed. Countries placed directly on the diagonal have kept the same score. The cases demonstrating the largest changes are labelled with the country names

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Checks on Government Index).

FIGURE 1.6

Degree of Impartial Administration, 2015



Notes: Darker shades indicate high scores and light shades reflect low scores.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Impartial Administration Index).



count Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, Togo and Tunisia. Again, Libya’s achievements should be interpreted with great caution, since two fighting groups each claim to have the right to govern the country.

The data on impartial administration reinforces the conclusion about stability when comparing 2005 and 2015. Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Tunisia have experienced substantial progress in fighting corruption and ensuring more transparent and predictable enforcement. In Guinea, the Condé administration has made serious attempts to

fight decades of mismanagement (Bangoura 2015), and Latvia benefits from recent anti-corruption reforms (OECD 2015). However, Figure 1.6 demonstrates that none of these countries is among the best-performing states (e.g. Australia, Costa Rica, Estonia and Switzerland), and several countries, such as Hungary, Madagascar, Mauretania, Syria, Turkey and Venezuela, have suffered substantial declines. The negative cases are often affected by violent conflict or government attempts to centralize power. In Madagascar, a period of political turmoil and transition has resulted in institutional decay and increased corruption (TI 2014).

To summarize, for the first four dimensions, scores have not changed significantly in the large majority of countries since 2005, and substantial negative changes have generally been outweighed or at least balanced by positive changes in other countries.


Since the subdimensions of participatory engagement (i.e. Civil Society Participation, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy and Subnational Elections) capture different phenomena, the GSoD indices do not aggregate them into a single index as is the case in the other four dimensions. The subdimensions are depicted separately in Figure 1.7, which illustrates that most countries had rather similar scores in 2005 and 2015. Few countries have undergone substantial negative and positive changes, as indicated by the low bars to the left

and right, respectively, of the red dotted lines. This finding applies to all four subdimensions.

One of the most interesting findings from this overview is that civil society participation has increased significantly in several African and Asian states, such as Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal and Tunisia. In most of these cases, the improvements reflect the fact that severe restrictions on the rights of civil society to organize have been abandoned, and autonomous groups now have better working conditions than before. Other countries, such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Turkey and Thailand, have been characterized by the opposite trend. The most obvious negative tendency is the relatively large drop in electoral turnout in quite a few countries, including Bangladesh, Cyprus, Greece, Guinea and the

FIGURE 1.7

Changes in Participatory Engagement by subdimension, 2005–15



Notes: The red dotted lines indicate a substantial change defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. The left side of the scale (negative scores) illustrates declines, and the right side (positive scores) gains in the respective subdimensions. The heights of the bars indicate how many countries are characterized by the different intervals of change between 2005 and 2015.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Civil Society Participation Index, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy, Subnational Elections Index).

USA. Yet, these downturns are balanced out globally by major upturns, which are often related to the introduction or reintroduction of elections, as in Angola, Myanmar and Nepal, among others.

1.6. A nuanced, long-term perspective on democratic progress from 1975 to 2015

To further analyse the global state of democracy, an overview of long-term trends associated with the different dimensions and subdimensions of democracy is also needed. The number of electoral democracies was nearly constant at a relatively low level (fluctuating between 35 and 45) from 1950 to 1975, and pessimism flourished due to democratic reversals in Latin America and the Caribbean and several failures to introduce democratic government in the many newly independent countries (Møller and Skaaning 2013a). The explosion in electoral democracies in the aftermath of the third wave of democratization beginning with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974 (Huntington 1991) is demonstrated above. However, the variances in degree within different dimensions have yet to be documented during this period.

Representative Government: significant improvements across regions


Many consider representative government, which reflects the extent to which government power is determined by free elections, to be the most essential aspect of modern democracy (Beetham 1999; Coppedge et al. 2011; Merkel 2004). Figure 1.8 demonstrates a general improvement in the state of representative government in all regions of the world (except for the region of North America, which is characterized by a stable, high level during the whole period). A steady increase until the late 1980s was followed by more abrupt growth between 1989 and 1991, around the end of the Cold War. Thereafter, slow growth has been followed by stability; since the mid-2000s, national improvements and setbacks have averaged out at the global level.

The underlying data linked to the subdimensions of representative government indicate that universal suffrage is close to being achieved in a large majority of countries, and that the great majority of governments in the sample are formally accountable to the electorate via elections. Many countries do well on the formal criteria related to universal suffrage and elected offices, which are now mentioned in the great majority of constitutions and legislation around the world, including those of most autocracies. Yet the empirical evidence indicates that formal institutions are relatively easy to introduce, and do not necessarily have a significant impact if the incumbents control the opposition and manipulate elections.

Nonetheless, since 1975 elections have become more common as well as cleaner (i.e. less fraud, manipulation and irregularities), and political parties are facing fewer barriers to organizing and participating in elections. However, many countries still have room to improve the quality of their elections and their treatment of opposition parties. There is a gap between the

FIGURE 1.8

Representative Government: regional trends, 1975–2015



Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index).

Since 1975 elections have become more common as well as cleaner, and political parties are facing fewer barriers to organize and participate in elections

states doing best in representative government (such as Costa Rica and Sweden, which scored close to the maximum of 1 on the scale in 2015) and most other states. Many countries severely violate the principle of representative government, which means that the third wave of democratization has had less impact on this core dimension of democracy than many hoped for—and expected—in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Fukuyama 1992; Lijphart 2000; Carothers 2002).

The global trends mask a variety of developments at the regional and country levels. By the mid-1970s, representative governments were largely restricted to a small group of countries in North and West Europe, North America and Oceania, although exceptions included Botswana, Costa Rica, India and Japan. Democratic institutions and practices in other parts of the world were then introduced (in some cases reintroduced) with the third wave of democratization. Democratic systems are now found in countries with more diverse combinations of socio-economic development, culture, national unity and state capacity.

The positive trend in the Representative Government dimension has manifested itself in all regions (see the Annex for details about the regional division of countries used in this publication). Europe experienced some early improvements when Greece, Portugal and Spain introduced free elections in the 1970s. Thereafter, the Americas experienced a steep growth pattern due to democratic openings in, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Honduras and Peru, followed by a less steep but still significant upward trend in Asia and the Pacific in the 1980s, when the Philippines and the Republic of Korea introduced democratic reforms. Dramatic changes then took place in Europe when communist regimes collapsed in 1989–91 and were replaced by electoral regimes with free elections in many countries, such as the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Hungary. In the early to mid-1990s, African countries saw major improvements. Governments selected

in relatively free multiparty elections replaced military dictatorships, one-party regimes and racial oligarchies in many countries, such as Ghana, Senegal and South Africa.

However, stark regional differences remain. The countries in North America, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean generally fulfil the criteria for representative government to a higher degree than those in the Middle East and Iran, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. While quite a few countries in the Middle East are monarchies without multiparty elections, Asia and the Pacific and especially Africa have many hybrid regimes. In such regimes, the formal criteria for representative government are fulfilled by holding multiparty elections, but there are substantial problems regarding electoral integrity, media working conditions, opposition parties and checks on government (Cheeseman 2015; Diamond 2008; Norris 2015; Rakner and van de Walle 2009). These regimes tend to have a strong incumbency bias, which undermines the integrity of elections by creating an uneven playing field for political competition (Levitsky and Way 2010) and sometimes results in electoral violence or deepens existing conflicts and polarizations.

Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as Venezuela, and post-communist Europe face similar problems. Nonetheless, these parts of the world have seen the largest positive change since 1975. The average score of representative government for Latin America and the Caribbean more than doubled from about 0.30 in 1975 to almost 0.70 in 2015. Figure 1.9 shows that these increases are reflected in all subdimensions of representative government. Universal suffrage has become the official norm in all countries of the region. Moreover, almost all countries in the region have multiparty elections; Cuba is a consistent exception. Electoral malpractices have also been reduced in Latin America and the Caribbean, and political party freedoms have increased. Nonetheless, improvements came to a halt in the mid-1990s, and there is a notable distance between the regional average

for Latin America and the Caribbean and the scores of the best-performing countries in the region, such as Chile and Uruguay.


Fundamental Rights: gradual improvements, continued threats

Individual human rights in the form of access to fair trials and civil liberties, as emphasized by liberal theories of democracy, and social rights and equality, as emphasized by theories of social democracy, are important to ensure effective popular control and political equality. Thus, a well-functioning democracy must have a set of fundamental rights that is continuously protected. The regional trends illustrating respect for fundamental rights (see Figure 1.10) are very similar to those for representative government. North America and Europe generally perform better than Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, while the Middle East and Iran shows the poorest achievement. However, most regions have experienced positive trends since 1975; Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced the greatest changes. Country scores in the region began at a very low level and now rank in an intermediate position among the regions. Economic growth and redistribution policies in several Latin American and Caribbean countries have positively influenced social rights and equality (Osueke and Tsounta 2014), whereas the end of civil wars in Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) and the Andean region (Colombia, Peru) has improved access to justice and civil liberties. Unfortunately, other types of violence related to drug trafficking and urban crime are very frequent in this region (UN 2014).

Citizens still face extreme violations of fundamental civil and political rights in countries such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Turkmenistan (e.g. personal integrity, freedom of expression and fair trial). However, it has become increasingly common for governments to use more selective, targeted, and less violent and comprehensive repression (Bermeo 2016; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013). This includes legislation that is presented as legitimate, harmless and in

FIGURE 1.9


Representative Government subdimensions: Latin America and the Caribbean, 1975–2015



Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Clean Elections Index, Inclusive Suffrage Index, Free Political Parties Index, Elected Government Index).

FIGURE 1.10

Fundamental Rights: regional trends, 1975–2015



Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Fundamental Rights Index).

It has become increasingly common for governments to use more selective, targeted, and less violent and comprehensive repression. This includes legislation that is presented as legitimate, harmless and in the interest of the common good, but which is used to gradually silence critical voices and undermine the opposition.

the interest of the common good, but which is used to gradually silence critical voices and undermine the opposition, as has happened in Russia, for instance (Treisman 2017). These tactics are more sophisticated than outright censorship or imprisoning or killing opposition members, and thus are sometimes more difficult to identify.


In other parts of the world, problems with fundamental rights are more closely related to social inequality and a lack of resources. In many developing countries, large portions of the population lack access to basic education, health care and social security. Various forms of discrimination and disparity in the distribution of economic and other types of resources are linked to 'low-intensity citizenship' (where a state is unable to enforce its laws and policies among selected social groups, distinguished by identity, class or gender), which O'Donnell (1993: 1361) describes in relation to many South American countries. This concept refers to a situation in which individuals and groups lack recognition and resources, and are thus disempowered to gain political influence. Accordingly, they fall short of achieving full democratic citizenship (i.e. equality in political and legal matters).

The picture is even more diverse at the country level. Some countries, such as Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Turkmenistan, engage in severe violations of virtually all democratic rights. In other countries, such as Guatemala, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, it is mostly selected social groups (distinguished by identity, class or gender) that have 'low-intensity democratic citizenship'. In these cases, members of groups that comprise persons disadvantaged due to 'age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, economic and migration status' (UN 2016: 1) do not obtain the services and treatment from public authorities to which they are entitled as citizens (MRG 2016). This type of exclusion limits, by definition, the extent to which disadvantaged and marginalized groups can participate in political life.

The exclusion of citizen groups in different domains affects their voting behaviour. While these groups may not be subjected to formal limits on voting or electing the political leadership, social and economic exclusion may influence their ability to participate in political life, which indicates that exclusions and inequalities in different domains tend to reinforce each other (UN 2016).

FIGURE 1.11

Fundamental Rights, Access to Justice, Civil Liberties and Social Rights and Equality: global trends, 1975–2015



Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Access to Justice Index, Civil Liberties Index and Social Rights and Equality Index).

The GSoD indices do not show steep, global declines in the three key components of fundamental rights: access to justice, civil liberties, and social rights and equality (see Figure 1.11). However, the data indicate that developments in social rights and equality are on a different track than access to justice and civil liberties, as they follow a positive, linear trend. The other subdimensions follow a pattern like representative government—a gradual increase, growth between 1985 and 1995, and then relative stability in the global average. However, there is a dip in civil liberties at the very end of the period. It is not statistically significant, but could be a warning sign that deserves to be taken seriously.

Subregional differences regarding gains in fundamental rights over time are noteworthy. For example, Europe has large subregional differences in access to justice. A small gradual improvement in north and western Europe is paralleled by southern European countries, which are still at a lower level, after a sudden rise in the late 1970s when authoritarian regimes ended in Greece, Portugal and Spain. A decade later, Eastern European citizens' access to justice improved due to the collapse of communist regimes. Yet access to justice improved more in East-Central European countries compared to post-Soviet European countries.

The gap between European subregions in citizens' access to justice mirrors similar gaps between these subregions in most other aspects of democracy. It continued to widen until most countries in East-Central Europe joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007. Since then, national political elites do not seem to have been able (or willing) to improve the situation.

Several Eastern European governments, such as those in Hungary and Poland, have recently attempted to undermine civil liberties as well as checks on government (Council of Europe 2017; Dawson and Hanley 2016; Greskovits 2015). After the Law and Justice Party won the 2015 national elections in Poland, it used its power to amend the laws governing


the judiciary and public media organizations, so that it could make 'friendly' management appointments and adapt editorial policies to make them more sympathetic to the government. In Hungary, Prime Minister Victor Orbán and his Fidesz Party have undermined the autonomy of public media, research institutions and the judiciary through new regulations and appointment procedures.

Looking at subregions is one way to apply a disaggregate perspective on developments; another is to focus on one of the five subcomponent indices for civil liberties or one of the three subcomponent indices for social rights and equality included in the GSoD data set. Among the latter is the Gender Equality Index. Figure 1.12 shows that gender equality has gradually increased in all regions, but at different speeds and starting at different levels. North America and Europe have seen positive trends, however obstacles to gender equality remain, particularly related to equal pay and representation in leadership positions in both the private and public sectors. In the regions with lower levels

Gender equality has gradually increased in all regions, but at different speeds and starting at different levels. In relative terms, much progress has been made, but in absolute terms, women hold far from an equal share of seats in parliaments and cabinets

FIGURE 1.12

Gender Equality: regional trends, 1975–2015



Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Gender Equality Index).

of gender equality, there is a noteworthy gap between the Middle East and Iran and the two other regions (Africa, and Asia and the Pacific), indicating the need for improvement in the Middle East and Iran.

Latin America and the Caribbean have made a remarkable jump from about 0.35 to 0.65 on the scale, which is relative to the sample: a score of 1 does not signify full gender equality, but merely the best performance registered in any of the included country–years.

Two of the indicators used to construct the GSoD gender equality index capture female representation in parliaments and cabinets. They show that the global average of women representatives in parliament has increased from around 7 per cent in 1975 to 15 per cent in 2015, whereas the share of women in cabinets has gone up from 5 per cent in the late 1980s to 14 per cent in 2015. Hence in relative terms, much progress has been made, but in absolute terms, women hold far from an equal share of seats in parliaments and cabinets.


Checks on Government: sudden upturns, followed by stability

According to liberal democratic theory, an active legislature, an independent judiciary, and a critical and pluralistic press need to continuously check the government to ensure it does not abuse political power. Taking the situation in 1975 as a baseline, checks on government have been on the rise all over the world since then (see Figure 1.13). However, there are still notable regional differences in the extent to which such checks are exercised. Africa and Asia and the Pacific generally lag behind Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America. The regional averages hide large differences between the trajectories of individual countries within the same region. For example, checks on government are currently much stronger in Sweden than in Russia, in Costa Rica than in Venezuela, in Ghana than in Ethiopia, and in Japan than in China.

Subtle attempts to undermine democracy by constraining the powers and autonomy of courts, the media and parliament are widespread in all regions. Efficiency and national interest are often used as an excuse to increase the powers of the executive at the expense of parliaments, for example President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's efforts in 2017 to change the Turkish Constitution to increase and prolong his grip on power. Similarly, the Polish Law and Justice Party recently tabled legislation endangering the independence of the judiciary and moved to 'neuter the constitutional court; to take control of the state media; to defund unfriendly non-governmental organizations or regulate them into irrelevance; and to put its own people in charge of public institutions' (Hanley and Dawson 2017). Other examples include President Blaise Compaoré's attempt to seek an unconstitutional third term in Burkina Faso in 2014 and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's gradual concentration of power by partially replacing the Congress, Supreme Court, electoral authorities and the attorney general with new bodies filled with his

FIGURE 1.13

Checks on Government: regional trends, 1975–2015



Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Checks on Government Index).

political allies. The problems have continued and in some respects increased since Nicolás Maduro took over the presidency from Chávez in 2013, such as the recent attempts to strip the opposition-led National Assembly of its few remaining powers (Sabatini 2016).

Frequently used means to concentrate power and silence critics include the abuse of libel and tax laws, excessive restrictions on public access to administrative and political documents, and biased appointments of judges, members of media boards and public officials (Huq and Ginsburg forthcoming; Levitsky and Way 2010; Ottaway 2003). Yet attempts to curb opposition and secure power are not always successful. President Compaoré was forced out of power by extensive demonstrations in 2014, and in the following year Maithripala Sirisena won the presidency in Sri Lanka and kept his promise to roll back some of the authoritarian measures and power concentration introduced by his predecessor, Mahinda Rajapaksa (DeVotta 2016; Dibbert 2016).


These attempts can be understood by revisiting the challenge of weak institutions and the strong focus on the executive branch in some

political systems, which undercut the mandate and influence of parliamentary institutions to perform their law-making and supervising roles. Recent events in sub-Saharan Africa, post-communist Europe and South America signal that this dimension requires attention (Bogaards and Elischer 2016; Dawson and Hanley 2016; Luna and Vergara 2016).

In relation to the Checks on Government subdimensions, Figure 1.14 focuses on Africa, which had the lowest levels from the outset. Nonetheless, the African trends on effective parliament, judicial independence and media integrity are quite representative of the trends found in other regions (not shown). The scores indicate that, in relative terms, media integrity has experienced the largest positive change, followed by more effective parliaments. The data indicate that the level of judicial independence has hardly changed. Nonetheless, although parliaments and particularly the media provide more checks on African governments today than in the past, the average performance on these features is relatively low compared to more established democracies in Canada, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

FIGURE 1.14

Checks on Government: Africa, 1975–2015



Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Effective Parliament Index, Judicial Independence Index and Media Integrity Index).

Impartial Administration: standstill at different levels

The GSoD indices also assess impartial administration—the fair and predictable implementation of public policies. Unfair and unpredictable implementation of official laws and policies undermines the rule of law. That is, a large discrepancy between laws and policies, on the one hand, and practices, on the other hand, affects the fulfilment of the democratic principles of popular control and political equality.

When looking at global developments in impartial administration, the findings stand out from most other aspects of democracy because this feature has not experienced any significant change (see Figure 1.15). In other words, corruption and predictable enforcement are as big a problem today as they were in 1975. This stability indicates that it is harder to introduce positive changes in fair and predictable public administration than in representative government or respect for civil liberties. In other words, access to political power and respect for different kinds of liberties


are easier to change formally depending on the design of the constitutional system, at least in the short term, than implementing the rule of law in public administration (see especially Mazzuca 2010; Møller and Skaaning 2014; O'Donnell 2010). This is troublesome, because an impartial administration influences the provision of public goods and services, public trust and satisfaction—and may even be more important than representative government (Rothstein 2011).

When considering trends at the regional level, the data reveal that only Latin America and the Caribbean experienced significant improvements in relation to impartial administration until the 1990s as countries moved away from authoritarian regimes. Europe even experienced a decline after the collapse of communist regimes. This finding is mostly related to nepotism and corruption influenced by the transition from planned to market economies (Holmes 2006). Moreover, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into many independent countries in the early 1990s means that these areas now have a relatively greater weight than West European countries when calculating the regional average than before. This tends to decrease the scores, because the administrations in the former set of countries are generally less impartial than those found in Western Europe.

The two subindices linked to impartial administration, namely predictable enforcement and the absence of corruption, show that the world averages are quite stable for both components. Their developments since 1975 mirror each other: a small decline in the absence of corruption (that is, an increase in corruption) is observed at the same time as a slight increase in predictable enforcement. However, these changes have not yet been significant enough to warrant strong conclusions. At the regional level, this tendency applies to Africa and Asia and the Pacific, but not to Europe, or to Latin America and the Caribbean. Studies have shown that there is considerable global variation in

FIGURE 1.15

Impartial Administration: regional trends, 1975–2015



Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Impartial Administration Index).

the impartiality of public administrations, and that ineffective and corrupt institutions tend to persist (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009; Rothstein 2011; Dahlberg, Linde and Holmberg 2015).

Participatory Engagement: global progress, but room for expansion


According to supporters of participatory democracy, vibrant democracy requires active citizen participation—during and between elections—as well as national representative institutions and fundamental rights. Politically engaged citizens must also be involved in different phases and levels of political agenda setting and decision-making.

The GSoD indices framework does not combine the scores into an overarching index for this

dimension, because they reflect fundamentally different aspects of participation. Figure 1.16 therefore provides separate information about four participatory mechanisms. At the global level, the scores for the different subdimensions of participatory engagement all show progress. Mechanisms of direct democracy are available and have been used more often in the last decade than in previous decades. Interpreting this trend, however, requires taking into account that direct voting is sometimes misused to control citizens from the top down rather than to represent them from the bottom up (Altman 2011). Free and fair subnational elections at the regional and local levels have become more widespread. Civil society participation has also been on the rise, and electoral participation in national elections has increased overall.

FIGURE 1.16

Civil Society Participation, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy and Subnational Elections: global trends, 1975–2015



Notes: The band in light red around the line for Civil Society Participation demarcates the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimate (see the Annex). No confidence intervals are included for the three other subdimensions because they are based on observational data.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Civil Society Participation Index, Electoral Turnout indicator, Direct Democracy indicator and Subnational Elections Index).

At the global level, the scores for the different subdimensions of participatory engagement all show progress


These trends are related to the positive developments in representative government and fundamental rights that have enabled citizens to participate more in public life (Bernhard et al. 2017). In centralized, non-electoral or one-party autocracies, citizens generally face more obstruction and fewer opportunities for participation than in the more open multiparty regimes that have become the norm today in most parts of the world. However, some countries, such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkey, have over the last five to last ten years experienced a 'shrinking of civil society space'—that is, an increase in

government activities that restrict the ability of autonomous civil society organizations to contribute to the functioning of political systems (CIVICUS 2016; Roth 2016).

The trends for civil society engagement largely mirror those of representative government: gradual improvement until 1989, then a sudden and relatively steep increase, followed by fading gradual improvement or stability. The regions also experienced sequential improvements: first Latin America and the Caribbean, then Asia and the Pacific, and then Europe and Africa after the end of the Cold War. Yet, while there are large regional

FIGURE 1.17

Degree of Direct Democracy, 2015



Notes: Darker shades indicate high scores and light shades reflect low scores.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Direct Democracy indicator).



differences in representative government, the differences between regional participatory engagement scores are less pronounced. While more traditional, institutionalized civil society participation continues to play a critical role, such as in Mongolia (Fish and Seeberg 2017), citizens around the world are also using other forms of participatory engagement, which are often loosely based on informal networks and civil resistance movements, facilitated by new social media (Shirky 2011).

The data show that turnout in national elections follows similar patterns in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, with increases mostly due to replacing non-electoral regimes with electoral regimes. Since not all electoral regimes are electoral democracies, changes in electoral turnout do not necessarily signify democratic upturns or downturns. In Europe, the downward trend in national election turnout rates is partly driven by some of the more established democracies, including France, Switzerland and the UK, where electoral participation has decreased over the last 40 years. The relatively new electoral democracies in East Europe have experienced an even more rapid decline in turnout levels. However, there are exceptions (e.g. the Scandinavian countries), where electoral participation has remained high.

The availability (and use) of direct democracy mechanisms has increased slightly in all regions. Yet they started from very low levels, and they are still not a prominent feature of democracy in any region. Asia and the Pacific represents the lowest regional average and Europe the highest (see Altman 2017). Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela are exceptions: to a relatively large degree they provide and use such mechanisms, as shown in Figure 1.17. Caution is needed when interpreting direct democracy scores, since governments in countries that do not meet the criteria for electoral democracy sometimes abuse referendums to strengthen their rule.

The opportunity for citizens to participate in free and fair subnational elections has increased substantially in Europe as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. The levels in Asia and the Pacific and especially Africa and the Middle East and Iran are lower, and progress has been slower and smaller in these regions. The developments largely reflect national-level trends in respect to the principles of representative government. However, there are some exceptions, where subnational elections either do not take place or are substantially less free and fair than national elections, such as in Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa (Behrend and Whitehead 2016; McMann 2017). The reasons for this include geographical challenges related to organizing subnational elections, the degree of ethnic diversity of country populations and variations in subnational autonomy among federal states.

1.7. Conclusions: trendless fluctuations

The global state of democracy has improved considerably since 1975, and there has not been a significant global decline since 2005, as shown in Figures 1.16 and 1.18. Long-term progress has been observed in four of the five dimensions covered by the GSoD indices: Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Participatory Engagement; Impartial Administration has not shown significant progress at the global level. This finding could help explain some of the widespread public dissatisfaction and disappointment with democracy in many countries. Corruption, discrimination and ineffectiveness make citizens feel that democracy does not deliver the basic services and equal treatment that they request, and the human rights to which they are entitled.

The global trends cover significant variation at the regional level. All regions except North America (which was at a high level from the outset) experienced significant improvements in most areas; Latin America and the Caribbean

The opportunity for citizens to participate in free and fair subnational elections has increased substantially in Europe as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. The levels in Asia and the Pacific and especially Africa and the Middle East and Iran are lower, and progress has been slower and smaller in these regions

have exhibited the most progress, while the Middle East and Iran has lagged in most areas. In Europe, first southern European countries and then former communist countries have driven the positive trend, but the latter group has also experienced some setbacks. Africa and Asia and the Pacific have made substantial achievements, but most countries in these regions still show moderate to large deficits on the dimensions compared to the best-performing countries.

Positive trends are found in all major world regions, and over the past ten years democracy has been quite resilient. For some aspects of democracy, more gains than losses have been achieved at the country level. For others, areas of decline have largely been balanced by areas of improvement. The findings presented in this chapter thus challenge the pessimistic


view that democracy is extremely fragile and generally in decline. Indeed, it is unsurprising that the initial scale and pace of post-Cold War democratization was not sustained, as this was an exceptional period (Møller and Skaaning 2013a: 89).

It is therefore not surprising (although many had expected and hoped for more) that overall progress has slowed for many aspects of democracy since the mid-1990s. The empirical overview suggests that the current global state of democracy is one of trendless fluctuations—upturns and downturns in individual countries, but with no broad tendencies of decline or progress (see Box 1.3).

Trendless fluctuations represent a trend in themselves—the continuity of democracy at the

FIGURE 1.18

Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration: global trends, 1975–2015



Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government Index and Impartial Administration Index).

highest level in world history. Considering the current challenges to democracy, this continuity indicates that in the most basic competition between democracy and dictatorship, the former tends to have the upper hand.

The repression of democratic rights and violations of democratic practices has certainly not come to an end, and no country has perfect democratic rule. While rapid and blatant reversals of democratic institutions still happen, incremental erosions of democratic features have become more common than abrupt and complete regressions through coups d'état.

Democracy should not be taken for granted. Ordinary citizens, civil society organizations and political elites need to continue their work to advocate, safeguard and advance democracy. Contemporary attempts at backsliding can be, and in many cases are, countered by democratically oriented groups. Fortunately, incremental declines in democracy generally lead to less brutal and less stable regimes than clear-cut dismissals of democratic institutions, and gradual erosions of democracy have greater chances of being rolled back (Bermeo 2016). In addition, while the threat of external promotion of autocracy may present a real danger in some cases, the authoritarian influence has generally had limited and contradictory effects. Sometimes such attempts have even unintentionally led to greater pluralism (Way 2016).

The findings presented in this chapter suggest that current views of the global state of democracy are overly pessimistic. A more

BOX 1.3

A period of trendless fluctuations

The lack of continued, large-scale progress in democratic development has caused several scholars and analysts to claim that democracy has been in decline in over the past ten years and that the pace of this trend is increasing exponentially. However, as Møller and Skaaning argue: 'one should think twice about the possible advent of a significant democratic rollback. Processes of democratization have usually been messy, with lots of movement back and forth. From a long-term perspective, this bumpy road has led to a more democratic world, but it has done so haltingly and with more than occasional setbacks. The one-and-a-half decades after 1989—showing a remarkable increase in the number of democracies—thus stand out as relatively exceptional. Seen in this light, it is not too surprising that this trend has recently changed' (2013a: 89). Apart from the interwar years, there have been no major reverse waves of modern democracy. Previous periods of 'democratic crisis' have generally been characterized by trendless fluctuations rather than large-scale decline. The current era most likely represents another of these periods—but now on a higher level of democracy than ever before.

detailed and historically longer-term view of the evolution of democracy is needed. In the words of Carothers and Youngs (2017), a 'more nuanced perspective might not dispel the gloom, but it may help prevent a lapse into disabling pessimism'. Building strong and resilient democracies takes time and proceeds incrementally. It also requires robust leadership, effective institutions and civic engagement. In some countries, democracy is under pressure: policymakers and citizens face critical choices about whether (and how) to defend or advance democracy. Other countries do not even qualify as electoral democracies. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to find that, overall, most aspects of democracy have advanced tremendously over the past 40 years and that democracy today is healthier than many contend.

The empirical overview suggests that the current global state of democracy is one of trendless fluctuations—upturns and downturns in individual countries, but with no broad tendencies of decline or progress

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
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
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Chapter

2

Democracy's resilience
in a changing world





Democracy's resilience in a changing world

Democracy has grown impressively from the 1970s to the 2000s. Yet in 2017, despite democracy's long-term resilience, it appears to be fragile in many countries. From new populist movements that threaten the rights of minorities to the stark challenges of corruption and state capture, democratic institutions are vulnerable to setbacks, the erosion of rights and the manipulation of electoral processes. Concerns about democracy's health have raised an important question: What makes democracy more resilient? This chapter explores the global state of democracy by exploring the conditions for its resilience. How can citizens resist illiberal or autocratic regimes? When do checks and balances among institutions prevent state capture and backsliding? How can structural risks to democracy in underlying social and political relationships be reduced? Can democracy be designed to be more resilient? What roles do outsiders play in protecting democracy from peril when it is under threat? The chapter concludes with a set of recommendations for building more resilient democracies to face these challenges and to weather the crises that lie ahead.

Written by
Timothy Sisk²

2.1. Introduction: what makes democracy resilient?

Concern has grown from scholars and policymakers over the possible global decline of democracy worldwide (Annan 2016). Amid global unease over the rise of populism and 'strong-leader' autocrats, or the endemic challenges of state capture and corruption in many countries, enthusiasm for democracy seems to have decreased: doubts have arisen about its ability to address the contemporary problems of providing peace and security and broad-based human development. Although democracy is currently under threat, it remains an ideal and a best-possible governance system. Democratic values among citizens, and within institutions and processes at the national and international levels, have proven to be remarkably resilient in many ways. Mass

demonstrations against corruption took place in 2017 in Brazil, Romania, South Africa, the United States and Venezuela; citizens have taken to the streets to reclaim democracy. This chapter explores democratic resilience: the ability of democratic ideals, institutions and processes to survive and prosper when confronted with change, challenges and the crises they may produce.

Democracy's values are historically longstanding and enduring, even though the ideals have been subject to criticism from many philosophical and practical perspectives over time (Dahl 1989; Denyer 2016). Democracy reflects a core value enshrined in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the 'will of the people' is the basis for the legitimacy and authority of sovereign states; it reflects a common and universal desire for peace, security and justice. The article stipulates that:

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
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives, (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country, (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Democracy reflects the fundamental ethical principles of human equality and the dignity of persons, and is thus inseparable from human rights (Beetham et al. 2008). Its core principles are manifested in different ways: the institutions, processes and elements of democracy such as electoral systems or arrays of institutions have grown organically and

uniquely in various countries (Beetham et al. 2008; Held 2006). Modern analysis must account for the wide variation in the norms, institutions and processes that collectively comprise today's democracies that goes far beyond traditional theories of liberalism or social democracy; democratic variation requires careful, close-in analysis of how local models reflect or detract from broad democratic values (Youngs 2015).

The gaps between the international norms of the 'right' to democracy and its implementation, particularly in elections, are often at odds with the realities of managed elections, in which the rules of the game are biased. Participation is often managed and the playing field is unfair, and the results at times are fraudulent and lack credibility, resulting in 'flawed or failed contests' that 'can undoubtedly wreck fragile progress' (Norris 2014: 3). Democratic rights are often overlooked in the localized political realities of

The key characteristics of democratic resilience



Resilience is the property of a social system to cope with, survive and recover from complex challenges and crises. The characteristics of a resilient social system include flexibility, recovery, adaptation and innovation.

Resilient social systems are flexible, adaptable, innovative and can recover from challenges or crises

state 'capture', particularly in countries with abundant export-valuable natural resource commodities. Some citizens have turned to extremist political solutions, which threaten the foundations of human rights, democracy and peace that have characterized the post-World War II international system.

Yet democracy shows considerable signs of resilience. Resilience is defined as a political system's ability to cope with, survive and recover from complex challenges and crises that present stress or pressure that can lead to systemic failure. Resilient social systems are flexible (able to absorb stress or pressure), can recover from challenges or crises, adaptable (can change in response to a stress to the system), and innovative (able to change in order to more efficiently or effectively address the challenge or crisis). For further information on International IDEA's definition of resilience see the Background Paper accompanying this chapter, *Democracy and Resilience: Conceptual Approaches and Considerations* (Sisk 2017).

This chapter explores the relationship between democracy and resilience to inform ways to build democracies that are more resilient. It focuses particularly on current events in 2016–17, complementing the analysis of International IDEA's Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices that cover the period 1975–2015. This current analysis explores in more depth critical issues that raise questions about democracy's resilience, including the ways that devoted citizens, strong institutions, cohesive societies, and international support contribute to its ability to survive and thrive.

Section 2.2 presents an overview of the current global context: democracy under threat and the causal explanations of complex, globally related challenges that lead to social polarization, political capture and democratic crises. Resilience in democracy is explored in two distinct contexts: (a) turbulent (and sometimes indirect) transitions to democracy and (b) recent setbacks in established democracies. Section 2.3 affirms that democracy has inherent

value: it can contribute over time to peace and security and to development goals; democracy and inclusive, accountable governance are at the centre of virtuous cycles of human progress.

Section 2.4 explores the challenge of populism and the resilient responses of citizens who defend democracy when it is threatened. Section 2.5 explores dimensions of institutional resilience: when political systems provide checks and balances that advance accountability in politics. Section 2.6 examines policies that reduce the underlying structural risks that can undermine democracy, particularly ethnic diversity and gender- and class-based inequalities. The argument that democracy can be designed to be resilient is discussed in Section 2.7, which explores these issues in societies that are deeply divided and conflict affected. Section 2.8 evaluates resilience through external support: when international actors (such as regional and international organizations) or transnational civil society act in concert to help safeguard and promote democracy within countries. Section 2.9 concludes with a set of recommendations for future efforts to build more resilient democracies worldwide.

2.2. Democracy imperilled: challenges, crises and opportunities

The 21st century offered promise as rapid technological innovations helped bring unparalleled development and continued gains in democracy, fundamental rights and prosperity. Yet, in 2017 the world is fragmented, conflicted and under threat from global challenges such as climate change, migration and widening socio-economic inequality—the effects of which undermine social cohesion, put peace at risk, and threaten to reverse hard-won 20th-century gains in all world regions. It is a tenuous moment for democracy. New challenges, if not adequately addressed, endanger democracy in today's complex world. The contemporary global, regional and country-specific landscape of democracy has rapidly evolved in recent years, raising questions about democracy's ability to thrive amid recent challenges and crises. What challenges threaten democracy today?

After the third wave: challenges to (and gains in) democracy


Since 1974, a third wave of democratization has emerged in a clear pattern of transitions from authoritarian rule and civil war towards the adoption of new, democratic constitutions, electoral processes, and broadening freedoms and participation (Brown 2011; Møller and Skaaning 2013). The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s triggered another wave of democracy that extended unprecedented freedoms to countries in Europe. Democracy thrived and deepened to become the world's principal form of governing institutions, and the quality of democracy expanded gradually in both established democracies and those that have transitioned since the 1970s. Development proceeded rapidly around the world: there was steady progress in human development in 2000–15 through the attainment in many countries of the Millennium Development Goal targets of reducing poverty, advancing the rights of women and girls, and improving access to clean water and sanitation (UN 2015).

Countries that successfully transitioned from authoritarian rule or civil war to democracy in the period 1974–2015 did so through domestic or national processes of negotiation and reform, at times with support from the international community (Stoner and McFaul 2013; Ould-Mohammedou and Sisk 2016). For example, United Nations envoys and country-level resident coordinators played pivotal supportive roles at key moments in the transition processes in Myanmar and Tunisia. In transitioning Nepal (2006–11) and in Colombia following the 2016 Havana peace agreement, the UN-fielded political missions supported the transition and the demobilization of rebels. Yet there is considerable consensus that successful transitions to democracy are internal processes. As Figure 2.1 suggests, progress and regression in democracy scores have occurred around the world over the last decade of the GSoD indices.

Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Myanmar and Nepal have

FIGURE 2.1

Relative gains and losses in Representative Government, 2005–15



Notes: This graph presents scores for the countries that saw the most variation—relative gains and declines—on the Representative Government dimension of the GSoD indices from 2005 to 2015 (from -1 to +1). Positive scores indicate positive developments during this period, and negative scores indicate negative developments.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index).

experienced the highest relative gains in representative government scores. All five of these countries had a score of 0 in 2005, meaning that they did not have competitive elections. Bangladesh, Burundi, Syria, Thailand and Turkey showed the highest relative losses, but of these, only Syria regressed to a score of 0. For decades, a prevailing assumption has been that in most instances, once democracy is ‘consolidated’, it will persist (Alexander 2002). Democracy is generally considered to have consolidated when two conditions are met. First, citizens and political leaders believe it is the only legitimate way to claim political authority. Second, there is greater institutionalization: the rules of democracy that allow for the pursuit of its principles are further defined, refined in practice and adapted to changing social contexts.

Progress towards democracy during a transition is not linear or inevitable (Carothers 2002), and countries considered to be consolidated democracies can experience backsliding (Lust and Waldner 2015). Indeed, democracy faces challenges in Western Europe. For example,

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Democracy faces challenges in Western Europe. For example, polarization undermines the social cohesion necessary for democracy to function well; observers of Germany worry about the fragile centre coalition that has represented modern German democracy. The narrowly approved 'Brexit' referendum in June 2016 in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union (EU) has raised concerns about the ability of a razor-thin majority to make decisions that deeply affect the lives of all citizens

polarization undermines the social cohesion necessary for democracy to function well; observers of Germany worry about the fragile centre coalition that has represented modern German democracy (Grimm 2016). The narrowly approved 'Brexit' referendum in June 2016 in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union has raised concerns about the ability of a razor-thin majority to make decisions that deeply affect the lives of all citizens. Snap elections in June 2017 demonstrated the stability of democracy in the UK when the government went ahead with polls in the wake of terrorist attacks.

Echoing global concerns about restrictions on civil society (Mendelson 2015), in countries such as Azerbaijan, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia there has been a rollback of independent organizations, free media and freedom of opposition (Shekhovtsov and Pomerantsev 2016). Events in Hungary and Poland have raised concerns about their democratic consolidation: economic stress has combined with exclusivist views of social and political identities to elect strongly ideological governments (Rovni 2014). In January 2017, protestors in Romania took to the streets in several cities for weeks to express anger over a government decree that would have weakened accountability laws for government officials (Lyman and Gillet 2017). These protests won considerable concessions from the embattled government, yet some worried whether the masses can sustainably serve as a check on corruption (Voluntiru and Tintariu 2017).

Democracy is also being tested in other regions. In Africa, democratization is evolving rapidly as a generation of leaders associated with independence is likely to be replaced soon by a new generation. For example, in Angola, South Africa and Zimbabwe the strength of multiparty democracy will be tested for possible alternations in ruling regimes for the first time since independence. Uganda has tightly controlled elections, and opposition parties have been restricted or impeded. Conflict erupted in Burundi from 2015 through 2017

over a constitutional crisis, giving rise to an intractable political crisis; in 2016 and 2017 crises erupted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon and Zimbabwe over executive manipulations to retain power beyond constitutional term limits. In Ethiopia, protests have erupted along ethnic lines, causing an ongoing state of emergency with continued concerns about the country's vulnerability to more widespread crisis (Jeffrey 2016). Power plays by presidents often lead to violent protests and cycles of repression, as in Burundi where an intractable 'third-term' claim by President Pierre Nkurunziza precipitated near state failure (ICG 2016).

In Asia and the Pacific, democracy remains uneven as countries such as China and Viet Nam enjoy continued economic progress under one-party systems; in 2016, Viet Nam transitioned to new leadership through an election by delegates of the country's ruling Communist Party. The Philippines—which transitioned to democracy following its 'People Power' revolution of 1983–86—has been subjected to a rollback of rights and freedoms justified by a populist war on drugs in search of order and security (Teehankee 2016). Opposition parties in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Maldives, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand have called into question the validity of electoral processes and boycotted or refused to accept the results; this pattern indicates the weakness of democracy in the region (UNDP 2015).

Patterns in Latin America suggest that democracy has become the nearly universal norm in this region, which is enjoying its most in-depth democratic consolidation to date (except for Cuba and Venezuela) (see Mujal-Leon 2011 on Cuba). The region has seen the expansion of rights for indigenous persons and groups, and rights of sexual orientation. Yet observers argue that democracy in the region remains a troubled system of governance given the persistence of economic inequality (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2014). El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico


have experienced armed violence stemming from organized crime, and other forms of human insecurity, such as gender-based violence, which restrict democracy (Santamaría 2014). The GSoD indices data on personal integrity and security in Figure 2.2 indicate that a number of countries in Central America and Mexico have continued to experience high levels of personal integrity rights violations since the period of initial democratization in the early 1990s. While there have been some improvements in personal security and integrity since the 1970s and 1980s, high levels of violations have persisted in the last 25 years despite the broader expansion of democracy in these countries. In such insecure environments, civil society, independent media, judges and prosecutors, and local government officials have all been targeted by criminal organizations and illicit networks. Civil society is often under pressure because of its success in mobilizing, organizing and holding governments to account.

Challenges affecting contemporary democracies

Drivers of demographic, economic and social forces appear to be the root causes of authoritarian resurgence, contentious politics and democratic decline globally (Human Rights Council 2012). Some observers link these trends to the regression of democracy: they contend that globalization processes have induced social exclusion and contention, which present new and fundamental challenges for democracy (Munck 2002). In the post-globalization world of economic interdependence, these challenges interact with national and local contexts to produce localized social dislocation and grievances. Countries face tremendous pressure on governance in response to climate change and the effects of extreme weather events and natural disasters on land, water, biodiversity and the oceans. Research has linked environmental pressures to the vulnerability of communities and countries to conflict: governance institutions face the potential of environmentally driven conflicts at the local and national levels (often related to

FIGURE 2.2

Personal Integrity and Security in Central America and Mexico, 1975–2015



Notes: This graph shows the trends across Central American countries and Mexico for personal integrity and security from 1975–2015. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher degree of personal integrity and security.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Personal Integrity and Security Index).

land and extractive industries); without 'good' governance, institutions may escalate into violence (UNEP 2004).

The Independent Commission on Multilateralism (2016) identified several challenges that governments and societies face, including environmental challenges stemming from climate change effects, social pressures from changing communities, economic issues such as youth unemployment, and management of natural resources and valuable commodities. Migration is a serious transnational challenge to democracy that has led to social polarization, xenophobia and anti-immigrant movements in many countries (Piper and Rother 2015). While migration generally produces net positive economic effects for recipient societies (UNDP 2009), migration and debates over immigration policy and responses have created new strains for many democracies. Countries as varied as Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa and the USA face

In Asia and the Pacific, democracy remains uneven as countries such as China and Viet Nam enjoy continued economic progress under one-party systems

Migration is a serious transnational challenge to democracy that has led to social polarization, xenophobia and anti-immigrant movements in many countries

migration-related pressures, and have seen violence against immigrants.

Among the most difficult and challenging global problems with local effects is ensuring security and combating terrorism; many governments justify restrictions of rights and freedoms with the need to prevent terrorism. Increasing terrorist attacks have had deleterious effects on democracy, most notably in relation to the restrictions on freedoms associated with responses to terrorist events (Chenoweth 2013; Large 2006).


In many contexts, however, discontent with democracy stems from the internal challenges found in local-level economic, demographic and social contexts. In many societies, persistent socio-economic inequality and marginalization destabilize the political process and support for institutions: democracy does not appear to change the challenges of everyday life for people living in poverty or those who face other social disadvantages. In South Africa's local elections of 2016, voters

gave a stunning rebuke to the 25-year ruling African National Congress—ousting it in the major municipalities of Johannesburg and Tschwane/Pretoria—over frustrations about the lack of service delivery, corruption and persistent inequality that continues to reinforce social differences entrenched during apartheid. In April 2017, protests erupted nationally calling for the removal of President Jacob Zuma, who was accused of graft and economic mismanagement.

There are concerns in South Africa, Venezuela and Zimbabwe that democracy has failed to end poverty or to deliver security. Weak or corrupt governance by democratically elected regimes has often failed to address the needs of people living in poverty. In turn, social inequalities and marginalization can lead to local crises, conflict and violence. Armed conflict has been on the rise around the world in the last decade, with enduring threats to human security (Dupuy et al. 2016; Marshall and Cole 2014; Petterson and Wallenstein 2015).

FIGURE 2.3

When democratic rights erode: civil liberties in Ethiopia, Hungary, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela, 2005–15



Notes: This graph shows the trends in civil liberties in Ethiopia, Hungary, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela from 2005–15. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate greater respect for civil liberties.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Civil Liberties Index).

Figure 2.3 illustrates the demonstrable declines in civil liberties in Hungary, Ethiopia, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela over the last decade, as borne out by the GSoD indices. When political, economic or social challenges are inadequately addressed, they increase the risk of crisis escalation with local—and sometimes global—implications. Crises in democracies include succession struggles, state failures or lapse of government authority, election-related or other political violence or threats of violence, terror events aimed at disrupting social cohesion, or direct violence between the state/police and the opposition. Violence is especially damaging to democracy. Recurrent crises negatively affect women's participation in politics, and election-related violence is often deliberately perpetrated to depress women's participation in voting, running for office, or involvement in public decision-making or political life (IFES 2015).

2.3. Reaffirming democracy

It is now vital to reaffirm democracy as a value system for governance and as a form of government. Ruling regimes typically profess their commitment to democratic principles, and to universal human rights, as a system of laws, institutions and practices through which state authority is legitimized. According to International IDEA's Voter Turnout Database (2016), 186 countries held legislative elections in the period 2011–15, with nearly 3.37 billion voters. More countries have the basic framework of democratic institutions and processes now than ever before. In the 21st century, state legitimacy originates from democratic processes that empower the state to provide security and deliver services (ostensibly, further enhancing its legitimacy) (OECD-DAC 2010).

Democracy's long-term utility: peace and prosperity

There is increasing consensus that democracy—as an enduring set of values and principles and as a form of government—is a fundamental building block of human progress. Democracy is a form of non-violent conflict management that can reconcile divisions and contention

within society; it is the basis of sustainable peace within countries. While authoritarian governments may be 'resilient', they do so at the cost of human rights. For years, scholars have argued that democracy generally contributes to international peace—the 'democratic peace theory' holds that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with other democracies—and can enable an internal 'democratic peace': democracies are less likely to experience internal social conflict that can escalate to civil war (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001).

In addition to its intrinsic value, democracy has enduring instrumental utility for development and peace (Sen 1999a, 1999b). It facilitates the equality of citizens' voices, and thus allows for the expression of interests and preferences and the free flow of information, both of which are essential elements of development. The sustainability of the social contract within countries is assured through inclusion, while participation in governance is undergirded by the protection of fundamental rights. Policy practice in international organizations has evolved since the founding of the UN and the modern Bretton Woods system to recognize that goals such as development and growth, prevention of conflict, and broadening participation, dignity, equity and sustainability must be pursued simultaneously. Democratic governance provides the normative framework through which policies to address these issues are 'formed and executed' (Asher et al. 2016: 80).

UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG16) builds on the premise that 'governance matters': it states that peaceful and inclusive societies are central to achieving all other development goals. SDG16's promotion of 'peaceful and inclusive societies' and 'effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions' reflects a commonly accepted understanding that democracy, peace and development outcomes are inherently intertwined, and that reducing violence, delivering justice and combatting corruption are all essential to achieving sustainable development (Jandl 2017).

Violence is especially damaging to democracy. Recurrent crises negatively affect women's participation in politics, and election-related violence is often deliberately perpetrated to depress women's participation in voting, running for office, or involvement in public decision-making or political life

Democracy is a form of non-violent conflict management that can reconcile divisions and contention within society; it is the basis of sustainable peace within countries

Democracy is seen as an institutional and enduring means of resolving and preventing social conflict, and thus democratic governance contributes to peace, which in turn contributes to development opportunities (Brown 2003). Greater inclusivity over time contributes to democratic accountability: democracy introduces a culture of equality that empowers historically marginalized people; inclusion helps create the 'demand side' necessary for creating the will for the state to respond on the 'supply side'. The key to democracy's contribution to development is its ability to non-violently manage conflict as a first-order priority, and subsequently to extend and improve government services over time. Democracy, peace and development work together over the long term to provide a virtuous cycle of progress even as patterns and progress vary by context. Cross-cutting civil society engagement in democratic transitions has been found to be associated with a reduced risk of terror attacks in a cross-country analysis (Pospieszna 2015).


Vicious cycles of state fragility reflect how poor, captured or violently contested control over political power is at the heart of violence, development reversals and humanitarian catastrophes that violent conflict creates (UNDP 2012; World Bank 2011). State fragility is caused by 'vicious' cycles of poor governance, poverty, corruption and inequality, and episodes of social violence, which are mutually reinforcing. Some observers argue that such fragility is more likely to be found in 'partial' or grey-zone democracies, 'competitive authoritarian regimes' or hybrid democracies than in autocratic states, which can be stable (Brownlee 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010). Countries in turbulent transitions from authoritarian rule are especially vulnerable to crises such as constitutional disputes or election-related violence and potentially reversion to authoritarian rule. Events such as communal conflict, election-related violence or state repression have been statistically shown to be more common in periods of political transition and change (Goldstone et al. 2010). During crises of transition, countries are

vulnerable to falling into downward spirals of conflict, economic crises, and 'states of fragility' (OECD-DAC 2016).

Of the countries involved in the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, only Tunisia has managed to make progress towards transforming from authoritarianism to democracy. Libya, Syria and Yemen are still plagued by the consequences of civil war: human flight, food insecurity, lack of medicine, the suspension of education and the collapse of livelihoods; in turn, they are caught in a web of regional rivalries along sectarian and global geopolitical lines (Cordesman 2016). Thus, while in the long run democracy is both intrinsically and instrumentally beneficial for acquiring security and prosperity, transitions from authoritarianism to democracy are fraught with peril and threats of complete state failure.

Democracy's relationship with economic development (which appears to contribute to sustainable peace) is more contested, in both the scholarly literature and in practice. Although many studies have investigated this link, some have found no direct relationship between democracy and development, as non-democratic countries can have high economic growth rates; research on a direct, linear, immediate relationship between democracy and development is inconclusive (Rocha Menocal 2007). Others argue that modern inclusive democratic politics and competition for citizen support can induce the creation of public goods that facilitate the development of a middle class. In this way, democratic politics responds to citizen interests through the provision of basic needs such as a reliable system of market regulation, financial regulation, education and health care, and infrastructure. (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Stasavage 2005; Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein 2005; Leftwich 2005). Indeed, many people today associate democracy as much with their own personal welfare as with the voice, or avenues for expression, that democratic institutions and practices provide. The most important relationship between democracy and development may be their 'co-evolution' in the long run (Gerring et al. 2012).

Democracy under pressure: Resilient responses



2.4. Resilient citizens: confronting problems and perils of representation

Data on declining confidence in political parties show that less than 20 per cent of the population in EU member states had favourable opinions of political leaders and political parties (European Commission 2014). In Latin America and the Caribbean, a 2011 study of public attitudes showed that trust in political parties was between 20 per cent in the lowest-scoring country (Paraguay) and only 40 per cent in the highest-scoring country (Mexico) (Corral 2011). This decline of confidence in parties reflects the overall trend that representation is under stress. Social movements mobilized by populism lack the 'inter-mediation' mechanisms linking society to democratic institutions that political parties have historically provided, together with political leaders' ability to effectively moderate and reach consensus across political divides.

Human Rights Watch's 2017 annual report notes a deterioration in human rights around the world, which is linked to a shared 'politics of fear' (HRW 2017). Human rights monitors such as Amnesty International (2017) have recently noted that: 'Seismic political shifts in 2016 exposed the potential of hateful rhetoric to unleash the dark side of human nature... more and more politicians call themselves anti-establishment and wield politics of demonization that hounds, scapegoats and dehumanizes entire groups of people to win the support of voters' (HRW 2017) citing 'a global pushback against human rights'. A common thread in many of these contexts has been populism—appeals by demagogic political elites who claim to stand for the common person and advocate illiberal (that is, against fundamental rights) perspectives that offer romantic and often unattainable visions of society. Populist movements are complex, and may have positive implications for democracy by giving

State fragility is caused by 'vicious' cycles of poor governance, poverty, corruption and inequality, and episodes of social violence, which are mutually reinforcing

The decline of confidence in parties reflects the overall trend that representation is under stress. Social movements mobilized by populism lack the 'inter-mediation' mechanisms linking society to democratic institutions that political parties have historically provided, together with political leaders' ability to effectively moderate and reach consensus across political divides

voice to those aggrieved in society at elites and the establishment, but they can also seize control of governments and implement unworkable social policies. Populism appears to be especially dangerous when it is paired with unchecked majoritarianism in winner-take-all systems (Mudde 2015).

'Illiberal' democracy: the challenge of populism

In the USA and Western Europe in particular, the underlying causes of populism include cultural concerns about the erosion of identity and territoriality, job insecurities from a rapidly changing economic environment, and anti-immigrant attitudes triggered by the threat of terrorism. Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain have experienced a rise in populism in the form of widespread mobilization for resistance to moderate, centrist or established political elites from both sides of the political spectrum (Judis 2016). Populism in these contexts is generally driven by class-based alienation intertwined with virulent identity politics, even as debates swirl over whether cultural backlash or economic dislocation best explain the phenomenon (Inglehart and Norris 2016).

Populism has serious consequences for democracy. When extreme ethnic nationalist populists prevail, minorities often see threats to their safety and economic livelihoods, especially vulnerable ethnic minorities and migrants. Populism and nationalism have generated concerns about whether democratic processes can withstand social forces driven by undercurrents of exclusion and nationalism. In the USA, a minority coalition of voters (46 per cent of the popular vote) elected populist, nationalist billionaire Donald J. Trump as president. Trump lost the overall popular vote to rival Hillary Clinton by 2.9 million votes (in the aggregate popular vote, 48.2 per cent to 46.1 per cent), but prevailed in the Electoral College, a feature of US democracy by which the president is elected by the number of delegates won in the 50 states (Crieg 2016). Trump's inauguration

in January 2017 prompted mass protests in Washington, DC, including the now-historic 'Women's March' by 470,000 people—three times as many as attended the inauguration (Wallace and Parlapiano 2017). The vote was further marred by ongoing allegations of foreign interference in the US election and the ties between the Trump campaign and Russia, as well as alleged Russian hacking of electoral administrators in 31 of the 50 US states (Berkowitz, Lu and Vitkovskaya 2017). There are public concerns that the Trump presidency continues to undermine the US democratic and constitutional order. These events highlight the vulnerability of the world's longest-standing democracy to social, economic and cultural drivers of nationalism that can undermine democracy's principles.

Comparative public opinion research in the USA and elsewhere provides evidence of a broader public concern about the efficacy of democratic institutions in both emerging and long-standing democracies even as most people in all regions surveyed considered personal and press freedoms to be very important (Pew Research Center 2015). Social movements have historically been critical to pressuring regimes to democratize. At the same time, the growth of populist citizen movements underscores the widespread discontent with governments and governance worldwide, leading to new forms of engagement. Populism presents a paradox: it involves heightened citizen participation, but often in an exclusive, ideologically extreme manner, or in a call for action that disregards rights—particularly those of minorities.

Narrowly construed populism undermines, rather than creates, the social capital needed for today's complex, multicultural societies. According to a broad literature on social cohesion, when citizen engagement cuts across divisions within society, and is organized around national platforms focusing on security and development, it is more likely to support democracy than those that are primarily exclusivist, nationalistic or ethnic in

orientation (Jensen 2010). Policymaking needs to be able to manage the politics of inclusive groups through innovative approaches that place a premium on broad-based stakeholder participation, ensuring inclusive institutions, accountable processes and outcomes, and citizen engagement throughout the policy cycle (OECD 2015).

Popular commitment to inclusive democracy

Broad economic and social processes continue to drive the demand for democracy. Increased access to education, rising incomes, and improved communication and urbanization have facilitated the development of the middle class and contributed to the popular demand for democracy. In bargains between elites and the masses, democracy emerges as an 'equilibrium' or middle ground. The more people understand how democracy works, the more they tend to believe it is the best form of governance (Cho 2014). Public opinion surveys have found little appetite for authoritarianism among Asian youth: those growing up in democratic regimes in the region have a more favourable view of democracy and expect it to continue (Dalton and Shin 2014). Restive movements for democracy in Hong Kong have symbolized youth demands for democracy beyond the semi-autonomous province.

Pathways to democracy may be driven by citizen beliefs in and attitudes towards political rights and liberties drawn from other contexts or from the diffusion of international norms (Koesel and Bunce 2013). Some argue that the increasing demand for women's participation in governance is driven in part by the global spread of norms about women's political equality. Following the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, known as the Beijing Platform), women's political empowerment increased globally due to both internal drivers (economic and social gains for women secured at the domestic level) and international pressures to increase women's participation

(Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006). While networked domestic and international women's movements have played a key role in advancing demands for democracy, women's coalitions that pressed for initial transitions to democracy have been difficult to sustain (Baldez 2003).

When elites do not rely on the masses for support, demands for democracy are less common. This can occur, for example, when state revenue is derived from primary commodity exports, such as oil, or when anti-democratic elites can buy support through patronage and clientelism, or enforce their rule coercively with the support of a well-compensated military (Geddes 2009; Haber and Menaldo 2011).

The presence of a strong civil society is critical to democracy's resilience. In many places, popular

Populism has serious consequences for democracy. Populism and nationalism have generated concerns about whether democratic processes can withstand social forces driven by undercurrents of exclusion and nationalism

BOX 2.2

Non-violent civil resistance: factors for success


During the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings Arab Uprisings, when Time magazine named 'The Protestor' as its Person of the Year, scholars came to the remarkable conclusion that between 1900 and 2006, non-violent civil resistance struggles were more than twice as likely as violence to be effective at advancing democracy (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Evaluating data on violent and non-violent protests from around the world, and the effectiveness of such protests in achieving citizen aims, they found that non-violent social movements were more likely to involve higher rates of participation and to facilitate more durable and peaceful democracies. Violent insurgencies were equally unlikely to achieve their goals. These findings shed light on how non-violent citizen action can form the basis of democratic resilience.

Drawing on early scholarly and activist work on non-violent resistance, popular non-violent protests for change have been successful when they:

- are large enough not to be ignored or easily suppressed, and when crowds are diverse and cross-cut generations, ethnicity, classes, genders and geographies;
- remain deeply dedicated to maintaining non-violent principles, even in the face of violent resistance by the state or other social groups;
- use flexible and innovative techniques, including a variety of non-violent methods beyond on-the-street protests including lower-risk tactics such as sick-outs and stay-aways, boycotts or legal petitions; and
- appeal to economic and business elites, civil servants and especially military forces who may shift loyalties toward non-violent democratic opposition rather than support an incumbent autocrat losing their grip on power.

FIGURE 2.4A

Democracy in India, 1975–2015




Notes: This graph shows the trends in India for Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government And Impartial Administration. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher performance on a given attribute.

Source: GSoD indices 2017.

FIGURE 2.4B

Democracy in India, a 2015 snapshot



Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index; Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government Index and Impartial Administration Index).

civil resistance, working with civil society and the media, ‘protects’ democracy through investigations, information transparency and advocacy (Fox and Halloran 2016). Democracies with a strong civil society are more likely to endure over time. Civil society can be resilient even where it is suppressed and subject to severe restrictions. Some human rights activists argue that civil society has proven to be resilient even in countries such as Iran (Bouroman 2007). Box 2.2 explores the characteristics of successful non-violent resistance.

Where civil society is active and able to organize, and when it cuts across major divisions within society, including religious or ethnic divides, debilitating social violence is less likely to erupt. For example, India has been a remarkably resilient democracy due to its independent judicial institutions, citizens and civil society, and commitment to a free press (Kohli 1992; Varshney 2001). A vigorous civil society helps create underlying trust and social cohesion that in turn fosters the contestation and contention that allows a democracy to remain strong under pressure (Cheema and Popovski 2010). While India continues to experience unrest in its periphery, and regional tensions remain high over Kashmir, its democracy is vibrant.

Figures 2.4A and 2.4B show representation, fundamental rights, checks and balances, and impartial administration in India for the period 1975–2015; India’s democracy remains stable, if not perfect, over time. An ongoing concern in India continues to be its struggle with inclusivity, religious and caste-based diversity, and eradication of discrimination; India has perhaps the world’s most extensive experience in seeking to remedy exclusion through reservations in representation and broad-based affirmative action (Glazer 2007). Despite the challenges of diversity, the quality of India’s democracy has remained stable over time.

2.5. Resilient institutions: countering capture, corruption and patronage

If citizens are strongly committed to democracy, it will persist as a permanent, essential ideal (Norris 2011). Improving democracy's resilience thus begins with establishing or restoring citizen trust in the efficacy of democratic politics and defending it against alternative ideologies, including authoritarian nationalism.

In many third-wave democratization countries, concerns about the de-consolidation or rollback of democracy involve corruption, capture and personal profit at the expense of citizens' welfare. The timing of the 2016 impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who was found guilty of manipulating the federal budget, raised questions about whether the political crisis surrounding her impeachment was generated to conceal the depth of the country's economic crisis. The ongoing corruption crisis, which involved many political elites, may have signalled the weakness, or the possible resilience, of democracy in the country. Some suggested that the corruption charges and relatively poor service delivery in the run-up to the Rio Olympic Games reflected the weakness of its system since Brazil returned to democracy following military rule from 1964 to 1985, when millions took to the streets to demand democracy (Boykoff 2016). Brazil's government continues to be shaken by the corruption crisis, as more politicians (including eight cabinet ministers and the president) were caught up in the scandal in 2017 (Langlois 2017).

The corrosive effects of capture and corruption

Capture, corruption and the unchecked infusion of money into politics are all too often manifested as undemocratic influence by the powerful few. Informal networks of patronage, favouritism and illicit dealing also obstruct the empowerment of women and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, and result in uneven levels of development. The response to such capture requires capable, autonomous and independent

judicial institutions—whose investigators, prosecutors and courts are critical to both prosecuting and preventing corruption—as well as a comprehensive approach to countering graft. Institutional resilience is essential to ensure that a wide range of integrity-enhanced rules for political competition is in place to ensure meaningful citizen control in democracies.

Many countries have faced complex political, economic, and social challenges and crises that have threatened the legitimacy of the ruling democratic regime. Several countries also experience public antipathy to government and traditional political institutions. Such political challenges can result in the deliberate, gradual 'erosion' of democracy, or backsliding, as has been seen in Russia, which adopted laws that strongly restrict the ability of human rights and other civil society organizations (including the media) to mobilize or to perform advocacy or accountability functions (Sherwood 2015).

These factors, often combined with captured institutions—when politicians co-opt power for their own purposes or extend a 'dominant-party' state (Greene 2010)—are among the various leading explanations of democratic backsliding from within. For example, Nigeria's 2016 elections were dominated by the winner President Muhammadu Buhari's pledge to combat corruption. In Kenya, scholars and civil society activists have decried patterns of clientelism that occur along ethnic lines, further exacerbating the ability of democratic institutions to provide accountability and undermining the basis of popular control and political equality (Kivoi 2010; Horowitz 2016). Such patterns of ethnic politics have been linked to vote buying and implicit and explicit patronage along ethnic lines. Kenya's decentralization process, which began with the adoption of its 2010 constitution, has led some to worry that ethnic patronage and 'capture' are being further entrenched in local government institutions, even as overall assessments of decentralization suggest that the constitution provides new checks and balances (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2016).

Increased access to education, rising incomes, and improved communication and urbanization have facilitated the development of the middle class and contributed to the popular demand for democracy. In bargains between elites and the masses, democracy emerges as an 'equilibrium' or middle ground

Institutional resilience is essential to ensure that a wide range of integrity-enhanced rules for political competition is in place to ensure meaningful citizen control in democracies

Can democracy self-correct? Considering institutional resilience

A longstanding feature of democracy is horizontal accountability—a system of checks and balances among separate democratic institutions and branches of government, including the executive. Independent or autonomous institutions that interact to achieve balance and survival can address internal weaknesses or vulnerabilities, and thus help safeguard democracy (Ganghof 2012).

Greater institutionalization, and the prevalence of multiple checks and balances, decreases the likelihood that a democracy can be fully captured by any branch of government or actor. Institutions such as judiciaries or local

governments become more autonomous over time, and are more likely to be able to resist threats to democracy—such as restrictions on fundamental rights—when they appear. Informal institutions or rules that are routinely followed can complement or supplement democratic processes and facilitate consolidation, though they can also detract from or work against formal democracy if they contradict (or serve as a substitute for) formal democratic processes (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). In the Republic of Korea, a scandal in 2016–17 involving then-President Park Geun-hye led to widespread street protests, a vote in Parliament to impeach her, a Constitutional Court affirmation of the legitimacy of the vote, and ultimately to her arrest and indictment for corruption, abuse of power and fraud (San-Hun 2017). Elections, held in May 2017, imbued the new government of President Moon Jae-in with newfound democratic legitimacy in the wake of the corruption crisis.

The rule of law, access to justice, and a strong, independent, capable and efficient judicial system are critical elements of a resilient democracy. An important factor is democratic control of the armed forces and security sectors, and their professionalization under the civilian control of constitutionally elected authorities. The transition processes in many third-wave democracies involved a sequential (and at times turbulent) process of extensive security sector reform and transitional justice; the military in some countries—such as Egypt, Myanmar and Sri Lanka—kept the autocratic regimes in power and became major economic stakeholders (Mani 2010).

Electoral processes can help adapt and strengthen democracy over time. Independent, autonomous and professional electoral management bodies are critical, since their mandate is to protect the procedural credibility of democratic processes. The longer a country has experienced successful electoral cycles, the more the electoral process has been shown to 'adapt' to social conditions and thus becomes increasingly resilient (see Box 2.3).

BOX 2.3

Elections as adaptive cycles: democratization in post-war Sierra Leone

Electoral cycles may generate rotations in ruling coalitions, which is important for flexibility in resilience—incorporating new public demands, interests and political actors into the political system. The more flexible, open and adaptive the electoral process is, the more the overall system of governance can adapt to changing social, economic and demographic changes within society. Over time, electoral processes may become entrenched to favour the dominant political actors. Some scholars, whose work has focused on post-democratization Africa, have developed compelling theories of electoral processes unfolding as a set of nested 'games' by which transitions to democracy occur. Each iteration of the game (or electoral process) furthers the consolidation of the democratic rules: voters and citizens become more mobilized, organizations and institutions become more vested, 'blatant failed manipulation of election outcomes' are identified and the costs of authoritarian repression increase (Lindberg 2009, 2015).

Sierra Leone appears to reinforce these findings on elections and adaptive resilience. In 2018, it will hold its fourth round of national elections since it emerged from civil war in 2002. The capacities of the Electoral Commission appear to have strengthened in each previous electoral cycle; indeed, the chairwoman of the commission, Christina Thorpe, has won several international awards for her work to strengthen the commission. The UN administered the 2002 elections, and the 2007 elections were the first to be held in a peaceful environment and fully managed by the National Electoral Commission and the Political Party Registration Commission in concert with the UN (Jinadu 2012). The 2012 elections were given overall high marks by observers, which concluded that the polls were 'conducted with a high degree of transparency' and that 'very few cases of election-related violence were reported across the country' (Carter Center 2013).

These electoral cycles strengthened the legitimacy of institutions: compliance with Sierra Leone's 2008 Anti-Corruption Act was an important element in the 2012 elections, as the issue was in prior rounds of elections since the civil war.

Figure 2.5 provides a 'big-picture' view of long-term global trends in institutions capable of protecting democracy, including effective parliaments, independent judicial institutions and the quality of media integrity. The long-term data show gradual, if slow, improvement in parliamentary effectiveness, yet little growth in global patterns towards more independent judiciaries.


Institutional resilience requires a level playing field and the protection of these institutions from corrupt influences. Reducing the influence of money in politics is central to ensuring institutional resilience and the conditions for political equality. This is particularly relevant for the funding of electoral campaigns, which are vulnerable to the influence of organized crime and illicit networks. International IDEA's *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook on Political Finance* identifies challenges such as unequal access to funding by political parties, the ability of the wealthy to unduly influence politics, an influx of illicit funding and widespread vote buying (Falguera, Jones and Ohman 2014). Box 2.3 examines the role of elections in conflict-affected countries in the context of Sierra Leone. Public funding for political parties contributes to resiliency by reducing the influence of money in politics; 120 countries provide funding to political parties for campaigns, regular operational purposes or in other ways such as subsidized access to private media (International IDEA Political Finance Database).

2.6. Resilient societies: reducing structural risks

Societal divisions, inequalities and fissures are reflected and processed through democratic processes, as democratic institutions are a prism of social dynamics. Economic challenges such as inequality and extreme poverty undermine citizen perceptions of state legitimacy and democracy's ability to address basic needs. In 2016, the World Bank reported that continued socio-economic inequalities are

FIGURE 2.5

Institutional resilience: parliamentary and judicial institutions and media integrity for 155 countries, 1975–2015



Notes: This graph shows the global level trends from 1975–2015 for Effective Parliament, Judicial Independence and Media Integrity. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher performance on a given attribute.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Effective Parliament Index, Judicial Independence Index, Media Integrity Index).

the principal barrier to greater economic inclusion and demands for political inclusion (World Bank 2016: 2).

Structural economic challenges severely and negatively affect the practice of democracy. While inequality and economic 'hard times' can lead to demands for democracy and 'pocketbook protests' (Brancati 2013), which can trigger greater participation and inclusion of the marginalized in governance (as has been the case in South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy), long-term or structured inequality poses significant threats to democracy's survival (Karl 2009). Multi-country studies have demonstrated that inequality increases the risk of clientelism or corruption (You 2015). A 2013 International IDEA report analyses the experiences of 38 cases in which marginalized groups engaged in decision-making; these groups overcame barriers and developed effective strategies for mobilization, articulated grievances, worked with sympathetic civil society and engaged with international actors (Smith and Hedström 2013).

Managing diversity and post-conflict transitions

An extensive body of scholarly research investigates the challenges of democracy in multi-ethnic societies, particularly those with a history of violence and enmity along identity lines. In 2016, Minority Rights Group International (2016) reported worsening identity-related conflict globally in its annual Peoples under Threat survey. In ethnically diverse societies such as Indonesia, Myanmar and Turkey, social cohesion is under strain from ethnic, religious and sectarian mobilization, violent conflict and repression of minorities, which in turn drive further conflict (Pew Research Center 2014). Myanmar's dramatic

transition to democracy, which culminated in the March 2016 election of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, has witnessed progress in the reduction of some ethnic or separatist internal conflicts, but the country has been criticized for its treatment of the Rohingya minority (ICG 2016).

While ethnic and religious diversity are not directly associated with democratic instability—many highly diverse countries such as Canada prosper as democracies—under certain conditions identity-based conflict can threaten the quality of democracy and its performance (Harris and Reilly 1998; Large and Sisk 2006). For example, some scholars believe the scourge of sectarianism in the Middle East and Iran inhibits the spread of democracy in the region (Hashemi and Postel 2017).

BOX 2.4

Democratization and identity-based mobilization in Nepal

In divided, conflict-affected countries such as Nepal, the introduction of democracy creates unique challenges. Democracy provides a way to move towards structural equality. Where spatial or 'horizontal' social inequalities motivate armed rebellion and civil war (Murshed and Gates 2005), democratic processes help manage and resolve inter-group grievances. For example, after the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) signed a comprehensive peace agreement in 2006, a large consortium of domestic and international civic groups (including International IDEA) engaged in extensive post-conflict democratization efforts. This process focused on educating, empowering and building inclusive local government institutions to guarantee the inclusion of all previously marginalized groups in the constitution-making process, including marginalized caste groups such as the Dalit, indigenous Janajati groups, Tharu and Madhesi ethnic groups, and women's groups. The democracy-promotion effort strategically focused on extending democracy to the local level ('devolution') to address the deepest structural drivers of civil war.

New social problems emerged with this opening of the political space, particularly in intensive identity-based political mobilization. Such ethnic mobilization created an 'inclusion dilemma' (Bogati et al. 2017). The spread of democracy increased demands from identity-based groups not only for participation in the constitution-making process, but, in many cases, for greater local autonomy, constitutional protections and even 'ethnic federalism'. The outbreak of identity-based political mobilization ultimately caused the collapse of the transitional Constituent Assembly and a long period of government failure that, in effect, undermined initial efforts to redress deep social divisions.

Although a new constitution was finally created in 2015, Madhesi groups in the Terai region rejected the final agreement on the internal or federal boundaries; unrest rocked the region in 2016 and again in 2017, causing disruptions along the critical supply routes with India and further preventing the full realization of peace in Nepal. Local elections unfolded in 2017 amid continued negotiation over the thorny issues of local powers, decentralized functions and federal boundaries.

Scholars and practitioners have pointed to a set of paradoxes and dilemmas relating to democracy in conflict-affected countries as they transition from war to democracy (OECD-DAC 2015). Leaders in such countries in effect exchange the uncertainty of the battlefield for the uncertainty of democratic electoral processes, which leaves post-war democracies vulnerable to elite capture (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Other common challenges in post-conflict transitions are the transformation of rebel forces into mainstream political actors, the often deeply divided nature of civil society, managing electoral processes, constitution-making, transforming security institutions and transitional justice, building state capacity for service delivery, and addressing the psychological and social wounds of war. Thus, countries emerging from conflict face structural challenges and are especially prone to crises that threaten the re-emergence of widespread political violence and, potentially, armed conflict.

Box 2.4 illustrates the turbulent nature of Nepal's road from civil war to democracy, as ethnic mobilization has prevented the full consolidation of democracy even though a new constitution was finally agreed in late 2015.

Social polarization increases the risk of conflict and complicates the processes of coalition formation and interest aggregation that are inherent to democracy. Around the world, social polarization appears to have significantly affected democracy's ability to manage conflict and to help realize effective approaches to controversial policy issues (Esteban and Schneider 2008). Some institutional choices, such as certain forms of list proportional representation, have been criticized as encouraging fragmentation of the party system—termed 'polarized pluralism'—especially during economic hard times (Pelizzo and Babones 2007).

Scholars have long argued that identity-based conflict can be mitigated by designing the right types of democratic institutions for the context, for example by adopting inclusive, proportional (or non-winner-take-all) electoral processes, decentralizing power and autonomy, and creating a strong regime of minority rights (Lijphart 2004; Reynolds 2011). However, there remains a strong debate between those who advocate ethnic power sharing as the best solution to the challenges of democracy in divided societies versus those who recommend institutions to create cross-cutting ethnic coalitions of moderate, centrist parties that seek to transcend ethnic divides (Reilly 2006). The immigration societies of Canada and the USA, which have taken different philosophical approaches to managing diversity stemming from new identity cleavages in society, are sometimes juxtaposed as a 'mosaic' approach (in Canada) vs. a 'melting pot' approach in the USA (Peach 2005).

Redressing women's exclusions and inequalities

Deeply ingrained inequalities are synonymous with demands for access to livelihoods, reliable service delivery and corruption-free governance. Inequality and a lack of economic opportunities, especially for youth, were at the heart of demands for democracy in the demographically and economically

unbalanced countries of the Middle East and Iran, and North Africa (Ncube and Anyanwu 2012). Following transitions, democracies must deliver in inclusive ways—assuring fundamental livelihoods and a marketplace based on fairness—to maintain credibility. Addressing structural inequalities requires political will and the inclusion of poor, marginalized, or disadvantaged individuals or groups in democratic processes. Thus, broad measures to enhance social inclusion and protect the vulnerable are central to democracy's resilience: the ideal of political equality is undermined unless all in society can access the resources necessary to meet basic human needs.

In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which established a set of rights for the advancement of women's human rights towards gender equality, including representation in governance. In the early 2000s, Millennium Development Goal number 3 set targets for the expansion of women's representation, which is commonly achieved through the adoption of women's quotas (Jones 2009). There is no single, one-size-fits all approach to designing democracy to enhance women's participation; International IDEA has produced a handbook to help relate the type of quota to the electoral system to help define a 'best-fit' approach (Larsrud and Taphorn 2007).

While women have enjoyed modest gains in representation, there is only a weak link between representation and influence (Ballington and Karam 2005). The percentage of women in parliament has increased from 11 per cent in 1995 to 23 per cent in 2017 worldwide, but this has not necessarily translated into improvement in the human rights of women, especially those from minority groups (UN 2015; IPU n.d.). Women's movements have been critical components of democratization efforts, often working across lines of conflict, historical divisions and ethnic divides. Women have been successful at uniting across social, economic and political divides in civil society

Broad measures to enhance social inclusion and protect the vulnerable are central to democracy's resilience

It is possible to design a set of rules—or institutions—to engineer specific desirable outcomes in democracies such as inclusivity, more meaningful representation or accountability

to make critical differences in democratic transition processes. Yet in Chile, Brazil, East Germany and Poland, women's groups have struggled to maintain their momentum after the transition (Baldez 2003).

Advances in women's representation have been seen in countries emerging from conflict, where transitional processes may give women the opportunity to mobilize and make gains in representation and influence (Hughes and Tripp 2015). There is more widespread involvement of women in many post-conflict countries, such as Nepal, Rwanda and South Africa, than in countries with similar levels of development that have not experienced conflict. Yet this surprisingly high level of women's representation in these post-conflict countries may not be fully inclusive, and women may not necessarily have a strong influence over policy outcomes (Berry 2015). Research has shown that when women have greater rights, societies and states are more secure (Hudson 2007/8).

2.7. Designing resilience: building better democracies

The effectiveness of quotas in elections or within political parties for expanding women's participation affirms that elements of democracy can be designed to achieve desirable outcomes. But can democratic institutions be designed to make democracy itself more resilient? Scholars of institutions have argued that it is possible to design a set of rules—or institutions—to engineer specific desirable outcomes in democracies such as inclusivity, more meaningful representation or accountability. The 'constitutional engineering' approach, pioneered by the eminent Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori (1997), assumes that considerations such as presidential system design, electoral system design, or the delimitation of internal boundaries and decentralized governance (such as in federal systems) can promote specific desirable outcomes in democratic systems (stability, inclusion or ethnic politics).

Perhaps the most extensive application of this perspective is found in the electoral system design literature, which argues that a country's electoral system must be chosen based on a close context assessment of goals such as accountability, inclusivity and gender equality (Norris 2004). Concerning other specific institutions, there is widespread debate in the scholarly literature over what types of institutions produce more resilient democracies. Research on institutional design helps inform policy-related debates to help countries choose the 'right' institutions to create more inclusive electoral processes (Reilly 2006; Reilly and Nordlund 2008). Outside actors such as bilateral development organizations, transnational civil society and international organizations often provide guidance on suitable institutions for a country's context.

Designing institutions during transitional times

Scholars have identified 'creative tension' between international actors, scholars and national actors in designing resilient institutions to promote peaceful, democratic politics (Bastian and Luckham 2003). Outsiders bring 'models and methods', while local actors provide contextual knowledge and can better anticipate the effects of various design approaches in invariably complex local circumstances. The principal concern is whether (and how) democracy can be designed to be resilient. The answer to this question may involve an assumption that in some situations, such as conflict-affected countries where the UN has a strong presence, outsiders will impose designs, but that institutional models will follow principles of national or local ownership. In February 2017, the UN Mission in Colombia, together with the government, announced a new multi-sponsor peacebuilding trust fund to support innovative and adaptive approaches to accessing justice, community security and local governance in the country's most conflict-affected (often remote) regions (UN News Centre 2016). This approach encourages broader democratic ownership of transformative processes.

While countries with long-established democratic institutions may rely on informal and innovative approaches to institutional adaptation and redesign, transitional processes from authoritarian rule or civil war have offered opportunities to engage in innovative institutional design that makes democracy more resilient. Institutions, once in place, often create their own incentives for endurance. Choosing the right institutions for the right context, at the right moment, can yield 'increasing returns' in the coming years; institutional design at such critical or 'conjunctural' moments sets the stage for subsequent politics through 'path dependency' (Pierson 2000).

Constitution-making processes have been one method of revisiting the fundamental ground rules of democracy and building more inclusive, and thus resilient, institutions. Institutional design in these contexts involves choosing the most fundamental structures of a political system in a manner that ensures inclusivity, proportionality, and the influence of minorities and marginalized groups in politics. Among the most critical choices are the design of presidential and parliamentary institutions, electoral systems, political party regulations, federalism and decentralization measures, and special institutions to address particularly contentious issues such as language, education and minority rights.

There are arguably no single, standardized 'best' forms of institutions or models for more resilient democracies; innovation entails adapting and adopting rules and mechanisms that are appropriate to the context and the aim they are designed to achieve. For example, while proportionality is a critical principle for building more resilient democracy, it can be manifested in electoral systems in many ways. Thus, it may be best to think in terms of principles to inform institutional design during transitions, such as proportionality, decentralization, and proliferating points of power and authority, and multiplying points of interaction, bargaining and mutual problem solving. These principles can in turn be

translated into specific institutional designs for more consensus-oriented democracy through comparative knowledge, the use of appropriate experts, understanding pre-existing institutions, and sequencing the pathways of reform and change (such as electoral processes) in a careful, calibrated manner (Reynolds 2011).

International influence on the design of institutions chosen during democratization (such as during constitution-making processes) occurs through internal decision-making that is aided by persuasion and knowledge transfer from international actors. Innovative approaches, such as the creation of the Mediation Support Unit for the UN's top mediators, appear to be an effective way to bridge the gap between the theory of institutional design and its application in inevitably complex contexts.

Informal institutions in multicultural contexts

The challenge of migration reflects the urgency of innovatively designing new institutions to address contemporary challenges in modern democracies. Migration is a global issue that has strong local effects. In some contexts, migrants' integration has not been well managed through existing institutions and policies, particularly in the social sphere; migrant communities often live in parallel, separate communities to those of host-country citizens. Such social distance between communities has led to a rise in anti-immigrant movements, vigilantism and extremist political parties. Nationalism in response to migration has led to increasing securitization, exclusion and marginalization, which in turn worsens the problem of status deprivation and fear by targeted minority communities. How might institutional design help alleviate such problems?

Newly designed institutions and processes may be needed for political systems to adapt to the social changes brought by migration—increasing demographic diversity—if they are to be resilient over time. First and foremost, permanent migrants and their communities must be integrated into the broader

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New, innovative avenues of voice, representation and participation are needed to open cultures and institutions to allow these communities to be heard

community, as well as the regional and national social fabrics. Social integration requires economic integration: economic exchange and interdependency often facilitates tolerance, as mutual interests and understanding develop across group lines. The guarantee of fundamental freedoms is vital: when migrants are permanent 'second-class' citizens, integration falters and frustration builds. Such has been the case of the Palestinian migrants in Lebanon, where close cooperation and interaction at the local level is critical to maintaining local peace even as the lack of citizenship is an enduring injustice to Palestinian refugees. Like in Lebanon, in some situations informal institutions emerge to open lines of dialogue and mechanisms for economic integration and service delivery in the absence of formal mechanisms and feasible pathways to citizenship (Yassin, Stel and Rassi 2016).

Building resilience in multicultural contexts, whether for migrants or across ethnic and other identity-based divides, requires thinking beyond traditional democratic institutions and processes of adaptation and reform (Wolff 2011). New, innovative avenues of voice, representation and participation are needed to open cultures and institutions to allow these communities to be heard. Approaches to engaging with migrants and their communities are also applicable to addressing the challenges of exclusion, disadvantage and marginalization in today's 'post-globalization' societies. Addressing exclusion is critical for developing sustainable approaches to citizenship consistent with international human rights norms. International rights law defines forced population transfers as a crime against humanity, and provides additional protection for particularly vulnerable migrants such as refugees.

Strengthening social cohesion has become a critical conceptual and practice-oriented approach to designing formal and informal, direct and indirect approaches to building trust within societies (Jensen 2010). Social cohesion approaches emphasize analysing the nexus and networks of cross-group coordination and

engagement (for example, in civil society or in the marketplace) and designing programmes and initiatives to build on them. From inter-faith dialogues to 'environmental peacebuilding' (which focuses on a common interest in environmental sustainability), social cohesion programmes have been applied in many diverse countries as a core approach to building the societal base upon which democratization—and the 'extension' of the state to the local level—can occur.

Examining social dynamics as the basis of overcoming division and fragility is a very useful complement to formal statebuilding and democratization efforts with local initiatives (Marc et al. 2013). For example, in conflict-affected countries the proliferation of peacemaking and peacebuilding institutions at various levels (which are sometimes overlapping and mutually reinforcing) can help build resilience by providing multiple avenues in which to address grievances or disputes before they escalate into violence (Odendaal 2013).

For the long term, a more coherent global institutional framework is needed to establish a more effective and humane system of managing migration. Until then, steps need to be taken to combat xenophobia and facilitate migrants' economic, social, and political integration and rights. Measures to design a more resilient approach include considering voting rights for migrants at the local level, reforming citizenship laws to clarify and facilitate pathways to naturalization, engaging with diaspora communities and leaders (e.g. religious leaders), and expanding opportunities for external voting so that migrants have political rights in their countries of origin (Ellis et al. 2007).

2.8. Supporting resilience: regional and international responses

Although responses can be uneven, outsiders regularly act to support democracy within countries. Democracy building has emerged as a significant global 'regime' or set of

negotiated international norms, rules and best practices, mechanisms for international monitoring and observation, and 'reactions to non-compliance' together with initiatives and efforts to build or develop local capacities through development assistance. Democracy building is closely related to the international global human rights regime, since democracy promotion norms and the post-World War II human rights regime developed concurrently (Farer 2004). The UN's role in democracy building has increasingly focused on the intersections between democracy and human rights, democracy and conflict prevention, and democracy and development.

While there is no definition of or universal agreement on democracy in international law, it is enshrined as a principle in a myriad of covenants, charters, and norms of global and regional international organizations. International solidarity and common action to 'protect' democracy are equally essential to its definition. In many regional organizations, democracy is a fundamental ground rule of international cooperation, which is at times—and often unevenly—enforced in reaction to breaches of these norms, such as electoral misconduct (Donno 2013; Montero et al. 2016).

Democracy assistance at a crossroads

International and regional organizations work to define, promote, monitor and—at times—enforce democracy norms in many different ways. Building resilient democracies requires a continuing focus on reacting to democratic crises when they occur. Equally, outsiders seeking to help safeguard democracy internally need a long-term vision: if democratic resilience is primarily an internal (or endogenous) quality, it must develop organically from within. At the same time, the growth and science of public administration has developed extensive professionalized knowledge and best practices in the area of impartial governance.

A principal concern about international democracy-building efforts is their efficacy, particularly when outsiders have models and

methods that are coercively imposed on local contexts (e.g. through force or conditionality) that do not fit. Local contexts may feature political fragmentation, weak state capacity, restricted space for civil society, ethnic and religious division and intolerance, institutional logjams and disempowered citizens (Carothers 2016). International democracy builders have been criticized for placing too much emphasis on electoral processes, and neglecting the need for political pluralism and strong rule-of-law institutions, and for paying insufficient attention to the realities of local power dynamics; the concept of 'good governance' has been described as under-appreciating local realities (Grindle 2017).

The focus on international democracy building has turned to the critical role of regional organizations. At the forefront of norms to safeguard democracy are the evolving 'automatic' regional reactions to changes of power, as seen in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) response to the Gambia crisis mentioned below.

The Organization of American States (OAS) 'Santiago Commitment' of 1991 paved the way for regional organizations to play a role in safeguarding democracy. It called on the OAS to initiate immediate action if there is an 'interruption' in democracy within any member state (Montero et al. 2016; Pevehouse 2005: 130). The 2001 OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter was a landmark norm to safeguard democracy through such ostensibly automatic regional responses; it identifies the conditions under which the OAS would intervene to protect democracy in the region. During the 2016 Venezuelan constitutional crisis, some members of parliament in that country sought to invoke the charter to trigger an OAS intervention; Pope Francis instead stepped in to help mediate the crisis (Herrero and Malkin 2016). After the failed mediation attempt, Venezuela's multifaceted economic, political and social crisis deepened in April 2017 over a decision by the Supreme Court—widely seen as loyal to the ruling

Building resilient democracies requires a continuing focus on reacting to democratic crises when they occur. Equally, outsiders seeking to help safeguard democracy internally need a long-term vision. The focus on international democracy building has turned to the critical role of regional organizations

Participation in regional organizations and initiatives may represent a critical avenue for inculcating democratic norms within countries; embeddedness in regional organizations may have a safeguarding effect for democracy

Nicolás Maduro administration—to assume the powers of Congress. Anti-‘dictator’ protests surged and turned violent as police clashed with protestors across the country.

OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro called in March 2017 to suspend Venezuela’s membership over the regime’s unwillingness to hold new elections. However, the body could not agree as some member state friends of the embattled Venezuelan regime blocked the suspension (Oré 2017). The OAS has been an arena of fierce debate over proposed US sanctions against the Maduro administration. For its part, the Venezuelan Government and its regional supporters have pursued a strong anti-imperialist narrative in relation to the legitimacy of Maduro’s proposed new constitution, the country’s economic free fall and related humanitarian crisis, and the conflict between protestors and the police that killed 70 in early 2017. The Vatican proposed new elections as a way out of the crisis (Esteves 2017). In July 2017, the disputed election to Venezuela’s Constituent Assembly led to an opposition boycott and public protests.

Regional and subregional organizations such as the OAS, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ECOWAS, the Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Parliamentarians for Human Rights Forum have played a variety of roles in helping to safeguard and protect democracy in times of peril in defence of regional democratic norms. Indeed, participation in such regional organizations and initiatives may represent a critical avenue for inculcating democratic norms within countries and embeddedness in regional organizations may have a safeguarding effect for democracy; there has been learning within and across regional organizations on how best to act collectively to defend democracy (Cordenillo and Gardes 2013). For example, OSCE election monitoring of the October 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections in Belarus was critical to informing

international community debates about lifting targeted sanctions against the country for prior restrictions on democracy. While the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights determined that the 2015 polls were better than previous electoral cycles—including the fact that two opposition candidates won seats in the 110-member parliament—they found ongoing restrictions and procedural irregularities (OSCE 2017). In 2016, the EU and several states elsewhere eased some sanctions against Belarus.

Safeguarding democracy regionally: crisis response, long-term vision

Crisis response measures for safeguarding democracy vary widely, and successful interventions such as the crisis management in the Gambia are by no means uniform either within the region or globally. As UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Mohammed Ibn Abbas observed, former President Yahya Gammeh ‘didn’t have too many friends’ (Searcey 2017). Coercive regional and global reactions to democratic backsliding remain uneven, both in terms of regional spread and the types of responses.

Electoral mediation is a critical area of overall international (and often regional) engagement to safeguard democracy (Kane and Haysom 2016). Regional and subregional organizations in Africa, for example, increasingly partner with local civil society electoral mediators in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho and Kenya to promote subregional and continental norms that unconstitutional seizures of power are replaced with multiparty elections (Shale and Gerenge 2017). In the Democratic Republic of Congo’s constitutional crisis of 2016–17, as in Venezuela, the local bishops of the Catholic Church stepped in to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the constitutional crisis created by the delay of elections in 2017.

Building more resilient democracy requires immediate responses when democracy is in crisis, complemented by long-term efforts

to build local capacities for safeguarding democracy. In the near term, safeguarding resilient democracy requires measures to adapt democratic practices to rapidly changing social realities. Improvements and innovations to monitoring electoral processes and engaging to prevent election-related violence increasingly involve crowdsourcing and other uses of 'smart' mobile technologies.

Building democracy's resilience with outside assistance entails further developing local capacities and initiatives. Knowledge sharing and finding appropriate comparisons—of both fragility and resilience—may allow for cross-national learning. Spreading and facilitating the adoption of new technologies and expanding information sharing using such technologies can increase the inherent resilience of democracies worldwide. When there is a threat of institutional capture, outsiders can work to shore up the autonomy of local institutions—for example, by conferring legitimacy on judicial authorities or recognizing the legitimacy of their rulings.

Programmatic and project interventions may help political parties become more internally democratic and inclusive. Carefully designed support for institutional design and the provision of expert knowledge can assist during reforms or transitions.

2.9. Conclusions and recommendations: building more resilient democracies

Democracy as a system of reconciling such differences cannot be taken for granted: policymakers and citizens must undertake measures to support and safeguard democracy to make it more resilient. Concerns about declines in the quality of democracy globally have caused some to retrench from the long-term tasks of democracy building. However, it is time to renew support for democracy with a clearer focus on (a) when it can be flexible and recover from likely future challenges, crises and changes and (b) how it can be strengthened.

The following recommendations address today's most pressing concern for democracy: safeguarding it when it is under threat by building resilience from within. Those who seek to build more resilient democracy must be flexible, adaptive and innovative.

Improving elections and representation

- *Continue to strengthen electoral integrity and election-related security* by ensuring a clear and fair legal framework, providing security at polling stations, and protecting the security of election technologies and communications. Renewed support for education, training and capacity development in election management bodies and civil society is required to build strong national and local capacities for ensuring electoral integrity
- *Expand and further professionalize regional organizations' capacities for capacity development, monitoring, and observation* by engaging in electoral processes to help prevent election-related conflicts from escalating into debilitating crises.

Protecting and advancing fundamental rights

- *Protect citizens' rights to mobilize, protest, assemble and associate, blog and resist by safeguarding judicial independence, protecting fundamental rights such as open information, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the ability to organize peacefully, and by monitoring and denouncing at the international level state efforts to restrict rights or prevent the exercise of freedom of association.* Strengthen the capacities of associations of attorneys, legal aid societies and advocacy organizations for judicial monitoring.
- *Protect, reaffirm and advance the rights of minority and marginalized groups* in global norms and instruments of fundamental human rights. Examples include the best practices such as the International Labour Organization's norms related to resources and indigenous rights.

Building more resilient democracy requires immediate responses when democracy is in crisis, complemented by long-term efforts to build local capacities for safeguarding democracy

Curbing corruption and state capture: accountability

- *Combat the influence of money in politics through holistic, integrity-oriented approaches that shift the culture of politics from personal enrichment and rent seeking to public service and trust.* Such approaches and networks should work domestically and globally to understand, share, uncover and confront illicit networks through regional information sharing, close engagement between state actors and community-based organizations, and market-based assessments of the local conditions that enable illicit networks to infiltrate government.
- *Adopt new mechanisms to give meaning to transparency* such as so-called sunshine provisions, which allow easy access to government information and technology-based reporting systems to track donations to parties, candidates and civil society organizations. Laws and accountability processes should be extended to improve transparency from national- to local-level politics, where capture and corruption may also be entrenched. Countries with high natural resource export revenues have become more resilient by adopting wealth-sharing institutions and procedures for government and citizen participation in global governance regimes such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species.

Democracy that delivers: an inclusive, capable state

- *To reduce inequality, a renewed focus on local governance service delivery and optimizing public services is needed.* There must be clear electoral and political incentives to adopt

pro-poor service delivery, especially at the local level, where the state often directly provides services and public goods. Re-dedication to local governance capacities to deliver essential services such as energy, water and sanitation is needed to reduce poverty and thereby decrease the structural risks for democracy related to inequality.

- *Take innovative approaches to engaging non-citizen communities by creating social integration programmes to prevent the alienation and radicalization of non-citizens, supplemented by limited or local voting rights and structured community-level dialogue to give marginalized communities representation and voice.*

Deepening and expanding participation

- *In conflict-affected contexts, building resilience into transitional institutions, such as constitution-making bodies and the new state, and emphasize continued negotiation and consensus-oriented policymaking.* Methodologies for social assessment and cultivation of representation in all segments of society are needed to improve the quality of participation in post-conflict contexts.
- *Ensure that civil society can participate in and perform their watchdog function in relation to government decision-making processes to enable long-term democratic resilience.* Preventing backsliding in democracy requires a resilient civil society, strong institutions, unending resolve and, at times, bold action. A resilient democracy requires citizen commitment to balancing ostensibly powerful institutions. Safeguarding democracy requires reinvigorating civil society participation, so that citizens acting equally with the powerful can ensure the popular control of governance.

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Chapter

3

Threats from within: democracy's
resilience to backsliding



Threats from within: democracy's resilience to backsliding

What can be done when the instruments of democracy are used to undermine it from within? Threats to democracy from those in power constitute some of the gravest affronts to the global state of democracy today. These leaders manage to increase their political power by manipulating electoral norms, restricting dissent and freedom of speech, and reforming the constitution to extend their terms in office—all within the legal framework of the democratic system. Most alarming, these actions have a ripple effect on the functioning of institutions beyond those directly targeted, and affect people's safety, wellbeing and livelihoods. Some countries have diverted from this dangerous path towards authoritarianism. This chapter focuses on factors that help resist or counteract democratic backsliding, including leveraging citizen preferences for democracy, generating change from the bottom up, and taking advantage of the remaining (if frail) checks and balances. It examines cases of recent backsliding in Hungary, Poland, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

Written by
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Our democracy is threatened whenever we take it for granted. All of us, regardless of party, should be throwing ourselves into the task of rebuilding our democratic institutions.

—Barack Obama, US President, 2008–16
(10 January 2017)

3.1. Introduction: democracy in decline

Examples of democratic backsliding abound in 2016–17. In Venezuela, the government has rewritten the constitution to give the president sweeping powers and undermine watchdog institutions. In Turkey, thousands of professors, journalists and members of the opposition have

been jailed with minimal due process (BBC News 2017d; Daragahi 2016; Kingsley 2017). In Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza defies international pressure and violently stamps out national opposition to extend his stay in power for a third term (ICG 2016). In Hungary, radio stations and newspapers critical of the government were forced to shut down (Bienvenu 2016). In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte's war on drugs resulted in thousands of extra-judicial killings and human rights violations; his intention to extend the use of martial law further threatens to curtail personal freedoms and the rights of detainees (BBC News 2017c, 2017b; UN News Centre 2017; Amnesty International 2017a). In established democracies such as the United States, there are worrying signs that the Trump presidency is challenging the constitutional and democratic order. While these actions

would not be surprising in authoritarian states, all were conducted by governments that came to power in free and fair elections. Thus, the question is: 'what is wrong with democracy?' (*The Economist* 2016; 2017: 5).

The unceasing march towards liberal democracies as the 'end of history' appears to have stalled. While the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War heralded an era of unprecedented democratization, current trends appear to be driving in the opposite direction: the resurgence of nationalist rhetoric and protectionist policies from India to the USA illustrated by the 'Brexit' vote in the United Kingdom; an ongoing 'war on terror' accompanied by a renewed securitization agenda that limits civil liberties; grotesque levels of economic inequality; and challenges to the claimed moral superiority of Western democracies by a newly confident and assertive Russian foreign policy.

The most serious concern is that democracy is rotting from the inside. Authoritarianism has traditionally been conceptualized as a regime type that is illegitimately imposed on its populace. It is assumed that authoritarian leaders suppress their political opposition and enact anti-democratic measures against the will of the electorate. Yet the recent election in liberal democracies of leaders with authoritarian characteristics—who reduce democratic freedoms and political competition—demonstrates that, to paraphrase Martin Luther King, Jr. (1965), the arc of the general will of the people does not always bend towards democracy.

The number of cases of 'modern democratic backsliding' (defined in section 3.2) is rising (Bermeo 2016: 8), including in supposed democratic transition success stories such as Poland and Malaysia. Countries that experience backsliding share three factors: (a) a party or leader coming to power through elections broadly considered to be free and fair; (b) manipulation of the institutions and procedures designed to provide checks on executive power;

BOX 3.1

Resilient societies: confronting backsliding

Democracy can be challenged from within. Modern democratic backsliding can take place through the manipulation of democratic rules and institutions. Constitutions and electoral rules can be used to favour a ruling party and limit the independence and power of the judiciary and the media. For a democracy to resist backsliding, the checks-and-balances system must be prepared to counteract the manipulation, abolition, or weakening of existing rules and institutions. A democratic system can recover if one element of the system can react to these dysfunctions, which requires citizens to have the capacity to adapt and respond to changing political scenarios, as well as opposition from the judiciary, the legislature, the media and political parties.

and (c) use of the law to reduce civic space and political freedoms in order to crush dissent and disable political opposition, and diminish the role of civil society.

When analysing modern democratic backsliding, International IDEA considers its implications for the legitimacy of democracy as a political system, and why it threatens democratic values as well as human rights and the rule of law, rather than the causes or drivers (Lust and Waldner 2015). This analysis complements the assessment of the global state of democracy since 1975 by focusing on a selected number of democratic backsliding events up to 2016.

Based on the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices data (International IDEA 2017) and a selection of 15 countries, International IDEA explored whether democratic backsliding events affect other dimensions of a country's democracy. These events include coups and the manipulation of electoral or constitutional rules to extend terms in office. The data analysis also explores whether citizens in backsliding regimes become disinterested in or opposed to democracy as a political system.

The analysis focuses on 15 countries that were selected from those for which data were available to maintain a regional balance, and to include examples of general backsliding as

Modern democratic backsliding can take place through the manipulation of democratic rules and institutions

TABLE 3.1

Selected countries and events for data analysis

Country (region)	Democratic backsliding event year	Type of democratic backsliding event	Analysis period (GSoD indices)	Analysis period (perception surveys)
Argentina (Latin America and the Caribbean)	1995	President Carlos Menem overstay—amendment	1975–1995–2015	1996–2016
Brazil (Latin America and the Caribbean)	1998	President Fernando Henrique Cardoso overstay	1975–1998–2015	2000–2015
Colombia (Latin America and the Caribbean)	2006	President Álvaro Uribe Vélez overstay	1975–2006–2015	2007–2015
Ecuador (Latin America and the Caribbean)	2007	President Rafael Correa election and Constitutional amendments	1975–2007–2015	2008–2015
Lesotho (Africa)	1994	Coup	1975–1994–2015	1999–2014
Madagascar (Africa)	2009	Coup	1975–2009–2015	2013–2015
Namibia (Africa)	2000	President Samuel Nujoma overstay	1995–2000–2015	2002–2014
Niger (Africa)	2009	President Mamadou Tandja overstay—coup/emergency	1975–2009–2015	2013–2015
Pakistan (Asia and the Pacific)	1999	Coup	1975–1999–2015	2001–2012
Peru (Latin America and the Caribbean)	1995	President Alberto Fujimori overstay	1975–1995–2015	1995–2015
Thailand (Asia and the Pacific)	2007	Coup	1975–2007–2015	2007–2013
Russia (Europe)	2012	President Vladimir Putin re-assumes office	1991–2012–2015	2006–2011
Turkey (Europe)	2002	President Recep Tayyip Erdogan election	1975–2002–2015	2007–2011
Ukraine (Europe)	2010	President Viktor Yanukovich takes office	1991–2010–2015	2006–2011
Venezuela (Latin America and the Caribbean)	2004	President Hugo Chávez overstay—replacement	1975–2004–2015	2005–2015

Notes: The starting year for the analysis period (perception surveys) is the year prior to the event year for which data are available in the perceptions survey; the final year is the most recent one for which data are available in the perceptions survey.

Sources: Bermeo, N., 'On democratic backsliding', *Journal of Democracy*, 27/1 (2016), pp. 5–19; Ginsburg, T., Melton, J. and Elkins, Z., 'On the evasion of executive term limits', *William & Mary Law Review*, 52 (2011), pp. 1807–69, <<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1683594>>.

defined by Bermeo (2016: 5–19), as well as cases in which leaders modified term limits to extend their mandate as identified by Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins (2011: 1869) (see Table 3.1). The analysis does not focus on the countries or events themselves, but on the changes they triggered in the quality of democracy dimensions and subdimensions, as well as perceptions of democracy within the countries.

The analysis compares the sample to a control group of countries (with comparable human development and historical connections) in which these trends *did not* occur (see Table 3.2). While they may have experienced democratic setbacks during those periods, they did not experience a backsliding event as defined above. The starting point of the analysis corresponds to the years of data availability in the survey sources. The same years were used for the analysis of the GSoD indices data and the perception surveys to ensure homogeneity.

Section 3.2 explores six types of democratic backsliding, focusing on the three most frequently observed in the modern era. Section 3.3 examines the effect of modern backsliding on the quality of democracy, while Section 3.4 explores the relationship between backsliding and public support for democracy. Section 3.5 presents conclusions and recommendations. For additional information on the concepts discussed in this chapter see *Measuring Public Support for Democracy: A Resource Guide* (Schwertheim 2017).

3.2. Democratic backsliding: concepts and questions

Bermeo (2016) distinguishes between six types of backsliding: (a) a classic coup d'état, in which a sitting executive is ousted by the military or other state elites; (b) an executive coup, in which a freely elected executive seizes power unilaterally by suspending the constitution and establishing a rule-by-decree dictatorship; (c) election day vote fraud; (d) a promissory coup, which is framed as a defence of democracy and accompanied by a promise to hold elections and

TABLE 3.2

Control countries and year for data analysis

Country (region)	Analysis period (GSoD indices)	Analysis period, (perception surveys)
Botswana (Africa)	1999–2015	1999–2014
Chile (Latin America and the Caribbean)	1995–2015	1995–2015
Costa Rica (Latin America and the Caribbean)	1995–2015	1996–2015
Ghana (Africa)	1999–2015	1999–2014
India (Asia and the Pacific)	1995–2015	1995–2012
Romania (Europe)	1991–2015	1995–2012
South Africa (Africa)	1999–2015	1999–2014
Republic of Korea (Asia and the Pacific)	1995–2015	1996–2010
Slovenia (Europe)	1991–2015	1995–2011
Uruguay (Latin America and the Caribbean)	1995–2015	1995–2015


Notes: Regarding the analysis period for the GSoD indices, all countries within each region have the same starting year. These periods also cover the entire span in the sample countries for each region starting with the first event. Regarding the analysis period for the perception surveys, the measurement aggregates scores from the source surveys for their questions 'is democracy your preferred system of government?' and 'is it good having a democratic political system?'

Sources: World Values Survey, 'Wave 6: 2010–2014', <<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp>>; Afrobarometer 2016; Latinobarometro 2016.

imminently restore constitutional democracy; (e) executive aggrandizement, whereby elected executives gradually weaken constraints on their power and increase institutional obstacles to political opposition; and (f) the strategic manipulation of elections. Bermeo concludes that the first three forms of backsliding are becoming rarer, and that the latter three persist or have increased in frequency; for this reason, this chapter refers to the latter three as *modern* backsliding.

Instigators of modern backsliding manipulate, rather than abolish, democratic mechanisms and institutions—for example by changing

What is democratic backsliding?



electoral laws and statutory protections for political freedoms—to strengthen their grip on power. This shift demonstrates the power of constitutional governance norms and regular elections, and thus the success of democracy promotion: deviating from these norms is becoming prohibitively expensive in terms of jeopardizing government legitimacy (Boix and Svoblik 2013: 301; Svoblik 2009: 477–94, 2015: 715–38). Box 3.2 describes Hungary's recent experience of backsliding. In certain contexts, after a coup there is considerable pressure for the new government to portray itself as a transitory body that intends to swiftly restore democracy (Chacha and Powell forthcoming; Thyne and Powell 2016).

Authoritarian leaders and elected despots increasingly seek to *use* the law (rather than violate or ignore it) to pursue their ends within the boundaries of the constitution (Przeworski 2014). Given the rise in backsliding associated with the manipulation—rather than the destruction—of constitutional and electoral mechanisms, this chapter focuses on cases of 'executive aggrandizement', which seem to occur more often than electoral system manipulation. In this context, what are some of the common elements of modern backsliding?

Constitutional rules provide constraints on those in power; their existence assumes that executive leaders may seek to usurp public power for personal or partisan gains. Electoral rules, which are a subset of constitutional rules, provide the means for individuals and groups to compete for access to power through the currency of public support. Both are prime targets for those seeking to weaken the democratic system, but the modern backslider seeks to *manipulate*, rather than abolish, them (Bermeo 2016).

Constitutional rules are changed either through the constitutionally prescribed procedure for amendment or by appealing to a popular base to replace the constitution. Abolishing or extending executive term limits is often a key feature of backsliding. Modern

BOX 3.2

The archetypal backsliding story: the case of Hungary

Hungary's democratic transformation began in the 1990s and was further consolidated when it joined the European Union in 2004 after years of political, economic and administrative reforms to fulfil the accession criteria (European Commission n.d.). It was assessed as having achieved the necessary stability of democratic institutions, implementation of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Since then, the optimism surrounding the country's democratic progress has been replaced with worrying signs of modern democratic backsliding achieved through both executive aggrandizement and strategic electoral manipulation.

The main force behind this transformation was the Fidesz Party and its leader Viktor Orbán, who has been prime minister since 2010. Shortly after the 2010 elections Fidesz, which enjoyed a large enough majority in Parliament to amend the constitution, commenced a comprehensive revision of the country's constitution through a unilateral governmental process that did not include the political opposition parties or civil society (European Parliament 2011). Citizens were sent a questionnaire just before the draft was presented, but their answers were never incorporated into the final document. In the four years that followed, 800 new laws were passed and major constitutional changes were made. The amendments eroded the power of the Constitutional Court, the judiciary and the Electoral Commission, thus eliminating the necessary checks and balances and consolidating the power of the ruling party (Schepple 2014a, 2014b).


The scope of the Constitutional Court was narrowed: it lost jurisdiction over laws related to austerity measures and taxes. Its political impartiality was eliminated when experienced judges were forced into early retirement and replaced by an increased number of loyal government supporters. The national judiciary offices, originally an independent legal body with the right to appoint, delegate and promote judges, as well as determine which cases should be handled, was brought under direct political influence (Rajk 2012; Rajk et al. 2012).

Electoral laws were changed to significantly restrict the ability to alter the current power structure. Constituencies were redefined to favour candidates of the ruling party, and new legal provisions ensured that the votes from compensatory lists would go to the winning party (Schepple 2014a, 2014b). The Electoral Commission was also populated with loyal party members.

The public media company, officially an independent outlet, was placed under government control and regulation, which impeded impartial, analytical or critical assessments of its policies (Howard 2014; Sipos 2015). The independent press was forced to censor itself following enormous fines and the loss of state-sponsored advertisement, while a national media and telecommunications agency was established to exercise wide-ranging censoring and sanctions to prevent any negative press coverage of the government (Freedom House 2016).

Thus, without breaking any laws and with no election day fraud, Fidesz subverted the system through both executive aggrandizement and electoral system manipulation to significantly roll back Hungary's democratic progress.

What are the effects of democratic backsliding?



backsliders may seek to change the electoral rules in their favour, for example by redrawing electoral boundaries, increasing their veto powers (Bulmer 2015) or changing the electoral system to manufacture strong majorities. Common consequences of democratic backsliding include expanding the executive decree power, reducing legislative oversight, curtailing the independence of the judiciary and the media, abusing the state of emergency and passing legislation restricting constitutionally guaranteed rights, which is often targeted at reducing political opposition and dissent. The following section presents a more detailed analysis of these consequences.

3.3. Consequences of backsliding

The GSoD indices data provide an empirical understanding of the broader consequences of democratic backsliding, including coups, self-coups and executive aggrandizement. The data reveal the effects of backsliding events on other dimensions of democracy (i.e. Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement) and development (namely social rights and equality, and public order).


Implications for the quality of democracy

Do democratic backsliding events—as defined in Section 3.2—always decrease the quality of a country's democracy, particularly with respect to representative government, fundamental rights, checks on government and impartial administration? Figure 3.1 compares the GSoD indices scores of the study sample and control group in these four attributes.

All four dimensions of democracy (Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration) on average stagnated or declined in the aftermath of the democratic backsliding incidents (detailed in Table 3.1). Importantly, this shows a trend reversal in those countries, since before the incidents the four attributes were improving. Those reversals were not part of a broader trend: these attributes of democracy improved or remained unchanged in

FIGURE 3.1

Quality of democracy: Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration



Notes: The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each, are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and span until 2015. The green bars indicate the change in the sample countries before the events, the blue bars indicate the change in the sample countries after the events, and the orange bars indicate the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores indicate gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2015.


Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government Index, Impartial Administration Index).

the control countries (presented in Table 3.2). These data therefore suggest that there is some correlation between the overall deterioration of these democratic attributes and the democratic backsliding events described in this chapter.

The fifth attribute of democracy, Participatory Engagement, shows a different trajectory. Figure 3.2 illustrates that none of the four subattributes used to measure participatory engagement (civil society participation, electoral participation, direct democracy and subnational elections) suffered a significant comparative change after countries experienced democratic backsliding. While there was a reversal compared to before the backsliding events, the trends seem to have followed the broader patterns observed among

FIGURE 3.2

Participatory Engagement: Civil Society Participation, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy and Subnational Elections




Notes: The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each, are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and span until 2015. The green bars indicate the change in the sample countries before the events, the blue bars indicate the change in the sample countries after the events, and the orange bars indicate the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores indicate gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2015.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Civil Society Participation Index, Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy Index, Subnational Elections Index).

FIGURE 3.3

Impartial Administration: Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement



Notes: The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each, are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and span until 2015. The green bars indicate the change in the sample countries before the events, the blue bars indicate the change in the sample countries after the events and the orange bars indicate the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores indicate gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2015.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index, Predictable Enforcement Index).

the control countries (described in Table 3.2). This indicates that, while many aspects of democracy suffer during and after events of democratic backsliding, they do not seem to encourage disengagement, despite attempts to silence civil society (Aho 2017; European Parliament 2017; HRW 2017b).

Another interesting finding is the extent to which impartiality in the administration changed after backsliding, particularly as it relates to corruption and the predictable enforcement of public authority. Figure 3.3 illustrates an average comparative decrease in the predictable enforcement of public authority after the backsliding events of 0.03, compared with complete stagnation in the control countries. By contrast, backsliding seems to have had no significant effect on corruption levels in the sample countries (Figure 3.3). This trend also applies to non-backsliding countries, which indicates that resilient democracies are able to resist setbacks in curbing corruption fuelled by democratic backsliding events.

A concerning by-product of democratic backsliding is the devastating effects it has on people's daily lives and wellbeing. In Burundi, 'violence, fear, socio-economic decline and deepening social fractures have characterized the beginning of the president's third term. Following protests in April 2015 and Nkurunziza's re-election in July, confrontation has taken the form of urban guerrilla warfare which, beyond the targeted assassinations, torture and disappearances, has had an insidious and devastating impact' (ICG 2016: i). In the Republic of the Congo violence erupted 'after protests [in 2015] over the constitutional referendum that extended the eligibility of presidential candidates beyond age 70, which allowed Mr Sassou-Nguesso, 72, to run again' (Benn and Chauvet 2016). Similarly, 50 people were killed in September 2016 in Kinshasa in protests against the president's decision to delay elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Burke 2016).

Figure 3.4 illustrates the relationships between democratic backsliding and the deterioration of public order (defined as a combination of internal conflict and major episodes of political violence). While the control countries strengthened public order by 10 per cent, democratic backsliding events were followed by a comparative deterioration of public order. Most problematic, violence in these contexts becomes a catch-22: as the concentration of power increases, people's dissatisfaction escalates, sparking violent reactions. In turn, those seeking to remain in power use this violence to justify their decisions and restrictions on liberty.

In addition, there may be a relationship between democratic backsliding and a decline in development. Figure 3.5 illustrates that backsliding depressed these countries' performance in social rights and equality (the extent to which basic welfare and social and political equality are realized) by nearly half, on average, compared to before the incidents and to control countries.


The malicious nature of modern backsliding

Since modern backsliders have typically been democratically elected and have formally complied with the constitution and other laws, they can claim a weapon that is largely unavailable to traditional coup makers—a degree of legitimacy (Schedler 2002). While all autocrats may claim to rule in the name of the people, or for the good of the nation, they must enforce that rule through force. This is costly to maintain in the long term; the more legitimacy that can be claimed, the lower the costs of staying in power (Dimitrov 2009).

Legitimacy is important at the international level: regional organizations have responded to the increasing occurrence of coups by asserting that 'unconstitutional transfers of power' warrant sanctions, including the suspension of membership until constitutional rule is reinstated (OAS 2001; AU 2007; ECOWAS 2001). It is harder for regional organizations

FIGURE 3.4

Public Order before and after events




Notes: Data on public order aggregates the following indicators: (a) internal conflict, (b) major episodes of political violence, (c) conflict incidence, (d) intrastate war, (e) monopoly on the use of force and (f) conflict intensity. The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each, are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The green bar indicates the change in the sample countries before the events, the blue bar indicates the change in the sample countries after the events and the orange bar indicates the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores indicate gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2012.

Sources: Political Risk Services (n.d.); Marshall (n.d.); UCDP (n.d.); Correlates of War Project (n.d.); Bertelsmann Stiftung (n.d).

FIGURE 3.5

Social Rights and Equality



Notes: The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each, are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and span until 2015. The green bar indicates the change in the sample countries before the events, the blue bar indicates the change in the sample countries after the events and the orange bar indicates the change in the control countries. A substantial change is defined as 0.1 points on the scale ranging from 0 to 1, and 0 to -1, i.e. 10 per cent of the scale range. Negative scores illustrate decline, and positive scores indicate gains. The height of the bars indicates the score change between the event years and 2015.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Social Rights and Equality Index).

to sanction modern backsliders who formally comply with their own constitutions, such as Hungary's Viktor Orbán (Choudhry and Bisarya 2014; Hedling 2014).

Since modern backsliders must obey the formal rules of the game, they leave open avenues in which to challenge their power (Bermeo 2016). While they may violently crush dissent and political opposition, they must also continue to hold elections. Therefore

elections provide both an opportunity for contest—however diminished—and a rallying point for the opposition. The endpoint of modern backsliding is thus not full-scale authoritarianism, but weakened democracy in which 'even if the cards are stacked in favour of autocratic institutions, the persistence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas through which opposition forces may—and frequently do—pose significant challenges' (Levitsky and Way 2002). Boxes 3.3 and 3.4

BOX 3.3

Modern backsliding and resistance efforts: the case of Venezuela

Between 1958 and 1993 Venezuela's democracy was perceived as relatively stable and highly institutionalized. While there were threats of backsliding during that period, serious signs of erosion began in 1993, when Rafael Caldera, an old establishment figure, was elected president as an independent candidate. In 1998, Hugo Chávez, a political outsider and former soldier who attempted a coup d'état against former President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992 (García Marco 2017), became president due to a severe economic crisis and divisions within the main parties (Corrales and Penfold 2011).

In the 1998 election, President's Chávez's party, the Movement of the Fifth Republic (Movimiento de la Quinta República) received 20 per cent of the vote and 35 seats in the Lower House (Molina 2002: 227). The president began his administration with high approval ratings (*The Economist* 1999), which gave him the political power to call for a referendum to elect a National Constituent Assembly responsible for writing a new constitution (Greste 1999). The referendum passed with more than 80 per cent of the votes (El Mundo 1999). In the Constituent Assembly election held a few months later, the majoritarian electoral system enabled President Chávez, with 66 per cent of the vote, to control 95 per cent of the seats (121 of 128). Thus his 'Chavism' movement was able to draft a constitution without having to make concessions to the opposition. On 15 December 1999 the new constitution was approved in a referendum with more than 70 per cent of the votes (El Mundo 1999).

A few days later the Constituent Assembly dissolved all other public authorities, including the Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice and all state Legislative Assemblies (Méndez la Fuente 2007: 115–47), thus disrupting the country's power balance and the autonomy of democratic institutions. The national and local elections of July 2000 further opened the door for President Chavez to build an almost absolute authority with few institutional counterweights, all within existing constitutional and electoral frameworks. After Chávez was re-elected with 60 per cent of the vote, and his party obtained more than 48 per cent of the congressional seats (Molina 2002: 227),

the 'Chavista' majority in Congress could appoint many political authorities, including judges and the authorities in charge of electoral institutions (Tanaka 2006: 47–77).

President Chávez enjoyed broad electoral support, which legitimated his mandate in practice. He and his party won the 1998, 2000, 2006 and 2012 presidential elections; the 2000, 2005 and 2010 congressional elections; the 1999 referendum to call a Constituent Assembly and later approve the new Constitution; the 2004 presidential recall referendum; and the 2009 referendum to allow the re-election of all authorities without restrictions. The president nonetheless lost the 2007 referendum that tried to change the Constitution to declare Venezuela a socialist state and extend the president's term limit, a defeat he accepted (Jiménez and Hidalgo 2014).

After Chávez's death in 2013, President Nicolás Maduro, his political successor, won the 2013 election. Some level of democratic resistance materialized in the 2015 parliamentary elections, when the opposition party, the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de Unidad Democrática), won a majority of 109 out of 167 seats (BBC News 2015b). Unfortunately that led to a counter-reaction. The Supreme Court, controlled by the government's political supporters, attempted to seize the National Assembly's powers, leaving a weakened legislature (Krauze 2017). In addition, subnational elections scheduled for December 2016 were suspended without justification, several political opponents were killed or jailed (Lozano 2017), and a National Constitutional Assembly was elected to redraft the Constitution in what the opposition considers an attempt by President Maduro to avoid elections he would likely lose (Casey 2017). However, the election of the Constitutional Assembly has not been widely recognized by the international community or internally by the opposition, amid allegations of electoral tampering (BBC News 2017e; Semana 2017; Smith-Spark and D'Agostino 2017; The Guardian 2017).

The government has managed to curtail the resistance to limit these democratic reversals, notably internally by the judiciary (led by the general prosecutor) and externally by the Organization of American States (OAS)—through a series of political manoeuvres (El País 2017; Lafuete and Meza 2017). Violence and intimidation have not silenced protesters (Sanchez and Armario 2017). The people remain the defenders of Venezuela's democracy.

discuss modern backsliding in the contexts of Venezuela and Sri Lanka, respectively.

3.4. Resistance to backsliding: a case for democratic resilience

Is democratic backsliding correlated with declining popular support for democracy? Two classic essays on democracy provide opposing visions of popular sentiments within backsliding regimes: De Tocqueville's passages on 'soft despotism' in *Democracy in America* (De Tocqueville 2003 [1835]) and Vaclav Havel's *The Power of the Powerless* (1992).

De Tocqueville posits that citizens have competing desires—to be free, and to have a leader—that they balance by electing a despotic leader who dictates public policy based on his or her whims, but returns to the electorate at periodic intervals for revalidation. People acquiesce to this situation because they convince themselves that they are still sovereign—and therefore free—because they continue to choose who leads them.

Havel takes as his starting point a greengrocer in what was then totalitarian Czechoslovakia. Each morning the grocer puts up a sign in his shop window that says 'Workers of the World Unite!' because the totalitarian system demands it; if the grocer did not, this would be taken as a challenge to the system that would be penalized. However, Havel makes two central points. First, if all shopkeepers refused to put up their signs, the system would be powerless to enforce its rules: the totalitarian state depends on acceptance because it cannot continue to enforce its rule by force indefinitely. Second—and importantly for this study—regardless of how many days the grocer puts the sign in his window, he knows there is something wrong with the system. Thus democracy is an idea as well as a system, and whether the grocer takes down the sign or not, the yearning for freedom from arbitrary and tyrannical rule remains.

Does the modern backsliding of democratically elected leaders indicate the popular acceptance of soft despotism—that is, do citizens elect

BOX 3.4

Modern backsliding and resistance efforts: the case of Sri Lanka

Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected president of Sri Lanka in 2005 in the midst of a civil war and lost his seat in the 2015 elections following accusations of human rights violations and corruption, as well as 'executive aggrandisement'. The civil war lasted nearly three decades and claimed an estimated 100,000 lives. It ended with a government victory in May 2009 (Insight on Conflict 2013).

In September 2010, the Parliament approved a constitutional change that allowed President Rajapaksa to seek an unlimited number of terms and gave the central government control over independent bodies such as the police, the judiciary, the Electoral Commission and the National Human Rights Commission (HRW 2016). In January 2013, Rajapaksa orchestrated the impeachment of a Supreme Court justice after she overruled one of his family's patronage schemes (Aneez and Sirilal 2013). After nine years of increasingly autocratic rule, President Rajapaksa and his family controlled nearly all aspects of the Sri Lankan state. The cabinet appointed in 2007 was one of the largest in the world, with 52 ministers and deputy ministers (BBC News 2007).

In 2015 President Rajapaksa lost the presidential election and was replaced by coalition candidate Maithripala Sirisena (BBC News 2015a). The following parliamentary elections secured a majority for Sirisena's coalition. The new government immediately implemented reforms that abolished surveillance and censorship of the media and civil society groups. It embarked on constitutional reforms to restrict executive powers, limiting the presidential mandate to two terms, took steps to reinstate an independent judiciary (HRW 2016) and released a number of political prisoners.

While Sri Lanka's democracy has not regained its previous strength, there are signs that the current government will continue its promised reforms. Majorities of the country's main ethnic communities prefer democracy 'to any other kind of government' (CPA 2011: 3). An ongoing constitutional reform process provides an opportunity to better prevent democratic backsliding in the future (HRW 2017a). Yet the risk of political backlash is real. The bounce-back may be hampered by the impact of decades of warfare on the country's political and institutional culture.

backsliders because they have diminished support for democratic values? Or is it wrong to conflate modern backsliding with declining support for democracy: do the public—like Havel's greengrocer—maintain their support for democracy and resist authoritarian rule even as it is forced upon them by the people they have elected?

This question is important, as individual attitudes matter. While other elements, such as elite-related and institutional factors, may drive democratic stability or prevent backsliding (Dahlum and Knutsen 2017),

The endpoint of modern backsliding is not full-scale authoritarianism, but weakened democracy

In countries experiencing democratic backsliding, people's positive perception of democracy as a system of government increased

citizens have a key role to play. The fuel that ignites collective and institutional action against state abuses, in this case democratic backsliding, starts with the citizen. The media typically pays attention when people mobilize, and institutions pay attention when the media reports on those concerns (World Bank 2017: 241). People's perceptions of democracy in the aftermath of democratic backsliding thus have the potential to shape their actions against backsliding, which is a crucial element of democracy's resilience.

In countries experiencing democratic backsliding, people's positive perception of democracy as a system of government increased (on average by more than 8 per cent), while control countries experienced an average

decline in support for democracy. Figure 3.6 illustrates how people's positive regard for democracy in the sample and control countries changed in the subsequent surveys with respect to the situation before and during the backsliding events.


A possible explanation for this contrast is that people may better appreciate what they do not have. In this case, democratic backsliding would seem to make citizens realize that democracy is preferable to other types of government, while in places where democracy has not suffered as much, people might take it for granted. While drawing causal explanations is beyond this survey, the critical finding for democracy assistance providers is that, in nearly all cases, democratic backsliding does not indicate a decline in popular support for democracy, but actually the opposite. The findings further suggest that resistance to democratic backsliding is emerging from within those countries—Havel's greengrocers.

While US President Donald Trump's election does not fully meet the criteria of democratic backsliding in this chapter, people from both parties, scholars and the media sounded alarm bells regarding the threat of democratic backsliding after several controversial decisions taken during his first months in office (Behar 2017; Hains 2017; Huq 2017; Huq and Ginsburg 2017; Kiley 2017; Wang 2017; Wilstein 2017). Similar to countries experiencing democratic backsliding, the situation seems to have prompted a slight increase in people's belief that providing more power to the president would be too risky, from 72 per cent in August 2016 (before his election) to 77 per cent in February 2017 (Pew Research Center 2017).

Recent research reveals the important role of non-violent resistance in these types of contexts (Vinhagen 2017). The cases of Poland and Zimbabwe in Boxes 3.5 and 3.6 show how citizen-based resistance emerges in two very different phases of backsliding. In Poland, the newly elected government is at the

FIGURE 3.6

People's change in their positive perception of democracy



Notes: This measurement aggregates scores from the source surveys for their questions 'is democracy your preferred system of government?' and 'is it good having a democratic political system?' While these measures carry some inherent biases and limitations (see the 'Resource Guide on Measuring Popular Support for Democracy'), these were mitigated by not comparing specific scores in the selected countries, but instead by looking at the change in those perceptions in each country before and after the backsliding events and in relation to the change among the control countries. The country selection for the sample and control countries, as well as the starting years of analysis for each, are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. For Table 3.1, the starting year is the one immediately before the 'event year' for which data are available in the perceptions survey; the final year is the most recent one for which data are available in the perceptions survey. The blue bar indicates the percentage change in the sample countries after the events, the orange bar indicates the percentage change in the control countries after the events. The lower side of the scale illustrates negative percentages (i.e. decline); the upper side positive percentages (i.e. gains). The height of the bars indicates the percentage change between the event years and 2015.

Sources: World Values Survey 2016; Afrobarometer 2016; Latinobarometro 2016.

BOX 3.5

**Democratic resilience through civil society:
the case of Poland**

Poland's peaceful transition to democracy, consolidation of democratic institutions and successful integration into the EU have contributed to a sense of national pride and admiration by other countries yearning for a similar transformation. After decades of oppression from its Soviet-backed regimes, Poland showed the world that civil society, trade unions and regular citizens could make a difference by uniting forces in their demand for democracy, human rights and an improved quality of life. Seen by many as the *musterkind* among the countries that joined the EU in 2004, Poland seemed at the time to be on a steady road to economic growth, political stability and democratic consolidation (Ekiert and Soroka 2013).

In recent years political developments have increasingly raised concerns, causing observers to question whether Polish democracy is temporarily diverging from its path or if a democratic U-turn has commenced. Since its election with an absolute majority of seats in 2015, the ruling Law and Justice Party has pursued changes to the country's checks and balances system. Just a few months after its election, the government passed bills that reduced the authority of the Constitutional Court and its ability to oversee Parliament, manoeuvred the appointment of the Constitutional Tribunal justices and limited the court's constitutional review powers. Other laws were passed enabling the government to bring public media under state control by appointing the heads of public TV and radio, as well as civil service directors (BBC News 2016). The European Commission expressed its concerns about what it perceived as being 'a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland', and urged the Polish Government on two consecutive occasions to reverse its decisions, guarantee the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal and comply with the EU's democratic requirements (European Commission 2016).

In December 2016 there was deadlock in Parliament when opposition parties besieged the chamber after being excluded from the budget voting, following their protests of a decision to

limit media access to Parliament (Amnesty International 2017b: 298). These actions, together with other bills that extended the state's right to monitor citizens and limited citizens' freedom of assembly, ignited mass protests in Warsaw and other main cities. Thousands of women gathered in the streets dressed in black to protest highly restrictive draft anti-abortion legislation. This ultimately led to a rolling back of the bill (Borys 2016), but other repressive measures continued igniting protests in 2017. Notably, a new draft bill intended to end the terms of members of the National Council of the Judiciary and give Parliament powers to choose most of its new members, while a new draft law would have allowed Parliament to appoint Supreme Court judges and put courts under increased government control (Al Jazeera 2017). Protesters and EU criticism over the proposed legislation managed to put enough pressure on the government to block them. However, one additional law allowing the justice minister to appoint and remove senior judges was ratified (Reuters 2017).

Following the Polish tradition of historical civic movements, such as the Workers' Defense Committee and the Committee for Social Self-defence in the 1970s (Lipski 1985) and Solidarity in the 1980s, the Committee for Defence of Democracy (KOD) was formed in direct response to the perceived degradation of the Polish democracy (KOD 2017).

The KOD quickly rose to become a nationwide movement, uniting citizens in protests against government decisions that were deemed unlawful, which limited civil liberties, undermined democracy and opposed EU principles (Eriksson 2016). Through its independence from any political party (and its clear refusal to become a party), as well as its active media and social media presence and inclusive and decentralized organization, the KOD soon became the representative of an urban and well-educated middle class (Eriksson 2016). Although not yet fully supported by the largely conservative, rural communities, the KOD continues to grow as a political force in Poland, showing the government and the world that just as democracy was once attained through citizen organizations, it might be safeguarded in the same way.

initial stages of what appears to be executive aggrandizement, while even authoritarian Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe must still hold elections, and allow some forms of political competition and protest to legitimize his stay in power.

**Checks and balances: limiting
democratic erosion caused by
executive aggrandizement**

Modern democratic backsliding involves the excessive expansion of executive power within

the country's existing constitutional and legal structures. While constitutional and electoral mechanisms that should safeguard the delicate balance of power within the state are subject to manipulation during backsliding, they still help limit power grabs (Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security 2012). For example, Gambian President Yahya Jammeh was ousted in January 2017 after two decades in power when he lost his bid for re-election (BBC News 2017a). His attempt to stay in power was met with troops from

BOX 3.6

**Resilience through civil society after backsliding:
the case of Zimbabwe**

Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA, which also means 'come forward') is one of the largest and most influential civic movements in Southern Africa. Since its foundation in 2003, it has tirelessly voiced the concerns and everyday issues affecting the lives of Zimbabwean women, uniting citizens' forces into visible actions meant to highlight and improve women's social, economic and human rights (WOZA 2017a).

In a country that has only had one ruling party and president since independence from British colonial rule in 1980, the yearning for democracy has become particularly pronounced over the last two decades. Following a severe economic crisis partly fuelled by the mismanagement of state finances, corruption and participation in a costly war in the DRC, Zimbabwe's citizens faced extreme inflation, high unemployment and an alarming decay in public services provision (Africa Economic Development Institute 2009).

Driven by this palpable degradation in the quality of life, civil society organizations started voicing the problems faced by ordinary citizens and demanding change. WOZA, originally comprised of an unobtrusive group of economically challenged mothers, became one of the leading figures of this citizen mobilization, working against political violence, and for equality and education, respect for basic human rights and increased democracy. The simplicity and legitimacy of their message, as well as their non-violent tactics and inclusive approach, attracted many followers. Today the movement includes an incredibly diverse group of 85,000 members representing all ages, genders, abilities, social statuses and economic backgrounds (WOZA 2017a). A special wing for men, MOZA, was created in 2006 (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2017).

Over time, WOZA has come to symbolize a resilient, peaceful voice for Zimbabwean citizens and their priorities for change. In 2006 it gained fame for creating the People's Charter of Zimbabwe, a 'wish' declaration of 10,000 citizens regarding their country's future; most notably, people expressed support for increased democracy, accountability and public service delivery (WOZA 2017b).

WOZA was actively involved in protests during the drafting of a new constitution, which the organization did not believe reflected the will of the people. Although civil society organizations were involved during the consultation period, WOZA criticized the feedback process as inadequate for creating a 'truly people-driven constitution' (Mapuva 2013: 266). WOZA made a commitment to the constitutional reforms, outlined in the WOZA People's Charter, and strongly opposed constitutional amendments that would have made the constitutional process subject to political party control (The Zimbabwean 2009).

Over the years, WOZA has conducted hundreds of peaceful protests that have drawn attention to citizens' day-to-day issues and struggles. The protests were often met with police brutality, incarcerations and public harassments, which spurred public sympathy for the organization and exposed the regime's repression and shortcomings (Amnesty International 2013; Freedom House 2011).

Senegal to enforce the election results, backed by a unanimous UN Security Council vote (Withnall 2017).

Democracy is comprised of a network of several mutually reinforcing institutions and processes. When one fails, others—particularly the judiciary, the legislative branch and the media—can exert pressure and demand accountability to revert, or at least limit, the weakening of the system (Jelmin 2012: 7).

Courts have been crucial in limiting executive authorities' attempts to increase their power by manipulating the constitution. For example, although Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez's supporters succeeded in changing the Constitution in 2005 to allow him to run for a second consecutive term, in 2010 the Constitutional Court truncated his attempt to change the Constitution again to allow him to run for a third term (Lozano 2010).

Parliaments can also curtail attempts to excessively expand executive power (Fish 2006). While in Rwanda the lower house of Parliament was unable to halt President Paul Kagame's bid to run after his second term concludes in 2017, which means he will be able to stay in office until 2034 (Uwiringiyimana 2015), the cases of Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria are more encouraging. In 2001, a proposed bill in Zambia that would have extended term limits was removed given the prospect of its defeat in Parliament. In Malawi the same happened in 2002 when the bill failed to receive sufficient endorsement by Parliament; in Nigeria this took place in 2006 when 'it was finally withdrawn when it became clear that it did not have sufficient parliamentary support' (Zamfir 2016: 5).

The media is an important catalyst for limiting or counteracting democratic backsliding. For example in Peru during President Alberto Fujimori's term, the government attempted to control the press by bribing a number of journalists to support his campaign for re-election (Hidalgo 2011). Yet media

circulation of a video of his adviser bribing a congressman resulted in the president's downfall. The same day the tape was broadcast, Fujimori called for elections and announced he was not going to run again (La República 2016). Similarly, social media has the potential to enable activists and protesters to voice their discontent about an increasingly eroding democratic landscape. The low costs and broad availability of these platforms makes them attractive tools for citizens to engage in political discussion and respond to state abuses (Faraon et al. 2011; Papic and Noonan 2011; Bruns et al. 2016). However, incumbents can also manipulate these tools to misinform their followers and increase their power (Chenoweth 2016; Cohen 2013; Gunitsky 2015; Walker and Orttung 2014: 73–4, 82; O'Brien 2014: 325).

Modern backsliders are less likely than their predecessors to abolish political parties, which leaves some avenues open to contest ideas and resist executive aggrandizement. Citizens stand a better chance of mobilizing popular resistance when there is space for elites to contest each other (Brownlee 2007). The case of the DRC (described in Box 3.7) provides an example of resistance in the political arena when constitutional checks through state institutions have been captured.

Regional organizations have sought to protect democracy; some have adapted tools designed to deal with traditional coups in order to address threats to constitutional democracy from within (Choudhry and Bisarya 2014). The African Union, the EU and the OAS, as well as subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, all have mechanisms to sanction member states for violating shared values promoting constitutional democracy and the rule of law, which modern backsliding actions fall foul of. In this way, democracy's resilience is bolstered not as an inherent characteristic of democratic governance, but because it is an important shared international value.

BOX 3.7

Pursuing resilience to backsliding from political checks and balances: the DRC

Attempts by African leaders to circumvent constitutional term limits and prolong their stay in office have become a major source of conflict and a threat to democratic stability and consolidation on the continent. According to Omotola (2011), between 2000 and 2010, 13 African presidents attempted to do so; ten were successful. Success often depends on whether the institutions are robust enough to serve as a check on executive authority—a key indicator of the health of any democracy (African Center for Strategic Studies 2016).

After 15 years as president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila was supposed to step down by December 2016 once his two terms in office concluded. However, he extended his stay in office. The unconstitutional extension of Kabila's term featured growing intraparty tensions and a weakening of discipline within his party; some from his party voted to 'defeat a parliamentary motion on a referendum to delay elections' in September 2014 (African Center for Strategic Studies 2016). A parliamentary coalition known as the Alliance of the Presidential Majority, which included members of Kabila's party, defeated an attempt to amend an electoral law in early 2015 that would have enabled him to extend his stay in office. The attempted amendment triggered street protests by opposition parties, citizens, journalists, human rights activists and civil society groups across the country's major cities (Roth and Sawyer 2015).

The president's supporters in Parliament then petitioned the Constitutional Court—the members of which are appointed by the president—to extend Kabila's term based on a constitutional provision that allows him to remain in office until a new president assumes his or her role. The National Independent Electoral Commission—which has been criticized for its lack of independence (Kumar 2016)—also petitioned the Constitutional Court to postpone the scheduled November 2016 elections until 2018, citing a lack of adequate preparations (Mwarabu 2016). In May 2016 the Constitutional Court ruled that President Joseph Kabila could extend his stay in office if the elections scheduled for November 2016 were postponed, which they eventually were. This was followed by violence and mass internal displacement (Gottipati 2017). And while this forced the signature of the Saint Sylvester Agreement on 31 December 2016 to hold new elections in 2017, the deal was not yet implemented at the time of writing (Berwouts 2017; Melber 2017; HRW 2017c).

3.5. Conclusions and recommendations: resistance to backsliding

Democratic systems are fragile: they are susceptible to both external capture and, increasingly, erosion from within. Democracies take work and time, and are constantly under threat of decay. Countries are not neatly either democratic or authoritarian. Even fully consolidated democracies are at risk of backsliding, and even the most authoritarian regimes cannot fully extinguish the yearning for democracy.

Democracy's resilience is bolstered not as an inherent characteristic of democratic governance, but because it is an important shared international value

Most modern backsliders want to avoid the political costs of descending into complete authoritarianism; they seek, at most, a hybrid regime that maintains some elements of constitutional democratic governance, such as political parties, elections or independent courts. This, in turn, leaves opportunities for democratic bounce-back, not least because—as the data show—backsliding does not depress participatory engagement. More importantly, backsliding is accompanied by an increase in support for democracy as the preferred political system. The findings on public perceptions of democracy in the aftermath of backsliding suggest that the idea of democracy is well entrenched around the world; when it is taken away, rather than giving up on democracy, citizens feel more attached to it than ever.

Thus, democracy's fragility should—and must—be acknowledged as a cause for constant vigilance and support, but its resilience is also clear to those who choose to look for it. This resilience is rooted not only in the details of institutional design, systems of representation or legal protections for minorities, but in the very idea of democracy as a form of legitimate rule. This idea has become a norm to such an extent that would-be authoritarians are often forced to submit themselves to constitutional rule and elections, which although they may rig, still provide risks to the ruling regime.

As modern backsliding is not an all-encompassing overturning of the democratic order, it leaves open avenues to contest power. These may be through constitutional institutions designed to check power, such as courts or electoral institutions, or through other elements of democratic society, such as political parties and the media. The slide may not always be permanent, and societies are often resilient to backsliding. As would-be backsliders must continue to hold elections, and do so without complete ownership of the state, there are opportunities for democratic bounce-back.

Finally, the variances within the data are important, and should provide interesting

grounds for further research. For example, the variation in the effects of backsliding in different dimensions of democracy, and the different regional patterns observed in this respect, suggest areas for more targeted and tailored responses to threats to democracy. For example, the greater impact of backsliding on civil liberties than on participatory engagement might—with more detailed research—provide actionable insights into how best to protect democratic societies under threat. Recommendations on confronting and resisting backsliding follow.

Democracy assistance providers

- *Avoid conflating democratic backsliding with a decrease in support for democracy.* The data show that the opposite is true, which indicates the importance of maintaining the support of the international community, particularly in cases at risk of, or at the onset of, backsliding. This can be critical in supporting local resistance.
- *Look beyond democratic transitions, and focus increasingly on democratic consolidation as well as democratic success stories.* Some countries have shown themselves to be susceptible to backsliding, so prevention, sustainability and long-term approaches are key to cementing resilience.

Opposition political parties and civil society organizations

- *Rapidly organize, mobilize and raise awareness when there are signs of shrinking civic space.* While modern backsliding takes place gradually, civil spaces might rapidly reduce. In addition, sometimes the most technical aspects of backsliding may not be of interest to (or understood by) the general public. These include manipulating the appointment mechanisms for courts or changes in electoral laws.
- *Monitor the integrity of elections.* Make sure the government abides by international electoral principles and that the media accurately reports on instances of electoral malpractice. Importantly, rally civic

action to prevent electoral violence and demand actions that protect the role of non-incumbents.

- *Remain organized and seek dialogue with moderate elements of the governing power during backsliding.* Strategic long-term interparty dialogue might help all sides to reach compromises and change the country's democratic culture, rather than focusing on a one-off political crisis.

Policymakers

- *Safeguard constitutional protections for political minorities and the opposition, as well as the more traditional mechanisms of separation of the branches of government and independent accountability institutions.* Political pluralism is just as important as institutional checks and balances.
- *Invest in building a professional, independent and competent electoral management body (EMB) with a robust mandate to administer elections that are transparent and merit public confidence.* The selection of the EMB's leadership is crucial to ensure its independence.

Regional organizations

- *Build on existing systems of sanctions to develop accompanying formal monitoring systems related to unconstitutional transfers of power.*

More regular monitoring of constitutional governance is needed to reaffirm the norms on transfers of power or government change. Some regional organizations are more advanced than others in developing their role in safeguarding constitutional democracy, and more dialogue and exchange of experiences among regional organizations could be beneficial (see Wiebusch 2016).

- *Invest in conducting regular monitoring of constitutional governance.* While some milestones may clearly tilt the balance against democracy in a country, backsliding can also take place in small doses over a long period of time. International monitoring is therefore needed to reaffirm the norms on transfers of power or government change.
- *Foster intraregional dialogue among member states on good practices to safeguard constitutional democracy.* Building a common understanding of the basic standards and principles for constitutional democracies with which all governments must comply would make it harder for would-be backsliders to threaten their country's democracies. Crucially, building these common principles would facilitate the monitoring role of regional organizations to look beyond compliance with mere formal constitutional and electoral norms.

Even fully consolidated democracies are at risk of backsliding, and even the most authoritarian regimes cannot fully extinguish the yearning for democracy

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Chapter

4

The changing nature of political parties and representation



The changing nature of political parties and representation

Democracy relies on effective representation—responsive political leaders who can craft policy solutions for their societies. Yet particularly in well-established democracies, many citizens question whether traditional political parties can handle current challenges and crises, and this has increased apathy and distrust among voters. It has also encouraged many to support alternative paths of political action—thus triggering the rise of ideologically extremist parties and movements. Party systems in established democracies are under threat, and traditional political leadership is caught between the centralization of policy decisions on the one hand, and disaffected voters on the other hand. To examine how public trust in political parties, parliamentary institutions and political leaders can be restored, this chapter examines case studies from India, the United Kingdom, the European Parliament and Spain, as well as the use of referendums around the world.

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But if we're really to make democracy vigorous again, if we're ready to revivify it, we need to get involved in a new project of the citizens and the politicians. Democracy is not simply a question of structures. It is a state of mind. It is an activity. And part of that activity is honesty.

— Rory Stewart, OBE MP, British diplomat, politician and author (2012)

4.1. Introduction: representation under pressure

Traditional political representation is under increased pressure around the world: most people have little trust in political parties. Many European

countries and the United States have recently experienced elections and referendums with unexpected results that have caused a political earthquake among traditional elites. While political parties still offer a central conduit for democratic representation, old and new political parties alike must adjust how they operate to re-establish trust among the electorate.

Political parties must tackle four key challenges to survive in the changing political landscape: (a) deliver results to address multifaceted challenges such as global economic crises, international terrorism and refugee flows; (b) restore citizens' sense of inclusion, particularly among marginalized groups; (c) respond to populism; and (d) adapt to new ways of interacting with both party members and the electorate.

These challenges relate to the resilience of democracy. Signs of this resilience can be found

in the renewal of party systems (see Box 4.1), the novel ways in which citizens relate to new political organizations, and how existing political parties are reinventing themselves to relate to an electorate that is still finding its place in the context of changing economies and values. It is important to distinguish between political parties and party systems: the system represents the whole, in which parties are units. Many of the challenges presented in this chapter are broadly linked to the party system rather than failures of individual parties.

Do parties still perform a relevant function? Representation has traditionally been a central organizing principle for citizens in democratic societies. The Hobbesian notion that ‘people must agree to be represented if politics is to work at all’ is still relevant to striking a balance between increasing opportunities for citizens’ active political participation and representing their interests (Runciman 2014; Leterme and van der Staak 2016). As societies evolve and more than one social group gains political rights and legitimacy, representative institutions ensure that the ‘dominance of one social force [is made] compatible with the community of many’ (Huntington 1968). In other words, representation means that if different groups of citizens are treated equally, according to their numbers, then the main public institutions will be socially representative of the citizen body as a whole (Landman 2008: 11).

Political parties stay relevant as long as they mediate different interests and offer coherent visions, which they can advocate in elections and legislatures, and pursue them as a basis for compromise with other parties. They are often complemented by civil society organizations, which also represent different interests in society.

Political parties that fail to address the issues that citizens consider to be most important risk becoming irrelevant and disappearing from the political map. New parties have pushed old ones out of mainstream politics at different times and places, and for different reasons.

BOX 4.1

Renewal and resilience in party systems

Political parties and party systems have transformative power and the capacity to stay relevant by adapting and innovating their role and function in society. Resilient parties strike a careful balance between giving citizens a central role in their internal processes and making citizens the goal of their policy actions. Resilient parties address complex crises and policy challenges by pursuing coherent political visions, and can communicate these visions through decisive, savvy and electable leaders. Political parties can help increase public trust in democratic institutions by remaining responsive to the electorate between elections, including on the most difficult societal issues; pledging full transparency and integrity; engaging a wide range of social groups; renewing their leadership (in particular with women and young people); and by applying new approaches to citizen engagement.

This chapter examines the challenges driving the renewal of party landscapes in established democracies (those that were in place by the 1920s and 1960s) and third-wave democracies (which transitioned away from authoritarian rule in the 1970s and early 1990s). Most of these democracies are in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America, while a few are in Africa and Asia and the Pacific. Many European party systems have enjoyed a significant period of stability, but recent developments show that this stability may be under threat. This chapter discusses some of the many reasons why these systems have been affected, some of which may be linked to structural changes in the economy, cultural and value changes, and rapid digitalization.

Section 4.2 explores the broad markers indicating that the representation political parties provide is under stress. It also examines changing trends over time, such as forms of active citizenship that are on the increase, including protests and digital engagement. Section 4.3 looks at the difficulties politicians face in representing citizens’ views when dealing with transnational crises, especially where countries have advanced the integration or interdependency of their political, trade or financial systems. Section 4.4 addresses the challenges stemming from people’s declining trust in political parties, and their shifting support to new kinds of parties, some of which

Resilient parties strike a careful balance between giving citizens a *central role* in their internal processes and making citizens the *goal* of their policy actions

Politicians around the world are accused of being 'out of policy control' because they cannot influence policies as much as their voters would like, and they cannot respond to voters beyond the extent that their influence allows

offer new ways of interaction and alternative policies, or anti-establishment rhetoric and populist strategies.

Section 4.5 assesses the responses to the challenges of representation and provides recommendations on how to tackle them. The chapter argues that while political parties are notionally appropriate conduits of citizen representation, they must present clear political visions that give political expression to unaddressed interests in society; root out corruption and restore integrity; attract and groom skilled, electable leaders; and give citizens more influence (as some new types of parties are doing). The chapter discusses five case studies relating to democratic resilience: the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in India, the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, engaging younger voters in Europe, the renewal of the party system in Spain, and the use of referendums around the world.

4.2. Challenges facing political parties

The challenge of results: dealing with crises and policy control

Since the 2007–08 global financial crisis, both emerging and established democracies have struggled to provide clear-cut solutions and policies to curtail multiple problems that are international in nature and severely challenge the status quo. Just as financial crises in Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia in the 1990s played a part in shaking up politics and party systems, these current crises have placed similar pressure on European parties to adapt and change. As mounting debt added pressure to eurozone economies, governments also had to deal with the rising influx of refugees and migrants, and security threats, all crises at arguably their highest levels since World War II. An international consensus emerged on how to tackle the financial crisis, and supranational bodies overruled national governments such as Greece when they disagreed. Technocrats and civil servants at the World Bank, International


Monetary Fund, the European Union and the European Central Bank have made many of these decisions. By giving power to unelected officials, the politics of decision-making on financial issues has moved away from national democratic accountability.

As a result, politicians around the world are accused of being 'out of policy control' (Leterme and van der Staak 2016) because they cannot influence policies as much as their voters would like, and they cannot respond to voters beyond the extent that their influence allows. Some argue that politicians are signing away their rights to multi-national companies through broad free trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the USA and the EU and the Trans-Pacific Partnership between a number of Pacific Rim countries. Some believe that such moves only benefit wealthy cosmopolitan elites that have no interest in advancing the welfare of ordinary citizens.

Politicians must either oversell themselves during elections and sweet talk voters afterwards when their policies prove unfeasible, or attempt to take back the powers that have been transferred to the supranational level. Politicians in Europe are increasingly using the latter approach, as the Brexit referendum, objections to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and increased border control have shown. In other European countries the opposite occurred: voting to join the EU entailed voting to transfer power from national legislatures to Brussels. If the people perceive a gap in democratic representation and feel they have insufficient ability to influence decision-making at the EU level, they may feel disillusioned.

The challenge for political parties is to offer a strong political vision that provides real choices, and to explain these problems to voters in clear and understandable language that conveys the underlying complexities. Populist politicians often offer unilateralist

Political parties' road to resilience



and simple solutions, to portray a controlled policy sphere that they claim to be able to directly influence. Yet operating in an isolated sphere of influence does not create more jobs, stronger economies or greater security. Many of today's global threats ignore borders: economic crises, international terrorism and refugee flows highlight how interconnected today's world is; handling these issues requires countries to work together.

The challenge of trust and inclusion

Citizens expect their governments to do more to deliver better results. Yet their elected representatives have lost some control over policies as power is transferred to technocrats at home or to supranational institutions. Representatives are less trusted to deal with the pressing issues of the day. Technological


advancements have also increased the amount of information available to the public to scrutinize politicians' words and deeds (e.g. through Freedom of Information legislation in a number of countries), which has increased their vulnerability to corruption scandals and has the potential to enhance integrity and transparency. Citizens' lack of trust in parties is exacerbated by the (conscious and unconscious) exclusion of women and young people from decision-making positions and party hierarchies.

Declining confidence in parties

A wide variety of societal barometers from around the world indicates that political parties are among the least trusted institutions in society. Figure 4.1 shows that the level of trust in political parties in all regions at

FIGURE 4.1

Percentage of citizens with 'A great deal' or 'Quite a lot' of confidence in political parties, 1994–2014



Notes: All figures showing regional averages of World Values Survey data are based on all the countries included in the sample for a particular wave. Thus, 1994–98 is based on 52 countries, 1999–2004 on 37 countries, 2005–09 on 57 countries, and 2010–14 on 58 countries.

Source: World Values Survey Waves 1–6, 1994–2014.

least until 2014, except for Asia and the Pacific and Europe, has stagnated or declined since 1994. While the base level of trust in political parties in Asia and the Pacific is higher than in other regions, trust in parties is lower compared to other institutions. The Asian Barometer shows that political parties in East Asia, in particular, are not highly trusted; levels of trust have stagnated or are in decline (Chang, Weatherall and Wu 2015). More recent surveys by the Latinobarometer seem to confirm the long-standing low level of trust in Latin America: 20 per cent in 1995 and 16 per cent in 2016 declared to have high or some trust in political parties (Latinobarómetro 2016)

Trust in parties erodes when there is evidence of corruption, a failure in the delivery of services, the emergence of anti-establishment rhetoric, or a lack of inclusion and responsiveness to citizens' demands. It can also reflect a more sophisticated and critical way of thinking among citizens, and thus represent a positive incentive to reform.

Citizen trust is broken when politicians make lofty campaign promises or 'fact-free' statements that are spun by a biased media in polarized public debates. This took place in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and most recently in the 2016 landmark Brexit referendum and the 2016 US presidential campaign. The democratic premise that citizens can make informed choices has been brought into question in the era of 'post-truth politics' (Davies 2016; Hochschild and Einstein 2015; The Economist 2016). The decline in trust can also be linked to corruption. For instance, in a 2014 EU opinion poll, only 3 per cent of citizens reported trusting political representatives to deal with corruption cases (European Commission 2014b). In Brazil, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea, corruption scandals have driven senior politicians out of office.






Marginalization of women and youth

A healthy, resilient democracy is based on inclusiveness, which political parties and representative institutions are in a key position to safeguard. Yet parties are finding it harder to sustain an atmosphere of inclusiveness, particularly as women and youth are largely excluded from representative institutions. Although women's representation in legislatures has more than doubled over the last 22 years—from 11 per cent in 1995 to 22 per cent in 2015, and 23.5 per cent in 2017 (IPU 2015, 2017)—at this pace it will take 40 years to reach equal numbers of men and women in legislatures. Women's access to legislatures is highest in the Nordic countries, at around 40 per cent, but progress is particularly slow in Asia. Women from minority groups represent 11 per cent of the world's population, yet account for only 2 per cent of its legislators. Parties' persistent marginalization of women undermines their empowerment and weakens democracy's resilience (IPU 2015, 2017).

Younger generations are insufficiently represented in party membership, leadership and legislatures. Their marginalization from, and decreasing trust in, traditional party politics is of particular concern, as young people can make or break future models of representation. According to World Values Survey data from 2010–14, only 43.6 per cent of those aged 18–29 reported that they 'always' vote (versus 59.1 per cent of the total population), and only 4.1 per cent were active members of a political party (5 per cent total average) (UN 2016). The World Values Survey data also revealed that youth party membership was particularly low in Europe and South America (1.8 and 1.5 per cent were active members, respectively). In Europe, this seems consistent with 2015 Eurobarometer survey findings that the majority of young people held political parties in low regard, and did not want to join them or any other political, societal or professional organization (European Commission 2015).

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Marginalization of women and young people



The low voter turnout among young people during the European Parliamentary elections in 2014 serves as an illustrative example (see Box 4.2).

Estimates of youth voter turnout at more recent, highly contested, polls in Europe show a mixed picture. For example, turnout figures for voters aged 18–24 in the United Kingdom have increased from 43 per cent in 2015, to 60 per cent in 2016 and 67 per cent in 2017 (Burn-Murdoch 2017), while 66 per cent and 61 per cent of Spanish voters aged under 35 turned out in the polls in 2015 and 2016, respectively, up from 58 per cent in 2011 (Camas García 2017). The first round of the 2017 French presidential elections

saw 71 per cent turnout among first time voters (aged 18–24) (Ipsos 2017a), and 66 per cent in the second round (Ipsos 2017b). This represents a slight decline from the 73 per cent and 72 per cent in the two rounds of the 2012 French presidential elections, respectively (Roudet 2013: 2, 4). The 2017 general election in the Netherlands may have seen a further decline in the number of youth willing to turn out to vote (Ketelaar 2017).

A survey of 126 parliaments by the Inter-Parliamentary Union carried out in 2014 and 2015 shows unsurprising levels of youth representation in legislatures: 65 per cent of legislatures have eligibility ages higher than the minimum voting age (IPU 2016).

BOX 4.2

Participation of young people in European Parliament elections: addressing the challenge of trust and inclusion

Turning out to vote is the most emblematic means of participating in the democratic process. Low turnout rates are often interpreted as a signal of dissatisfaction with the political decision-making process. In Europe, electoral turnout has been declining in both national and European Parliament (EP) elections, although four EU member states have compulsory voting (Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Cyprus). In 2014, turnout for the EP elections reached its lowest point ever (43 per cent, down from 62 per cent in 1979) despite the fact that the number of EU member states has steadily increased over the years (European Commission 2014a). The participation of young people (aged 18–24, Austria 16–24) in EP elections follows this trend: only 28 per cent cast ballots in the 2014 poll (EP 2014: 9).

Young people who voted in the 2014 EP elections stated that they did so due to their ‘duty as a citizen’ (39 per cent), because ‘you always vote’ (26 per cent) and to ‘support the political party you feel close to’ (21 per cent) (EP 2014: 31). The young people who did not vote explained their decision as a ‘lack of trust or dissatisfaction with politics in general’ (15 per cent), ‘not interested in politics as such’ (21 per cent) or ‘their vote has no consequences or vote does not change anything’ (10 per cent) (EP 2014: 61). The fact that many young people feel their vote does not matter, or express a lack of interest in politics, shows that political parties must do more to reach out to youth and engage them in their programmes and policies.

There is a perception that the EP lacks democratic legitimacy, and that it does not reflect the will of European citizens, including young people. Many citizens perceive EP elections as secondary to, and

less important than, national elections. More often, the electorate sees EP elections as an extension of debates on national issues rather than a vote on European integration and decision-making. While successive treaty reforms since the mid-1980s have increased the EP’s power and status in the EU institutional architecture, they have not been accompanied by increased citizen participation, including that of young people. The relationship between abstract policies and their local impact is not always clear. Some efforts have been made to make the work of the EU and the European Commission more accessible to European citizens, yet political parties could do more to offer space for young people to engage in policy debates.

Given European demographics, political parties do not pay sufficient attention to youth issues, and when young people’s interests are included, political parties and institutions often view them as a homogenous group. Manifestos of European political parties do not sufficiently capture the concerns of young people (Bouza 2014: 17), who tend to be preoccupied by socio-economic matters, such as access to employment and education. However, it would be wrong to assess young people’s involvement in political life based only on their participation in traditional and institutional politics or on their turnout at elections. This is because there is a disconnect between their preferred forms of political activism, involvement in political life and means of communication on the one hand, and those employed by political parties on the other (Dezelan 2015: 3).

According to projected patterns, electoral turnout will decline in EP elections given demographic changes in the electorate. However, collective efforts—and the application of innovative measures by political actors and institutions at the national and pan-European levels—can increase young people’s participation in political life in Europe. At a minimum, this would delay the declining turnout trend and promote intergenerational equity, which will further strengthen democracy.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, a surge of new parties and leaders has emerged since the early 1990s in response to popular frustration with corruption and the mishandling of the economy and the subsequent economic crises that deepened poverty and inequality in their countries

Almost one in three unicameral or lower parliamentary chambers and 80 per cent of upper parliamentary chambers have no members under the age of 30. This age group comprises just 2.1 per cent of parliamentarians in lower or unicameral houses globally, and North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe are the only regions that exceed these figures, with 3.4 and 3.1 per cent, respectively. Increasing youth representation generally involves lowering the eligibility age, and adopting quotas and proportional representation systems (IPU 2016).

4.3. The challenge of new parties and populism

When parties are perceived to have lost their policy focus, as well as the trust of the electorate, and party systems fail to adequately represent different groups in society, electoral support will tilt towards new parties and leaderships. Electoral challengers to the party establishment have been ubiquitous across regions in third-wave and longer-established democracies alike. These challengers have often successfully given political expression to real or perceived economic, social or cultural grievances. Challengers have come from both the left and the right, but have generally exploited a common set of contexts and sentiments to gain influence and use different methods to come to power.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, a surge of new parties and leaders has emerged since the early 1990s in response to popular frustration with corruption and the mishandling of the economy and the subsequent economic crises that deepened poverty and inequality in their countries. In dealing with these crises, governments faced the challenge of acting with both responsibility and responsiveness, but too often delivered on just one at the expense of the other (either plain austerity or spending largesse), or none. Their failure paved the way for the rise of new parties and leaders that triggered the collapse of the party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Similar frustrations have prompted the renewal of the

political party landscape in more stable party systems such as in Colombia, Mexico and, most recently, Chile.

In Europe, political challengers grew stronger after the 2007–08 global financial crisis, as traditional parties failed to keep up with rapid economic and cultural changes in society. Over the last four decades, economies in Europe have shifted from industrialized to service based (with the sharing economy and digital mega-companies innovating lifestyles); occupational roles have transformed, and there are growing inequalities between the traditional working and professional classes. These developments have disrupted the social configurations that provided the traditional support bases for mainstream political parties (e.g. churches and unions) (Kalyvas 1996; Bartolini 2000; Arzheimer 2006). A recent opinion survey, conducted in ten EU member states, shows that few political parties in Europe enjoy widespread appeal, with the exception of some established parties in Western European countries that suffered less economically in the years since the euro crisis (Stokes, Wike, and Manevich 2017).

Cultural changes have transformed societal values. Some argue that ‘the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class’ (Huntington 1991: 13). However, others argue that a ‘country’s experience with democracy enhances self-expression values’ rather than the other way around (Dahlum and Knutsen 2017). When basic human needs are largely met, support has increased for ‘left-libertarian parties such as the Greens and other progressive movements advocating environmental protection, human rights, and gender equality’ in Western societies (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Yet like any revolution, this progressive shift has prompted a backlash, ‘especially among the older generation, white men, and less educated people, who react against the erosion of familiar and reassuring traditional norms and

actively reject the rising tide of progressive values' (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 2).

Amid this complex breeding ground for the rising challengers, new parties and leaders espouse anti-establishment tactics to connect with voters. Some do so within the limits of democratic pluralism, often assailing the establishment for economic problems or corruption, while others choose the flip side of it—populism. Populism can be defined as a mix of a divisive rhetoric that pits 'the people' against 'the elite'. When in office, populist politicians seek to undermine democratic pluralism and the checks and balances on government, which they perceive as obstructing the realization of the 'will of the people' (Mudde 2016).

Populism is neither new nor exclusive to well-established democracies. It has appeared in several regions in the last 30 years. In South America, president Evo Morales, as well as former presidents Hugo Chávez, Alberto Fujimori, and the Kirchners, used populist tactics, while in South East Asia President Rodrigo Duterte gained support in the 2016 Philippines presidential election by blaming the country's condition on the leadership of the mainstream political parties. Elements of populism have also been integral to African politics, although their shape and form have been constantly shifting. Most countries on the continent adopted multiparty politics in the 1990s, which was marked by the emergence of populist mobilizations by political actors seeking to carve out a niche for themselves against better-established competitors. The mobilization of ethno-regional and religious identities accompanied the introduction of populist positions on issues such as redistribution, socio-economic rights and justice into politics. More recently, populist pressures have built up around land issues (e.g. the actions taken by the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe), the pursuit of the 'will of the people' and the empowerment of the black majority (as exemplified by the Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa), and the

fight against corruption and indiscipline (e.g. the unorthodox methods and actions of the leader of the Party of the Revolution Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania).


The Western European and US variants of populism are characterized by three features: 'anti-establishmentism', 'authoritarianism' and 'nativism' (Mudde 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2016: 5). Nativism in particular is difficult to place on the left–right ideological spectrum, which many argue no longer adequately describes the political spectrum. New political battle lines are drawn between 'open versus closed', 'globalist versus nationalist' or 'anywheres versus somewheres'; populist politicians most often advocate the latter (Edsall 2017; Goodhart 2017).

Populist parties and movements have been on the rise since the 1970s in Europe (see Figure 4.2). The National Front (Front National, FN) in France and the Coalition of the Radical Left (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás, Syriza) in

Populism can be defined as a mix of a divisive rhetoric that pits 'the people' against 'the elite'. When in office, populist politicians seek to undermine democratic pluralism and the checks and balances on government, which they perceive as obstructing the realization of the 'will of the people'

FIGURE 4.2

Average vote share for populist parties in North and West Europe



Notes: This graph shows the average vote-share percentage of populist parties from 1975–2016 in North and West Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK). It illustrates that the average vote share for populist parties in these regions has more than doubled since 1975, and that from 2005 through 2016 the average populist vote reached over 10 per cent. Note that this represents average populist party support: it is not distributed evenly across countries or parties. This average includes populist parties such as the Swiss People's Party, which received 29.4 per cent of the vote in the 2015 Swiss federal election and the British National Party, which gathered only 1.1 per cent of the vote in the 2014 EP elections.

Sources: Parliaments and Governments (2016); Inglehart and Norris (2016).

Greece have both experienced rapid growth. The FN increased its vote share from 10.4 per cent in 2007 to 21.3 per cent in the first round of the 2017 French presidential elections (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2007; 2017). Similarly, Syriza's vote share grew from 4.6 per cent in the 2009 parliamentary elections to 16.8 per cent in 2012, and 35.6 per cent in 2015 (Ministry of Interior 2015). By 2016, populist parties had entered coalitions in 11 European countries (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Most importantly, they showed that reshaping politics did not require winning parliamentary seats (e.g. as shown by the Brexit referendum in the UK).

Political movements that grow out of citizen protest and stand out for their anti-establishment rhetoric are another rising phenomenon. Over the past ten years, these movements have most often transformed into political entities when their political goals required a hold on legislative power. From Italy to Spain, from the UK to the USA, and from Brazil to India, political outsiders have become involved in political establishments using new means to win elections and gain access to political party systems. Their campaigns use methods that may disturb the normal functioning of society in order to make a political point (see Tilly and Tarrow 2006).

Although some of these new formations largely operate in the same manner (and face the same

challenges) as traditional parties, they seem to be more innovative. For instance, they blur the distinction between members and non-members, and lower the (financial) bar to joining the movement. These new political 'movements' (many shun the term 'party') rely more on direct citizen engagement, for example through social media and other digital tools, than on traditional party gatherings. They are effective at mobilizing citizen participation and rewarding members with a strong sense of political representation (Stokes 2015). This new leadership tends to speak, dress and live differently from their competitors, which leads to a higher sense of public confidence than that bestowed on traditional politicians. Their direct engagement with citizens, as well as their unorthodox policies and calls for systemic change, mean that many of them are considered populists.

Political movements are located across the ideological spectrum. In Europe, while the left is occupied by Podemos in Spain or the Pirate Party (Píratar) in Iceland, the far right is represented by the AfD in Germany (see Box 4.3), the Golden Dawn (Laïkós Síndesmos—Chrysí Avgí) in Greece, and the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) in the Netherlands. In the middle are political movements such as the Citizens party (Ciudadanos) in Spain, the 'Forward!' party (En Marche!) in France, and the Save Romania Union party (Uniunea Salva i România, USR) in Romania. Yet others, such as the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) in Italy, combine far-left social policies with anti-EU stances that are also popular among right-wing parties. Importantly, many have responded to the lack of policy alternatives that established parties offer and fulminate against the international institutions, globalized economy and international interdependence that curtail these policy alternatives, as described above. Interestingly, support for Eurosceptic parties does not automatically translate into support for leaving the EU. A 2017 public attitudes survey found that in France, 54 per cent of those expressing a favorable opinion about the

BOX 4.3

Alternative für Deutschland

The Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) political party was created in 2013, and has taken reactive positions to the Eurocrisis and the refugee crisis. The party has also campaigned against what it calls the 'Islamification of Germany'. It has formed an alliance with the Freedom—Civil Rights Party for More Freedom and Democracy. The AfD party chairwoman, Frauke Petry (who has since quit the party), has likened the party to the Sweden Democrats and True Finns parties, as well as France's Front National, among others (Connolly 2016). As of spring 2017, few Germans saw the AfD in a positive light (Stokes, Wike, and Manevich 2017). However, exit polls following Germany's most recent federal elections, held on 24 September 2017, showed that the AfD was expected to enter parliament as the country's third-largest party, demonstrating the extent to which German voters stand behind the AfD's call for alternative policies.

National Front still prefer to stay in the EU. The same applies to Germany, where 69 per cent of those with a positive view of the AfD want Germany to remain in the EU (Stokes, Wike, and Manevich 2017).

4.4. The challenges of citizen engagement

Party membership numbers reflect how citizens relate to traditional party politics. Overall, party membership has declined since 1994 in Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America, and in Africa since 2005. In contrast, in the Middle East and Iran, and North America, party membership appears to be on the rise (see Figure 4.3). In the period 2010–14, party membership was at around 14 per cent globally, only one-third of which was active (UN 2016). Political party membership in 27 countries of Europe, the birthplace of some of the oldest parties in the world, was 4.7 per cent on average by the end of the 2000s (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012), and fell to 2.4 per cent during 2010–14 (UN 2016: 70).


However, not all parties have lost members, and some efforts to attract new members have been successful. Membership of the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in the UK increased from 0.8 per cent of the electorate in 2013 to 1.6 per cent in 2016 (Keen and Apostolova 2017). The two traditional parties in France opened up their candidate nomination process to all supporters, rather than just members. The Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS) first opened its party primaries to non-members in 2011; the French ‘Parti Républicains’ (Republican Party, PR) did so during the 2016 primaries. The French ‘En Marche!’ (today ‘La République En Marche!’ or LREM) has *adherents* rather than *members*.

Political parties are updating their internal cultures and operational structures to match the increase in online and street-based interactions and decision-making. Digital technologies enable citizens to voice their opinions much more directly than before,

which is creating horizontal rather than vertical spheres, with no hierarchies: everyone decides, and no one rules. Furthermore, politicians’ whereabouts, behaviour and decisions have become more quickly visible to the greater public—and can be influenced more directly. For instance, voter research shows that 46 per cent of youth in Europe regard social networks as progress for democracy, because they allow everyone to take part in public debates (EP 2016: 4). Digitalization, however, poses both opportunities and threats to citizen participation and representation. Those left outside of traditional representation because of their youth, disability, sex or minority status can benefit from these new avenues of meaningful engagement and exert influence from outside parties. Citizens who are less connected to the digital age—including older, poorer or less-educated individuals—may feel excluded from (and less represented by) parties

FIGURE 4.3

Membership in political parties as a percentage of the population, 1994–2014



Notes: This graph shows the percentage of the population that belongs to a political party. It illustrates that party membership declined or stagnated in all regions except the Middle East and Iran during this period. Party membership in North America declined from 50 per cent in 1994 to 34 per cent in 2005, after which it bounced back to 46 per cent.

Source: World Values Survey, Waves 1–6, 1994–2014.

Political parties are updating their internal cultures and operational structures to match the increase in online and street-based interactions and decision-making. Digital technologies enable citizens to voice their opinions much more directly than before

that increasingly engage in online decision-making. Since online participation can be easily manipulated, political parties must embrace ethical forms of online engagement while maintaining offline contact.


Leaders have recently deferred some decisions to the citizens themselves. There has been a slight increase in the global use of direct democracy instruments since 1975 (GSoD indices 2017: 5.3). The worldwide use of referendums, one of the best-known direct democracy instruments, has increased significantly over time: from up to 410 referendums in the period between 1945 and 1972, to as many as 1,846 national referendums between 1972 and 2015 (Topaloff 2017). Between 2015 and 2017 countries as diverse as Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Sudan, Switzerland, the UK, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and Zambia used referendums to make decisions or influence decision-making. Referendum

questions were on issues including financial reform, independence, EU membership or an aspect of integration, international trade, immigration, taxation, civil and political rights enshrined in constitutions, peace treaties, and political and electoral reform. However, as Box 4.4 describes, political elites who use referendum outcomes to further their political agendas can also use direct democracy strategically.

An increase in protests challenges the accountability of representative institutions, some of which have grabbed global headlines in recent years. Their names refer to the squares they occupy (Tahrir in Cairo, Taksim in Istanbul, Euromaidan in Ukraine) or the colours and symbols that unite them (yellow umbrellas in the 2014 Hong Kong protests, pink hats in the 2017 Women's March). This 'march of protest', as *The Economist* introduced it in 2013, has moved the realm of politics increasingly to the streets (Cordenillo and van der Staak 2014).

FIGURE 4.4

Social Rights and Equality by Protest Participation, 2010–14



Notes: This graph shows the relationship between social rights and equality and protest participation. It illustrates that there is a slight positive correlation, which means that in countries with a higher level of social rights and equality, there tends to be a higher percentage of the population that have engaged in some type of protest activity. Pearson's correlation coefficient results: $n = 57$, $r = .612$, $p\text{-value} < .005$.

Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Social Rights and Equality Index); World Values Survey (Wave 6) questions V85–V89.

While 59 large protests took place globally in 2006, 112 occurred in the first half of 2013 alone (Ortiz et al. 2013). Significant protest movements took place in an estimated 56.4 per cent of countries from 2009 to 2014 (EIU 2015). The Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone Project registered an increase in the intensity of protest between 2012 and 2015 to levels similar to those of the late 1980s (World Economic Forum 2016). Protests do not only help resist authoritarian governments; they are an increasingly popular and legitimate form of expressing political opinions in evolving democracies. Comparing data from the GSoD indices with data on citizen participation through petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest from the 2010–14 wave of the World Values Survey shows that countries with higher levels of social rights and equality also have a citizenry that more actively protests (see Figure 4.4). This suggests that countries with stronger and healthier democracies also have higher levels of protest participation.

BOX 4.4

Referendums: keeping politics out of direct democracy—addressing the challenges of citizen engagement and populism

Few recent democratic developments have better reflected the tension between citizen participation and citizen representation than the rise in popular referendums. In 2016 alone, referendums brought about political shock waves from Italy to the UK and from Hungary to the Netherlands. Each has sparked discussion about whether referendums give citizens more voice, or provide politicians a tactical instrument for political manipulation. How politicians formulate (and subsequently implement) direct democracy legislation will increasingly determine the relationship between citizens and their elected leaders.

Many prominent referendums have taken place recently. In 2016 and 2017, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Hungary, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and Zambia all held referendums with significant political impact. However, the referendums that may have affected the global debate over citizen participation and representation the most were those held in established democracies with long-standing party systems. For instance, referendums struck down government-backed positions in the UK over EU membership, in Denmark over opt-ins to EU legislation, in the Netherlands on the approval of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, and in Italy over reform of the Senate. Many people have therefore come to see referendums as the best tool for angry citizens to whip their politicians back into line.

However, when looking more closely, many referendums have worked ambiguously to return power to the citizen. Instead of being a corrective force of representative politics, referendum outcomes have often created confusion over what citizens are asking for, and have led to further disillusionment among citizens for three reasons.

First, a wide variety of direct democracy instruments is too often lumped together under the catch-all term 'referendum'. In practice, some are citizen initiatives, while others are government-initiated referendums. Some are optional, and others are mandatory. Some are advisory, while others are binding; some have high and others low thresholds. All of these design factors affect how politicians interpreted and adhered to a referendum outcome. There is a general need to strengthen public understanding of the exact mandate of the referendum used in order to avoid disillusionment with its outcomes.

Thresholds in particular can blur the discussion. In the Netherlands in 2016, a citizens' initiative that just cleared the low 30 per cent turnout threshold forced the government to reluctantly reverse its position on an EU trade deal with the Ukraine. In Hungary soon afterwards, a referendum condemning the EU asylum quota was

rejected with a 44 per cent turnout rate. The government interpreted it as a victory nonetheless, as 98 per cent of those who had voted supported its stance. For these reasons, the Venice Commission (2007) has advised against using any form of thresholds.

The second reason for controversy and disillusionment are the many unintended outcomes that referendums tend to bring about. In 2016, prime ministers in the UK and Italy tied their political futures directly to referendums on other matters. Conversely, in the Dutch and Irish EU constitution referendums of 2005, elected leaders largely ignored the outcomes when they found that citizens had voted against an international treaty mainly to voice dissatisfaction with domestic government policy. Therefore, it seems that referendums tend to provide the right answer to the wrong question. Likewise, the 2016 referendum on the peace agreement in Colombia was very narrowly defeated amid a low turnout of 37 per cent. Some modifications were made to the peace agreement, after which the government signed the new deal without another referendum.

The third reason for citizen disillusionment with referendums is that elected politicians can use them strategically to further their political agendas. For instance, political parties can initiate optional referendums to take contentious issues out of an election campaign, or to demonstrate popular support for a government position. British Prime Minister David Cameron tried to do the latter when he conditioned a Brexit referendum on a general election victory for his party. The 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum was a successful attempt by the ruling party to strengthen the position of the ruling president and to extend his term. Such a tactical use of referendums by political parties to cement their power runs contrary to the purposes of direct democracy. In practice, mandatory referendums, invoked automatically when very important political issues are debated, may avoid political manipulation more effectively than optional referendums, which are held according to the whim of politicians.

What future do referendums have in established democracies? Many new political movements, and even some established parties, are now openly campaigning for the introduction of mandatory referendums in an attempt to regain citizens' trust. Switzerland offers a good example of how representative and direct democracy support each other.

In addition, to avoid citizen disillusionment with referendum outcomes, politicians should be clearer about the decision-making authority that is devolved to citizens directly, and the authority that remains with elected politicians. In practice, they should avoid treating advisory referendums as de facto binding, or adopting a policy based on a referendum with a turnout below the threshold. Finally, politicians should realize that the tactical use of referendums can delegitimize representative democracy and be politically risky.

4.5. Resilient responses to the challenges of representation

For centuries, the delegation of power from citizens to elected representatives has been one of the most powerful principles of organizing democratic societies. Political parties emerged to facilitate this delegation. Today, both established and third-wave democracies face pressure to tilt power back to the citizen.

This pressure is driven by the citizens themselves, and targets the traditional form of political organization—the party. Restoring parties' ability to represent citizens requires reclaiming the initiative to provide citizens with choice and influence, and successfully delivering positive policy outcomes. It also demands committing to (and practicing) higher standards of integrity and more effectively engaging with members and citizens, including through online technologies and other methods used by new political movements.

Political parties should adjust to the changing nature of representation: today's active citizens are less interested in the one-way participation of conventional political activity (party membership, rallies and voting). Many want to directly shape decisions by establishing horizontal relationships with leaders and representatives. Emerging political movements that use anti-establishment rhetoric that appeals directly to the people, and that have more flexible organizations, embody these new ideals better than traditional parties.

In order to stay relevant, political parties must demonstrate a renewed emphasis on citizen engagement. Citizens are not only the object of political persuasion (i.e. to get the necessary votes to win political office) but the ultimate target and the political parties' reason for existence as well. Resilient parties strike a careful balance between giving the citizen a central role in internal party activities and decisions, and making the citizen the goal of their policy actions.

Resilient party responses

Parties are considered an appropriate conduit to fulfil four main functions of representation: aggregating societal interests into policy agendas, mobilizing citizens around those platforms, recruiting leaders to advance the party's agenda and forming governments to implement them. While these functions remain essential, both established and third-wave democracies strive to overcome the challenges of representation by upgrading the infrastructures that parties offer to citizens. This section explores party responses that help democracy become more resilient and able to adapt to new challenges of representation.

Credible political actions: addressing the real issues

Political parties play an important role in a democratic system. It is important to distinguish between the parties themselves and the party system: parties sometimes disappear as a natural part of democratic evolution, generally because they have become ideologically irrelevant or are unable to respond to a significant challenge. New parties usually step in to take their place, which keeps the overall system of political parties resilient.

Delivering results requires more than technocratic decisions. Parties that pursue coherent political visions have been shown to be more likely to deal with complex government crises. Equally important, parties with successful programmatic platforms have been able to credibly communicate their political vision and message to the electorate through decisive, savvy and electable leaders. Successful leaders are able to explain complex issues and policies to voters and take responsibility for their implementation. They can also build broad coalitions of support with groups in society, tapping into their constituencies and agendas, and attract like-minded members through democratizing the party's internal decision-making process (Valladares, Sample and van der Staak 2014).

Parties need to be able to make decisions and implement them. However, this is becoming increasingly difficult, as key areas of decision-making such as public finances and immigration are transferred away from their sphere of influence to decision-making bodies dominated by non-elected technocrats inside and outside the country. Recent referendums in Greece, Hungary and the UK addressed citizens' perceptions that unaccountable and unelected civil servants in Brussels were deciding on their behalf. This trend is illustrated by the likely setbacks in negotiations for free trade agreements, such as the ongoing negotiations on the TTIP between the EU and the USA. Furthermore, the increased control along Europe's borders due to the Syrian refugee crisis has prompted some to call for the dismantlement of free movement within the Schengen Area. Yet, as discussed previously, while unilateralist approaches to such issues may seem appealing, in the long run closing countries off from the world makes it harder to address transnational problems. Skilled leaders must communicate these complex messages to the electorate in an engaging and understandable way.

Addressing policy challenges without compromising ideology

Populist parties thrive in policy vacuums, when traditional parties allow them to offer one-sided (populist) narratives. By engaging with citizens, traditional parties can disrupt the vacuum and offer compelling policy alternatives. As an example of a policy vacuum, Syrian refugees featured prominently in Slovakia's 2016 elections, even though the country only had 330 asylum applicants in 2015 (Eurostat)—considerably fewer than other EU countries.

Some established political parties are adopting the traits and practices of their successful populist rivals. Traditional parties are most effective when they can combine their strengths to formulate public policies and recruit new political leaders with the capacity to mobilize citizens and articulate their interests in clear-cut and bold terms. In Spain, modern

technologies are being introduced to keep up with the country's political newcomers (see Box 4.5). Traditional parties often argue that the only guarantee of realistic and consistent policies and political professionalism (in both parliament and government) are broad-based membership parties, supported by fee-paying

BOX 4.5

Spain: crisis, protest and technology renewing the party system—addressing the challenge of citizen engagement

An important element of resilience in representative democracy is finding new ways for citizens and political parties to interact. Spain provides an example of extreme pressure on a party system that managed to transform itself.

The recession triggered by the financial crisis in 2007–08 nearly caused the collapse of the Spanish economy, and created a seismic shift in the party system. From the end of authoritarian rule in 1977 until the crisis, Spain had operated as a bipartisan system. In nearly half of the elections since then, one of these two parties won an absolute majority and could rule on its own. When they did not, a few key regional parties could break any deadlock in Parliament by siding with the party in government. During the recession citizens took to the streets to demand a response to the crisis. The social unrest was based on a perception that politics—and political parties in particular—were not doing enough to protect the population from the worst effects of the crisis. Corruption scandals started to emerge almost weekly, and involved mostly the two main parties, some of their former high officials and their internal party finances. A significant portion of the population started to identify the political class as one of the three main problems affecting the country (CIS n.d.). In response to these sentiments, new political movements emerged.

In 2011, a diverse group of (mostly young) people known as *Indignados* (the 'indignant') camped out in central Madrid to protest the economic situation, political elites and austerity measures, as well as to criticize young people's lack of access to education, employment or training. The movement defined the most important political cleavage as elites versus the people, rather than left versus right. It used technology to extend the debate and discussion online, which served as the basis for political change. The movement sparked an increase in political engagement and debate, and the formation of two new parties. A group of university professors launched Podemos ('We can') in January 2014, which captured the *Indignados* spirit. Less than five months later, the party won 1.2 million votes in the European elections using technology to consult widely with the population. A Catalonia-based party also came onto the national stage during this time on an anti-corruption and regeneration platform. The 'Citizens' (*Ciudadanos*) party innovatively used social and traditional media to quickly reach the whole country. New technologies helped the new parties carve out their own space in the political arena, and the old parties followed.

After the two new parties obtained substantial shares of the vote in the 2016 general election alongside the two main traditional parties, a coalition government was formed. As Spain continues to struggle with the consequences of the economic crisis, its party system has renewed. It now includes more actors, which has enhanced its ability to more accurately represent society and become more oriented towards dialogue. The country is also now at the forefront of using technology to engage citizens and to increase feedback and accountability.

members, which invest in the long-term development of ideologies, policies and leaders. While this may be true, in order to maintain citizens' support in the long run, parties will have to balance their traditional ways with innovative approaches to interacting with (and representing) a new breed of active citizens.

BOX 4.6

The AAP in India: from movement to party through integrity-based campaign strategies—addressing the challenges of trust and new parties

The Aam Aadmi Party (Common Man's Party, AAP) in India grew out of a protest movement against pervasive corruption in politics, and went on to win almost all the seats in the Delhi Legislative Assembly in 2015. Its experience illustrates the appeal of parties that pledge to restore integrity to politics.

Some Indian political parties have a history of engaging in clientelistic exchanges (Kitchelt 2012), trading the voters' political support for favours. This has contributed to the increased perception of corruption in politics. Suri (2007) discusses the challenge of maintaining high levels of support for democracy when citizens have low levels of trust in parties. The exposure of several prominent corruption scandals at the end of the 2000s increased public outrage over politicians' conduct. In this context, Anna Hazare, a citizen activist, started a hunger strike in 2011 calling for the creation of a wide-ranging anti-corruption agency in India (Sharma 2014: 39). The bill to create such an agency had been on the table since 1968 but had never become law. Hazare's movement advocated a Citizens' Ombudsman Bill with a wide remit to investigate corruption at the highest levels (Sharma 2014: 40–41).

India's lower house of Parliament passed a version of the bill, but it never passed the upper house. Hazare's movement faced a dilemma—whether to continue acting outside the traditional political sphere to pressure the government, or to engage directly in electoral politics (Sharma 2014: 43). The AAP was formally launched on 26 November 2012. The party's rules prohibited nepotism, promoted financial transparency and gathered plenty of grassroots support (Sharma 2014: 50–51). It contested the 2013 state elections in Delhi and won 28 out of 70 seats. It formed a coalition with the Indian National Congress, and Hazare's senior advisor, Arvind Kejriwal, became chief minister of Delhi. When the AAP was unable to secure the passage of an anti-corruption bill, Kejriwal resigned. In the 2015 Delhi state elections the AAP won 67 out of 70 seats, and Kejriwal became chief minister again (Singh 2015).

For the first year after the 2015 elections, the AAP had either fulfilled or was working to fulfil over half of its election promises and was yet to start on about one-third; it broke only two election promises (The Hindu 2016).

The AAP's transition from a protest movement to governing Delhi on an integrity platform is a good example of democratic resilience. The movement chose to redefine itself as a political party, and thus successfully continued its agenda from within the democratic system to advance a comprehensive approach to integrity. India has a long history of successful citizen protest, starting with Gandhi's call for self-rule from Britain. The AAP harnessed a strong anti-corruption sentiment across all socio-economic groups and turned it into a political victory at the state level; it has not yet had success in federal elections.

Restoring trust

Political parties are better able to retain citizen trust by presenting citizens with a comprehensive integrity agenda. Focusing only on the funding of political parties and campaign finance has failed to protect politics from corruption due to the complex networks and roles of money in politics (OECD 2016). Holistic, integrity-enhanced systems—that coordinate frameworks across different policy areas such as procurement, conflict of interest and party finance—increase resilience, which protects public policies and the state from narrow economic interests.

Trustworthy leaders can demonstrate a clean track record and credibly commit to implementing integrity-oriented rules and practices that apply within their parties and in government. By doing so, they deter misconduct in public office and the influence of narrow economic interests over policy. When high-profile scandals emerge, political parties face pressure to tackle corruption. Other groups have promoted their integrity in order to establish a presence in the political arena. India's AAP, for example, a protest movement that successfully transformed into a governing political party, won on a ticket promoting integrity-oriented policies (see Box 4.6).

Increasing a party's inclusiveness—particularly of women and young people, as discussed above—can also restore trust. To remain competitive, party leaders should reach out to both groups and ensure they are equally included in the party's internal democracy and decision-making. Parties should also have women's and young people's chapters and caucuses, promote the use of digital engagement tools, improve the gender balance in the leadership and use all-women shortlists.

Understanding the ways in which electoral systems and political party dynamics influence democratic representation is important in addressing the challenges of apathy, distrust, and scepticism that voters can feel when democracy does not appear adequately representative of them or their interests (see Box 4.7).

Democratizing decision-making

Political parties in both established and emerging democracies are adopting new technologies to reach out to members and non-members for help in undertaking traditional party tasks such as online policy formulation, voting and fundraising (see International IDEA's Digital Parties Portal). Democracy software such as Agora Voting or DemocracyOS (see Box 4.8) allows large groups of citizens to table proposals, and discuss and vote on them online. The 2008 and 2012 Obama presidential campaigns (as well as the 2016 US presidential campaigns) successfully used big data campaigning, which allowed them to better target potential voters and win swing states.

Political parties in India and Spain have introduced software to make their donations visible online in real time and thus win voters' trust. Meetup has become a common (and free-of-charge) instrument for parties in Italy and the Netherlands to bring citizens together for small, and sometimes larger, informal gatherings and debates. Social media such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and personal blogs have become a mainstay of any politician seeking interaction with constituents. Politicians are increasingly realizing that technology is a two-way street: it should not only 'mobilize the masses' but also allow the masses to 'mobilize politics'.

There are, however, also serious risks involved in the use of ICT by political parties. In the 2016 US and 2017 French presidential elections, senior politicians' email accounts were hacked and leaked to the media. Since the cybersecurity of political parties and candidates often falls outside the mandate of electoral authorities, these actors are often seen as the weakest link in safeguarding elections against hacking. Second, social and other digital media are used increasingly to spread misinformation. In 2016, the US presidential elections and the Brexit referendum were influenced by misinformation that originated from (or was endorsed by) political parties and candidates.

BOX 4.7

The effect of electoral systems: the Canadian majoritarian system

Some electoral systems may also cause a proportion of the electorate to feel disenfranchised or inadequately represented. Majoritarian systems—particularly first-past-the-post systems, in which the candidate with the most votes is elected—have tended to produce strong governments and more political stability since they give the winning parties a higher proportion of seats than their vote share. Those voting for smaller parties, or who live in a constituency consistently represented by another party, may feel disenfranchised.

The Canadian federal election of 2015 provides a good illustration of this. The two biggest parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, received 39.5 per cent and 31.9 per cent of the total vote, respectively, which together gave them 83 per cent of the seats (compared to their combined vote share of 71.4 per cent). In contrast, the Green Party received 3.4 per cent of the total vote and received one seat in the House of Commons (which represented 0.3 per cent of the total number of seats).

For a more in-depth analysis of different electoral systems see the Resource Guide accompanying this chapter, *Elections, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Resource Guide* (Sisk 2017).

BOX 4.8

DemocracyOS: redesigning democracy's operating system

Frustrated by the high entry costs and obstacles to influencing decision-making, in 2012 a small Argentinian start-up designed a new operating system to facilitate more open and participatory democracy. DemocracyOS is an open-source platform that users can access on their personal devices, including smartphones, tablets and computers (Finley 2014).

The software has three functions. First, it informs users of every bill presented in their Congress or Parliament in almost real time, and in their own language. It is available in 15 languages, and presents information using everyday terms that all citizens can understand. Second, the platform facilitates debate among citizens, using verified user accounts to ensure the quality of debate. Third, it allows users to vote—signalling to their (local or national) representative how they want them to vote on or handle particular bills (Scaturro 2014).

DemocracyOS has been used worldwide. In 2012 the Argentinean start-up morphed into the Net Party (Partido de la Red), on the platform that their representative would only make decisions informed by the DemocracyOS software; it fell short of winning a seat in the national Congress. In 2013 Tunisian civil society used the tool to debate the national constitution (Chao 2014), and federal and municipal governments in Mexico, Spain and three US states have adapted the tool for their own use. It also continues to facilitate direct engagement with voters in Argentina: in 2014, 'all 350 bills introduced in the Buenos Aires city legislature were debated on the platform' (Serna 2015), bringing local citizens closer to their representatives.

Political parties should use technology to facilitate their existing functioning, not to replace substantive debate and face-to-face interactions. In order to avoid a growing digital divide they should pay equal attention to offline innovations that stimulate citizen engagement, such as the broad citizen forums in Belgium and the Netherlands known as the G1000 and G500, respectively. The G1000, which first met in Brussels in 2011, gathered one-thousand randomly selected citizens to discuss the major challenges of democracy in Belgium, while the G500, a political youth organization founded in 2012, seeks to advance their youth agenda through established political parties

in the Netherlands (Van Reybrouck 2013; ColaM 2016; G1000 n.d.).

As mentioned in Box 4.8, parties such as the Net Party in Argentina base their mobilization strategy exclusively on open-source software. The open primaries that many of France's traditional parties have introduced, as well as the latest leadership election for the British Labour Party, are examples of efforts to attract like-minded individuals by increasing the incentives to join parties through decentralizing the power to elect leaders and candidates. However, such attempts to broaden citizen engagement in internal

BOX 4.9

The British Labour Party: a mainstream party reinventing itself—addressing the challenge of new parties and results

As an old mainstream party, the British Labour Party has reinvented itself in the past and is now in the process of doing so again (O'Hara 2016). Between 1979 and 1997, the party went from losing power (after being in government since 1974) and then losing subsequent elections in 1983, 1987 and 1992 to eventually rebuilding and reinventing itself, and returning to government in 1997. Similarly, after losing seats in every election since 2001, it bounced back in the 2017 elections with an increased number of seats.

In 1979, the UK was facing difficult economic circumstances. The 1973 oil crisis had forced it to temporarily adopt a three-day working week to conserve energy (Worthington 2014), and in 1976 it was forced to ask the International Monetary Fund for a bailout loan. Strikes by multiple trade unions during the winter of 1978–79 had further effects on the economy. The electorate, tired of almost a decade of turbulent economic times, expressed a desire for change in the May 1979 general elections by voting the Conservative Party, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, into power. The election result plunged the Labour Party into disarray and triggered bitter arguments over its purpose and future course. The party split in 1981 when a group of MPs left to form the Social Democratic Party. The following general election, in 1983, saw Labour's worst result since 1918: it received a mere 27.6 per cent of the vote and the Conservative Party increased its majority to 144 MPs.

Following the 1983 election, Michael Foot resigned as leader of the Labour Party and was succeeded by Neil Kinnock, who sought to make the party electable again by appealing to a broader electorate. The party reformed its internal rules, which gave the leadership more latitude to pursue centrist policies. Within the party, Kinnock pushed for less reliance on trade unions, acknowledging that the party had been electorally damaged in the past by being perceived as too close to the unions (Matthijs 2011: 143).

While Kinnock did not personally succeed in bringing Labour into government, the party improved its standing in subsequent elections. In 1987, Labour's share of the vote increased to 30.8 per cent, and in 1992 to 34.4 per cent. Kinnock resigned after Labour lost the 1992 elections, and was replaced by John Smith. After Smith's death in 1994, Tony Blair became leader. The defeat in 1992 was interpreted as a signal that the electorate had broadly accepted many of Thatcher's policies. The implication was that in order to win, Labour would have to move closer to the centre and court 'Middle England' voters (Matthijs 2011: 153). This approach involved developing a 'third way' between socialism and neoliberalism—a reformed welfare state (Matthijs 2011: 157). Many see Blair's success in removing 'Clause 4' of the Labour Party Constitution—which committed it to national ownership of industries—as one of the biggest symbolic steps of reform (Radice 2010: 84). Labour's 1993 party conference adopted a policy to increase the number of female MPs. The policy was a success: the number of female MPs increased from 60 in 1992 to 120 in 1997 (Keen and Apolostova 2017). Labour won the 1997 general election by a landslide, gaining 43.2 per cent of the votes and a majority of 179 MPs.

Through a concerted effort to reinvent itself and relate to the everyday lives and concerns of the British people, Labour came back from the brink of irrelevance to rebuild itself and regain power in 1997. Its experience shows that the democratic system was resilient enough to enable the party to reshape itself and become relatable to the broader electorate. In 2017, the party faced a similar challenge. In the past, it had always chosen to engage with the parliamentary system and seek power through representation in the House of Commons. Yet in 2017 some supporters of Jeremy Corbyn, the party leader, argued that extra-parliamentary activities were perhaps more important (Williams 2016). Contrary to all initial polling figures, Labour galvanized its support in the 2017 general elections, with a 9.6 per cent increase in the vote share. Age played a critical role in this election result: the swing to Labour was mainly among people under the age of 44 and highest of all among 25–34 year olds, which is the biggest age gap seen in UK elections since the 1970s (Ipsos Mori 2017).

party affairs blur the difference between members and non-members, which could fundamentally change the way parties are funded, as well as how they behave and make decisions. One caveat is that in some primary systems, small but forceful minorities may be able to exercise disproportionate influence in selecting candidates or leaders. Nevertheless, many parties have few alternatives: they face serious pressure to adopt these innovations if they want to keep up with a new type of competitor—political movements.

Democratizing decision-making does not guarantee that political parties become more supportive of democracy and have better chances of getting elected. The reforms in the British Labour Party in the 1990s were successful to the extent that they struck a balance between giving members a greater say in party deliberations and leaving room for leaders to compromise and reach out to non-members (see Box 4.9). The primaries ahead of the 2017 French presidential election did not improve the party candidates' chances of winning the presidency.

4.6. Conclusions and recommendations: overcoming challenges to parties

This chapter highlighted four key challenges that both old and new political parties face in the changing political landscape, which includes handling multifaceted crises such as global economic crises, international terrorism and refugee flows. Parties must also restore citizens' sense of inclusion, particularly those from marginalized groups, in decision-making processes. Most importantly, as anti-establishment challengers pursue alternative avenues of political action, traditional parties are forced to adapt their methods and policies without alienating their supporters. Above all, populist politicians threaten the democratic values that enable political pluralism. The chapter finally addressed new ways of interaction between parties, their members and the electorate.

In spite of these challenges, parties remain the key conduit to deliver policies that benefit the population. Parties with a coherent political vision are better equipped to deal with complex crises, and can better transmit these ideas to the electorate. This requires parties that do not shy away from discussing sensitive topics: otherwise, these can be captured by populist voices. In addition, parties need to restore the electorate's trust: focusing on addressing corruption from within, increasing their inclusiveness and democratizing their decision-making processes are low-hanging fruits for parties to re-engage with their citizens and reinvigorate their bases.

To address the challenges posed by the changing nature of political representation, political parties, democratic institutions and civil society should consider the following recommendations.

Political parties

- *Communicate a strong political vision* and offer fresh and innovative programmes to address current issues.
- *Create alternative forms of citizen engagement* through alternative forms of membership, such as associate members or supporters.
- *Carefully consider the use of direct democracy instruments such as referendums.* Strengthen public understanding of the exact mandate of the referendum and be clearer about the decision-making authority devolved to citizens, and the authority that remains with elected politicians.
- *Remain responsive to the electorate between elections* by rethinking parties' communication strategies, and updating parties' internal cultures and operational structures to match the increase in online and street-based interactions and decision-making.
- *Encourage an atmosphere of pluralism and inclusiveness* by engaging and establishing links with a wide range of ideologically compatible social organizations, social

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movements and interest groups. Focus on engaging with women and young people.

- *Address the root causes of distrust by pledging full transparency of party finances, strictly regulating conflicts of interest, and implementing sound anti-corruption policies and internal party democracy mechanisms*
- *Ensure that leaders and democratically elected representatives reflect the demographics of the society by mentoring and recruiting more women and young people into key roles that lead to leadership positions.* Parties should also have women's and young people's chapters and caucuses, promote the use of digital engagement tools, improve the gender balance in the leadership and use all-women's shortlists.
- *Expand citizen engagement at all levels by using digital tools such as interactive websites and apps. This includes reaching out to members and non-members for help in undertaking traditional party tasks such*

as online policy formulation, voting and fundraising.

- *Increase the transparency of information about elected representatives* including providing access to transparent financial data about political campaigns and parties as well as the financial interests of representatives.
- *Ensure that broader parts of society are franchised* by introducing measures to ensure that women and young people can engage politically. Consider strengthening civic education and lowering the voting age.

Civil society

- *Engage with political parties* to translate public pressure into policies and engage with the legislative and executive branches of government through political parties.
- *Call for more transparency and constructive democratic debate.*

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
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Chapter

5

Money, influence, corruption
and capture: can democracy
be protected?





Money, influence, corruption and capture: can democracy be protected?

Scandals involving money in politics have affected countries in every region of the world, from Argentina to France to the Republic of Korea. These events fuel distrust in democratic institutions and actors, and undermine the integrity of the political system by making the policy process vulnerable to capture. While money is a necessary component of political life, big money provides a disproportionate advantage to a selected few, and creates an uneven playing field for women and marginalized communities. Furthermore, current policies that are intended to provide a counterweight often fall short: they have a limited scope, and the institutions that are supposed to enforce them are marred with constraints, while political parties face little accountability. A wider, holistic approach is needed to better equip democratic political institutions to resist the negative influence of money, to empower citizens and to encourage accountability. This chapter explores how democracy can be protected from the pernicious influence of money in politics, using case studies on Peru, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

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Soharto and Sokarno, both authoritarian, needed money. Where does a political leader get the money? Whether he gets money from outside the country or from a local oligarch and his network, he becomes a puppet.

—B. J. Habibie, Indonesian President, 1998–99
(Bitar and Lowenthal 2015: 159)

5.1. Introduction: a world of scandals

Around the world, scandals involving money in politics are delegitimizing democracies. In mid-2016 Argentina's former secretary of public infrastructure, José López, who occupied the post for 12 years (2003–15), was arrested after trying to smuggle USD 8.9 million in cash to a monastery. He was

also being investigated for illicit enrichment (Kidd 2016). In 2015 allegations of former Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat taking up to USD 260 million in bribes (Herver 2015) led to the removal of his parliamentary immunity (Gherasimov 2017). In the Philippines, the 'pork barrel scandal' was exposed in 2013, and several senators who used resources from the Priority Development Assistance Fund for almost 10 years to finance ghost projects were put in jail. An estimated PHP 10 billion (USD 200 million) was lost in this fraud (Carvajal 2013). In South Africa, an investigative report published in November 2016 accused President Jacob Zuma of allowing the wealthy Gupta family to exercise undue leverage, for instance by influencing the appointment of key cabinet positions such as the minister of finance (Al Jazeera 2016).

In the Republic of Korea, President Park Geun-hye was impeached in 2017 amid allegations of entanglement in a corruption scheme masterminded by one of her associates, Choi Soon-sil. Among other things, Choi apparently used her political muscle ‘to pressure companies for millions of dollars in donations to two non-profit foundations she controlled’ (BBC News 2017c). In 2017 in France, Les Républicains’ presidential candidate François Fillon dramatically torpedoed his campaign prospects after the press revealed he apparently channelled more than USD 900,000 in public funds into his private accounts. He was accused of several wrongdoings, including falsely registering his wife as his ‘assistant’ and paying himself from money reserved for staff (Lloyd 2017; Zaretsky 2017). In Brazil, President Michel Temer became the first sitting head of state to face corruption charges, which were later dismissed by the Chamber of Deputies (Lopes 2017a; Watts 2017). These types of allegations are not new in the country. An earlier case involving the international company Odebrecht revealed, as part of ‘Operation Car Wash’, how this enterprise allegedly bribed and provided illicit campaign financing to Peruvian former Presidents Alejandro Toledo and Ollanta Humala and Brazilian former President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, as well as many other politicians in the region (BBC News 2017b; Casey and Zarate 2017; Cowie 2017).

Corruption scandals affect perceptions of democratic politics. They cause citizens to lose trust in political parties, politicians and institutions, and inspire protests or deep indignation. People often relate politics to corruption and self-enrichment (Edelman Insights 2013). Even when money is poured legally into politics, the disproportionate weight large donors have over public decision-making exacerbates an already poor public perception of politics. The fact that money is an important resource for communicating to constituents, running successful election campaigns, making stronger political organizations, supporting

BOX 5.1

A resilient democracy is a protected democracy

When misused, money can have a corrosive influence on democratic actors, institutions and processes by undermining the level playing field for political participation, enabling corruption and policy capture, and affecting trust in (and the legitimacy of) the political system. A resilient approach to monitoring the effects of money in politics includes adopting innovative, holistic and integrity-enhancing systems that go beyond the narrow scope of political finance.

A holistic approach to the challenges posed by money in politics includes a combination of improved anti-corruption mechanisms, new oversight instruments led by a variety of social and political actors, and enhanced political party regulations. Improved anti-money laundering systems, vibrant civil society and media that can effectively function as watchdogs, and crowdfunding efforts to raise small donations as a counterbalance to big money can go a long way towards advancing these efforts.

policy research or training party members is forgotten or undermined as political scandals overwhelm the public.

While this chapter acknowledges that money plays an important role in enabling political operations, it focuses on the negative effects of ‘big money’ or large resources pouring into politics, drawing on recent developments in different regions of the world. It explores the extent to which political finance regulations—which are mostly focused on parties and elections—can tackle the negative effects of money. The review supports calls to protect the integrity of democratic politics throughout the political cycle, on a permanent basis. This protection includes integrity-enhanced mechanisms for political competition that focus on public officials’ vulnerabilities to corruption—conflict of interest, lobbying activities, their assets, bank and tax secrecy rules and transfers, parliamentary immunity norms, protections for whistle-blowers and the freedom of the press. Policy responses to the negative influence of money in politics should therefore seek to protect public policy using strategies that address corruption and promote the effective oversight of elected officials and political parties. Such a holistic and integrity-enhanced approach involves political parties,

Around the world, scandals involving money in politics are delegitimizing democracies

Policy responses to the negative influence of money in politics should seek to protect public policy using strategies that address corruption and promote the effective oversight of elected officials and political parties.

oversight agencies and regulators, as well as civil society organizations, journalists and activists, and—most importantly—corporate and individual donors. Effective responses must implement innovative instruments—especially by civil society organizations, journalists and activists—to improve the accountability of money in politics.

The text is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the main challenges money poses to democratic politics, with a focus on how unequal access to funding undermines a level playing field in political competition. It also looks at how political finance can serve as a conduit for corruption and policy capture, and the impact it can have on public trust in politics and politicians. Section 5.3 examines the weaknesses of narrow and isolated political finance legal frameworks, while Section 5.4 presents the framework for an alternative holistic, integrity-enhanced approach. Section 5.5 presents conclusions and recommendations. A broader discussion of anti-corruption and all the elements of the proposed integrity-enhanced system are beyond the scope of the chapter. For additional information on anti-corruption initiatives see the Resource Guide accompanying this chapter, *Innovations in Anti-Corruption Approaches: A Resource Guide* (Schwertheim 2017).

5.2. Global challenges of money in politics

The presence of big money in politics poses risks to all politicians equally. It is one of the most critical threats to the resilience of representative institutions, particularly political parties. There are three interconnected challenges—unequal access to funding that undermines a level playing field in political competition, political finance that often serves as a conduit for corruption and policy capture, and money in politics that affects public trust in politics and politicians.

Undermining a level playing field

Money enables political participation as it helps candidates reach constituents, spread ideas

and organize supporters. This is particularly important for new parties or those competing against incumbents. Yet it can also impede fair participation by those with limited access to financing. When the costs to compete in politics are high, access to the required funds severely restricts who can compete. Women, youth and minority groups often have much lower levels of funding. For example, in many countries, women in politics are often considered less qualified than their male counterparts (Quintero-Benavidez and Cardoso-García 2013), which hinders women's capacity to access public networks for fundraising (International IDEA and NIMD 2017; Ballington and Kahane 2014). Only 13.3 per cent of countries provide direct public funding to political parties that is contingent on gender equality among candidates, and 86.5 per cent of countries have no legislation offering financial advantages to encourage gender equality within parties (International IDEA Political Finance Database). A lack of finance is also one of the top obstacles preventing people from minority and indigenous groups from accessing politics (IPU and UNDP 2010: 16–17).

US elections receive considerable attention, not least because of the exorbitant amounts of money spent in each cycle. The 2012 and 2016 presidential races, for example, cost more than USD 2 billion each (Open Secrets 2017). India's elections are also notoriously expensive. Table 5.1 presents the campaign spending by Members of Parliament (MPs) compared to GDP per capita in that country, and illustrates the prohibitively high costs of competing in elections. The average amount spent by an MP in the 2014 parliamentary elections was 50 times higher than the average per capita GDP. In the constituency of Assam, the ratio of campaign expenditure to GDP per capita was 109:1. Political parties in India provide very little financial support to their candidates; only those with access to large amounts of funding can run for office.

Illicit actors can also buy votes, and use money to sustain patronage and clientelistic

Global challenges of money in politics



1



**Unequal access
to funding**

2



**Increased corruption
and policy capture**

3



**Decreased public
trust in politics**

TABLE 5.1

Campaign spending by members of parliament compared to gross domestic product per capita in India, 2014

Candidate	Constituency	Spending (USD)	GDP per capita (USD)	Ratio of campaign expenditure to per capita GDP
Average election expenses				
	National	55,440	1,112	50:1
	Assam	66,023	604	109:1
	Gujarat	68,530	1,447	47:1
	West Bengal	65,754	915	72:1
	Kerala	77,756	1,321	59:1
Specific candidates				
Gourav Gogoi	Kaliabor, Assam	123,000	604	203:1
Mansukhbhai Dhanjibhai Vasava	Bharuch, Gujarat	100,475	1,447	69:1
Saugata Roy	Dum Dum, West Bengal	97,818	915	107:1
E. T. Mohammed Basheer	Ponnani, Kerala	96,967	1,321	73:1

Notes: GDP per capita based on data from 2013 and 2014. Spending figures as reported.

Sources: Association of Democratic Reforms and National Election Watch 2014; Government of India 2014.

Money can also disempower the majority by giving greater opportunities to a few, well-funded actors

systems (Briscoe and Goff 2016a: 42; World Bank 2017: 78). Patronage systems reward supporters with jobs or government benefits because of their affiliations or connections, regardless of their qualifications. In clientelistic systems, voters are encouraged to exchange their political support for favours (Falguera, Jones and Ohman 2014).

Money can also disempower the majority by giving greater opportunities to a few, well-funded actors (World Bank 2017: 62). Figure 5.1 illustrates how power is distributed by socio-economic position (i.e. the level of political influence wealthy people enjoy compared to those of average and lower income) to favour the richest segments of society, particularly in the Middle East and Iran. Between the early 1980s and late 1990s


this situation was rather stable; afterwards there was a deterioration in the way people's socio-economic position influenced their overall power until the early 2000s. The situation is also critical in Asia and the Pacific, as well as Africa. In the latter, after slight improvements between the early 1980s and early 1990s, the distribution of power and wealth has stagnated. The Latin America and the Caribbean region is currently doing better, but progress has not been constant; from the late 1970s to the early 1990s it made important improvements, but afterwards it stagnated. In Europe, the situation was quite positive and relatively stable until the early 1990s; there was a steep decline in the early post-Cold War period until the early 2000s, and has declined again in recent years.

Both robust and fragile democracies debate whether (and how) to regulate money in politics. Some countries justify reducing regulations with the argument that they undermine basic rights such as freedom of speech and the right of political participation. For instance, the US Supreme Court ruled in the 2010 Citizens United landmark decision that money equals speech, with the implication that the government cannot regulate certain political spending from corporations as this would violate their right to freedom of speech (Supreme Court of the United States 2010). This approach ultimately leads to relaxing political finance regulations (Will 2014). On the opposite side of the debate are those advocating an increase in regulations and financing limits, setting ceilings on political party spending, implementing transparency measures, and providing public funding to candidates and parties. Proponents of these strategies warn of the pervasive economic incentives created by leaving politics at the mercy of economic interests, such as corporations as well as illicit and international actors that are even less preoccupied with policies that benefit local stakeholders (OECD 2016).

One of the most common political finance regulations is the provision of public funding (Norris, van Es and Fennis 2015): 120 countries provide direct public funding to political parties either for campaigns or on a regular basis (International IDEA Political Finance Database). In all OECD countries except Switzerland, political parties receive direct public funding (OECD 2016). There are also matching systems, such as in Germany, where state funds are disbursed based on the parties' capacity to attract small private donations (Casas-Zamora and Zovatto 2016: 31–32). Public funding can help level the playing field, for example by reducing dependency on private funding and making funds available to opposition parties. State resources to parties can be earmarked to promote greater gender balance in political participation or to support youth mobilization. However, funds are often provided based on previous electoral

FIGURE 5.1

Power distributed by socio-economic position



Notes: This graph shows the trends in how power is distributed by socio-economic position over time by region. The y-axis shows the score (0 to 1) and the x-axis the years. Higher scores indicate lower political influence of wealthy people.

Source: V-Dem, Power Distributed by Socio-economic Position.

results, which favours established parties over newcomers or small parties (Falguera, Jones and Ohman 2014). Using public funding to decrease politicians' dependence on private donors also risks tilting the balance to the other side if parties become over-dependent on state support, and thus less interested in being responsive to the public and managing their resources wisely. Furthermore, if parties are perceived as wasting taxpayers' money, the public may lose further trust in them. If public funding is provided but private funding is unlimited, the overall amount spent may rise, and wealthy donors will maintain influence over politicians (Casal Bértoa et al. 2014: 355–75). The levels of public funding must also be high enough to be meaningful. Thus, a balance must be reached between public and private funding in efforts to limit the perverse effects of money in politics (Council of Europe 2001).

Furthermore, it is important to limit expectations about what public funding can achieve. While it may be an important way

Some countries justify reducing regulations with the argument that they undermine basic rights. On the opposite side of the debate are those advocating an increase in regulations and financing limits

to encourage the political participation of women and marginalized groups, it may have a limited impact on overall efforts to curb corruption. Indeed, there seems to be some (albeit weak) correlation between countries that provide public campaign funding and low levels of corruption, particularly in Europe. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, while more countries have introduced public financing since 1975, corruption remains relatively stable; the most significant shift is that now more countries with low levels of corruption have public campaign financing.

Corruption and policy capture


There are a myriad of ways in which power and financial resources can be misused in politics (see, for example, Box 5.2), which affect both robust and fragile democracies (Stiglitz

2013). Corruption—the abuse of public or private office for personal gain (OECD 2008: 22)—and policy capture—when private rather than public interests determine policy (Warren 2003)—are prevalent risks.

Generally, more democratic governments are better at curbing corruption. While the introduction of elections alone may fuel corruption, corruption declines when the quality of elections improves, and when other checks in society and the state take root, such as freedom of expression and association, and judicial control (McMann et al. 2017; Zhang 2016; Rothstein and Holmberg 2014: 33). The relationship between representative government and the absence of corruption seems to corroborate that positive correlation (see Figure 5.3).

FIGURE 5.2

Public Campaign Finance correlated by Absence of Corruption in 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2015



Notes: This graph illustrates changes in the relationship of public campaign financing and the absence of corruption from 1975–2015. Both variables have a scale that runs from 0 to 1: higher scores indicate a higher absence of corruption and a higher level of availability of public campaign finance, respectively. Pearson's correlation coefficient results in 1975: $n = 130$, $r = -.315$, $p\text{-value} < .005$. Pearson's correlation coefficient results in 2015: $n = 154$, $r = .489$, $p\text{-value} < .005$.

Source: GSOD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index); V-Dem, Public Campaign Finance.

BOX 5.2

Policy and state capture: ‘godfatherism’ in Nigerian politics

In Nigeria, a corrupt and wealthy few have shaped policies, captured state institutions and hijacked political processes for over a decade. Since many aspirants to political office cannot raise the necessary resources on their own, they seek ‘sponsorship’ from wealthy and powerful individuals known as ‘political godfathers’. Godfathers have the power to select both the candidates and the winners (Ibrahim 2013). They finance campaigns and use violence and corruption to manipulate national, state or local political processes in support of their favoured politicians. For example, in 2003 a political godfather paid armed gang leaders NGN 3–10 million (USD 23,000–77,000) to disrupt elections in Port Harcourt in favour of Governor Peter Odili. The ensuing violence prevented many from voting, and helped Odili win the election (Lackey and Dufka 2007).

In return for their sponsorship, godfathers capture government institutions to serve their own interests, including generating patronage for other protégés. Godfathers reign in all spheres of society: government, the private sector, academia, legal systems and religious institutions (Abudillahi and Tunde 2013). ‘They demand a substantial degree of control over the governments they help bring into being, not in order to shape government policy, but to exact direct financial “returns” in the form of government resources stolen by their

protégés or lucrative government contracts awarded to them as further opportunities for graft’ (Omilusi 2016: 39–40).


In some cases, written contracts are signed between political godfathers and politicians seeking sponsorship. For example, in Anambra State in southern Nigeria, a contract was signed in 2003 between former People’s Democratic Party National Board of Trustees member, Chris Uba, and Chris Ngige, a gubernatorial candidate for the party. The terms of their relationship were spelled out in the contract and ‘declaration of loyalty’ that referred to Ngige as the ‘administrator’ and to Uba as the ‘leader/financier’ (Lackey and Dufka 2007). If such contracts or verbal agreements are violated, godfathers can use the state apparatus or armed gangs to enforce them. When Ngige violated the terms of his contract after he won the election, he was kidnapped by armed state police officers and forced at gunpoint to sign a letter of resignation (Lackey and Dufka 2007).

Public officials who owe their positions to political godfathers incur a debt that they are expected to repay throughout their tenure in office, which negates the principles of responsive, accountable and transparent governance (Lackey and Dufka 2007). The capture of power and influence by a corrupt elite has undermined the foundations of democratic governance and prevented millions of Nigerians from helping to select political leaders and policy decisions (Abudillahi and Tunde 2013; Chukwuemeka 2012).

Large donations can also result in policy capture, for example if less-affluent politicians seek financing from large (and sometimes illicit) external donors, including organized criminals, to be able to stand as a viable candidate (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014; Briscoe and Goff 2016b). These actors can hold politicians hostage to their donors’ own interests and agendas. Such a pattern fuels a common sentiment that democracy is weakened, as ‘the rich don’t need a rule of law; they can and do shape the economic and political processes to work for themselves’ (Stiglitz 2013: 167). High-income individuals can wield much greater influence over the choice of politicians and policies through donations and lobbying, which ultimately damages efficient state delivery and accountability for the majority (Reitano and Hunter 2016). Policy capture may even lead to violence where those in power attempt to retain it by forcefully pressuring opponents (Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016).

FIGURE 5.3

Representative Government correlated by Absence of Corruption, 2015



Notes: This graph shows the relationship of representative government and absence of corruption. Both the representative government attribute and the absence of corruption subattribute have a scale that runs from 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating a higher level of representative government and higher absence of corruption, respectively. Pearson’s correlation coefficient results: $n = 153$, $r = .671$, $p\text{-value} < .005$.

Source: GSOD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index and Representative Government Index).

The strength of democratic systems and political party systems can affect the amount of influence corporations have in resource-rich countries

Globalization has facilitated international banking transactions and strengthened international corporations, which have blurred ownership structures and interests in influencing national and local politics. Subsidiaries of multinationals often place deep roots in communities, providing jobs and, in some cases, even delivering social programmes for long periods of time. This creates a complex network of relationships and interests, and blurs the lines between foreign and national control.

Countries often enact limits or bans on foreign donations to political parties and candidates in order to protect their sovereignty by curbing the influence of foreign interests in politics: 63.3 per cent of countries ban donations from foreign interests to political parties, and 48.9 per cent prohibit foreign donations to candidates (International IDEA Political Finance Database). While bans or limits on contributions are common in political finance regulations, there are many schemes to circumvent such restrictions (OECD 2016). The Panama Papers, for example, have shown that money from a wide range of sources influences politics in many corners of the globe (The Guardian 2016). For instance, Ukraine is currently investigating a money-laundering network linked to high-level politicians including parliamentarian Ihor Kononenko. The money laundering, which allegedly took place through Austrian banks, involved 'sales of uranium, gas and titanium, inter alia to Russian arms firms through businesses registered in Mr Kononenko's name' (European Parliament 2016). Similarly, the Panama Papers scandal revealed that Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif failed to disclose assets, prompting a Supreme Court investigation that eventually forced him to step down (Ahmed and Khan 2017). The Panama Papers had already forced another prime minister to resign; they revealed that in 2016 Iceland's Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson had hidden money in tax havens, which led to accusations of conflicts of interest (Erlanger, Castle and Gladstone 2016).

Political donations, corruption and policy capture appear to be particularly linked to the extractive industries (especially oil, gas and forestry exploitation) and government activities such as public procurement and service delivery (e.g. water and education) (OECD 2016). Countries that rely on natural resource rents as an important contribution to their GDP tend to feature higher levels of corruption (Skaaning 2017; World Bank 2016). Multinational companies often pressure the authorities in resource-rich countries to adopt lax regulations for extractive industries (Moore and Velasquez 2012).

The strength of democratic systems and political party systems can affect the amount of influence corporations have in resource-rich countries. For instance, Ghana's party system is relatively established, and politics are mainly dominated by political party competition (World Bank 2016). While the system has its weaknesses—for example, there is relatively little oversight of the ban on corporate donations—Ghana has made a robust commitment to strengthening public governance in the oil sector, most prominently by passing the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) and a 2015 amendment that establishes important parameters for transparency and accountability, which is considered a best practice in Africa (Roe et al. n.d.: 28–29).


Uganda's democratic and political party system, by contrast, is weak. While a 2005 referendum introduced a multiparty system, President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni's party dominates the political landscape; he has been in power since 1986 (Hitchen 2017). Corruption and human rights abuses further exacerbate the country's democratic challenges (World Bank 2016). Therefore, while accepting corporate contributions to individual candidates is risky in Ghana (Kumah-Abiwu 2017: 9–10), it arguably poses a lower threat than contributions to parties in Uganda, where corruption from national and international corporations is more likely to thrive in a one-party system.

Other important tools to curb corruption and policy capture include the critical role of investigative journalists in unveiling scandals. Figure 5.4 illustrates the correlation between the two around the world, and especially in Europe.

Since 2012 the situation regarding freedom of expression and media integrity has worsened, especially in Europe, the Middle East and Iran, and North America (Figure 5.5). Reporters without Borders describes a ‘climate of fear and tension combined with increasing control over newsrooms by governments and private-sector interests’, which has taken a ‘growing toll on journalists in Africa’. The Middle East and Iran is now ‘one of the world’s most difficult and dangerous regions for journalists’ (Reporters Without Borders 2016).

FIGURE 5.4

Media Integrity correlated by Absence of Corruption, 2015




Notes: This graph shows the relationship of media integrity and absence of corruption. Both subattributes are scaled from 0 to 1: higher scores indicate a higher degree of media integrity and a higher absence of corruption, respectively. Pearson’s correlation coefficient results: $n = 154$, $r = .639$, $p\text{-value} < .005$.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index and Media Integrity Index).

FIGURE 5.5

Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Integrity, 1975–2015



Notes: This graph shows the trends in the level of freedom of expression and media integrity over time by region. The y-axis shows the score (from 0 to 1) and the x-axis the years: higher scores indicate higher freedom of expression and media integrity, respectively.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Freedom of Expression Index and Media Integrity Index).

The work of investigative journalists is dangerous: 74 were killed in 2016, 21 of them while reporting, and 53 were murdered or deliberately targeted (Reporters without Borders 2016: 5). The Middle East and Iran top the list, followed, respectively, by countries in South America, Asia and the Pacific and Africa (UNESCO 2016: 3). The situation is especially troubling for journalists reporting on corruption or policy capture (Reporters Without Borders 2016). Out of the more than 1,200 journalists killed between 1992 and 2016, approximately 20 per cent were investigating corruption. The Philippines, Brazil, Colombia and India, respectively, were the four most dangerous countries for journalists at that time (Radsch 2016). In Guatemala, for example, *El Periódico* has denounced cases of blatant corruption linked to organized crime over more than a decade. José Rubén Zamora, one of its reporters, was kidnapped and found badly beaten and left for dead in 2008; the perpetrators have not yet been identified (Goldman 2015).

Similarly, Javier Valdez, renowned for his relentless denunciation of corruption and organized crime activities in Mexico, was murdered in May 2017 (Lauría 2017). Such episodes intimidate reporters and suppress coverage of corruption. David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, argues that 'governments often fail to provide measures of protection and accountability that can deter attacks on journalists. In addition to physical violence and attacks, journalists also face a range of punitive measures that threaten their well-being and livelihood' (UN 2016: 16). The media's work in fighting corruption is also halted by the corruption that media outlets and journalists face themselves (Uribe Burcher and Villaveces-Izquierdo 2013; White 2015).


Lack of trust in politics and politicians

Corruption and policy capture generally affect people's level of trust in politicians, which in turn affects political participation more broadly (Arkhede Olsson 2014). Figure 5.6 shows that these two tend to be particularly linked in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to a lesser degree in Africa. This trend is also present in Europe, but mostly in countries with low levels of corruption. Trust in politicians does not seem to be driven by perceptions of corruption in Asia and the Pacific.

The loss of trust in politicians among youth is particularly harmful to democracy, as this may shape long-term social attitudes towards these institutions. A closer examination of a sample of countries confirms the relationship between low levels of public trust in politicians and other areas of government. Guatemala, the Philippines and Uganda have very low levels of trust in all four areas included in Table 5.2—public trust in politicians, judicial independence, favouritism in decisions of government officials, and irregular payments and bribes awarding public contracts. Meanwhile, New Zealand and Sweden show favourable ratings in all

FIGURE 5.6

Trust in politicians correlated by Absence of Corruption, 2014



Notes: This graph shows the relationship of average public trust in politicians and absence of corruption. The trust in politicians' variable is scored from 1 to 7, but the graph only displays the minimum and maximum scores, which are 1.34 and 6.16, respectively. The absence of corruption subattribute has a scale that runs from 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating a higher absence of corruption. Pearson's correlation coefficient results: $n = 130$, $r = .552$, $p\text{-value} < .005$.

Source: GSOD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index); Schwab and Sala-i-Martin 2015.

TABLE 5.2

Levels of trust in politics and democratic institutions, 2014

	Public trust in politicians	Judicial independence	Favouritism in decisions of government officials	Irregular payments/bribes awarding for public contracts
Ghana	3.2	4.4	3.0	3.0
Uganda	2.5	3.0	2.6	2.2
Canada	4.8	6.2	4.4	5.1
Guatemala	1.8	3.0	2.6	2.6
Philippines	2.6	3.6	3.1	3.3
Japan	4.5	6.2	5.1	6.0
New Zealand	5.7	6.7	5.5	6.6
Georgia	2.9	3.8	3.4	5.0
Sweden	5.3	5.7	5.0	5.4

Notes: Scores are scaled from 1 (lowest level of trust) to 7. The survey asks people: 'In your country, how would you rate the ethical standards of politicians?': 1 is 'extremely low' and 7 'extremely high'.

Source: World Economic Forum 2015.

categories. As such, these data indicate how these elements are intertwined and need to be understood holistically.

5.3. Inadequacy of narrow political finance legal frameworks

Adopting narrow political finance frameworks does not necessarily result in better reporting, more effective auditing and verification of political finance data, or even higher compliance with the law. People often buy votes and provide bribes disguised as donations with the expectation that they will benefit from favourable state decisions, legislation, friendly appointments and even contracts (Ohman 2014). The scandal in Brazil involving petroleum corporation Petrobras and several congressmen and politicians demonstrates this pattern. According to General Prosecutor Rodrigo Janot, Petrobras paid bribes to political parties and parliamentarians who were responsible for nominating candidates to senior positions and allocating salaries within Petrobras. Some of the bribes were

provided during elections disguised as political donations from smaller companies (Brandt, Affonso and Macedo 2016). In June 2017 the scandal reached President Michel Temer when Prosecutor General Rodrigo Janot accused him of accepting a BRL 500,000 (USD 150,000) bribe (Al Jazeera 2017).

The limited effectiveness of political finance regulations is related to five main factors: (a) the backlash generated by overly strict reporting, (b) the constraints faced by oversight agencies, (c) the limited scope of the regulations, (d) the weak accountability of political parties and (e) the lack of political will. Each of these factors is described briefly below.

Backlash against overly strict reporting

One of the obstacles that may contribute to the ineffectiveness of political finance regulations is the potential backlash against overly strict reporting requirements. This can happen when such measures are expected to have a visible impact on curbing corruption more broadly.

However, as Figure 5.7 illustrates, even though there seems to be a positive correlation between countries with low levels of corruption and the disclosure of campaign donations, the introduction of these systems since 1975 has not significantly decreased corruption levels.

These types of requirements might also create pervasive incentives for opaqueness. For instance, including caps on political finance can promote the under-reporting of candidates' and parties' expenditures. Casal-Bértoa et al. (2014: 355–75) refer to political actors disguising or under-reporting private donations in their financial declarations as 'electoral backlash'. This behaviour ultimately promotes further corrupt and criminal activities. In Kenya, scandals in 2016 suggest that political parties and candidates ran parallel accounts that were not disclosed to

the Registrar of Political Parties. For example, during the country's general elections in 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Alliance and Raila Odinga from the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy were estimated to have used more than KES 10 billion combined (USD 96.71 million), which was not included in the party audit reports (Kamau 2016).

Constraints faced by oversight agencies

Oversight agencies' unclear mandates, reduced capacities and lack of political independence may also weaken political finance regulations (Doublet 2011: 33–46). For instance, Abdul Gani Patail, the Malaysian Attorney General, was removed from office after leading an investigation involving Prime Minister Najib Razak, who allegedly received USD 700 million in his private accounts from the debt-laden state

FIGURE 5.7

Disclosure of campaign donations correlated by Absence of Corruption in 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2015



Notes: This graph shows how the relationship of disclosure of campaign donations and the absence of corruption changed from 1975–2015. Both variables are scaled from 0 to 1: higher scores indicate a higher absence of corruption and a higher level of campaign disclosure requirements, respectively. Pearson's correlation coefficient results in 1975: n = 130, r = .417, p-value <.005. Pearson's correlation coefficient results in 2015: n = 154, r = .615, p-value <.005.

Sources: GSOD indices 2017 (Absence of Corruption Index); V-Dem, Disclosure of Campaign Donations.

development fund, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). Before the attorney general was dismissed, he confirmed that he had received documents linking the prime minister to the 1MDB fund (Lamb 2015).

Oversight agencies also often lack a mandate to investigate bank accounts, and have little support from other actors—such as financial intelligence units—that have access to key information for reviewing political finance data. For example, magistrates at the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE) in Guatemala have raised concerns about their lack of human and technical resources to audit political parties' financial information, as well as their lack of coordination with financial oversight institutions (Ramos 2015). Similarly, Nigeria's Independent National Election Commission lacked the capacity to impose sanctions for political finance violations that occurred during the 2011 presidential elections (Ohman 2016).

When multiple actors have overlapping mandates related to political finance regulation, this diffuses the responsibilities of the various agencies involved and constrains the ability of any single agency to take action (OECD 2016). Of the nine countries analysed in this study, four have two or more institutions with formal roles related to political finance oversight (International IDEA Political Finance Database). In Guatemala and Japan, the main body responsible for political finance oversight does not have explicit authority to investigate alleged breaches.

Limited scope of the regulations

Political finance regulations often have a limited scope. For instance, only about 30 per cent of OECD member states that collect data on asset disclosure from public officials in the executive branch reported that they audited or reviewed the accuracy of the information on assets (OECD 2016). Similarly, in the Philippines the limited scope of the regulation on monitoring campaign expenditures, which limits reporting to the official 90-day campaign period, has

resulted in significant under-reporting of campaign expenses. In 2016, expenses related to advertisement before the three-month period amounted to PHP 6.7 billion (USD 140 million) and were not officially reported (Mangahas 2016). In addition, much of the focus of political finance regulations has been at the national level (OECD 2016), yet much of the corruption takes place at the local level (Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016).

Political donors also exploit loopholes in bans and limits on certain types of donations or donors through inter alia membership fees, loans and third-party funding via foundations, interest groups and committees (OECD 2016; International IDEA Political Finance Database). For example, Guatemala bans corporate donations to candidates, but not if they come from foundations. In the United States, third-party funding is channelled through Political Action Committees (PACs) and Super PACs, which allow campaigns to avoid certain regulations on donations from corporations and trade unions (Center for Responsive Politics n.d.; Glorioso 2016; Lazar 2015; Money, Politics and Transparency n.d.).

Moreover, regulations may not capture emerging risks that threaten the resilience of political finance systems. New technologies and social media, for instance, have become a powerful tool for gathering funds and for conducting campaigns and political operations. However, their role in channelling funds in and out of politics has not been properly addressed in most countries' regulatory frameworks (Tambini et al. 2017: 11–15).

Weak accountability of political parties

Weak accountability mechanisms focused on political parties also limit the impact of political finance regulations. Sanctions are the main tool used to hold political actors accountable (Arugay 2016), particularly in relation to parties' and candidates' financing oversight, where little emphasis has been placed on reward and learning mechanisms. Most countries sanction parties and candidates

Including caps on political finance can promote the under-reporting of candidates' and parties' expenditures

for violations of political finance regulations. Fines, forfeiture of money or property, and prison are the most common punishments. Less common sanctions include the loss of public funding, suspension of political party registration and restrictions on future election participation (International IDEA Political Finance Database).

However, such sanctions can only dissuade corruption to a certain extent. Most of the sanctions are directed at individuals, which places little responsibility for enforcement on the parties (International IDEA Political Finance Database). Fines tend to be low in relation to the benefits that corruption generates (Casal-Bértoa et al. 2014: 355–75). For example in Guatemala, fines range from USD 15–125 (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014). In France, breaches of private donation regulations, including accepting money from banned funding sources or surpassing spending caps, are sanctioned with a maximum fine of EUR 3,750 (USD 3,988) and a one-year prison sentence (OECD 2016).

Moreover, it can be difficult to implement sanctions against parties (Ambarkhane 2016: 51). For example, in Peru the National Office for Electoral Processes (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales, ONPE) sanctioned seven political parties from 2010–16 after they failed to disclose their financial information. According to the law, those parties should have lost their public funding (ONPE 2016; El Peruano 2015). Yet since parties do not receive public funding in Peru due to budget constraints, the ONPE sanctions were never implemented.

Lack of political will

Appropriate and sufficient measures to curb the negative effects of money in politics are only effective when there is sufficient political will. In South Africa, civil society organizations have urged Parliament to adopt the Promotion of Access to Information Act since 2005, which would require reporting private donations. In India, while political

finance expenditure is well regulated and monitored (International IDEA Political Finance Database), the regulation of donations is less robust. For example, there is no limit on the amount an individual can contribute to a candidate, no ban on corporate and trade union donations to political parties or candidates, and no ban on anonymous donations to candidates (International IDEA Political Finance Database).

Despite these limitations, political finance regulations play a key role in regulating the access of private interests to political power. However, they need to be part of a broader enabling environment that promotes transparency, protects the work of civil society, and regulates public contracting and the appointment of public officials and judges. As such, policies that seek to prevent or mitigate these threats should consider the broad range of actors, institutions and modalities involved in the relationship between money and politics (OECD 2016), including young people as key actors in changing societal attitudes towards corruption (One Young World 2016).

5.4. A holistic, fairness-oriented and integrity-enhanced response

Current policy discussion on the best approach to dealing with money in politics points to the need to understand political finance regulations as part of a wider effort to protect political integrity. Their effectiveness improves when combined with efforts to 'rethink bank and tax secrecy norms, parliamentary immunity principles and regulations against money laundering, among many other rules that lie on the periphery of the field of political finance' (International IDEA et al. 2015).

This approach reflects a growing awareness of the complexity of the role of money in politics (OECD 2016), and the need for appropriate, responsive regulatory instruments. This would contribute to the resilience of democracies, making them flexible and adaptable to address the emerging challenges that money poses to politics as discussed in section 5.2.

Comprehensive and integrity-enhanced systems are positive strategies to protect the state and public policies from narrow economic interests. These include the coordination of frameworks, institutions and actors to fight corruption, promote transparency, and protect and promote oversight of the state and politics. The experience of Peru is a case in point (see Box 5.3). Such innovative and adaptable approaches thus promote resilient democratic politics by encouraging further accountability.

International conventions dealing with anti-corruption, such as the Inter-American Convention to Fight Corruption or the United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopt rather comprehensive approaches, but fail to include political party finance regulations in their frameworks (OAS 1996; UN 2003). The OECD recently proposed a more holistic approach to political finance, which incorporates broader areas of corruption that have a bearing on politics. The framework would benefit from

including considerations regarding money laundering and the confiscation of assets (OECD 2016). Particularly important are the measures concerning the implementation of the Financial Action Task Force recommendations on money laundering related to politically exposed persons (i.e. people entrusted with prominent functions), as well as solutions to tighten up the use of tax havens and off-shore jurisdictions (FATF 2013: 3). Figure 5.8 illustrates four main areas of action to curtail the negative role of money in politics as part of the broader fight against corruption and policy capture. It includes integrity issues that countries could adopt through legislation, regulations or codes of conduct.

Public officials

Monitoring public officials' behaviour includes regulations pertaining to conflicts of interest, which have recently been at the forefront of public debate. The 2016 election of businessman Donald Trump as US president has highlighted conflicts of interest with his

BOX 5.3

Peru: a multi-stakeholder approach to dealing with money in politics

In the months leading up to Peru's 2016 presidential election, a coalition of local and international actors—primarily politicians, journalists, business people and civil society organizations—coordinated their work to increase awareness of the risks that illicit networks pose on politics.

The national media was a key force in highlighting the need for such coordination. The radio is the most consumed form of communication nationwide as it reaches the whole territory, including rural areas. The strategy thus involved the country's main group of broadcasting stations—RPP, which includes the news radio station with the highest ratings nationwide, music stations, a TV channel and a web platform—reaching out to more than 6 million viewers (*RPP Noticias* n.d.). Brief segments were developed to highlight the risks of links between politics, corruption and money from illicit activities—such as illegal logging, illegal mining and drug trafficking.

Another key actor involved in these awareness efforts was OJO Público [public eye], a watchdog journalist group in Peru that developed the Fondos de Papel [Paper Funds] website (OJO Público n.d.). The platform facilitates the crosschecking of information regarding contributors to political parties and electoral campaigns,

as well as data concerning people accused of, investigated, or sentenced for links with illicit actors and activities. The database was designed to help identify funding patterns and trends used by Peruvian political parties, as well as donors who become providers to the state after their preferred party takes office.

This multi-stakeholder strategy also included coordinating efforts with *Transito* [transit] and 'Carmen', artistic associations that link the scenic arts with political affairs. They held short plays to raise awareness and disseminate information about corruption, illicit money and politics. Young artists organized public displays and produced a brief theatre play titled 'I, Messiah', which was performed for a month (Carmen Comunicaciones 2017).

The awareness efforts targeted first-time voters aged 18 to 25, who are traditionally harder to reach. Engaging *TV Cultura*, an association of social communicators, was therefore key to spreading the message among this segment of the population. They distributed an animated series called 'Ana Liza' through social media, which analysed organized crime, how these networks operate, why they infiltrate politics and their broader impact on society (*TV Cultura* 2016).

While it is too soon to assess the full extent of these efforts, the coordination of such a varied group of actors increased the impact of each action and connected the traditionally narrow approach to dealing with money in politics to broader anti-corruption work.

Money in politics: Integrity-enhanced systems



private financial interests in the USA and abroad (Yourish, Griggs and Buchanan 2017). While US presidents are not subject to the general rules concerning conflicts of interest, and President Trump has taken limited steps to remove himself from his organization's daily operations (Rushe 2017), he has been criticized for still profiting from his businesses and for not creating a blind trust or otherwise selling off his businesses (BBC News 2017a; Surowiecki 2017). Critics point out that this is a violation of the US Constitution; numerous lawsuits have been filed against the president, including from a non-governmental organization called Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (Venook 2017), as well as a group of congress people together with the Constitutional Accountability Center (Toobin 2017).

However, conflicts of interest often take place on a smaller scale. In many countries where corruption is most widespread, public officials'

salaries are low compared to other sectors of society, which may exacerbate the problem. Some experts argue that making public sector salaries more competitive may hamper this type of petty corruption, particularly in relatively poor countries (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015; de Haan, Dietzenbacher and Le 2013; Quah 2002: 516).

Other measures related to public officials' behaviour include disqualification and incompatibility provisions and clear rules for public contracting and general mechanisms to fight the abuse of state resources (Ohman 2011; Venice Commission 2013). Additional solutions include obligations to report suspicions of corruption or to declare and recover assets, and anti-bribery mechanisms. For example, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 2011) is 'the first and only international anti-corruption instrument focused on the "supply

side” of the bribery transaction’ (OECD n.d.).

Political parties and candidates

The instruments that regulate these actors’ behaviour traditionally centre on political party regulations, chiefly political party finance frameworks, as well as mechanisms that promote internal democracy and accountability to protect political organizations from murky interests. These mechanisms should include sanctions that not only target individuals but parties’ responsibility to vet their own members and candidates. Colombia’s Constitution, for example, was amended in 2009 to make political parties and movements liable when endorsing candidates previously convicted of crimes linked to organized crime activities (Perdomo 2014: 75).

In parallel to increasing parties’ and candidates’ responsibility, mechanisms should be in place to facilitate their internal vetting and accountability procedures. The disclosure of political finance data is an important part of these instruments. Figure 5.7 shows that in 2015, disclosure of campaign donations was positively correlated with lower levels of corruption.

Information should be publicly accessible, and disclosed in a timely and reliable fashion, as well as presented in intelligible and searchable formats (Pfeiffer and Speck 2008). Access to data helps watchdog organizations all over the world cross-check financial data and monitor it for inaccurate reporting. Promoting transparency and open data diminishes the risk that money will negatively affect politics (Granickas 2014). Social media has created new avenues for combating corruption and policy capture in general (Enikolopov, Petrova and Sonin 2016; Bekri et al. 2011), especially in political finance (Shah 2016). In Mexico, social media may even be more effective than traditional media at revealing corrupt practices and incentivizing accountability (Ramírez Plascencia 2015: 36–45).

New technologies can also facilitate crowd sourcing (see Box 5.4), as well as reporting on

money in politics. Some countries have already taken important steps to create digital reporting systems (software or online based) that allow political actors to disclose their finances in a more timely, reliable and intelligible fashion (International IDEA 2016). Australia, Estonia, Finland, the USA and the UK have well-established online political finance reporting systems, while Colombia, Georgia, India and Moldova have taken important steps towards adopting internet-based reporting technologies (Jones 2017, forthcoming).

Oversight actors

Mechanisms used by oversight actors include general transparency frameworks that ensure

The instruments that regulate political parties and candidates’ behaviour should include sanctions that not only target individuals but parties’ responsibility to vet their own members and candidates

BOX 5.4

New forms of political funding through online platforms and crowd sourcing

Globally, politicians are becoming increasingly adept at harnessing communication technology by using ‘crowdfunding’ to raise donations for their campaigns. Crowdfunding relies on small donations from many people to finance a project, such as a political campaign. Candidates reach out to their constituencies, typically via social media platforms, email or SMS. Asking their supporters for either a one-off or regular donation, individuals can choose to pay via SMS, apps, or online payments such as PayPal or credit cards. Crowdfunding therefore lowers the barriers to financially supporting candidates for the everyday citizen and engages individuals. A donation is a pledge of political support, and plays on candidates’ social capital and tech skills.

Most famously, US President Barack Obama raised USD 631 million from small donors in his 2012 presidential campaign, which was nearly three times the amount of his competitor, Mitt Romney (Pricco 2014). Crowdfunding also provides an alternative funding mechanism for new political parties and candidates who lack established donor networks. In 2015 the Spanish party Podemos (founded the previous year) used crowdfunding to help secure 69 of 176 seats in Parliament (*El Mundo* 2015).

Anti-corruption movements and citizen watchdogs praise crowdfunding, which has the potential to re-engage citizens with politics and increase funding transparency and accountability (Wills 2012). In 2017 the Indian party Peoples’ Resurgence and Justice Alliance announced its crowdfunding campaign to run in the local Manipur elections on a platform of greater transparency in local and national political finance (*The Times of India* 2017). Similarly, in the 2016 Ghanaian presidential elections, civil society actors pushed the crowdsourcing platform ‘ActionGhana’. By collecting donations from within the country and abroad, the campaign addressed Ghana’s lack of public finance and candidates’ consequential reliance on anonymous donations. The challenger candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo, built on this call for transparency by leading an active crowdsourcing campaign and won the election (Bonsu 2016).

access to information or internal and external audits of state institutions (see, for example, the experience of GRECO in Box 5.5); instruments to enable oversight agencies and the judiciary to fulfil their independent roles; and tools to promote civil society and journalist participation and control. These mechanisms facilitate spaces for dialogue while protecting their work and accepting criticism. They also include whistle-blower protections, which are particularly important given their instrumental role in detecting corruption such as bribery, abuses of public office and fraud (UNODC 2015). In addition, whistle-blowers

facilitate law enforcement and judiciary activities to fight corruption and the undue influence of money (both legal and illegal) in politics (Uribe Burcher 2017). Indeed, in Brazil many important political figures have been brought to justice, most prominently as part of the 'Lava Jato' case, which resulted in the incarceration of Sérgio Cabral, the former governor of Rio de Janeiro (2007–14) for corruption and money laundering (Martín 2017). Similarly, the 'Odebrecht' corruption case, involving one of the largest construction firms in Latin America and the Caribbean, has prosecuted more than 70 company executives (Gallas 2017), and several public servants—including former presidents and congressmen (7días 2017; CNN 2017; Ecuavisa 2017; Mejía Huaraca 2017), while the 'Mensalao', a votes-for-cash scandal that exposed how politicians abused their offices to buy favourable decisions on behalf of the government, resulted in numerous senior politicians serving prison time (BBC News 2013; Lopes 2017b; *The Economist* 2013).

The actions of whistler-blowers are also directly linked to the pivotal role of the media in curbing corruption. Cases of organized criminal networks' influence over politics in Latin America and the Caribbean are often revealed by social organizations or investigative journalists (Perdomo 2014: 236). Thus, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has supported the efforts of investigative journalists to fight corruption, as their work is key to reducing and preventing these types of crimes, and to showing citizens how corruption affects their daily lives (UNODC 2014).

For example, in Guatemala a series of scandals involving President Otto Pérez Molina in a large corruption network led to massive protests that resulted in his resignation (Ahmed and Malkinsept 2015). Investigative journalists, civil society and international organizations such as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG) played a key role in

BOX 5.5

Pursuing a holistic approach through peer review—the case of GRECO

The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), an intergovernmental group of 48 European countries and the USA, was created in 1999 within the Council of Europe (GRECO 2017a). GRECO's main task is to monitor states' compliance with the Council of Europe's anti-corruption standards through a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. GRECO evaluators conduct onsite visits and draft reports about the status of member countries' compliance with the standards and the extent to which they are effectively implemented. The reports are subsequently reviewed by all member states and adopted by the GRECO plenary. The compliance procedure follows up on the progress made, and countries are invited to send follow-up reports on what they have done to comply with the recommendations.

While GRECO is not solely focused on money in politics, the theme has featured prominently in its activities. Since 2000 it has conducted four rounds of reviews, on topics including 'independence, specialization and means available to national bodies engaged in the prevention and fight against corruption', 'links between corruption, organised crime and money laundering', political party financing and preventing the corruption of MPs (GRECO 2017b).

Despite having to navigate inherent political sensitivities, GRECO has maintained a credible system, partly because most of its reports are public and all countries are treated equally. GRECO also has a clear mandate to monitor, which gives it access to relevant actors that other organizations might not have. Its focus on mutual evaluation and peer pressure is based on a shared political will to fight corruption and standards (some of which are binding) that member states have agreed to, including 'common rules against corruption in the financing of political parties and election campaigns' (Council of Europe 2003). Because the media and academics use GRECO reports, member states are encouraged to show progress and adhere to its recommendations.

Organizations in other regions have incorporated similar anti-corruption peer review mechanisms. For example, the Organization of American States launched the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption in 2013 (OAS 2016).

BOX 5.6

Evolving approaches to political finance regulation in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

The funding of political parties and election campaigns in Eastern Europe often produces a perverse public–private financial cycle in which oligarchs and oligarchic parties can fuse economic and political power. Three examples illustrate these challenges. First, a November 2014 corruption scandal in Moldova amounted to 12 per cent of the country's GDP. Dubbed 'the theft of the century', USD 1 billion was funnelled from the country's banks and disappeared to foreign shell companies. Two people (a former prime minister and the country's richest businessman) were implicated. Second, in neighbouring Ukraine, five businessmen operating in a grey area of overlap between business and politics were estimated in 2015 to possess a combined wealth of USD 11.5 billion (*The Economist* 2015). Much of their money was amassed through government contracts and privatization schemes, induced by their direct or indirect involvement in politics (Wilson 2016). Third, in Georgia's increasingly politicized media environment, the 2016 re-election of the political party Georgian Dream, created by billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili in 2012, was partly attributed to mass publicity. Several influential private TV stations gave the party positive coverage, including Georgian Dream Studios, owned by Ivanishvili's son. As a sign of Georgian Dream's financial might, the party bought about 75 per cent of the total paid advertisement during the 2016 pre-election campaign period (OSCE/ODIHR 2017: 17).

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine each have a history of entanglement between the private sector and politics that has made corruption more difficult to combat. Through oligarchs, forms of corporate corruption such as bribery and tax evasion have become intertwined with political corruption, which relies on illegal donations and vote buying as well as 'the use of state and public sector powers and resources by incumbent politicians or political parties to further their prospects of election' (International IDEA Political Finance Database). Oligarchic parties have infiltrated and influenced parliaments and ministries, as well as state prosecutors, audit offices and central banks due to three main weaknesses in how these countries have attempted to combat such corruption.

First, anti-corruption efforts in Eastern Europe have long been insufficiently integrated, perhaps most importantly in legislation. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova lack unified political finance laws. GRECO has called for Georgia to establish a more uniform legal framework (GRECO 2015). Ukraine had to amend seven different acts when reforming its political finance legislation in 2015 (Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2015).

Second, anti-corruption institutions have often been fragmented. In 2014–16, Ukraine established an anti-corruption bureau, a corruption prevention agency and an agency for tracing assets derived from corruption, while also relying on the state bureau of investigation and the specialized anti-corruption prosecutor's

office. Establishing the necessary legal and institutional frameworks has taken time, and achieving substantial progress in investigating and prosecuting high-profile cases of political corruption has been slow (PACE 2017). Technical deficiencies in the functioning of the first electronic asset declaration system, combined with attempts by some political groups in Parliament to undermine the system, have caused many national anti-corruption watchdogs and Ukraine's international allies to question the leadership's commitment to combating political corruption. In Georgia, amid past reports of the politically motivated use of campaign finance legislation and sanctions (Corso 2012), amendments to the legal framework regulating party and campaign finance in 2013 forced the State Audit Office, which monitors the role of money in politics, to seek court decisions to request the source of party assets or impose sanctions (NDI 2013: 6). However, at least partially due to this procedure, the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission noted a lack of timely actions to address campaign finance violations in the 2016 election (OSCE/ODIHR 2016a: 6–7, 2016b: 2, 8–9).

Third, oversight agencies are insufficiently independent from incumbent governments, which increases the likelihood that political finance legislation will be used for politically motivated prosecutions or the protection of private interests. For example, in March 2016 Ukraine's public prosecutor resigned amid media reports of politically involved businesspeople hindering anti-corruption efforts (Kyiv Post 2016). Criticism that Georgia's political finance oversight agency, the State Audit Office, lacked independence triggered legal and institutional reforms in 2016 to ensure its independence and impartiality. Civil society reporting subsequently became much more focused on detecting political corruption and the lack of enforcement of existing laws.

In an attempt to address these challenges, since 2013 Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have all passed new political finance legislation with a broader and more holistic scope. Each has also introduced more varied anti-corruption efforts, such as laws that oblige MPs and other senior officials to declare their personal assets. In Ukraine and Georgia this is done online to make the information more accessible to watchdogs and the public. Second, despite their numerous oversight agencies, these countries are making progress towards improving coordination, for instance between oversight agencies that are responsible for political finance monitoring and state agencies such as courts and tax agencies, and sometimes private sector banks. Third, political finance oversight is catching up with digital advancements. All three countries are in the process of launching online digital reporting and public disclosure systems for political party or candidate finances. Political parties will use these to submit information about their incomes and expenditures in order to allow watchdogs to better monitor this information. Georgia has integrated its political finance database with the civil registry, and intends to link it to the social security, pensions and tax registries. Moldova has integrated its political finance databases with the state population register, and is in the process of incorporating the tax inspectorate and banking database as well.

Whistle-blower protections are particularly important given these actors' instrumental role in detecting corruption such as bribery, abuses of public office and fraud

Guatemala's call for accountability (Goldman 2015). In South Africa, reports of state capture (Bhorat et al. 2017) and allegations that President Jacob Zuma allowed the wealthy Gupta family to exercise undue influence led to widespread protests and calls for his resignation (Al Jazeera 2016).

In recent years new technological advancements have prompted collaboration between hackers, activists and journalists to demand increased transparency from politicians and business actors. For example, the International Consortium on Investigative Journalists coordinated reporting on the Panama Papers. This approach has proven effective at diffusing the personal risk to any individual journalist while enabling reporters to cover hazardous topics. Media outlets should provide staff and freelancers with preventive security training and post-assignment debriefings, following the example of the Committee to Protect Journalists' *Journalist Security Guide* (Smyth 2012).

Donors

Encompassing legal and illegal actors, including organized criminals, donor regulations target the various avenues through which corrupt politicians commonly launder embezzled money, mainly in financial havens (Briscoe, Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2014; Markovska and Adams 2015: 165–81). The experience of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is telling in this regard (see Box 5.6). Also, in Nigeria from 2000 to 2013, over US 7 trillion in illicit flows from corruption and embezzlement transited the country, according to Attorney General and Minister of Justice Abubakar Malami (Nnochiri 2016). In 2014 and 2015 a series of scandals involving illicit campaign financing to parties across the political spectrum prompted a reform of Chile's political financing regime and oversight system (Pascale 2015). Guatemala's use of a pre-trial mechanism, which notifies public officials suspected of corruption or other crimes that they will soon undergo a formal investigation, encourages suspected criminals to quickly transfer their properties to financial

havens or relatives to prevent their goods from being seized (Perdomo 2015). This practice illustrates the need for tools to discourage and combat money laundering and to facilitate the confiscation of assets.

5.5. Conclusions and recommendations: protecting democracy

Corrupt practices and public scandals undermine trust in democracy. Citizens believe politicians are looking to enrich themselves and protect their own interests, while groups with access to fewer financial resources cannot participate on an equal footing. Thus, citizens feel disenfranchised, disillusioned and distrustful of political organizations and associate money in politics with bribery, fraud and various crimes. Yet the fact that scandals come to light in the first place is a sign of a robust and resilient democracy, especially as scandals are often the catalyst for reform.

The institutional approach to curtailing the negative role of money in politics has focused mostly on regulating the political finance of parties and candidates. The most common methods of regulation include providing public funding for political participation, limiting expenditures or donations to political organizations and campaigns, and promoting the transparency of political finance. Regrettably, unintended results of implementing some of these regulations have undermined their credibility and generated an intense debate regarding their efficiency. For example, providing public funding to political parties might encourage less constituent engagement and more centralized political organizations, and not necessarily limit private donors' influence over politicians. Even when political finance regulations include sanctions, they are often insufficient or improperly enforced. Most importantly, difficulties in implementing these laws due to a lack of resources or independence from oversight agencies are also a challenge: a lack of enforcement destroys the credibility of the regulations, and undermines respect for the

rule of law.

Despite the limited efficiency of political finance frameworks, they are nonetheless part of a wider and holistic approach that is needed to enhance the resilience of democratic political institutions against the negative influence of money. This comprehensive approach entails better oversight of the public sector, integrity in the public administration, stronger political parties and attention to illegal financial transactions. However, laws and regulations can only do so much. These regulations require a conducive social fabric that empowers citizens and encourages accountability, ensuring the proper implementation and sustainability of these holistic and integrity-enhanced systems to curtail the negative role of money in politics. The following recommendations describe ways to better curb the negative influence of money in politics and to promote democracies' resilience to corruption and policy capture.

All actors

- *Adopt systems that promote the integrity of politics, policymaking and state delivery* through coordination between legislators and public and private institutions to fight corruption, promote civic education and awareness of the importance of integrity in politics, protect and support oversight of the state and politics, and prevent policy capture.
- *Target the international mechanisms that facilitate political corruption and the transnational flow of dirty money through (and into) politics.* National, regional and global organizations, as well as the private sector and media outlets, should enhance the mechanisms at their disposal to minimize the transnational threats associated with money in politics and maximize the benefits that interconnectivity generates for cooperation at all levels. This includes international mechanisms to investigate and prosecute corruption.
- *Promote and support independent oversight mechanisms to help implement anti-corruption and political finance regulations,* including the right to access information in an intelligible and searchable format,

and in a timely and reliable fashion. Oversight agencies should also be able to fulfil their roles independently, with adequate resources, legal mechanisms and control powers. Whistle-blower protection measures are also crucial.

- *Explore new technologies and interconnectivity to monitor the transparency of politicians and business actors* such as crowdsourcing platforms that facilitate small donations and social media tools for reporting and oversight. These tools can encourage innovation and alternative funding mechanisms. Governments can incentivize these alternative funding channels through tax breaks, for example, and parties can adopt such tools. The private sector could invest in these technologies, and citizens could engage in this type of political action, thus making it a viable alternative to 'big money' in politics.

Governments

- *Implement policies and norms that help prevent and detect money laundering, particularly in connection to politically exposed people and the confiscation of assets.* Oversight agencies in charge of controlling public contracting, conflicts of interest, disqualification systems, political finance and general anti-corruption norms should be able to collaborate and share information with financial institutions and other authorities.
- *Adapt legislation to prevent policy capture and corruption and avoid special regimes and exceptions to the rule.*
- *Adopt sanctions, rewards, and learning and preventive mechanisms to promote party accountability.* Sanctions should go beyond punishing individuals to make political parties responsible for their representatives. For example, Colombia's constitutional amendment extends political sanctions to parties that endorse candidates with a criminal background.
- *Enhance and promote regulations that aim to level the playing field between men and women,* such as linking provisions for public funding and other financial advantages to

A wider and holistic approach should entail better oversight of the public sector, integrity in the public administration, stronger political parties and attention to illegal financial transactions

gender equality among candidates.

- *Facilitate, promote and protect the work of investigative journalism in the fight against corruption.* Protect the lives and wellbeing of journalists. States should not impose obstacles—such as accreditation procedures or penalties through defamation lawsuits or intermediary liability—that undermine independent media.

Political parties

- *Adopt codes of conduct that promote better control and accountability of political party representatives* focused on accountability mechanisms related to their decision-making and internal party democracy procedures.
- *Include anti-corruption mechanisms in codes of conduct such as declarations of assets from party representatives and conflict-of-interest norms.* Such measures can help protect parties from being captured by private interests that can endanger their credibility.
- *Implement transparency mechanisms that go beyond political finance law requirements* by publishing detailed financial data, making party representatives' assets public, and implementing accountability activities that interact with constituents and civil society organizations. These measures will help enhance parties' legitimacy, and may increase the membership fees they receive.

Civil society and the media

- *Monitor the role of money in politics by connecting all the possible ways in which money can be disguised,* focusing on tracking public contracting, the appointment of public officials, conflicts of interest,

independency of oversight agencies and gender inequalities in accessing political financing. Demand coordinated and holistic approaches to fighting corruption and state capture that promote integrity in politics. Invest in adequate instruments, such as digital systems to implement and oversee anti-corruption and political finance regulations; the easier it is for authorities to enhance transparency and control, the more open they will be to change.

- *Lobby governments and parliaments to adopt—and comply with—international and regional norms and commitments* on the right to access information, freedom of expression and opinion building, in adherence with the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, particularly Goal 16 that includes targets on reducing corruption and ensuring public access to information.
- *Work together with other media outlets on sensitive topics, sharing information and publishing stories simultaneously,* to diffuse the risk to any individual journalist while enabling reporters to cover hazardous topics. These outlets should also provide staff and freelancers with preventive security training and post-assignment debriefings.

Regional organizations

- *Consider introducing peer review systems that include monitoring of political finance regulations and their implementation.* Take inspiration from good practices such as GRECO in an effort to improve regulatory processes, increase awareness and promote the implementation of existing regulations.

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
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
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Chapter

6

Mind the gap: can democracy
counter inequality?





Mind the gap: can democracy counter inequality?

Rising inequality has become the defining challenge of the century; it has profound implications for the health and resilience of democracies everywhere. Inequality—and the fears of social decline and exclusion it generates—feeds social polarization and the shrinking of a vital moderate centre. It also severely skews political voice and representation towards those who have resources and power. This generates and perpetuates elites with outsized influence over shaping policy- and decision-making processes; this (im)balance of power determines the prospects for development and how progressive and equitable they are, including in the vital area of state performance and social services provision. Over the long term, inequality can create imbalances in voice, representation, opportunity and access that disenfranchise segments of the population, and undermine trust in (and support for) democracy. This kind of alienation can also increase support for populist and extremist views and violent conflict—particularly among young people. This chapter explores how democracies can tackle the political challenges posed by inequality and help make democracies more resilient, using case studies from Angola, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guatemala, the United States and Venezuela.

Written by
Alina Rocha Menocal³

We must work together to ensure the equitable distribution of wealth, opportunity and power in our society.

—Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, 1994–99 (1996)

6.1. Introduction

There has been significant global political and socio-economic transformation over the last 30 years. Since the 1980s, there has been a remarkable shift in political systems all over the world. A wave of democratization which started in Portugal and Spain in the 1970s has swept through Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Asia

and the Pacific, and Africa. While the Arab states have not been immune to momentous political change, only one of the countries affected by the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, Tunisia, seems to have embarked on a democratic path.

Considerable progress has also been achieved globally in improving the well-being of those most in need, as captured by the Millennium Development Goals, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that have since replaced them. Since 1990, almost 1.1 billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty (World Bank 2016). Significant strides have been made in areas including maternal deaths, deaths from curable diseases such as polio and malaria, child survival and primary school enrolment (Gates and Gates 2016).


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The basic welfare subcomponent of International IDEA's Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices (which takes into account infant mortality rate, life expectancy, supply of kilocalories, literacy rate and average years of schooling as well as expert evaluations on equality of access to basic schooling and health care) reflects similar progress. As Figure 6.1 shows, there has been a steady increase in basic welfare across all regions of the world since 1975.

Yet democratic regimes' ability to perform—both economically and socially—remains mixed at best. Moreover, while poverty levels have improved globally since the 1980s, and inequality between countries has declined considerably, inequality *within* countries is at a historic high (World Bank 2016; IMF 2015; Piketty 2014). The levels and trends in average inequality are quite different across regions, although inequality remains greater in developing countries than in developed ones. Since 2008, there has been a broad-based decline in inequality across regions (measured in national average Gini, see World Bank 2016). However, on average, levels of inequality were either higher in the 2010s than they were in the 1980s (including in industrialized countries, in Eastern Europe, and Central and South Asia), or they stabilized back to late 1980s levels after steep increases through the 1990s and 2000s (Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia). A few South American countries (e.g. Brazil, Bolivia and Colombia) have made progress in reducing income gaps since the late 1990s/early 2000s, but this has not translated into improvements in other inequalities. The region also started from a very low baseline, and continues to be the most unequal in the world. In Brazil, for instance, which has made the most progress in the region in reducing inequality, the gap between rich and poor is still about five times that of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Atkinson 2014; IMF 2015; OECD n.d.).

FIGURE 6.1

Basic Welfare: regional trends, 1975–2015



Notes: This graph shows the development of basic welfare subcomponent scores (y-axis) for the different regions of the world over time (x-axis). The y-axis ranges from 0 to 1; higher scores indicate a higher provision of basic welfare.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Basic Welfare Index).

The one region where inequality seemed to be lower in the 2010s than in the late 1980s is sub-Saharan Africa, but progress there masks wide-ranging variations within the continent, and the region continues to stand out for its relatively high levels of inequality. As for the Middle East, while it was the only region where inequality decreased consistently in the two decades between the late 1990s and the late 2000s, it was also the only one to experience a steady rise in the five years leading up to 2013.

Wealth concentration has become especially acute. Between 1988 and 2008, the bottom 5 per cent of the global income distribution made no progress at all, while the top 5 per cent (and indeed the top 1 per cent) has done spectacularly well (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).

In 2010, 388 people owned as much as the poorest half of the world's population; by 2015 this number had fallen to 80, and by 2017 to

There has been a steady increase in basic welfare across all regions of the world since 1975. Yet democratic regimes' ability to perform—both economically and socially—remains mixed at best

Inequality facts

**1.1
BILLION**

have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990.



Sources of data: World Bank (2016)

Wealth concentration



8 PEOPLE OWN AS MUCH WEALTH AS THE POOREST HALF OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION

In 2010, 388 people owned as much as the poorest half of the world's population, but by 2015 this figure had fallen to 80; it currently stands at eight.

Sources of data: Oxfam (2017)



The poorest children are **4 times** less likely

than the richest children to be enrolled in primary education in developing countries.

Sources of data: World Bank (2016)



While poverty levels have improved globally since the 1980s, and inequality between countries has declined considerably, **inequality within countries is at a historic high.**

Sources of data: World Bank (2016); IMF (2005); Piketty (2014)

Lack of access



The poor are **less likely to have access to education, health and other crucial services** and opportunities, which deeply affects their life chances.

Poverty risk has shifted



While the effects of inequalities, exclusion and discrimination are felt in many parts of society, they are particularly prevalent among young people. Poverty risks have been shifting from the elderly towards young people over the past few decades.

Sources of data: Glasco Holguin (2016)

Wealth concentration has become acute



Between 1988 and 2008, the bottom 5 per cent of the global income distribution made little progress in increasing their income, while the top 1 per cent did spectacularly well, receiving 15 per cent of global income in 2008, compared to 11.5 per cent 20 years earlier.

Sources of data: Paz-Arauco et al. (2014)

8 (Oxfam 2017). This concentration of wealth, which has been likened to ‘the greatest reshuffle of individual income since the Industrial Revolution’ (Milanovic 2016), might even be underestimated because of assets hidden offshore (Shaxson, Christensen and Mathiason 2012).

There are growing pockets of people who are poor, marginalized and consistently ‘left behind’, and who have been excluded or overlooked by ongoing progress—even in countries such as China and India, which have enjoyed sustained periods of economic growth. People living in poverty are chronically less likely to have access to education, health, and other crucial services and opportunities, which affects their life chances and wellbeing (Oxfam 2017; UN 2015). According to the World Bank, ‘[t]he poorest children are four times less likely than the richest children to be enrolled in primary education in developing countries’ (World Bank 2016: 17). While the effects of inequalities, exclusion and discrimination are felt in many corners of society, they are particularly prevalent among young people: poverty risks have been shifting from the elderly towards youth over the past few decades (OECD 2011, 2014; Glassco and Holguin 2016).

The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and regional equivalents provide a crucial opportunity to harness action at both the domestic and international levels to combat inequality. The SDGs offer an ambitious and compelling framework to foster more resilient states and societies. They include specific goals related to ‘ending poverty, in all its forms, everywhere’ and ‘reducing inequality’ as well as tackling marginalization and responding to the needs of all groups, including children, women and girls, people with disabilities and older people (Stuart et al. 2016). However, there is also broad agreement that these goals cannot be achieved without addressing persistent inequalities, particularly those affecting young people (World Bank 2016; Stuart et al. 2016; Glassco and Holguin 2016; Oxfam 2017).

There are ongoing debates about how much inequality is appropriate or even desirable within a society, for example to maintain an incentive structure and to recognize different levels of talent and effort. However, the chasm between rich and poor in some countries has become so wide that there is now consensus across the board that persisting inequality represents a structural and institutional risk to the deepening and resilience of democracy. This concern is now even evident among international financial institutions such as the World Bank (World Bank 2016) and the International Monetary Fund (Lagarde 2014), which for a long time tended to prioritize the promotion of growth through structural adjustment, under the assumption that such growth would trickle down and help to combat poverty, while inequality itself rarely registered as a problem.

There are good reasons to be concerned about the rise of inequality and its effect on democratic resilience. Inequality, and the fears of social decline and exclusion it generates, feeds social polarization and the shrinking of a vital moderate centre. It also severely skews political voice and representation towards those with resources and power. This generates and perpetuates elites with outsized influence over shaping policy and decision-making processes; this (im)balance of power determines the prospects for development and how progressive and equitable they are, including in the crucial area of state performance and social services provision. Over the long term, inequality can create imbalances in voice, representation, opportunity and access that disenfranchise segments of the population, and undermine trust in (and support for) democracy (Oxfam 2017). This kind of alienation and disaffection can also increase support for extremism and violent conflict. In the face of increasingly concentrated inequalities (whether real or perceived), moderates in political ideology and strategy lose ground as those aggrieved come to believe that the abuse of power by those with extreme wealth or privilege needs to be countered by equally strong positions and strategies.

Inequality can create imbalances in voice, representation, opportunity and access that disenfranchise segments of the population, and undermine trust in democracy

How rising inequality undermines democracy



How?

- Undermines the well-being of marginalized people
- Increases the power of the wealthy and privileged

What are the consequences?

- Excludes groups of society from political processes
- Can increase polarization and resentment
- Biases the provision of education, health and other services
- Can lead to populism
- Exacerbates distrust
- Can increase violent extremism
- Creates a feeling of alienation
- Can trigger conflict and war
- Threatens the legitimacy of government

This chapter explores the relationship between democracy and inequality. It examines how inequality impacts the quality and resilience of democratic governance, as well as whether (and how) democracies and democratic institutions can reduce inequality. Overall, it finds that the links between inequality and democracy are complex and non-linear. While inequality poses a serious threat to the quality and resilience of democracy, democracy does not inherently reduce inequality.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 starts by defining inequality and social exclusion, and emphasizes the need to understand inequality in a holistic, multidimensional manner that encompasses the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. Section 6.3 examines the different ways in which inequality affects democracy. Existing evidence suggests that inequality does not directly bring about regime change: a political system, whether authoritarian or democratic, will not break down simply because there are high levels of inequality (Houle 2009; Knutsen 2015). However, inequality does have a pernicious effect on the quality and resilience of democracy, understood here to go beyond the formal attributes of democracy to encompass the nature of public decision-making and the degree to which political institutions enable a majority of citizens to change the status quo (Munck 2014). Inequality also affects the extent to which democratic norms and values—including basic rights and freedoms, representation, accountability, equality and participation—are upheld in practice (Munck 2014).

Section 6.4 examines how democratic politics affect inequality. While inequality may have a deeply pernicious impact on democratic resilience, and ‘reducing exceptionally high levels of inequality is necessary for the maintenance of the quality of democracy’ (Karl 2000), democracy does not inherently reduce inequality. This section highlights that

BOX 6.1

Democracy and inequality: summarizing the nexus

Rising inequality around the world poses difficult policy dilemmas and political challenges for democracies, their leaders and political institutions. This is the case not only for socio-economic inequality with the continued concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, but also for those facing multiple and ‘intersecting’ inequalities, such as women and youth.

Inequality is a dynamic process between state institutions and society over the distribution of power and resources, which profoundly impacts the inclusion or exclusion of citizens. Inequalities can have a detrimental effect on countries as they affect the quality of democracies, particularly the basic functioning of democratic institutions, and enable a self-perpetuating cycle of declining social cohesion and exclusion from democratic processes, economic stagnation, as well as the erosion of accountability and a decreasing legitimacy of democratic institutions.

Resilient democracies can respond to these challenges by adopting flexible, adaptable and innovative mechanisms that consider a context-specific confluence of factors, including sound and innovative policies that address the intersectional nature of inequality, as well as the required state capacity, elite commitment, effective political parties, reform coalitions, mobilization and ideas from below, and the framing of shared national visions and destinies. How these factors interact with international drivers and dynamics is also important. Social mobilization and sustained bottom-up pressures can help harness more substantive transformations towards greater inclusion and more broadly shared prosperity. Social movement mobilization can thus be both a threat and an incentive (via electoral consequences) for democratically elected governments.

democracy poses distinct challenges to efforts to promote more inclusive processes and outcomes. Above all, the struggle for greater inclusion and equality is a political rather than a technical one: tackling inequality is not just about increasing the size of the pie for everyone, but about reallocating the slices (Hudson 2015). This process inevitably generates winners as well as losers, and so it is likely to be challenging and contested, and to require protracted negotiation, bargaining, and confrontation among a plethora of state and societal actors at different levels (from the local to the global).

Section 6.5 explores how the rules of the game, power relations and evolving state–society relations embedded within democratic systems shape patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and the prospects for reducing intersecting inequalities. Whether democracies

The people most likely to be left behind by development are those who face multiple overlapping or 'intersecting inequalities'. These include young people

can become more inclusive and resilient over time is ultimately a contextual question.

A comprehensive assessment of processes of change towards greater inclusion is beyond the scope of the chapter. Instead, it explores some of the factors, variables and relationships that are likely to foster inclusive development and reduce inequalities within a democratic context, drawing on both academic and policy-oriented research on democracy and inequality, the politics of development, and institution-building, including democratization and state-building.

Section 6.6 outlines the key conclusions emerging from the analysis and provides recommendations for actors at both the domestic and international levels to engage more effectively in efforts to tackle inequality and promote more inclusive development in order to help strengthen democratic resilience. For additional information on the concepts explored in this chapter see *Democracy and Inequality: A Resource Guide* (Cox 2017).

6.2. Understanding inequality and social exclusion

Inequality is complex and highly contested—and comes in many different forms. While the international development field often focuses on economic inequality, which is usually measured in terms of deficits in income and assets as they relate to individuals or households, inequality encompasses many other dimensions and categorizations as well. These include inequality before the law in terms of basic political and socio-economic rights and freedoms, inequality of access and opportunity, inequality in essential capabilities (such as the ability to be healthy, educated or socially integrated), inequality of outcomes and distribution of resources, inequality in the distribution of power, and inequalities in social standing.

Inequality is an individual as well as a collective phenomenon: it exists between individuals and households as well as between

social groups (Lustig et al. 2017). It is thus economic, political, social and cultural in nature, and it is shaped through a dynamic process of interaction and contestation between state and society over the distribution of power and resources. Patterns of inequality and social exclusion are entrenched in the underlying institutional arrangements and 'rules of the game' that underpin a given social and political system. 'Horizontal' inequalities are perpetuated when certain groups are systematically excluded, discriminated against and disempowered on the basis of defined economic, social, political, cultural, territorial, and other characteristics or shared identity. These processes of inequality and exclusion are sustained, reinforced and reproduced over time and space through political and social institutions (both formal and informal), economic structures and relations, legal frameworks, and behaviours that are embedded in (or reflect) prevailing political structures, power relations, and social and cultural attitudes and values (Bermeo 2009; Stewart 2010; Lustig et al. 2017). Apartheid South Africa (Marx 1998), Liberia under Americo-Liberian rule, and the oligarchic and discriminatory regimes that ruled in many countries across Latin America and the Caribbean (Bolivia, Ecuador and Guatemala) for much of the 20th century (Yashar 1998) are powerful examples of how patterns of institutionalized inequality produce and reproduce themselves over time.

The people most likely to be left behind by development are those who face multiple overlapping or 'intersecting inequalities' (Paz Arauco et al. 2014), which reinforce and exacerbate each other, and endure (O'Neil and Piron 2004; Stewart 2010; Paz Arauco et al. 2014). Women represent an important cross-section of marginalized groups. For example, Dalit women are among the most disadvantaged, discriminated against and vulnerable groups in India due to the interaction of class, caste and gender, while indigenous women in Latin America and the Caribbean face discrimination and exclusion

on the basis of gender and class, as well as ethnicity.

Young people all over the world are also confronted with intersecting forms of systemic discrimination, and are thus particularly vulnerable. Clearly, youth (and women) are not homogeneous groups, and certain young people are more affected by inequality and exclusion than others. However, inequality and exclusion profoundly undermine young people's opportunities to engage economically, socially and politically, and to exercise (or even secure) full citizenship. Inequality also severely limits social mobility—the prospect that over the course of a lifetime, a young person will be able to work his or her way into a better economic situation. As a recent Oxfam report has noted, '[i]nequalities between generations have grown at an alarming rate over the past few decades, paralleling the rise in the gap between rich and poor' (Glassco and Holguin 2016: 4). For instance, youth are consistently over-represented among the unemployed, and experience uneven and unequal access to services (for example, health and education) (OECD 2014). Social and economic inequalities in early life also increase the risk of lower earnings, lower standards of health and lower skills in adulthood. Parents' degree of political involvement and level of education also influence the political participation of youth: parents pass on advantages such as political awareness, access to community and educational opportunities, and most importantly, support for their children's educational attainment (Flanagan and Levine 2010). In 2016, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) cautioned that 'if income or family background strongly predict children's life chances, and if income inequality is widening in most rich countries, that will exacerbate inequality in children's outcomes, raising important questions about fairness for children' (UNICEF 2016: 34). A key question is whether equality of opportunity will be further affected in the future, given

that income inequality is rising in most OECD countries (OECD 2015).

These trends are even more pronounced among young women, who face additional barriers such as social norms, conventions and stereotypes (child marriage, parenthood, machismo) that limit their access to education and the labour market, truncate their ability to claim and exercise their rights, and constrain their possibilities to engage and participate in political processes. As Glassco and Holguin explain, '[w]omen still earn far less than men for comparable work, and women lack control over income and wealth. Systemic discrimination against women and girls is both a cause and result of the inequalities that drive poverty, and can be exacerbated by class, ethnicity and age' (2016: 10). See Box 6.2 for a discussion of how inequalities in education are exacerbated by gender.

BOX 6.2

Intersecting gender inequalities and education

Education is a key arena in which inequalities intersect to affect an individual's ability to exploit the available opportunities. Mutually enforcing experiences of structural disadvantage and discriminatory practices have been shown to lead to lower levels of educational attainment and to sustain social exclusion and restricted life chances. This is especially true for women, who also face gender-based discrimination and exclusion. Despite progress at all levels of education provision and significant strides towards gender equality—as school enrolment rates for girls are rising, particularly at the primary level—millions remain excluded from school.

Girls' exclusion from education is due to a variety of factors that vary according to the level of education (primary, secondary or tertiary), region or subject studied, and geographic and socio-economic divisions. In Nigeria, the interaction of ethnicity, geographical location, poverty and gender results in only 12 per cent of poor Hausa girls from rural areas attending school (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).

Demographic and health surveys in many countries consistently show that girls from the poorest-quintile households are much less likely to complete primary school. Those born into poverty are in a highly disadvantaged starting position, which directly affects their ability to exploit any limited opportunities. In addition, while the numbers of children out of school have declined globally (and the share of girls in this total has fallen from 58 per cent in 1999 to 54 per cent in 2010), girls from the poorest households remain the least likely to attend school (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).

Inequality undermines the prospects for stable and sustainable democratic governance because it hollows out much of the substance of the formal and informal institutions that give democracy meaning and foster its resilience

6.3. Inequality and democratic resilience

There has been much debate in both academic and policymaking circles about the relationship between inequality and democracy. Evidence from the existing literature suggests that inequality has no clear effect on regime change: an authoritarian regime will not break down and lead to democratization on the basis of inequality alone; nor will a highly unequal democracy collapse because of inequality (Knutsen 2015; Houle 2009). However, how wealth is distributed across the population fundamentally affects the quality of democratic governance and undermines the sturdiness and resilience of a democracy (Houle 2009).

Above all, democratic resilience requires the evolution of a political culture in which the commitment to democracy is grounded on its *intrinsic* or normative value (i.e. democracy is seen as good in its own right), and not simply on its *instrumental* value (i.e. what it can deliver) (see Box 6.3). Inequality is central to the question of democratic resilience because it profoundly affects the ability to foster this kind of supportive democratic culture (Karl 2000). Democracy is more easily maintained, and will prove more resilient, when wealth and privileges are distributed in a more or

less equitable manner across society. A more equitable distribution of resources and power attenuates polarization and distributional conflict, tempers class struggle, and fosters moderation and more tolerant and gradualist views of politics among the population at large (Levin-Waldman 2016; Karl 2000; Bermeo 2009).

Building the kind of democratic political culture in which all relevant players accept democracy as 'the only game in town' (Przeworski 1991) has proven extremely difficult. As the discussion below illustrates, inequality makes this challenge even more daunting. Among other things, it skews the provision of crucial services away from those who need them most (including young people). Inequality also erodes social cohesion, distorts political voice and representation, jeopardizes the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and can feed violence and armed conflict. As such, inequality undermines the prospects for stable and sustainable democratic governance because it hollows out much of the substance of the formal and informal institutions that give democracy meaning and foster its resilience. The contrasting experiences of Venezuela and Costa Rica capture these challenges vividly (see Box 6.4).

BOX 6.3

Democracy as an intrinsic value

As Sen (1999) and others have argued, democracy as a system of governance has strong intrinsic value: in principle, democracy provides voice and basic freedoms (e.g. freedom of assembly and free press) that allow people to pursue their goals and aspirations, and to seek redress to any injustices (Stiglitz et al. 2009).

Through these freedoms, citizens in democracies can also expect that, in principle, policy decision-making processes are inclusive, participatory, broadly representative of different societal interests, transparent and accountable. While this does not always happen in practice, in theory a democratic system can be corrective to public policy: 'it can ensure the accountability of officials and public institutions, reveal what people need and value, and call attention to significant deprivations' (Stiglitz et al. 2009). This can help reduce the potential for conflict and encourage consensus building.

Following Sen's tradition, in order to attain fundamental freedoms (which in turn are integral to one's wellbeing and quality of life), it is crucial to ensure participation in one's development through open and non-discriminatory democratic processes, to have a say without fear, and to speak up against perceived injustices and wrongs (Sen 1999; Stiglitz et al. 2009).

BOX 6.4

Venezuela and Costa Rica: contrasting trajectories

Venezuela was once one of the oldest and most established democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as one of the wealthiest countries in South America. In the 1970s, it was also considered a relatively equal society by regional standards (Hausmann and Rodríguez 2014). Today, however, after nearly two decades of the 'Bolivarian' revolution led by President Hugo Chávez until his death in 2013 and continued under his successor President Nicolás Maduro, democratic institutions have been thoroughly hollowed out, and the country's economy is in ruins.

Venezuela's economic and political collapse from the 1980s onwards cannot be attributed to a single factor, and inequality itself was not a causal determinant from the start. However, as a variety of analysts have argued, the country's downward spiral over the past two decades illustrates the noxious effect that inequality can have on democratic resilience and state–society relations more broadly (The Economist 2017; Hausmann and Rodríguez 2014).

Venezuelan democracy emerged in 1958 as the result of a pact negotiated among political elites who agreed to alternate political power between two parties, Acción Democrática and the Partido Social Cristiano. This pact was sustained through the redistribution of oil rents. As oil prices declined in the 1980s, Venezuela experienced a dramatic fall in oil revenues. As economic growth severely contracted, the political pact broke down. The weakened and fragmented political party system lost its capacity to foster cooperation and collective action through the late 1980s and 1990s. Venezuela's acute economic recession gave rise to growing inequalities and disparities that helped to fuel social conflict, and contributed to the implosion of the political system (Hausmann and Rodríguez 2014).

As Venezuelans of all classes lost purchasing power during 20 years of stagnation and repeated devaluations, economic conditions worsened, and income inequalities between the rich and the poor became more pronounced. President Chávez came to power in 1999 in an election that reflected society's increasing polarization and disenchantment with traditional parties and 'politics as usual'. In many ways, President Chávez had broad appeal as a forceful anti-corruption, anti-party leader who would put government in order. He galvanized the lower classes and the disenfranchised against a political establishment that had failed to alleviate distributional conflicts with promises to make their lives better.

A key element of Chavismo ideology is that the state should support social welfare programmes for its citizens. For instance, revenues from Venezuela's significant oil reserves were invested in programmes designed to reduce poverty, improve education, and strengthen social justice and social welfare. However, power became increasingly centralized and unaccountable. As the military gained ascendancy, the autonomy of the legislative and judiciary branches of government was trampled. Civil liberties have been

under attack, and political parties that can represent and channel citizen demands have effectively been all but eviscerated. Ordinary Venezuelans took to the streets to protest hyperinflation, rising crime and murder rates, and allegations of corruption. In December 2015, the opposition won a majority in parliamentary elections by a landslide. However, the government moved swiftly to curtail the National Assembly's powers including the controversial election of a new Constituent Assembly to redraft the constitution in July 2017 (Broner 2017). The political crisis has continued to deepen, punctured by ongoing economic chaos, state repression, deadly protests, contested elections and a lack of credible mechanisms to mediate conflict and (potential) violence between various actors in state and society (The Economist 2017).

Costa Rica provides a useful counterexample. Historically, it has been less well off economically than Venezuela, but over the past two decades it has experienced steady economic growth. Costa Rican democracy, which is one of the most established in Latin America, has also proven remarkably resilient over time (Sada 2015). It has been able to weather multiple economic crises (in the mid-1980s, and now more recently) without any of the problems experienced by Venezuela and without jeopardizing its stability and sustainability. The resilience of its democratic regime can be attributed to its ability to maintain a relatively egalitarian social system in which the gap between rich and poor is less stark than in Venezuela. 'The roots of that system date back to at least the 1940s, when elite divisions combined with organized popular demands led to a progressive pro-reform coalition committed to democracy and broad-based development' (Rocha Menocal 2015a). Some scholars have argued that the foundations of Costa Rica's commitment to economic equality were laid much earlier, in the relatively equal small farmer economy of the colonial period that differentiated Costa Rica, which was not rich in natural resources, from the mining centres of Bolivia, Mexico and Peru and set in motion a very different developmental trajectory (Yashar 1997).

This led to the emergence of the Partido Liberación Nacional (formerly the Partido Social Democrática, formed in 1951), which came to power in 1953 and played a key role in weakening the power of land-holding elites and dismantling the army. By challenging traditional elites in this way, the party created the political space in which to press for political and economic reform, including redistributive policies, land reform and the creation of an inclusive welfare state (financed by drastic increases in sales and income taxes) (Yashar 1997). Since then, established political parties have represented and protected the economic interests of both the elites and ordinary people, which has helped to prevent polarization. Over time, distributional conflicts have not been severe, thanks to an inclusionary social welfare system, and the Costa Rican state has performed reasonably well in delivering human development (Sada 2015). Social polarization and class conflict have largely been avoided in favour of moderation, accommodation and a balance of class power that is supportive of democracy.

A government's ability to perform key functions and provide essential services is crucial to democratic resilience

Inequality, social provision and delivery

A government's ability to perform key functions and provide essential services is crucial to democratic resilience. The state's responsibility goes deeper than simply establishing and maintaining services. It needs to ensure that those services can be adequately paid for (e.g. through progressive taxation and international assistance), as well as guarantee that they are of high quality and adhere to democratic principles.

Citizens closely associate their perceptions of the state with the state's ability to deliver public goods and to enable development and prosperity. Services—including clean water and sanitation, health care, education, welfare safety nets, job generation, security and access to justice—*represent visible and tangible connections* between the state and the population, and, under the right circumstances, they can help to strengthen state–society relations and the quality of the social contract (Nixon, Mallett and McCullough 2016; Mcloughlin 2015). In principle, service provision helps to ensure the well-being of the population and to prevent citizens from falling into poverty, especially among the most vulnerable and marginalized segments of society, including young people. As such, state performance and service delivery can play an important role in fostering more inclusive, legitimate and stable institutions (Nixon, Mallett and McCullough 2016; Mcloughlin 2015).

Inequality, and the multi-dimensional exclusion it generates, skews social provision away from those who are most in need of services. It creates an enormous social distance between different social groups—even if they often live in close proximity—which undermines the prospects for substantive interactions and shared experiences. The fire that engulfed the 24-storey Grenfell Tower public housing block in one of London's wealthiest boroughs on 17 June 2017, which claimed more than 80 lives and displaced hundreds of residents who lost everything, is a particularly stark example of this social distance. Such patterns result in fragmented systems of social provision and justice that only deliver good-quality services to those who are

able to pay for them (Paz Arauco et al. 2014). Elites often opt out of public services: they build their own schools and hospitals, and live in walled neighbourhoods (Karl 2000). Those who are poor and marginalized often lack access to basic services, social protection and justice. Inadequate or biased service provision can increase social tensions, exacerbate patterns of exclusion, and generate further alienation and resentment, especially among marginalized groups. For example, the proliferation of vigilante justice in impoverished rural areas in countries such as Guatemala and South Africa resulted from a complex set of factors linked to the increasing precariousness of peasants' lives (especially those in indigenous communities), fundamental concerns about (in)security and violence at the hands of both state and non-state actors, widespread corruption, inept formal judicial institutions and agents, and a generalized lack of trust in the national police. Inequalities and exclusion are particularly pronounced among young people, who today are worse off and more marginalized than previous generations. In the developed world, younger generations are for the first time in almost a century expected to be poorer than their parents. Governments have responded to the global financial crisis and economic slowdown with cuts to social services and provisions through processes often lacking consultation and transparency. Young people everywhere have thus disproportionately experienced a loss of access and opportunities in health, education, employment and training, and infrastructure (Oxfam 2016; UN 2016). Their prospects for social mobility have been severely curtailed, which has led to growing frustration and resentment. Young people believe governments have failed to effectively address the challenges that affect them, which has made them question whether democracy is the most appropriate system of government for their country (Sisk 2017). The resulting crisis has fuelled youth-led online and street protests and demonstrations, from food riots in Mexico in 2007, to the Occupy movements that took place in developed countries from 2011–13 (UN 2016).

Democracy's inability to deliver thus poses an enormous risk to democratic resilience, as illustrated by the rise of *Chavismo* in Venezuela and the spiral towards authoritarianism that has engulfed it, especially under President Maduro (see Box 6.4). In Mali, disapproval of government performance between 2002 and 2008 eroded popular commitment to elected government; citizens concluded that the country's inept and corrupt rulers were incapable of delivering key services, which led to the collapse of parts of the political system in 2012 (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi 2015). Likewise, although Ghana has been consistently praised for its relative democratic resilience (see Box 6.8), 'swelling budget deficits, frequent electricity blackouts, and slowing economic growth have fuelled public resentment' (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi 2015), which contributed to the opposition's victory in the 2016 elections. In South Africa, deepening frustration with democracy's inability to deliver for people who are poor and marginalized, and to overcome the patterns of inequality entrenched under apartheid, led to a stunning electoral defeat in 2016 of the 25-year ruling African National Congress in major municipalities. Such frustrations are most damaging and destabilizing when disapproval of a particular government becomes associated with the state itself because this jeopardizes confidence in the democratic system beyond the government that may be in power.

Inequality and social cohesion

While transitions to democracy have taken place in countries with varying levels of economic development, there is a growing consensus that a certain level of prosperity may be needed to ensure its sustainability and resilience (Carothers 2002; Houle 2009; Karl 2000; Rocha Menocal 2012). However, the way in which wealth and prosperity are shared among the population may have greater influence on fostering the appropriate conditions for democratic resilience than levels of wealth as such. Indeed, some of the sturdiest democracies across both the developed and the developing world also tend to be more equal:

Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and Uruguay (EIU 2016; Houle 2009). Brazil and South Africa, however, are deeply unequal—and the resilience of their democratic institutions is constantly being tested. So how and why does (in)equality contribute to democratic resilience?

Inequality generates dynamics that undermine social cohesion and the fabric and social capital that hold a society together (see Box 6.5 for an example from the USA). It also profoundly hinders collective action in ways that transcend narrow identities (IDB 2008). Democracies are more resilient and function better when ties of trust and reciprocity bind citizens to each other and to the state (World Bank 2011; Marc et al. 2013). Such ties should be multiple, overlapping and cross-cutting, rather than based on narrower identities that link people together with others who are primarily like them along one key dimension such as kinship, family, religion or class (Varshney 2001). This is particularly true where relations between citizens have been fractured by conflict and

Inequalities and exclusion are particularly pronounced among young people, who today are worse off and more marginalized than previous generations

BOX 6.5

Inequality and democratic resilience in the United States

As Toqueville noted in the 19th century, democracy in the USA thrived because it was based on an exceptionally egalitarian social and economic structure of small landholders (Karl 2000). Material equality produced egalitarian sentiments, which formed the basis for the principle of equal citizenship: 'since people's economic circumstances, educational backgrounds, and everyday experiences were so similar, they were able to reach and sustain collective choices through majority rule' (Karl 2000). However, current levels of inequality have led to societal polarization and a decline in moderate political views, which are crucial to democratic resilience (Levin-Waldman 2016; Karl 2000; Bermeo 2009; UNDP 2013).

The USA is currently the most unequal democracy in the developed world. President Donald Trump successfully exploited the grievances of those who felt 'left behind', especially among the less privileged white working class, to win the 2016 election. The election also reflected an important overlap of class, gender and race politics that has been brewing in the US political system for the past few decades. (Perceptions of) inequality interacted with identity, which encouraged political leaders to focus on issues of difference and immigration to rally popular support (Caryl 2016).

In theory, all citizens in a democracy are equal before the law. However, unequal political systems severely undermine the principle of 'one person, one vote', and not all voices count equally

violence, and where a sense of social cohesion or common identity has been defined in narrow and exclusionary terms.

This weakening of the social fabric as a result of entrenched inequality is particularly pronounced among youth, in both less- and more-established democracies. Socio-economic inequalities limit the opportunities for young people to engage in political processes and institutions, and thus exacerbate marginalization and disenfranchisement and lead to frustration, disillusionment, alienation, a loss of trust and credibility in political processes and institutions, as well as a weak commitment to democracy—all of which threaten the resilience of democracies.

Inequality, political voice and representation

In theory, all citizens in a democracy are equal before the law. However, unequal political systems severely undermine the principle of 'one person, one vote', and not all voices count equally. Karl identified the 'slow strangulation by insidious oligarchy' as the primary danger to democracy as gaps in wealth, access and

opportunity had become more pronounced (2000: 150); if anything, this problem has worsened since.

Societies characterized by entrenched and overlapping inequalities can become fragmented and polarized, which makes it difficult to achieve political consensus for social and redistributive policies and recourse to justice. In countries as diverse as Colombia, the Philippines, South Africa and the USA, inequality and differences in access, opportunity and power have enabled elites to exert disproportionate influence over government. Through capture, corruption and the unchecked infusion of money in politics, some wealthy people in these countries have been able to leverage their resources to bend laws to their bidding, enfeeble courts, violate rights, buy off politicians and political parties, intimidate or control the media, and run roughshod over constitutions and contracts (Levin-Waldman 2016). Their power and access have also enabled them to shape policymaking processes and the rules of the game more generally in ways that protect their own interests, and to block policies that would seek to equalize wealth or promote concern for the wider public good (Levin-Waldman 2016; Scheve and Stasavage 2017). This further undermines the state's interest in (and capacity to provide) quality education, health, security and other essential services.

In many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, powerful elites have consistently sought to block reforms and initiatives that affect their core economic interests, such as control of key resources such as land and oil, and change has often been the product of intense confrontation between competing forces. For example, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru are in the midst of fraught processes of contestation over the existing rules of the game. Different actors are pitted against each other as they try to redefine power relations and address the root causes of inequality and conflict, often in the face of entrenched opposition from vested interests (see Box 6.6).

BOX 6.6

The endurance of elite power in Guatemala

The peace process that ended Guatemala's armed conflict in the 1990s was very inclusive and comprehensive. The negotiations included a wide variety of stakeholders, including the rebels who had lost the military battle as well as indigenous groups, women's organizations and religious leaders (as well as other, less progressive, groups such as landed elites). The ensuing peace accords were extraordinary in terms of their ambition to redefine the basis of the state and the social contract binding the state and society.

Yet more than two decades on, underlying power relations have remained broadly intact; until very recently, the political system was underpinned by the agreement (tacit or explicit) to preserve elite privileges. This understanding seems to have been shaken by ongoing investigations by the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity, which was established to dismantle criminal networks with ties to politicians and the security forces. Accusations of grand corruption at the highest levels of government triggered weeks of unprecedented mass protests that eventually forced President Otto Pérez Molina to step down in 2015. President Pérez Molina, who has since been arrested, is a former special forces soldier and feared ex-leader of a military intelligence unit accused of numerous abuses of power (Rocha Menocal 2015a).

In South Africa, a former public protector (ombudsman) has expressed concern that a few affluent political and economic players have taken control of important state agencies, such as the tax authority, the national prosecuting authority and state energy utility, which has given them influence over policy decisions (Calland 2017). Likewise, Angola has been a rentier state for decades, sustained by profits from its oil exports; since the end of its civil war it has maintained a political and economic system that has heavily favoured a small group of national elites linked to global economic interests (see Box 6.7).

In many democracies, especially across the developing world, the state has become particularly susceptible to the influence and penetration of organized crime (Perdomo 2015). For example, the infiltration of ‘dirty money’ into political processes—especially election financing—jeopardizes the resilience of democracy because it undermines the quality of elections, distorts political voice and representation, and subverts accountability mechanisms.

In many countries, ranging from Colombia and Latvia to Mexico and Pakistan, organized crime leads to collusion between illicit networks, politicians, business actors, government institutions, and even civil society organizations and foundations. These illicit networks, which are often linked to interests in developed countries, are often used for personal enrichment and to influence elections and ensure protection from prosecution. Criminal networks also frequently attract popular support, especially among the poor, by delivering basic services, including security and trash collection. Meanwhile, the complicity and failure of political institutions to address these challenges weakens their domestic legitimacy.

The promise of democracy seems to have lost much of its appeal not only in the developing world, but also among wealthier countries, with a variety of analyses pointing to a ‘crisis’ in democracy (Gallo and Biava 2013; *The Economist* 2014; EIU 2016; Gershman 2016).

BOX 6.7

The political economy of growth and inequality in Angola

After a devastating 30-year civil war, Angola has experienced a period of relative peace and stability since 2002. However, it remains one of the most poorly governed countries in the world, despite spectacular levels of economic growth over the past ten years. Such growth, driven mainly by oil and diamonds, has not benefited the majority of the population (Thorp et al. 2012). Power and resources remain heavily concentrated in the hands of the ruling party, and the executive and the political system continues to thrive on clientelism, patronage and corruption.

Constructive linkages between the state and society are minimal, because the state’s needs can be fulfilled without Angolan labour, taxes or consumption. The country’s elite has thus had no interest in promoting more equitable growth or ensuring that the population as a whole thrives. International demand for reliable sources of minerals and oil has helped sustain the Angolan state and perpetrate existing power dynamics (Thorp et al. 2012).

International initiatives such as the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative represent efforts to increase transparency and accountability in the extractive industries, which could help increase equality in Angolan society. However, this would require domestic political elites to foster a more sectorally diverse development, and to demand (and implement) effective monitoring.

Deepening inequality, exacerbated by the shock and dislocation brought about by the global financial crisis of 2007–08, has contributed to widespread disillusionment with the workings of political systems in more established democracies. As movements across the political spectrum—ranging from the US Tea Party and the ‘Occupy’ movements in various countries to the anti-European populists in the UK, France and the Netherlands—illustrate, there is profound dissatisfaction with the quality of representation. This is anchored in concerns that not all voices are equal, and that the economic and political establishment is stacked in favour of elites who have lost touch with the people (*The Economist* 2014; Gershman 2016; Caryl 2016).

A 2014 study on US policymaking analyses almost 2000 government policy initiatives between 1981 and 2012 and concludes that the USA may have become more of an oligarchy than a democracy (Gilens and Page 2014). In the context of the Brexit process in the UK, concerns have also been raised that some

Criminal networks also frequently attract popular support, especially among the poor, by delivering basic services, including security and trash collection

High levels of inequality can put democratic governance under considerable stress by undermining the legitimacy of state institutions

powerful individuals and groups have exercised outsized influence in shaping the terms of the debate (especially through the media) and driving an agenda seeking to turn the UK into a tax haven that would disproportionately benefit them (MacShane 2017).

Inequality and legitimacy of political institutions

Trust in state institutions is essential for political stability and compliance with the law. High levels of inequality can put democratic governance under strain by undermining the legitimacy of state institutions (Stewart 2010). This legitimacy can be threatened if state policies are biased and exclusionary; if state authorities do not respect, protect and fulfil human rights or uphold the rule of law equally across the board; or if significant segments of the population are excluded from power and decision-making processes. This robs institutions of the 'immune system' needed to maintain their resilience over time and to channel challenges and conflict peacefully (World Bank 2011).

Quantitative analysis demonstrates that in 40 democratic systems, inequality 'is the single largest determinant of democratic support', and higher levels of inequality consistently reduce citizen support for democracy across the board (Kriekhaus et al. 2014). Despite considerable democratic advancements, especially in the area of elections, inequality generates a sense of collective public frustration about what democracy can deliver, and what can be achieved through formal political institutions and processes. When there is a widespread feeling that key institutions, such as political parties and the judiciary, cannot be trusted or are not adequately representative, political participation often takes place outside formal institutional channels (Rocha Menocal et al. 2008). This leads to the further de-institutionalization of fragile democratic structures and increases the appeal of populist and/or authoritarian alternatives.

Young people around the world feel disillusioned with mainstream politics and

disadvantaged by public policy (UN 2016). The millennial generation is much less likely than older cohorts to be interested in electoral politics and to vote in national elections. According to a World Values Survey sample of 33 countries, close to 44 per cent of young adults aged 18 to 29 'always vote', compared to almost 60 per cent of all citizens, and young people are consistently less likely to vote than older generations across different regions in both the developed and the developing world (UN 2016: 70). This trend can also be observed in political party membership, which has seen sharp declines over the past few decades, particularly among young people. This disengagement from formal democratic processes and institutions is problematic because it robs youth of crucial representation mechanisms and opportunities to voice their concerns. For example, in 2015, people under 30 made up only 1.9 per cent of the world's 45,000 members of parliament (MPs) (IPU 2016: 15). More than 80 per cent of the world's upper houses of parliament have no MPs under 30, and young male MPs outnumber their female counterparts in every age group (IPU 2016). Low voter turnout can lead to a vicious cycle of political disengagement: if young people do not vote, they are more likely to be ignored by politicians and policymakers, which leads to greater disillusionment among younger citizens (UN 2016).

Youth are not necessarily apathetic. Protests and demonstrations have become important avenues of political expression. Young people have been at the forefront of many emerging political movements, many of which have focused on issues related to inequality. From the Occupy movements to the *Indignados* in Spain and the #Yo Soy 132 in Mexico, they have delivered piercing critiques of the political establishment and the extent to which wealth and privilege have rewritten the rules of the system, shifted ever more economic risk to youth and excluded youth from influencing the policies that affect their lives (Oxfam 2016). Young people have also been engaged in a number of peacebuilding

and other community engagement initiatives (UN 2016). Advances in technology and social media have facilitated mobilization among young people, which has enabled them to connect in ways that were unimaginable a few decades ago. Indeed, digital activism—from networked social movements to ‘hacktivism’, or political activism through hacking—is one of the fastest-growing forms of youth civic engagement (UN 2016). However, the challenge from a democratic governance perspective remains serious: there is still a profound disconnect between youth politics and electoral politics. As the diverging paths of two Arab Uprising countries, Egypt and Tunisia, illustrate, informal political activism is not an effective substitute for the institutionalized politics of parties, elections and governments that are vital to democratic resilience.

Moreover, a large proportion of young people who have engaged in political protests and movements has come from middle-income or more economically advantaged backgrounds. For those from less privileged backgrounds, the lack of effective political representation can feed radicalization, as illustrated in the global rise of religious and political extremism.

The rise or resurgence of populism and nationalist and anti-immigrant discourse in many democracies that are both more established and emerging (e.g. the Philippines, Turkey, France, the UK and the USA, respectively) is driven by the fact that even where economic growth has increased, its benefits have not been equally shared (Plattner 2012; *The Economist* 2014; Caryl 2016). While many factors contribute to the rise of populism, including xenophobia and ‘fear of difference and social change’ (Beauchamp 2017), there also seems to be an important overlap of class politics and identity politics. Those who tend to be attracted to far-right movements, for example, are less educated and poorer, and deeply resent processes such as immigration and the imposition of what they perceive as ‘liberal’ values and political

correctness (e.g. protection of LGBT rights and multiculturalism) (see also Box 6.5).

In countries ranging from Turkey to Venezuela, populists have come to power through elections but have increasingly displayed authoritarian tendencies, centralized power and control, and undermined or bypassed accountability mechanisms from other branches of government, media or civil society (see Box 6.4). Despite their contempt for crucial institutions of democratic governance, however, these leaders have thus far proven highly effective at appealing to people living in poverty and maintaining popular support. The election of President Trump in the USA and the British Brexit vote demonstrate that established and resilient democracies are not immune to these populist challenges (Lustig et al. 2017).

Inequality, violence and armed conflict

Inequality can be a leading driver of social polarization and violent conflict. Social exclusion—and the entrenched patterns of political, economic and social forms of inequality that sustain it—are crucial factors associated with violence (DFID 2005; Stewart 2010). Political instability and violence are more likely to emerge, and are more difficult to tackle, in societies where economic growth and social policies have reduced poverty without addressing objective or perceived interpersonal and regional disparities (World Bank 2016). Widening inequality within developing countries, often characterized by profiteering from domestic and international actors, including major global corporations, threatens social stability (UNDP 2013). Nigeria is a prime example, with tensions and conflict emerging around competition over control of natural resources (Schultze-Kraft 2017).

Socio-economic inequality leads to higher incidences of violence and instability among young people in particular, and strongly increases the likelihood that youth will join radical or extremist groups (UN 2016). While the stereotype of youth as

Young people have been at the forefront of many emerging political movements, many of which have focused on issues related to inequality

Socio-economic inequality leads to higher incidences of violence and instability among young people in particular, and strongly increases the likelihood that youth will join radical or extremist groups

the exclusive perpetrators of violent crime is certainly overblown, in settings ranging from Colombia and Guatemala to South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), poor, unemployed youth are disproportionately involved in violent and organized crime, or become child soldiers who are often manipulated, hired or coerced by adults (Higginson et al. 2016). For example, gangs in both the developed and the developing world (e.g. the USA and the UK, and El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, respectively) often serve as a means of overcoming extreme disadvantage or marginalization, and a source of identity and belonging (Higginson et al. 2016). In conflict zones, youth are often drawn to violent groups for protection (Oxfam 2016).

Inequality can generate violence and conflict because it breeds resentment and exacerbates other 'root' causes of conflict, and undermines cross-cutting social, political and economic capacities that are needed to inhibit the escalation of (violent) conflict. This is especially the case when inequality is group or identity based. Horizontal inequalities along political (e.g. ethnic) divisions are the most pernicious, and are exacerbated when coupled with other dimensions (Stewart 2010). Similarly, political exclusion compounded by economic inequality increases the probability of conflict—especially when the excluded groups are relatively poorer than the country average (Cederman et al. 2013). Thus, social groups that feel unequal and suffer from multiple disadvantages based on *who they are or are identified as* may mobilize against the state and its ruling elites in an effort to challenge existing political understandings and arrangements.

The extent to which elites have been able to develop or sustain a collective vision of a shared national project or common destiny with society as a whole has had an important effect on how inclusive the developmental trajectories have been, especially where

relations between different groups in state and society have been fractured by conflict and violence. Where elites have used exclusionary nation-building as a rallying mechanism for selective incorporation and mobilization, based, for example, on narrowly defined group identities, this has led to biased state-building processes that have provided fertile ground for the outbreak of violent conflict and demands for change. Examples include the struggle against apartheid rule in South Africa; the rise of the indigenous population against the Americo-Liberian elite in Liberia; the north-south conflict in Sudan and the persistent conflict in South Sudan; the rise of the Maoist rebellion in Nepal; and exclusion along race, class and gender lines in Guatemala and Peru (and more generally across Latin America and the Caribbean) (Rocha Menocal 2015a). Many third-wave democracies emerged in reaction to this kind of exclusion, which also played a role in the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings. Yet democratic resilience remains at risk where exclusionary structures and dynamics have not been adequately addressed or have mutated into other forms of exclusion, such as in Egypt, Guatemala and South Africa.

Political settlements that are grounded in an inclusive nation-building project—or an 'imagined community' that can transcend more narrowly defined identities—tend to be more stable and resilient over time (Anderson 1983). These kinds of political settlements, which may involve very few actors and elites at the top, help to promote social cohesion and more productive relations between state and society because they incorporate the population at large in a shared sense of national destiny. Despite Niger's numerous democratic challenges, it has managed to mitigate some of the most pervasive catalysts for conflict—crime and violence—partly through a set of policies that aims to politically involve some of the most excluded groups, including the Tuareg people (Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016).

BOX 6.8

Ghana: a resilient democracy that can deliver?

Over the past three decades, Ghana has experienced one of the world's most successful transitions to multiparty democracy, and it is one of the few democracies emerging from the 1980s onwards that has taken root. Its democratic resilience is no small achievement, especially given its multi-ethnic setting.

Between 1992 and 2016 Ghana held seven elections, and power has been transferred from the government to the opposition on three occasions, most recently in 2016. The provision of basic services, especially health and education, has improved dramatically. In 2003, it became one of only a handful of non-OECD countries to provide free and universal health coverage (under the National Health Insurance Scheme), and between 1998 and 2008 child immunization rates soared from 19 per cent to 70 per cent (Rocha Menocal 2015b). In 2007, it became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to make pre-primary education compulsory, and the number of kindergartens doubled between 2001 and 2011.

Ghana's progress in political voice, health and education is partly rooted in how its state–society relations have evolved over time and the nature of political competition, as well as its post-independence socio-economic transformation (Rocha Menocal 2015b). The country has a long history of tolerance and accommodation. State formation processes and state–society relations based on the promotion of social cohesion and a unified 'Ghanaian identity' emerged early on, and a social contract linking the state and citizens has been an integral part of its state- and nation-building project from the start. Leaders and both formal and informal institutions have fostered inclusion in ways that transcend narrower ties based on kinship or ethnicity (Rocha Menocal 2015b). In addition, an expanding urban and increasingly educated middle class has been actively engaged in political processes and is committed to the country's democratic values.

There is also evidence that various elements of Ghana's newly established democracy have reinforced or even accelerated progress on health and education over the past 10 years (Rocha Menocal 2015b). For example, research and analysis undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute's Development Progress project suggests that clientelism—the exchange of goods and services for political support—does not determine who people vote for in Ghana; they want their MPs to deliver public and collective goods. This research has found that voting preferences in Ghana are primarily driven by the performance of elected representatives, among both educated urban middle classes and poorer rural areas. Citizens'

expectations about service delivery and the provision of health and education have made these sectors electoral battlegrounds, and have been crucial in lowering their costs and expanding access to them.

Another example is Ghana's oversight committees in Parliament, which have the right to subpoena, supervise and monitor government decisions, particularly in the health and education sectors, thereby opening up policy formulation to the public and the country's thriving think tanks. Their hearings have attracted growing audiences since they began to be televised. The media in Ghana have also been instrumental in pushing for increased accountability and improved service delivery.

Of course, despite this remarkable progress, democracy in Ghana is far from perfect, and there are still many challenges to address. The political system remains extremely centralized—including very strong formal presidential powers—which makes key accountability mechanisms (especially from Parliament) very weak. There is still evidence of clientelism and corruption. Election campaigns tend to focus on short-term objectives, even if they are oriented towards the provision of public goods. This makes political elites less willing to undertake more fundamental reforms over the long term, and there are ongoing concerns about the (financial) sustainability of many popular policies that have been introduced. Making the state accountable through increased democratic space remains a key challenge.

Since politics is about the contestation of power and resources, these conflicts for power are likely to be endemic. The crucial difference is that in resilient democracies, this competition is channelled through a pre-established and publicly accountable framework, and through peaceful mechanisms. Processes of change are complex, and not always pretty: some of the dynamics prevalent in Ghana do not look any better in more established democracies (such as the USA). If the ultimate definition of democracy is 'institutionalized uncertainty', as renowned political scientist Adam Przeworski (1991) has defined it, then Ghana seems to be on a good (enough) path, at least for now.

However, challenges lie ahead. While Ghana's democracy so far has proven that it can deliver, despite challenges and limitations, as discussed earlier in this chapter, there have been growing signs of popular dissatisfaction with the government's capacity to deliver on services such as electricity and core functions such as economic growth. Addressing these shortcomings is important, as otherwise there may be risks to Ghana's relative democratic resilience

Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire both transitioned to formal electoral democracy at the beginning of the 1990s, but Ghana has maintained a much more resilient (if still struggling) democratic system, and has been able to deliver on key dimensions of

well-being. The two countries have similar economic structures, ethnic compositions and horizontal inequalities (Langer 2008), as well as severe socio-economic horizontal inequalities between the North and South. Yet, while Ghana historically avoided

any major national conflict, Côte d'Ivoire experienced civil war between the North and the South from 2002–07. Despite similar socio-economic inequalities, Ghana has consistently been politically inclusive, as described in Box 6.8, and has consciously sought to respect and protect different cultures and religions (Langer 2008). The government's commitment to provide basic services has remained in place under democratic rule (Lenhardt et al. 2015; see also Box 6.8). While Côte d'Ivoire also followed an inclusive policy under the rule of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960–93), Northerners became increasingly excluded politically, economically and socially. These horizontal inequalities triggered a civil war, but have not become politically salient in Ghana as a rallying point for conflict (Langer 2008).

Contemporary Rwanda has also developed a strong and widely shared vision for the future that is partly rooted in a reinvented sense of nation that considerably downplays (or even denies) the importance of group-based identities (Lemarchand 2008). However, its trajectory is more controversial from a democratic resilience perspective, and it helps to highlight the often fraught, nonlinear and complex nature of change. The country has made a remarkable transition from the genocidal violence that engulfed it two decades ago, and forging this inclusive vision of a Rwandan nation has been an essential component of that. However, while Rwanda is a formal democracy, progress on inclusive democratic processes (e.g. how decisions are made) has been much more limited. Power remains highly centralized in the hands of President Paul Kagame, and dissenting voices are very much curtailed (Bouka 2014). The 2017 elections reflect this, where the official results suggest that President Kagame won with 99 per cent of the vote, but observers commented on the oppressive political environment, people's fear of criticising the government, and the use of violence and harassment to intimidate opposition parties (Baddorf 2017).

Importantly, the ability or need to build an inclusive sense of collective identity that can help to reduce the salience of horizontal inequalities and promote development that is more broadly shared across narrowly defined identities is not exclusive to democracies. This process of building political systems grounded in an inclusive nation-building project was also central in the experiences of Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan before their respective transitions to democracy, where the very issue of national survival was at stake (Rocha Menocal 2017). Here too the dilemmas and trade-offs have been palpable: processes of incorporation were highly selective, and political voice was considerably curtailed. Nevertheless, all three countries proved extraordinarily successful in other areas, namely in promoting development and inclusive growth, which then eased the way towards democratic transitions that have proven relatively resilient, if not always perfect (Rocha Menocal 2017).

6.4. Does democracy reduce inequality?

Democracy and inequality: no automatic relationship

The positive correlation between wealth, democracy and equality is one of the strongest and most enduring relationships in the social sciences (Acemoglu and Robinson 2011; Haggard and Kaufman 2009). Well-established and wealthy democracies tend to be better governed (Acemoglu and Robinson 2011), which helps explain the tremendous enthusiasm that the post-Cold War wave of democratization generated about the prospects for transformation and progressive change. There were great hopes of 'the end of history' (Fukuyama 1992), and that the spread of democracy would foster prosperity. Improved governance and greater inclusion and equality were expected to follow (Carothers 2002; Levy 2014).

In theory, there are compelling reasons to assume that democracy, by its nature,

should reduce inequality: it is intended to be a political system that provides popular control over public decision-making based on political equality. So, on average, most voters should be in favour of redistribution from the rich, as the rich are likely to be in the minority (Meltzer and Richard 1981). In principle, this redistributive tendency constitutes its main threat to elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2014).

Yet the expansion of formal democracy has coincided with patterns of inequality that have proven stubbornly persistent or have become more pronounced (Plattner 2012; Fukuyama 2011)—even in a context of steady (and sometimes spectacular) rates of growth among a variety of emerging economies, at least until recently (Bermeo 2009; Lustig et al. 2017). The reality is thus much more complex: formal political equality before the law does not in itself lead to equality in other realms, and democracy does not automatically reduce inequality.

On the contrary, the struggle to promote greater equality has historically been much more contentious and disruptive. According to Walter Scheidel (2017), mass violence (e.g. the disintegration of the Roman Empire or total revolution as in Russia and China) and catastrophes such as the Black Death, rather than democratic politics, have acted as ‘the great equalizers’. Successful episodes of land reform have required a degree of authoritarian coercion: land reforms that dismantled prevailing hierarchical social structures in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan ‘were imposed on them by the USA, which uncharacteristically used its authority as an occupying power to bring about significant social change’ (Fukuyama 2011). Elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific, such as in Malaysia and Singapore, the spectre of socialism and communism, or genocidal ethnic conflict, helped form coalitions that could mitigate those threats while addressing the critical needs of the population through redistribution policies (Slater 2010). And as Fukuyama

has noted, ‘[i]n the history of the growth of European welfare states, elites were persuaded to give up privileges or to accept higher rates of taxation only by the threat of revolution, or else they were weakened or even physically eliminated by violent conflicts’ (2011: 88).

Democracies—especially less established ones—confront many different challenges to their attempts to promote equality. Even though in principle democracy is intended to change the formal distribution and exercise of power in society, policy outcomes and inequality also depend on the informal institutions and power relations underpinning a political system (Acemoglu and Robinson 2014; World Bank 2017), and those may not be aligned with efforts to address inequality.

While democratic decision-making processes are intended to be more participatory and inclusive, this does not mean they are automatically more effective at promoting and sustaining growth or tackling economic inequality. Kurt Weyland’s (1996) analysis of the striking failure of the first three democratically elected governments in Brazil to enact badly needed redistribution reforms provides a powerful illustration of just how poor the developmental outcomes of a democracy characterized by too much fragmentation and too many competing interests can be. Similarly stark is the case of the USA, with its persistent struggles to enact progressive reforms in several policy areas, from migration to healthcare.

The reality is complex: formal political equality before the law does not in itself lead to equality in other realms, and democracy does not automatically reduce inequality

Developing countries that have transitioned to (formal) democracy since the 1980s have enacted a variety of reforms intended to promote process-based inclusion, such as new constitutions (e.g. Colombia, Guatemala,

Kenya, Nepal and South Africa), elections (see Box 6.9), and anti-corruption and transparency policies. However, such efforts on their own have often proven insufficient to alter existing power relations and redefine underlying political settlements along more inclusive lines. For example, while electoral quotas have played an instrumental role in increasing participation, there are ongoing debates about whether more representation increases women's influence in the political arena or reduces gender-based inequalities (O'Neil and Domingo 2017).

Indeed, under a democratic regime, public authorities are intended to engage with a wider range of actors when deciding on and implementing policy (World Bank 2008), and this creates more 'veto players' (vom Hau 2012). Greater access to the state also means that the bureaucracy can more easily become politicized, which may hamper development and investment over the long term (Bardhan 2005). The need to respond to a variety of newly empowered societal actors might also stretch states' organizational capabilities to their maximum, leading to incoherence and fragmentation (World Bank 2008).

BOX 6.9

Can elections reduce inequality?

As the most visible and well-established mechanism for citizens to exercise their voice and hold elected officials to account, elections hold tremendous promise to make political systems more inclusive, reduce inequality, promote the redistribution of power and resources, foster legitimacy and deepen the quality of democratic governance. However, on their own, efforts to increase participation through elections do not necessarily reshape the political order along more inclusive and equitable lines, or foster state legitimacy. Elections therefore have considerable limitations.

Elections and electoral systems can spark violent conflict, especially when they generate 'winner-takes-all' dynamics that raise the stakes of political competition. This is, for example, the case in first-past-the post contests, in which the candidate with the most votes is elected. They can also further harden group-based identities, which can make collaboration and compromise difficult, as critics of proportional representation systems, in which posts are proportionally allocated according to a party's share of the vote, have also cautioned.

As illustrated by the examples of Kenya in 2007 and again in 2017, as well as the precariousness of the Lebanese political system, and Egypt in the aftermath of the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, these problems can be especially treacherous where elites exploit ethnicity, religion or other fault lines of conflict to attract support. In addition, elections tend to be associated with increased clientelism and corruption. Money in politics, whether legitimate or 'dirty', has done much to pervert the exercise of political voice and the process of democratic representation, in both developed and developing countries. Organized crime's infiltration of politics has had a pernicious effect on local and national democratic institutions across Latin America and the Caribbean, the Baltic States and beyond (see Perdomo and Uribe Burcher 2016).

The relentless pressure to contest and win elections in democracies generates incentives and interests among politicians that often conflict with efforts to reduce inequality. The short-term politicking (i.e. activities geared towards cultivating political support to win elections, etc.) that arises during electoral cycles inhibits a longer-term focus on the broader public good, and can limit government officials' ability to make tough decisions that might be necessary for a redistributive development strategy (Rocha Menocal 2017).

It is the natural tendency of democratic systems to fragment, diffuse and divide power among many different stakeholders at various levels (Dahl 1971), thereby making decision-making processes more time consuming; this tendency has increased the appeal of authoritarian development models in some quarters (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein 2005; Leftwich 2008; Reilly 2013). Many so-called developmental states (i.e. committed to development; see Evans 1995) that have been relatively more successful at fostering shared prosperity have been non-democratic. These include the Republic of Korea and Taiwan prior to their transition to democracy as part of the third wave, as well as contemporary China and Viet Nam (Rocha Menocal 2017).

However, not all authoritarian regimes are developmental and committed to greater equity and shared prosperity. Nor do states need to be authoritarian to foster greater inclusion. While there have been several 'anti'-developmental or non-developmental authoritarian states in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, several countries—including Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Costa Rica (see Box 6.4), Ghana (see Box 6.8), India, Mauritius and South Africa—have shown that, however flawed and limited, democracy and democratization can help orient the state towards inclusion and redistribution. Yet, as many of these examples attest, promoting (shared) development in a democratic context

introduces distinct challenges that should not be overlooked, just as authoritarian settings face challenges of their own (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007).

Pressures to deliver

One of the greatest challenges that incipient or weak democracies confront is that expectations to deliver remain extremely high and are often unrealistic. As such, the commitment to democracy tends to be much more *instrumental* (based on what it can deliver) than *principled* (based on the processes and values it embodies) (Barbara 2016; see also Box 6.3). For instance, surveys covering countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and Iran consistently reveal that respondents care most about whether their governments ‘deliver the goods’ in areas such as economic management, growth stimulation, job creation, health, education and security (Fukuyama 2011; Bergh et al. 2014; Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi 2015). Corruption is a central part of this story, since it has such a large impact on people’s satisfaction with their governments and their perceptions of its overall performance. Surveys and other research suggest that people tend to support democracy, but concerns about political freedoms, rights and democracy as an intrinsic value remain decidedly secondary (Bergh et al. 2014). In other words, citizens tend to assess a state’s legitimacy based on its performance and the governments’ ability to deliver on key needs and expectations, rather than on democratic rights and processes such as elections (Chang, Chu and Welsh 2013).

A crucial implication is that, all else being equal, putting in place participatory and representative democratic institutions will not result in popular support for a political system if it does not deliver expected goods and services, especially among young people. As the fate of many of the Arab Uprising countries acutely demonstrates, many democracies that are struggling to become more resilient face a dual challenge: formal institutions of participation, representation and inclusion have remained

hollow and ineffective, yet the regimes have remained unable or unwilling to deliver on some of the crucial needs and expectations of their populations. In other words, political systems have not become more inclusive either in terms of process beyond perfunctory forms or in terms of outcomes. This helps explain why many of the democratic systems that have emerged over the past three decades remain so vulnerable (Rocha Menocal 2015a). The question of how these democracies can more effectively function and deliver to improve the wellbeing of their populations in ways that are more inclusive, equitable and fair has never been more urgent. The following section examines different factors that have enabled democratic political systems to tackle inequalities.

6.5. The politics of inequality: factors that have made a difference in promoting inclusion

Challenges to redistributive reform

Policymaking is not purely technical; it is also political in nature. Thus, who is included in the bargaining process (and where the power lies in that process) fundamentally affects the substance of policies that are adopted and how they are implemented. The entry barriers and the distribution of power among actors—including policymakers, bureaucrats, civil society groups, the private sector and individual citizens—determine who gets to participate in the *policy arena*, and whose voices are heard. Actors’ bargaining power emanates from multiple sources, including social norms, formal rules, control over resources and the ability to mobilize others. In highly unequal societies, the capacity of different actors to influence decision-making tends to be uneven, which reinforces inequality (Lustig et al. 2017; World Bank 2017).

A key challenge in all countries, including democracies, is how to harness collective action among elites, as well as between elites and broader social groups, to promote inclusive development. Where power is less centralized, equity-enhancing policy change is less likely.

Putting in place participatory and representative democratic institutions will not result in popular support for a political system if it does not deliver expected goods and services, especially among young people

Policymaking is not purely technical; it is also political in nature. Thus, who is included in the bargaining process fundamentally affects the substance of policies that are adopted

Since redistribution efforts are likely to face strong opposition from established elites, a broad coalition of societal support and determined, coherent state action is often necessary for success (Grindle 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2004). Where formal institutions are weak and ineffective, or co-exist uneasily with informal institutions (and are thus often infiltrated by personalized interests), this can be very difficult to achieve.

The proliferation of interests, which is often exacerbated by clientelistic politics, encourages fragmentation within the state and society, and obstructs the emergence of a united front of potential beneficiaries of progressive reform. Patronage (i.e. the dispensation of favors or rewards such as public office, jobs, contracts, subsidies or other valued benefits in exchange for political support) also undermines the internal unity and coherence of the state, which therefore cannot impose reforms that benefit broader sections of the population over the objections of elites (see the discussion below on elites' commitment to tackling inequality). A multi-country study—involving Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Nigeria, Pakistan and Thailand—found that throughout the 2000s, electoral competition was often dominated by patronage parties with close ties to economic elites or the military establishment (Haggard and Kaufman 2009). Since few parties, interest groups or social movements represented the interests of the poor in these countries, elites did not feel compelled to intervene in favour of progressive change.

Proponents of reforms to promote greater equity and inclusive development thus face a hard task: for policies to be formulated and implemented, reformers need to sway all relevant decision-making institutions and players who have the power to derail such efforts. Those who oppose more redistributive reforms only need to gain support from a limited number of these institutions and players to block change (Weyland 1996; Keefer 2011).

The persistent failure to address the problems associated with the highly unequal distribution of land in Guatemala (which date back almost two centuries and were a major root cause of the country's 30-year internal conflict) is a powerful example of how competing interests can thwart reform (see Box 6.6). Likewise in Colombia, high levels of inequality and extremely unequal patterns of land distribution have served as major drivers of the 50-year conflict. While a peace agreement has recently been signed between the Colombian Government and the country's largest guerrilla group (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), the agreement's implementation faces steep challenges given that some of its components include land redistribution and other issues that clearly clash with the interests of some elites who are opposed to the agreement. Likewise, elites in Nepal have thwarted progressive reform after feeling 'threatened when the poor begin using their larger numbers to seek equal rights and redistributive policies' (Lawoti 2014: 143).

These examples point to a great democratic paradox: inequality undermines democracy's sustainability and resilience, yet some of the most obvious and direct ways to address inequality are likely to prove extraordinarily difficult to undertake under a democratic framework, and would contradict key principles of democracy (Plattner 2012). Nonetheless, a variety of democratic countries in the developing world have managed to promote more inclusive forms of development and reduce inequality without resorting to violence. It is arguably unrealistic to expect that inequality will ever be banished in a democratic system. It is also not necessary to wait for thorough structural socio-economic or political transformation to reduce marginalization (Norton et al. 2014; Carothers 2007). Within a democratic context, the nature and pace of change may also be more gradual, iterative and cumulative: different steps may build on one another. Even if the trajectory of change

remains far from linear, while there is always a possibility that there will be setbacks and difficult tensions and dilemmas that need to be addressed (Carothers 2007; World Bank 2016). Since change takes time, formal democratic frameworks and institutions may provide crucial entry points to push for further reforms that can eventually give democracy greater substance and help it become more resilient (Stokke and Törnquist 2013). In some cases, even small changes may have a big impact on complex systems (Walby 2007).

The question is, how? While answers to this question must be country specific, accumulated research on the politics of development has articulated some key insights about the complex nature of transforming states and societies along more inclusive lines, and highlighted several crucial factors that have made a difference (e.g. Booth 2012; Putzel and Di John 2012; Hickey, Sen and Bukenya 2014; Rocha Menocal 2017). These are outlined below.

Policies

Sound policymaking has been important in enabling progress to combat poverty and inequality. For example, some of the ‘best performing’ low- and middle-income countries in fostering shared prosperity include Brazil, Cambodia, Mali, Peru and Tanzania; each has combined sound macroeconomic management with thorough sectorial policies (World Bank 2016). Policies intended to improve the coverage and quality of education, expand the coverage of public health care, and enhance market connectivity, emerge as recurring factors in a variety of different analyses that explore how inequality can be addressed, though the policies take different shapes and forms in different settings (Stuart et al. 2016; Paz Arauco et al. 2014). Box 6.10 highlights some of the progress different countries have made in the provision of universal health care.

Policies and initiatives targeted at vulnerable or marginalized groups have also helped reduce inequality, especially those that focus on intersecting inequalities over time (Paz Arauco et al. 2014). For example, social protection programmes (which include social assistance, social insurance and labour market instruments) have all had positive impacts. These programmes aimed to increase household expenditure on food and other basic needs, better diets, improving access to health care and education (particularly family investment in girls’ education), reducing child labour, as well as improving household productivity and labour market participation (Stuart et al. 2016). (Conditional) transfer programmes

Within a democratic context, the nature and pace of change may also be more gradual, iterative and cumulative: different steps may build on one another

BOX 6.10

Progress in universal health provision

There are multiple examples of substantial progress towards universal health care among low- and middle-income countries. Thailand’s Universal Coverage Scheme, launched in 2002, enhanced equity by bringing a large uninsured population under the umbrella of a national programme, which greatly reduced catastrophic health payments among the poor and improved access to essential health services. Within a year of its launch, the scheme covered 75 per cent of the population, including 18 million previously uninsured people.

In Cambodia, efforts to achieve more comprehensive access to health services were achieved through health equity funds. The funds are multistakeholder initiatives in which non-governmental organizations reimburse public health facilities for treating poor patients, which largely eliminated prohibitive fees and improved the quality of care by supplying cash incentives for staff and facilities to serve patients. According to the World Bank (2016: 137):

As of 2013, health funds covered more than 2.5 million people in 51 of Cambodia’s 81 districts, supporting more than a million health centre consultations. Between 2000 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate in Cambodia fell from 108 to 29 deaths per 1,000 live births, one of the most rapid rates of decline in the world. Direct public provision networks in China, Colombia, Mexico and Thailand effectively cover everyone not covered by existing social health insurance mechanisms. Brazil and Costa Rica have unified government-run health insurance and the public provision network into a single health system that aims to cover everyone.

Most of these countries have defined an explicit benefits package—which is legally mandated in Colombia and Thailand—while others simply guarantee a minimum package of services, as in Chile. Indonesia, Tunisia, Turkey and Viet Nam have expanded their programmes to poor populations, while programmes in Argentina, Ethiopia, India, Kenya and Peru have focused exclusively on maternal and child health among the poor (World Bank 2016).

Context-specific factors that drive marginalization need to be factored into social protection programme objectives, design and implementation, and linkages between social protection and other sectors are crucial

such as Bolsa Família in Brazil (see Box 6.11), Chile's Solidario-Programa Puente, Familias en Acción-FA in Colombia, Bono de Desarrollo Humano-BDH in Ecuador, Red Solidaria in El Salvador and PROGRESA-Oportunidades in Mexico, are all examples of such initiatives. They have been credited with helping to reduce marked inequalities across Latin America and the Caribbean (Lustig et al. 2017) and have led to considerable experimentation in countries in other regions based on similar ideas and principles (including Indonesia and South Africa).

Emerging research suggests that the context-specific factors that drive marginalization need to be factored into social protection programme objectives, design and implementation, and that linkages between social protection and other sectors are crucial. For example, programmes targeted at women that use an integrated approach to address their social and economic vulnerabilities through raising awareness on women's rights and transferring cash can support women's economic empowerment and start to dismantle discriminatory social norms (Stuart et al. 2016).

Some countries have implemented affirmative action policies and measures to redress intersecting inequalities. For example, quotas

for women and other marginalized groups have become more common in political processes (including elections but also in government more generally), and countries ranging from Bolivia to Canada to India have experimented with various other initiatives. Even severely conflict-affected countries have sought to increase the participation of marginalized groups. In Nepal, for example, the interim constitution of 2007 provided a legal basis for minority rights, granted equal status to women and men while acquiring citizenship, and criminalized discrimination on the basis of caste and class. As a result of new quotas for members of lower castes and women in the civil service, the police and the army, women held one-third of seats in the Constituent Assembly formed in 2008, including traditionally marginalized Tarai Dalit women (Paz Arauco et al. 2014). As of November 2015, 29 per cent of Constituent Assembly members were women (176 out of 598) (Stuart et al. 2016).

However, sound policies are not sufficient to address inequalities. One of the most important lessons emerging in development policy circles over the past two decades is that the *politics* of policies—rather than the policies themselves—are fundamental in shaping their implementation and effectiveness, and determining what kinds of policies are feasible in the first place (Booth 2012; Putzel and Di John 2012; Levy 2014; Hickey et al. 2014; Rocha Menocal 2017; World Bank 2017). Institutions reflect power dynamics; the fundamental power distribution in the political system and the underlying rules of the game (both formal and informal) shape how institutions work and how inclusive, effective and representative they are (Rocha Menocal 2017; Hickey et al. 2014; Putzel and Di John 2012; Khan 2010; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). The following section explores the political and institutional factors that need to be taken into account in order to better understand whether (and how) to address inequalities.

BOX 6.11

Bolsa Família

The Bolsa Família (BF) programme in Brazil focuses on making existing social services available to the poorest and hardest-to-reach households in the country. The programme, which was created in 2003 under the administration of President Lula (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva), combined and scaled up a variety of previous initiatives under a simple concept: providing poor families with small cash transfers in return for keeping their children in school and attending health centres regularly for preventive care. As of 2015, BF covered 48 million people, or about a quarter of the country's population (Munk School of Global Affairs and University of Toronto 2016).

The programme, widely considered successful, is credited with helping to tackle extreme poverty and improving school attendance, and has been praised for playing an important role in Brazil's remarkable progress in reducing inequality (Munk School of Global Affairs and University of Toronto 2016).

State capacity and its linkages with society

While it has become fashionable in certain circles to underestimate the significance of the state, the state remains a leading factor in promoting and securing development outcomes that are more inclusive and broadly shared. The state is the entity with the mandate, capacity and legitimacy to redistribute wealth and resources (Leftwich 2008; Törnquist and Harriss 2016). All successful post-World War II examples of long-term inclusive development have been in countries with high levels of state capacity (vom Hau 2012; Hickey et al. 2014).

In the so-called East Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), for example, the state oversaw and led a process of equitable and rapid economic growth and radical socio-economic transformation from the 1960s to the 1990s. More recently, China and Viet Nam have been used as important examples of this trend, though they have not reduced inequality to the same extent. These states all have the institutional capacity and autonomy to promote development goals without being ‘captured’ by particularistic interests, while remaining embedded in society through a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies (Evans 1995).

State capacity, understood as *capable and impartial administration* that is protected from state capture for private, personal or patronage gains, is essential to democratic resilience. While many countries that have promoted inclusive development and reduced inequality across the developing world have been authoritarian, Botswana, Brazil, Ghana, India and South Africa are more complex examples of the push and pull of progress and setbacks in both democracy and inequality. As Brazil and South Africa vividly demonstrate, democratization and democratic deepening pose distinct challenges. While strengthening

the quality of democratic governance and reducing inequality have been embraced as central goals in the global arena to foster more peaceful and resilient states and societies, these two processes may not always be mutually reinforcing.

Both democracy and the reduction of inequality need effective and capable states to underpin them. Much current thinking on democratization, especially within the international development community, continues to assume that today’s emerging democracies are built on the foundations of coherent, functioning and fully capable states (Carothers 2002, 2007; Fukuyama 2005; Levy 2014). Thus, most of the literature presupposes that a reasonably effective state exists before a democratization process starts.

However, many democratizing countries are also attempting to build effective, capable states to begin with. The key question in this context should not be one of sequencing (e.g. whether to postpone democratization reforms indefinitely until a fully functioning state is in place), but rather of better understanding how different reforms intended to promote state-building on the one hand and democracy strengthening on the other hand can reinforce each other more gradually in a ‘co-evolutionary’ manner (Carothers 2007). A crucial implication of this is that efforts to promote democratic resilience should not only focus on establishing and strengthening democratic systems, but also on increasing awareness of how such efforts affect state capacity, service delivery and other dimensions of governance, such as corruption. As with the relationship between democracy and inequality, the relationship between democratization and the building of effective and capable state institutions can be fraught with tensions—as the case of contemporary Rwanda vividly illustrates—and it is essential to recognize these tensions and dilemmas so they can be better addressed (Paris and Sisk 2008).

State capacity, understood as *capable and impartial administration* that is protected from state capture for private, personal or patronage gains, is essential to democratic resilience

Efforts to promote democratic resilience should not only focus on establishing and strengthening democratic systems, but also on increasing awareness of how such efforts affect state capacity, service delivery, and corruption

Elite commitment to tackling inequality

Elites within both the state and society who are committed to combating inequality have proven instrumental in organizing or mobilizing people, resources and policies in pursuit of particular ends or goals, and in overall efforts to promote progressive change. Elites shape the formal and informal rules of the game and ensure that others abide by them (Leftwich and Hogg 2007). As Paz Arauco et al. (2014) note in their analysis of intersecting inequalities in seven countries (Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, India, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Nepal), the willingness of political and other elites to engage in a dialogue with other actors, to accept constitutional change, and implement pro-poor or redistributive policies is a necessary (although not sufficient) factor to achieve an inclusive political settlement. Yet the role and interests of political elites should not be interpreted in a deterministic way: the nature of the political settlement depends on the dynamic interplay and relative balance of power among different constellations of actors (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Elite commitment can go a long way towards achieving progressive outcomes even where resources are limited (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).

For example, after independence, the new elected leadership in Botswana was able to incorporate indigenous leaders into new institutional arrangements and establish a series of overlapping and reinforcing agreements and consensus on the emerging rules of the game across a variety of divides (e.g. traditional–modern sectors, political parties, ethnic-racial divisions, public–private sectors). This ‘political strategy of balancing regional, ethnic and racial interests enabled the Botswana elite to work together in harmony and for a common development agenda which has seen the country transform from one of the poorest in the world to a middle income country’ that is also relatively more equal (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009: 6).

Political parties

Political parties serve as important links between the state and society, and are therefore instrumental vehicles for collective action and organization. They have also played a key role in driving political settlements as well as shaping government incentives to adopt policies to foster inclusion (Putzel and Di John 2012). It is therefore essential to understand the kinds of incentives and interests that drive political parties, and the contexts within which they operate. Their structure, organization and strategy will help determine their effectiveness in promoting stability and harnessing collective action to increase inclusion, implement development goals and promote resilient democratic institutions.

In Tanzania and Zambia, for example, well-established political parties were able to mediate the bargaining process and incorporate factions and individuals into the security forces in a regulated manner, which was one of the most important factors behind establishing a more resilient state (Lindemann 2008). In almost all less developed, resilient countries, national political parties have organized forms of centralized patronage and managed rents (Putzel and Di John 2012). However, as Putzel and Di John (2012) have argued, where the basic parameters of the state remain contested—for example regarding who is a citizen, or who has the basic authority to allocate property rights—the establishment of multiple political parties may allow rival elites and their social constituents to challenge the existence of the state itself, which can exacerbate conflict.

States seem to be more likely to pursue and implement policies that promote more inclusive and equitable development over the long term where institutionalized political parties are in place. Institutionalized parties can convey a programmatic policy stance, discipline party leaders and members, and facilitate collective citizen action (Keefer 2011). For instance, the Communist Party in Kerala, India, built its strategy on a concerted attack on rural poverty. Likewise, with its roots

in social movements that had long protested against social and economic inequalities, the Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil was until very recently a coherent, well-organized and institutionalized vehicle for collective action, as is the PAIS Alliance Political Movement in Ecuador. These parties have played an instrumental role in shaping government incentives to adopt policies that foster more inclusive and participatory development. Curiously, often non-democratic systems, such as China and Viet Nam, are likely to exhibit more institutionalized ruling parties than democratic ones, as in South East Asia.

The evidence surrounding the assumption that programmatic parties (i.e. parties that generate policy, mobilize support, and govern predominantly on the basis of a consistent and coherent ideological position) deliver better and more inclusive outcomes remains inconclusive. While strong clientelism has been found to be associated with a slight reduction in economic growth, there is no marked association between programmatic politics and higher growth (Kitschelt et al. 2012). Similarly, clientelism does not seem to be associated with a reduction in human development indicators, and it may help improve some, such as life expectancy and literacy; other research points in different directions (Kitschelt et al. 2012). The crucial point is that ‘programmatic’ versus ‘clientelistic’ party categories are rarely as mutually exclusive as such labelling might suggest. Parties are likely to combine targeted clientelistic appeals with universal provision pledges, and vice versa (Kitschelt et al. 2012; Cheeseman et al. 2016). The Congress Party in India, for example, relies on patron–client relationships to mobilize support, but also pursues a coherent, policy-based agenda. In addition, a recent study on Brazil, India, Ukraine and Zambia suggests that the existence of one or two programmatic political parties is usually insufficient to drive the ‘programmatisation’ of a party system (especially if such parties do not win power), and programmatic and non-programmatic parties tend to co-exist (Cheeseman et al. 2016).

Moreover, strong programmatic parties can be damaging for a polity if they produce ideological polarization that reduces the potential for compromise between political actors (Galston 2010). This can lead to deadlock over legislation or rapid alterations in government policies, both of which can destabilize the economy and society. The nature of the current political environment in countries such as the USA helps to illustrate this danger (see Box 6.5). More clientelist appeals may therefore be necessary to defuse social tensions and provide continuity of policies in certain circumstances.

However, across much of the developing world, political parties are preoccupied with winning elections for their political survival. Their concern for the public good is at best secondary (vom Hau 2012). Factors such as the maturity of the political system and the nature of political competition and electoral systems are likely to affect the developmental or more personalistic approach of political parties and the role they can play in shaping political settlements that are more or less inclusive (Kitschelt et al. 2012; Cheeseman et al. 2016; Carothers 2006).

Coalition building

A key challenge in countries across both the developing and the developed world is how to harness collective action to overcome common challenges. Stakeholders’ ability to influence developmental patterns depends not only on what they seek to achieve, but also on their relative power and the institutional context in which decisions are made. Where elites perceive a zero-sum game in which change to promote more inclusive institutions results in a relative loss of wealth and privilege or a challenge to established power relations, there will be strong incentives to divert or block even the best-intentioned policies.

Building coalitions—at both the domestic and international levels—is essential for enacting reforms. Collective action can threaten development where it leads to or reinforces predatory behaviour by a tightknit group of elites (as happened in Zimbabwe, for

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example). However, it can prove positive, and even decisive, where it evolves into a process of bargaining around issues of broader public interest and where there are opportunities for a wide range of state and non-state stakeholders at different levels—subnational, national, regional, global—to participate.

Ruling elites in Botswana played a crucial role in forging a 'grand coalition' committed to a common development agenda that could cut across narrow divides. This coalition brought together a constellation of diverse regional,

ethnic and racial interests towards a shared national goal, which has helped transform the country in a relatively short period of time (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009). This grand coalition 'enabled the new state to take control of key resources such as land, minerals, wildlife and ultimate political authority across the country without alienating, antagonizing or even abolishing traditional institutions as some African countries did in the post-independence era' (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009: 6).

The remarkable transformation of the Colombian city of Medellín can in part be explained by the effectiveness of coalitional politics. Until the early 1990s, the city had been marred by violence and characterized by deep-rooted inequality and marginalization. Within a broader context of important national and global transformations that were underway at the time (such as the constitution-making process), a coalition incorporating a wide constellation of actors came together. These included traditional political elites, business leaders, new political leaders and parties, community organizations and social movements. That coalition was able to open up new spaces for collective action that were instrumental in harnessing reform efforts (Mclean 2014) (see Box 6.12).

The strength of collective action also depends on the incentives and interests of the groups concerned. 'Elites' are often not homogeneous, and conflicts and fractures across types of elites (e.g. political versus economic, old versus new), within elites (e.g. across ethnicity, region or ideology) and at different levels (local, national, international) are likely to emerge (Pritchett and Werker 2012). The same can be said of the 'private sector', both national and international (Pritchett and Werker 2012). Such differences in interests, incentives, social and political alignments, ideas and affinities can weaken groups that are opposed to change (Khan 2012) and make it more difficult to bring together coalitions to pressure state actors and other leaders to pursue shared interests (Rocha Menocal 2015a; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).

BOX 6.12

Medellín: a story of transformation

Over a period of two decades, Medellín, Colombia's second-largest city and home to the drug cartel led in the 1980s and 1990s by Pablo Escobar, experienced a remarkable transformation. While in 1991 it was named the most violent city in the world, by the 2010s it had managed to reduce its homicide rate by 90 per cent, and is now widely considered a pioneer of inclusive urban development (Mclean 2014).

The roots of Medellín's marginalization and insecurity lay in a combination of factors that enabled many violent actors to become powerful: inequality and exclusion, and the wider political and financial instability caused by Colombia's continuing civil war and the recession of the 1980s. The Medellín cartel, the military, paramilitaries and militias competed forcefully for the right to provide 'security', and violence became the 'common sense' way of getting things done.

A confluence of international, national and local influences created an enabling political climate for the 'Medellín miracle'. It involved the interactions of power, politics and coalitions of political actors galvanized by crisis (Mclean 2014).

A combination of factors enabled critical junctures to become progressive spaces for change in Medellín. At the international level, influences such as global capital, international development organizations and the US war on drugs put different kinds of pressures on the economic and political system in Medellín and Colombia more broadly. Legislative landmarks such as Colombia's 1991 Constitution brought about formal institutional changes at the local and national levels that were important in opening up arenas of political contestation and enabling new actors to participate. Coalition-building was also instrumental. At the national level, there was a commitment to addressing the violence in Medellín, while at the local level there was a hunger for change. This enabled a variety of stakeholders, from elites to radical groups, to unite behind a shared agenda for reform that they perceived to be in their own interest, if for different reasons.

Bold, strategically placed infrastructure projects that aimed to reduce inequality and promote inclusion were commissioned from internationally acclaimed architects. Schools, public libraries and parks were created, and transport networks were extended to considerably reduce the commuting times from poor neighbourhoods to the city centre. In 2013, Medellín won the Urban Land Institute's 'Innovative City of the Year' award. It was also selected to host the UN-HABITAT 2014 World Urban Forum on Urban Equity in Development (Mclean 2014).

For instance, groups that have traditionally been excluded from (or marginal to) policymaking processes (e.g. poor people in rural and urban areas) may gain salience by partnering with better-off groups that have more leverage. More privileged groups can be persuaded to support policies and programmes to make growth more inclusive if they perceive such changes as being essential to achieving or protecting their interests, avoiding widespread social unrest or ensuring their survival. For example, Rio de Janeiro and Nairobi have made progress in eradicating slums and strengthening local-level governance processes in efforts to address urban neglect and unrest (Jones, Cummings and Nixon 2014).

Social mobilization

Social mobilization and sustained bottom-up pressures can also help achieve substantive transformations towards greater inclusion and shared prosperity. Social movement mobilization can thus serve as both a threat factor and an incentive (via electoral consequences) for democratically elected governments. In Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Nepal, for example, social mobilization has played a crucial role in shaping both political trajectories and policymaking. These countries have all had movement-based governments at some point. While they were grounded in different discourses or narratives (e.g. class based in Brazil and Ecuador, and ethnically based in Bolivia and Nepal), they all shared a strong national political project based in part on values of social justice and a commitment to greater equality, with a special focus on those who were marginalized, excluded or otherwise left behind (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).

The inclusive and redistributive policies adopted by Brazil and Ecuador have been either the result of long-standing demands of social movements or the interpretation by left-wing governments of what movements have asked for (Hevia-Pacheco and Vergara-Camus 2013). The willingness or need of these governments to cooperate with social movements in policy design, implementation and monitoring—

and the tensions that these processes have generated—are crucial to understanding the content of their policies. These two examples suggest that social movement mobilization can help exert influence and pressure on governments to implement progressive social policies and strengthen their commitment to civil society participation, a key element of resilient democracies. Crucially, the kinds of linkages and alliances that social movements can build with political parties is essential to determining their effectiveness—and vice versa (see the discussion on political parties above).

Some of the policies and programmes that the recent and current governments in Brazil and Ecuador have adopted also respond to long-term demands for increased participation from social movements. In Brazil, governments have enacted such policies because social movements have represented historical political allies of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party). Ecuador's government has implemented more inclusive measures because these movements were well organized and mobilized at the forefront of protest movements that have brought down three governments, and have demonstrated their capacity to mobilize nationwide support for the government and for specific political leaders (including former President Rafael Correa and current President Lenín Moreno).

Bolivia has also made considerable progress in tackling intersecting inequalities (despite the still-high rates of poverty) largely due to a long process of mobilization by the indigenous population. A critical milestone was the election of coca advocate and native peasant leader Evo Morales as president in 2005, followed by the adoption of a new Constitution a few years later. As in Ecuador, the rewriting of Bolivia's Constitution represented the culmination of years of mobilization of indigenous groups for the recognition of their rights—mobilization that became increasingly politicized with the affirmation of formal democracy in those countries. Subsequent legislation has led to the implementation of different affirmative action measures and to electoral reforms establishing

Social mobilization and sustained bottom-up pressures can also help achieve substantive transformations towards greater inclusion and shared prosperity

Ideas are a key ingredient of politics, and are important in shaping thinking, behaviour and outcomes about inclusion and exclusion, and how much inequality ought to be tolerable

special indigenous constituencies in the Pluri-national Assembly and indigenous local governments. Bolivia has experienced reduced inequalities on all indicators during 1998–2008, with gains particularly visible for rural residents. However, the divide between ethnic groups, demonstrated by the persistently low education outcomes for the minority Quechua, remains significant (Paz Arauco et al. 2014).

Power of ideas and national narratives

Within international development assistance circles, relatively little attention has been paid to the importance, or even power, of ideas in shaping development trajectories (Hudson and Leftwich 2014). Yet ideas are a key ingredient of politics, and are important in shaping thinking, behaviour and outcomes about inclusion and exclusion, and how much inequality ought to be tolerable. Ideas and norms also influence the nature and quality of interactions between different elites and their followers, and across different groups in state and society (Hudson and Leftwich 2014).

The fight for progressive social change also calls for changes in attitudes and values towards excluded groups. Values and beliefs are central to the discussion of prospects for inclusion and exclusion in at least two ways. The first is state legitimacy. As noted above, legitimacy and associated concepts of fairness are socially constructed (McLoughlin 2015), and people base their judgements about what is acceptable and tolerable on their beliefs about how decisions are made, and not necessarily on objective criteria or 'universal absolutes' (McLoughlin 2015; Hudson and Leftwich 2014). Crises of legitimacy occur when norms (e.g. about inequalities) are either violated or change, and these can destabilize, if not unravel, the rules of the game underpinning political systems (McLoughlin 2015).

Second, the power of ideas is also central to discussions of who is included in (and excluded from) state- and nation-building processes. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the narrow or broad sense of nation built in a country has a

profound effect on shaping inequalities and the resilience of democratic institutions. Without shared myths to bind societies together, the risks of fragmentation, polarization, culture wars and violence increase dramatically (Stevens 2017). Yet the Medellín 'miracle' was based in part on the ability to generate a common narrative about poverty and marginalization as root causes of the violence and conflict besetting the city. As has been discussed, Ghana (see Box 6.8), a multi-ethnic country that has proven remarkably peaceful and stable over time, especially compared to other countries in West Africa (and beyond), is another good example of the power of ideas in shaping inclusive narratives.

International factors

While institutional transformation is clearly driven from within, international factors also matter. Regional and global drivers and dynamics can play important roles in informing (or shaping) internal reform processes, and influencing the incentives and dynamics of domestic actors to support democratic resilience and the quality of democratic governance; inequality is an important component of that. For example, transnational networks promoting human rights, women's empowerment, and transparency and accountability have harnessed collective action at the international and global levels, which in turn influences domestic politics and debates (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Other global governance and transnational networks in the areas of health and education have also had an important role in setting expectations and generating more incentives for government to deliver, especially in aid-dependent countries. More recent global mobilization and outrage at the massive increases in inequality—epitomized by movements such as Occupy and international campaigns on the need to cap executive pay, make tax avoidance more difficult and put greater pressure on tax havens—have helped to place inequality at the centre of both domestic and international policymaking agendas. International commitment to values such as democracy and human rights has also been significant in harnessing democratization processes, at least on paper.

Global commitments such as the Millennium Development Goals and the more ambitious and broader agenda for transformation embedded in the SDGs, which make specific commitments to promote inclusion and tackle inequalities, can also encourage reform at the domestic level. International donor efforts to use democracy- or development-related incentives and conditionalities to encourage a greater focus on education and health outcomes in partner countries have also had an impact, although such approaches may not always work.

However, many other international factors have helped to undermine the commitment to democratic governance and a more inclusive agenda within different countries. For instance, foreign intervention during the Cold War proved important in supporting the kinds of authoritarian regimes that emerged in Asia (Rocha Menocal 2017). China casts a particularly long shadow as an alternative, non-democratic model for development, given its size, power and the extraordinary developmental transformation it has brought about (Reilly 2013). A variety of mechanisms and practices enable domestic actors, especially elites, to engage in tax avoidance, or to skew the benefits of economic growth to benefit well-placed stakeholders at home and abroad. And of course, organized crime has done much to heighten inequalities, warp the quality of democratic governance and test democratic resilience.

International development actors can significantly influence the political and power dynamics of the countries in which they engage, even if they are reluctant to recognize this important political role. International development assistance has a political impact, which may either be positive (harnessing domestic pressures for change) or negative (reinforcing political inequalities or undermining the conditions for reform). If this influence, however unintentional, is not well understood, well-intentioned programmes may generate unintended consequences that undermine longer-term objectives. Thus the question is not whether donors influence

internal political and power dynamics, but rather *how* they should design their engagement and interventions, based on a sound assessment of the multiple dilemmas and trade-offs involved (Yanguas 2017).

International development organizations can make a useful, and perhaps even indispensable, contribution towards helping internal state and societal actors overcome institutional obstacles to transformation along different dimensions. As discussed above, many of the challenges associated with promoting more inclusive development and reducing inequality are not technical or even financial, but political. Some of the biggest constraints take the form of unresolved processes of contestation and failed collaboration. Often, cooperation proves impossible because there is a lack of trust, or because incentives are not aligned. For instance, the short-termism that electoral politics generates among would-be developmental leaders in poor countries—especially those that are ethnically fragmented and have weak and ineffective institutions—tends to contribute to a focus on narrow interests (e.g. winning elections) rather than to greater accountability or a concern for the broader public good over the long term. International development actors may have a fundamental role to play in building trust, nudging incentives and interests, and seeking to facilitate and broker spaces for collective action, while also focusing on tackling ‘global drivers of bad governance’ more explicitly (TWP CoP 2015; Booth and Unsworth 2014).

6.6. Conclusions and recommendations: addressing inequality

The growing rise in the gap between those who have and those who are left behind poses a genuine threat and structural risks to the quality of democracy and its long-term resilience. Inequality undermines social and political cohesion and exacerbates polarization and resentment. It perverts political voice, giving outsized influence to those with means and resources, or the right status. This skews

More recent global mobilization and outrage at the massive increases in inequality have helped to place inequality at the centre of both domestic and international policymaking agendas

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processes of basic service provision and state functionality, which fundamentally undermines the state's ability to deliver. This in turn threatens the legitimacy of governments aspiring to be democratic, and generates a vicious cycle that can lead to the rise of populism, violence, extremism and armed conflict. In short, inequality profoundly jeopardizes the development of a political culture that values democracy for its own sake, and not just on the basis of what it provides (or does not provide), which is essential to democratic resilience.

Social and economic inequalities in early life increase the risk of lower earnings, lower standards of health and lower skills in adulthood for millions of people (OECD 2014 and 2015). These disadvantages are perpetuated across generations, and undermine young people's opportunities to engage politically, depriving them of their rightful voice in the democratic political debate. As persistent inequalities jeopardize democratic legitimacy, it is paramount to break the patterns of intergenerational poverty and exclusion through early interventions.

Addressing inequalities is not a technical procedure, but a deeply political process involving negotiation, bargaining and contestation among a variety of actors who are committed to promoting inclusion and reducing inequalities to varying degrees. Democracy on its own does not automatically redress inequalities; in fact, it poses distinct challenges. The chapter has highlighted different factors that have helped reduce inequalities in an attempt to develop a more nuanced understanding of how social strata, power relations and experiences are related, which can help inform more nuanced approaches to tackling inequality. The recommendations outlined below draw on this analysis and their implications for developing more effective policies in this area, with a view to fostering democracies' legitimacy and, ultimately, their resilience.

All actors

- *Take advantage of the current climate to harness collective action against inequality.* Over the past several years, there has been growing recognition from a variety of actors at the domestic and international levels that tackling inequality and social exclusion is an urgent priority. Although not compulsory, the SDG framework can be a powerful lever of international pressure and scrutiny to harness action on inequality (Stuart et al. 2016).
- *Develop an in-depth understanding of the political context and underlying power and institutional dynamics in which inequalities exist and are sustained over time to determine which policies are sound and politically feasible.*
- *Focus on informal as well as formal institutions that generate and reinforce inequalities.* Efforts focused purely on reforming formal rules and frameworks (e.g. legal reforms to improve women's rights and opportunities) run the risk of not being implemented if norms that sustain existing asymmetries in bargaining power remain unchanged.
- *Promote youth as agents of progressive change.* Young people are delivering piercing critiques of the extent to which wealth and privilege have succeeded in rewriting the rules of the system, while shifting ever more risk to young people and barring them from having a fair say in the policies that affect their lives. Investing in young people who are informed and engaged can be an important step towards protecting and promoting democracy as an ideal, as well as its practice in day-to-day political debates and decision-making processes.
- *Invest in developing and sharing knowledge to better understand what works and what does not in reducing inequalities, and to track progress.* Data are essential to help identify where the needs are greatest, to ensure that policies and tools respond to those needs, and to monitor implementation and track progress. Substantial efforts are also needed to build the evidence base, fill gaps

and share more knowledge about lessons learned (World Bank 2016).

National and local policymakers

- *Use social and economic policies to rectify intersecting social, political and economic inequalities and soften the sharp edges of economic inequality and social exclusion.* These may include tax policy, education, health, unemployment, conditional cash transfers, micro-credit and affirmative action. The focus should be on young women and men in particular to help break vicious cycles of intergenerational inequalities.
- *Identify and address not only the technical but especially the political constraints on effective policy implementation* by reforming laws and other formal institutions necessary to deal with inequalities and seeking to influence the incentives, behaviours, practices and values of key strategic actors and stakeholders. Pay particular attention to how the formal and informal spheres interact, and whether they complement each other or pull in different directions.
- *Harness redistributive coalitions* that can capitalize on domestic and international pressures to address inequality as a policy priority.
- *Be mindful of the potential side effects and unintended consequences of social policies intended to redress inequality, and find a balance between competing aims.* For example, there may be different perceptions of how much inequality a society is willing to tolerate based on the trade-offs involved, while politicians catering to voters may see

social programmes as a form of patronage that they can use to build political machines, which can generate clientelism and corruption (Fukuyama 2011).

The international community

- *Focus on inequality as an intersectional phenomenon and prioritize its reduction, rather than focusing solely on poverty reduction and income levels.* An intersectional understanding of inequality also helps highlight the need for more collective and holistic approaches to the problem.
- *Be mindful of the political context and adapt approaches and interventions to tackle inequalities to contextual realities.* Develop a sharper understanding of how efforts in one area (e.g. democracy support) may affect those in another (e.g. state-building), and recognize the tensions, trade-offs and dilemmas involved. This may require thinking and working on a range of issues—from service delivery, citizen participation and governance reforms, to economic development and promoting inclusion—in different ways, focusing not on ‘best practice’ but rather on ‘best fit’.
- *Focus on revitalizing and reinventing more vigorous links between states and societies to help give democracies renewed vigour and resilience.*
- *Support international cooperation to fight against tax avoidance and capital flight* by requiring country-by-country reporting, promoting transparency and information exchange, and imposing unitary taxes on capital.

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Chapter

7

Migration, social polarization,
citizenship and multiculturalism



Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism

Fuelled by globalization, climate change and state failure, and due to its transnational nature, migration poses fundamental challenges to democratic societies on both the national and local levels, particularly in cities. It challenges the nation state and, by extension, policy areas that represent core components of state sovereignty, including citizenship. Large migration flows strain democratic institutions' capacity to effectively integrate migrants into society, and call into question the extent to which governments should enable migrants' political participation and integration. Migration affects governments' ability to deliver public services. Public debate and concerns about migration, including whether multiculturalism 'works', showcase the polarization of societies and policymakers' dilemmas in the search for adequate responses. Migration also affects democratic institutions and processes in migrants' countries of origin, as citizens abroad seek to influence politics at home. This chapter assesses the democratic dividend of migration for destination and origin countries, and how policymakers can effectively address public concerns on migration while also reaping the benefits of inclusive and multicultural integration policies. It features case studies on Canada, Chile, Germany, Myanmar, South Africa, Tunisia and the United Kingdom.

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One significant litmus test of the strength and resilience of the democratic system as we know it—meaning open and responsible government founded on tolerance, respect for human rights and the rule of law—is how global people movement will be managed.

—Erika Feller, Assistant High Commissioner (Protection), UNHCR, 2006–15 (2015)

7.1. Introduction

Migration is often at the centre of public debate, especially during election campaigns. In some countries, party platforms increasingly promise to expel migrants or to restrict their entry. In others, a perceived government failure to address concerns over migration has led to xenophobic violence or civil unrest. Yet many countries acknowledge the economic benefits of migration and the increasing need for skilled migrants to support their economies.

Migration presents a long-standing challenge that has escalated into a global crisis and serves as a main driver of public debate. The Syrian crisis has driven an unprecedented number of refugees to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey as

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well as European Union countries, sparking global and regional debates about fair burden sharing and how countries can cope with increasing migration flows. Other countries, such as Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia and South Africa, have been long-term hosts to economic migrants as well as refugees fleeing war and conflict in Africa.

In Europe, governments and political parties across the spectrum have increasingly resorted to restrictive migration policies in a bid to

curb increased migration flows. Migration has played a fundamental role in elections and referendums, as showcased by the electoral success of populist parties and leaders, particularly in Europe and the United States. In Australia, migration policy has focused on facilitating skilled and unskilled migration, but has restricted the arrival of significant numbers of asylum seekers. Canada has adopted a multicultural immigration policy, traditionally accepting many migrants and refugees.

BOX 7.1

Migration terms

Asylum seeker: A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on an application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.

Diaspora: A community of individuals living together on the same territory and sharing the conviction or belief of belonging (themselves or their families) to another territory with which they maintain regular relations. They are not tourists or short-term visitors.

Emigration: The act of departing or exiting from one state with a view to settling in another.

First- and second-generation migrant: Any person who has immigrated to a new country and been naturalized, or the children of such an immigrant. The term second generation may refer to either the children or the grandchildren of such an immigrant.

Immigrant policies: Government policies regulating pathways to social, economic and political integration.

Immigration: The process by which non-nationals move into a country for settlement.

Immigration policies: Government policies that aim to regulate entry into and permission to remain in a country, including border control.

Internally displaced person: A person or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular because of (or in order to avoid) the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.).

Irregular migrant: A foreign national with no legal resident status in the country in which they reside, a person violating the terms of their status so that their stay may be terminated, or a foreign national working in the shadow economy, including those with a regular residence status who work without registering to avoid taxes and regulations.

Migrant: Any person who has moved across an international border away from their place of birth or habitual residence other than for short-term travel.

Migrant background: All persons with one migrant parent. Alternatively, migrant background may refer to persons with one parent born outside the country of current long-term residence.

Migrant flows: The number of people migrating within a specific time frame.

Migrant stocks: The total number of persons born in a country other than that in which they reside, or a country's foreign-born population.

Refugee: A person who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country' (article 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; article 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, article 1(2) of the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country 'owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality'. Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country 'because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order'.

Migration affects governments' ability to deliver public services, which poses challenges to democratic accountability and highlights the need for a combined local, national and global governance response

Due to its transnational nature, migration poses fundamental questions to democracy. Discussions about migration, and by association about multiculturalism, illustrate the polarization of societies and the dilemmas policymakers face in the search for adequate responses. Migration can also affect democratic institutions and processes in countries of origin, as citizens abroad seek to influence politics at home. Box 7.1 defines some of the terms used in discussions about migration.

Migrants are increasingly becoming political actors who can influence the quality of democracy in both destination and origin countries. The upsurge in migration flows has strained the capacities of democratic institutions to effectively integrate migrants into society, and has generated calls to examine how governments

can enable and encourage migrants' political participation. Migration affects governments' ability to deliver public services, which poses challenges to democratic accountability and highlights the need for a combined local, national and global governance response.

Migration affects many economic and political aspects of democracy. This chapter focuses on the democratic dividend from migration and the enabling factors that support democracy (see Box 7.2). It argues that democratic institutions can approach migration challenges to democracy by enacting policies that do not solely rely on traditional formal political structures and the notion of the nation state. The key principle for migration policy is inclusiveness—creating resilience in the democratic system by allowing different voices to be heard, and harnessing different ways to manage discontent and the need for change. Democratic institutions can be enhanced by local initiatives that have successfully included migrants in political life, and link these lessons to international and regional governance frameworks. This can open space for new approaches to political advocacy, and in the long run enable democratic institutions and processes to respond to migration challenges in a sustainable and resilient manner.

This chapter analyses the challenges posed by migration to democracy, focusing on the political integration of legal immigrants and the political engagement of the diaspora. It does not address the impact of irregular or undocumented migrants, due to the lack of reliable data. The economic and social impact of immigration and emigration, as well as an analysis of push and pull factors in relation to migration, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Section 7.2 provides an overview of global migration patterns and trends. Section 7.3 focuses on how migration challenges and affects democracy by assessing how politically inclusive countries are of immigrants; it provides insights based on the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices and Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) data. Section 7.4 discusses the role that emigrants play as

BOX 7.2

Flexibility and resilience in democracy: making the most of migration

Resilient democracies can tackle migration through multicultural policies that favour the inclusion of migrants and provide political benefits for societies. Governments need to adapt state capacities related to migration policymaking and—particularly in countries with high immigration rates and immigrant-friendly policies—work to reduce the potential backlash from citizens with negative perceptions of immigration. Political parties can adopt flexible and inclusive approaches at the national and local levels to increase minority representation, adopt targets for migrant representation and increase candidate representation to enable effective migrant political participation.

Adopting policies that facilitate migrants' naturalization can increase their participation in governance processes and thus contribute to inclusion, for example by reducing the administrative burden and timelines for obtaining citizenship. Democratic institutions can design policies that aim to empower migrants to decide how they participate in public life, rather than defining policies based on 'citizenship as nationality'. To strengthen democracy, especially in countries with high or increasing proportions of migrants, policymakers can also consider granting voting rights—particularly at the local level—as a pathway to citizenship.

Migrants' integration and sense of belonging can be enhanced with the support of civil society and local community-based initiatives such as local migrant associations, technology-based integration solutions and urban diversification. On a global level, migrant inclusion could be facilitated by enhancing international migration governance systems and through better regional cooperation to share burdens and implement migration protection regimes. The United Nations New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants as well as the process to develop a Global Compact on Migration and Refugees are important first steps.

agents of democracy and the potential gains to democracy from emigration, with a focus on enabling the engagement of the diaspora in political life.

Section 7.5 highlights policy dilemmas resulting from migration, and Section 7.6 analyses the policy implications of (and possible approaches to) tackling migration challenges to democracy—that is, how political party systems and governments in destination and origin countries can address problems related to migration. Section 7.8 provides a set of conclusions and policy recommendations. The chapter discusses how democracies respond to migration challenges using case studies chosen to showcase regional examples as well as good practices in relation to policy approaches. For additional information on the issues discussed in this chapter see *Migration, Multiculturalism and Democracy: A Resource Guide* (Sisk 2017).

7.2. Migration patterns and global trends

Migration is not a new phenomenon, but its scale has increased with the rising global population. Push factors that make people leave their home country include limited job opportunities, political instability, human rights violations, conflicts and wars, state failure, and climate change or natural disasters. Important pull factors that influence their choice of destination include family migration and co-ethnic immigrant groups, prospects for an increased standard of living in terms of job opportunities and public service delivery, as well as politically stable countries that guarantee fundamental freedoms and encourage individual choice in education, career, gender roles and sexual orientation, and place of residence.

By late 2015, migrants accounted for over 3 per cent of the world's population. Over the last 45 years, the number of people living outside their country of origin has almost tripled from 76 million to 244 million (IOM 2015a). However, the proportion of migrants as a share of the world's population has remained relatively stable since 1990 (UN 2016).

Migration flows have increased since 1990 in all regions, particularly from developing countries to developed countries. While most of this is voluntary migration, forced migration has risen dramatically: over 20 million persons are now recognized as refugees, the majority having fled persecution or conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria (UNHCR 2015).

Over the last 45 years, the number of people living outside their country of origin has almost tripled from 76 million to 244 million

BOX 7.3

The gender dimensions of migration



As of 2015, women and girls made up 48 per cent of the global migrant population (UNHCR 2015). Female migrants face different challenges than their male counterparts. They are often confronted with multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination on the grounds of sex, ethnicity, nationality, class and other bias, in addition to their status as migrants. This can significantly undermine their human rights as well as their ability to participate effectively in the host country's social, economic and political life.

The range of challenges faced by migrant women derives from their legal status in the host country. For instance, women migrating under family reunification programmes may often depend on their husbands legally, economically and socially. In other cases, migrant women may depend on their employer, especially when they migrate for economic purposes in a designated sector (e.g. domestic workers in certain countries) (Sohoon and Piper 2013; ILO 2008). In addition, migrant women are vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, sexual exploitation, domestic violence and female genital mutilation. Other factors that may hinder their integration and empowerment involve religious influences, patriarchal traditions, and cultural practices that may exclude them from public and political life (UNHCR 2013).

In this context, migration systems should consider the vulnerabilities and specific needs of migrant women. This requires adopting gender-sensitive policies that facilitate their access to information, employment and public services such as healthcare and education as a key part of the integration process. Furthermore, language learning programmes and information campaigns are essential for empowering migrant women and making them aware of their human, civic and political rights. Targeted policies and programmes that encourage the active participation of migrant women in civic and political life, including voting and standing as candidates in national and local elections, are also crucial for their integration into the host society and to ensure that the interests of their communities are effectively represented (European Women's Lobby 2007).

Civil society and grassroots organizations can play an important role in empowering migrant women through capacity-building initiatives and mentorship programmes that help them develop leadership skills and realize their potential as decision-makers and agents of change (OSCE 2014). For example, the New American Leaders Project trains first- and second-generation migrants living in the USA in political leadership at the state and local levels, recognizing that 'democracy is stronger when everyone is represented and everyone participates' (Dyogi and Bhojwani 2016).

Migration patterns



Europe hosts about 76 million migrants, Asia 75 million, Africa 21 million, the USA and Canada 54 million, Latin America and the Caribbean 9 million and Oceania 8 million. Some democracies, such as Mexico, are transit and emigration countries simultaneously.

Sources of data: UN (2015)

Countries of origin



Among voluntary migrants, the largest numbers come from India, Mexico and Russia. Most tend to stay close to their countries of origin (except for significant intra-Asia flows of labourers).

Sources of data: UNHCR (2015)



Two-thirds of all migrants live in 20 countries, concentrated in North America, Europe and the Arabian Peninsula, with by far the largest single group in the USA.

Sources of data: UN (2015)

Refugees and asylum seekers

1.5 million new refugees in just 6 months

START 2016
15 million refugees

MID 2016
16.5 million refugees

In the first half of 2016, there were 1.5 million new refugees and asylum seekers worldwide, raising the total number of refugees under the UNHCR mandate to 16.5 million, the largest total since 1992. The greatest concentrations were in or near the Middle East, with Turkey hosting the most refugees, nearly 2.8 million.

Sources of data: UNHCR (2017)

Migrants and refugees

- 80% of migrants are between the ages of 15 and 64
- Approximately 50% of voluntary migrants are women
- Approximately 50% of refugees are women and 51% are children
- More than 1/3 of migrants have completed tertiary education
- Almost 1/5 live in established gateway cities
- One out of every three people living in London, New York and Sydney is a migrant
- More than half of the people living in Brussels and Dubai are migrants

Sources of data: UNHCR (2016a: 52), UNHCR (2016a: 52), IOM (2015a) & IOM (2015b)

Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, there have been more refugees than at any time since World War II, tragically highlighted by the high number of people risking and losing their lives. In 2016, more than 5,000 persons died crossing the Mediterranean Sea, the highest annual total ever reported (UNHCR 2016b). About 1.5 million persons were recognized as refugees worldwide or applied for asylum in the first half of 2016; the majority had fled Syria (UNHCR 2016a: 3–4). The greatest concentrations were in or near the Middle East; Turkey hosted the most refugees (2.8 million) under its temporary protection regime (UNHCR 2016a: 8).

7.3. The impact of migration on democracy

Recent studies of the impact of migration on democracy have examined three areas: (a) public concerns about immigration, (b) migration levels and (c) the quality of governance and migrant integration policies (McLaren 2010). First, public perceptions of migration challenge notions of national identity and shared societal values when public policies divide the population into native-born inhabitants and newcomers (Huysmans 1995: 60). This affects how well democracies integrate newcomers and create social cohesion or multicultural societies. Such perceptions may affect the public's willingness to support policymakers, depending on whether citizens trust that politicians and political institutions are able to handle the migration challenge (Miller and Listhaug 1990: 358). Indeed, many studies have concluded that immigration disrupts political and social cohesion and identities (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2006; Gibson 2002; Fetzer 2000; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993), and that migrant integration policies in turn affect public attitudes towards migrants, and thus political trust (Weldon 2006). Second, migration levels may affect citizens' attitudes towards migrants and their trust in political institutions, and citizens' belief that political institutions can handle the migration challenge. Third, how well political institutions

handle migration may affect citizens' levels of trust in these institutions.

Inclusion—that is, how well societies politically integrate immigrants—is a key factor when assessing how migration affects democracies, as well as the conditions under which democratic systems can respond to these challenges in a resilient manner. How well countries integrate immigrants into the political system depends on a number of factors, including (a) the ease with which countries enable immigrants and subsequent generations of immigrants to naturalize or become citizens; (b) whether countries allow migrants to vote or stand as a candidate in national or local elections; (c) immigrants' voter turnout; (d) whether a country's policies facilitate political integration (i.e. how inclusive a country's policies are of immigrants); (e) how well immigrants are represented in a country's key political institutions such as the parliament, political parties and local councils, and whether other consultative bodies exist; and (f) the challenge that anti-immigrant parties pose to democracy. This section analyses each of these factors in turn.

Immigrants and the pathway to citizenship

Citizenship is an important incentive for integration and removes barriers for immigrants to participate in political life. It provides full civic and political rights and protection against discrimination, which can help increase immigrants' sense of belonging and willingness to participate. A 2012 study comparing the political participation of foreign-born and native-born residents of European countries, and citizens versus non-citizens, found that native-born and foreign-born citizens demonstrated similar overall levels of participation in political activities (Just and Anderson 2012). Among the foreign born, citizenship significantly increased political participation, especially with regard to 'less institutionalized political acts' (Just and Anderson 2012: 496). This effect was greatest among immigrants who grew up in relatively undemocratic countries (Just

Inclusion—that is, how well societies politically integrate immigrants—is a key factor when assessing how migration affects democracies, as well as the conditions under which democratic systems can respond to these challenges in a resilient manner

and Anderson 2012). For this reason, it is important to assess whether countries enable immigrant naturalization, given that the path to citizenship can include many obstacles, from lack of documentation to highly discretionary decision-making procedures. Citizenship can be acquired automatically (mainly at birth) or upon application. Naturalization is defined here as the non-automatic acquisition of citizenship by an individual who was not a citizen of a particular country by birth, requiring an application by the immigrant and an act of granting by the host country (OECD 2011).

The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship vary widely: countries have the exclusive authority to regulate the terms under which immigrants can obtain citizenship. Citizenship rules regulate eligibility criteria such as residence requirements or whether citizenship is acquired based on parental

heritage or 'blood' (*ius sanguinis*) or the country of birth (*ius soli*). They also regulate the conditions under which citizenship is granted, including language proficiency, citizenship or integration tests, economic and criminal record requirements, costs, as well as legal guarantees and discretionary decision-making powers. Lastly, these rules regulate whether countries allow dual citizenship (see Section 7.4).

Many countries require citizenship tests as part of the naturalization process, including Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA (OECD 2011). The introduction of these tests has decreased the number of citizenship applicants, however their impact on immigrants' integration remains unclear (OECD 2011). Similarly, most countries have language requirements, which indicate an applicant's willingness to integrate; Sweden does not have such a requirement (OECD 2011).

TABLE 7.1

Acquiring citizenship for migrants: regional and country examples

	Citizenship based on <i>ius soli</i> (e.g. birthplace)	Citizenship based on <i>ius sanguinis</i> (e.g. parental heritage)	Ease of naturalization for adults
Europe	Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (with restrictions)	Automatically granted	Transparent, accessible procedures; 32 states (all EU member states, Croatia, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, Switzerland)
Africa	More than half the countries with restrictions; absolute <i>ius soli</i> in Chad, Lesotho and Tanzania	Automatically granted	Procedures exist, however effective implementation is lacking. Chad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda (requires 15–20 years), Central African Republic (35 years), Democratic Republic of the Congo and Egypt (presidential decrees are required).
Latin America and the Caribbean	All countries	Automatically granted	Transparent, accessible procedures; short legal residency required (Chile, Colombia, Venezuela 5 years; Brazil 4 years; Peru, Argentina and Bolivia 2 years), with some form of citizenship test. Many countries also allow a fast-track process if the applicant comes from a Spanish, Portuguese, Latin American or Caribbean state.
Asia and the Pacific	Uncommon (Cambodia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand)	Main form of acquiring citizenship	Procedures generally exist, however are often difficult, and subject to several restrictions and obligations

Sources: Bauböck and Goodman (2010); Feere (2010); Davidson and Weekley (1999); Manby (2010).

In countries with inclusive citizenship policies, immigrants are more likely to opt for citizenship (Huddleston et al. 2015). For example, Ireland, Portugal, the UK, the Nordic States and the Benelux countries have more inclusive citizenship policies than Austria, Switzerland or the Baltic States (Huddleston et al. 2015). While Bulgaria and Hungary have very high naturalization rates, these are not related to immigrants but to co-ethnics living abroad who benefit from special naturalization privileges (Huddleston et al. 2015). In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA—all countries with high naturalization rates—immigrants obtain residence permits upon entry and are encouraged to naturalize at the end of an initial settlement period (OECD 2011). This policy approach towards immigrants encourages them from the outset to think of themselves as ‘future citizens’, compared to the (European) approach that requires ‘proof of integration’ before naturalization takes place.

The change in naturalization trends is linked to migration flows; however there is a time lag, which means that countries should focus on long-term residents if they wish to encourage naturalization. Naturalization rates based on long-term residence nevertheless vary: Canada (89 per cent of men and 90 per cent of women), Sweden (79 and 80 per cent, respectively), and the Netherlands (72 and 73 per cent, respectively) have relatively high naturalization rates. In Luxembourg (12 per cent of men and 13 per cent of women), Switzerland (28 and 40 per cent, respectively) and Germany (35 and 36 per cent, respectively) fewer immigrants naturalize (OECD 2011). Given the increased migration flows, there is nevertheless a rising trend towards restricting the acquisition of citizenship, including in countries such as Australia, Canada and the USA (OECD 2011). Other contextual factors in addition to the openness or restrictiveness of citizenship policies influence whether immigrants become citizens. These include whether immigrants originate from developing countries, their length of settlement in their host countries, whether there are family ties or humanitarian

reasons for migration, and whether countries allow dual nationality. Immigrants from developing countries are more likely to naturalize and are more affected by restrictive immigration policies (Huddleston et al. 2015; OECD 2011). Similarly, refugees, women and immigrants with high levels of education are more likely to naturalize (OECD 2011).

Naturalization can be a useful (political) integration tool for immigrants. One way to encourage migrants to participate in political life on a par with natives and increase their sense of belonging is to promote inclusive naturalization policies that allow dual nationality (Dumbrava 2010; Blatter 2011). Nevertheless, naturalization rates may remain low if overall migration policy does not support naturalization (North 1987; Bloemraad 2006; Jones-Correa 2001). Issues such as identity, plans to return or fear of social rejection by the host community may also prevent migrants from naturalizing (Hyde, Mateo and Cusato-Rosa 2013). While naturalization does not necessarily impose an identity or promote homogeneity or exclusivity (especially if multiple nationalities are possible), in practice it may do so, due for example to requirements to renounce previous nationalities or attend integration courses and exams (Joppke 2010; Pedroza 2015). Naturalization policies alone may not be able to redress the disenfranchisement of migrants when migrations tend to be temporary.

Since international law says little about the impact of migration on the composition of the population that enjoys voting rights, it is important to analyse this aspect.

Immigrants and voting rights

A core principle of democracy is universal suffrage. Since the 18th century, barriers to the right to vote and to stand as candidates have been removed or lowered. At the same time, the idea of representative democracy was based on the congruence of territory, citizenry and government. Globalization has challenged the requirements of citizenship and residence: citizens may be disenfranchised

The change in naturalization trends is linked to migration flows; however there is a time lag, which means that countries should focus on long-term residents if they wish to encourage naturalization

There is a trend in an increasing number of countries to link immigrants' local voting rights to residency, while national voting rights are rarely granted to immigrants before naturalization

due to migration. Notwithstanding academic controversies on the relationship between naturalization policies and immigrant integration (Huddleston and Vink 2013), key obstacles to immigrants' political participation include their lack of electoral participation and country approaches to naturalization.

Host countries permit immigrants to participate in elections to varying degrees. In the last 50 years more than 50 countries have held parliamentary debates at different levels (local, provincial and national) about extending voting rights to migrants after a certain period of residence. More than 30 countries have reformed their electoral laws and even constitutions to enable non-citizen residents to vote (Pedroza 2015). Non-citizen voting rights exist, or are provided for in constitutions without having been applied or implemented, in 64 democracies (Blais et al. 2001; Earnest 2004; Waldrauch 2005). The largest group of countries to allow non-citizens to vote is the EU. After 3–5 years of residence, non-citizen residents may stand as candidates in local elections in 11 EU countries, vote locally in 15, regionally in five and nationally in three (certain groups in Portugal and the UK). Outside the EU, Norway, Iceland and eight Central and South American countries including Belize, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela have the same purely residence-based local franchise (Bauböck 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck 2016). However, almost 10 million non-EU adults are disenfranchised in 13 EU countries (Huddleston et al. 2015). The same is true for resident non-citizens in Canada, Japan, Turkey and USA. According to 2013 MIPEx data, in the USA this affects 21.9 million people or 7 per cent of the population, and 4.8 million people in Canada or 10 per cent of the population (Huddleston et al. 2015).

The Nordic countries and Ireland grant the most inclusive local voting rights in Europe, while outside the EU the most democratically inclusive country granting national voting rights is New Zealand (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEx 2015). Malawi grants national franchise after

seven years. In Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay the residence requirements for national franchise are five and 15 years, respectively (Bauböck 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck 2016).

Granting voting rights to immigrants is controversial, given that voting is traditionally seen as a feature of citizenship. Whether citizenship is defined as the compilation of civil, social and political rights or as a status of full membership in a polity, there is a trend in an increasing number of countries to link immigrants' local voting rights to residency, while national voting rights are rarely granted to immigrants before naturalization (Bauböck 2005). In some regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, democratization has been linked to the extension of voting rights to non-citizens, although it remains a politically sensitive issue. With the exception of Chile and Uruguay, democratization in South America has indirectly contributed to immigrant voting rights because government policies were sympathetic to migrants' rights and allowed immigrants to mobilize for suffrage, often having previously been prevented by authoritarian regimes (Escobar 2015, 2017). In Myanmar, non-citizens, such as Rohingya Muslims, were 'white card holders' who had the right to vote until the November 2015 elections, when that right was withdrawn, preventing them from taking part in the country's first democratic elections. In Japan, foreigners are only allowed to participate in some local referendums, but are not granted local voting rights (Huddleston et al. 2015).

Whether extending voting rights to resident non-citizens improves democracy remains empirically unproven. Electoral systems and the socio-political context influence the implementation of more inclusive voting rights. Some argue that the political inclusion of residents improves governance through more genuine representation and is an obligation of democratic governments, as laws and policies apply to both citizens and residents (Munro 2008). Conversely, concerns surround the granting of voting rights to

migrants at the national level due to fears that this will negatively affect national identity and loyalty, potentially endangering the order of the state. A third position in this debate is that access to national voting rights should be given to immigrants through naturalization, and thus pathways to their citizenship should be facilitated. Box 7.4 describes migrants' involvement in local elections in Chile.

At the local level, a different picture emerges: even when the ratio of resident non-citizens to citizens is high, local enfranchisement does not risk a national government of newcomers (Bauböck 2004; Walzer 1997). The right to vote locally may lead to a sense of belonging, as it recognizes residents' equal capacity to participate in the formation of governments, while also instilling trust between newcomers and others, thus improving legitimacy (Pedroza 2015). Policies that extend voting rights universally, even if limited to the local level, offer non-citizen residents the chance to equally integrate into politics and achieve a new sense of belonging (Offe and Fuchs 2002). For example, the Council of Europe's Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level includes the right to vote as one of its standards. Likewise, the EU's Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy highlight that 'the participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration' (European Commission 2004: 10). The European Agenda for Integration recognizes that integration is a local process, and that integration policies should include granting migrants voting rights in local elections (European Commission 2011).

Extending voting rights to migrants is more than a policy issue that may enhance democracy. It also affects which principles a country applies when it grants citizenship, and influences its political definition of citizenship. Migration policy must therefore consider citizenship policy when democratic institutions define approaches to include migrants in political life.

BOX 7.4

The decisive role of migrants in Chile's municipal elections

Migrants residing in Chile for at least five years are entitled to vote. In the 2016 municipal elections, migrants represented 1.4 per cent of total voters on the electoral roll, and 8.9 per cent of the voting population in Santiago (El Mercurio 2016). According to the Ministry of Interior, voter turnout tends to be much higher among migrants than among Chilean citizens (Gonzalez 2016). As a result, migrant voters can play a decisive role in the outcome of local and municipal elections, especially in municipalities with high concentrations of migrants. In addition, as stated by the Jesuit Migration Service, data from the 2013 legislative elections show that candidates who directly appealed to migrant voters were more successful than those who did not (*La Segunda* 2014). As the country's migrant population is continuously growing, political parties and candidates increasingly need to adapt their programmes to address migrants' concerns and propose measures to include them at the local level (*El Mercurio* 2016).

Immigrants and the influence of voter turnout—willingness to politically engage?


Voter turnout gauges the level of civic engagement. Thus whether immigrant citizens vote is an important consideration for political party and government strategies to engage with immigrants and the native population.

In Europe, voter turnout among the native population strongly influences immigrants' participation: the more native citizens vote, the more immigrant citizens vote (Voicu 2014). Some argue that their length of stay in the host country does not seem to affect whether immigrants who have voting rights make use of them (Voicu 2014). Other evidence shows that the longer immigrants stay in the host country, the more politically active they become, regardless of whether they obtain citizenship (Just and Anderson 2012). Immigrants who moved to Canada in 2001 or later were less likely to vote in 2011 than more established immigrants or those born in the country (Uppal and LaRochelle-Côté 2012).

Thus, immigrants with voting rights do not necessarily vote, and current studies show that immigrant turnout in national elections is generally lower than in local elections. Even in local elections, immigrants have a lower voter

FIGURE 7.1

Participation and Access to Nationality by Representative Government, 2014




Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Representative Government attribute (y-axis) and the averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a country scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its representative government. Pearson's correlation coefficient: $n = 35$, $r = .567$, p -value $< .005$.

Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to Nationality).

FIGURE 7.2

Participation and Access to Nationality by Checks on Government, 2014



Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Checks on Government attribute (y-axis) and the averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a country scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its checks on government. Pearson's correlation coefficient: $n = 35$, $r = .619$, p -value $< .005$.

Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Checks on Government Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to Nationality).

turnout compared to natives. The exception is Canada (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016). This is true regardless of whether a country is politically inclusive of immigrants, has an open citizenship regime or allows immigrants to vote in local elections. Examples include the Netherlands, which strongly encourages immigrant voting rights at the local level (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016: 33); Sweden, which has a large immigrant population (13 per cent), an immigrant-friendly citizenship regime and policies to further immigrant political inclusion (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016: 39); and Norway, which also facilitates immigrant political inclusion and has an open citizenship regime (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016: 44).

Different factors influence voter turnout, including the political socialization of immigrants and their socio-economic status. Immigrants' willingness to engage politically in their host societies requires a genuine interest in doing so. If political parties and governments aim to engage with as large a segment of the electorate as possible, their strategies need to address general voter scepticism that political parties and governments can tackle challenges such as migration regardless of whether a voter is a migrant or a native.

Political integration of immigrants

In addition to facilitating naturalization and granting voting rights, a country's legislative and political system must be open to immigrant political integration in order to facilitate immigrants' inclusion and ability to engage in the political life of their host countries.

To assess whether there is a correlation between a political system's openness to immigrants' political integration and the quality of its democracy, three International IDEA GSoD indices attributes (Representative Government, Checks on Government and Fundamental Rights) were compared to the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality scores.

The GSoD indices score in relation to representative government measures the extent to which a country has clean elections, inclusive suffrage, free political parties and an elected government (vertical axis Figure 7.1). The score in relation to checks on government measures the effectiveness of parliaments, judicial independence and the existence of a critical media (vertical axis Figure 7.2). Fundamental Rights (vertical axis Figure 7.3) measures equal and fair access to justice, respect for civil liberties, and the extent of social and political equality. The GSoD indices and MIPEX both score 35 countries, the majority of which score very high on the GSoD indices. This means that even the lower-scoring countries in the GSoD indices and MIPEX sample score higher relative to the global sample.


The MIPEX political participation and access to nationality scores (horizontal axis on Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) measure 167 indicators over the time period 2004–14, including countries’ migration policies in relation to electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies as well as eligibility for naturalization, conditions for acquisition of citizenship status, security of citizenship status and acceptance of dual nationality. All EU member states are included, as well as Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA.

Political participation policies focus on migrants’ right to vote and stand in national, local and regional elections; their right of association and membership in political parties; the existence, powers, composition and representativeness of migrant consultative bodies at the regional, national and local levels; and whether public funding enables active political participation by migrants and their associations.

Access-to-nationality policies focus on eligibility criteria for naturalization such as residence and permit requirements for legal residents, and conditions for the naturalization of spouses and

FIGURE 7.3

Political Participation and Access to Nationality by Fundamental Rights, 2014



Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Fundamental Rights attribute (y-axis) and the averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a country scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its fundamental rights. Austria is not included due to lack of data. Pearson's correlation coefficient: $n = 34$, $r = .593$, $p\text{-value} < .005$.

Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Fundamental Rights Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to Nationality).

second- and third-generation migrants. They also focus on conditions for the acquisition of citizenship such as language, economic and criminal record requirements, good character clauses and costs. Other factors include the security of citizenship status based on the length of procedures, grounds of citizenship refusal and discretionary powers of refusal, legal guarantees and redress in the case of citizenship refusal, protection against the withdrawal of citizenship, and whether dual nationality is granted to second- and third-generation migrants. The 2014 data from the MIPEX and GSoD indices show that political systems that are open or inclusive in terms of their political integration of immigrants tend to score high in key attributes of democracy quality.

Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show that in Europe, the high scores for immigrant-friendly countries such as Finland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden reflect policies that focus on ensuring that immigrants have equal legal rights to citizens and a high level of integration

Data show that political systems that are open or inclusive in terms of their political integration of immigrants tend to score high in key attributes of democracy quality

support. By contrast, the low MIPEX political participation/access to nationality scores and medium GSoD indices scores for immigration-restrictive countries such as Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Romania reflect the fact that these countries only offer basic opportunities for integration, with limited migrant political participation and difficult pathways to citizenship. In Romania, it should also be noted that emigration exceeds immigration. While the GSoD indices quality of democracy scores are high for Canada, Spain, Switzerland and the USA, they have mid-range scores for MIPEX political participation/access to nationality indicators, reflecting their restrictive policies on voting rights for immigrants and a lack of consultative bodies (in the case of Canada) and pathways to citizenship (in the US case). Japan scores high on the GSoD indices quality of democracy scores but low on the MIPEX political participation/access to nationality indicators, reflecting its restrictive policies on immigrant voting rights and political participation. Despite recent reforms in refugee and asylum policies, Turkey scores low on both the GSoD quality of democracy indices and the MIPEX political participation/access to nationality indicators, reflecting an unfavourable legal framework for the integration and political participation of immigrants as well as a difficult path to citizenship or even legal residence.

The political integration of immigrants through citizenship access and political participation rights benefits democratic societies and helps create the conditions for strong and resilient democracies. Political parties and governments should adopt strategies and policies that promote the inclusion of immigrants to tackle the migration challenge.

Immigrant representation in key political institutions and consultative bodies

Political parties in some countries—especially those that have granted local voting rights to immigrants—realize they cannot ignore immigrants' issues and concerns. In the USA,

the Democratic and Republican parties grapple with the impact of immigrant votes, which influences their electoral campaigns and results. Latino voters have been vital to Democrats' victories in congressional and presidential elections, and their influence is increasing as they become a larger share of the US electorate (Oakford 2014). Since 2012, the number of eligible Latino voters has increased to 27.3 million, accounting for 12 per cent of all voters in 2016 (Krogstad 2016), with second-generation immigrants driving the increase (Oakford 2014). Millennials make up 44 per cent of Latino eligible voters (Krogstad 2016). In 2016, of the 57 million Latinos living in the USA, a record 27 million were eligible to vote, almost half of whom were young millennials. This is the largest increase of any group during this time frame. The Latino share of the overall voter turnout was higher in 2016 (11 per cent) than in 2012 (10 per cent) or 2008 (9 per cent) (Krogstad and Lopez 2016).

Political parties and parliaments as well as local councils face the challenge of integrating the interests of an increasingly diverse population due to the effects of migration. As the main representatives of the people in political decision-making processes, parties should strive to reflect the interests of all citizens (Kemp et al. 2013).

While data are lacking on whether political parties reflect the diversity of their populations, minority groups are usually under-represented (Bloemraad 2013). In Sweden, 9.5 per cent of national MPs have an immigrant background, compared to only 5.7 per cent in Germany and 1.3 per cent in Portugal—and less than 1 per cent in Italy, Ireland and Spain (Dähnke et al. 2014: 12–13). Canada elected its most diverse Parliament in 2015 (Woolf 2015). Box 7.5 explores the role of parliaments in developing policies that affect migrants.

Immigrants remain under-represented at the local level, even though there tend to be more councillors with an immigrant background at the municipal level and in cities, and parties nominate a substantial number of minority

candidates in local elections. For example, the total number of councillors of immigrant origin in Norway and the Netherlands was under 1 per cent (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010) and 3 per cent, respectively, in 2011 (Vermeulen 2011). In New Zealand, immigrant Indians formed their own political party to compete in local elections on a pro-immigration rights platform in 2016; while Asians and Indians represent 13 per cent of the country's current population, they are not proportionally represented in Parliament (Lynch 2016). In Australia's current Parliament of 226 senators and members, only 26 were born overseas (13 per cent) (Parliament of Australia 2015), despite the fact that 28 per cent of Australians are born overseas (Hasham 2016).

Adding to the representation deficit is the challenge immigrants face in joining political parties. In some regions, such as Europe, this is comparatively easy, since few parties prevent immigrants from becoming members beyond residence requirements (Dähnke et al. 2014: 14). However, except for Poland, non-citizen immigrants cannot vote in or stand for elections.

Immigrants face challenges related to the opening up of traditional party cultures to accept and further their effective participation. These include the lack of a welcoming culture that adapts to the diversity of its members, and the need for personal contacts with the (local) party leadership to be encouraged to join a party and be included on a candidate list. In addition, immigrants often lack access to historical and established party networks, particularly youth organizations that in European countries such as the Nordics, Austria and Germany often provide the entry point for a political career. Immigrants who do become successful party members often take on the role of mediator with immigrant communities, and can thus influence how a party contributes to the migration debate and migration policy. Conversely, if immigrant representatives in political parties are perceived to be mere 'tokens' with no real influence on programmes and policy, this can limit their ability to influence party structures.

BOX 7.5

Contributions of parliaments to migration governance

Given the transnational nature of migration, national and regional parliaments play a key role in regional and international approaches to the challenges migration poses to democracy. Parliaments design national migration policies. Therefore, they should promote a culture of democratic debate that advocates inclusion and tolerance of migrants, and contribute to policies that maximize the benefits of migration, particularly in the economic sphere.

Given the challenges faced by government institutions in dealing with the current levels of migration, parliamentarians must ensure that legislation is enacted and enforceable, and backed by the necessary financial resources to strengthen the national and local government institutions responsible for protecting migrants' rights and furthering their integration into society.

Parliaments have the ability to reach out to different government entities and civil society to develop a holistic approach to the challenges of migration. For example the Rwandan Parliament has established a mechanism allowing migrants to lodge appeals directly with a parliamentary human rights committee, which helps protect migrants' rights (IPU 2015).

Political parties have applied different strategies to increase minority representation, including bolstering their profile within ethnic communities, implementing recruitment drives to encourage ethnic minority representatives to stand for election, and adopting numerical targets for minority candidates. In a very few cases, political parties have established ethnic candidate lists (Bird 2003). Other political parties have used targets, intraparty minority networks and quotas to increase minority representation. Examples include the Ontario New Democratic Party and the Welsh Labour Party as well as the Swedish Social Democratic Party, which introduced quotas for candidates of immigrant background at the local level. In Stockholm municipality, a quota for candidates targeting migrants from non-Nordic countries has been set in proportion to the district's immigrant population (25 per cent) (Dähnke et al. 2014: 22). While political institutions and parties have often successfully used quotas to increase the share of women (Wängnerud 2009), they have not always worked for minority groups (Ruedin 2013; Lubbers and Van der Zwan 2016). Reserved seats in legislatures are more often used to ensure the representation of minority groups (Htun 2004).

Many political parties allow immigrants to hold positions within their party structure, including on candidate lists (Htun 2004), and some have created incentives for immigrants to politically engage with them through special forums or campaigns. Many of these structures are informal and weak, and depend on

individual interactions rather than institutional structures. Overall, political parties could be more effective at attracting people from immigrant backgrounds (Dähne et al. 2014).

Electoral systems and the cultural context affect the level of minority representation in political institutions (Ruedin 2013; Togeby 2008; Dancygier et al. 2015; Sobolewska 2013). The size of an electoral district affects the likelihood that under-represented groups will be elected, as this defines how many candidates parties can field in an election. Similarly, a low formal threshold (or no threshold) can increase the representation of under-represented groups, particularly in proportional representation systems (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005; Larsrud and Taphorn 2007). In countries with proportional representation electoral systems, such as the Netherlands, candidate selection methods influence the representativeness of the candidate list, including candidates' relative positions on the list, which can increase their chances of being elected. Parties that have more positive views on migration and integration tend to have higher shares of ethnic minorities, and place them higher on candidate lists (Lubbers and Van der Zwan 2016). In addition, if a party's candidate selection system is more inclusive, the relative position of ethnic minority groups is higher. Parties that have strong internal support systems for ethnic minorities tend to have a higher share of ethnic minorities (Lubbers and Van der Zwan 2016). In majority systems such as in Colombia, Hungary, India, Jordan, New Zealand, Niger and Pakistan, seats are set aside in the legislature for under-represented groups (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005). Box 7.6 examines the inclusiveness of political parties in Germany.

In the context of tackling the migration challenge, a party's agenda and views on migration—regardless of where it stands on the political spectrum—seem to influence whether immigrants are represented in political party structures, whether they can stand for election

BOX 7.6

Case study on inclusive political parties in Germany

Although foreign permanent residents constitute almost 50 per cent of Germany's immigrant population, only citizens have the right to vote in federal elections (Basic Law, article 20(2)). In a series of decisions in 1990, Germany's Constitutional Court ruled that enfranchising foreigners would require revising the citizenship law to facilitate naturalization. German reunification, along with the migratory consequences of the democratization processes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, presented an opportunity for reform. In 1992, the citizenship law was revised to introduce naturalization as a right for foreigners who had lived in Germany for 15 years, but fell short of introducing the territorial principle: immigrant children born in Germany still had to apply for German citizenship. In 1999, the Citizenship Act introduced *ius soli* for children born in Germany to immigrant parents with eight years of residency and entitled immigrants to citizenship after eight years if they complied with two key integration requirements—adhering to the laws of the German state and learning its language; this resulted in 905,000 naturalizations from 2000 to 2005.

There was the potential for a significant increase in the number of naturalized citizens, since 68.6 per cent of the German immigrant electorate had been in the country for more than eight years and thus qualified for citizenship under the 1999 law. Thus political parties in Germany revised their strategies to mobilize immigrant support to appeal to immigrant voters' interests, and by increasingly nominating immigrant candidates on party lists or preventing their defection (Claro da Fonseca 2011).

The 1999 Citizenship Act did not go far enough to increase the representation of one of Germany's key minorities, the Turks, in the Bundestag. The Turkish minority in Germany had been affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) since the 1960s, with support for the Greens rising in the 1980s. Turkish candidates in the Left Party were successful in the 2005 elections, followed by the further diversification of German political parties fielding Turkish candidates in the 2009 elections, including the SDP, the Greens, the Left and the Free Democratic Party. Even though the Turkish minority remains under-represented in the Bundestag, it has a higher political representation than Muslims in Britain or France (Aktürk 2010).

Despite a general understanding among traditional German political parties, particularly since the 2000s, that immigration has had a positive impact on Germany, in particular for the economy as a result of gaining skilled labour, the idea of increasing inclusiveness and multiculturalism has been controversial. Particularly after reunification, EU expansion and the recent refugee crisis in Europe, there has been a rise in xenophobic violence, nationalism and the establishment of anti-immigrant political parties such as the AfD (see Box 4.3) and movements such as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, Pegida), and the passage of restrictive asylum legislation.

and whether they have a realistic chance of winning due to their relative position on a party's candidate list. The level of support that a party provides to immigrants also matters. Political parties' inclusiveness thus affects the representation of immigrants. Parties that have positive views on migration should therefore evaluate the inclusiveness of their candidate selection processes and strengthen their internal party support structures to ensure migrants are appropriately represented.

Countries may include immigrants in decision-making processes through consultative bodies, even if they do not grant them formal voting rights or facilitate their inclusion in political parties. In the EU, ten countries (Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) have established formal consultative bodies between immigrants and government bodies (EU FRA 2017).

Consultations with immigrants can take many different forms and operate on different levels. For example local government authorities, including cities and municipalities in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and Sweden have established dialogue platforms among citizens and immigrant or ethnic minority associations, consultative bodies, and elected representatives from each municipality, and research institutions focusing on immigration-related issues to enhance integration at the local level. These dialogue sessions (called Strengthening Integration Dialogue Platforms) have addressed topics such as voting in the general elections and the challenges and opportunities to improve facilities and living conditions in their municipalities (EU FRA 2017). In Italy, 14 regional councils, 48 municipal councils and 19 provincial councils have immigrant consultative bodies (EU FRA 2017).

The composition and selection modalities of these consultative bodies varies: typically, the largest immigrant groups are represented, depending on their self-organization and the extent of their networking abilities. Immigrant

representatives can be elected by immigrants or other organizations or be publicly appointed (EU FRA 2017).

The challenge of anti-immigrant parties

Concerns over immigration have reinvigorated right-wing populist parties and leaders in countries such as Germany (Otto and Steinhardt 2014), Denmark (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2008), Austria (Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2013), Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia and the USA (Mayda, Peri and Steingress 2016). Many parties across the political spectrum increasingly use the media to communicate the narrative of an out-of-touch political elite versus the people, and an 'us versus them' mentality based on ethnocentric identities and xenophobia (Greven 2016).

Fuelled by the refugee crisis resulting from the ongoing Syrian civil war, Europe has experienced increased support for the revitalization of nationalist, anti-immigrant political parties that promote Islamophobia. These parties have been on the rise in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, as well as in the traditionally liberal Netherlands and the Nordic states, and have secured significant parliamentary blocs in several countries. Other nations have seen the rise of nationalist street movements such as the English Defence League or France's Muslim-baiting Bloc Indentitaire. Nationalist and right-wing parties gained significantly at the ballot box in 2015 in Austria, Denmark, Finland and Switzerland (Recknagl 2015). In 2016, far-right Freedom Party candidate Norbert Hofer received strong support in the first round of the Austrian presidential elections, while the right-wing populist parties Law and Justice, and Fidesz, govern in Poland and Hungary, respectively. In France, National Front candidate Marine Le Pen has gained support from the white working class and the unemployed to reach the second round of the presidential election in May 2017, in which she was defeated.

In addition, mainstream parties increasingly accommodate the rhetoric of anti-immigrant parties during election campaigns, adding

Political parties have applied different strategies to increase minority representation, including bolstering their profile within ethnic communities, implementing recruitment drives to encourage ethnic minority representatives to stand for election and adopting numerical targets for minority candidates

Whether it is the size of the foreign population in a country or the size and speed of migration flows that leads to a rise in populist parties is still debated

fuel to anti-immigrant public attitudes and affecting political party platforms. For example, in France, measures have been taken to reduce access to citizenship, so that children of immigrants no longer gain citizenship at birth, but at the age of 18, and only once they prove themselves to be 'well assimilated' (Demos 2017).

While the trend of rising public support for nationalist anti-immigrant political parties is evident in Europe and the USA, particularly after the 2016 election of populist President Donald Trump, in other regions it has not been as marked or as successful. While Australia saw the launch of the anti-immigrant Australian Liberty Alliance in 2015, which represented the first resurgence of right-wing sentiment

since the rise of former candidate for prime minister, Pauline Hanson, who campaigned against Asian immigrants in 1990, it did not gain traction at the ballot box (Pearlman 2015). Citizens' views on migration, and their resulting voting behaviour, are challenging the core values of democratic projects such as the EU, as demonstrated by the UK's 'Brexit' referendum, which was influenced by the issue of migration in the context of freedom of movement within the EU (see Box 7.7).

Migration fuelled by globalization thus affects democracy by increasing public support for (particularly right-wing) populist parties and their anti-immigrant agendas. Whether it is the size of the foreign population in a country or the size and speed of migration flows that leads to a rise in populist parties is still debated. A controversial 2016 study suggests that there is a tipping point of immigration that leads to electoral support for right-wing populist parties in Europe: as the percentage of immigrants approaches approximately 22 per cent of the general population, the percentage of right-wing populist voters exceeds 50 per cent—the threshold for forming a government (Podobnik, Jusup and Stanley 2016). The data furthermore suggest that the greater the percentage of voters in favour of right-wing populist parties compared to the percentage of immigrants, the lower their tolerance of immigrants (Podobnik, Jusup and Stanley 2016). By contrast, other studies show that it is not the percentage of the foreign population in a country that invigorates right-wing populism, but rather the speed and size of immigration flows (Demos 2017; Guibernau 2010).

There have been positive examples of the public voting for pro-immigrant political parties or leaders who advocate inclusive and fair migration policies, such as the election of Sadiq Khan as mayor of London in 2016 (see Box 7.8).

A European study from 2010 found that public concern about immigration is one cause of citizens' lack of trust in political institutions

BOX 7.7

The influence of migration perceptions on the 'Brexit' referendum

A slim majority of UK voters chose to leave the EU in June 2016 in what has become known as the 'Brexit' referendum. The three most decisive issues for voters were the economy (21 per cent), sovereignty (17 per cent) and immigration (20 per cent) (Swales 2016). These issues had a strong impact on voting behavior: the majority of those who said immigration (88 per cent) or sovereignty (90 per cent) were the most important issues voted to leave, compared to a small minority who said the economy was more important (Prosser, Mellon and Green 2016). Almost 50 per cent of the British population believed in 2016 that immigration negatively affects the economy, according to the British Social Attitudes survey (Versi 2016). 'Leave' voters believed that immigration had negatively affected Britain, and felt that Brexit would lower immigration, positively influence the economy and strengthen security (Swales 2016).

Before the referendum, polls indicated that immigration had become voters' top priority, which prompted the Leave campaign to adopt more anti-immigrant rhetoric (Taylor 2016). Several leading Conservatives made anti-immigrant statements; then-Prime Minister David Cameron referred to refugees as a 'swarm' (BBC News 2015). Boris Johnson, who was then mayor of London, portrayed Turkish people as a threat to the UK due to their geographic proximity to Syria and Iraq. The leader of the nationalist UK Independence Party (UKIP), Nigel Farage, alleged during his campaign that immigrants would overwhelm Britain. One of UKIP's posters featured the image of a mass of migrants traveling by foot with the header 'breaking point' (Versi 2016). Both parties found strong support among their members for a Leave vote: 98 per cent of UKIP voters and 58 per cent of Conservatives voted to leave (Swales 2016). The Leave campaign attracted voters concerned about migration who were unaware of its long-term positive effects on the economy: 95 per cent of those who voted Leave were anti-immigrant and economically not well off. The Leave campaign better tapped into public concerns, providing more clarity about the potential impact of Brexit on immigration and independence.

and politicians, and not simply the result of far-right rhetoric or pessimism, or migration levels (McLaren 2010). Specifically, if citizens' perceptions of the effects of immigration are negative, they are less trusting of the political system. The study concluded that levels of immigration were unrelated (or negatively related) to public concerns about immigration. In European countries with high-quality governance and policies that make it easier for immigrants to participate in political life and integrate, public concern about immigration and political distrust was high, while concerns about immigration had a weaker effect on trust in political institutions in countries with poor governance. In relation to immigrant-friendly migration policies, those with less negative views of immigrants were less distrustful of their political systems and politicians than those who were very concerned about immigration. This relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust exists regardless of the presence of far-right parties. Reducing the disconnect between citizens and political institutions and governments, and increasing trust between them, can help public attitudes towards immigration produce better governance (McLaren 2010)

Therefore a key policy implication for governments—in addition to considering state capacities in relation to migration policymaking—is that countries with high immigration rates and immigrant-friendly or multicultural policies must work to reduce the potential backlash from citizens who have negative perceptions of immigration. This is particularly true in Europe, Latin America and the USA, which have experienced a rise in populist leaders and parties as a result of voter dissatisfaction, which has often been linked to anti-immigrant sentiments. This seems to be corroborated by recent explanations that the rise of authoritarian populists in Western societies has caused a strong cultural backlash against long-term social change and liberal values (Norris 2016).

BOX 7.8

The mayor of London

In May 2016, the month before the Brexit referendum, London voters elected Sadiq Khan, the son of Pakistani immigrants and an observant Muslim, as their new mayor by a greater margin than any London mayor since it became an elected office in 2000. His Conservative opponent sought to link Khan's faith with violent extremism (Krol 2016), to which Khan responded (on Twitter), 'There's no need to keep pointing at me & shouting "he's a Muslim". I put it on my own leaflets' (Sullivan and Pickard 2016). He described himself to one of Europe's largest and oldest cities as a native: 'I am a Londoner, I am European, I am British, I am English, I am of Islamic faith, of Asian origin, of Pakistani heritage, a dad, a husband' (Sullivan and Pickard 2016).

At a time of rising pan-European Islamophobia, in the midst of the campaign that led to the UK vote to leave the EU, and in the context of electoral losses by Khan's Labour Party, this represents a dramatic success for an inclusive political vision. One commentator referred to his victory as 'a stinging rebuke to the peddlers of prejudice' (Hasan 2016). With Muslims representing about one-eighth of the city's population, Khan attracted a broad base of voters. His working-class roots, his record as an MP and minister in the previous Labour government, and his focus on quality-of-life issues such as housing and transport proved an attractive political package (Booth 2016). Arguably the UK's acceptance of multiculturalism, rather than the 'assimilationist' model of integration practiced in other countries, enabled his victory (Hasan 2016).

7.4. Emigrants as agents of democracy: how can democracies gain from emigration?

Notwithstanding the important contributions of emigrant remittances to the economies of their home countries, the most important effect of emigration for origin countries may be on political institutions and social attitudes through democratic norm diffusion. Diaspora communities influence their home countries through the transfer of social remittances. The definition of diaspora used here is Gerard-Francois Dumont's: 'a community of individuals living together on the same territory and having in common the conviction or belief of belonging, themselves or their families to another territory with which they maintain regular relations'; they are not tourists or short-term visitors. They transfer information, innovative ideas, intellectual capacities, new technological skills, business and trade practices, and democratic political habits and practices when they return to their home countries, when they visit relatives and via social media, TV and telecommunications. Globalization,

in particular the spread of the internet and communication technology, has made it easier for migrants to stay informed and connected to politics in their home countries. This has transformed their ability to participate in their home countries' political life and influence their democratic institutions and political leadership.

Diaspora and reintegrating emigrants may thus act as a bridge between origin and destination countries, and in their home countries as 'agents of democracy' and a reconciling force to overcome political trauma. Their actions and views can affect society's attitudes regarding the perception of freedom, tolerance of differences, human rights, governance and political practices in their countries of origin (see Box 7.9).

The evidence suggests that there is a democratic dividend from emigration (Rapoport 2016; Lodigiani 2016); migrants act as agents of democracy, which has important policy

implications. For instance, a study conducted in Cabo Verde showed that returnees demand greater accountability from their government if their host country had high-quality governance, and that returnees were able to influence their home countries more than emigrants can from host countries (Batista and Vincente 2011). A study conducted in Mexico found evidence that migration to the USA contributed to democratization in Mexico by significantly increasing the probability of an opposition party winning a municipal election (Pfütze 2014). In Mali, returnees increased electoral participation and helped spread the idea of the need for increased political participation among non-migrants in Mali, which enhanced democracy (Chauvet and Mercier 2014). In Moldova, emigration to Western countries decreased support for the Communist Party, which contributed to the establishment of new and more democratic political parties (Mahmoud et al. 2014). In Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania, returning members of the diaspora joined the national political leadership. In India, returnees have influenced political elites by reshaping political understandings, norms and expectations, and have contributed to political stability and the resilience of the country's democracy by encouraging political elites to accept marginalized social groups into political life (Kapur 2010).

Home countries can greatly benefit from reintegrating emigrants, especially those who were forced to leave but can return post-conflict. While abroad, if host societies allowed them the opportunity, migrants may have increased their skills, wealth, and political interest and capacities. They may have been able to stand as candidates in municipal elections and have gained significant political experience that they can apply to their home country. The diaspora may have formed civic associations or even political groups preparing to reintroduce democracy in the event that their home country begins a democratic transition. In some cases, the diaspora plays a key role in raising awareness about the political situation in their home countries, and mobilizing foreign governments

BOX 7.9

The Myanmar diaspora as agents of democratization

With approximately 5 million migrants, Myanmar's diaspora is among the most diverse and populous in South East Asia, comprising economic migrants, refugees and political exiles (Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012). It has played an active role in promoting democratic reforms from their host countries.

For instance, in 1999 migrant women from different ethnic and religious backgrounds founded the Women's League of Burma (WLB), an umbrella organization based in Thailand that aims to raise awareness on gender issues and enhance the participation of women in the peace and democracy-building processes. The WLB has been engaged in advocacy and capacity-building activities to politically empower Myanmar's women (Hedström 2013). Following the historic 2015 general elections, the WLB joined with other civil society organizations focusing on women's issues to establish the Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process, a Myanmar-based organization that works to advance the role of women in the ongoing peace process.

In a similar way, many migrants who had fled the country for political reasons remained politically active in their host countries and decided to return home after the country's democratic opening. For example, Aung Moe Zaw is the founder and editor of a media outlet (The Irrawaddy) that covers news in Myanmar and other South East Asian countries. Founded in 1993 by Myanmar migrants residing in Thailand, The Irrawaddy opened an office in Myanmar in 2012 (The Irrawaddy n.d.). Aung Moe Zaw, chair of the Democratic Party for a New Society, returned to Myanmar in 2012 and reregistered the party in the run-up to the 2015 general elections. Although the party did not win any seats, it remains active in the political scene (Long 2015).

and the international community to advocate democratic reforms there (Koinova 2009; Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012).

Given the potential influence of the diaspora on the political life of their home countries, the following section analyses how countries encourage or facilitate their political engagement. It explores (a) whether countries allow emigrants to retain citizenship and accept dual citizenship, (b) whether countries allow emigrants to vote in national elections, (c) voter turnout of emigrants and (d) how well emigrants are represented in key political institutions such as parliaments and political parties or other consultative bodies.

Citizenship and emigrants


An important consideration for many emigrants is whether they can retain their original citizenship when they naturalize as immigrants in their host countries. Many countries accept dual nationality, especially if giving up the origin country nationality has negative consequences for emigrants who have maintained ties to their host countries (OECD 2011).

Dual nationality can exist from birth or be acquired. Dual nationality by birth is generally accepted by countries, often with an obligation to choose upon reaching the age of majority, whereas the acquisition of another nationality usually entails a requirement to make a choice or the automatic loss of one. Numerous international conventions (such as the 1930 Hague Convention, the Council of Europe Convention of 6 May 1963 on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations, the Council of Europe Convention on Nationality, of 6 November 1997) regulate the issue of dual nationality, with a preference expressed in initial documents for the principle of having one nationality only. This principle, however, did not take into account the reality of the existence of multiple nationalities between countries, leading to the stipulation that any person who acquires the nationality of a signatory state will *automatically* lose his/her former nationality. This automatic clause posed problems of application, and led to a prevailing position in law and in practice that allows multiple nationalities as long as the following principles are respected: the right

The evidence suggests that there is a democratic dividend from emigration; migrants act as agents of democracy, which has important policy implications

FIGURE 7.4

Percentage of countries allowing dual citizenship, 1975–2015



Notes: This graph shows the percentage of countries with a population over 1 million that allow dual citizenship by region for the period 1975–2015.

Source: MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Database 2015.

Since 1975 every region of the world has seen a substantial increase in the share of countries offering dual citizenship. This 40-year trend shows that dual citizenship is becoming the norm

to a nationality, and avoiding the arbitrary deprivation of a nationality and statelessness.

Since 1975 every region of the world has seen a substantial increase in the share of countries offering dual citizenship. In 2015, dual citizenship is most commonly accepted in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (91 per cent), North America (100 per cent), Europe (76 per cent), the Middle East and Iran (90 per cent), and Africa (63 per cent), but even at the lowest rate, in Asia and the Pacific (57 per cent), a majority of countries offer dual citizenship. This 40-year trend shows that dual citizenship is becoming the norm (MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Database 2015).

Whether or not countries should grant or permit dual citizenship is controversial. Such controversies touch on legal issues such as military conscription and tax liability that may arise out of administrative conflicts, and on socio-political debate around the question of granting multiple voting rights to migrants in both host and origin countries.

Expanding external voting for emigrants?

Migrants from democracies as diverse as Cabo Verde, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico and the Philippines are influencing electoral politics, civic engagement and patterns of governance by remaining involved in political institutions and democratic processes in their home countries. Returning emigrants can play a key role in democratic transitions, such as in Myanmar or during the independence era of South Sudan.

As with voting rights for immigrants, allowing emigrants to vote is controversial, as it lets citizens influence politics in their origin countries without necessarily being affected by the election results or government policies (Lopez-Guerra 2005; Rubio-Marin 2006). Some argue that allowing dual citizens to vote in two countries weakens the 'one person one vote' principle. Others assert that globalization has led to overlapping jurisdictions, and that expatriate voters have a sufficient stake in their home country to justify the right to participate politically (Spiro 2006). Modern democracies thus tolerate many loyalties and affinities (local, regional, religious, civic, political, etc.) that are not incompatible with loyalty to the nation state (Martin 2003). Box 7.10 explores the issue of voting from abroad in the context of Tunisia.

BOX 7.10

Voting from abroad: the Tunisian diaspora

Although Tunisian migrants were granted the right to vote in 1989, after the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, Tunisian civil society and migrant organizations actively advocated reforms to the regulation of out-of-country voting (Lafleur 2015). The 2011 electoral law stipulates that Tunisian citizens residing abroad have the right to vote in and stand for national elections. According to the law, the diaspora is represented by 18 MPs in the form of reserved seats, or approximately 8 per cent of seats in Parliament. Given that France hosts approximately 54 per cent of the Tunisian diaspora, 10 out of 18 diaspora MPs are elected to represent Tunisian migrants residing in France. Three MPs are elected from Italy, one from Germany, two from the Arab world, and the remaining two are from the Americas and the rest of Europe. Out-of-country voting takes place over three days, during which registered voters can cast their ballots in Tunisian embassies and consulates. Diaspora MPs are to return to Tunisia for one week per month in order to represent their constituents.

Although generally low, the turnout of diaspora voters for the 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly was 29.2 per cent, which was considered remarkably high, given that voter turnout within Tunisia was 51.2 (Jaulin 2013a, 2013b). Hence, out-of-country constituencies represent an important electoral stake, and election campaigns abroad involve all the main political parties, as well as migrants' associations, civil rights and religious organizations (Jaulin 2016).

Voting from abroad is arguably necessary to preserve the basic right to vote, as most countries do not permit non-citizens to vote in national elections. It can, however, raise political and practical concerns. Politically, it may be difficult for emigrants to connect to issues relevant to a constituency in their home country; therefore, some states, such as the Dominican Republic, France, Italy, Portugal and Tunisia, set aside parliamentary seats to represent citizens living abroad. Practical concerns include enabling timely and secure voting; requiring in-person voting at consulates can alleviate these, but at the cost of reduced turnout due to inconvenience (European Commission for Democracy through Law 2010). In post-

conflict situations, diaspora networks and civic organizations are key to enabling expatriate political engagement. The effect is magnified when diaspora organizations also maintain a presence in the country of origin (Brinkerhoff 2008).

Granting emigrants the right to vote is a discretionary act, as no international law legally obligates states to maintain voting rights for emigrants. Many countries extend voting rights to non-resident citizens, although technical and administrative constraints can pose barriers to actual voting. Laws in 146 out of 206 democracies allow non-resident citizens to vote from abroad (International IDEA Voting from Abroad Database 2015). Of these, 48 apply expatriate voting to only one type of election, while most allow it for two or more types. The most common practice—in 43 countries—is to allow external voting for three or more types of elections; 43 countries allow external voting in presidential and legislative elections (International IDEA Voting from Abroad Database 2015).

In Europe and Asia emigrant voting is more commonly allowed than elsewhere (86 per cent and 77 per cent, respectively). Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania are the most restrictive, with just over half (53 per cent each) of countries allowing emigrants the right to vote in some type of election. Globally, the right to vote is predominantly granted for elections at the national level, with more countries allowing expats to vote for the legislature (33 per cent) than at the presidential level (22 per cent). In Oceania, Europe and North America it is more common to allow emigrants to vote in a referendum. Emigrants are rarely granted the right to vote in subnational elections. Only 29 countries grant expats this right. This practice is most common in Europe (24 countries) and Oceania (four countries) (International IDEA Voting from Abroad Database 2015).

The EU is the largest group of countries that allows emigrant voting (except for Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Malta). The USA, Canada and several European states (Austria, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) have increased accessibility through ballots sent by mail. Central and South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Peru and Venezuela) require their citizens to vote at a consulate or embassy in their country of residence. Some countries, such as Israel, require emigrants to travel to their country of citizenship to vote on election day (Bauböck 2005). The Philippines requires a planned return in the foreseeable future as a condition for absentee voting.

Seventeen countries—including six in Europe (Croatia, Estonia, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania), six in Africa (Algeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Tunisia) and five in Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti and Panama)—allow their citizens abroad to participate in some electoral processes and to elect their own representatives to Parliament. This reinforces external voters' links with the national political community, enabling the promotion of their own legislative agenda and intervention in political decisions from an overseas viewpoint (Collyer 2014).

Refugees have traditionally been among the last marginalized groups to become enfranchised. There is no standard international practice on promoting the political rights of refugees; there are regional variations in resource allocation, practice and institutional leadership. For example, refugee enfranchisement was written into the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement), and subsequent 1996 balloting for Bosnia Herzegovina covered refugees in 55 countries, while in Liberia in 1997 there were no out-of-country enfranchisement opportunities or organized repatriation (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). Nevertheless, refugees and the

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international organizations charged with their protection face obstacles to their ability to realize full political participation rights, including intimidation, physical obstacles, and a lack of access to election and civic information pertaining to their home country. In other cases, refugees' disenfranchisement may stem from financial, transparency and logistical constraints that prevent the electoral authorities from reaching out to the refugee population or ensuring ballot secrecy and transparency (Grace and Fischer 2003).

A non-territorial conceptualization of the 'nation' is one of the reasons countries facilitate expatriate voting, but often extensions of voting rights to citizens abroad have occurred in the context of democratic transitions, most notably in South America and Southern Europe, where authoritarian governments had caused an exodus of citizens who remained away for decades and would not immediately return. When political participation in these countries was newly defined, citizens abroad were often granted full rights. Furthermore, colonial state traditions affect legislation on external voting in Africa; former French and Portuguese colonies have enfranchised expatriate citizens, while former British colonies have been reluctant to do so. Studies have found a correlation between the size and nature of the emigrant population and the extent to which countries restrict voting rights for expatriates. The larger the population abroad, the more political elites worry that external voters can influence election results (Caramani and Grotz 2015). For this reason, some African states with comparatively large numbers of emigrants, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Uganda, prohibit it. When the opposition parties in Zimbabwe proposed allowing the diaspora to vote, the Electoral Commission stated that it was not opposed to the proposal, but lacked 'funding for the necessary logistical arrangements' (News24 2016). If migration involves refugees, external voting rights are granted when their support is needed, often following a change of regime. Conversely, some governments encourage emigrant voting when

they expect voters will support the incumbent. Examples include Turkey and Hungary, where both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Victor Orbán strongly targeted emigrant voters in the 2017 and 2014 elections, respectively.

Nevertheless, there is no clear correlation between external voting provisions and countries' political or socio-economic features. While the third wave of democratization has generally spread expatriate suffrage since the 1990s, the evidence is mixed. New democracies in South America enfranchised emigrants, while African countries did not, often because expatriates supported opposition parties. Countries that have granted voting rights to expatriates include well-established democracies as well as emerging or restored ones, and even countries that cannot be classified as democratic (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007).

Does granting voting rights to emigrants strengthen democracies in origin countries? Some argue that it represents a step towards enhanced democracy because it removes residence requirements, while others argue that franchise expansion can rupture the long-term democratization process (Caramani and Grotz 2015). A recent study focused on Europe and the Americas concluded that expatriate voting rights depend on citizenship of the respective state at the national level, and on residency at the local level. This means that there are patterns of franchise expansion, however they are 'contained' by the level at which emigrant voting is permitted (Arrighi and Bauböck 2016).

The effects of voting rights on democracies depend on many factors, including the socio-political context and the electoral systems through which these rights are implemented, as well as the proportion of citizens among expatriates, and accessibility and participation rates.

Voter turnout of emigrants

When emigrants are granted voting rights, they have the potential to influence closely fought

elections. In the 2017 French presidential election, 2.6 per cent of French nationals living overseas were registered to vote. In the first round of the polls, Emmanuel Macron won 24 per cent of the vote, while Marine Le Pen received 21.3 per cent of the vote. Macron won the first round by about 1 million votes, giving the 1.3 million French nationals eligible to vote overseas powerbroker potential (Lui 2017). Other examples include the close first round of the 2016 presidential elections in Austria, during which Austrian expatriates made up 1 per cent of registered voters. While these numbers are low, postal ballots, which include expatriate voters, had the potential to decide the first round of Austria's presidential elections (The Guardian 2016). During the 2017 Constitutional Referendum in Turkey, voter turnout of Turkish citizens living abroad in countries such as Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands increased compared to Turkey's 2014 presidential election. In Germany, voter turnout reached 48.7 per cent among eligible Turkish voters (YeniSafak 2017). In Cabo Verde (2006) and Romania (2009), emigrant votes overturned the challenger's majority in presidential elections. In Italy (2006), emigrant votes were the decisive factor that led to the centre-left coalition's defeat of the incumbent government (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015).

Nevertheless, where emigrant voting is permitted, rates of registration and turnout are usually lower than they are in country, such as in Italy, the Philippines, Senegal, Spain and Sweden. Conversely, in some countries, despite declining numbers of persons voting from abroad, the percentage of emigrants that actually votes remains high. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, although the absolute number of registered external voters is dropping as citizens return, their turnout has remained at approximately 80 per cent since the early 2000s (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007).

There are some factors that particularly influence low voter turnout among external

voters. Emigration voting is costly and reduces the benefits of the act of voting. In addition, the ease with which emigration voting can take place influences turnout (Kostelka 2017), such as legislation governing external voting, or the location of polling stations, ease of access to information and voter registration logistics (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). These factors speak to states' ability to organize elections and voters' ability to make use of them. In Southern Africa, low literacy levels among migrants, poor consular and postal facilities, and basic communication and transportation infrastructures hinder the effectiveness of external voting rights and reduce turnout rates among emigrants (Caramani and Grotz 2015).

Although emigrant voting rates are normally lower than those of natives due to the costs involved, the size of the diaspora also affects emigrant voter turnout, as large diasporas can motivate political parties to mobilize emigrants. Thus, if the size of the diaspora increases, the emigrant voting rate is likely to rise as well. At the same time, the overall origin country voter turnout decreases (Kostelka 2017).

To support democracy, origin country policymakers need to consider the potential of emigrant political participation in their home countries given general trends of declining voter turnout.

Political representation of emigrants in key political institutions and consultative bodies

Most countries (67 per cent) allow and facilitate emigrant voting in national elections by assigning votes to an electoral district, for example from their previous residence (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). However, only 13 countries have reserved seats or 'special representation' for non-resident citizens in their parliaments—Algeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Mozambique, Panama, Portugal, Romania and Tunisia. Angola and Panama, however, do not implement this legislation

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(Sundberg 2007; EUDO Citizenship National Elections Database 2017). Some argue that special representation is a good way to include emigrants because it facilitates their voting but limits their influence by weighting their votes differently than those of the native population (Collyer 2014); others argue that such systems violate the principle of treating votes equally (Bauböck 2007). When compared to registered votes, emigrant votes may count more. At the same time, special representation can contribute to the stability of electoral systems (Venice Commission 2011).

There is evidence that migration to countries with higher levels of female political empowerment increases the share of women in parliaments in origin countries (Lodigiani and Salomone 2012). Women's diaspora organizations and activists have played a significant role in capacity building and furthering female political empowerment to increase women's political participation in their home countries. Examples include the successful advocacy efforts of the South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network created by US-based Sudanese migrants and the Liberian peace activist Leymah Roberta Gbowee.

Most countries do not allow emigrants to vote in mayoral or local council elections. Exceptions include Australia, Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand and Uruguay, although local non-resident citizen voting rights are among those tied to additional varying residence requirements, a requirement to return to the origin country to vote or civil servant status (EUDO Citizenship Database 2015).

Many origin countries wish to retain ties to their citizens abroad, given that they can be a valuable source of remittances or political influence in the destination country (Itzigsohn 2000; Bauböck 2003). At the same time, many origin countries want to retain some political control over the diaspora. For instance, the Moroccan diaspora is dispersed to more than 100 countries and has developed a robust

financial bridge between these countries and Morocco, with Moroccan remittances among the most important in the world (Cesari 2013). In 1990, under the patronage of King Hassan II, Morocco created the Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad to promote economic and cultural cooperation with the diaspora. This foundation, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration, established an Observatory of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad to provide information for the government on migration management issues. In 2010 the flow of international remittances to Africa was USD 18 billion, which represents 5 per cent of global remittances (UNDP 2011). Fourteen other African countries—including Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda—have set up diaspora-related institutions and ministries. The African Union Commission has created the African Citizens Directorate to deal with overarching issues in the relationship between overseas diaspora and origin-country governments (Mohamoud 2009).

Another example is the work of the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) (Gutierrez 1997, 1999). The PCME was established in 1990 to increase communication between US citizens of Mexican origin, resident non-citizen Mexicans and the government of Mexico; promote Mexican identity and group cohesion among Mexicans living in the USA; and strengthen the Mexican community abroad as a political agent in the USA. As a result, the Mexican community in the USA has become more cohesive and active in the last decade (DeSipio 1996). Migrants in the USA have mobilized around the same issues as those of the PCME, especially since 1994, and have responded to issues in Mexico, including policies related to dual citizenship, and the right to vote in Mexican elections from abroad (DeSipio 1996).

India connects with its diaspora communities through annual meetings such as the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, which marks the contribution

of the diaspora to India's development and is sponsored by the Ministry of External Affairs of the government of India, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Confederation of Indian Industry, and the Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region of India.

Armenia, which has one of the largest diaspora communities (7.5 million diaspora population, versus 2.5 million living in Armenia) spread over more than 100 countries, has an established model policy system coordinated by the Ministry of Diaspora. Mechanisms include the 'Hayastan' All-Armenian Fund, headed by the president of the republic, which coordinates the diaspora's financial assistance to Armenia. Once every three years the ministry organizes the Armenia-Diaspora Conferences to discuss issues of national concern (President of the Republic of Armenia n.d.)

7.5. The migration debate: dilemmas for policymakers

Migration is a controversial topic that poses fundamental and difficult dilemmas for policymakers in democratic institutions. It has become increasingly politicized, as it involves a country's national identity and therefore evokes nationalist sentiments, which are combined with political parties' tendencies to define their identity by taking tough stances towards migration and multiculturalism (Kivisto 2002). Migration can raise economic concerns, as particularly during times of relatively high unemployment, citizens may see immigrants as unfairly obtaining scarce social benefits, or competing with natives for jobs. Lastly, migration has increased citizens' worries about security and safety, especially when immigrants are alleged to be perpetrators of (or to have links to) terrorism. All three of these factors—security, culture, and social welfare or jobs—shape attitudes towards migrants.

According to 2015 World Gallup poll data, in the top ten migration destination countries

(Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, United Arab Emirates, UK and USA), opinions about migration are divided (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015). In seven of these countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the USA), majorities believe immigration should be increased or stay the same, while more than half of the respondents in the remaining three (Russia, Spain and the UK) say immigration levels should decrease. In Europe, people have more negative attitudes towards migration compared to other world regions, although there are marked differences in attitudes between countries. People under 44 are more aware of immigration and more likely to favour increasing immigration levels: about one in four (24 per cent) favour increasing immigration levels, compared to 17 per cent of those aged 65 and older. This 'youth effect' exists in most receiving regions and countries, except Russia (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015; IOM 2015a). According to data from the Gallup World Poll from more than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014, younger and more-educated people tend to view migration more favourably, with the exception of Russia (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015), where government policy aimed to increase immigration, despite 70 per cent of survey respondents saying they desired lower levels. Poorer and less-educated people generally tend to have more negative views about immigration than younger, well-educated, financially secure and ethnically mixed people (Ford 2012). A comparison of attitudes in four Asian countries found greater public knowledge and high levels of tolerance of migrant workers in the Republic of Korea and Singapore than in Malaysia and Thailand. The former two offer jobs with higher pay and prestige to citizens, while in the latter two citizens are more likely to work alongside immigrants in manual labour; Malaysia and Thailand have longer land borders and are thus more accessible to unauthorized immigrants (Tunon and Baruah 2012).

Attitudes towards migration

Top ten migration destination countries

The top 10 migration countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In seven of these countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the USA) the majority believe that immigration should be increased or stay the same.

In Russia, Spain and the UK, more than half say immigration levels should decrease.




■ Majorities believe immigration should be increased or stay the same
 ■ Majorities believe immigration levels should decrease

Sources of data: World Gallup Poll Data (2015)

Negative attitudes


In Europe, people have more negative attitudes towards migration compared to other world regions, although there are marked differences in attitudes between countries.



Sources of data: Espinova et al. (2015)

Attitudes towards migration

Poorer and less-educated people generally tend to have more negative views about immigration than younger, well-educated, financially secure and ethnically mixed people.




Sources of data: Ford (2012)

< 44 YEARS

24%

favour increasing immigration




The youth effect

People under 44 are more aware of immigration and more likely to favour increasing immigration levels: about one in four (24 per cent) favour increasing immigration levels, compared to 17 per cent of those aged 65 and older. This 'youth effect' exists in most receiving regions and countries, except Russia. Globally, younger and more-educated people tend to view migration more favourably and, except in Russia, government policy reflects public attitudes towards migration.

> 64 YEARS

17%

favour increasing immigration



Sources of data: Espinova, Ray and Pugliese (2015); IOM (2015a) & Espinova, Ray and Pugliese (2015)

Hostility towards immigrants and anti-immigrant discourse tend to increase ahead of elections. For example, nearly 46 per cent of news articles, from both tabloids and broadsheets, framed migration as a threat and migrants as actual or potential ‘villains’ in the months leading up to the 2015 general election in the UK (Crawley, McMahon and Jones 2016) and the 2017 presidential election in France. This risks a feedback loop in which politicians—such as US President Donald Trump—use anti-immigrant rhetoric to drum up hostility (often with the help of some media outlets) and gain votes. Once elected, they use their office to further institutionalize this hostility. Whitaker and Giersch (2015) analysed attitudes towards immigration in 11 African states, and found that ‘opposition to immigration is more likely in more democratic countries in Africa which have high immigration rates and are more ethnically diverse, in countries with dominant party systems, and when individuals are surveyed close to a national election’. Threats to the smooth functioning of democratic institutions and processes arise out of political and social polarization, securitization, exclusion, and marginalization or discrimination by narrowly defining ‘the nation’. Media coverage of migration also influences national and local voting behaviour. In many destination countries, public concerns and attitudes towards migration significantly influence government policies, party agendas and electoral campaigns. Native populations react negatively to an influx of immigrants through anti-immigrant protests, vigilante groups and mainstream parties’ adoption of restrictive policies. For example, the immigration ban ordered by US President Trump in January 2017 attempted to bar Syrian refugees indefinitely and to block entry into the USA for 90 days for citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

The rise of terrorist organizations claiming to be motivated by Islamic beliefs has contributed to Islamophobia in many countries; migrants and refugees, particularly Muslims, often

become an easy target of public scapegoating. In both absolute and percentage terms, very few immigrants have perpetrated terror attacks in Europe or North America, compared to those committed by native-born citizens (Belgioisio 2017).

In response to public concerns, many countries are increasing their border control capacities and have stepped up their security screening of refugees admitted via asylum or resettlement programmes. In contrast to their counterparts in Europe and the USA, South American politicians and civil servants stress the inefficacy of restrictive responses to migration and the universality of migrants’ rights based on the principles of support for open borders, an understanding of migration as a fundamental right and the non-criminalization of irregular migration (Acosta 2016). Argentina’s 2004 Migration Law and Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution go so far as to stipulate a ‘human right to migrate’ (Aracazo and Freier 2015). However it must be noted that these countries are migrant-origin countries and not traditional migrant-destination countries. In Argentina, cultural perceptions and underlying power structures effectively limit the political integration of immigrants.

In some countries, arguments against admitting immigrants focus on the need to preserve the national culture. Concerns over cultural threats rarely address the fact that some states thrive when embracing multiculturalism as a basic principle, as is the case with Canada and Australia. Other states, such as France and Germany, instead espouse integration based on assimilation and equality. Countries with lower population densities, such as Australia, Canada and the USA, that place greater emphasis on openness to (and the integration of) newcomers appear to be able to develop resilience and the ability to absorb more immigrants as a proportion of total inhabitants (Alsenia, Harnoss and Rapoport 2013; Legrain 2006; IOM 2004). Box 7.11 discusses South Africa’s approach to asylum seekers.

Hostility towards immigrants and anti-immigrant discourse tend to increase ahead of elections

BOX 7.11

South Africa's migration management efforts

South Africa, a multicultural society with progressive asylum laws, received the highest number of asylum applications in the world between 2006 and 2012. Its generous refugee admission policy, coupled with inefficient implementation and a lack of legal channels for economic migrants, led asylum seekers to remain in the country for years with work permits but without a resolution of their asylum claims (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). A 2016 green paper that presented the government's strategy for integrating the newly established Border Management Agency into an overall migration management plan cited the EU's Dublin system as a model regional approach to assigning responsibilities for refugees (Department of Home Affairs of the Republic of South Africa 2016). Notwithstanding this initiative, there have been ongoing controversies related to political attitudes towards immigration in 2017.


Although the government's efforts have sought to manage migration while maintaining South Africa's high standards of human rights,

some politicians have aligned with their native-born constituents and against immigrants. For example, in December 2016 the mayor of Johannesburg categorized all irregular immigrants as 'criminals' who would not be tolerated. In addition, he stated that once in power, his Democratic Alliance Party would make sure that immigrants could not enter the country without permission (Mashengo and Malefane 2016). While not explicitly linking his remarks to the mayor's, the home affairs minister assured the public that the new Border Management Agency aimed to prevent irregular entry, rather than keep foreigners out (Herman 2016). In 2008 and 2015 South Africa experienced xenophobic violence, with a wave of lootings, killings and displacement (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). Violence broke out during an anti-immigrant march in Pretoria in February 2017; the next month a civil society coalition (the Coalition of Civics Against Xenophobia) staged a peaceful countermarch (Mohapi 2017; De Villiers 2017). The organizers stated that, with the support of local residents, as well as immigrants, embassies and neighbouring countries, the march was the start of a series of civil society events to combat xenophobia (Sakhile 2017).


FIGURE 7.5

Attitudes towards immigration in South Africa, 2015

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing immigration?



Attitudes Towards Immigration in South Africa (SA)



Notes: The Afrobarometer in South Africa measures attitudes for South African citizens over the age of 18. Fielding occurred from 13 August to 21 September 2015 with the survey being available in SeSotho, SePedi, Afrikaans, SeTswana, Tshivenda, Xhosa, Zulu and English. n = 2,400, MoE +/- 3%.

Source: Afrobarometer Data, South Africa, Round 6, 2015, <http://www.afrobarometer.org>.

Public attitudes towards immigration in South Africa in 2015 show an almost even split of positive and negative attitudes towards migration. An overall majority of the public believe that the government is managing migration unsatisfactorily. While International IDEA's GSoD indices data show that South Africa's scores on representative government, fundamental rights, checks on government and impartial administration have remained relatively stable since the end of apartheid in 1995, impartial administration and checks on government have seen a decline since 2008 and 2011, respectively.

People's attitudes towards immigration are not necessarily related to their perceptions of their country's economic conditions. According to 2015 Gallup World polling data, adults who live in countries with the highest unemployment rates are the most negative towards immigration. Nearly half of adults in countries with unemployment rates over 15 per cent believe immigration should decrease. However, in several countries in Africa and elsewhere around the world, there is no (or very little) difference in attitudes towards immigration based on the state of the national economy, such as Bangladesh, Belgium, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Malta, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Uzbekistan and Venezuela (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015).

Economic concerns over immigration often focus on immigrants taking scarce jobs or requiring public support. However, it is not clear that such concerns are warranted. Assuming that jobs occupied by immigrants would otherwise go to natives depends on the 'lump of labour fallacy'—the idea that an economy contains a fixed number of jobs and that workers are interchangeable from one job to the next. Empirical studies show that increased immigration has only small net effects on overall employment and wages. The relative mix of skills in the immigrant versus native labour forces is a key factor. In Europe, low-skilled migrant labour tends to increase opportunities for local workers, since the availability of low-


cost child care, for example, enables parents to join the labour force (UNDP 2009: 85). Studies of Thailand and Hong Kong found that even large increases in immigration have very little effect on overall wages or employment.

Similarly, the net fiscal effects of migration are not large—an estimated +/- 1 per cent of GDP (UNDP 2009: 88). While some immigrants, particularly refugees, require short-term public support in the form of housing, health care, education and administrative processing, there is no conclusive evidence that, on average, either refugees or voluntary migrants consume more in social services than they pay in taxes. Initial costs include administrative overheads and integration programmes. First-generation economic migrants and refugees who are not admitted into immigration programmes tend to need support, while subsequent generations become significant net contributors to the public treasury if they are well integrated into the labour market. Since many of the initial costs fall on local authorities, undercounting of

People's attitudes towards immigration are not necessarily related to their perceptions of their country's economic conditions

FIGURE 7.6

South Africa—attributes of democracy



Notes: This graph shows the changes in trends in South Africa for Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher performance on a given attribute.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government Index, Impartial Administration Index).

migrants and unexpected migration flows can result in fiscal shortages in countries where local spending is supported centrally on a per capita basis (UNDP 2009: 88). Some highly skilled or entrepreneurial immigrants create enough wealth through tax contributions, spending their own income, or creating new jobs and establishing businesses—such as Google, Yahoo and Tesla—to produce significant economic gains for native citizens. States with well-developed immigration systems can expect per-immigrant costs to remain steady, even as the number of immigrants increases; Canada and Sweden appear to be successful in this regard (Bonin et al. 2008). However, a lack of comparable data hampers efforts to perform cost–benefit analyses of the economic impacts of migration (Bonin et al. 2008).

Policymakers and political leaders—such as US President Trump—have reacted to concerns about immigration by proposing solutions such as building walls to keep migrants out, or externalizing borders and establishing camps in third countries. Some countries, notably Czechia, Hungary and Poland, have refused to admit refugees in line with agreed EU quotas. Hungary has enacted particularly restrictive policies towards asylum seekers, including the establishment of refugee camps against the background of a particularly nationalistic anti-immigrant stance taken by its leadership.

Other countries have adopted multiculturalist integration policies with regard to migration, such as Australia, Canada and Sweden. Other examples of pluralistic societies include India, the UK and the USA (Buzzle n.d.). Yet multiculturalism has increasingly come under pressure (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008) and there has been a growing global backlash against multiculturalism in public opinion, political discourse, immigration policy and political theory (Castles and Miller 2009). In 2010–11, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that ‘multiculturalism has utterly failed’, with ‘immigrants needing to do more to integrate in German society’.

Former British Prime Minister David Cameron questioned the UK’s longstanding policy of multiculturalism in 2010–11, arguing that some young British Muslims were drawn to violent ideology because they found no strong collective identity in Britain (Green and Staerklé 2013; UNHCR 2015).

The virulent French debate on headscarves exemplifies the fear that immigrants threaten national values that pervades the public discourse in many countries. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC in 2001; in Madrid and London in 2005; in Brussels and France in 2015; the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria; Al-Shabab attacks in Kenya in 2015; and Islamic State attacks in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Yemen in 2015 (Alpert 2015) have led to calls for increased immigration and border control, and fuelled backlashes and retaliatory violence against immigrants.

Many countries that used to have a strong policy emphasis on multiculturalism, such as Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden, have shifted to requiring more ‘adaptation’, ‘sharing of values’ and ‘integration’ from immigrants, often under pressure from rising far right parties. Other European countries that had once considered multiculturalism are now adopting coercive ‘civic integration’ policies, such as Austria and Germany (Green and Staerklé 2013; Joppke 2007). Conversely, in Canada, multicultural immigrant policies have made the political process more inclusive (Kymlicka 2010a), and united immigrants and minorities to identify with, and feel pride in, their new country.

Policy implications: approaches to migration challenges

Migration policies must be based on the rule of law and equal access to justice, particularly ensuring access to impartial assessments of asylum claims. Legitimate and democratic governments have the right to make the laws and rules that govern immigration as well as to enforce them. Even a restrictive immigration

policy that limits entry can be implemented in accordance with the rule of law and other democratic principles if the country does so fairly, transparently and in compliance with human rights norms.

Democratic dialogue can help promote tolerance of immigrants and counter inaccurate public beliefs about immigration, as well as enhance the legitimacy of government policies. In Argentina, immigration is recognized as a fundamental right in the Constitution, while the federal immigration law guarantees immigrants equal treatment, non-discrimination, and access to educational, medical and social services (Hines 2010).

The constructive involvement of immigrant and host communities in the planning and implementation of public policies can help engage citizens and improve decision-makers' understanding of communities' needs. In addition, dialogue platforms and participatory policymaking contribute to building social cohesion and trust among immigrant and host communities, as they are both offered the space to interact and understand each other's views and concerns. The inclusion of less-skilled and less-educated migrants is important in this regard.

Creating opportunities for people to meet and interact in common spaces—such as workplaces, political parties, schools, neighbourhood facilities and public transport systems—can help create a collective national identity, while respecting the diversity of group identities. Public institutions and governments have an important role to play in creating such spaces that are sensitive to (and promote) diversity (Buzzelli 2001; Hansen and Pikkov 2008; Wong 2010). Similarly, programmes that foster partnerships and social and civic engagement can contribute to building social capital in and across communities; governments may consider providing public funding to such initiatives (Hyman, Meinhard and Shields 2011). Since cities and municipalities can play a significant role in fostering social cohesion, governments can particularly learn from local-level engagements.

To respond to migration effectively, host country governments should enforce immigration policy and rules through competent institutions and based on accurate data. Many countries struggle to equip their national and local institutions with the necessary resources, and to enact a legislative framework and guidance on competencies to ensure that migration policy can be enforced fairly and in line with human rights and democratic principles. To ensure safe and orderly migration, government institutions and agencies need to provide clear and accessible information regarding immigration laws and policies, as well as reliable and publicly available data about migration flows (EIU 2016). This will facilitate a better-informed measurement of the impact of migration on countries. Such data can form the basis of a public debate to set realistic priorities regarding migration policy. In addition, governments should invest in research on the nexus between migration and democracy.

Learning from local initiatives

Many cities are forming partnerships between migrants, local governments and civil society to manage migration by increasing mobility and social diversity. Except for citizenship acquisition, the inclusion of migrants is facilitated locally, including provision of language courses, civic education, access to health services and ensuring public safety. National governments can strengthen their capacity to deal with migration by learning from successful local examples.

Forming social networks within cities furthers migrants' integration and helps build resilient and democratically inclusive societies. Cities today link local urban social cohesion to economic growth and global competitiveness (Schwedler 2011). The participation and inclusion of migrants in their host cities is an indispensable part of building stable, open and vibrant communities (IOM 2015b). Cities have a key role to play in community building and in supporting social, cultural, economic and political participation at the local government level.

Even a restrictive immigration policy that limits entry can be implemented in accordance with the rule of law and other democratic principles if the country does so fairly, transparently and in compliance with human rights norms

National governments can strengthen their capacity to deal with migration by learning from successful local examples. Forming social networks within cities furthers migrants' integration and helps build resilient and democratically inclusive societies

Local governments influence social capital indirectly through policies and programmes designed to increase social inclusion, such as transportation and recreational services, and to create common spaces. Local governments should thus work to strengthen community organizations that represent the interests of diverse communities (Saloojee 2005; Richmond and Saloojee 2005; Hyman, Meinhard and Shields 2011). For example, several US cities guarantee equal access to all types of services for immigrants and natives, while in Canada cities implement a strict policy of non-discrimination and inclusion (Sisk 2001). Canada's approach to multiculturalism is discussed in more detail in Box 7.12.

Some cities in Europe (such as Athens, Berlin, Bilbao and Dublin) and Asia (Fuzhou in China, as well as Singapore and a network of cities in Japan) are forming institutional structures with the support of national authorities to harness the diverse interests of migrants and further inclusive cooperation. Berlin, Dublin and Lille are establishing partnerships with migrant associations to promote citizenship and political participation among migrant groups. Participatory budgeting (i.e. community members directly deciding how to spend part of the public budget) is being used to finance municipal inclusion policies in over 1,700 local governments in more than 40 countries, especially low-income countries where municipal budgets remain low despite decentralization (IOM 2015b).

Therefore neighbourhood and community councils, along with e-democracy and participatory budgeting, enable local authorities to consolidate civil engagement. Urban inclusion policies often take a more pragmatic approach than migration governance at the national level by promoting the positive impacts of differences on competitiveness and social cohesion, and creating initiatives to fill gaps in central governance and policies on migration. For example in Buenos Aires, Argentina, legislation was drafted with the aim of giving

every child—regardless of their legal status—the right to go to school and to provide access to public services for all people. These laws were passed years ahead of the national 2004 Immigration Law, but needed the national law to facilitate implementation (IOM 2015b).

Decisions that influence migrants and refugees are often taken by local governments, civil society and the private sector. Enabling migrant participation in public decision-making processes during planning processes can contribute to enhancing their skills, access to services and a sense of community. For example, the US city of Portland, Oregon, practices inclusive neighbourhood-level development planning, while Amsterdam promotes heterogeneous neighbourhoods as a way of achieving social and economic inclusion (Bosswick, Lüken-Klaßen and Heckmann 2007).

7.6. Conclusions and recommendations: managing migration democratically

Given the transnational nature of migration, effective policy approaches to maintaining a resilient democratic system must be designed around long-term goals that combine national and local approaches with cooperation in regional and global governance structures. In this way, policy approaches to migration will consider its non-territorial implications for national politics.

One of the key approaches to tackling the migration challenge is to address the disconnect and reduced trust between citizens and political institutions and governments, in order to encourage public attitudes towards immigration to lead to better governance.

To maximize the benefits of migration, the naturalization of resident non-citizens can be facilitated by reducing the administrative burden and time required to obtain citizenship. In the period before immigrants become citizens, migrants' integration and sense of belonging can be enhanced with the support of civil society and local community-

BOX 7.12

**Factors of success and their impact on democracy:
Canada's multicultural immigration policy**

Canada is the only country in the world that enshrines multiculturalism in its constitution, which gives this policy a high degree of legal security, making it more difficult to rescind. Since 1971 it has pursued a multicultural immigration policy that encourages a vision of Canada based on the values of equality and mutual respect with regard to race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion. One of its key objectives is to promote the full and equitable participation of migrants and to remove barriers to such participation. In 2016, Canada took in approximately 300,000 migrants, of whom 48,000 were refugees. Annual immigration accounts for roughly 1 per cent of the country's current population of 36 million (Foran 2017). Since 2006, Canada has naturalized over 1.5 million new citizens (Huddleston et al. 2015). Cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal are some of the most diverse in the world.

The Canadian population supports immigration and wants migrants to become citizens; approximately 85 per cent eventually do (Foran 2017). Canada's migration policy has its critics, who maintain that multiculturalism threatens national cohesion and contributes to ghettoization (Bissoondath 2002; Wong 2010). Others argue that 'as is the case in England, France, and other democracies, national unity in Canada is increasingly threatened by the growing atomization of our society along ethnic lines' (Gregg 2006; Bennett-Jones 2005). The Conservative Party has called for the deployment of Canada's army to detain potential refugees from crossing the border and for a new law to prevent asylum seekers from being eligible for refugee status determination hearings if they cross the border illegally (Freeman 2017).

In contrast to countries that are pursuing, or have introduced, ever more restrictive immigration policies in the last five years, particularly in the wake of the rise of populist parties, Canada deliberately strives to keep its borders open. In 2015, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau highlighted this longstanding policy as 'Canada's strength' because it is not taken for granted, and is based on shared fundamental human rights values and policies that aim to balance individual and collective identity, as well as on economic policies that benefit Canada's middle class (Trudeau 2015). He even went so far as to refer to Canada as the 'first post-national state', declaring that 'there is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada' (Trudeau 2015).

Besides having a strong political leadership that realistically acknowledges the challenges of migration and works to implement a bold multicultural migration policy, why has Canada's migration policy worked, and how has it strengthened its democracy? History, geopolitics and its history as a heterogeneous country arguably play a role in this success, as well as the fact that its 'open border' policy is subject to border control and passport checks. The country's history as an immigration country may have favourably influenced public opinion about the benefits and usefulness of migration. In addition, Canadians seem to interpret 'nationhood' dynamically, based on a sense of identity that encourages pluralism and embraces a diverse population (Foran 2017).

Canada's multiculturalist policy has had diverse effects on its democracy and social cohesion. It has helped successfully integrate immigrants

and ethnic and religious minorities into the country (Kymlicka 1998, 2010b; Banting, Courchene and Seidie 2006; Bloemraad 2006). Immigrants and native-born Canadians mutually identify and accept each other to a high degree, with a strong probability that immigrants to Canada will acquire citizenship. Inter-marriage and proficiency in Canada's official languages is common in Canada. The probability that Canadian immigrants will vote, join a political party or seek political office is higher than for immigrants to the USA, Europe or Australia (Kymlicka 1998; Howe 2007). There are more foreign-born citizens and Canadian-born minorities elected to Parliament in Canada than in other Western countries, both in absolute numbers and in proportion to their percentage of the population (Adams 2007).

Immigrants to Canada, regardless of their religious affiliation, increasingly share the country's liberal-democratic norms, including the protection of homosexual and women's rights (Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2007). According to a survey conducted by Focus Canada in 2006, 83 per cent of Canadians agree that Muslims make a positive contribution to Canada (Adams 2009), suggesting that the country has been less affected by the global surge in anti-Muslim sentiments and the resulting polarization of ethnic relations experienced in many European countries (Kymlicka 2010b).

While Canada does not grant national or local voting rights to immigrants before they become citizens, it does encourage immigrants to participate in civic life and, before becoming citizens, to actively engage with civil society to develop lasting relationships in their communities. Canada is one of the few major destination countries that does not have established immigrant-led consultation bodies. However, when immigrants arrive, they do so as permanent residents and quickly become full citizens. The Canadian model of integration is thus based on the assumption that all immigrants can (and will) rapidly become citizens after 3–4 years, spending their first years in the country focused on employment and settlement. According to 2011 data, 92 per cent of immigrants became citizens after 10+ years in Canada (OECD 2014). This is one of the highest naturalization rates in the world, alongside Australia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and most Nordic countries (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEX 2015). Canada's traditionally quick and clear path to citizenship is the strongest factor explaining its integration success (Huddleston et al. 2015). Recently, however, it has become more restrictive: permanent residents face longer waiting periods to become naturalized, and there are increased restrictions and documentation burdens to attain citizenship, reunite dependent family members and secure equal residence (Huddleston et al. 2015).

Canada nevertheless leads the developed world in promoting rapid labour market integration, non-discrimination and a common sense of belonging. Immigrants and citizens generally enjoy the same access, social rights and strong discrimination protections in a flexible labour market. Both low- and high-educated newcomers benefit from increasing funds for settlement services, long-term language support, and bridging and recognition procedures, depending on their economic sector and province. Federal and provincial support for cultural diversity encourages immigrants to identify with Canada and contribute to civil society, while helping society understand and respond to newcomers' specific needs related to the labour market, adult education, schools, the health system or the local community (Huddleston et al. 2015).

Democratic institutions should thus consider policies that empower migrants to decide how they participate in public life, rather than defining policies based on citizenship-as-nationality or franchise-without-nationality models

based initiatives. As the Canadian example demonstrates, this can lead to a high level of naturalization without necessitating an interim step of voting rights for non-citizens. Enfranchising resident non-citizen migrants is a possible (albeit controversial) approach to increasing their political participation, but it sets a high political benchmark. Democratic institutions should thus consider policies that empower migrants to decide how they participate in public life, rather than defining policies based on citizenship-as-nationality or franchise-without-nationality models. To strengthen democracy, especially in countries with high or increasing proportions of migrants, policymakers should consider granting voting rights—particularly at the local level—as a pathway to easier citizenship. This would better promote respect for individuals' choices than an approach that focuses on groups or ethnic nations.

Origin countries may enjoy a democratic dividend from emigration: migrants can serve as agents of democracy who diffuse democratic norms; returnees may increase demands for government accountability, help enhance the country's electoral and political participation, and form new political parties. In addition to considering granting voting rights to expatriates, origin countries should empower returning migrants to engage politically in their countries, and should consult with their diaspora communities on migration issues to encourage them to act as goodwill ambassadors in destination countries and to invest in the development of their home countries, potentially enhancing social cohesion and cultural understanding. Origin countries should thus accept other types of political participation and advocacy from their diaspora, for example through migrant associations or formal consultative bodies, and provide them with the space to articulate their interests and views.

Migration can be tackled through multicultural policies that favour the inclusion of migrants and provide political benefits to societies by

helping to create the conditions for strong and resilient democracies. Governments need to consider state capacities in relation to migration policymaking, and countries with high immigration rates and immigrant-friendly policies must work to reduce the potential backlash from citizens who have negative perceptions of immigration by engaging in fact-based debates. In this way, government institutions will be more capable of providing quality services and integrating migrants, which will strengthen the accountability of political institutions with regard to voters who may have concerns about the government's ability to manage migration, in line with the notion that 'democracy should deliver'.

Political parties in destination countries need to consider *inclusive* measures to enable effective migrant political participation and engage in fact-based political dialogue on migration with the entire voting population. A party's agenda and views on migration—regardless of where it stands on the political spectrum—influence whether immigrants are represented in political party structures, whether they can stand for election and whether they have a realistic chance of winning due to their ranking on a party's candidate list.

Political parties that have migrant-friendly policies can thus consider making party statutes, electoral platforms and candidate lists more inclusive, and can engage migrants with a view to strengthening their representative base. They can also incorporate migrants' views in order to develop migration policies that benefit the country. Since political parties are potential holders of legislative and governing powers, they play a key role in encouraging immigrants to participate politically, to enable them to become agents of democracy and sustain social cohesion (Dähnke et al. 2014: 12–13).

To effectively address the challenge posed by migration to democracy and to strengthen democratic institutions, the following

recommendations are put forward to governments, parties and supranational institutions.

National and local governments

- *Invest in data collection on the nexus between migration and democracy*, including migration flows and the factors that influence the positive and negative impacts of migration to maximize the benefits. Such data should form the basis of a migration policy debate with the public to set realistic priorities and objectives.
- *Design migration policies to focus on changing public perceptions of migration and encourage political accountability by making decision-making processes more accessible to migrants and more transparent to the public, including by clarifying objectives of public consultation on migration policies.* Migration policies should focus on ensuring that ‘democracy delivers’ to increase public confidence in governments’ ability to manage migration.
- Taking each country’s circumstances into account, *facilitate the naturalization of immigrants and consider granting local voting rights* as a pathway to integration and easier citizenship for immigrants. This would promote respect for individuals’ choices rather than focusing policies on groups or ethnic nations.
- *Engage civil society actors to help integrate immigrants at the national and local levels* by harnessing civil society expertise and advocacy skills, building on evidence and data that identifies participation gaps to increase migrants’ political participation and promote cultural understanding, particularly in local communities.
- *Consider the potential of emigrant voting rights and facilitate their political participation in origin countries* by learning from successful diaspora women’s civil society initiatives, ensuring good access to information for emigrant voters, facilitating voter registration and engaging in dialogue with host countries to avoid political controversy.

- *Empower returning migrants to engage politically and in dialogue and consultation on migration issues* with their diaspora communities. Encourage them to act as goodwill ambassadors in destination countries and invest in the development of their home countries.

Political parties

- *Engage in fact-based democratic dialogue on migration to promote tolerance* of migrants and to counter inaccurate public beliefs, knowledge and behaviour about migration.
- *Political party statutes, electoral platforms and candidate lists should be inclusive and engage migrants* to strengthen their representative base, including by creating equal conditions for migrants within their internal structures to influence political party programmes and policies and their contribution to an effective migration policy. This can be done by adopting measures that facilitate the entry of migrants, and particularly women migrants, into political forums, through targeted recruitment, training and coaching.
- *Take a long-term view when defining party strategies* to strengthen parties’ credibility with voters, and expand the party base to be inclusive and more representative of the population.

Global and regional governance systems

- *Regional organizations, national and local governments, and civil society organizations should work together* to define and meet the goals, targets and indicators of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly Goal 16, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. Greater attention should be paid to the role that cities and municipal authorities can play in effective migration governance, and to the political representation of migrants.
- *Cooperate in regional and international organizations* to define policies that equitably share the responsibilities for migration and refugee protection, and

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uphold related international law such as the Global Compact on Migrants and Refugees.

- *Enhance the governance of international migration* through greater regional consultation and cooperation and more effective dialogue between governments and global international organizations focused on key policy issues such as the linkages between migration and democracy, development, security, human rights and trade.
- *Expand cooperation mechanisms such as advisory or consultative bodies to reinforce the mutual benefits of migrants* to improve cultural understanding, promote tolerance and integration, and facilitate the political participation of migrants in both origin and destination countries.
- *International and regional consultative processes on migration should strengthen their engagement with civil society*, particularly migrant associations, to promote migrant integration and participation rather than migration *control*. These processes should include representatives of academia, foundations and the private sector.

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Chapter

8

Inclusive peacebuilding in
conflict-affected states: Designing
for democracy's resilience





Inclusive peacebuilding in conflict-affected states: designing for democracy's resilience

Countries emerging from armed conflict face a long and arduous road, characterized by multiple obstacles as well as many opportunities. Steps taken in the immediate post-conflict period have a tremendous impact on the country's future. This chapter recommends implementing targeted and active inclusion in peacebuilding processes in order to activate and maintain consistent representative–constituent communication channels, give voice to individuals and groups who identify ways to challenge traditional notions of the democratic state, and facilitate broader access to the highest levels of decision-making as a guiding principle in state- and democracy-building processes. It recommends promoting such policies and practices in three key transitional processes: constitution-building, electoral design and rebel-to-political-party transformation. The chapter features case studies of Liberia, Nepal and Libya.

Written by

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Our experience has identified inclusivity and institution-building as critical in preventing relapse into violent conflict and producing more resilient States and societies. Exclusion is one of the most important factors that trigger a relapse into conflict.

—Ban Ki Moon, United Nations Secretary-General, 2007–16 (UN 2012)

8.1. Introduction: imperatives of inclusivity

At the end of the second Liberian civil war in 2003, the country was in shambles. Over the course of 14 years of violent conflict, almost

300,000 Liberians had died and more than 500,000 had been displaced. The country's GDP had fallen by over 90 per cent in less than two decades, one of the most striking such drops in the world (Radelet 2007: 1–2). Almost 70 per cent of the country still lives below the poverty line of USD 1.90 per day (UNDP 2016).

The war particularly impacted women and children, and the various traumas they suffered continue to haunt the country. All warring sides used mass rape as a weapon of war during the conflict. Male child soldiers were sometimes forced to rape their own mothers, grandmothers and sisters as part of their initiation, and the victims were as young as eight months old (Toral 2012). Child soldiers comprised an estimated 25–75 per cent of all fighting forces in Liberia (Pan 2003). Boys and

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girls were used in the conflict; the latter were primarily used as cooks, porters, sex slaves, and domestics for men and boys (Pan 2003). The war also destroyed 70 per cent of the country's school buildings, and more than half of all Liberian children were estimated to be out of school after the war: 'A whole generation of Liberians has spent more time at war than in school' (Radelet 2007: 4).

In 2003, as war raged, a group of women came together to wage a nonviolent campaign for peace in response to former President Charles Taylor's declaration that he would never negotiate with rebels and that he would sooner see the last soldier die than allow international peacekeepers in. Two female social workers and a leader of Muslim women's groups organized the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace, which began to publicly and privately demand peace. They held a 'sex strike', denying intimacy to their partners until peace was achieved. In public, the women utilized peaceful marches, songs and sit-ins, and convinced President Taylor and rebel groups to engage in peace talks.

The women then travelled to the site of the negotiations in Accra, Ghana, where they continued to exert pressure for a peace deal. In July, as violence escalated in Liberia, the women in Accra staged a sit-in at the site of the negotiations. They linked arms, refusing to allow the delegates to leave without a final settlement. When guards came to arrest the women, one of the leaders threatened to remove her clothing, an act that would shame the men. The women were not arrested, and they met with the chief mediator, who agreed to listen to their demands for peace. Three weeks later, President Taylor, who had been indicted for war crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, resigned and a peace deal was announced (Rennebohm 2011).

This grassroots movement, which inspired other women around the country and the continent, continued its work into the post-conflict, transitional phase. The women acted as watchdogs over the implementation of the

peace agreement and took an active role in encouraging fighters to abide by disarmament rules. They also organized to provide transportation and childcare, and supervise market stalls, so that thousands of women working in the markets could register to vote in the first post-conflict election. Groups such as those in the Women in Peacebuilding Network continued to push for women's integration into the economy, working to ensure sustainable peacebuilding (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). In 2011, one of the group's founders, Leymah Gbowee, won the Nobel Peace Prize for mobilizing women 'across ethnic and religious dividing lines to bring an end to the long war' (Cowell 2011).

The Liberian case highlighted the critical importance of inclusion, which is also increasingly recognized in peacebuilding efforts. In *Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict* (UN 2012), the UN Secretary-General underscored the importance of early emphasis on inclusion in peacebuilding efforts, and calls on the international community to identify entry points for inclusion. The transitional period in which reconstruction activities take place offers opportunities to integrate this principle into the fundamental institutions and processes that will serve as a basis for the newly born or reborn state. Since an inclusive approach to peacebuilding processes implies the localization of peacebuilding efforts, it increases the local population's ownership of the transition, thereby making the peace more sustainable.

Acknowledging that the transition from war to peace and democratic rule is a process and cannot necessarily be bound by any single event, this chapter does not strictly define a transitional period. Indeed, transitions are not necessarily completely peaceful. The signing of a peace deal does not mean that the conflict is over in the minds of the people or that the underlying problems have been sufficiently addressed. However, a transition signals that the primary warring parties have shown a commitment to ceasing hostilities and rebuilding the state.

Active and targeted inclusion ensures that political representatives value (and consistently seek) constituents' views and voices, and that they incorporate these views into higher-level discussions and decisions

This chapter discusses how political elites who are managing the development of the new state can best integrate principles of inclusion into the design of new political institutions in the aftermath of violent conflict. Active and targeted inclusion, explained in detail below, promotes stability and resilience in new democratic institutions by prioritizing communication between political elites and citizens as well as by giving voice to the most marginalized groups in society. This chapter focuses on active and targeted inclusion mechanisms in constitution-building as well as in the political settlement and the design of electoral systems. These processes form some of the core elements of democratic resilience: they lay the foundation for the rules of the new state, determine who can participate in that state and design the levers of that participation (Reilly 2015). As such, they have the power to determine the state's resilience—the ability of its social systems to cope with, survive and recover from complex challenges and crises that have the potential to trigger systemic failure. Indeed, decisions made during the transition 'can make an enormous difference to generations of ordinary people' (Maley 2006: 683).

The resilience of democratic institutions depends primarily on their inclusiveness. When political institutions aim for *active and targeted inclusion*, the resulting structures of authority and the citizenry at large are better prepared to deal with the problems at the heart of the conflict that may threaten future stability. Active and targeted inclusion operationalizes the UN Secretary-General's definition of inclusion, which is 'the extent and manner in which the views and needs of parties to conflict and other stakeholders are represented, heard and integrated into a peace process' (UN 2012: 11). It goes beyond the quest for simple numerical representation of a broad array of interest groups to focus on the communication necessary to facilitate inclusion and on the difficult questions of identity formation necessary for long-term, sustainable inclusion. *Active* inclusion aims to

create innovative channels of communication between decision-makers and constituents at key institution-building moments. It demands more of the people, asking them to provide input and feedback. It also requires more of decision-makers, who must work to engage people outside their core support groups. *Targeted* inclusion acknowledges the importance of unconventional and contentious definitions of identity. It proactively encourages people to speak from their own perspectives, and to allow those views to be part of the political debate, from which they may have been traditionally excluded. Therefore active and targeted inclusion ensures that political representatives value (and consistently seek) constituents' views and voices, and that they incorporate these views into higher-level discussions and decisions. It also demands that societies confront head on some of the potentially divisive issues that could most threaten the peacebuilding process, primarily by giving voice and access to groups that challenge traditional, mainstream conceptions of the democratic state. Active and targeted inclusion gives the new state a chance to creatively define its own version of democracy, stability and peace. This kind of inclusion helps build or 'design' democratic resilience by providing the state with a broad range of diverse experiences, viewpoints and skills that can be used strategically to cope with, survive and recover from complex challenges and crises that have the potential to lead to systemic failure.

Section 8.2 of this chapter examines how the dominant liberal peacebuilding model has focused largely on a limited definition of inclusion, which is centred on traditional notions of numerical representation, and the consequences of this approach. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 review the use of post-conflict inclusion mechanisms in three fundamental state-building processes: constitution-building, rebel-to-party transformation, and electoral system design, using the case studies of Libya and Nepal (Box 8.1). These sections argue that active and targeted inclusion—which

focuses on ensuring diversity and continued communication with constituents, incentivizes former rebels to participate in the political process and facilitates access to executive power—promotes the long-term resilience of the state. Section 8.5 concludes with a set of recommendations for stakeholders. For additional information on the issues discussed in this chapter see *Democracy and Peacebuilding: A Resource Guide* (Cox 2017).

8.2. Trends in peacebuilding and democratization

To understand the extent to which inclusion has been considered and integrated into peacebuilding theory and practice, it is critical to first look at the dominant model of peacebuilding. The post-Cold War era ushered in a flood of (largely UN-led) peacekeeping missions. Between 1989 and 1994, the UN Security Council authorized 20 new peacekeeping missions, septupling the number of peacekeepers around the world from 11,000 to 75,000 (UN Peacekeeping 2016). These missions were tasked with a wide variety of responsibilities, ranging from implementing peace agreements to re-organizing military and security forces and overseeing elections.

Over time, it became clear that many of these post-Cold War peacekeeping missions were working towards goals that were implicitly based on a set of assumptions about the ideal nature of a state. Many policymakers and academics believed the end of the Cold War signalled the dawn of a new era of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992). While some evidence did indicate that international support was necessary for stable and successful transitions, peacekeeping was also used to orient new states towards liberal democracy, which would help achieve global peace according to democratic peace theory, which asserts that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other (Doyle 1986).

Liberal peacebuilding refers to activities that were designed and implemented based on the assumption that liberal democracy and market-

BOX 8.1

Resilience by design: building inclusive democracy in post-conflict countries

Transitional, post-conflict periods present opportunities and challenges to build democratic institutions that can help prevent future conflict. If transition processes are inclusive, nationally owned, open and democratic, the resulting democratic system will be resilient. It is important to foster a broad sense of ownership of the decisions made during transitional periods: if people feel they have a stake in the decisions, they are more likely to respect the rules and stay politically engaged in the long term.

Targeted and active inclusion in primary political institutions and processes—such as constitution-building, political parties and elections—helps create the conditions for a resilient democracy that is well equipped to survive destabilizing shocks and crises. Inclusive constitution-building processes ensure that the constitutional settlement enjoys public and elite legitimacy and promotes interactions between elites and constituents. Allowing former rebels to reimagine and redefine themselves as politicians helps broaden the base of public support for state legitimacy. Inclusive electoral systems that encourage elites to seek electoral support outside of their ‘safe’ zones provide incentives for consensus-building rather than winner-take-all politics. Moreover, electoral systems that provide more elected representatives with access to the highest levels of decision-making power are more conducive to resilience than those that view inclusion as little more than simple numerical representation. Truly inclusive electoral systems must provide access to decision-making and power holders and foster the growth of new, local stakeholders who are interested in the democratic process.

oriented economies were the best guarantees of sustainable peace. Liberal peacebuilding missions focused on democratization, good governance, respect for the rule of law, the promotion of human rights, the growth of civil society and the development of open market economies (Hoffman 2009). In the immediate post-conflict stage, the liberal peacebuilding model often focused on expanding multiparty politics and scheduling elections, which were accompanied by a revised constitutional settlement.

The liberal peacebuilding debate

Initially, there were high levels of optimism about peacebuilding, based partly on early successes in Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa (Hoffman 2009: 10). Yet international support gradually waned as it became clear that liberal peacebuilding did not always result in peace. Many missions were followed by a return to conflict and the subversion of the democratic institutions left behind (Paris 2010: 341). Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Timor-Leste and Rwanda were cited as examples of the model's weaknesses and tendency to fail.


Figure 8.1 shows how the countries with major peacekeeping missions (those deployed for six months or more with at least 500 military troops) fared over time with regard to representative government, which is used here as an indicator of electoral democracy. The results are mixed. Cambodia, Central African Republic, Haiti and Liberia experienced periods of dramatic drops in representative government, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, Timor-Leste, Macedonia, Namibia and Tajikistan have maintained relative stability over time. Still others have experienced periods

of clear growth. Only Croatia has maintained a clear upward trajectory in representative government over time. Of course, a host of factors other than peacebuilding missions have affected trends in representative government in these countries.

The ideological assumptions underlying the liberal peacebuilding model, and its practical application, have been vigorously debated. Sceptics have long pointed to the inherently messy and conflictual nature of democratization, arguing that it is difficult to take on in a post-conflict environment, when stability is a priority (Wolff 2011: 1780). Critics have also noted implementation problems, such as peacebuilders' lack of expertise in

FIGURE 8.1

GSOD indices: the evolution of Representative Government in 20 post-conflict countries



Notes: The y-axis shows the score for representative government and the x-axis shows the years before and after a major peacebuilding mission. The orange dashed line marks the beginning of the peacekeeping operation (year 0 in the axis). Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher performance in representative government.

Source: GSOD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index).

supporting state–society relations (Barnett and Zurcher 2009) and programmes' tendencies to work at cross-purposes and thus harm host states (Carothers 2006; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Paris and Sisk 2007; Uvin 2001).

Further, the liberal peacebuilding model's idea of inclusion is often limited in scope, restricted to consultations with national elites at the expense of subnational actors (Richmond 2011). Inclusion thus becomes limited to leaders who occupy the highest levels of the transitional state.

National and local actors determine the outcomes of all liberal peacebuilding activities because they must decide whether . . . to engage in them or sustain them . . . National and local ownership are therefore integral to peacebuilding outcomes. That said, the focus of most bilateral and multilateral donors on direct engagement with the state privileges national ownership...The organizational routines that require agreement by the state therefore detract from ownership by other members of society, often leading to the empowerment of an illiberal state (Campbell 2011: 100).

The focus on national elites is often compounded by peacebuilders' privileging of international 'experts', which creates a significant gap between local needs and national policy direction.

Countries where interventions take place are forced by the international community to adopt a democratic system of government regardless of existing conditions and/or citizens' preference. They are quickly put through the formal steps expected to make democracy a reality, usually beginning with elections. This process of democratization supposedly complements any previous peace agreement, helping to stabilize the country and consolidate the peace. A growing body of evidence suggests

that coercive democratization is not a successful strategy in most post-conflict situations (Ottaway 2010: 1–2).

Peacebuilders also often have expansive powers, which can quell true political participation as well as locally driven reforms (Chandler 1999; Paris 2010: 343). Over time it has become clear that the post-Cold War peacekeeping model and implementers' tendencies to impose a one-size-fits-all framework, especially one focused on national-level stakeholders, cannot produce the necessary conditions for durable peace.

Inclusion and resilient states

As policymakers continue to confront the challenges associated with rebuilding conflict-ravaged states, they must think about how to modify the prevailing liberal peacebuilding model to make targeted and active inclusion more of a central priority. In 2012, the UN secretary-general noted the importance of inclusivity and institutional design.

Our experience has identified inclusivity and institution building as critical in preventing relapse into violent conflict and producing more resilient States and societies. Exclusion is one of the most important factors that trigger a relapse into conflict. Almost all cases that have avoided such a relapse have had inclusive political settlements, achieved either through a peace agreement and subsequent processes or because of inclusive behaviour by the party that prevailed in the conflict. An early emphasis on inclusion is therefore essential. A closely related objective is to strengthen formal and informal institutions, including to restore core governance functions and equitable service delivery. Inclusivity and institution-building are also critical to domestic accountability systems, help to restore the social contract, and lay a more reliable foundation for the State's engagement with the international community (UN 2012: 2).

Over time it has become clear that the post-Cold War peacekeeping model and implementers' tendencies to impose a one-size-fits-all framework, especially one focused on national-level stakeholders, cannot produce the necessary conditions for durable peace

Inclusive peacebuilding



The 2015 review by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations acknowledged the importance of inclusivity and broadening decision-making ownership, and criticized its past failure to reach out to (and work with) actors beyond the national government. Going forward, the review recommended:

'[I]nclusive national ownership'... whereby the national responsibility to drive and direct efforts is broadly shared by the national government across all key social strata and divides, across a spectrum of political opinions and domestic actors, including minorities. This implies participation by community groups, women's platforms and representatives, youth, labour organizations, political parties, the private sector and domestic civil society, including under-represented groups (UN 2015b: 21).

Scholarly research supports these calls for inclusion. Including former rebels in the political settlement of the transitional process has proven to be critical to both long-term peace and democratic resilience. The consensus is that giving former combatants a voice in their political, economic and social destiny lowers the chances of a recurrence of violence (Toft 2010: 10), and thus allows more time for democratic institutions to stabilize and win the public's trust. Some evidence suggests that including former combatants in new political institutions increases the likelihood that a democratic process will lead to the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). Including ex-combatants through broad participation and shared or diffused responsibility has been effective in Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala (Travesi and Rivera 2016; Herbert 2013; Stanley and Holiday 2002).

It is also important to bridge other divides and integrate representatives who can offer subnational, minority, class, gender and age perspectives (ZIF 2015; UN 2015a). UN Security Council Resolution 1325 reaffirms

the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction. It emphasizes women's unique strengths and ability to effect change, and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security (UNSC 2000). Inclusion does more than bring diverse groups into decision-making processes. It can also help promote broadmindedness in society and increase social tolerance. Inclusive, consensual systems promote mutual respect and tolerance, and help facilitate deliberation (Kirchner, Freitag and Rapp 2011: 210). Such tolerance is essential for developing societal resilience, and makes it easier for people to adjust to change. This may be especially true for democracies, where the freedoms of speech and expression can expose controversial issues. Mutual tolerance and respect help societies listen to and provide space for contentious views without falling apart or resorting to violence.

Including actors beyond the principal conflict parties has often been beneficial for peacebuilding and transition processes. Such inclusion can take place through a variety of modalities beyond official negotiations, including inclusive commissions, problem-solving workshops or consultations (Paffenholz 2014).

Limits of inclusion

Regardless of the context, finding the right balance of inclusivity in post-conflict settings can be challenging. Some groups may be legitimately excluded from peace negotiations, for example if the population believes the group has sacrificed its right to participate because of past abuses. Inclusivity can also decrease efficiency: when broad inclusivity involves many ministries or organizations, decision-making and progress might be slow or costly (World Bank 2011: 124; ZIF 2015).

Since it is impossible to include every single constituency in decision-making processes, the

Including former rebels in the political settlement of the transitional process has proven to be critical to both long-term peace and democratic resilience. The consensus is that giving former combatants a voice in their political, economic and social destiny lowers the chances of a recurrence of violence

Inclusive constitution-building processes are more likely to produce a resilient constitution that will result in an enduring constitutional settlement and decrease the likelihood of a return to conflict

World Bank emphasizes context-dependent, 'inclusive enough' coalitions. These coalitions should prioritize groups that offer political legitimacy, financial and technical resources, and that will continue to press for deep institutional reforms, such as business, labour, and women's groups and other elements of civil society (World Bank 2011: 124). Indeed, the joint Peace and Development Advisors programme, established by the UN Development Programme and the UN Department of Political Affairs in 2004, has demonstrated success in supporting local-level dialogue and infrastructures for peace (UNDP-DPA 2015). Aiming to build local and national capacities for conflict resolution and prevention, the programme has worked with a national network of female mediators in Burundi, and youth dialogue platforms in Ukraine (UNDP-DPA 2015: 7–10).

The following two sections discuss how the three transitional processes of constitution-building, rebel-to-political party transformation and electoral system design can integrate active and targeted inclusion principles, and address the challenges related to its practical implementation.

8.3. Post-conflict constitutions: inclusion in practice

Post-conflict constitutions are endowed with a great responsibility. Not only do they fulfil their usual function as a framework for government, but they also embody the peace deal—including the settlement of disputes related to identity, ideology, autonomy, and access to public power and resources. With so much at stake, post-conflict constitution-building processes take place in fiercely contested political arenas, with each group staking claims for its interests. Excluding interested parties from the process renders them unable to voice their concerns and aspirations, and risks their rejection of the final document, regardless of its substantive content. Moreover, as all groups will be forced to live together in the new (or reborn) political community, the acquiescence of all groups to the new constitutional settlement is critical to

its legitimacy, and therefore its stability and resilience.

Inclusive constitution-building processes are more likely to produce a resilient constitution that will result in an enduring constitutional settlement (Elkins, Blount and Ginsberg 2009) and decrease the likelihood of a return to conflict (Widner 2005). This section outlines the challenges of inclusive constitution-building in terms of representation in the constitution-making body and offers practical suggestions for those interested in active and targeted inclusion.

Defining 'we the people'

Thomas Paine described a constitution as 'not the act of its government, but of the People constituting its government' (Paine [1791] 1999). However, the people cannot decide until someone decides who 'the people' actually are (Jennings 1956). In many ways, this is also the most critical decision, as it can affect the *substantive output* of the constitution-making process (i.e. the text) as well as the procedural legitimacy of the process, and thus the sense of broad ownership of the resulting constitution (Hart 2003).

While all citizens may, in some cases, be given the chance to ratify a constitution through referendum, the task of framing the constitution is delegated to a constitution-making body such as a constituent assembly. Thus defining 'the people' involves deciding who is included in (and excluded from) the constitution-making body, how they are included and whom they represent.

In liberal democracies, regular elections produce winners and losers; it is accepted that the winners, who represent only part of the population, can make decisions for a certain period on behalf of the entire country. This situation is acceptable because the losers are protected from the tyranny of the majority through safeguards such as fundamental rights, and because they will have the opportunity to vote in a future election.

Constitutions, however, are made in the name of all the people, and are intended to last for generations. Therefore, the stakes involved in constitution-building processes are higher than those related to ordinary electoral processes, and thus the demands for inclusion are stronger.

Inclusion through representation

Inclusion through representation presents opportunities for inclusivity along two dimensions: horizontal inclusion (or targeted inclusion), which seeks to give voice to as many of the principal societal groups as possible, including non-mainstream, contentious groups, and vertical inclusion (or active inclusion), which aims to involve the broader citizenry beyond the elites selected to conduct negotiations. Both dimensions should be considered when designing post-conflict constitution-building processes.

Horizontal inclusion

In societies divided by violent conflict, defining 'the people' is often a highly contentious process that can take several forms. In many ways, the decision about how society is represented in the constitution-making body will reflect an existential dilemma over the nature of the political community being founded: is it a community of a single group of citizens, or several groups?

One approach is to view the constituents' power as the combined will of all individuals, which can be approximated through proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. The 2011 Tunisia National Constituent Assembly was elected on this basis. However, Tunisia is a relatively ethnically homogenous state. The challenge of horizontal inclusion becomes particularly vexing in more heterogeneous states, especially those that can be classified as plurinational states (i.e. comprised of more than one discrete nation) (Tierney 2007). For example, some view the 1867 founding act of modern Canada as a covenant between its English- and French-speaking communities (Tierney 2007). A more recent example is Libya, where the Constitutional Drafting Assembly

was elected based on equal representation of the three main regions, despite vastly different population sizes (see Box 8.2).

In these contexts, to satisfy the demands of subnational societies, targeted inclusion in constitution-building processes must be based on a concept of 'we the *peoples*', participating as equal partners, even if the communities have unequal numbers and even if some of the subnational identities are contentious. The implications for political equality are troubling from an orthodox liberal democratic standpoint, but where the resulting logic of horizontal inclusion accurately reflects the shared socio-historical conceptions of citizenship and political community as experienced by the broader public, it is likely to increase the legitimacy of the constitution-building process.

Lastly, if the legitimacy of the constitution-making body is to be based on its reflection of the collective self-perceptions of the broader society, special measures may be required to ensure the inclusion of groups that would otherwise be under-represented, such as women. In Tunisia, the electoral law for the National Constituent Assembly required vertical parity in the party lists, but not horizontal parity across constituencies. Therefore, many parties did not include women at the tops of their lists; thus while female candidates represented 50 per cent of the total, only 27 per cent of the elected assembly members were women (Inclusive Security 2017).

Vertical inclusion

Regarding vertical inclusion, the central question is how to ensure that the elite pact at the centre of the constitution-making process has the broadest possible societal base. Some have suggested that the optimal process of designing a Constituent Assembly should be hourglass shaped: broad inclusion at the outset, in a national debate during elections to the assembly, and broad inclusion at the end, in the form of a popular referendum. In between vertical inclusion would be limited, as delegates

To satisfy the demands of subnational societies, targeted inclusion in constitution-building processes must be based on a concept of 'we the peoples', participating as equal partners, even if the communities have unequal numbers and even if some of the subnational identities are contentious

BOX 8.2

Libya's constitutional crisis

Constitution-building in the post-2011 Libyan transition has been characterized by serious mismanagement. At the start of the process, there was great hope for an inclusive and broadly representative constitution. Yet over time it has become clear that minority communities that experienced deep cultural and political marginalization under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's rule continue to be relatively sidelined. This situation has undermined the legitimacy of both the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) and the draft constitution.

Background and context

While Libyan society is dominated by an Arabic-speaking majority of Arab-Berber ancestry that makes up approximately 90 per cent of the population, the country is also home to several minority groups. While it is difficult to obtain up-to-date Libyan demographic data, Berbers, also known as Amazigh, are thought to be the largest minority group, constituting 4–10 per cent of the population (Minority Rights n.d.; UK Home Office 2016: 8). Other minorities include black Africans (6 per cent) and Tuareg and Tebu (1 per cent combined) (UK Home Office 2016).

Under President Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled from 1969 to 2011, pan-Arabism was the dominant ideology. Gaddafi's belief in the need for unity across the Arab world and the indivisible nature of Arabism and Islam resulted in serious and severe restrictions on the lives and rights of the country's non-Arab groups. For instance, it was illegal for Berbers to give their children non-Arab names, and those who participated in cultural celebrations abroad were arrested upon their return (IRIN 2012). The Amazigh language and script were forbidden, and those who promoted Berber culture and/or heritage were at risk of death (Lane 2011). Some Tuaregs, especially those who settled in Libya 40 or 50 years ago (as opposed to hundreds of years ago), were denied 'family booklets', which served as the main proof of citizenship and were required to apply for jobs and bank loans, and to purchase property. Most critically, they were unable to claim Libyan or any other citizenship (IRIN 2012). Unsurprisingly, minority populations today tend to be economically disadvantaged. Their neighbourhoods were marginalized under Gaddafi, and lacked infrastructure and struggled to receive state assistance (IRIN 2012). Members of the Berber community were at the forefront of the uprising against the Gaddafi regime.

Constitution-building

After President Gaddafi's fall, Berbers and Libya's other minority communities expected official recognition of their identities as well as full rights and liberties. Some Berbers cited a new constitution that guaranteed their rights as one of their primary demands (Lane 2011). There was thus much hope surrounding the CDA, which started work in April 2014 and published a final draft in April 2016.

Unfortunately, the CDA did not manage to effectively or holistically represent Libyan society, in part because only two of its 60 seats were reserved for each of the Berber, Tebu and Tuareg communities, referred to as the 'three cultural components' (Carter Center 2014). Since Berbers alone are estimated to constitute about 10 per cent of the population, this community felt that it should have received at least six seats. Despite their demands, the minority groups also failed to win veto power on issues most critical to them, including national identity markers such as the name and identity of the state, as well as flag, anthem and language rights. In response, the Berber community boycotted the election to the CDA as well as the entire

drafting exercise, leaving two seats vacant throughout the process (St John 2016; Eljarh 2014). Moreover, a 12-member Working Committee of the CDA prepared the latest draft of the constitution, but the committee's failure to include representatives of the Tuareg and Tebu communities prompted their boycott of the CDA. Additionally, before the most recent draft constitution was released in February 2016, 11 members of the Working Committee from the western region of Libya accused the group of dividing the country and then boycotted the proceedings (Ibrahim 2016). By the time the draft constitution was released, minority and historically marginalized communities were barely represented.

International best practice related to constitution drafting emphasizes the need to ensure sufficient time, opportunity and transparent procedures for consultations. It is also important to ensure that marginalized groups are guaranteed adequate opportunity to participate; the CDA does not appear to have done so (ICJ 2015: 18–19). While the CDA held several town hall meetings, civil society groups pointed out that there was insufficient notice to guarantee high levels of participation; the meetings were often attended only by elites and offered little chance for discussion because they often took the form of lectures. Moreover, certain parts of the country were not visited because of security concerns (ICJ 2015: 19). The International Commission of Jurists observed that 'the CDA made little active effort to seek out the views of marginalised populations. The CDA also did not engage institutions that arguably were specifically mandated to assist such as the National Council for General Liberties and Human Rights' (ICJ 2015: 19). Civil society organizations that represented the interests of minority groups and women also submitted reports and proposals to the CDA for consideration; few of their recommendations were included (ICJ 2015: 19–20).

The CDA's February 2016 final draft was surrounded by controversy. It was issued in violation of its own rules of procedure, as it did not enjoy a two-thirds majority of support within the assembly. In addition to disagreements about proposed decentralization structures and the choice of parliamentary versus presidential systems of government, the draft constitution has been severely criticized by minority groups. The Coalition of Libyan Human Rights Organizations warned of human rights deficiencies: 'If adopted in its current form the draft would likely undermine fundamental human rights in Libya for generations to come due to the weak protections afforded to certain vulnerable groups such as women and ethnic, religious and political minorities' (Lawyers for Justice in Libya 2016). The coalition warned that the draft lacks comprehensive protections of equality and non-discrimination. It also called for more explicit guarantees of the right to religious freedom and protection of ethnic, political, cultural and religious minorities, and persons with disabilities from discrimination. The draft was further criticized for the way in which it 'authorizes and enshrines gender discrimination' (Lawyers for Justice in Libya 2016). Finally, the draft constitution proclaims that Libya is a part of the Arab world, which is likely to cause concern among the country's non-Arab minorities (Ibrahim 2016).

Overall, the CDA has failed to produce a broadly legitimate constitution. Although there are several contentious issues in the latest draft, the absence of minority representation within the process and the draft's failure to address minority groups' fundamental concerns are particularly alarming. The way in which the CDA addresses various groups' criticisms and concerns will determine the future of the country's constitutional order. In July 2017, amid protesters storming the CDA building, the draft constitution was approved, setting the stage for parliament to approve a national referendum (Musa 2017).

should be removed from the polarizing tendencies of public debate that might prove non-conducive to compromise and consensus. The referendum would provide a 'downstream constraint', which would prevent the elites from making a deal too far from the preferences of their constituents, or the public at large (Elster 2012).

This analysis is based mainly on the French National Constituent Assembly of 1789 and the US Constitutional Convention of 1787. While this thinking applies to many current constitution-building processes, modern norms of democratic representation and the divided society implications of post-conflict transitions require a more nuanced approach to process design, and to vertical inclusion.

The predominant mechanism for vertical inclusion in constitution-building processes is active in the sense that it seeks regular, consistent input from the people, largely through public consultations. However, many doubt the value of such public participation, contending that 'there is not even a scintilla of evidence that it improves the durability or the democratic content of constitutions' (Diamond et al. 2014). Critics of popular participation as a means of vertical inclusion predominantly argue that it is not productive for two reasons. First, there is a view that secret, elite negotiations as an essential element of constitution-making can be jeopardized by too much openness and transparency. Second, there is a notion that public consultations are likely to be at best superficial, and at worst potentially damaging by generating unrealistic expectations of how the public's views might be incorporated into the text.

While there might be some validity to these criticisms, two recent examples of more thoughtful structuring of public participation show signs of leading to more effective vertical inclusion. First, in Kenya—and to a less structured degree in Tunisia—the public received iterative drafts of the constitution for comment at various stages of the negotiating

process. In this way, the vertical inclusion could be visualized as several hourglasses standing on top of each other, as the process repeatedly opened out for public engagement, and narrowed again for deliberation and negotiation among the delegates. While it is debatable whether the various rounds of comments had a substantial effect on the final text, such iterative broadening of vertical inclusion can provide not only the benefit of continuous public engagement in the process, and therefore increased public ownership; it can also help negotiations by providing delegates with more information regarding the positions of their constituents, and of the public as a whole.

Second, the participatory process in Chile, which took place throughout 2015 and 2016, was remarkable in its use of deliberative settings for public consultations. Public consultations had previously consisted of a town hall meeting in which members of the public were given the opportunity to voice their desires and concerns to a member of the constitution-making body or its staff. Most recently, in 2016, a series of meetings at the district, provincial and national levels were held following a broad civic education process. The meetings were facilitated to focus on issues and concepts, and used small groups to encourage deliberation and discussion. While expectations may have been unrealistically raised in terms of how recommendations from these meetings would be used, the use of informed, deliberative discussions is a valuable lesson learned for future participatory processes.

Vertical inclusion beyond elections and referendums has become a widespread norm. The question for designers of constitution-building processes is therefore not *whether* to include public consultations, but how to ensure they can be an effective means of meeting citizens' evolving expectations. Including different groups in the constitution-building process gives a wide range of actors a stake in the final constitutional settlement, making it more likely that more people will abide by the

The question for designers of constitution-building processes is therefore not *whether* to include public consultations, but how to ensure they can be an effective means of meeting citizens' evolving expectations

constraints of the new constitutional order and seek to protect it from potential violations. A stable constitutional order, in turn, contributes to long-term democratic resilience by channelling conflict through rules agreed to by all sides, providing certainty and predictability in terms of how power is to be allocated, and constraining majoritarian impulses.

8.4. Peacebuilding through elections and political parties

Former rebel groups play an important role in post-conflict transitional periods, and their decisions about whether (and how) to participate in electoral politics can have far-reaching consequences for the resilience of both the new state and the democratic system as a whole. In many cases, these rebels form the political parties that represent the interests of the formerly aggrieved parts of the population. Evidence shows that, all else equal, including former rebels in the peacebuilding process makes a recurrence of conflict less likely, in both the short and long term (Marshall and Ishiyama 2016: 1020; Call 2012: 4). Yet the transformation process is challenging: it requires significant adjustments and capacity building, and if rebels do not feel it is worthwhile to participate in the new political process, they may cast doubt among their supporters about the legitimacy of the new system, or even return to the battlefield. Nor will the inclusion of former rebels always enjoy the broad support of society, which can jeopardize the system's long-term legitimacy.

Ex-rebel party leaders enter the political process tentatively, full of doubts about whether the rules of democratic politics will be enforced, and whether they and/or their parties will benefit. Former rebels have four types of incentives to form parties and participate in electoral politics. First, they may suffer from 'battle fatigue' and be eager to abandon a life of war for a more stable political process. In Colombia, for example, the seven months since the signing of the peace deal have seen a baby boom for former FARC rebels, who are happy to be able to start

families (Otis 2017). Second, participating in elections can help legitimize a group's armed struggle by portraying it as a fight for representation and accountability, rather than just power. Third, elections offer significant domestic and international visibility, which can help reassure opposition parties that the government will deliver on its promises. Fourth, elections often bestow resources on parties, from both the state and international donors (Matanock 2012; Zürcher et al. 2013). One study found that between 1990 and 2009, rebel leaders chose to form parties 54 per cent of the time; these parties contested elections and regularly won seats in national legislatures (Manning and Smith 2016).

Yet the inclusion of former rebels in the structures of power comes with risks to democratic legitimacy. When there are parts or aspects of the conflict that remain unresolved, inclusion may inadvertently demonstrate to splinter groups that they will also eventually be included if they take up arms again. This issue may be compounded by the proliferation of small arms and the vested interests of those who gained financially from the conflict. Once former rebels attain formal power, they may end up remaining there long after they are relevant, essentially 'freezing' the power structure. There is also the danger that warring groups may end up being over-represented relative to other segments of the population. Indeed, the design of inclusive institutions must strike a careful balance between giving voice to those who were formerly aggrieved and to those who now risk marginalization, simply because attention is so focused on those most intimately involved in the conflict.

Rebel groups also face considerable challenges and risks by becoming political parties. Meaningful transformation requires significant attitudinal and behavioural changes, which take time (De Zeeuw 2007: 11–19; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Lyons 2005; Manning 1998). 'State building requires not just new institutions that channel politics in more productive directions, but deep and long-lasting social

transformations that permit groups embittered by violence to accord legitimacy to a new state in ways that previously proved elusive' (Lake 2016: 17).

The process of developing ideological platforms and policy direction and choosing candidates can also expose unresolved questions or fault lines within the party and provoke significant internal conflict. Which candidates represent the party's ideals and stand a chance of winning? Who gets to choose the candidates? Should the party choose 'sons of the soil' who are well known in their constituencies, or those who are most likely to stick to the party line once in office? What is the best strategy for the electoral system in use?

Contesting elections can also change and destabilize internal party hierarchies and organizations. Parties have different internal constituencies—the 'professional politicians' at the central level, mid-level party officers, those elected to represent the party in public office, committed party supporters who strongly identify with the party and what it stands for, and voters. Parties need the support of each of these groups to succeed, and it can be challenging to balance their priorities and concerns while strategizing at the broader level to contest elections. Once in office, elected representatives often develop a stake in their individual success that outweighs their loyalty to the party. This can sharpen internal divisions and empower new groups within the party to challenge the leadership.

Despite the risks of including former rebels in the transition, successful transformation results in benefits for the party and the state, which are discussed in the next section.

Rebel-based parties and resilience

Including rebels in post-conflict transitions can help build a more resilient state in several ways. First, rebels-turned-politicians often realize that participating in electoral politics can be more worthwhile than returning to the battlefield. Politicians who win legislative,

municipal or council seats gain access to a regular salary, visibility and a possible platform for further political advancement. They may also gain leverage with regard to the central party hierarchy, as electoral participation and victory can bring resources to the party and individual members. These individuals may therefore develop a stake in continued participation in democratic processes and institutions; targeted inclusion policies will seek to convince them of the benefits of the new system. In the long run, these new politicians' participation creates more resilient (and legitimate) institutions. Former rebels' participation lends legitimacy to democratic institutions, and over time, their continued participation can result in modifications and adjustments that reflect the needs and demands of their parties and constituents.

For example, in Mozambique, former members of the National Resistance Party (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO) were elected to Parliament. RENAMO's MPs have disregarded the party leader's calls to boycott Parliament over alleged electoral fraud in part because they rely on their salaries (Hanlon 2017). The party leadership has not enforced such calls because the state provides the party with a subsidy based on its representation in Parliament.

If enough former rebels participate in democratic politics, it can increase internal party democracy and make the new party stronger over the long term. For example, in El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN) mayors elected after the war faced pressure from local constituents to make immediate improvements in public service delivery; their ability to deliver these services helped them win votes in the next election. Mayors also found common cause with one another, and in some cases worked across party lines to address the needs of their municipalities. Within the FMLN, these mayors banded together to challenge the party's 'orthodox' wing in ways that led to

Former rebels' participation lends legitimacy to democratic institutions, and over time, their continued participation can result in modifications and adjustments that reflect the needs and demands of their parties and constituents

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greater internal democracy and improved the party's competitiveness vis-à-vis other parties (Manning 2008).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar dynamics were observed in some areas, particularly within the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, HDZ BiH) in western Herzegovina. While some party officials sought to boycott elections in the early 2000s to protest sanctions imposed on their leader by the UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, subnational party officials pushed for participation, arguing that the party would otherwise be excluded from politics. These officials were concerned about the party's fate as well as their own; they depended on public office for their livelihood and their reputation, which could provide them with other positions or advantages in the future (Manning 2008). These findings resonate with broader comparative work on democratization in single-party regimes in Mexico or Taiwan (Eisenstadt 2007; Rigger 2001). These dynamics merit further study in the post-conflict context.

Thus ex-combatants often find that it is worthwhile to participate in democratic politics, and their participation can help promote the legitimacy and resilience of democracy in post-conflict states. So how can transitional agreements be designed to convince former rebels that participation in democratic politics is worth the risk? This depends in part on the choice of electoral system design, which can determine who gains access to the legislature and, perhaps more critically, how much access previously marginalized groups have to executive office and other senior positions in the new state. As explained in the following section, decision-makers must strike a balance between broad short-term inclusion, which may be critical for confidence building, and more meaningful, targeted long-term inclusion.

Electoral institutions

Political institutions are especially critical in post-conflict environments (Wolff 2011: 1778), when former adversaries are assessing the potential shape and character of a new state, evaluating the roles they could play in that state and deciding how much faith they have in the ability of the new rules of the game to address their grievances. Thus it is critical to choose the most appropriate electoral system (Sisk and Reynolds 1998), since this choice usually has a profound effect on a country's future political life. Electoral systems, once chosen, usually persist, as political interests solidify around, and respond to, the incentives they generate. Rules about who can compete, the range of choices voters have, how votes translate into seats, and the likelihood of gaining representation will influence actors' willingness to participate in elections and their faith in the system's legitimacy.

The choice of electoral systems

Since elections are often perceived as one of the most fundamental aspects of democracy, citizens should have faith that the electoral system will guarantee that their interests will be represented. The three main types of electoral systems are plurality/majority, PR and mixed (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005). Some research indicates that PR's ability to include a broader cross-section of society in the legislature may have more limited utility for long-term peace and stability than previously conjectured. Majoritarian systems, which incentivize consensus-based politics, may work better in conflict-affected countries because they encourage elites to build support outside of their traditional voter bases by moderating their policies. PR systems, by contrast, may institutionalize the kind of fragmentation that led to conflict in the first place.

The choice of electoral system can affect a country's long-term stability and bolster its ability to deal with shocks and crises in four ways. First, electoral systems influence politicians' behaviour and strategy. Some majoritarian systems reward moderation, for instance, and can have

significantly different outcomes from those that provide a stage for more extremist views (Reilly 2002: 156). Second, electoral systems have the power to either ease or exacerbate conflict (Horowitz 1985; Benoit 2004: 369). Supporters of consociationalism, a governance model based on power sharing between elites from different social groups, argue that PR is the best option for deeply divided societies, because it produces proportional outcomes, facilitates minority representation and treats all groups equally (Lijphart 2004: 100).

In post-conflict settings, PR systems, which aim to ensure that the number of seats won corresponds to the proportion of votes received, are the most popular. Their guarantee of inclusion for a wide variety of groups has made such systems one of the most attractive options for states seeking to increase broad participation, including women's representation (Larsrud et al. 2005). PR systems are often part of a wider set of institutions that forms the basis of consociationalism. Consociational systems give various subnational groups significant autonomy and representation in the national legislature. They can also include parliamentarism, a grand coalition government, segmental autonomy, a proportional electoral system and a minority veto (Selway and Templeman 2012: 1545).

Third, the choice of an electoral system determines the degree to which representatives feel accountable to their constituents. For example, under closed-list systems, parliamentarians may feel more accountable to party leaders than they do to voters. Majoritarian systems, however, may foster a closer link between representatives and voters (Rocha Menocal 2011: 2). Fourth, electoral systems can influence the public's faith in government. In majoritarian systems, it is easy to feel that votes are 'wasted' because a candidate can win with just over 50 per cent of the vote, leaving nearly half of the population feeling unrepresented. The issue of wasted votes is frequently raised in American elections: the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system

gives third-party candidates little chance of winning. In closely contested elections, voters who cast their ballots for third-party candidates are often seen to have wasted their votes or to have helped one of the major parties (Krugman 2016). In PR systems, however, some argue that the perception that fewer votes are 'wasted' provides greater incentives for turnout (Norris 1997: 305).

Based on the logic of inclusion discussed above, for many years scholars assumed that electoral systems that prioritized power sharing and facilitated a 'place at the table' for a wide spectrum of groups were best suited to divided societies. This belief is based on the assumption that groups that are included in the national legislature feel they have a voice and are therefore not motivated to rebel (Goati 2000; Selway and Templeman 2012: 1545; Bogaards 2013: 74). This assumption is most relevant in post-conflict countries: the consensus is that making institutions more accessible to minority groups is critical to long-term peace (Alonso and Ruiz 2005: 1) and to establishing and maintaining broad public faith in the value of democracy. Therefore, many scholars long assumed that majoritarian systems were less conducive than PR systems to fostering long-term stability, peace and democracy, especially in post-conflict states (Selway and Templeman 2012: 1544). When the electoral system is specified in a peace agreement, it is always PR, either on its own or as part of a mixed system (Bogaards 2013: 79).

Proportional versus majoritarian systems

PR systems, however, are not a panacea for divided societies. In fact, critics point out that PR systems replicate societal divisions within the national legislature, since they offer no incentives to broaden policy platforms or appeal to non-traditional supporters. PR elections often result in 'coalitions of convenience' that are not based on a common ideology or longer-term goals (Horowitz 2012: 26). While majoritarian systems tend to favour groups that are numerically dominant, some also provide incentives for candidates to

The choice of electoral system can affect a country's long-term stability and bolster its ability to deal with shocks and crises

Preferential systems—known as ‘centripetal’ systems due to their aim to pull parties toward moderate, compromising policies—have the unique ability to encourage the formation and strengthening of a core of ‘moderate middle’ sentiment within the electorate

moderate their policies and stances in order to win support from outside their traditional bases. Some majoritarian systems incentivize political moderation and are more likely to produce consensus between rivals (Horowitz 2012: 26). Vote pooling, which requires politicians to gain votes from their own supporters as well as those of their rivals, may be one of the best options for encouraging moderation and consensus (Horowitz 2012: 28). For example, the single transferable vote (STV) allows voters to rank candidates in multi-member districts. The winner is the candidate with the most votes above the quota, but the surplus votes are then transferred to voters’ second, third and other choices.

These preferential systems—known as ‘centripetal’ systems due to their aim to pull parties toward moderate, compromising policies—also have the unique ability to encourage the formation and strengthening of a core of ‘moderate middle’ sentiment within the electorate (Reilly 2002: 158). Such systems give politicians electoral incentives to attract votes from other groups. They also encourage different actors to come together to make deals on reciprocal electoral support, and to develop ‘centrist, aggregative, and multi-ethnic political parties’ or coalitions of parties that can make cross-ethnic appeals and present a diverse range of policy options (Reilly 2002: 159). ‘Centrifugal’ systems, by contrast, push parties towards ideological extremes. Plurality-like rules can have a centripetal effect when the electoral rules positively bias parties in seat allocations, while non-proportional rules push parties into more extreme positions because voters defect from parties that expect fewer seats than their vote share (Calvo and Hellwig 2011: 39).

Unfortunately, centripetal systems are uncommon. Sri Lanka uses the STV in attempts to ensure cross-ethnic support for its president, but preference votes have never been used because the candidates always receive more than 50 per cent of the vote. In Ireland, the STV has promoted moderation and inclusion. In the 1998 legislative elections, 76 per cent of

representatives needed preference votes to win seats (Mitchell 2008: 14).

Some studies question the logic of inclusion and its relationship to democratic stability and peace. For instance, PR does not always facilitate the inclusion of marginalized groups and minorities, which in turn promotes peace and long-term democracy. Some research shows that ethnic groups win more seats and do better overall under majoritarian systems than in PR systems (Alonso and Ruiz 2005: 14; Reynolds 2011: 115). Moreover, and perhaps more surprisingly, some evidence suggests that higher levels of parliamentary representation do not automatically moderate ethnic conflict. One study found that parliamentary representation has no significant effect on the level of ethnic rebellion, primarily because there are no guarantees that a particular group will have access to decision-makers or be able to block decisions contrary to its interests (Alonso and Ruiz 2005: 2, 14).

The evidence on the ability of PR systems to create lasting peace is also mixed. While PR is correlated with peace in some studies (Bogaards 2013: 80), in others it is linked to political violence (Selway and Templeman 2012: 1558). Previous analysis has shown that PR has no significant effect on decreasing violence in the most diverse societies; it has only been shown to reduce violence in homogenous societies (Selway and Templeman 2012: 1560). Selway and Templeman also analyse other consociational institutions, and find that in ‘highly divided’ countries that have just PR and parliamentarism, consociationalism is associated with more political deaths and riots (2012: 1563, 1565).

In the long term, then, legislative seats may not guarantee lasting peace or democratic resilience. Societal groups that feel marginalized (or at risk of marginalization) want to be able to influence and access higher-level decision-making processes, particularly at the executive level. Broad inclusion (i.e. occupying opposition seats in the legislature) only goes so far towards

contributing to long-term resilience. In order to influence long-term change, inclusion must be more meaningful.

Therefore, *targeted inclusion* may be necessary—for example, including marginalized groups at specific levels of power. Examples of slightly modified PR systems that facilitate access to executive power include South Africa, where all parties with at least 5 per cent of legislative seats have a right to be represented in the Cabinet, and Lebanon, which permanently earmarks the presidency for one religious group and the prime ministership for another (Lijphart 2004: 99). In such systems, elected representatives in the opposition have limited power to block

legislation or advance their agendas. A system's resilience depends more on whether the Cabinet and other decision-making bodies are inclusive (Alonso and Ruiz 2005: 2).

With increased global movement and migration, democracies may want to move away from encouraging narrow group identities that conflict with other narrowly defined groups. Instead, they may increasingly choose to build and foster political institutions that reward consensus and seek the benefits of diversity. If this is the case, PR may not meet the needs of future democracies. Box 8.3 explores the inclusion of minority groups during the constitution-building process in Nepal.

BOX 8.3

Peacebuilding and inclusivity in Nepal

Overview of the conflict (1996–2006)

Nepal is home to 125 caste and ethnic groups that have distinct languages, cultures and religions. For many years, however, this diversity was neither respected nor reflected in the state apparatus and constitutional order. Until 2006, the country was known as 'the only Hindu Kingdom in the World', ruled by a Hindu dynasty that favoured high-caste Hindu males to the detriment of indigenous peoples, women and lower castes. Chronic caste and ethnicity-based discrimination, social exclusion, economic inequality and political grievances helped fuel a long-running armed conflict (1996–2006) between the government and the Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (Gurung 2005; Bishwa 2007).

The Maoist party sought to abolish the semi-feudal structure of the state, overthrow the Nepalese monarchy and establish a new democratic system. It mobilized traditionally marginalized groups, including Janajati (indigenous peoples outside the Hindu caste system) and Dalit people from the lowest-caste group, referred to as the 'untouchables' (Lawoti 2010; Gurung 2005), and fought for ethnic autonomy, regional devolution and local governance, equality of languages, the establishment of a secular state, the end of ethnic oppression, gender equality, protection of the disabled and the adoption of a republican constitution (Gurung 2005).

The Maoists and the Government of Nepal signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006. The agreement entailed a power-sharing arrangement between the mainstream parties and the Maoists that included the former rebels in the interim government. In parallel to the peace process, historically marginalized groups such as women, Madhesi (a majority Hindu group from the southern plains), Janajatis and Dalits demanded political inclusion and equal representation in government bodies (Carter Center 2014). Nearly half of the population (49.6 per cent) had been excluded from FPTP elections from 1991 to 2008 (Vollan 2014: 261).

A key commitment of the CPA was the establishment of an inclusive, democratic, progressive and decentralized state 'in order to address the problems related to women, Dalit, indigenous peoples, Janajatis, Madhesi, oppressed, neglected and minority communities and backward regions in the remote mountain and plains regions by ending discrimination based on class, caste, language, gender, culture, religion, and region' (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2006).

Inclusivity in the Constituent Assembly

The first elections for Nepal's 601-member Constituent Assembly were held in 2008: 240 members were elected from single-member constituencies via FPTP, 335 were elected using a closed-list PR system from a single nationwide constituency, and 26 were appointed by the Council of Ministers on the basis of consensus.

This election was a milestone, and was seen as a chance to guarantee that the constitution-making body, and subsequently the constitution-making process, would be representative of Nepal's diverse society. Several affirmative action measures were taken to ensure the participation of traditionally marginalized groups. For example, when submitting their candidate lists, political parties were required to comply with quotas for women and traditionally marginalized groups. At least 50 per cent of the candidates on the PR lists were required to be women, and women had to make up at least 33 per cent of the total number of candidates for the PR lists and FPTP races combined. In Nepal, this level of female representation was unprecedented. In the past, women had, for instance, never compromised more than 6 per cent of the country's parliamentarians (GIIDS 2017).

Furthermore, in the PR lists, political parties were required to nominate candidates from the following groups in accordance with their share of the population measured in the 2001 census: 37.8 per cent Janajatis, 32.1 per cent Madhesi, 30.2 per cent 'Others,' 13 per cent Dalits, and 4 per cent from nine 'backward regions' with the lowest development index scores (an individual can belong to more than one such group,

which results in a total of more than 100 per cent). With the exception of the gender quota requirements, PR lists that included 100 or fewer candidates did not have to comply with the ethnic quotas. This exception initially only applied to party lists covering more than 20 per cent of the seats to be elected under the PR election. However, following complaints by Madhesi parties, this percentage was raised to 30 per cent (Carter Center 2008).

Notwithstanding certain shortcomings related to the design and implementation of this quota system (EU Election Observation Mission to Nepal 2008; Carter Center 2008; Einsiedel, Malone and Pradhan 2012), women and marginalized groups made unprecedented gains in political representation that would have been difficult to achieve without quotas. These groups were guaranteed a minimum number of seats in the Constituent Assembly through the quotas applied to the closed-list PR race, and were fairly well represented in the candidate lists of the Maoist party for the FPTP race and won in a number of constituencies. The 2008 election resulted in the most inclusive legislative body in the history of Nepal, and one of the most representative bodies in South Asia: women obtained 33.22 per cent of the total number of seats, Madhesis 34.09 per cent, Janajatis 33.39 per cent, Dalits 8.17 per cent, and representatives from backward (i.e. lowest in the development index) regions 3.83 per cent (Vollan 2014: 259). Nonetheless, Hill castes were still represented far beyond their share of the population, despite the existence of inclusiveness measures (UNDP 2014).

The 2008 election also led to an outstanding victory for the former rebels. The Maoists won 220 of the 575 elective seats (38.2 per cent), making it the largest party in the Constituent Assembly and the only one with enough seats to block the passage of articles. This historic victory completely altered the balance of power (International IDEA 2015).

However, it has been difficult to realize true inclusivity in Nepal. Due to the exception that was introduced for party lists with candidates making up less than 30 per cent of the contested seats, only 11 parties that nominated more than 100 candidates had to meet all quota requirements. These parties won a total of 277 of the 335 PR seats (Vollan 2008). Political parties were also allowed to allocate the seats won in the closed-list PR race to any of the candidates on their lists, not just those at the top. This gave them a 10 per cent margin of flexibility with regard to implementing the gender and ethnic quotas. Furthermore, a broad interpretation of the 'other groups' category led many parties to include candidates from any group that was not included in the specific quotas, regardless of whether they belonged to a marginalized or minority group. Candidates from high castes and privileged communities were included in this category, which undermined the quota (EU Election Observation Mission to Nepal 2008; Vollan 2008; Carter Center 2008).

Furthermore, although women and marginalized groups made significant gains in representation in 2008, this did not immediately translate into access to the highest levels of decision-making power. Despite the Maoists' promise to include marginalized groups in the government, no Dalits were included in the Cabinet for seven months after the former rebels won the election. Only after increasing complaints from the Dalit community were two Dalit ministers appointed (Gelpke, Khanal and Pyakurel 2012).

The 2015 Constitution

In September 2015, nearly a decade after the signing of the CPA, 507 out of 601 members of the Constituent Assembly voted in favour of the new constitution, which established a secular, federal and democratic republic. In line with the spirit of the CPA, the constitution adopted the mixed electoral system used in the 2008 and 2013 Constituent Assembly elections in efforts to increase equality and inclusion.

Some majority groups have successfully lobbied to reverse the ratio of FPTP to PR seats, which has resulted in fewer PR seats (IFES 2016). There is concern that the new system may result in fewer women and representatives of marginalized groups in the legislature. The enforcement of these provisions has yet to be defined in electoral law, and it remained a point of contention between Nepal's central government and representatives from marginalized groups as of late 2016.

Several discriminatory provisions continue to threaten the inclusive spirit of the constitution, such as limits on the citizenship rights of Nepali women, the possible creation of electoral districts that favour majority ethnic groups and limits on religious free speech. Such provisions undermine the principles of inclusion that the constitution sought to address, and have led to political unrest and protests in the year since the promulgation of the constitution, in particular by women's groups and Madhesis (The Guardian 2015; ICG 2016). Without proper inclusion of these aggrieved groups, the long-term effectiveness and resilience of the state are at risk. Similarly, there are ongoing disputes between major political parties and advocates of marginalized groups over the creation of provincial borders that would disadvantage regional minorities in elections (Chen 2016). These provisions threaten the fragile trust that many Nepalis have in the state, and risk causing conflict and delegitimizing the new constitution.

The road ahead

Nepal's legislative elections due in January 2018, will be the first to take place under the new constitution. Impressive advancements in inclusiveness have been made in the composition of Nepal's Parliament since the CPA, and the 2008 and 2013 elections significantly increased the representation of marginalized groups. However, the successes remain fragile.

The adoption of the 2015 Constitution was followed by violent protests by marginalized groups over a number of unresolved issues including the delimitation of provincial boundaries, the implementation of citizenship provisions perceived as discriminatory by women and Madhesi communities, and the implementation of federalism. There are further concerns about whether the mixed electoral system will be able to facilitate more diversity in high-level offices and local governance structures. Decision-making power still consistently rests with men from upper castes, and therefore does not reflect the concerns of the wider population. Societal acceptance of women and marginalized groups in positions of power continues to lag behind the ideals described in the CPA and the Constitution. Democracy cannot be achieved without including representatives from the entire spectrum of Nepali geography, ethnicity and society. Therefore the country's lawmakers must ensure that the quotas and principles of equality and inclusiveness enshrined in the 2015 Constitution are implemented in accordance with the needs of all groups in society, or risk regression of the democratic process.

8.5. Conclusions and recommendations: inclusive peacebuilding

After more than 30 years of international peacebuilding, experts now recognize that a fundamental flaw in the dominant model of peacebuilding is its lack of emphasis on inclusion. Inclusion, however, must go beyond quotas; it must be meaningful and targeted. Provisions to facilitate true inclusion do more than ensure numerical representation; they provide access to decision-making and foster the growth of new, local stakeholders who are interested in the democratic process.

The processes of constitution drafting, rebel-to-party transitions and electoral system design demonstrate how targeted and meaningful inclusion works in practice. Regular interaction with constituents, access to decision-makers, and careful nurturing of actors who are new to the democratic process can lead to broad public legitimacy and belief in new democratic institutions. In the long term, this broad-based 'buy-in' can help prevent a return to violence and give political actors incentives to maintain their participation in democratic politics; a continuous commitment to democracy—despite sporadic shocks and emergencies—is the best example of a resilient democratic state. The following recommendations are targeted at stakeholders at various stages of the post-conflict democratic transition process.

Peace/transition negotiators

- *Develop and use a more comprehensive definition of inclusion that takes into account more than simply the number of individuals and groups at the table.* Effective inclusion also requires a publicly legitimate selection process and legitimate representatives, and for these representatives to have access to decision-makers.
- *Integrate active and targeted inclusion strategies into the design of all institutions,* so that they are the product of regular communication with the public and are open to groups that challenge mainstream conceptions of the democratic state.

- *Find innovative ways to follow the lead of local stakeholders, including at the subnational level.* International donors have critical support roles to play during transitions, but they should not always be in the lead. Local and regional concerns must be addressed, and it is important to foster a broad sense of ownership of the decisions made during transitional periods. If people feel they have a stake in the decisions, they are more likely to respect the rules and stay involved in the long term.
- *Include issue-based civil society organizations in decision-making processes during the transitional period.* These organizations, which will push for fundamental reforms, are more likely to prioritize the voices and needs of ordinary citizens.

Authorities in charge of elections and international election assistance providers

- *Provide continuous support for political party development that targets various party subgroups likely to be empowered by participating in electoral politics.* These include the party's representatives in the national legislature, cabinet, local office, candidates for these offices, and regional party leaders from areas of the country that may have interests distinct from those of party leaders in the capital.
- *Help prepare party representatives to effectively perform their duties.* Conventional party-building programming often includes working with legislative representatives to develop stronger links with their constituencies and providing training in how to analyse and prepare legislation. This will equip new party officials with the tools to be effective representatives.
- *Promote the inclusion of new parties' leaders in programming in ways that give them a stake in the system.* Distrust is likely to be high within parties, and programmes designed to support legislators or local elected officials may be viewed as threatening to members of the party's central hierarchy who are not in these bodies, for example.

Inclusion must go beyond quotas; it must be meaningful and targeted.

Practitioners should invite members of the party hierarchy to participate in such programming, and ensure transparency and inclusion in their activities.

Electoral system designers

- *Think beyond power-sharing arrangements at the executive level.* More limited power-sharing arrangements (such as a share in state administration and security sectors) may also promote democratic resilience. Find new ways to provide credible, broad-based security guarantees for post-rebel parties without locking out competing 'unarmed' opposition parties.
- *Focus on electoral systems that balance inclusivity with access to decision-making in government, and that seek to achieve inclusivity via broad-based popular support.* Majoritarian systems do not always lead to a tyranny of the majority, and PR systems do not always result in inclusive government. Look beyond labels to explore which electoral system is best suited to particular contexts.
- *Include provisions that allow for veto power and that do not relegate certain parties to the opposition benches.*

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Annex

A

The Global State of Democracy
Indices methodology



The Global State of Democracy indices methodology

A.1. Introduction

This Annex provides a brief overview of the methodology underlying the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices. These indices, developed in 2017, cover 155 independent countries for the period between 1975 and 2015 (see country list in Table A.5). They were produced by a team of International IDEA staff and two external experts, under the supervision of an expert advisory board consisting of five leading experts in the field of democracy measurement.

Careful justification and documentation of conceptual distinctions and methodological choices and the use of state-of-the-art procedures were emphasized in all stages of the construction of the indices in order to ensure consistency, transparency, and high levels of measurement validity and reliability.

The indices build on an elaborate conceptual framework, which is rooted in International IDEA's well-established State of Democracy (SoD) framework, which was originally designed as a tool for in-country stakeholders to assess the quality of their democracy. It builds on a conceptual framework with two principles (popular control and political equality), seven mediating values (participation, authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, solidarity) and four pillars (citizens, law and rights, representative and accountable government, civil society and popular participation, democracy beyond the state). During the development of the GSoD indices, the SoD conceptual framework was

modified to enable its translation into a systematic, cross-national and cross-temporal quantitative measurement tool.

No original data were collected during the construction of the GSoD indices. They are composite measures based on 98 indicators from various extant data sources. These indicators were assigned to the different subattributes of the conceptual framework and combined into the GSoD indices using either Item-Response Theory (IRT) modelling, Bayesian Factor Analysis (BFA), or classical mathematical operations such as multiplication and mean. The aggregation process is described in more detail below. A key feature of the methodology is that it generates uncertainty estimates for each index, allowing users of the data set to assess whether the differences in scores over time and across countries are significant.

For a full description of the GSoD indices methodology see *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework* (Skaaning 2017).

A.2. Objective

The objective of the GSoD indices is to provide systematic and data capturing trends at the global, regional and national levels for different aspects of International IDEA's comprehensive understanding of democracy. The indices turn a broad range of empirical indicators from various data sets into measures of different aspects of democracy (attribute, subattribute and subcomponents) that can be used to evaluate the state of democracy at the global, regional and national levels.

The GSoD indices are used to track trends in democratic development in International IDEA's *Global State of Democracy* publication. They can also help stakeholders, including policymakers, researchers and civil society actors, analyse trends related to different aspects of democracy and identify priority policy areas.

A.3. Conceptual distinctions

Rather than creating an overarching democracy index that offers a single score for each country, the GSoD indices measure distinct aspects of democracy, which are emphasized by one or more major traditions within democratic thought. As such, the GSoD data set includes separate, fine-grained indices and subindices related to five attributes: Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement.

Figure A.1 presents an overview of the GSoD conceptual framework. It consists of five attributes, sixteen subattributes, five subcomponents of civil liberties, and three subcomponents of social rights and equality. Separate GSoD indices are constructed for each attribute, subattribute and subcomponent. The only exception is the Participatory Engagement attribute, which is conceptually and empirically multi-dimensional, and there are no obvious ways to aggregate its subattribute. Accordingly, a combined index for this attribute has not been constructed.

The concept of democracy has multiple dimensions, each of which is associated with one or more of the predominant conceptions of democracy found in the literature—electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy and participatory democracy. Table A.1 illustrates the overlaps between the conceptual framework underlying the GSoD indices and the different traditions of democratic thought.

FIGURE A.1

Conceptual framework: The Global State of Democracy




TABLE A.1

The GSoD conceptual framework and predominant conceptions of democracy: a general overview of overlaps

Attributes	Subattributes	Electoral democracy	Liberal democracy	Social democracy	Participatory democracy	
1 Representative Government (free and equal access to political power)	1.1 Clean Elections	X	X	X	X	
	1.2 Inclusive Suffrage	X	X	X	X	
	1.3 Free Political Parties	X	X	X	X	
	1.4 Elected Government	X	X	X	X	
2 Fundamental Rights (individual liberties and resources)	2.1 Access to Justice		X	X	X	
	2.2 Civil Liberties	2.2.1 Freedom of Expression		X	X	X
		2.2.2 Freedom of Association and Assembly		X	X	X
		2.2.3 Freedom of Religion		X	X	X
		2.2.4 Freedom of Movement		X	X	X
		2.2.5 Personal Integrity and Security		X	X	X
	2.3 Social Rights and Equality	2.3.1 Social Group Equality			X	
		2.3.2 Gender Equality			X	
2.3.3 Basic Welfare				X		
3 Checks on Government (effective control of executive power)	3.1 Effective Parliament		X	X		
	3.2 Judicial Independence		X	X		
	3.3 Media Integrity		X	X		
4 Impartial Administration (fair and predictable public administration)	3.1 Effective Parliament		X	X		
	4.1 Absence of Corruption		X	X		
5 Participatory Engagement (instruments for and realization of political involvement)	5.1 Civil Society Participation				X	
	5.2 Electoral Participation				X	
	5.3 Direct Democracy				X	
	5.4 Subnational Elections				X	

Notes: Three subattributes (1.2 Inclusive suffrage; 5.2 Electoral participation; 5.3 Direct democracy) are measured using only one observable indicator each. However, 5.3 (direct democracy) is a composite measure based on 12 variables.

A.4. Criteria for indicator selection

The GSoD conceptual framework guides the selection of indicators. These indicators rely on various types of sources and are collected from extant data sets compiled by different organizations and researchers, described in more detail below. The main priority when selecting the indicators was to achieve a high level of concept–measure consistency, in order to ensure that the indicators capture the core meaning of each concept.

The following criteria also guided the selection of indicators:

1. Indicators should be produced using transparent and credible data-generating processes.
2. Indicators should have extensive coverage: they should include scores for at least 140 countries from different regions, and for at least 30 years within the period 1975–2015.
3. Multiple indicators should be selected for each subattribute, especially if an adequate observable indicator is not available.
4. The data sets from which the indicators are extracted should be updated regularly.

All interested parties have full and free access to the country-level data for all indices, downloadable from International IDEA’s website (International IDEA 2017b). With the exception of three indicators from the International Country Risk Guide (which are subject to copyright regulations and limitations), all underlying indicators extracted from various data sets are available on this page.

A.5. Data sources

The GSoD indices summarize information from 98 indicators collected from the following 14 data sets. Some of these indicators, such as the elected offices and direct democracy indicators from V-Dem, are composite measures based on several subindicators.

These 14 data sets represent four different types of source data:

- **expert surveys**, in which country experts assess a particular issue in a country (V-Dem and ICRG);
- **standards-based ‘in-house coding’** by researchers and/or their assistants based on an evaluative assessment of country-specific information found in reports, academic books and papers, reference works, news articles, etc. (V-Dem, Polity IV, LIED, CLD, NELDA and MFD);
- **observational data** on directly observable features such as the ratio of women to men in parliament, infant mortality rates and legislative elections (V-Dem, LIED, NELDA, Gapminder, FAO, UNESCO, GHDx and IPU); and
- **composite measures** based on a number of variables that come from existing data sets rather than original data collection (V-Dem, HRPS and LJIS).

TABLE A.2

Data sets used to construct the GSoD indices

Data sets	Data providers
Civil Liberties Dataset (CLD)	Møller and Skaaning
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) statistics	FAO
Gapminder	Gapminder
Global Health Data Exchange (GHDx)	Global Health Data Exchange
Human Rights Protection Scores (HRPS)	Fariss
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)	Political Risk Services
Women in Politics data (IPU)	Inter-Parliamentary Union
Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED)	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius
Latent Judicial Independence Scores (LJIS)	Linzer and Staton

Media Freedom Data (MFD)	Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle
National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)	Hyde and Marinov
Polity IV	Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) statistics	UNESCO
Varieties of Democracy data set (V-Dem)	Varieties of Democracy

Notes: For details on the data sets and data providers see *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework* (Skaaning 2017).

A comprehensive presentation and discussion of the individual indicators and data sources, including summary tables used for the respective indices, can be found in *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework* (Skaaning 2017).

A.6. Aggregation

All available variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1 for the purpose of aggregation. Three different procedures were used for aggregation—IRT modelling, BFA, and standard mathematical operators (multiplication and average).

IRT modelling

IRT modelling was used at the lowest level of aggregation (subattribute or subcomponent level) if there was a significant amount of missingness (more than 5 per cent) in any of the indicators used to reflect the concept in question. This method uses patterns of cross-indicator agreement to construct estimates of a particular latent concept, such as freedom of expression or social group equality. The analyses used the multidimensional IRT approach implemented in the software package *mirt* for the R statistical software.

Using *mirt* to compute the scores has a series of advantages. It can compute scores for all country-years for which there is incomplete overlap in the coverage of indicators using the full information maximum likelihood

approach. This is an important feature, because although all the selected indicators have very good coverage and therefore overlap significantly, quite a few do not offer complete time series or do not cover all countries in the sample. Furthermore, *mirt* enables the construction of confidence intervals around the scores (use of the confidence intervals is described in more detail below). Finally, *mirt* estimates do not require significant computational power, which makes the indices easier to construct and replicate.

The IRT model used (*mirt*) required the indicators that were measured on an interval scale to be recoded into an ordinal scale. While this rescaling led to some loss of information for some variables, this procedure is generally considered both more conservative and more empirically valid. As a rule of thumb, ordinal variables are employed without recoding. Interval scale variables are recoded into ordinal scales using cut-offs at regular intervals (5 percentiles) on the original scales. In addition, where the category of an ordinal variable comprised less than 1 per cent of the observations, these observations were merged into an adjacent category. See the Codebook (Tufis 2017a) for further information about recoding.

Bayesian Factor Analysis

BFA is used for most aggregations that feature virtually perfect overlap in the coverage of measures to be combined. This method generally has the advantage (compared to the IRT models) that the included measures do not have to be ordinal variables. Therefore the variation is not lost, and the estimates (factor scores) of the underlying concept become more fine-grained.

Factor analysis uses information about covariation patterns between indicators to collapse several correlated, observed indicators into a smaller number of underlying variables called factors. Simply put, resulting factors reduce complexity by capturing variation that is common to several observed variables. For example, information on infant mortality

TABLE A.3

Aggregation rules for the creation of indices at the attribute and subattribute levels

Attribute	Aggregation	Subattribute	Aggregation
1 Representative Government (free and equal access to political power)	Bayesian factor analysis of clean elections, free political parties and elected government to create contestation index; thereafter, multiplication of contestation and inclusive suffrage	1.1 Clean Elections	Bayesian factor analysis
		1.2 Inclusive Suffrage	NA (only one indicator)
		1.3 Free Political Parties	Item response modelling
		1.4 Elected Government	Item response modelling
2 Fundamental Rights (individual liberties and resources)	Bayesian factor analysis	2.1 Access to Justice	Bayesian factor analysis
		2.2 Civil Liberties	First item response modelling or Bayesian factor analysis by subcomponents (i.e. freedom of expression [BFA], freedom of association and assembly [BFA], freedom of religion [BFA], freedom of movement [BFA], and personal integrity and security [IRT]). Thereafter, Bayesian factor analysis of subcomponent indices.
		2.3 Social Rights and Equality	First item response modelling by subcomponents (i.e. social group equality, gender equality, and basic welfare). Thereafter, Bayesian factor analysis of subcomponent indices.
3 Checks on Government (effective control of executive power)	Bayesian factor analysis	3.1 Effective Parliament	Item response modelling
		3.2 Judicial Independence	Item response modelling
		3.3 Media Integrity	Bayesian factor analysis
4 Impartial Administration (fair and predictable public administration)	Bayesian factor analysis	4.1 Absence of Corruption	Item response modelling
		4.2 Predictable Enforcement	Item response modelling
5 Participatory Engagement (instruments for realization of political involvement)	N/A (no obvious way to combine the multi-dimensional subattributes)	5.1 Civil Society Participation	Bayesian factor analysis
		5.2 Electoral Participation	N/A (only one indicator)
		5.3 Direct Democracy	N/A (only one indicator)
		5.4 Subnational Elections	Multiplication of indicators related to regional elections and local elections, respectively. Thereafter, the scores for the two levels are averaged.

Notes: Three subattributes (1.2 Inclusive suffrage; 5.2 Electoral participation; 5.3 Direct democracy) are measured using only one observable indicator each. However, 5.3 (direct democracy) is a composite measure based on 12 variables.

rate, life expectancy, literacy, kilocalories per person per day, mean years of schooling, educational equality and health equality can be comprehended by a single factor because all indicators capture a common underlying phenomenon (as indicated by high factor loadings and bivariate correlation coefficients), which can be interpreted as reflecting the provision of basic welfare.

The BFA procedure, like IRT models, provides point estimates for the latent dimension as well as confidence intervals. BFA is used to combine subcomponent scores into subattribute scores, and then subattribute scores into attribute scores when the measures are expected to reflect the same latent concept, and when the indicators or indices to be aggregated are highly correlated.

Where the indicators/indices showed lower correlations and theoretical guidance suggested the benefits of doing so, the scores were **multiplied or averaged**. Multiplication was used to combine a contestation index (created by using BFA on three subattributes: clean elections, free political parties and elected government) with the inclusiveness subattribute to create the Representative Government index. Multiplication was also used to aggregate the indicators related to the presence and the freeness and fairness of regional and local elections, respectively. Thereafter, the values for free and fair regional elections and for free and fair local elections were averaged. Table A.3 summarizes the aggregation procedures used to construct the indices at different levels.

A.7. Scale

All indices offer nuanced scores in the form of interval scale measurement. This means that the scores are graded, and that the numbers express a rank order and the exact differences between the values. Nominal-level data only express that some things are different, while ordinal scale measurement rank orders phenomena, but the distances between scores are not known, so one cannot, for instance, meaningfully calculate the average without relying on rather demanding assumptions.

The indices are normalized to range from 0 (lowest achievement) to 1 (highest achievement). A score of 0 generally refers to the worst performance in the whole sample of country-years (covered by a particular index), while 1 refers to the best country-year performance in the sample. However, for a number of indices, 0 also has an absolute meaning as the lowest score that is theoretically possible. For example, the suffrage and electoral participation indices have substantively meaningful minimums and maximums: 0 refers to the full absence of inclusive suffrage or electoral participation, while 1 refers to universal adult suffrage and 100 per cent voter turnout in national elections, respectively. The subattribute indices capturing clean elections, elected government, direct democracy and subnational elections also have substantively meaningful minimum values that refer to the total absence of the features in question.

A.8. Use of confidence intervals for comparisons across countries and over time

The yearly scores for each country for most indices are accompanied by uncertainty estimates, which can be used to assess whether differences between and within countries over time are significant. The only exceptions are 1.2 (inclusive suffrage), 5.2 (electoral turnout), 5.3 (direct democracy) and 5.4 (subnational elections) because these are based on observational data. These uncertainty estimates in the form of confidence intervals (margins of error) reflect the statistically likely range for the country-year index scores based on the indicators employed. The GSoD indices confidence levels refer to one standard deviation below and above the estimated score. This means that about 68 per cent of the 'true' values would be found within these intervals.

Confidence intervals are only available for indices based on multiple indicators. The more the underlying indicators are in agreement regarding the scoring (high-low) on a particular aspect of democracy, the narrower the confidence levels are. If the confidence


levels overlap when comparing the scores for two or more countries on the same GSoD (attribute) index, the difference between the scores is not statistically significant. Likewise, overlapping confidence intervals for different years when comparing the scores of one country for a particular GSoD index indicate that the difference is statistically insignificant. Short-term fluctuations—especially very recent ones—are generally hard to capture well and should be interpreted with caution; longer-term trends are more reliable. Confidence intervals were not included in all the figures in the publication, to avoid cluttering them with shading or other indications of the confidence bounds.

Figure A.2 illustrates the scores and related confidence intervals for checks of government in Peru and Venezuela from 1990 to 2015. Two kinds of comparison can be made based on this information: between-country differences in particular years and within-country differences over time.

Starting with **comparisons across countries**, in the very first years of the period, there is a slight overlap in the confidence bounds for the two countries, so even though the score for Venezuela is higher in 1990 than Peru's score, the difference is not significant (at the 68 per cent level, which is approximately one standard deviation). However, with the downturn in Peru in the aftermath of President Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe* (self-coup) in 1992, the situation in Venezuela gets significantly better than in Peru until about 1999, when Chávez becomes president in Venezuela and begins concentrating power in the executive. In the following year, President Fujimori loses power and the checks on government score improves in Peru, while it continues to decline in Venezuela. Thus from about 2002, Peru has a significantly better score than Venezuela, after a couple of years in which the scores for the two countries are not significantly different from each other. Similar comparisons can of course be made to evaluate whether the score for one country in one year is significantly better or worse than the score for another country in another year.

FIGURE A.2

Checks on Government in Peru and Venezuela, 1990–2015



Notes: The light-shaded bands around the lines demarcate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.

Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Checks on Government Index).

As for **within-country comparisons**, there seem to be some fluctuations in Peru after 2002, but these changes are not significant, as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals for the various years. However, the scores for the level of checks on government in Peru between 1992 and 2000 are significantly lower in the intermediate period compared to the years before and after. Likewise, the data indicate that Venezuela experienced two significant declines: the scores for checks on government for the intermediate period (around 1999 to 2004) were significantly lower than the scores for the previous period, and significantly higher than those for the subsequent period. The small bump between 2010 and 2013 does not constitute a significant change.

Similar comparisons can be made between regional averages, between countries and regional averages, between countries and the global average, and between regions and the global average, and all of these units can be compared at different points in time.

A.9. Countries and regions

The 155 countries with over one million inhabitants covered by the GSoD indices (International IDEA 2017b) are divided into six regions and 13 subregions as shown in Table A.4. The regional definitions largely follow those developed for The Global State of Democracy (International IDEA 2017a), and as outlined in the background paper 'Geographical definitions of regions and

international organizations in The Global State of Democracy' (International IDEA 2017c). The countries are primarily divided geographically, but also taking into account cultural and historical links, particularly in the regional subdivisions. Regarding the GSoD indices, some modifications to International IDEA's list have been made that put more weight on countries' social, political and historical backgrounds.

TABLE A.4

Division of countries into regions as covered by the GSoD indices (2017)

Region	Countries
Africa	
East Africa	Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda
Central Africa	Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, Republic of Congo
Southern Africa	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe
West Africa	Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
North Africa	Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia
Latin America and the Caribbean	
Caribbean	Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago
Central America and Mexico	Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
South America	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
North America	
North America	Canada, United States of America
Asia and the Pacific	
Central Asia	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
East Asia	China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Taiwan
South Asia	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
South East Asia	Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam

Oceania	Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea
Middle East and Iran	
Middle East and Iran	Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
Europe	
East-Central Europe	Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia
Eastern Europe/Post-Soviet Europe	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine
North and West Europe	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
South Europe	Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Note: Country names in this list do not represent the official position of International IDEA with regard to the legal status or policy of the entities mentioned. The list represents a harmonization of often-divergent lists and practices.	

A.10. Cautionary notes

The GSoD indices can be used to assess cross-country differences and similarities and to identify trends at the country, regional and global levels over time. Users are advised not to collapse the scores for the individual attributes into a single democracy index, as a disaggregate perspective provides more nuanced information.

It is not recommended that the indices are used to carry out impact assessments of specific policy reforms or democracy promotion initiatives. Despite disaggregation, they are often too abstract to be useful for suggesting concrete policy reforms, which should instead be informed by detailed and context-specific evaluations of opportunities and constraints. The release of version 7 of the V-Dem data (2017), one of the main data sources that the GSoD indices draw upon, was followed by the following cautionary note: ‘With the updates covering 2013–16, it has for a few country-variable combinations, been impossible to achieve that target [at least five country experts per country-indicator]. At times result in significant changes in point estimates as a consequence of self-selected attrition of

Country Experts, rather than actual changes in the country.’ Moreover, ‘... identifiers for the main country coded by 11.7% of experts were incorrectly assigned ... this issue has likely reduced cross-national comparability to an unclear extent’ (V-Dem 2017). Therefore, caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions about the 2013–15 period covered by the GSoD indices that rely heavily on data from the V-Dem expert survey.

In practice, this problem tends to be more pronounced for democracies in North America and Northern and Western Europe, where the scores for some indicators and countries have tended to be dragged down (towards the global mean) for methodological rather than substantive reasons. Accordingly, no strong conclusions are drawn based on the small dips recognizable in some of the line graphs by the very end of the period covered (2012–15) concerning North America and Europe, and they are often not mentioned in the text. Although these changes are generally not statistically significant, they could signal downward trends; they could also be a methodological artefact.

A.11. Global State of Democracy indices: country scores per decade

Table A.5 displays scores for all 155 countries in the sample for the following years: 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2015. All indices scores range from 0 (lowest democratic achievement)

to 1 (highest democratic achievement). The table provides only a snapshot: fluctuations between the years displayed may be obscured. For example, if a country had a coup in 1976 and recovered in 1984, the table would not capture those fluctuations.

TABLE A.5

Global State of Democracy indices: country scores per decade

Global State of Democracy indices: Representative Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.46	0.06
Albania	0.22	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.54	0.06	0.68	0.06	0.64	0.06
Algeria	0.00	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.43	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.42	0.06
Angola	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.47	0.06
Argentina	0.65	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.77	0.06
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.53	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.47	0.06
Australia	0.80	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.84	0.06	0.82	0.06
Austria	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.76	0.06
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	0.36	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.32	0.06
Bangladesh	0.34	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.61	0.06	0.60	0.06	0.45	0.06
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.56	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.38	0.06
Belgium	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.79	0.06	0.76	0.06
Benin	0.00	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.66	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.71	0.06
Bolivia	0.00	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.77	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.68	0.06
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	0.00	0.06	0.61	0.06	-	-
Botswana	0.63	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.66	0.06	0.66	0.06	0.66	0.06
Brazil	0.27	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.86	0.06	0.87	0.06	0.80	0.06
Bulgaria	0.24	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.73	0.06
Burkina Faso	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.70	0.06
Burundi	0.00	0.06	0.30	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.31	0.06
Cambodia	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.43	0.06
Cameroon	0.27	0.06	0.28	0.06	0.38	0.06	0.44	0.06	0.46	0.06
Canada	0.78	0.06	0.79	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.82	0.06
Central African Republic	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.41	0.06	0.44	0.06
Chad	0.27	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.38	0.06	0.38	0.06
Chile	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.84	0.06	0.81	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Representative Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
China	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Colombia	0.65	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.68	0.06	0.70	0.06
Costa Rica	0.77	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.90	0.06
Côte d'Ivoire	0.24	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.61	0.06
Croatia	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.79	0.06
Cuba	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.20	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.22	0.06
Cyprus	0.63	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.74	0.06
Czechia	0.25	0.06	0.28	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.80	0.06
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.17	0.06	0.16	0.06	0.16	0.06	0.15	0.06	0.13	0.06
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.17	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.44	0.06
Denmark	0.79	0.06	0.79	0.06	0.79	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.79	0.06
Dominican Republic	0.42	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.66	0.06
Ecuador	0.00	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.69	0.06
Egypt	0.33	0.06	0.38	0.06	0.36	0.06	0.34	0.06	0.36	0.06
El Salvador	0.36	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.66	0.06	0.74	0.06
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.73	0.06	0.79	0.06	0.79	0.06
Ethiopia	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.41	0.06
Finland	0.78	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.82	0.06
France	0.86	0.06	0.86	0.06	0.86	0.06	0.86	0.06	0.92	0.06
Gabon	0.27	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.47	0.06
Gambia	0.69	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.45	0.06	0.42	0.06
Georgia	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.68	0.06
German Democratic Republic	0.22	0.06	0.25	0.06	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.81	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.89	0.06	0.87	0.06	0.79	0.06
Ghana	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.50	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.68	0.06
Greece	0.82	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.80	0.06
Guatemala	0.31	0.06	0.43	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.74	0.06
Guinea	0.20	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.37	0.06	0.37	0.06	0.51	0.06
Guinea-Bissau	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.55	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.62	0.06
Haiti	0.21	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.43	0.06
Honduras	0.00	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.66	0.06	0.63	0.06
Hungary	0.23	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.74	0.06
India	0.60	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.70	0.06	0.69	0.06	0.70	0.06
Indonesia	0.40	0.06	0.34	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.74	0.06	0.71	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Representative Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Iran	0.19	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.30	0.06	0.36	0.06	0.36	0.06
Iraq	0.00	0.06	0.16	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.50	0.06
Ireland	0.79	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.82	0.06
Israel	0.77	0.06	0.73	0.06	0.74	0.06	0.73	0.06	0.70	0.06
Italy	0.83	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.84	0.06	0.81	0.06
Jamaica	0.68	0.06	0.69	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.77	0.06	0.78	0.06
Japan	0.81	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.80	0.06
Jordan	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.37	0.06	0.41	0.06	0.44	0.06
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.44	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.32	0.06
Kenya	0.38	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.62	0.06
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.61	0.05
Kuwait	0.22	0.06	0.21	0.06	0.23	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.47	0.06
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.39	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.56	0.06
Laos	0.30	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.17	0.06	0.18	0.06	0.19	0.06
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.74	0.06	0.74	0.06	0.74	0.06
Lebanon	0.57	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.45	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.54	0.06
Lesotho	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.68	0.06	0.72	0.06
Liberia	0.29	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.62	0.06
Libya	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.80	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0.54	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.62	0.06
Madagascar	0.32	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.61	0.06	0.53	0.06
Malawi	0.00	0.06	0.20	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.60	0.06
Malaysia	0.47	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.45	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.49	0.06
Mali	0.00	0.06	0.21	0.06	0.62	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.60	0.06
Mauritania	0.27	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.34	0.06	0.44	0.06
Mauritius	0.78	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.78	0.06
Mexico	0.34	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.54	0.06	0.74	0.06	0.68	0.06
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.65	0.06	0.60	0.06	0.64	0.06
Mongolia	0.24	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.70	0.06	0.70	0.06	0.69	0.06
Morocco	0.00	0.06	0.36	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.50	0.06
Mozambique	-	-	0.00	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.56	0.06
Myanmar	0.13	0.06	0.15	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.54	0.06
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.66	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.70	0.06
Nepal	0.00	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.48	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.51	0.06
Netherlands	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.83	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Representative Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
New Zealand	0.81	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.81	0.06
Nicaragua	0.29	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.56	0.06
Niger	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.64	0.06
Nigeria	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.63	0.06
Norway	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.78	0.06
Oman	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.41	0.06	0.41	0.06
Pakistan	0.00	0.06	0.31	0.06	0.55	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.54	0.06
Panama	0.22	0.06	0.31	0.06	0.77	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.78	0.06
Papua New Guinea	0.51	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.52	0.06
Paraguay	0.30	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.61	0.06	0.66	0.06	0.68	0.06
Peru	0.00	0.06	0.73	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.75	0.06
Philippines	0.00	0.06	0.37	0.06	0.61	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.62	0.06
Poland	0.28	0.06	0.28	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.79	0.06
Portugal	0.56	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06
Qatar	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Republic of Congo	0.20	0.06	0.20	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.40	0.06
Republic of Korea	0.35	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.73	0.06
Romania	0.22	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.70	0.06
Russia	0.19	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.53	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.43	0.06
Rwanda	0.00	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.38	0.06
Saudi Arabia	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Senegal	0.42	0.06	0.54	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.68	0.06	0.67	0.06
Serbia	0.19	0.06	0.21	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.62	0.06	0.63	0.06
Sierra Leone	0.36	0.06	0.21	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.61	0.06
Singapore	0.52	0.06	0.53	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.58	0.06
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	0.72	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.77	0.06
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	0.80	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.80	0.06
Somalia	0.00	0.06	0.16	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
South Africa	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.77	0.06	0.73	0.06
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	0.06
Spain	0.23	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.77	0.06
Sri Lanka	0.65	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.61	0.06	0.66	0.06
Sudan	0.29	0.06	0.30	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.30	0.06	0.45	0.06
Swaziland	0.00	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.24	0.06
Sweden	0.85	0.06	0.85	0.06	0.85	0.06	0.86	0.06	0.85	0.06
Switzerland	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.82	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Representative Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Syria	0.26	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.00	0.06
Taiwan	0.24	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.76	0.06
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.36	0.06	0.36	0.06	0.35	0.06
Tanzania	0.33	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.51	0.06
Thailand	0.52	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.33	0.06
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.58	0.06	0.67	0.06
Togo	0.00	0.06	0.16	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.51	0.06
Trinidad and Tobago	0.63	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.74	0.06	0.73	0.06	0.75	0.06
Tunisia	0.27	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.31	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.59	0.06
Turkey	0.66	0.06	0.54	0.06	0.68	0.06	0.70	0.06	0.56	0.06
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0.16	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.23	0.06
Uganda	0.00	0.06	0.30	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.41	0.06
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.63	0.06	0.54	0.06	0.46	0.06
United Kingdom	0.81	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.91	0.06	0.83	0.06
United States	0.79	0.06	0.89	0.06	0.90	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.89	0.06
Uruguay	0.00	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.86	0.06	0.85	0.06	0.84	0.06
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.29	0.06	0.30	0.06	0.27	0.06
Venezuela	0.75	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.60	0.06	0.49	0.06
Viet Nam	0.34	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.25	0.06
Yemen	0.21	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.44	0.06	0.43	0.06	0.37	0.06
Zambia	0.28	0.06	0.28	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.53	0.06	0.62	0.06
Zimbabwe	0.03	0.06	0.41	0.06	0.45	0.06	0.37	0.06	0.48	0.06

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSOD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>>.

Global State of Democracy indices: Fundamental Rights Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.30	0.05	0.25	0.05	0.16	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.41	0.06
Albania	0.15	0.05	0.16	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.67	0.05	0.72	0.05
Algeria	0.43	0.05	0.44	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.50	0.05
Angola	0.19	0.06	0.23	0.05	0.33	0.06	0.42	0.05	0.43	0.05
Argentina	0.49	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.70	0.06	0.69	0.05	0.64	0.06
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.54	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.56	0.05
Australia	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.88	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.80	0.05
Austria	0.83	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.90	0.05	-	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	0.39	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.32	0.05
Bangladesh	0.39	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.44	0.05
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.66	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.54	0.05
Belgium	0.88	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.92	0.06	0.93	0.05	0.91	0.05
Benin	0.37	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.74	0.05
Bolivia	0.27	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.52	0.06
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	0.38	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.64	0.05
Botswana	0.61	0.05	0.62	0.05	0.67	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.73	0.05
Brazil	0.26	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.67	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.66	0.05
Bulgaria	0.34	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.71	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.75	0.05
Burkina Faso	0.45	0.05	0.44	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.60	0.06	0.63	0.05
Burundi	0.32	0.05	0.39	0.05	0.44	0.05	0.44	0.05	0.32	0.05
Cambodia	0.00	0.05	0.24	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.43	0.05
Cameroon	0.32	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.50	0.05
Canada	0.80	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.83	0.05
Central African Republic	0.32	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.40	0.05
Chad	0.28	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.36	0.05
Chile	0.23	0.06	0.28	0.05	0.70	0.06	0.77	0.05	0.71	0.05
China	0.20	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.41	0.06
Colombia	0.39	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.58	0.05
Costa Rica	0.70	0.05	0.73	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.86	0.05
Côte d'Ivoire	0.39	0.06	0.40	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.57	0.05
Croatia	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.67	0.05
Cuba	0.28	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.31	0.05	0.32	0.05	0.37	0.05
Cyprus	0.59	0.05	0.64	0.06	0.68	0.06	0.76	0.05	0.80	0.05
Czechia	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.79	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.81	0.05
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Fundamental Rights Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.27	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.05
Denmark	0.97	0.05	0.97	0.05	0.98	0.05	0.99	0.05	0.94	0.05
Dominican Republic	0.39	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.58	0.06	0.64	0.05	0.60	0.05
Ecuador	0.36	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.61	0.05
Egypt	0.41	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.28	0.05
El Salvador	0.15	0.05	0.16	0.05	0.45	0.06	0.52	0.05	0.49	0.05
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.36	0.05	0.17	0.05	0.19	0.05
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.82	0.05	0.85	0.06	0.87	0.05
Ethiopia	0.23	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.41	0.06
Finland	0.89	0.05	0.90	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.95	0.05	0.89	0.05
France	0.79	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.91	0.05	0.91	0.05	0.92	0.05
Gabon	0.39	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.62	0.05
Gambia	0.56	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.44	0.06	0.47	0.05	0.45	0.05
Georgia	-	-	-	-	0.56	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.62	0.05
German Democratic Republic	0.39	0.05	0.39	0.05	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.84	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.94	0.06	0.96	0.05	0.93	0.05
Ghana	0.35	0.05	0.31	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.74	0.05	0.65	0.05
Greece	0.68	0.05	0.78	0.05	0.81	0.05	0.82	0.05	0.83	0.05
Guatemala	0.13	0.05	0.12	0.05	0.29	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.47	0.05
Guinea	0.22	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.37	0.06	0.40	0.05	0.43	0.05
Guinea-Bissau	0.29	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.45	0.06	0.46	0.05
Haiti	0.25	0.05	0.26	0.06	0.43	0.05	0.46	0.06	0.46	0.05
Honduras	0.32	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.58	0.05
Hungary	0.42	0.05	0.44	0.05	0.77	0.05	0.76	0.05	0.70	0.05
India	0.46	0.05	0.57	0.06	0.58	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.58	0.05
Indonesia	0.32	0.05	0.32	0.06	0.33	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.57	0.05
Iran	0.36	0.05	0.29	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.39	0.05	0.39	0.05
Iraq	0.30	0.05	0.24	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.40	0.05
Ireland	0.78	0.05	0.82	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.88	0.05	0.86	0.05
Israel	0.67	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.69	0.06
Italy	0.73	0.05	0.82	0.05	0.84	0.05	0.84	0.06	0.84	0.05
Jamaica	0.55	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.67	0.05
Japan	0.85	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.06	0.83	0.05
Jordan	0.43	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.52	0.06	0.52	0.05	0.54	0.05
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.57	0.06	0.53	0.05	0.52	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Fundamental Rights Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Kenya	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.48	0.05
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.05
Kuwait	0.53	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.55	0.05
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.55	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.58	0.05
Laos	0.24	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.26	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.36	0.05
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.81	0.05	0.83	0.05	0.83	0.05
Lebanon	0.49	0.06	0.45	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.52	0.06
Lesotho	0.43	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.60	0.05
Liberia	0.35	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.60	0.05
Libya	0.27	0.05	0.27	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.40	0.05
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.73	0.06	0.85	0.05	0.85	0.05
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0.56	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.56	0.05
Madagascar	0.35	0.05	0.36	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.47	0.05
Malawi	0.29	0.05	0.29	0.06	0.56	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.61	0.05
Malaysia	0.47	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.49	0.05
Mali	0.44	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.62	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.62	0.05
Mauritania	0.44	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.41	0.05
Mauritius	0.62	0.05	0.67	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.68	0.05
Mexico	0.42	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.53	0.05
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.58	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.61	0.05
Mongolia	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.66	0.05
Morocco	0.36	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.61	0.05
Mozambique	0.32	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.55	0.05
Myanmar	0.17	0.05	0.18	0.06	0.21	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.45	0.05
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.66	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.71	0.05
Nepal	0.30	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.60	0.05
Netherlands	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.90	0.06	0.88	0.05
New Zealand	0.77	0.05	0.83	0.05	0.84	0.05	0.88	0.05	0.87	0.05
Nicaragua	0.21	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.56	0.05
Niger	0.40	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.68	0.05
Nigeria	0.43	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.53	0.06	0.56	0.05
Norway	0.89	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.96	0.05	0.98	0.05	0.93	0.05
Oman	0.40	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.50	0.06
Pakistan	0.42	0.06	0.36	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.42	0.05
Panama	0.38	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.71	0.05
Papua New Guinea	0.54	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.54	0.06	0.55	0.05	0.53	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Fundamental Rights Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Paraguay	0.18	0.06	0.20	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.55	0.06
Peru	0.35	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.57	0.05
Philippines	0.30	0.05	0.31	0.06	0.58	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.57	0.05
Poland	0.38	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.79	0.05	0.79	0.05	0.80	0.05
Portugal	0.72	0.05	0.83	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.81	0.05
Qatar	0.39	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.45	0.05
Republic of Congo	0.31	0.05	0.26	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.39	0.05	0.40	0.06
Republic of Korea	0.42	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.73	0.05	0.77	0.05	0.76	0.05
Romania	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.67	0.05	0.69	0.05
Russia	0.26	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.57	0.06	0.48	0.05	0.45	0.05
Rwanda	0.45	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.50	0.05	0.57	0.05
Saudi Arabia	0.28	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.33	0.06	0.34	0.05
Senegal	0.53	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.62	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.69	0.05
Serbia	0.53	0.05	0.58	0.06	0.52	0.05	0.67	0.05	0.59	0.05
Sierra Leone	0.31	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.50	0.05	0.55	0.06
Singapore	0.54	0.05	0.55	0.06	0.57	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.59	0.05
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	0.70	0.05	0.78	0.05	0.73	0.05
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	0.84	0.05	0.83	0.05	0.85	0.05
Somalia	0.21	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.20	0.05	0.29	0.05
South Africa	0.29	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.69	0.06
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.26	0.05
Spain	0.40	0.05	0.83	0.05	0.84	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.84	0.05
Sri Lanka	0.60	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.63	0.05
Sudan	0.31	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.29	0.05	0.29	0.05
Swaziland	0.35	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.36	0.05	0.38	0.05
Sweden	0.90	0.05	0.93	0.05	0.95	0.06	0.95	0.05	0.88	0.05
Switzerland	0.84	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.92	0.05	0.93	0.05	0.91	0.05
Syria	0.20	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.26	0.05	0.16	0.05
Taiwan	0.42	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.81	0.05
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.25	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.32	0.06
Tanzania	0.54	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.55	0.05
Thailand	0.41	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.37	0.05
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.57	0.05	0.56	0.05
Togo	0.36	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.52	0.05
Trinidad and Tobago	0.71	0.06	0.69	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.71	0.05
Tunisia	0.48	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.49	0.06	0.49	0.05	0.72	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Fundamental Rights Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Turkey	0.50	0.05	0.42	0.06	0.48	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.41	0.05
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0.27	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.26	0.05
Uganda	0.36	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.57	0.05
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.56	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.49	0.06
United Kingdom	0.79	0.05	0.85	0.06	0.85	0.05	0.88	0.06	0.82	0.05
United States	0.81	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.84	0.05
Uruguay	0.33	0.05	0.67	0.05	0.81	0.05	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.05
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.32	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.31	0.05
Venezuela	0.60	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.60	0.06	0.48	0.05	0.43	0.05
Viet Nam	0.31	0.05	0.31	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.54	0.05
Yemen	0.28	0.05	0.26	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.22	0.05
Zambia	0.46	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.60	0.05
Zimbabwe	0.23	0.05	0.50	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.45	0.05

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>>.

Global State of Democracy indices: Checks on Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.24	0.06	0.28	0.05	-	-	0.48	0.06	0.54	0.06
Albania	0.23	0.05	0.23	0.06	0.61	0.06	0.64	0.05	0.65	0.05
Algeria	0.20	0.06	0.20	0.06	0.37	0.06	0.36	0.06	0.39	0.06
Angola	0.23	0.05	0.23	0.06	0.36	0.05	0.36	0.06	0.37	0.05
Argentina	0.51	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.60	0.06	0.60	0.05
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.42	0.06	0.38	0.06	0.40	0.05
Australia	0.82	0.06	0.89	0.06	0.89	0.06	0.89	0.06	0.91	0.05
Austria	0.69	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.74	0.05	0.75	0.05	-	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	0.26	0.05	0.21	0.06	0.16	0.06
Bangladesh	0.30	0.05	0.33	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.43	0.06	0.37	0.06
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.48	0.05	0.17	0.06	0.16	0.05
Belgium	0.71	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.77	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.79	0.05
Benin	0.23	0.05	0.24	0.06	0.62	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.64	0.06
Bolivia	0.21	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.49	0.06
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.49	0.06	0.50	0.05
Botswana	0.60	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.64	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.63	0.06
Brazil	0.27	0.05	0.50	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.73	0.06	0.72	0.06
Bulgaria	0.15	0.06	0.16	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.68	0.05	0.74	0.06
Burkina Faso	0.39	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.47	0.05	0.57	0.06
Burundi	0.29	0.05	0.39	0.05	0.48	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.35	0.05
Cambodia	-	-	0.10	0.06	0.34	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.33	0.06
Cameroon	0.25	0.06	0.29	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.37	0.05	0.37	0.06
Canada	0.79	0.06	0.77	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.78	0.05	0.73	0.06
Central African Republic	0.22	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.54	0.06	0.47	0.06	0.56	0.05
Chad	0.25	0.06	0.20	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.30	0.06	0.33	0.06
Chile	0.20	0.06	0.23	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.77	0.06	0.77	0.06
China	0.15	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.24	0.05	0.25	0.06	0.24	0.06
Colombia	0.54	0.05	0.54	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.61	0.05	0.64	0.06
Costa Rica	0.71	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.80	0.06
Côte d'Ivoire	0.25	0.06	0.25	0.05	0.43	0.06	0.53	0.06	0.50	0.06
Croatia	-	-	-	-	0.41	0.05	0.60	0.06	0.64	0.05
Cuba	0.15	0.06	0.12	0.05	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.06	0.22	0.06
Cyprus	0.60	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.69	0.06	0.71	0.05
Czechia	0.21	0.06	0.22	0.06	0.77	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.72	0.06
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Checks on Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.15	0.06	0.17	0.05	-	-	0.41	0.06	0.43	0.06
Denmark	0.92	0.06	0.93	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.94	0.06	0.88	0.06
Dominican Republic	0.30	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.42	0.05	0.47	0.06	0.44	0.06
Ecuador	0.33	0.06	0.53	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.55	0.06	0.37	0.06
Egypt	0.41	0.06	0.44	0.05	0.44	0.06	0.44	0.06	0.38	0.06
El Salvador	0.25	0.05	0.41	0.06	0.48	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.58	0.06
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.23	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.05
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.87	0.06	0.87	0.06	0.82	0.05
Ethiopia	0.29	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.06
Finland	0.84	0.05	0.85	0.06	0.89	0.05	0.88	0.06	0.79	0.05
France	0.73	0.05	0.77	0.05	0.74	0.06	0.77	0.05	0.88	0.06
Gabon	0.28	0.06	0.29	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.39	0.05	0.44	0.06
Gambia	0.48	0.05	0.48	0.06	0.30	0.05	0.35	0.06	0.32	0.06
Georgia	-	-	-	-	0.40	0.05	0.50	0.06	0.59	0.06
German Democratic Republic	0.14	0.06	0.14	0.05	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.89	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.91	0.06	0.90	0.06	0.79	0.06
Ghana	0.32	0.06	0.29	0.05	0.56	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.67	0.05
Greece	0.58	0.05	0.72	0.06	0.75	0.06	0.77	0.05	0.71	0.06
Guatemala	0.31	0.06	-	-	0.48	0.06	0.54	0.05	0.59	0.06
Guinea	0.10	0.06	0.20	0.05	0.34	0.06	0.35	0.05	0.38	0.05
Guinea-Bissau	0.24	0.06	0.23	0.06	0.47	0.05	0.50	0.06	0.53	0.05
Haiti	0.17	0.05	0.17	0.06	0.54	0.06	-	-	0.50	0.05
Honduras	0.42	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.46	0.06
Hungary	0.25	0.05	0.28	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.69	0.06	0.61	0.06
India	0.53	0.06	0.66	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.67	0.06	0.62	0.05
Indonesia	0.25	0.06	0.21	0.05	0.23	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.61	0.05
Iran	0.30	0.06	0.37	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.46	0.06	0.45	0.05
Iraq	0.25	0.06	0.26	0.05	0.26	0.06	0.48	0.06	0.59	0.06
Ireland	0.73	0.06	0.72	0.05	0.73	0.05	0.74	0.06	0.74	0.06
Israel	0.72	0.06	0.71	0.06	0.72	0.05	0.72	0.06	0.65	0.06
Italy	0.67	0.06	0.69	0.06	0.72	0.06	0.71	0.05	0.75	0.05
Jamaica	0.58	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.59	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.65	0.06
Japan	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.79	0.05	0.79	0.06	0.70	0.05
Jordan	0.27	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.44	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.46	0.06
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.33	0.05	0.32	0.06	0.32	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Checks on Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Kenya	0.36	0.06	0.37	0.06	0.51	0.05	0.63	0.06	0.61	0.05
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.49	0.06
Kuwait	0.58	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.55	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.56	0.06
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.38	0.05	0.39	0.06	0.55	0.06
Laos	0.35	0.06	0.27	0.05	0.27	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.31	0.05
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.65	0.06	0.69	0.05	0.73	0.05
Lebanon	0.48	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.46	0.06	0.48	0.05	0.50	0.06
Lesotho	0.36	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.56	0.06	0.56	0.06
Liberia	0.41	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.45	0.06	0.62	0.05	0.58	0.05
Libya	0.16	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.60	0.06
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.80	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.81	0.06
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0.55	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.44	0.06
Madagascar	0.36	0.05	0.33	0.06	0.56	0.05	0.45	0.06	0.49	0.06
Malawi	0.19	0.06	0.19	0.05	0.58	0.06	0.60	0.06	0.61	0.05
Malaysia	0.39	0.06	0.35	0.05	0.34	0.06	0.41	0.06	0.42	0.05
Mali	0.26	0.06	0.28	0.05	0.59	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.61	0.06
Mauritania	0.33	0.06	0.33	0.05	0.32	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.38	0.05
Mauritius	0.69	0.06	0.70	0.06	0.69	0.05	0.72	0.06	0.66	0.06
Mexico	0.25	0.06	0.31	0.05	0.44	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.55	0.06
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.62	0.06
Mongolia	0.26	0.05	0.27	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.61	0.06	0.58	0.05
Morocco	0.28	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.50	0.06
Mozambique	0.26	0.06	0.20	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.49	0.06
Myanmar	0.10	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.29	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.46	0.05
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.62	0.06	0.62	0.05	0.60	0.06
Nepal	0.33	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.63	0.05	0.39	0.06	0.63	0.06
Netherlands	0.79	0.06	0.84	0.05	0.84	0.06	0.84	0.06	0.81	0.06
New Zealand	0.71	0.05	0.75	0.06	0.76	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.78	0.06
Nicaragua	0.20	0.06	0.38	0.05	0.60	0.06	0.59	0.05	0.32	0.06
Niger	0.29	0.06	0.28	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.60	0.05	0.56	0.05
Nigeria	0.35	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.55	0.05	0.61	0.06
Norway	0.93	0.05	0.94	0.06	0.95	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.87	0.06
Oman	0.16	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.22	0.05	0.27	0.05	0.30	0.06
Pakistan	0.46	0.06	0.36	0.06	0.48	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.57	0.06
Panama	0.25	0.05	0.26	0.06	0.60	0.06	0.60	0.05	0.57	0.05
Papua New Guinea	0.57	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.58	0.05	0.59	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Checks on Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Paraguay	0.17	0.06	0.17	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.53	0.05	0.52	0.06
Peru	0.22	0.06	0.55	0.06	0.34	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.63	0.05
Philippines	0.23	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.63	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.66	0.06
Poland	0.29	0.05	0.29	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.75	0.05	0.75	0.06
Portugal	-	-	0.77	0.06	0.79	0.05	0.78	0.06	0.74	0.05
Qatar	0.23	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.23	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.25	0.05
Republic of Congo	0.22	0.06	0.21	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.29	0.05	0.33	0.06
Republic of Korea	0.28	0.05	0.31	0.06	0.65	0.06	0.74	0.06	0.67	0.06
Romania	0.12	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.50	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.64	0.05
Russia	0.09	0.05	0.14	0.06	0.50	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.32	0.06
Rwanda	0.30	0.06	0.35	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.39	0.06	0.39	0.06
Saudi Arabia	0.19	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.24	0.06	0.26	0.05	0.24	0.05
Senegal	0.48	0.06	0.52	0.06	0.55	0.05	0.58	0.06	0.59	0.06
Serbia	0.29	0.06	0.33	0.06	0.32	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.50	0.06
Sierra Leone	0.33	0.05	0.30	0.06	0.29	0.06	0.47	0.05	0.47	0.05
Singapore	0.41	0.06	0.43	0.06	0.42	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.44	0.06
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	0.54	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.69	0.06
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	0.71	0.06	0.73	0.05	0.78	0.06
Somalia	0.19	0.05	0.23	0.06	-	-	0.43	0.05	0.47	0.05
South Africa	0.41	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.64	0.05	0.70	0.06	0.65	0.06
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.35	0.06
Spain	0.35	0.06	0.80	0.05	0.80	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.70	0.05
Sri Lanka	0.57	0.06	0.49	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.56	0.06
Sudan	0.30	0.06	.	.	0.19	0.06	0.33	0.05	0.32	0.06
Swaziland	0.28	0.06	0.34	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.34	0.06	0.37	0.06
Sweden	0.88	0.05	0.91	0.05	0.91	0.05	0.92	0.06	0.91	0.06
Switzerland	0.81	0.06	0.83	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.87	0.06	0.81	0.06
Syria	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.06	0.23	0.05	0.17	0.06
Taiwan	0.28	0.06	0.31	0.06	0.52	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.63	0.05
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.23	0.05	0.30	0.06	0.26	0.06
Tanzania	0.46	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.60	0.06	0.60	0.06
Thailand	0.43	0.05	0.41	0.06	0.57	0.05	0.56	0.06	0.37	0.06
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.54	0.06	0.58	0.05
Togo	0.18	0.05	0.15	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.49	0.06
Trinidad and Tobago	0.63	0.06	0.64	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.69	0.05	0.65	0.05
Tunisia	0.33	0.06	0.36	0.06	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.06	0.76	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Checks on Government Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Turkey	0.56	0.06	0.54	0.05	0.56	0.06	0.58	0.06	0.43	0.06
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.06
Uganda	0.21	0.06	-	-	0.51	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.55	0.06
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.49	0.06	0.57	0.05	0.48	0.06
United Kingdom	0.78	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.87	0.06
United States	0.81	0.06	0.77	0.05	0.79	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.77	0.06
Uruguay	0.32	0.05	0.69	0.06	0.76	0.05	0.79	0.05	0.72	0.06
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.11	0.05
Venezuela	0.65	0.06	0.65	0.05	0.67	0.06	0.33	0.05	0.26	0.05
Viet Nam	0.31	0.06	0.31	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.06	0.40	0.05
Yemen	0.35	0.05	0.33	0.06	0.40	0.05	0.45	0.06	0.37	0.05
Zambia	0.32	0.06	0.32	0.06	0.54	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.53	0.06
Zimbabwe	0.43	0.06	0.42	0.06	0.41	0.05	0.40	0.06	0.44	0.06

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gso-d-indices>>.

Global State of Democracy indices: Impartial Administration Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.41	0.05	0.31	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.35	0.07	0.36	0.05
Albania	0.35	0.19	0.33	0.17	0.42	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.55	0.06
Algeria	0.41	0.09	0.39	0.06	0.35	0.07	0.35	0.05	0.38	0.05
Angola	0.31	0.08	0.29	0.07	0.28	0.04	0.25	0.07	0.28	0.07
Argentina	0.39	0.07	0.58	0.06	0.47	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.50	0.05
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.48	0.05	0.39	0.05	0.39	0.05
Australia	0.90	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.82	0.05
Austria	0.71	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.68	0.05	-	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	0.16	0.05	0.16	0.05	0.16	0.04
Bangladesh	0.35	0.04	0.31	0.06	0.38	0.05	0.33	0.07	0.31	0.04
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.38	0.05	0.30	0.08	0.32	0.08
Belgium	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.88	0.05
Benin	0.40	0.05	0.42	0.06	0.48	0.05	0.51	0.06	0.48	0.06
Bolivia	0.06	0.07	0.44	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.47	0.04	0.49	0.05
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	0.37	0.06	0.49	0.07	0.48	0.06
Botswana	0.66	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.62	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.68	0.05
Brazil	0.30	0.08	0.40	0.05	0.60	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.59	0.05
Bulgaria	0.32	0.05	0.34	0.04	0.54	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.57	0.04
Burkina Faso	0.42	0.06	0.47	0.08	0.50	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.59	0.04
Burundi	0.30	0.12	0.42	0.11	0.43	0.06	0.32	0.05	0.25	0.06
Cambodia	0.27	0.18	0.34	0.08	0.29	0.05	0.29	0.06	0.23	0.05
Cameroon	0.36	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.31	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.28	0.05
Canada	0.76	0.04	0.82	0.04	0.81	0.05	0.82	0.05	0.83	0.05
Central African Republic	0.16	0.05	0.31	0.07	0.33	0.05	0.28	0.07	0.32	0.05
Chad	0.30	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.15	0.07	0.15	0.07	0.13	0.06
Chile	0.30	0.13	0.38	0.09	0.69	0.05	0.70	0.06	0.66	0.05
China	0.24	0.15	0.42	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.41	0.05
Colombia	0.44	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.49	0.04	0.45	0.05	0.48	0.05
Costa Rica	0.63	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.74	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.72	0.05
Côte d'Ivoire	0.41	0.07	0.42	0.07	0.42	0.07	0.40	0.07	0.60	0.07
Croatia	-	-	-	-	0.39	0.05	0.53	0.06	0.58	0.05
Cuba	0.26	0.07	0.28	0.07	0.28	0.06	0.28	0.06	0.29	0.06
Cyprus	0.59	0.05	0.62	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.74	0.06	0.70	0.05
Czechia	0.34	0.05	0.36	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.64	0.05
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.22	0.05	0.24	0.05	0.14	0.05	0.12	0.05	0.17	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Impartial Administration Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.12	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.19	0.05	0.16	0.05
Denmark	0.98	0.05	0.98	0.05	0.98	0.05	0.98	0.05	0.90	0.05
Dominican Republic	0.25	0.07	0.40	0.07	0.30	0.04	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.05
Ecuador	0.25	0.06	0.44	0.04	0.49	0.05	0.48	0.04	0.56	0.06
Egypt	0.34	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.26	0.08	0.28	0.09	0.31	0.06
El Salvador	0.16	0.08	0.15	0.09	0.40	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.47	0.05
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.33	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.11
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.67	0.05	0.76	0.04	0.84	0.05
Ethiopia	0.22	0.10	0.22	0.10	0.43	0.05	0.43	0.04	0.44	0.05
Finland	0.98	0.06	0.99	0.06	0.99	0.06	0.99	0.06	0.85	0.04
France	0.88	0.09	0.89	0.08	0.89	0.09	0.87	0.07	0.89	0.06
Gabon	0.37	0.06	0.38	0.06	0.46	0.10	0.44	0.09	0.58	0.09
Gambia	0.57	0.05	0.54	0.06	0.34	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.28	0.05
Georgia	-	-	-	-	0.26	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.58	0.06
German Democratic Republic	0.48	0.06	0.48	0.06	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.93	0.05	0.94	0.05	1.00	0.05	1.00	0.06	0.96	0.08
Ghana	0.35	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.46	0.07	0.50	0.06	0.47	0.06
Greece	0.52	0.05	0.61	0.07	0.63	0.07	0.62	0.08	0.57	0.05
Guatemala	0.17	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.36	0.05	0.42	0.06	0.40	0.05
Guinea	0.28	0.07	0.23	0.05	0.26	0.08	0.27	0.09	0.41	0.06
Guinea-Bissau	0.38	0.05	0.32	0.05	0.31	0.12	0.30	0.08	0.31	0.11
Haiti	0.16	0.05	0.15	0.05	0.43	0.09	0.31	0.05	0.36	0.05
Honduras	0.22	0.05	0.31	0.06	0.33	0.07	0.32	0.06	0.44	0.06
Hungary	0.52	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.60	0.05
India	0.40	0.08	0.52	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.53	0.05
Indonesia	0.24	0.05	0.17	0.05	0.18	0.05	0.44	0.05	0.45	0.05
Iran	0.48	0.05	0.36	0.06	0.46	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.46	0.05
Iraq	0.33	0.05	0.25	0.05	0.16	0.07	0.30	0.05	0.24	0.05
Ireland	0.72	0.05	0.76	0.05	0.77	0.05	0.78	0.05	0.78	0.05
Israel	0.67	0.05	0.67	0.04	0.67	0.05	0.66	0.04	0.65	0.04
Italy	0.63	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.66	0.05
Jamaica	0.60	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.65	0.04
Japan	0.80	0.05	0.81	0.05	0.81	0.05	0.81	0.05	0.78	0.05
Jordan	0.48	0.05	0.50	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.52	0.05
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.30	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Impartial Administration Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Kenya	0.30	0.05	0.27	0.05	0.32	0.05	0.41	0.06	0.42	0.05
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.43	0.05
Kuwait	0.53	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.46	0.04
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.37	0.06	0.31	0.08	0.44	0.08
Laos	0.28	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.31	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.32	0.05
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.62	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.80	0.05
Lebanon	0.34	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.36	0.04	0.39	0.05
Lesotho	0.28	0.07	0.32	0.06	0.57	0.05	0.55	0.08	0.50	0.07
Liberia	0.33	0.05	0.25	0.05	0.17	0.04	0.36	0.06	0.36	0.05
Libya	0.17	0.06	0.18	0.06	0.19	0.06	0.18	0.05	0.24	0.08
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.67	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.69	0.05
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.05	0.56	0.06	0.40	0.05
Madagascar	0.37	0.06	0.35	0.04	0.40	0.05	0.41	0.06	0.29	0.05
Malawi	0.44	0.15	0.43	0.15	0.42	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.47	0.08
Malaysia	0.50	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.39	0.05	0.41	0.05
Mali	0.35	0.05	0.33	0.04	0.44	0.07	0.44	0.06	0.43	0.06
Mauritania	0.45	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.42	0.07	0.28	0.05
Mauritius	0.59	0.07	0.62	0.08	0.62	0.08	0.62	0.08	0.59	0.07
Mexico	0.35	0.04	0.40	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.45	0.06
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.40	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.47	0.07
Mongolia	0.51	0.13	0.51	0.13	0.60	0.05	0.55	0.06	0.50	0.05
Morocco	0.32	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.39	0.04	0.41	0.05	0.42	0.05
Mozambique	0.50	0.05	0.49	0.06	0.44	0.06	0.42	0.05	0.44	0.06
Myanmar	0.16	0.07	0.15	0.08	0.13	0.07	0.18	0.05	0.44	0.05
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.59	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.56	0.05
Nepal	0.29	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.46	0.08	0.41	0.07	0.45	0.06
Netherlands	0.83	0.05	0.83	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.84	0.05	0.82	0.07
New Zealand	0.84	0.06	0.85	0.06	0.85	0.06	0.85	0.06	0.84	0.06
Nicaragua	0.07	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.42	0.05
Niger	0.59	0.04	0.59	0.05	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.08
Nigeria	0.16	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.18	0.04	0.31	0.08	0.41	0.06
Norway	0.92	0.05	0.92	0.05	0.93	0.05	0.92	0.05	0.89	0.05
Oman	0.46	0.07	0.47	0.07	0.49	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.54	0.07
Pakistan	0.38	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.32	0.05
Panama	0.32	0.07	0.16	0.05	0.56	0.06	0.58	0.05	0.63	0.05
Papua New Guinea	0.37	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.37	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Impartial Administration Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Paraguay	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.36	0.10	0.43	0.05	0.44	0.05
Peru	0.26	0.10	0.48	0.05	0.31	0.06	0.52	0.05	0.49	0.05
Philippines	0.21	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.47	0.05
Poland	0.52	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.67	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.62	0.05
Portugal	0.64	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.72	0.05
Qatar	0.37	0.06	0.37	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.40	0.05
Republic of Congo	0.22	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.29	0.06
Republic of Korea	0.43	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.75	0.06	0.77	0.05	0.64	0.06
Romania	0.21	0.05	0.20	0.05	0.38	0.05	0.40	0.05	0.49	0.05
Russia	0.29	0.07	0.29	0.07	0.36	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.32	0.05
Rwanda	0.46	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.58	0.06	0.63	0.05
Saudi Arabia	0.43	0.05	0.45	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.41	0.05	0.39	0.05
Senegal	0.57	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.57	0.06	0.56	0.05	0.64	0.05
Serbia	0.46	0.07	0.47	0.07	0.39	0.07	0.50	0.06	0.50	0.05
Sierra Leone	0.35	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.42	0.06	0.39	0.05
Singapore	0.74	0.07	0.81	0.06	0.80	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.81	0.06
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	0.53	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.62	0.05
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	0.65	0.04	0.66	0.05	0.68	0.05
Somalia	0.28	0.09	0.27	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.15	0.05	0.15	0.05
South Africa	0.36	0.07	0.40	0.06	0.60	0.05	0.60	0.06	0.56	0.05
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.14	0.05
Spain	0.49	0.06	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.83	0.05
Sri Lanka	0.53	0.07	0.47	0.07	0.49	0.05	0.44	0.04	0.56	0.05
Sudan	0.43	0.06	0.45	0.06	0.19	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.23	0.05
Swaziland	0.36	0.05	0.34	0.05	0.35	0.06	0.33	0.05	0.31	0.05
Sweden	0.87	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.88	0.06	0.82	0.06
Switzerland	0.89	0.05	0.90	0.05	0.93	0.05	0.98	0.06	0.85	0.05
Syria	0.32	0.05	0.31	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.32	0.05	0.15	0.05
Taiwan	0.44	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.70	0.06	0.65	0.04
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.13	0.07	0.22	0.07	0.14	0.05
Tanzania	0.62	0.08	0.56	0.07	0.54	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.47	0.05
Thailand	0.24	0.05	0.37	0.07	0.40	0.06	0.42	0.05	0.17	0.07
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.51	0.05	0.49	0.05
Togo	0.39	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.39	0.09	0.41	0.07	0.48	0.07
Trinidad and Tobago	0.63	0.04	0.58	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.58	0.06
Tunisia	0.48	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.36	0.06	0.58	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Impartial Administration Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Turkey	0.46	0.06	0.39	0.08	0.52	0.05	0.57	0.04	0.38	0.06
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0.18	0.05	0.11	0.05	0.17	0.06
Uganda	0.04	0.05	0.16	0.09	0.48	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.43	0.05
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.31	0.07	0.30	0.05	0.29	0.09
United Kingdom	0.83	0.05	0.83	0.05	0.86	0.04	0.89	0.05	0.82	0.05
United States	0.77	0.05	0.76	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.79	0.05	0.80	0.06
Uruguay	0.18	0.18	0.71	0.07	0.76	0.05	0.77	0.05	0.77	0.05
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.24	0.05	0.17	0.05	0.20	0.05
Venezuela	0.50	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.30	0.06	0.19	0.05
Viet Nam	0.33	0.12	0.32	0.10	0.32	0.07	0.37	0.05	0.53	0.05
Yemen	0.62	0.11	0.51	0.07	0.20	0.05	0.20	0.05	0.13	0.05
Zambia	0.52	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.51	0.06	0.55	0.06	0.50	0.06
Zimbabwe	0.40	0.13	0.49	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.19	0.05	0.28	0.05

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gso-d-indices>>.

Global State of Democracy indices: Civil Society Participation Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.25	0.09	0.17	0.06	0.15	0.07	0.58	0.09	0.63	0.08
Albania	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.57	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.61	0.05
Algeria	0.27	0.11	0.27	0.11	0.59	0.05	0.49	0.07	0.47	0.07
Angola	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.52	0.12	0.57	0.10	0.51	0.08
Argentina	0.71	0.07	0.81	0.06	0.81	0.06	0.77	0.05	0.76	0.05
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.57	0.09	0.57	0.05	0.61	0.07
Australia	0.86	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.84	0.06
Austria	0.81	0.10	0.84	0.07	0.84	0.06	0.73	0.05	-	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	0.39	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.22	0.07
Bangladesh	0.50	0.12	0.65	0.13	0.57	0.09	0.57	0.09	0.63	0.11
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.48	0.06	0.37	0.05	0.41	0.05
Belgium	0.73	0.05	0.73	0.05	0.82	0.07	0.82	0.07	0.84	0.06
Benin	0.47	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.75	0.05	0.74	0.05	0.87	0.06
Bolivia	0.42	0.09	0.64	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.86	0.05	0.80	0.05
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.11	0.64	0.09	0.59	0.06
Botswana	0.63	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.63	0.06	0.60	0.05
Brazil	0.38	0.08	0.64	0.11	0.74	0.05	0.78	0.06	0.77	0.05
Bulgaria	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.66	0.06	0.63	0.07	0.70	0.05
Burkina Faso	0.66	0.10	0.67	0.08	0.74	0.05	0.74	0.05	0.74	0.06
Burundi	0.27	0.08	0.30	0.10	0.50	0.06	0.57	0.05	0.52	0.07
Cambodia	0.06	0.05	0.26	0.06	0.60	0.05	0.53	0.06	0.57	0.09
Cameroon	0.28	0.05	0.35	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.55	0.06	0.61	0.05
Canada	0.74	0.05	0.80	0.07	0.80	0.07	0.79	0.07	0.81	0.05
Central African Republic	0.19	0.07	0.43	0.05	0.55	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.57	0.06
Chad	0.23	0.06	0.22	0.07	0.55	0.11	0.51	0.10	0.61	0.11
Chile	0.18	0.09	0.21	0.06	0.58	0.08	0.67	0.06	0.70	0.07
China	0.10	0.06	0.29	0.10	0.37	0.06	0.46	0.06	0.38	0.08
Colombia	0.51	0.05	0.51	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.64	0.06	0.69	0.05
Costa Rica	0.74	0.06	0.81	0.05	0.83	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.83	0.05
Côte d'Ivoire	0.17	0.07	0.25	0.06	0.51	0.11	0.63	0.07	0.74	0.05
Croatia	-	-	-	-	0.51	0.07	0.69	0.05	0.80	0.05
Cuba	0.20	0.05	0.24	0.07	0.20	0.05	0.20	0.05	0.24	0.08
Cyprus	0.56	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.76	0.05	0.75	0.07
Czechia	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.59	0.08	0.61	0.07	0.57	0.07
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Civil Society Participation Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.40	0.06	0.40	0.06	0.56	0.06	0.59	0.07	0.55	0.09
Denmark	0.93	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.93	0.05
Dominican Republic	0.54	0.14	0.62	0.07	0.65	0.05	0.78	0.04	0.69	0.06
Ecuador	0.49	0.21	0.66	0.08	0.74	0.07	0.72	0.05	0.65	0.07
Egypt	0.46	0.10	0.49	0.05	0.49	0.05	0.53	0.05	0.45	0.09
El Salvador	0.54	0.13	0.55	0.13	0.63	0.06	0.67	0.08	0.67	0.08
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.30	0.08	0.19	0.06	0.16	0.08
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.68	0.05	0.73	0.05	0.75	0.09
Ethiopia	0.15	0.05	0.16	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.39	0.05
Finland	0.90	0.09	0.93	0.06	0.96	0.05	0.96	0.05	0.86	0.05
France	0.70	0.06	0.70	0.06	0.86	0.06	0.87	0.05	0.79	0.05
Gabon	0.24	0.06	0.23	0.06	0.61	0.10	0.61	0.10	0.75	0.06
Gambia	0.50	0.05	0.50	0.05	0.49	0.06	0.46	0.09	0.37	0.05
Georgia	-	-	-	-	0.55	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.68	0.05
German Democratic Republic	0.13	0.08	0.13	0.08	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.85	0.05	0.89	0.05	0.92	0.05	0.90	0.05	0.91	0.06
Ghana	0.53	0.07	0.50	0.09	0.78	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.67	0.06
Greece	0.51	0.11	0.68	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.76	0.06	0.84	0.05
Guatemala	0.50	0.08	0.37	0.05	0.71	0.09	0.64	0.05	0.70	0.05
Guinea	0.15	0.06	0.53	0.13	0.68	0.13	0.66	0.15	0.64	0.10
Guinea-Bissau	0.53	0.10	0.51	0.12	0.66	0.16	0.61	0.11	0.61	0.05
Haiti	0.38	0.08	0.45	0.11	0.43	0.05	0.51	0.07	0.51	0.07
Honduras	0.60	0.11	0.58	0.06	0.67	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.69	0.05
Hungary	0.23	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.59	0.05	0.57	0.05	0.56	0.06
India	0.50	0.05	0.75	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.81	0.05	0.65	0.06
Indonesia	0.32	0.06	0.32	0.05	0.32	0.05	0.73	0.10	0.82	0.05
Iran	0.34	0.12	0.38	0.06	0.46	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.45	0.05
Iraq	0.08	0.10	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.61	0.08	0.59	0.07
Ireland	0.71	0.09	0.72	0.08	0.74	0.07	0.73	0.07	0.84	0.05
Israel	0.61	0.05	0.78	0.06	0.83	0.05	0.71	0.06	0.66	0.07
Italy	0.76	0.05	0.73	0.05	0.77	0.05	0.77	0.06	0.70	0.06
Jamaica	0.71	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.71	0.06
Japan	0.72	0.08	0.72	0.08	0.68	0.06	0.67	0.06	0.64	0.07
Jordan	0.54	0.05	0.52	0.06	0.54	0.05	0.54	0.05	0.61	0.05
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.49	0.05	0.49	0.06	0.47	0.05

Global State of Democracy indices: Civil Society Participation Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Kenya	0.45	0.06	0.46	0.07	0.73	0.05	0.74	0.05	0.74	0.06
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.58	0.06
Kuwait	0.61	0.10	0.58	0.08	0.60	0.11	0.57	0.08	0.61	0.07
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.46	0.06	0.57	0.05	0.65	0.06
Laos	0.16	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.11	0.05	0.15	0.07	0.32	0.06
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.59	0.08	0.62	0.05	0.66	0.05
Lebanon	0.50	0.05	0.50	0.05	0.66	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.78	0.05
Lesotho	0.43	0.10	0.45	0.11	0.60	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.78	0.07
Liberia	0.62	0.05	0.49	0.08	0.69	0.09	0.77	0.06	0.83	0.06
Libya	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.64	0.05
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.55	0.09	0.61	0.06	0.67	0.05
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0.37	0.05	0.64	0.05	0.63	0.06
Madagascar	0.30	0.07	0.29	0.08	0.51	0.05	0.52	0.05	0.55	0.06
Malawi	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.59	0.07	0.58	0.09	0.61	0.05
Malaysia	0.39	0.05	0.50	0.08	0.51	0.07	0.67	0.10	0.70	0.12
Mali	0.54	0.08	0.56	0.09	0.79	0.05	0.76	0.06	0.72	0.09
Mauritania	0.49	0.10	0.35	0.11	0.50	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.64	0.05
Mauritius	0.74	0.10	0.73	0.11	0.73	0.11	0.73	0.11	0.63	0.08
Mexico	0.27	0.10	0.43	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.61	0.05
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.47	0.05	0.46	0.06	0.54	0.05
Mongolia	0.22	0.09	0.22	0.09	0.67	0.08	0.75	0.12	0.73	0.08
Morocco	0.42	0.05	0.42	0.05	0.54	0.08	0.67	0.05	0.74	0.05
Mozambique	0.17	0.09	0.16	0.09	0.47	0.05	0.49	0.08	0.56	0.05
Myanmar	0.21	0.05	0.21	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.27	0.05	0.64	0.06
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.61	0.05	0.61	0.05	0.61	0.05
Nepal	0.43	0.05	0.52	0.07	0.72	0.06	0.77	0.11	0.76	0.10
Netherlands	0.84	0.05	0.68	0.07	0.70	0.09	0.69	0.07	0.65	0.08
New Zealand	0.80	0.05	0.70	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.78	0.05
Nicaragua	0.09	0.05	0.52	0.09	0.66	0.04	0.66	0.05	0.58	0.08
Niger	0.37	0.05	0.44	0.07	0.73	0.07	0.78	0.08	0.84	0.05
Nigeria	0.57	0.18	0.57	0.18	0.62	0.20	0.74	0.07	0.69	0.05
Norway	0.89	0.05	0.93	0.05	0.93	0.05	0.93	0.05	0.93	0.05
Oman	0.25	0.05	0.27	0.05	0.31	0.05	0.33	0.05	0.34	0.05
Pakistan	0.57	0.06	0.49	0.06	0.59	0.05	0.74	0.05	0.68	0.05
Panama	0.30	0.09	0.33	0.05	0.62	0.08	0.63	0.10	0.60	0.10
Papua New Guinea	0.58	0.12	0.61	0.08	0.64	0.09	0.64	0.09	0.56	0.06

Global State of Democracy indices: Civil Society Participation Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Paraguay	0.14	0.06	0.14	0.06	0.51	0.05	0.56	0.05	0.51	0.05
Peru	0.28	0.06	0.45	0.06	0.41	0.06	0.68	0.05	0.68	0.05
Philippines	0.30	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.81	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.81	0.05
Poland	0.13	0.08	0.25	0.05	0.71	0.05	0.72	0.05	0.66	0.06
Portugal	0.72	0.05	0.62	0.06	0.62	0.06	0.68	0.05	0.62	0.07
Qatar	0.20	0.05	0.20	0.05	0.20	0.05	0.23	0.08	0.21	0.07
Republic of Congo	0.29	0.06	0.33	0.05	0.76	0.09	0.59	0.09	0.66	0.06
Republic of Korea	0.19	0.05	0.29	0.06	0.69	0.05	0.75	0.06	0.69	0.06
Romania	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.56	0.05	0.58	0.05	0.62	0.05
Russia	0.06	0.15	0.08	0.17	0.63	0.08	0.44	0.05	0.42	0.05
Rwanda	0.37	0.05	0.37	0.05	0.56	0.12	0.63	0.10	0.61	0.06
Saudi Arabia	0.20	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.30	0.05	0.33	0.04
Senegal	0.58	0.07	0.65	0.05	0.78	0.05	0.78	0.06	0.81	0.05
Serbia	0.26	0.09	0.37	0.07	0.44	0.05	0.73	0.09	0.60	0.07
Sierra Leone	0.36	0.09	0.40	0.06	0.47	0.08	0.80	0.08	0.83	0.09
Singapore	0.45	0.05	0.49	0.07	0.49	0.07	0.49	0.07	0.50	0.08
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	0.55	0.06	0.60	0.05	0.61	0.05
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	0.76	0.05	0.79	0.05	0.86	0.05
Somalia	0.12	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.46	0.11	0.46	0.11	0.51	0.07
South Africa	0.52	0.09	0.57	0.09	0.82	0.05	0.80	0.05	0.73	0.06
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.36	0.05
Spain	0.20	0.14	0.64	0.08	0.64	0.08	0.64	0.08	0.69	0.08
Sri Lanka	0.56	0.06	0.59	0.08	0.64	0.09	0.61	0.07	0.78	0.08
Sudan	0.21	0.05	0.57	0.12	0.22	0.05	0.37	0.07	0.43	0.05
Swaziland	0.44	0.11	0.45	0.11	0.46	0.09	0.47	0.08	0.49	0.06
Sweden	0.95	0.06	0.95	0.06	0.94	0.05	0.94	0.05	0.90	0.05
Switzerland	0.88	0.09	0.88	0.09	0.88	0.09	0.88	0.09	0.85	0.10
Syria	0.14	0.05	0.14	0.05	0.14	0.05	0.16	0.05	0.15	0.05
Taiwan	0.30	0.05	0.43	0.06	0.70	0.05	0.84	0.06	0.82	0.06
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.36	0.05	0.42	0.07	0.37	0.07
Tanzania	0.24	0.11	0.33	0.09	0.64	0.05	0.63	0.05	0.64	0.05
Thailand	0.63	0.07	0.56	0.05	0.65	0.09	0.75	0.07	0.57	0.22
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.64	0.05	0.63	0.05
Togo	0.21	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.47	0.05	0.64	0.06	0.72	0.08
Trinidad and Tobago	0.74	0.05	0.76	0.05	0.81	0.06	0.79	0.05	0.80	0.05
Tunisia	0.49	0.09	0.48	0.08	0.52	0.05	0.44	0.05	0.77	0.13

Global State of Democracy indices: Civil Society Participation Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Turkey	0.89	0.07	0.49	0.11	0.64	0.07	0.79	0.05	0.54	0.09
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0.18	0.05	0.17	0.05	0.08	0.09
Uganda	0.35	0.18	0.48	0.07	0.72	0.05	0.68	0.05	0.65	0.05
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.47	0.11	0.66	0.12	0.76	0.11
United Kingdom	0.77	0.05	0.74	0.07	0.84	0.10	0.87	0.07	0.83	0.06
United States	0.88	0.05	0.89	0.05	1.00	0.05	0.97	0.06	0.92	0.05
Uruguay	0.43	0.15	0.82	0.07	0.86	0.05	0.87	0.05	0.65	0.10
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.42	0.05	0.30	0.07	0.21	0.05
Venezuela	0.67	0.05	0.69	0.05	0.65	0.05	0.55	0.06	0.60	0.14
Viet Nam	0.42	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.55	0.06	0.55	0.06	0.48	0.06
Yemen	0.25	0.13	0.26	0.13	0.42	0.08	0.42	0.08	0.43	0.08
Zambia	0.47	0.05	0.56	0.08	0.84	0.06	0.75	0.05	0.68	0.10
Zimbabwe	0.34	0.05	0.59	0.05	0.76	0.11	0.56	0.11	0.53	0.10

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gso-d-indices>>.

Global State of Democracy indices: Electoral Participation										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.52	-	0.50	-
Albania	-	-	-	-	0.89	-	0.59	-	0.77	-
Algeria	0.00	-	-	-	0.80	-	0.54	-	0.44	-
Angola	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.72	-
Argentina	0.73	-	0.78	-	0.80	-	0.71	-	0.81	-
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.51	-	0.61	-	0.74	-
Australia	0.85	-	0.84	-	0.83	-	0.82	-	0.79	-
Austria	0.87	-	0.87	-	0.79	-	0.67	-	0.69	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	0.83	-	0.37	-	0.40	-
Bangladesh	0.55	-	0.00	-	0.62	-	0.77	-	0.49	-
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.55	-	0.82	-	0.78	-
Belgium	0.86	-	0.86	-	0.83	-	0.86	-	0.87	-
Benin	0.00	-	-	-	0.74	-	0.52	-	0.57	-
Bolivia	0.00	-	0.65	-	0.50	-	0.63	-	0.88	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.41	-	0.59	-
Botswana	0.26	-	0.54	-	0.45	-	0.44	-	0.55	-
Brazil	0.43	-	0.64	-	0.77	-	0.79	-	0.75	-
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	0.81	-	0.62	-	0.61	-
Burkina Faso	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.36	-	0.36	-
Burundi	0.00	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.70	-	0.55	-
Cambodia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.89	-	0.78	-	0.70	-
Cameroon	-	-	-	-	0.55	-	0.45	-	0.38	-
Canada	0.64	-	0.68	-	0.64	-	0.55	-	0.62	-
Central African Republic	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.50	-	0.45	-	0.48	-
Chad	-	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.60	-	0.58	-
Chile	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.81	-	0.64	-	0.46	-
China	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Colombia	0.48	-	0.39	-	0.29	-	0.45	-	0.52	-
Costa Rica	0.71	-	0.79	-	0.84	-	0.59	-	0.53	-
Cote d'Ivoire	-	-	-	-	0.31	-	0.24	-	0.26	-
Croatia	-	-	-	-	0.72	-	0.63	-	0.64	-
Cuba	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.91	-	0.91	-	0.89	-
Cyprus	0.55	-	0.78	-	0.79	-	0.78	-	0.50	-
Czechia	-	-	-	-	0.84	-	0.59	-	0.60	-
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Electoral Participation										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	-	-	0.86	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.56	-
Denmark	0.88	-	0.86	-	0.82	-	0.81	-	0.80	-
Dominican Republic	0.69	-	0.66	-	0.31	-	0.69	-	0.70	-
Ecuador	0.00	-	0.63	-	0.66	-	0.70	-	0.90	-
Egypt	-	-	0.22	-	0.30	-	0.20	-	0.27	-
El Salvador	0.36	-	0.48	-	0.42	-	0.63	-	0.61	-
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.49	-	0.48	-	0.57	-
Ethiopia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.76	-	0.66	-	0.70	-
Finland	0.80	-	0.81	-	0.71	-	0.70	-	0.73	-
France	0.72	-	0.64	-	0.72	-	0.47	-	0.46	-
Gabon	-	-	-	-	0.58	-	0.43	-	0.28	-
Gambia	0.44	-	0.57	-	0.00	-	0.14	-	0.17	-
Georgia	-	-	-	-	0.54	-	0.43	-	0.47	-
German Democratic Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.89	-	0.81	-	0.72	-	0.72	-	0.66	-
Ghana	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.30	-	0.80	-	0.82	-
Greece	0.83	-	0.87	-	0.86	-	0.88	-	0.71	-
Guatemala	0.26	-	0.43	-	0.26	-	0.42	-	0.50	-
Guinea	-	-	0.00	-	0.60	-	0.97	-	0.68	-
Guinea-Bissau	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.57	-	0.67	-	0.80	-
Haiti	0.47	-	0.47	-	0.29	-	0.00	-	0.28	-
Honduras	0.00	-	0.78	-	0.63	-	0.61	-	0.66	-
Hungary	-	-	-	-	0.69	-	0.72	-	0.63	-
India	0.57	-	0.65	-	0.57	-	0.61	-	0.70	-
Indonesia	0.86	-	0.89	-	0.88	-	0.75	-	0.80	-
Iran	-	-	-	-	0.53	-	0.68	-	0.62	-
Iraq	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	0.89	-	0.77	-
Ireland	0.48	-	0.76	-	0.74	-	0.67	-	0.51	-
Israel	0.82	-	0.80	-	0.82	-	0.76	-	0.76	-
Italy	0.95	-	0.92	-	0.91	-	0.85	-	0.68	-
Jamaica	0.57	-	0.02	-	0.45	-	0.51	-	0.46	-
Japan	0.74	-	0.68	-	0.66	-	0.67	-	0.52	-
Jordan	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.35	-	0.44	-	0.34	-
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.64	-	0.67	-	0.71	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Electoral Participation										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Kenya	-	-	-	-	0.46	-	0.39	-	0.56	-
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.62	-
Kuwait	0.12	-	0.08	-	0.18	-	0.23	-	0.12	-
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.73	-	0.66	-	0.42	-
Laos	-	-	0.00	-	-	-	0.89	-	0.88	-
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.51	-	0.55	-	0.52	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	0.61	-	0.55	-	0.66	-
Lesotho	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.50	-	0.50	-
Liberia	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.59	-	0.36	-
Libya	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.73	-	0.43	-	0.43	-
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0.48	-	0.61	-	0.69	-
Madagascar	0.86	-	0.76	-	0.54	-	0.51	-	0.35	-
Malawi	0.00	-	-	-	0.68	-	0.58	-	0.65	-
Malaysia	0.40	-	0.61	-	0.64	-	0.52	-	0.63	-
Mali	0.00	-	-	-	0.25	-	0.21	-	0.34	-
Mauritania	-	-	0.00	-	0.42	-	0.51	-	0.40	-
Mauritius	-	-	0.77	-	0.77	-	0.75	-	0.71	-
Mexico	0.65	-	0.45	-	0.66	-	0.43	-	0.49	-
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.64	-	0.49	-	0.61	-
Mongolia	-	-	-	-	0.96	-	0.54	-	0.56	-
Morocco	0.00	-	0.48	-	0.52	-	0.40	-	0.29	-
Mozambique	-	-	0.00	-	0.66	-	0.36	-	0.43	-
Myanmar	0.35	-	0.35	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.62	-
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.62	-	0.81	-	0.74	-
Nepal	0.00	-	0.60	-	0.83	-	0.00	-	0.74	-
Netherlands	0.80	-	0.80	-	0.75	-	0.78	-	0.71	-
New Zealand	0.82	-	0.87	-	0.80	-	0.79	-	0.72	-
Nicaragua	0.77	-	0.00	-	0.78	-	0.75	-	0.72	-
Niger	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.37	-	0.44	-	0.45	-
Nigeria	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.65	-	0.32	-
Norway	0.80	-	0.84	-	0.74	-	0.77	-	0.78	-
Oman	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	-	-	0.16	-
Pakistan	0.00	-	0.42	-	0.38	-	0.39	-	0.40	-
Panama	0.48	-	0.56	-	0.70	-	0.80	-	0.81	-
Papua New Guinea	0.62	-	0.76	-	0.71	-	0.99	-	1.00	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Electoral Participation										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Paraguay	0.62	-	0.57	-	0.33	-	0.48	-	0.58	-
Peru	0.00	-	0.73	-	0.66	-	0.79	-	0.86	-
Philippines	0.00	-	0.79	-	0.68	-	0.65	-	0.64	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	0.69	-	0.51	-	0.49	-
Portugal	0.90	-	0.80	-	0.79	-	0.69	-	0.62	-
Qatar	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Republic of Congo	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.80	-	0.73	-
Republic of Korea	0.68	-	0.84	-	0.85	-	0.59	-	0.79	-
Romania	-	-	-	-	0.76	-	0.58	-	0.66	-
Russia	-	-	-	-	0.63	-	0.62	-	0.63	-
Rwanda	0.00	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.90	-	0.99	-
Saudi Arabia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Senegal	0.82	-	0.40	-	0.27	-	0.41	-	0.30	-
Serbia	0.84	-	0.84	-	0.65	-	0.48	-	0.63	-
Sierra Leone	0.56	-	0.48	-	0.00	-	0.76	-	0.88	-
Singapore	0.74	-	0.56	-	0.84	-	0.21	-	0.52	-
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	0.76	-	0.44	-	0.51	-
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	0.86	-	0.61	-	0.54	-
Somalia	0.00	-	0.87	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
South Africa	-	-	-	-	0.86	-	0.57	-	0.54	-
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	-
Spain	-	-	0.83	-	0.77	-	0.76	-	0.64	-
Sri Lanka	0.72	-	0.75	-	0.69	-	0.69	-	0.77	-
Sudan	0.28	-	0.28	-	0.00	-	0.28	-	0.31	-
Swaziland	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	0.86	-	0.86	-	0.82	-	0.78	-	0.83	-
Switzerland	0.44	-	0.41	-	0.36	-	0.37	-	0.39	-
Syria	-	-	-	-	0.58	-	0.50	-	0.00	-
Taiwan	-	-	-	-	0.67	-	0.58	-	0.74	-
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.72	-	0.71	-	0.77	-
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	0.48	-	0.68	-	0.62	-
Thailand	0.46	-	0.47	-	0.64	-	0.73	-	0.39	-
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.88	-	0.76	-
Togo	0.00	-	0.70	-	0.63	-	0.88	-	0.53	-
Trinidad and Tobago	0.26	-	0.64	-	0.67	-	0.72	-	0.78	-
Tunisia	-	-	0.64	-	0.63	-	0.68	-	0.40	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Electoral Participation										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Turkey	0.57	-	0.76	-	0.79	-	0.76	-	0.84	-
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.56	-	0.83	-
Uganda	0.00	-	0.69	-	0.69	-	0.74	-	0.55	-
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.68	-	0.78	-	0.50	-
United Kingdom	0.78	-	0.72	-	0.75	-	0.58	-	0.60	-
United States	0.38	-	0.58	-	0.39	-	0.57	-	0.33	-
Uruguay	0.00	-	0.93	-	0.96	-	0.92	-	0.97	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.87	-	0.81	-	0.98	-
Venezuela	0.81	-	0.77	-	0.49	-	0.24	-	0.74	-
Viet Nam	-	-	-	-	0.95	-	1.00	-	0.99	-
Yemen	-	-	0.00	-	0.38	-	0.71	-	0.54	-
Zambia	0.50	-	0.50	-	0.34	-	0.35	-	0.24	-
Zimbabwe	-	-	0.75	-	0.26	-	0.49	-	0.61	-

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gso-d-indices>>.

Global State of Democracy indices: Direct Democracy Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-
Albania	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.18	-	0.08	-
Algeria	0.07	-	0.02	-	0.17	-	0.37	-	0.18	-
Angola	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Argentina	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.18	-	0.17	-	0.17	-
Australia	0.21	-	0.34	-	0.16	-	0.17	-	0.04	-
Austria	0.04	-	0.17	-	0.19	-	0.12	-	0.25	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	0.19	-	0.19	-	0.17	-
Bangladesh	0.04	-	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.12	-	0.00	-
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.23	-	0.23	-	0.15	-
Belgium	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Benin	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.24	-	0.09	-	0.03	-
Bolivia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.29	-	0.48	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Botswana	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.13	-	0.17	-	0.07	-
Brazil	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.03	-	0.26	-	0.16	-
Bulgaria	0.26	-	0.10	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.31	-
Burkina Faso	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Burundi	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.18	-
Cambodia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Cameroon	0.26	-	0.12	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-
Canada	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.17	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Central African Republic	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.14	-
Chad	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.24	-	0.35	-	0.13	-
Chile	0.00	-	0.18	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
China	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Colombia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.55	-	0.37	-	0.10	-
Costa Rica	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.10	-	0.25	-
Cote d'Ivoire	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.26	-	0.10	-
Croatia	-	-	-	-	0.03	-	0.08	-	0.40	-
Cuba	0.02	-	0.20	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Cyprus	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Czechia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.17	-	0.09	-
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Direct Democracy Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.35	-	0.21	-	0.10	-	0.17	-	0.13	-
Denmark	0.24	-	0.20	-	0.41	-	0.29	-	0.24	-
Dominican Republic	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.04	-
Ecuador	0.03	-	0.12	-	0.19	-	0.27	-	0.47	-
Egypt	0.42	-	0.41	-	0.31	-	0.39	-	0.27	-
El Salvador	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.28	-	0.34	-	0.14	-
Ethiopia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Finland	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.19	-	0.11	-	0.02	-
France	0.29	-	0.13	-	0.27	-	0.25	-	0.09	-
Gabon	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.26	-	0.18	-	0.04	-
Gambia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.17	-	0.03	-
Georgia	-	-	-	-	0.04	-	0.27	-	0.29	-
German Democratic Republic	0.21	-	0.06	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-
Ghana	0.09	-	0.21	-	0.21	-	0.10	-	0.03	-
Greece	0.26	-	0.15	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.26	-
Guatemala	0.00	-	0.04	-	0.19	-	0.14	-	0.04	-
Guinea	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.26	-	0.27	-	0.12	-
Guinea-Bissau	0.00	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-
Haiti	0.00	-	0.26	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Honduras	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.09	-
Hungary	0.08	-	0.08	-	0.30	-	0.44	-	0.34	-
India	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Indonesia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Iran	0.00	-	0.24	-	0.22	-	0.07	-	0.04	-
Iraq	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.14	-	0.17	-	0.11	-
Ireland	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.27	-
Israel	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-
Italy	0.32	-	0.32	-	0.35	-	0.47	-	0.40	-
Jamaica	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-
Japan	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Jordan	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	0.17	-	0.05	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Direct Democracy Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Kenya	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.13	-	0.19	-
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	-
Kuwait	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	0.25	-	0.24	-
Laos	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.06	-	0.20	-	0.34	-
Lebanon	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Lesotho	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Liberia	0.16	-	0.09	-	0.07	-	0.03	-	0.11	-
Libya	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.01	-
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.66	-	0.42	-	0.56	-
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0.30	-	0.46	-	0.25	-
Madagascar	0.26	-	0.16	-	0.27	-	0.23	-	0.26	-
Malawi	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Malaysia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Mali	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.13	-	0.04	-
Mauritania	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.27	-	0.12	-	0.20	-
Mauritius	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-
Mexico	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.09	-
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.22	-	0.27	-
Mongolia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Morocco	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.20	-	0.27	-
Mozambique	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Myanmar	0.24	-	0.14	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.01	-
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Nepal	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.03	-
Netherlands	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.17	-	0.08	-
New Zealand	0.17	-	0.17	-	0.61	-	0.52	-	0.52	-
Nicaragua	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.10	-	0.10	-
Niger	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.17	-	0.29	-
Nigeria	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-
Norway	0.17	-	0.02	-	0.17	-	0.04	-	0.02	-
Oman	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Pakistan	0.00	-	0.26	-	0.15	-	0.26	-	0.12	-
Panama	0.02	-	0.17	-	0.15	-	0.13	-	0.15	-
Papua New Guinea	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Direct Democracy Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Paraguay	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.07	-	0.07	-	0.22	-
Peru	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.23	-	0.15	-	0.36	-
Philippines	0.17	-	0.17	-	0.20	-	0.10	-	0.09	-
Poland	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.24	-	0.22	-
Portugal	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.13	-	0.17	-
Qatar	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.26	-	0.13	-
Republic of Congo	0.26	-	0.23	-	0.27	-	0.19	-	0.19	-
Republic of Korea	0.40	-	0.30	-	0.14	-	0.05	-	0.04	-
Romania	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.36	-
Russia	0.03	-	0.04	-	0.27	-	0.16	-	0.07	-
Rwanda	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.03	-	0.27	-	0.30	-
Saudi Arabia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Senegal	0.26	-	0.10	-	0.04	-	0.19	-	0.09	-
Serbia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.41	-	0.24	-	0.22	-
Sierra Leone	0.00	-	0.01	-	0.12	-	0.05	-	0.01	-
Singapore	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	0.36	-	0.56	-	0.45	-
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	0.33	-	1.00	-	0.58	-
Somalia	0.07	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.03	-	0.04	-
South Africa	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.26	-	0.12	-	0.03	-
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	-
Spain	0.03	-	0.18	-	0.19	-	0.21	-	0.14	-
Sri Lanka	0.00	-	0.19	-	0.10	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Sudan	0.03	-	0.26	-	0.13	-	0.21	-	0.06	-
Swaziland	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Sweden	0.03	-	0.20	-	0.21	-	0.19	-	0.04	-
Switzerland	0.83	-	0.87	-	0.87	-	0.87	-	0.87	-
Syria	0.26	-	0.26	-	0.26	-	0.24	-	0.26	-
Taiwan	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.31	-
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.24	-	0.27	-	0.10	-
Tanzania	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-
Thailand	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.00	-
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	-	0.02	-
Togo	0.26	-	0.23	-	0.28	-	0.05	-	0.05	-
Trinidad and Tobago	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Tunisia	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.27	-	0.13	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Direct Democracy Index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Turkey	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.25	-	0.05	-	0.35	-
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0.31	-	0.21	-	0.10	-
Uganda	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.08	-	0.45	-	0.26	-
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.39	-	0.17	-
United Kingdom	0.13	-	0.12	-	0.02	-	0.02	-	0.17	-
United States	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Uruguay	0.20	-	0.21	-	0.86	-	0.81	-	0.75	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.24	-	0.24	-	0.12	-
Venezuela	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.53	-	0.38	-
Viet Nam	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.03	-
Yemen	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.02	-	0.17	-	0.07	-
Zambia	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Zimbabwe	0.00	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.20	-	0.26	-

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufis 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>>.

Global State of Democracy indices: Subnational Elections index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Afghanistan	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.09	-	0.08	-
Albania	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.49	-	0.71	-	0.84	-
Algeria	0.11	-	0.11	-	0.21	-	0.26	-	0.29	-
Angola	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Argentina	0.76	-	0.76	-	0.76	-	0.76	-	0.71	-
Armenia	-	-	-	-	0.31	-	0.18	-	0.13	-
Australia	0.76	-	0.94	-	0.94	-	0.94	-	0.84	-
Austria	0.84	-	0.84	-	0.84	-	0.84	-	0.81	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Bangladesh	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	0.30	-	0.20	-
Belarus	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	0.07	-	0.10	-
Belgium	0.92	-	0.46	-	0.92	-	0.92	-	-	-
Benin	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.32	-	0.35	-
Bolivia	0.00	-	0.33	-	0.37	-	0.85	-	0.81	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.65	-	0.67	-
Botswana	0.29	-	0.29	-	0.29	-	0.30	-	0.71	-
Brazil	0.36	-	0.77	-	0.73	-	0.73	-	0.73	-
Bulgaria	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.31	-	0.33	-	0.39	-
Burkina Faso	-	-	0.00	-	0.35	-	-	-	-	-
Burundi	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.29	-	0.05	-
Cambodia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.23	-	0.37	-
Cameroon	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.06	-	0.14	-	0.17	-
Canada	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.86	-
Central African Republic	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Chad	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Chile	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.56	-	0.56	-	0.56	-
China	0.00	-	0.13	-	0.13	-	0.14	-	0.13	-
Colombia	0.26	-	0.26	-	0.52	-	0.60	-	0.63	-
Costa Rica	0.96	-	0.96	-	0.96	-	0.48	-	0.45	-
Cote d'Ivoire	-	-	0.32	-	0.30	-	0.46	-	0.58	-
Croatia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.74	-	0.82	-
Cuba	0.04	-	0.23	-	0.29	-	0.29	-	0.29	-
Cyprus	0.33	-	0.37	-	0.37	-	0.37	-	0.41	-
Czechia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.86	-
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	0.00	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Subnational Elections index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.17	-	0.16	-
Denmark	0.85	-	0.85	-	0.85	-	0.85	-	0.80	-
Dominican Republic	0.16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.33	-
Ecuador	0.37	-	0.51	-	0.51	-	0.73	-	0.73	-
Egypt	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.10	-
El Salvador	0.11	-	0.26	-	0.32	-	0.39	-	0.41	-
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	0.07	-	0.07	-	0.06	-
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.42	-	0.42	-	0.41	-
Ethiopia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.32	-	0.36	-	0.29	-
Finland	0.17	-	0.17	-	0.17	-	0.17	-	0.17	-
France	0.77	-	0.85	-	0.85	-	0.85	-	0.83	-
Gabon	0.17	-	0.17	-	0.33	-	0.33	-	0.34	-
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.35	-	0.46	-
Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.36	-
German Democratic Republic	0.11	-	0.11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	0.92	-	0.92	-	0.92	-	0.92	-	0.80	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.14	-	0.16	-
Greece	0.44	-	0.44	-	0.88	-	0.88	-	0.86	-
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.10	-	0.00	-
Guinea-Bissau	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	0.47	-	0.45	-	-	-
Honduras	0.22	-	0.32	-	0.36	-	0.35	-	0.38	-
Hungary	0.08	-	0.18	-	0.78	-	0.78	-	0.83	-
India	0.66	-	0.66	-	0.67	-	0.67	-	0.72	-
Indonesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.68	-	0.67	-
Iran	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.00	-	0.26	-	0.25	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	0.18	-	0.18	-	0.16	-
Israel	0.38	-	0.38	-	0.39	-	0.39	-	0.33	-
Italy	0.82	-	0.82	-	0.82	-	0.82	-	0.74	-
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	0.87	-	0.87	-	0.87	-	0.87	-	0.88	-
Jordan	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.11	-	0.00	-	0.33	-
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.12	-	0.23	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Subnational Elections index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Kenya	0.07	-	0.10	-	0.10	-	0.10	-	0.32	-
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kuwait	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	0.23	-	0.08	-	0.09	-
Laos	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.59	-	0.42	-	-	-
Lebanon	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.32	-
Lesotho	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	-	-	-	-
Liberia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.39	-	0.39	-	-	-
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	0.17	-	0.15	-	0.35	-	-	-	0.22	-
Malawi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malaysia	0.25	-	0.25	-	0.25	-	0.25	-	0.27	-
Mali	0.00	-	0.13	-	0.27	-	0.26	-	0.35	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	0.30	-	0.30	-	0.48	-
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	0.08	-	0.16	-	0.61	-	0.59	-	0.61	-
Moldova	-	-	-	-	0.67	-	0.64	-	0.68	-
Mongolia	0.27	-	0.27	-	0.29	-	0.28	-	0.27	-
Morocco	0.11	-	0.11	-	0.11	-	0.22	-	0.24	-
Mozambique	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.37	-
Myanmar	0.11	-	0.06	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.11	-
Namibia	-	-	-	-	0.57	-	0.46	-	0.42	-
Nepal	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.17	-	0.25	-	0.20	-
Netherlands	0.35	-	0.35	-	0.35	-	0.35	-	0.34	-
New Zealand	0.83	-	0.83	-	0.84	-	0.84	-	0.86	-
Nicaragua	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.62	-	0.67	-	0.48	-
Niger	0.00	-	0.00	-	-	-	0.69	-	0.44	-
Nigeria	0.34	-	0.35	-	0.31	-	0.40	-	0.55	-
Norway	0.36	-	0.36	-	0.36	-	0.64	-	0.91	-
Oman	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.17	-
Pakistan	0.28	-	0.54	-	0.30	-	0.63	-	0.47	-
Panama	0.12	-	0.26	-	0.36	-	0.36	-	0.41	-
Papua New Guinea	0.22	-	0.22	-	0.22	-	0.22	-	0.38	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Subnational Elections index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Paraguay	0.05	-	0.05	-	0.64	-	0.64	-	0.65	-
Peru	0.00	-	0.40	-	0.40	-	0.81	-	0.73	-
Philippines	-	-	-	-	0.62	-	0.53	-	0.54	-
Poland	0.05	-	0.05	-	0.45	-	0.89	-	0.55	-
Portugal	0.33	-	0.43	-	0.49	-	0.49	-	-	-
Qatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Republic of Congo	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	-
Republic of Korea	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.86	-	0.86	-	0.86	-
Romania	0.11	-	0.11	-	0.34	-	-	-	-	-
Russia	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.47	-	0.30	-	0.46	-
Rwanda	0.00	-	0.00	-	-	-	0.19	-	0.26	-
Saudi Arabia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.04	-	0.05	-
Senegal	0.47	-	0.47	-	0.47	-	0.47	-	0.75	-
Serbia	0.17	-	0.17	-	0.47	-	0.68	-	0.65	-
Sierra Leone	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.37	-	0.37	-
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.79	-	0.75	-
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.13	-
South Africa	0.45	-	0.64	-	0.71	-	0.67	-	0.77	-
South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.09	-
Spain	0.00	-	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.86	-
Sri Lanka	0.37	-	0.36	-	0.48	-	0.48	-	0.45	-
Sudan	0.00	-	0.04	-	0.00	-	0.17	-	0.22	-
Swaziland	0.13	-	0.13	-	0.13	-	0.13	-	0.33	-
Sweden	0.91	-	0.91	-	0.91	-	0.91	-	0.91	-
Switzerland	0.81	-	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.89	-	0.83	-
Syria	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.04	-	0.04	-
Taiwan	0.26	-	0.34	-	0.67	-	0.75	-	0.88	-
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	0.10	-	0.12	-	0.13	-
Tanzania	0.00	-	0.06	-	0.10	-	0.10	-	0.09	-
Thailand	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.27	-	0.42	-	0.32	-
Timor-Leste	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	-	-	-
Togo	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	0.12	-	0.12	-	0.08	-	0.05	-	-	-

Global State of Democracy indices: Subnational Elections index										
Country	1975		1985		1995		2005		2015	
	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)	Score	CI (+/-)
Turkey	0.36	-	0.50	-	0.56	-	0.55	-	0.50	-
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0.03	-	0.03	-	0.05	-
Uganda	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.30	-	0.62	-	0.62	-
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	0.39	-	0.27	-	0.17	-
United Kingdom	0.33	-	0.33	-	0.33	-	0.99	-	0.83	-
United States	0.74	-	0.86	-	0.86	-	0.91	-	1.00	-
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.80	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0.04	-	0.04	-	0.08	-
Venezuela	0.28	-	0.28	-	0.72	-	0.62	-	0.51	-
Viet Nam	0.29	-	0.31	-	0.30	-	0.28	-	0.45	-
Yemen	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.12	-	0.07	-
Zambia	0.30	-	0.30	-	0.33	-	0.31	-	0.40	-
Zimbabwe	0.12	-	0.19	-	0.18	-	0.16	-	0.06	-

Notes: '-' indicates missing scores for a given year and country. CI = confidence intervals. Countries are not included in the data set before independence or after they have been dissolved. For more details see The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook (Tufts 2017a). The GSoD indices website provides the full data set along with a range of visualization tools that allow users to explore these trends in depth. Visit <<http://www.idea.int/gso-d-indices>>.

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About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy institutions and processes worldwide. International IDEA acts as a catalyst for democracy-building by providing knowledge resources and policy proposals, and supporting democratic reforms in response to specific national requests. It works with policymakers, governments, international organizations and agencies, as well as regional organizations engaged in the field of democracy-building.

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The Institute's work is organized at the global, regional and country levels, focusing on the citizen as the driver of change. International IDEA produces comparative knowledge in its key areas of expertise: electoral processes, constitution-building, and political participation and representation, as well as democracy as it relates to gender, diversity, and conflict and security.

International IDEA brings this knowledge to national and local representatives who are working for democratic reform, and facilitates dialogue in support of democratic change.

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- increased capacity, legitimacy and credibility of democracy;
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Is democracy really in trouble, or do recent events simply signal a temporary downward fluctuation?

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International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide, defines democracy as a political system that advances popular control and political equality. Democracy is a proven universal value for citizens all over the world, and should be accepted as a globally owned concept for which there is no universally applicable model. Democracy comes in multiple forms, which are in constant evolution, with no endpoint.

The Global State of Democracy seeks to address the lack of analytical material on democracy building and the quality of democracy internationally, and to bridge the gap between academic research, policy development and democracy assistance initiatives. It provides evidence-based analysis of the global state of democracy. It introduces the new Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices as a key evidence base to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy. The target audience is policy- and decision-makers, civil society organizations and democracy activists, policy influencers such as the media and research institutes, as well as democracy support providers and practitioners.