# The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook

www.idea.int

© 2017 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members.

References to the names of countries and regions in this publication do not represent the official position of International IDEA with regard to the legal status or policy of the entities mentioned.

Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of this publication should be made to:

International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE–103 34 STOCKHOLM
SWEDEN
Tel: +46 8 698 37 00, fax: +46 8 20 24 22
Email: info@idea.int

International IDEA encourages dissemination of its work and will promptly respond to requests for permission to reproduce or translate its publications.

This publication has received support from International IDEA's Member States through the Institute's core funding. Grateful acknowledgement is made to the governments of Norway and Sweden, whose generous support made this publication possible.

Text editing: Andrew Mash
Layout: International IDEA
Original design concept: Phoenix Design Aid

## Acknowledgements

We thank everyone who has been involved in this first edition of the Global State of Democracy Indices. This publication has benefited from contributions made by many individuals at International IDEA, and from the expert input of members of the Institute's partner organizations.

In particular, thanks to Mélida Jiménez, Victoria Perotti, Lina Antara and Joseph Noonan at International IDEA, Svend-Erik Skaaning at Aarhus University and Claudiu Tufis at the University of Bucharest for their contributions to the development of the Global State of Democracy indices, and to the members of the Expert Advisory Board for their advice in the development of the Global State of Democracy indices and related documentation.

### Methodology and data-set development (Global State of Democracy Indices)

Svend-Erik Skaaning, Professor at the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University, Co-Principal Investigator of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project

Claudiu Tufis, Associate Professor, University of Bucharest, Political Science Department

### Expert Advisory Board (Global State of Democracy Indices)

Michael Bernhard, Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Chair, Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida

Michael Coppedge, Professor at the Department of Political Science and Faculty Fellow at the Kellogg Institute of International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Co-Principal Investigator of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project

Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Co-Principal Investigator of the Historical Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project

Staffan Lindberg, Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Director of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute

Gerardo Munck, Professor at the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California

# The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook

Claudiu D. Tufis*

*The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook* is the third in a series of documents prepared by International IDEA to present the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices. It presents information about the data set, including variables, attributes of democracy, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators. The Codebook complements *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework* (Skaaning 2017), which presents the theoretical framework that guided the construction of the indices, and *The Global State of Democracy Indices: Technical Procedures Guide* (Tufis 2017), which outlines the technical aspects of constructing the indices.

---

The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) indices depict democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2015 but do not provide a single index of democracy. The indices produce data for 155 countries. The data underlying the indices is based on 98 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.

*The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy's Resilience* (International IDEA 2017) aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the GSoD indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. It explores the conditions under which democracy can be resilient and how to strengthen its capacity as a system to overcome challenges and threats.

The full publication, as well as the GSoD Indices Database, can be accessed online: <http://www.idea.int/gsod>.

* Claudiu D. Tufis is an associate professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Bucharest.

# 1. Introduction

The main objective of the GSoD indices is to provide systematic data that captures trends at the global, regional and national levels for different aspects of International IDEA's comprehensive understanding of democracy.

The GSoD indices turn a broad range of empirical indicators from various data sets into measures of different aspects of democracy that can be used to evaluate the state of democracy at the global, regional and national levels. The indices can also assist stakeholders, such as policymakers, researchers and civil society actors, in their analyses of trends related to different aspects of democracy and identification of priority policy areas. *The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy's Resilience* is an example of how the GSoD indices can be used to track trends in democratic development.

The GSoD indices, which were constructed for the first time in 2017, cover 155 independent countries with more than one million inhabitants in the period 1975 to 2015. They are composite measures based on 98 indicators from different kinds of extant data sources. These indicators are assigned to the different subattributes of the conceptual framework and combined in the GSoD indices.

The GSoD indices have been produced by a team of International IDEA staff and two external experts. The construction of the GSoD indices was supervised by an expert advisory board consisting of five leading experts in the field of democracy measurement. Careful justification and documentation of the conceptual distinctions and methodological choices made as well as the use of state-of-the-art procedures were emphasized at all stages in the construction of the indices. This was done to ensure consistency and transparency, as well as high levels of measurement validity and reliability.

## Structure of the Codebook

This Codebook presents information about all the variables included in the GSoD indices data set. The identifying variables are presented first. The attributes, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators are then presented, grouped by attribute of democracy. Within each attribute, the variables are presented from the highest to the lowest level of aggregation, which means that the attributes are presented first, followed by the corresponding subattributes, the corresponding subcomponents (only in the case of the second attribute, fundamental rights) and finally the corresponding indicators.

# The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook

# Variables

## Identifying variables

### ID Country Year (ID_country_year)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | ID _ country _ year |
| **Definition** | This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each combination of country and year (the country-year) in the data set. It has been constructed by concatenating the Correlates of War country code (COWcode) and the year, so that the last four digits of the variable always indicate the year, while the remaining one to three digits preceding the year represent the COWcode. |

### ID Country Name (ID_country_name)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | ID _ country _ name |
| **Definition** | This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 155 countries in the data set.<br>The values this variable takes are the names of the countries included in the data set |
| **Countries** | Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe |

## ID Country Code (ID_country_code)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | ID _ country _ code |
| **Definition** | This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 155 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the Correlates of War country code (COWcode). |

## ID Year (ID_year)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | ID _ year |
| **Definition** | This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 41 years included in the data set (from 1975 to 2015). |

## ID Region (ID_region)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | ID _ Region |
| **Definition** | This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the six regions in the data set.<br>The values this variable takes are the names of the regions included in the data set. For more details see International IDEA (2017b). |
| **Regions** | Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and Iran, Europe |

## ID Subregion (ID_subregion)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | ID _ subregion |
| **Definition** | This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 17 subregions in the data set.<br>The values this variable takes are the names of the regions included in the data set. For more details see International IDEA (2017b). |
| **Subregions** | East Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, North Africa, Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, South America, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, Oceania, East-Central Europe, Eastern Europe/Post-Soviet Europe, North and West Europe, South Europe |

# Attribute 1. Representative Government

Representative Government is the first of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Representative Government.

**1 attribute:**
Representative Government

**4 subattributes:**
1. Clean Elections
2. Inclusive Suffrage
3. Free Political Parties
4. Elected Government

**21 indicators**

# Representative Government (C_A1)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ A1 |
| **Definition** | The representative government attribute emphasizes contested and inclusive popular elections for legislative and executive offices. This attribute distinguishes among four subattributes. Three of them (clean elections, free political parties and elected government) have been aggregated into a contestation index using Bayesian factor analysis (BFA). The representative government index is obtained by multiplying the contestation index by the fourth subattribute, inclusive suffrage. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | – |
| **Aggregation** | – |
| **Indicators included** | C _ SD11, C _ SD13, C _ SD14, v _ 12 _ 01 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score) |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ A1 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ A1 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## Subattributes

### *Clean Elections (C_SD11)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD11 |
| **Definition** | The clean elections subattribute denotes the extent to which elections for national, representative political office are free from irregularities. All of the selected indicators tap into the quality of elections. Two of the indicators reflect free elections more generally, whereas the other indicators capture more specific aspects of this feature, such as irregularities in voter registration and government intimidation. The six indicators have been aggregated into the clean elections subattribute using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 11 _ 01, v _ 11 _ 02, v _ 11 _ 03, v _ 11 _ 04, v _ 11 _ 05, v _ 11 _ 06 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score) |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD11 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD11 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Inclusive Suffrage (v_12_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elsuffrage |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 12 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?<br><br>Responses:<br>Per cent.<br><br>Clarification<br>The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted. If new constitutions, electoral laws or the like explicitly introduce new regulations on suffrage, the scores were adjusted only if the changes suggested the need to do so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion and/or 'economic independence'), estimates were calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources and—in the case of very poor information—the conditions in similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect de jure provisions on suffrage extension by percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year in which the law was enacted. |
| **Original scale** | 0% to 100% |
| **Citation** | Coppedge et al. (2017: 82) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Free Political Parties (C_SD13)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD13 |
| **Definition** | The free political parties subattribute denotes the extent to which political parties are free to form and campaign for political office. Nine indicators, partly based on expert surveys and partly in-house coded, are used to measure how free political parties are. All of them reflect whether political parties generally, and opposition parties in particular, are allowed to organize freely and run in elections. The nine indicators have been aggregated into the free political parties subattribute using item response theory (IRT). |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 13 _ 01, v _ 13 _ 02, v _ 13 _ 03, v _ 13 _ 04, v _ 13 _ 05, v _ 13 _ 06, v _ 13 _ 07, v _ 13 _ 08, v _ 13 _ 09 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD13 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD13 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Elected Government (C_SD14)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD14 |
| **Definition** | The elected government subattribute denotes the extent to which national, representative government offices are filled through elections. It is operationalized using five indicators from V-Dem, LIED and Polity. All the indicators have a rather formal focus, which means that they do not assess the quality of elections or fully capture the extent to which reserved domains and undue influence from non-elected groups might in practice restrict elected officials' effective power to govern. The five indicators were aggregated into the elected government subattribute using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 1.1. clean elections, 1.3. free political parties and 1.4. elected government to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. inclusive suffrage |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 14 _ 01, v _ 14 _ 02, v _ 14 _ 03, v _ 14 _ 04, v _ 14 _ 05 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD14 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD14 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Indicators

## *EMB autonomy (v_11_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elembaut |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 11 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military or another de facto ruling body.<br><br>1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial towards the de facto ruling body.<br><br>2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.<br><br>3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.<br><br>4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections law and administrative rules.<br><br>Clarification<br>The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 85) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.1. Clean Elections |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean Elections. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Election voter registry (v_11_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elrgstry |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 11 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: No. There was no registry or the registry was not used.<br><br>1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double voting and impersonation).<br><br>2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.<br><br>3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.<br><br>4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 89) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br><br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.1. Clean Elections |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean Elections. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Election other voting irregularities (v_11_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elirreg |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 11 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties and/or vote fraud?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.<br><br>1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but fairly common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.<br><br>2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disadvantaged particular groups.<br><br>3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities and many were probably unintentional or did not disadvantage particular groups' access to participation.<br><br>4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.<br><br>Clarification<br>Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions). |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 94) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br><br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.1. Clean Elections |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean Elections. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Election government intimidation (v_11_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elintim |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 11 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence or harassment by the government, the ruling party or their agents?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.<br><br>1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.<br><br>2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic but possibly centrally coordinated harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.<br><br>3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.<br><br>4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents throughout the election campaign period and polling day.<br><br>Clarification<br>Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately). |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 95) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br><br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.1. Clean Elections |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean Elections. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Election free and fair (v_11_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elfrfair |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 11 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e. who became president or who won the legislative majority).<br><br>1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (as defined above).<br><br>2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).<br><br>3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).<br><br>4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and some logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.<br><br>Clarification<br>The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately). |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 102) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br><br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.1. Clean Elections |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean Elections. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| Coverage |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Competition (v_11_06)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | LIED |
| **Original variable** | competitive elections |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 11 _ 06 |
| **Definition** | The chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative body are filled using elections that are characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain power if they were to attract sufficient support from the electorate. This presumes that control over key executive and legislative offices is determined by elections, the executive and members of the legislature have not been unconstitutionally removed and the legislature has not been dissolved. With respect to the electoral process, this presumes that the constitutional timing of elections has not been violated (in more than a marginal fashion), non-extremist parties are not banned, opposition candidates are generally free to participate, voters experience little systematic coercion in exercising their electoral choice and electoral fraud does not determine who wins. With respect to the outcome, this presumes that the declared winner of executive and legislative elections reflects the votes cast by the electorate, as near as can be determined from extant sources. Incumbent turnover (as a result of multiparty elections) is regarded as a strong indicator of competition but is neither necessary nor sufficient. In addition, reports from outside observers (as reported in books, articles and country reports) are used to determine whether the above-mentioned conditions have been met in a given election. Coding for this variable does not take into account whether there is a level playing field, all contestants gain access to funding and the media, media coverage is unbiased, civil liberties are respected or other features associated with fully free and fair elections are present. Competition therefore sets a modest threshold. |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br>1.1. Clean Elections |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 1.1. Clean Elections. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Party ban (v_13_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2psparban |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are any political parties banned?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.<br><br>1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.<br><br>2: Yes. Many parties are banned.<br><br>3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.<br><br>4: No. No parties are officially banned.<br><br>Clarification<br>This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 128) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Barriers to parties (v_13_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2psbars |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How restrictive are the barriers to forming a political party?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Parties are not allowed.<br><br>1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).<br><br>2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).<br><br>3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).<br><br>4: There are no substantial barriers.<br><br>Clarification<br>Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 129) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Opposition parties' autonomy (v_13_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2psoppaut |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Opposition parties are not allowed.<br><br>1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.<br><br>2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.<br><br>3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.<br><br>4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.<br><br>Clarification<br>An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government—that is, it has no control over the executive. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 130) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Elections multiparty (v_13_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elmulpar |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Was this national election multiparty?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few political parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party).<br><br>1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.<br><br>2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained, either legally or informally.<br><br>3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.<br><br>4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, or anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties). |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 130) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br><br>Recoded into 20 categories, each of which contains five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).<br><br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Competitiveness of participation (v_13_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | Polity |
| **Original variable** | Parcomp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities that are coded unregulated (1) on regulation of participation (PARREG, variable 2.5) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.5 also are not coded on variable 2.6.<br>Competitiveness is coded on a five-category scale:<br>0. Not applicable.<br>1. Repressed.<br>2. Suppressed.<br>3. Factional.<br>4. Transitional.<br>5. Competitive. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2016: 28) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Multiparty elections (v_13_06)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | LIED |
| **Original variable** | multiparty legislative elections |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 06 |
| **Definition** | Multiparty legislative elections are defined by the existence of two conditions: legislative elections (LEGSELEC) and opposition (OPPOSITION).<br><br>LEGSELEC: A legislative body issues at least some laws and does not perform executive functions. The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is at least partly elected. The legislature has not been closed.<br><br>OPPOSITION: The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is (at least in part) elected by voters facing more than one choice. Specifically, parties are not banned and either more than one party is allowed to compete or elections are nonpartisan (i.e. all the candidates run without party labels). |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Was opposition allowed? (v_13_07)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | NELDA |
| **Original variable** | NELDA 3 |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 07 |
| **Definition** | This variable indicates whether at least one opposition political party existed to contest the election. Some countries have multiple government parties but no opposition political party. An opposition party is one that is not in the government, meaning that it is not affiliated with the incumbent party.<br>Responses:<br>0: No.<br>1: Yes. |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Hyde and Marinov (2015: 5) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | If multiple elections were conducted during one year, the score for that year was computed as an average of the scores for all the elections in that year.<br>Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Was more than one party legal? (v_13_08)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | NELDA |
| **Original variable** | NELDA 4 |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 08 |
| **Definition** | This variable indicates whether multiple political parties were technically legal. The legalization of multiple parties need not necessarily mean the existence of a functioning opposition party, as there may be other non-legal barriers to the development of an opposition party. Similarly, a well organized opposition party may exist but may not be legal.<br><br>Responses:<br>0: No.<br><br>1: Yes. |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Hyde and Marinov (2015: 5) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | If multiple elections were conducted in one year, the score for that year was computed as an average of the scores for all the elections in that year.<br><br>Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br><br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Were opposition leaders prevented from running? (v_13_09)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | NELDA |
| **Original variable** | NELDA 13 |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 13 _ 09 |
| **Definition** | A 'Yes' was coded when at least some opposition leaders were prevented from running and contesting the elections. A decision to boycott the election was coded 'Yes' here only if it was in response to the government preventing opposition figures from running. Cases where opposition was not allowed were also coded as 'yes'. Note that this question is similar to nelda3 (was opposition allowed?), but distinct in that it should be coded as 'Yes' if any specific opposition party candidates are explicitly prevented from running. If nelda3 is coded 'No' this question is coded 'N/A'. If nelda3 is 'Yes', this question is coded on a 'Yes'/'No' basis. |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Hyde and Marinov (2015: 9) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | If multiple elections were conducted in one year, the score for that year was computed as an average of the scores for all elections in that year.<br>Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br>1.3. Free Political Parties |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Elected executive index (v_14_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2x _ elecoff |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 14 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?<br><br>Clarifications<br>This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly by popular elections or indirectly by a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and whether, in presidential systems with a directly elected president who is also the chief executive, the legislature is directly elected. Note that a popular election is only minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, 'appointment' by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Coppedge et al. (2017: 57) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 0, 0.5 and 1. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.4. Elected Government |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Competitiveness of executive recruitment (v_14_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | Polity |
| **Original variable** | Xrcomp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 14 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates. If power transfers are coded unregulated ('1') in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, competitiveness is coded '0'.<br><br>Three categories are used to measure this concept.<br>1: Selection: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation or by a combination of both, as in monarchies where the chief minister is chosen by the king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are: rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; and repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties.<br><br>2: Dual / Transitional: Dual executives occur where one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Term also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.<br><br>3: Election: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections involving two or more major parties or candidates. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2016: 21) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values.<br><br>Recoded 0 and 1 as 0, 2 as 0.5, and 3 as 1. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.4. Elected Government |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Openness of executive recruitment (v_14_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | Polity |
| **Original variable** | Xropen |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 14 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Recruitment of the chief executive is 'open' to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded unregulated (1) in Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1) or involve a transition to/from unregulated, openness is coded 0.<br><br>Four categories are used:<br>1: Closed: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, emirs, who assume executive power by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded 'closed' unless a relative succeeds him as ruler.<br><br>2: Dual Executive-Designation: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.<br><br>3: Dual Executive-Election: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.<br><br>4: Open: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election or transitional arrangements between designation and election. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2016: 22) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values.<br><br>Recoded 0, 1 and 2 as 0; 3 as 0.5; and 4 as 1. |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br><br>1.4. Elected Government |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Legislative elections (v_14_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | LIED |
| **Original variable** | legislative elections |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 14 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | LEGSELEC: A legislative body issues at least some laws and does not perform executive functions. The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is at least partly elected. The legislature has not been closed. |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br>1.4. Elected Government |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Executive elections (v_14_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | LIED |
| **Original variable** | executive elections |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 14 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | EXSELEC: The chief executive is either directly or indirectly elected (i.e. chosen by people who have been elected). |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | — |
| **Indicator of** | 1. Representative Government<br>1.4. Elected Government |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Attribute 2. Fundamental Rights

Fundamental Rights is the second of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes, subcomponents and indicators that comprise the index of Fundamental Rights

**1 attribute:**
Fundamental Rights

**3 subattributes:**
Access to Justice
Civil Liberties
Social Rights and Equality

**8 subcomponents:**
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of Association and Assembly
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of Movement
Personal Integrity and Security
Social Group Equality
Basic Welfare
Gender Equality

**45 indicators**

# Fundamental Rights (C_A2)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ A2 |
| **Definition** | Fundamental Rights in the form of liberal and social rights support both fair representation and the vertical mechanism of accountability that the first attribute seeks to achieve. This attribute is composed of three subattributes: access to justice, civil liberties, and social rights and equality. The three subattributes were aggregated into the fundamental rights index using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | – |
| **Aggregation** | – |
| **Indicators included** | C _ SD21, C _ SD22, C _ SD23 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ A2 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ A2 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## Subattributes

### *Access to Justice (C_SD21)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD21 |
| **Definition** | The access to justice subattribute denotes the extent to which the legal system is fair (i.e., citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and have the right to be under the jurisdiction of, and to seek redress from, competent, independent and impartial tribunals without undue delay). It comprises four expert coded variables (V-Dem) that go beyond the independence of courts and an in-house coded CLD measure of the right to a fair trial.<br>The five indicators were aggregated into the access to justice subattribute using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 21 _ 01, v _ 21 _ 02, v _ 21 _ 03, v _ 21 _ 04, v _ 21 _ 05 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD21 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD21 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Civil Liberties (C_SD22)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD22 |
| **Definition** | The civil liberties subattribute denotes the extent to which civil rights and liberties are respected. The five civil liberties subcomponents are freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, and personal integrity and security, each of which reflects core concepts in the human rights literature. The five subcomponents were aggregated into the civil liberties subattribute using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality |
| **Indicators included** | C _ SD22A, C _ SD22B, C _ SD22C, C _ SD22D, C _ SD22E, |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD22 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD22 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Social Rights and Equality (C_SD23)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD23 |
| **Definition** | The Social Rights and Equality subattribute denotes the extent to which basic welfare (i.e. social security, health care and education) and political and social equality between social groups and genders are realized. The three Social Rights and Equality subcomponents are social group equality, basic welfare and gender equality, each of which reflects core concepts in the human rights literature.<br>The three subcomponents were aggregated into the Social Rights and Equality subattribute using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.1. access to justice, 2.2. civil liberties and 2.3. social rights and equality |
| **Indicators included** | C _ SD23A, C _ SD23B, C _ SD23C |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD23 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD23 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## Subcomponents

### *Freedom of Expression (C_SD22A)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD22A |
| **Definition** | The freedom of expression subcomponent is measured using indicators from V-Dem and CLD. The question underlying the CLD variable is fairly encompassing, whereas the V-Dem variables are more specific and refer to different aspects of media freedom and to the right to openly discuss political issues and express political opinions outside the mass media (two measure freedom of expression, for men and women respectively). The seven indicators were aggregated into the freedom of expression subcomponent using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.2. Civil Liberties |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 22 _ 01, v _ 22 _ 02, v _ 22 _ 03, v _ 22 _ 04, v _ 22 _ 05, v _ 22 _ 06, v _ 22 _ 07 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD22A = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD22A = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of Association and Assembly (C_SD22B)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD22B |
| **Definition** | Three indicators that directly refer to freedom of association for political and civil groups. These three indicators were aggregated into the freedom of association and assembly subcomponent using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.2. Civil Liberties |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 22 _ 08, v _ 22 _ 09, v _ 22 _ 10 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD22B = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD22B = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of Religion (C_SD22C)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD22C |
| **Definition** | A separate subcomponent index comprised of two V-Dem general indicators on religious freedom based on expert surveys and a similarly broad in-house coded variable from CLD. The three indicators were aggregated into the freedom of religion subcomponent using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.2. Civil Liberties |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 22 _ 11, v _ 22 _ 12, v _ 22 _ 13 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD22C = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD22C = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of Movement (C_SD22D)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD22D |
| **Definition** | Freedom of Movement was captured by a general, in-house coded indicator from CLD and three, more specific, expert coded indicators from V-Dem that distinguish between foreign and domestic movement and provide assessments of the latter feature for men and women. The four indicators were aggregated into the freedom of movement subcomponent using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.2. Civil Liberties |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 22 _ 14, v _ 22 _ 15, v _ 22 _ 16, v _ 22 _ 17 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD22D = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD22D = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Personal Integrity and Security (C_SD22E)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD22E |
| **Definition** | Five indicators capture different types of violations, such as forced labour, torture, and political and extra-judicial disappearances and killings. To capture personal security more broadly, a general indicator on political violence was also included, which pertains to different types of conflict and violence and distinguishes between various levels. The six indicators were aggregated into the personal integrity and security subcomponent using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.2. Civil Liberties |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.2.A. freedom of expression, 2.2.B. freedom of association and assembly, 2.2.C. freedom of religion, 2.2.D. freedom of movement and 2.2.E. personal integrity and security |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 22 _ 18, v _ 22 _ 19, v _ 22 _ 20, v _ 22 _ 21, v _ 22 _ 22, v _ 22 _ 23 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD22E = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD22E = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Social Group Equality (C_SD23A)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD23A |
| **Definition** | Five V-Dem expert-coded indicators were used to measure social group equality, the first of the Social Rights and Equality subcomponents. Four of the underlying questions ask about social class and identity group inequalities with regard to civil liberties and political power distribution. The fifth asks about the representation of disadvantaged social groups. The five indicators were aggregated into the social group equality subcomponent using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 23 _ 01, v _ 23 _ 02, v _ 23 _ 03, v _ 23 _ 04, v _ 23 _ 05 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD23A = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD23A = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Basic Welfare (C_SD23B)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD23B |
| **Definition** | The provision of basic welfare is measured using standard observable human development indicators: infant mortality rate, life expectancy, kilocalories per person per day, literacy rate and average years of schooling. In addition, two expert-based indicators from V-Dem were included that assess whether everyone in a given society has access to basic education and health care. All the indicators reflect the extent to which the basic needs of the population are being met. The seven indicators were aggregated into the basic welfare subcomponent using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 23 _ 06, v _ 23 _ 07, v _ 23 _ 08, v _ 23 _ 09, v _ 23 _ 10, v _ 23 _ 11, v _ 23 _ 12 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD23B = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD23B = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Gender Equality (C_SD23C)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD23C |
| **Definition** | Two expert-coded indicators from V-Dem were used to operationalize gender equality–power distribution by gender and female participation in civil society organizations—as well as three observational indicators on the ratio between female and male mean years of schooling (GHDx), the proportion of lower chamber female legislators (V-Dem) and the proportion of women in ministerial-level positions (IPU). The five indicators were aggregated into the gender equality subcomponent using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | —— |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 2.3.A. social group equality, 2.3.B. gender equality and 2.3.C. basic welfare |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 23 _ 13, v _ 23 _ 14, v _ 23 _ 15, v _ 23 _ 16, v _ 23 _ 17 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD23C = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD23C = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Indicators

## *Access to Justice for men (v_21_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clacjstm |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 21 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?<br>Responses:<br>0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.<br>1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.<br>2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems in most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.<br>3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.<br>4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.<br>Clarification<br>This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and men have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 231) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.1. Access to Justice |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Access to Justice for women (v_21_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clacjstw |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 21 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do women enjoy equal, secure and effective access to justice?<br>Responses:<br>0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.<br>1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.<br>2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems occur in most cases or rather unevenly across different parts of the country.<br>3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.<br>4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.<br>Clarification<br>This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and women have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 232) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.1. Access to Justice |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Judicial corruption decision (v_21_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2jucorrdc |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 21 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay a process or to obtain a favourable judicial decision?<br>Responses:<br>0: Always.<br>1: Usually.<br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Not usually.<br>4: Never. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 210) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.1. Access to Justice |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Judicial accountability (v_21_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2juaccnt |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 21 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Never.<br>1: Seldom.<br>2: About half of the time.<br>3: Usually.<br>4: Always. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 209) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.1. Access to Justice |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Fair trial (v_21_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | CLD |
| **Original variable** | Fairtrial |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 21 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | Definition:<br>The indicator specifies the extent to which citizens have the right to a fair trial in practice: they are not subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; and they have the right to recognition as a person before the law; the right to be under the jurisdiction of and seek redress from competent, independent and impartial tribunals; and the right to be heard and to be tried without undue delay if arrested, detained or charged with a criminal offence.<br>Indicator Scale:<br>1: Severely restricted: Fair trials are very unlikely. The courts are totally subordinated to the will of government or the justice system is profoundly undermined by arbitrary arrests, incompetence, corruption and intimidation.<br>2: Substantially restricted: Some elements of fair trials exist but the courts are not fully independent of the government and/or the justice system is characterized by widespread corruption, intimidation and inefficiency.<br>3: Moderately restricted: The courts are generally independent of the government, but the justice system is characterized by moderate degrees of corruption or inefficiency.<br>4: Unrestricted: All elements of fair trails are respected. No arbitrary arrests take place, the courts are competent, independent and impartial; and hearings and trials generally follow arrest and charge within a reasonable time. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2010) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.1. Access to Justice |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Print/broadcast censorship effort (v_22_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2mecenefm |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.<br><br>1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nonetheless routine.<br><br>2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.<br><br>3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.<br><br>4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.<br><br>Clarification<br>Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs and bribery. Censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion or defamatory speech are not relevant unless used as a pretext for censoring political speech. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 251) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.A. Freedom of Expression |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Harassment of journalists (v_22_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2meharjrn |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are individual journalists harassed; that is, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten or killed, by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Journalists do not dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.<br><br>1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually forced to stop.<br><br>2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.<br><br>3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.<br><br>4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 254) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.A. Freedom of Expression |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Media self-censorship (v_22_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2meslfcen |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.<br><br>1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.<br><br>2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.<br><br>3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 254) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.A. Freedom of Expression |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of discussion for women (v_22_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2cldiscw |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expressing political opinions.<br><br>1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.<br><br>2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.<br><br>3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. As a rule, however, there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.<br><br>4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is unrestricted.<br><br>Clarification<br>This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces, such as restaurants, public transport, sports events or at work, without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. Of interest are restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country where men and women enjoy equal but extremely few rights to freedom of discussion. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 225) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | —— |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.A. Freedom of Expression |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Freedom of discussion for men (v_22_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2cldiscm |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinions.<br><br>1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.<br><br>2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.<br><br>3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. As a rule, however, there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.<br><br>4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is unrestricted.<br><br>Clarification<br>This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces, such as restaurants, public transport, sports events or at work, without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. Of interest are restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country where men and women enjoy equal but extremely few rights to freedom of discussion. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 225) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | —— |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.A. Freedom of Expression |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v_22_06)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clacfree |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 06 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Not respected by the public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expression are severely restricted or controlled by the government.<br><br>1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.<br><br>2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.<br><br>3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.<br><br>4: Fully respected by the public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 218) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | —— |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.A. Freedom of Expression |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of opinion and expression (v_22_07)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | CLD |
| **Original variable** | Freexp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 07 |
| **Definition** | Definition:<br>The extent to which individual citizens, groups and the media have freedom of opinion and expression, that is, the right of citizens, groups and the press to hold views freely and to seek, obtain and pass on information on political issues as broadly understood without being subject to limitations or restrictions.<br><br>Component Scale:<br>1: Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of opinion or expression exists. As a rule, political statements and press coverage independent and/or critical of the government do not exist or are harshly suppressed.<br><br>2: Fairly restricted. Some elements of expression of political opinions and press coverage independent and critical of the government exist but are exposed to numerous interventions and prohibitions.<br><br>3: Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of opinion and expression, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions and prohibitions on political statements and/or press coverage.<br><br>4: Unrestricted. Unhampered freedom of opinion and expression exists. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2010: 5) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.A. Freedom of Expression |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *CSO entry and exit (v_22_08)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2cseeorgs |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 08 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity, such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes or publicly commenting on public officials and policies, are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.<br><br>1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.<br><br>2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expediency.<br><br>3: Minimal control. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, constitutional provisions exist that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such bans take place within the rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.<br><br>4: Unconstrained. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities that seek to violently overthrow the government. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 243) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.B. Freedom of Association and Assembly |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *CSO repression (v_22_09)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2csreprss |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 09 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of CSOs, seeking not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany and Maoist China.<br><br>1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in opposition CSOs that are not acting unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists such as beatings, threats to family members and destruction of valuable property. Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law and Serbia under Milosevic.<br><br>2: Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in response 3, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of CSOs' actions through measures that restrict the association of such organizations with each other or political parties, bar CSOs from taking certain actions or blocking international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s and the late Franco period in Spain.<br><br>3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions such as fines, firings and denial of social services, to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new CSOs and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. Examples include Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.<br><br>4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves and criticize the government without fear of government sanction or harassment. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 244) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | —— |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.B. Freedom of Association and Assembly |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Freedom of assembly and association (v_22_10)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | CLD |
| **Original variable** | Freass |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 10 |
| **Definition** | Definition:<br>The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of assembly and association, that is, the right of citizens to gather freely and carry out peaceful demonstrations as well as to join, form and participate with other persons in political parties, cultural organizations, trade unions or the like of their own volition without being subject to limitations or restrictions.<br><br>Component Scale:<br>1: Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of association and assembly exists. As a rule, politically relevant civic organizations and attempts at assembly do not exist or are harshly suppressed.<br><br>2: Fairly restricted. Some elements of civic organizations exist, but oppositional organizations of relevance to governance are prohibited, disabled or systematically repressed, and demonstrations critical of the government exposed to numerous interventions and prohibitions.<br><br>3: Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of association and/or assembly, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions or prohibitions on parties, social organizations or public meetings.<br><br>4: Unrestricted. There is unrestricted freedom of association and assembly. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2010: 7) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.B. Freedom of Association and Assembly |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of association and assembly. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of Religion (v_22_11)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clrelig |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 11 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is there freedom of religion?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Not respected by the public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to the public authorities, which control the activities of religious communities in some detail.<br><br>1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized but significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled; voluntary conversions are restricted; and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.<br><br>2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled, however, and/or there are occasional instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups based on their religion.<br><br>3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions on proselytizing or hindrances to accessing the construction of places of worship.<br><br>4: Fully respected by the public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, the public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.<br><br>Clarification<br>This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by the public authorities. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 218) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.C. Freedom of Religion |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Religion. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| Coverage |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Religious organization repression (v_22_12)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2csrlgrep |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 12 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.<br><br>1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations that have not acted unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists, such as beatings, threats to families and destruction of valuable property.<br><br>2: Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade religious organizations from acting or their members from expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict the association of religious CSOs with each other or political parties, bar religious CSOs from taking certain actions or by blocking international contacts.<br><br>3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions such as fines, firings or the denial of social services to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or their members from expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious CSOs and side-track them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.<br><br>4: No. Religious CSOs are free to organize, associate, strike or express themselves and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 248) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.C. Freedom of Religion |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Religion. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| Coverage |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (v_22_13)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | CLD |
| **Original variable** | Frerel |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 13 |
| **Definition** | Definition:<br>The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of thought, conscience and religion, that is, the right of citizens to have a religion or change their religion or belief of their own volition; and alone or in community manifest their religion or belief in practice, through worship, observance and teaching in private or public, as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to limitations or restrictions.<br><br>Component scale:<br>1: Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. As a rule, any kind of religious practice is controlled by the government and harshly suppressed.<br><br>2: Fairly restricted. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practice exists and is officially recognized, but major religious movements are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled.<br><br>3: Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions or prohibitions on communities or individual worshippers.<br><br>4: Unrestricted. Unhampered freedom of religion exists. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2010: 10) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | —— |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.C. Freedom of Religion |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Religion. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of foreign movement (v_22_14)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clfmove |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 14 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Not respected by the public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from travelling.<br><br>1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.<br><br>2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only face minor restrictions.<br><br>3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from travelling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.<br><br>4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by the public authorities.<br><br>Clarification<br>This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by the public authorities. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 222) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | —— |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.D. Freedom of Movement |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Movement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Freedom of domestic movement for women (v_22_15)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2cldmovew |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 15 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g. North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).<br><br>1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement but most do not (e.g. Apartheid South Africa).<br><br>2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively, all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.<br><br>3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.<br><br>4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.<br><br>Clarification<br>This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and at night, in public thoroughfares and across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residence where they wish. Note that restrictions of movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely low levels of freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions on movement that are placed on non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions on movement that result from crime or unrest. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 223) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.D. Freedom of Movement |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Movement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of domestic movement for men (v_22_16)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2cldmovem |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 16 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g. North Korea).<br><br>1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement but most do not (e.g. Apartheid South Africa).<br><br>2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively, all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.<br><br>3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.<br><br>4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.<br><br>Clarification<br>This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime or at night, in public thoroughfares or across regions in a country, and to establish permanent residence where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely low levels of freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 223) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.D. Freedom of Movement |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Movement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom of Movement and residence (v_22_17)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | CLD |
| **Original variable** | Fremov |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 17 |
| **Definition** | Definition:<br>The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of movement and residence, that is, the right of citizens to settle and travel within their country or to leave and return to their country of their own volition without being subject to limitations or restrictions.<br><br>Component Scale<br>1: Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of movement exists. As a rule, citizens are not allowed to choose their place of residence or to travel around the country or abroad.<br><br>2: Fairly restricted. Some elements of foreign travel, choice of residence and/or domestic travel exist but numerous individuals, often belonging to specific groups, are exposed to a variety of prohibitions.<br><br>3: Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of travel and/or residence, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no prohibitions.<br><br>4: Unrestricted. There is unrestricted freedom of movement and residence. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2010: 13) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | – |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.D. Freedom of Movement |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Movement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom from forced labour for women (v_22_18)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clslavef |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 18 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labour?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.<br><br>1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.<br><br>2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by the public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.<br><br>3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.<br><br>4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labour is virtually non-existent.<br><br>Clarification<br>Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to leave a job s/he desires to leave not for reasons of economic necessity, but instead due to employer coercion. This includes labour camps but not work or service that forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women from forced labour. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 228) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Freedom from forced labour for men (v_22_19)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clslavem |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 19 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labour?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.<br><br>1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.<br><br>2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by the public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.<br><br>3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.<br><br>4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labour is virtually non-existent.<br><br>Clarification<br>Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to leave a job s/he desires to leave not for reasons of economic necessity, but instead due to employer coercion. This includes labour camps but not work or service that forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 227) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom from torture (v_22_20)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2cltort |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 20 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is there freedom from torture?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Not respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of the government.<br><br>1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by senior leaders in the government. At the same time, government leaders are not actively working to prevent it.<br><br>2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by senior leaders in the government.<br><br>3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by senior government leaders.<br><br>4: Fully respected by the public authorities. Torture is non-existent.<br><br>Clarification<br>Torture refers to the deliberate inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with the aim of extracting information or intimidating victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (the police, security forces, prison guards and paramilitary groups). |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 219) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Freedom from political killings (v_22_21)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clkill |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 21 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is there freedom from political killings?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Not respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by the senior leaders of the government.<br><br>1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and senior government leaders are not actively working to prevent them.<br><br>2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by senior government leaders.<br><br>3: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by senior government leaders.<br><br>4: Fully respected by the public authorities. Political killings do not take place.<br><br>Clarification<br>Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of the deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state, including paramilitary groups. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 220) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Human rights protection scores (v_22_22)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | Fariss |
| **Original variable** | Latentmean |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 22 |
| **Definition** | The Latent Human Rights Protection scores were generated using a dynamic ordinal item-response theory model to generate country-year estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the estimated level of respect for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights.<br><br>The measure is based on 13 in-house coded variables from nine different data sets: the CIRI physical integrity data (extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, political imprisonment) (Cingranelli and Richards 2014); Hathaway torture data (Hathaway 2002); Ill-treatment and Torture (Conrad et al. 2013); Political Terror Scale (Gilby and Dalton 1996); Mass-repression (Harff and Gurr 1998); Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Genocide and Politicide (Marshal et al. 2017); Genocide and Democide (Rummel 1994a, 1994b); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (One-sided Killing)(Sundberg 2009); World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators(Political Executions)(Taylor and Jodice 1983). |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Farris (2014)<br><br>Fariss et al. (2014) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br><br>2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Internal conflict (v_22_23)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | ICRG |
| **Original variable** | D |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 22 _ 23 |
| **Definition** | An assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an ongoing civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (Civil War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/ Political Violence, Civil Disorder), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Howell (2011: 4) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.2. Civil Liberties<br>2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Personal Integrity and Security. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v_23_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clacjust |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Poor people enjoy far fewer civil liberties than rich people.<br><br>1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.<br><br>2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.<br><br>3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.<br><br>4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.<br><br>Clarification<br>This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socio-economic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labour. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 233) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.A. Social Group Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.A. Social Group Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Social Group Equality in respect for civil liberties (v_23_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clsocgrp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties? Or are some groups generally in a more favourable position?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Members of some social groups enjoy far fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br><br>1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br><br>2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br><br>3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.<br><br>4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.<br><br>Clarification<br>Here, civil liberties are understood as comprising access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labour. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 234) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.A. Social Group Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.A. Social Group Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Power distributed by socio-economic position (v_23_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2pepwrses |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is political power distributed according to socio-economic position?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. People of average wealth and poorer people have almost no influence.<br><br>1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.<br><br>2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average wealth or poorer people have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less to wealthy people.<br><br>3: Wealthy people have more political power than others but people of average wealth have almost as much influence and poor people have a significant degree of political power.<br><br>4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.<br><br>Clarification<br>All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translate into political power. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 257) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.A. Social Group Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.A. Social Group Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Power distributed by social group (v_23_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2pepwrsoc |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is political power distributed according to social groups?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change.<br><br>1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change.<br><br>2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change.<br><br>3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time followed by another group, but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.<br><br>4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.<br><br>Clarification<br>A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socio-economic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways and as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood by those residing in that society to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 258) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.A. Social Group Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.A. Social Group Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Representation of disadvantaged social groups (v_23_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2lgdsadlo |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Considering all the disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?<br><br>Responses:<br>1: They have no representation at all.<br><br>2: They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.<br><br>3: They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.<br><br>4: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.<br><br>5: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.<br><br>Clarification<br>Disadvantage refers to socio-economic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged, members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 187) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.A. Social Group Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.A. Social Group Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Infant mortality rate (v_23_06)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | Various sources, compiled through Gapminder.org (2015) |
| **Original name** | Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 06 |
| **Definition** | The probability that a child born in a specific year will die before reaching the age of one, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Expressed as a rate per 1000 live births. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Gapminder.org, Infant mortality rate v4 (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br>2.3.B. Basic Welfare |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.B. Basic Welfare. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Life expectancy (v_23_07)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | IHME through Gapminder.org (2015) |
| **Original name** | Life expectancy at birth (years) |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 07 |
| **Definition** | The average number of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | IHME (2015, 2016) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into deciles, ranging from 1 (the lowest decile) to 10 (the highest decile). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br>2.3.B. Basic Welfare |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.B. Basic Welfare. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Kilocalories per person per day (v_23_08)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | FAO |
| **Original name** | Grand Total - kcal/capita/day |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 08 |
| **Definition** | Calorie supply per capita is the amount of food available for consumption, measured in kilocalories per capita per day. This figure is reached by dividing the total available food supply for human consumption by the population. This data set tracks the calorie supply per capita in each country for calories available from crop products. Although these figures can be taken as the average supply available for consumption, actual consumption by individuals can vary greatly. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br>2.3.B. Basic Welfare |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.B. Basic Welfare. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Literacy (v_23_09)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | UNESCO |
| **Original name** | Adult literacy rate, population over 15 |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 09 |
| **Definition** | Percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100.<br>Data on literacy is compiled by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on national censuses and household surveys or, for countries without recent literacy data, using the Global Age-Specific Literacy Projection Model (GALP). |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values.<br>Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br>2.3.B. Basic Welfare |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.B. Basic Welfare. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Mean years of schooling (v_23_10)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | IMHE |
| **Original name** | Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25, age standardized, both sexes |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 10 |
| **Definition** | Estimates of average years of educational attainment per capita. This measure is available disaggregated by age and gender and is offered in both age-standardized and population-weighted series. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | IHME (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br>2.3.B. Basic Welfare |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.B. Basic Welfare. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Educational equality (v_23_11)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2peedueq |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 11 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.<br><br>1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.<br><br>2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but 10–25 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.<br><br>3: Relatively equal. Basic education overall is equal in quality but 5–10 per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.<br><br>4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five per cent of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.<br><br>Clarification<br>Basic education typically refers to schooling between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 260) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.B. Basic Welfare |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.B. Basic Welfare. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Coverage** |  |

Number of Countries Covered
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

## *Health equality (v_23_12)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2pehealth |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 12 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>To what extent is high quality basic health care guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Extreme. Because of poor quality health care, at least 75 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.<br><br>1: Unequal. Because of poor quality health care, at least 25 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.<br><br>2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor quality health care, 10–25 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.<br><br>3: Relatively equal. Basic health care overall is equal in quality but because of poor quality health care, 5–10 per cent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.<br><br>4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than 5 per cent of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.<br><br>Clarification<br>Poor quality health care can leave citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed). |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 260) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.B. Basic Welfare |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.B. Basic Welfare. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Power distributed by gender (v_23_13)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2pepwrgen |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 13 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is political power distributed according to gender?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.<br><br>1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.<br><br>2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.<br><br>3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.<br><br>4: Men and women have roughly equal political power. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 259) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.C. Gender Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.C. Gender Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *CSO women's participation (v_23_14)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2csgender |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 14 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Almost always.<br><br>1: Frequently.<br><br>2: About half the time.<br><br>3: Rarely.<br><br>4: Almost never.<br><br>Clarification<br>Please pay attention to both: (a) whether women are prevented from participating in CSOs because of their gender; and (b) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 246) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.C. Gender Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.C. Gender Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Female vs. male mean years of schooling (v_23_15)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | IMHE |
| **Original name** | Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25 - age standardized; male and female |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 15 |
| **Definition** | Estimates of average years of educational attainment per capita. This measure is available disaggregated by age and gender and is offered in both age-standardized and population weighted series. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | IHME (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br>2.3.C. Gender Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.C. Gender Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Lower chamber female legislators (v_23_16)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2lgfemleg |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 16 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?<br><br>Responses:<br>Percentage |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Coppedge et al. (2017: 190) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values.<br><br>Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br><br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br><br>2.3.C. Gender Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.C. Gender Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Participation of women in ministerial level positions (v_23_17)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | United Nations |
| **Original variable** | Proportion of women in ministerial level positions |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 23 _ 17 |
| **Definition** | Proportion of ministerial level positions held by women out of total number of ministerial level positions. |
| **Original scale** | Percentage |
| **Citation** | Inter-Parliamentary Union (2017)<br>United Nations (1990, 1995, 2000) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. |
| **Indicator of** | 2. Fundamental Rights<br>2.3. Social Rights and Equality<br>2.3.C. Gender Equality |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subcomponent 2.3.C. Gender Equality. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Attribute 3. Checks on Government

Checks on Government is the third of the five attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Checks on Government.

**1 attribute:**
Checks on Government

**3 subattributes:**
Effective Parliament
Judicial Independence
Media Integrity

**15 indicators**

# Checks on Government (C_A3)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ A3 |
| **Definition** | Besides regular elections, the exercise of political power needs to be continuously subjected to scrutiny. If the other branches of government (the legislature and the judiciary) or a critical and pluralistic press do not check executive power, they are more prone to be abused for private gain and to biased political decision-making and implementation. Vertical accountability through elections should be supplemented by horizontal accountability between elections. The three subattributes were aggregated into the checks on government index using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | –– |
| **Aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicators included** | C _ SD31, C _ SD32, C _ SD33 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ A3 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ A3 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## Subattributes

### *Effective Parliament (C_SD31)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD31 |
| **Definition** | The effectiveness of parliament subattribute denotes the extent to which the legislature is capable of overseeing the executive. It includes three indicators from the V-Dem experts survey that tap fairly directly into the effectiveness of parliament. Another V-Dem indicator on executive oversight and the executive constraints indicator from Polity are included as they capture relevant aspects of institutional checks on government not covered by judicial independence and media integrity. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on government. |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 31 _ 01, v _ 31 _ 02, v _ 31 _ 03, v _ 31 _ 04, v _ 31 _ 05 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD31 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD31 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Judicial Independence (C_SD32)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD32 |
| **Definition** | The judicial independence subattribute denotes the extent to which the courts are not subject to undue influence from the other branches of government, especially the executive.<br><br>Since our framework places judicial independence under the attribute concerning checks on government, it is important to supplement the three judicial independence indicators with two indicators on government compliance with the courts. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on government. |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 32 _ 01, v _ 32 _ 02, v _ 32 _ 03, v _ 32 _ 04, v _ 32 _ 05 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD32 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br><br>U _ SD32 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Media Integrity (C_SD33)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD33 |
| **Definition** | The media integrity subattribute denotes the extent to which the media landscape offers diverse and critical coverage of political issues. Media Integrity and freedom of expression are related. Nonetheless, the media can do a poor job controlling the government even in a situation of media freedom if they are very one-sided, uncritical, superficial or corrupt. V-Dem offers indicators that reflect these additional circumstances. These indicators are based on expert surveys in addition to an in-house coded indicator from MFD, which indicates whether the media are critical of the government and its officials. The five indicators were aggregated into the media integrity subattribute using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 3.1. clean elections, 3.2. free political parties and 3.3. elected government to create 3. Checks on government. |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 33 _ 01, v _ 33 _ 02, v _ 33 _ 03, v _ 33 _ 04, v _ 33 _ 05 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD33 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD33 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Indicators

## *Legislature questions officials in practice (v_31_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2lgqstexp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 31 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: No - never or very rarely.<br><br>1: Yes - routinely.<br><br>Clarification<br>'Question' means, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain policies or testify. |
| **Original scale** | Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 182) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.1. Effective Parliament |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective Parliament. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Executive oversight (v_31_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2lgotovst |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 31 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavourable decision or report?<br>Responses:<br>0: Extremely unlikely.<br>1: Unlikely.<br>2: Very uncertain.<br>3: Likely.<br>4: Certain or nearly certain. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 183) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br>3.1. Effective Parliament |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective Parliament. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Legislature investigates in practice (v_31_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2lginvstp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 31 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavourable to the executive?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Extremely unlikely.<br>1: Unlikely.<br>2: As likely as not.<br>3: Likely.<br>4: Certain or nearly certain. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 183) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br>3.1. Effective Parliament |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective Parliament. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Legislature opposition parties (v_31_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2lgoppart |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 31 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?<br>Responses:<br>0: No, not at all.<br>1: Occasionally.<br>2: Yes, for the most part. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 184) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br>3.1. Effective Parliament |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective Parliament. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Executive constraints (v_31_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | Polity |
| **Original variable** | Xconst |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 31 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any 'accountability groups'. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisers in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and, in many states, a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process.<br>A seven-category scale is used:<br>1: Unlimited authority.<br>2: Intermediate category.<br>3: Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority.<br>4: Intermediate category.<br>5: Substantial limitations on executive authority.<br>6: Intermediate category.<br>7: Executive party or subordination. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2016: 25) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br>3.1. Effective Parliament |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Effective Parliament. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *High Court independence (v_32_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2juhcind |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 32 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>When the High Court in the judicial system rules in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect the government's wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Always.<br><br>1: Usually.<br><br>2: About half of the time.<br><br>3: Seldom.<br><br>4: Never.<br><br>Clarification<br>We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without 'merely reflecting' those wishes, in that a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. 'Merely reflect the wishes of the government' means that the court's own sincere evaluation of the record is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 212) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.2. Judicial Independence |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial Independence. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Lower court independence (v_32_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2juncind |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 32 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>When judges not in the High Court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government's wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Always.<br><br>1: Usually.<br><br>2: About half of the time.<br><br>3: Seldom.<br><br>4: Never. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 213) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.2. Judicial Independence |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial Independence. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Compliance with High Court (v_32_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2juhccomp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 32 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the High Court with which it disagrees?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Never.<br><br>1: Seldom.<br><br>2: About half of the time.<br><br>3: Usually.<br><br>4: Always. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 213) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.2. Judicial Independence |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial Independence. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Compliance with judiciary (v_32_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2jucomp |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 32 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Never.<br><br>1: Seldom.<br><br>2: About half of the time.<br><br>3: Usually.<br><br>4: Always.<br><br>Clarification<br>We are looking for a judgment on the entire judiciary excluding the High Court. Consider judges in both the ordinary courts and the specialized courts. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 214) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.2. Judicial Independence |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial Independence. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Latent judicial independence (v_32_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | Linzer/Staton |
| **Original name** | LJI |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 32 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | This indicator measures the power concept of de facto independence of the judiciary, which is defined as the extent to which independent judges are autonomous and their decisions are influential (Linzer and Staton 2015).<br><br>The measure is based on seven in-house coded variables and one observational variable from eight different data sets: De facto judicial independence(Feld and Voigt, 2003; Gwartney and Lawson, 2007; Keith 2012; Howard and Carey, 2004; Cingranelli and Richards 2014), Contract Intensive Money (Clauge et al, 1999), Constraints on the Executive(Marshall et al, 2016), Law and Order (Howell, 2011). |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Linzer and Staton (2015) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.2. Judicial Independence |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Judicial Independence. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Critical Print / broadcast media (v_33_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2mecrit |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 33 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: None.<br><br>1: Only a few marginal outlets.<br><br>2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.<br><br>3: All major media outlets criticize the government, at least occasionally. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 252) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.3. Media Integrity |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media Integrity. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Print / broadcast media perspectives (v_33_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2merange |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 33 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.<br><br>1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.<br><br>2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.<br><br>3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 253) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.3. Media Integrity |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media Integrity. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Media bias (v_33_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2mebias |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 33 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage; or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.<br><br>1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.<br><br>2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.<br><br>3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates.<br><br>4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.<br><br>Clarification<br>Take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered 'more or less impartial' when the media as a whole presents a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 255) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.3. Media Integrity |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media Integrity. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Media corrupt (v_33_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2mecorrpt |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 33 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do journalists, publishers or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.<br><br>1: Journalists, publishers and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.<br><br>2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.<br><br>3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally without anyone being punished.<br><br>4: Journalists, publishers and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 256) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br><br>3.3. Media Integrity |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media Integrity. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Media freedom (v_33_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | MFD |
| **Original variable** | Media freedom |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 33 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | The media environments around the world are sorted into three basic categories:<br>1: Free: Countries where criticism of the government and government officials is a common and normal part of the political dialogue in the mediated public sphere.<br>2: Imperfectly Free: Countries where the social, legal or economic costs related to criticism of the government or government officials limit public criticism, but investigative journalism and criticism of major policy failings can and do occur.<br>3: Not Free: Countries where it is not possible to safely criticize government or government officials.<br>Clarification<br>In the original data set (Van Belle 2000), there were four categories. Category 4 meant that the government directly controlled all news media, whereas category 3 meant that the government exerted indirect control. Since the end of the Cold War and with the massive growth in information technology, distinguishing between state-operated news media and media controlled by other means became something of a pointless exercise. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 3. Checks on government<br>3.3. Media Integrity |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 3.3. Media Integrity. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Attribute 4. Impartial Administration

Impartial Administration represents the fourth of the five attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index on Impartial Administration.

**1 attribute:**
Impartial Administration

**2 subattributes:**
Absence of Corruption
Predictable Enforcement

**9 indicators**

# Impartial Administration (C_A4)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ A4 |
| **Definition** | The government and the public administration more generally should implement official public policies in an impartial manner. If implementation is unfair and unpredictable, large discrepancies between official laws and policies, on the one hand, and practices, on the other, undermine democratic principles. Thus, democracy is a matter not only of access to power and control of power, but also of the exercise of power. Since impartial administration to a large extent overlaps with the concept of the rule of law, this attribute is also rooted in the tradition that emphasizes the liberal aspects of democracy.<br>The two subattributes were aggregated into the impartial administration index using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | –– |
| **Aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicators included** | C _ SD41, C _ SD42 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ A4 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ A4 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## Subattributes

### *Absence of Corruption (C_SD41)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD41 |
| **Definition** | The Absence of Corruption subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and the public administration, more broadly, do not abuse their office for personal gain.<br>Four V-Dem indicators explicitly refer to corruption in the government broadly understood, i.e., the executive and public administration more generally (but excluding courts and parliaments). We make use of these and another expert-coded but broader indicator on government corruption from the ICRG data set. The five indicators have been aggregated into the Absence of Corruption subattribute using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 4.1. Absence of Corruption and 4.2. Predictable Enforcement to create 4. Impartial Administration |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 41 _ 01, V _ 41 _ 02, v _ 41 _ 03, v _ 41 _ 04, v _ 41 _ 05 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD41 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD41 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Predictable Enforcement (C_SD42)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD42 |
| **Definition** | The Predictable Enforcement subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and public officials enforce laws in a predictable manner. To measure predictable enforcement, three expert-coded V-Dem indicators were included: the executive's respect for constitutional provisions, the presence of transparent laws with Predictable Enforcement and rule-abidingness in the public sector. To these were added an indicator from the ICRG (also expert-coded) on the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy. The four indicators were aggregated into the Predictable Enforcement subattribute using IRT. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration |
| **Aggregation** | BFA of 4.1. Absence of Corruption and 4.2. Predictable Enforcement to create 4. Impartial Administration |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 42 _ 01, v _ 42 _ 02, v _ 42 _ 03, v _ 42 _ 04 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD42 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD42 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Indicators

## *Public sector corrupt exchanges (v_41_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2excrptps |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 41 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How routinely do public sector employees grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.<br><br>1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.<br><br>2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.<br><br>3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.<br><br>4: No. Never, or hardly ever.<br><br>Clarification<br>When responding to this question, think about a typical person employed in the public sector, excluding the military. If there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in public service delivery, try to average them out before stating your response. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 178) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br><br>4.1. Absence of Corruption |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of Corruption. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Public sector theft (v_41_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2exthftps |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 41 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.<br><br>1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as personal property.<br><br>2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them as personal property.<br><br>3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others as personal property.<br><br>4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.<br><br>Clarification<br>When responding to this question, think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in public service delivery, try to average them out before stating your response. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 179) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br><br>4.1. Absence of Corruption |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of Corruption. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Executive embezzlement and theft (v_41_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2exembez |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 41 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.<br><br>1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as personal property.<br><br>2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them as personal property.<br><br>3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others as personal property.<br><br>4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 178) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br><br>4.1. Absence of Corruption |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of Corruption. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v_41_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2exbribe |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 41 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers) or their agents grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: It is routine and expected.<br><br>1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.<br><br>2: It happens but is unpredictable; those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be required.<br><br>3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.<br><br>4: It never, or hardly ever, happens. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 177) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br><br>4.1. Absence of Corruption |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of Corruption. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Corruption (v_41_05)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | ICRG |
| **Original variable** | F |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 41 _ 05 |
| **Definition** | This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licences, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loans. Although this measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favour-for-favours', secret party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Howell (2011: 4) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br>4.1. Absence of Corruption |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Absence of Corruption. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Executive respects constitution (v_42_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2exrescon |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 42 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?<br><br>Responses:<br>executive violate the constitution whenever they want to without legal consequences.<br><br>1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but must respect certain provisions.<br><br>2: Somewhere between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.<br><br>3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution and when it happens they face legal charges.<br><br>4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 177) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br><br>4.2. Predictable Enforcement |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable Enforcement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Transparent laws with Predictable Enforcement (v_42_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2cltrnslw |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 42 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year and enforced in a predictable manner?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.<br><br>1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.<br><br>2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.<br><br>3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.<br><br>4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.<br><br>Clarification<br>This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 221) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br><br>4.2. Predictable Enforcement |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable Enforcement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Rigorous and impartial public administration (v_42_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2clrspct |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 42 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.<br><br>1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.<br><br>2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.<br><br>3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited. 4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rare.<br><br>Clarification<br>This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike; or, conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and bias (i.e. nepotism, cronyism or discrimination). The question covers the public officials who handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 221) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br><br>4.2. Predictable Enforcement |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable Enforcement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Bureaucratic quality (v_42_04)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | ICRG |
| **Original variable** | L |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 42 _ 04 |
| **Definition** | The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal |
| **Citation** | Howell (2011: 7) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 4. Impartial Administration<br>4.2. Predictable Enforcement |
| **Aggregation** | IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Predictable Enforcement. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

# Attribute 5. Participatory Engagement

Participatory Engagement represents the fifth of the five attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. As it is not clear from extant theory whether the different aspects of popular participation stand in an interactive and/or substitutable relationship with each other, we refrain from aggregating up to the attribute level here, and urge users to do the same and only use the subattribute indices.

This section of the Codebook offers details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise this attribute.

**4 subattributes:**
Civil Society Participation
Electoral Participation
Direct Democracy
Subnational Elections

**7 indicators**

## Subattributes

### *Civil Society Participation (C_SD51)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD51 |
| **Definition** | The measurement of Civil Society Participation relies on two V-Dem indicators. They result from an expert survey and consider the extent to which the population is engaged in civil society activities. The two indicators on Civil Society Participation clearly tapped into a common dimension and were aggregated into an index using BFA. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | –– |
| **Aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 51 _ 01, v _ 51 _ 02 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Auxiliary variables** | L _ SD51 = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval<br>U _ SD51 = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Electoral Participation (v_52_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elvaptrn |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 52 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>According to official results, what percentage (%) of the adult voting age population (VAP) cast a vote in this national election?<br><br>Responses:<br>Percentage<br><br>Clarification<br>The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, VAP values can surpass 100, which is not an error but reflects such conditions. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Coppedge et al. (2017: 103) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year.<br><br>Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x _ elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections as stipulated by election law or established precedent.<br><br>A small number of cases had values higher than 100. For each of these cases the International IDEA Voter Turnout Database was checked and these were coded as either 100 (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections was close to 100%) or missing (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections was not close to 100%). |
| **Indicator of** | –– |
| **Aggregation** | –– |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Direct Democracy (v_53_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2xdd _ dd |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 53 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>To what extent are direct popular votes utilized?<br><br>Clarification<br>Direct popular votes are institutionalized processes by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. The term is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums and plebiscites, as they are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Similarly, it does not apply to elections for representatives. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Coppedge et al. (2017: 60) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | –– |
| **Aggregation** | –– |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Subnational Elections (C_SD54)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | GSoD indices |
| **Original variable** | Constructed variable |
| **GSoD name** | C _ SD54 |
| **Definition** | The subnational elections subattribute denotes the extent to which citizens can participate in free elections for regional and local governments. A formative aggregation formula was used, which took into account the reinforcing relationship between the existence of subnational elections and their freeness and fairness.<br><br>Accordingly, a measure of free local level elections was created by multiplying the indicators on elected local governments (v _ 54 _ 01) and free and fair subnational elections (v _ 54 _ 03); and a measure of free regional level elections by multiplying the indicators on elected regional governments (v _ 54 _ 02) and free and fair subnational elections (v _ 54 _ 03). Since free elections at the local level can be considered partially substitutable with free elections at the regional level, the aggregation is completed by taking the average of these products. |
| **Original scale** | Interval |
| **Citation** | Skaaning (2017) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | –– |
| **Aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicators included** | v _ 54 _ 01, v _ 54 _ 02, v _ 54 _ 03 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## Indicators

### *CSO participatory environment (v_51_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2csprtcpt |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 51 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Most associations are state-sponsored and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.<br><br>1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.<br><br>2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.<br><br>3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 246) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 5.1. Civil Society Participation |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 5.1. Civil Society Participation. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Engaged society (v_51_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2dlengage |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 51 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never, allowed.<br><br>1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite level is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.<br><br>2: Public deliberation is not repressed but infrequent; and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.<br><br>3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tend to be the same across issue-areas.<br><br>4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate; these vary with different issue-areas.<br><br>5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighbourhoods and in the streets. Grassroots deliberation is common and unconstrained.<br><br>Clarification<br>This question refers to deliberation as manifest in discussion, debate and other public forums such as popular media. |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 202) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 5.1. Civil Society Participation |
| **Aggregation** | BFA to construct subattribute 5.1. Civil Society Participation. |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Local government elected (v_54_01)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2ellocelc |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 54 _ 01 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.<br><br>1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.<br><br>2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.<br><br>3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.<br><br>4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.<br><br>5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.<br><br>Clarification<br>'Government offices' here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, not the judiciary and not minor officials. An executive is a single individual or a very small group (e.g. a mayor or local cabinet). An assembly is a larger body of officials. 'Elected' refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office, including appointment by a higher level of government, are considered to be non-elected. In classifying a position as elected no judgment is made about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. This is simply an indication that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office. |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Coppedge et al. (2017: 119) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 5.4. Subnational Elections |
| **Aggregation** | ((v _ 54 _ 01 * v _ 54 _ 03) + (v _ 54 _ 02 * v _ 54 _ 03)) / 2 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Regional government elected (v_54_02)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elsrgel |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 54 _ 02 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.<br><br>1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.<br><br>2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.<br><br>3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.<br><br>4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.<br><br>5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.<br><br>Clarification<br>'Government offices' here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, not the judiciary and not minor officials. An executive is a single individual or a very small group (e.g. a mayor or local cabinet). An assembly is a larger body of officials. 'Elected' refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office, including appointment by a higher level of government, are considered to be non-elected. In classifying a position as elected no judgment is made about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. This is simply an indication that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office. |
| **Original scale** | Nominal |
| **Citation** | Coppedge et al. (2017: 119) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 5.4. Subnational Elections |
| **Aggregation** | ((v _ 54 _ 01 * v _ 54 _ 03) + (v _ 54 _ 02 * v _ 54 _ 03)) / 2 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

## *Subnational elections free and fair (v_54_03)*

| | |
|---|---|
| **Data source** | V-Dem |
| **Original variable** | v2elffelr |
| **GSoD name** | v _ 54 _ 03 |
| **Definition** | Question:<br>Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?<br><br>Responses:<br>0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).<br><br>1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).<br><br>2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome (who won office).<br><br>3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).<br><br>4: Yes. There were a certain amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.<br><br>Clarification<br>This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. 'Free and fair' refers to all aspects of the election process except the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (which is measured separately). |
| **Original scale** | Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. |
| **Citation** | Pemstein et al. (2015)<br><br>Coppedge et al. (2017: 123) |
| **Data manipulation for aggregation** | –– |
| **Indicator of** | 5.4. Subnational Elections |
| **Aggregation** | ((v _ 54 _ 01 * v _ 54 _ 03) + (v _ 54 _ 02 * v _ 54 _ 03)) / 2 |
| **Final scale** | Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score). |
| **Coverage** |  |

# References


Cingranelli, D. L., Richards, D. L. and Chad Clay, K., CIRI Human Rights Dataset, Version 14, April 2014, <http://www.humanrightsdata.com>, accessed 14 July 2017

Coppedge, M. et al., *V-Dem Codebook v7* (Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute, 2017) <https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/6a/23/6a236129-6ace-4182-9778-b7c839b3940d/codebook_7.pdf>, accessed 11 August 2017

Clague, C., Keefer P., Knack S. and Olson, M., 'Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance', *Journal of Economic Growth*, 4 /2 (1999), pp. 185–211

Fariss, C., 'Respect for human rights has improved over time: Modeling the changing standard of accountability', *American Political Science Review*, 108/2 (2014), pp. 297–318

Fariss, C. and Schnakenberg, K., 'Dynamic patterns of human rights practices', *Political Science Research and Methods*, 2/1 (2014), pp. 1–31

Feld, L. P. and Voigt, S., 'Economic growth and judicial independence: cross country evidence using a new set of indicators, *European Journal of Political Economy*, 19/3 (2003), pp. 497–527

Gapminder, 'Infant mortality rate v4', 2015, <http://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd002/>, accessed 14 August 2017

Gibney, M. and Dalton, M., 'The Political Terror Scale', in D. L. Cingranelli (ed.), *Policy Studies and Developing Nations, Volume 4: Human Rights and Developing Countries* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1996)

Gwartney, J. and Lawson R., *Economic Freedom of the World: 2007 Annual Report* (New York: Fraser Institute, 2007).

Harff, B. and Gurr, T. R., 'Toward empirical theory of genocides and politicides: identification and measurement of cases since 1945', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32/3 (1988), pp. 359– 71

Hathaway, O. A., 'Do human rights treaties make a difference?', *Yale Law Journal*, 111/8 (2002), pp. 1935–2042

Howell, L. D., 'International country risk guide methodology', Political Risk Services (PRS Group), 2011, <http://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg>, accessed 1 August 2017

Howard, R. M. and Carey, H. F., 'Is an independent judiciary necessary for democracy?', *Judicature*, 87/6 (2004), pp. 284–90

Hyde, S. and Marinov, N., *NELDA 4.0: National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset Codebook for Version 4*, 29 July 2015, <http://www.nelda.co/NELDA_Codebook_version4.pdf>, accessed 11 August 2017

Hyde, S. and Marinov, N., 'Which elections can be lost?', *Political Analysis*, 20/2 (2012), pp. 191–210

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), 'Global educational attainment, 1970–2015', 2015, <http://ghdx.healthdata.org/record/global-educational-attainment-1970-2015>, accessed 1 August 2017

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), *Global Burden of Disease Study, 2015: Life Expectancy, All-Cause and Cause-Specific Mortality 1980–2015* (Seattle, WA: IHME, 2016), <http://ghdx.healthdata.org/record/global-burden-disease-study-2015-gbd-2015-life-expectancy-all-cause-and-cause-specific>, accessed 1 August 2017

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), *The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy's Resilience* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017), <http://www.idea.int/gsod>

—, 'Geographic Definitions of Regions in *The Global State of Democracy*', Background Paper, 2017, <http://www.idea.int/gsod>

Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 'Women in national parliaments', 2017, <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm>, accessed 16 August 2017

Johnson, J. C., Souva M. and Smith, D. L., 'Market-protecting institutions and the World Trade Organization's ability to promote trade', *International Studies Quarterly*, 57/2 (2013), pp. 410–17

Keith, L. C., *Political Repression: Courts and the Law* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012)

Linzer, D. and Staton, J. K., 'A global measure of judicial independence, 1948–2012' [formerly, 'A measurement model for synthesizing multiple comparative indicators: the case of judicial independence'], *Journal of Law and Courts*, 3/2(2015), pp. 223–56

Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R. and Harff, B., 'PITF -STATE FAILURE PROBLEM SET: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2016', 21 June 2017, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFProbSetCodebook2016.pdf>, accessed 15 August 2017

Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R. and Jaggers, K., *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015*, 19 May 2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf>, accessed 12 August 2017

Pemstein, D. et al., 'The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data', Varieties of Democracy Institute Working Paper No. 21, 2015, <https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/67/30/6730d372-7952-4c41-ac15-cc3ad0111830/v-dem_working_paper_2015_21.pdf>, accessed 1 August 2017

Rummel, R. J., *Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder in the Twentieth Century* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994a)

—, 'Power, genocide and mass murder', *Journal of Peace Research*, 31/1 (1994b), pp. 1–10

Skaaning, S-E., *The Civil Liberty Dataset (CLD) Codebook*, May 2010, <http://ps.au.dk/fileadmin/Statskundskab/Dokumenter/Forskning/Forskningscentre/DEDERE/CLDcodebook.pdf>, accessed 11 August 2017

—, *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017), <http://www.idea.int/gsod>

Skaaning, S-E., Gerring, J. and Bartusevicius, H., 'A lexical index of electoral democracy', *Comparative Political Studies*, 48/12 (2015), pp. 1491–525

Sundberg, R., 'Revisiting One-sided Violence: A Global and Regional Analysis', in L. Harbom and R. Sundberg, (eds), *States in Armed Conflict* (Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet, 2009)

Taylor, C. L. and Jodice D., *A World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (3rd edn), Volume 2: Political Protest and Government Change (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983)

Tufis, C., *The Global State of Democracy Indices: Technical Procedures Guide* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017), <http://www.idea.int/gsod>

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, *The World's Women, 2000: Trends and Statistics* (New York: United Nations, 2000)

—, *The World's Women 1995: Trends and Statistics* (New York: UN, 1995)

—, *The World's Women, 1970–1990: Trends and Statistics* (New York: UN, 1990)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UIS. Stat Database (Paris: UNESCO, 2017), <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>, accessed 11 August 2017

United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), FAOSTAT Database (Rome: FAO, 2016)

Van Belle, D., *Press Freedom and Global Politics* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000)

Whitten-Woodring, J. and Van Belle, D., 'The Correlates of Media Freedom: An introduction of the Global Media Freedom dataset', *Political Science Research and Methods*, 5/1 (2017), pp. 179–88

**International IDEA**
Strömsborg
SE–103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
Tel: +46 8 698 37 00
Email: info@idea.int
Web: www.idea.int