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Democracy Notes
Published: 30/06/2023
Simple, reliable democracy data: Introducing Global State of Democracy Indices v7
The seventh annual update to the Global State of Democracy Indices—now covering 174 countries between 1975 and 2022—was recently published by International IDEA. All the data and documentation are available for download on our website.   If you’re a regular reader of blog posts from International IDEA, you are likely the kind of person who knows where to find data on democracy. Following several decades of advances and innovation in democracy data, there is no shortage of options. But the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices occupy a unique niche in this space. The GSoD Indices were intentionally designed to be useful to policy analysts, speechwriters, journalists, academics, and students. Their ability to serve these users rests on two fundamental design choices: (1) to gather data from the best and most comprehensive sources and (2) to aggregate these data in a unique collection of indices that measure the things that matter most.   In informal terms, the GSoD Indices are a democracy data concierge service: the information you need, arranged for you by an expert.  Sophisticated methodology – documented but behind the scenes  These apparently simple and reliable indices of democracy rely on sophisticated social scientific work behind the scenes. Our methods are fully documented and replicable for those users who wish to do so.   A straightforward and (hopefully) intuitive explanation is that each of the indices in the dataset seeks to provide something approaching a consensus measure of the concept of interest. We do this by collecting the best available data (from other data projects such as the Varieties of Democracy project, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and Freedom in the World), and using sophisticated measurement models to estimate the values of a single index (meaning a composite measure) for each concept (as well as a measure of the uncertainty of that estimated value). Our methods allow data with different scales, distributions, and even informational quality to be aggregated in a way that gives the most weight to the best measures.   Annual updates  Ideally, quantitative data on democracy could be updated at short intervals, for example on a monthly basis (which we do in a qualitative way in the Democracy Tracker). However, the best we can do is to provide annual updates to annual measures of democratic performance. In June 2023, we launched version 7 of the GSoD Indices, now including data from 1975 to 2022. This new version of the dataset not only added another year of observations, but also added six new data sources, and inaugurated a revised conceptual framework that organizes the indices.   New measure of the rule of law  For the first six versions of the GSoD Indices, the conceptual framework was stable. However, over the years we have taken note of feedback from diverse audiences on the ways in which the data could be made even more useful.   One frequent request was for a measure of the rule of law. For many organizations working on democracy and human rights, this is a key measure, and the GSoD Indices did not consolidate its relevant measures into a singular index. For version 7 of the GSoD Indices, creating a single, reliable, measure of the rule of law was a top priority. We are very happy to share that in consultation with external experts, we were able to create this index. We have reconfigured the conceptual framework so that there are now four top-level indices of democratic quality: Representation, Rights, Participation, and the Rule of Law.   Each of these indices is constructed from several second-level indices (17 in total). Two of the second-level indices are in turn constructed from a third level (this applies to Civil Liberties and Political Equality). On that note, we also added an index of Freedom of the Press at the lowest level of aggregation. This hierarchical arrangement of the indices is illustrated in the figure above.  Uses for the data  The aggregated data are used for many different purposes. Within IDEA, we use the specific measures of things like Credible Elections or Freedom of the Press to track trends within countries, and to identify areas where interventions could be most effective. Other organizations use the data in applications such as human rights due diligence research, risk estimation, and country-specific research. The graph below illustrates how the various regions of the world compare to each other on each of our four top-level categories of democratic performance. Interactive website coming in September We invite you to explore this refreshed and updated conceptual framework through downloadable data files and documentation on our website. And stay tuned for new interactive data pages on the GSoD online platform that we will launch in September.
Published: 13/06/2023
A snapshot of governance discussions at a global intergovernmental organization
Summary: International IDEA's governance structure and policymaking procedures reflect its commitment to promoting and strengthening democratic institutions and processes worldwide. The organization's consultative and consensus-building approach ensures that it is responsive to the needs and priorities of its Member States, Board of Advisers and other key stakeholders. Its Council and Board meetings serve as essential platforms for engagement, collaboration, and decision-making in the pursuit of democratic governance. As an intergovernmental organization (IGO), International IDEA plays a crucial role in promoting and strengthening democratic institutions and processes around the world. To ensure effective decision-making and policymaking, International IDEA has a well-defined governance structure that includes the Council of Member States, the Board of Advisers, the Secretariat and other governance bodies. This blog post provides a snapshot of the governance processes at International IDEA by describing the Institute's governance structure and presenting some of the topics that were discussed in the context of the April 2023 governance meetings. The Council is the highest decision-making body of International IDEA and is composed of representatives from 34 Member States. The Council usually meets twice a year to set the strategic direction of the organization, approve its budget, and discuss matters of institutional importance. The Council is also tasked to assign the Secretary-General. The Board of Advisers, on the other hand, provides expert advice to the Council and the Secretariat on matters related to the organization's mandate and strategic objectives. International IDEA's Secretariat is responsible for implementing the organization's policies and programs. It is headed by the Secretary-General who is appointed by the Council for a five-year term. The Secretariat is organized into departments and units that work on specific areas such as electoral processes, political participation, democracy assessment, and constitution building. The policymaking procedures of International IDEA are based on a consultative and consensus-building approach. The organization works closely with its Member States and other stakeholders to develop policies and programs that respond to their needs and priorities. The Secretariat also conducts research and analysis to inform its program development and develop insights with direct policy relevance to its Member States. International IDEA's governance meetings provide important opportunities for Member States and other stakeholders to participate in the organization's policymaking processes. These meetings allow for the exchange of ideas and information, the sharing of best practices, and the development of consensus on key issues related to democratic governance. In the margins of the meetings of the Council and the Board of Advisers, the Institute also organizes briefings on key initiatives and thematic areas of its work. As part of the meetings in April 2023, this included briefings on International IDEA’s Democracy Tracker tool and its two new workstreams on Democracy and Digitalization as well as Democracy and Climate Change. The Democracy Tracker is a novel and unique digital tool to assess the quality and performance of democracy worldwide. It provides an at-a-glance overview on the current state of democracy in 173 countries, combining annually updated quantitative scores with a comprehensive qualitative analysis on democracy-relevant events on a monthly basis. The Tracker lives up to today’s constantly and rapidly changing world by tracking changes in the democratic landscape that help to understand and explain democratic progress and declines. The Council and the Board received an introduction to the tool and discussed the importance of careful assessment when it comes to determining the impact of the monthly updates for long-term democratic performance. Digitalization is one of the defining processes of our time. It also has direct implications for democratic governance. It is for that reason that International IDEA, as part of its new Institutional Strategy, has launched a new workstream on Digitalization and Democracy and hosted a joint discussion between the Council representatives and the Board of Advisers on the positive impact of digitalization on democracy. During the session, the participants shared examples of best practices and policies in terms of innovative and effective e-governance initiatives and discussed the possibilities of Artificial Intelligence to enhance digital democracy. Climate change already has a clear impact on democratic governance. To address the complex challenge of climate change, International IDEA has launched a workstream on Climate Change and Democracy. The interventions stemming from the program are intended to support democracies in formulating and putting in place effective policy responses to combat the climate crisis. The discussants saw ample potential for International IDEA to work on the link between democracy and climate change and acknowledged the Institute’s unique role as a global convening power to initiate discussions on the nexus between the two in political fora. Overall, the Council and the Board stressed the importance of these new initiatives and workstreams for the Institute and their global impact on enhancing democratic governance. These and various other issues will stay high on the agenda of both governance bodies as the Institute continues to implement its new Strategy.
Democracy Notes
Published: 31/05/2023
Courts, power politics and parallels: Can Imran Khan hold on in Pakistan?
The high-stakes contest between former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the Pakistani government and its powerful military establishment has become one of the most serious political crises in Pakistan's recent memory—not a small feat for a country known for its tumultuous politics. Every day comes with a new twist or turn: civilians to be tried in military courts, Khan himself being dragged from an Islamabad courtroom, rumours of assassination plots, and threats to ban the party of the most popular politician in the country outright.   The road to the current deadlock began in November 2022, when Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) opposition party moved to force snap regional elections in two key provinces it was certain to win. In violation of the constitution and a direct order from Umar Ata Bandial, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, the government repeatedly delayed elections far beyond the constitutionally-mandated 90-day window, and the PTI and its allies attempted further unconstitutional steps to force the government to comply. As has too often been the case in Pakistani history, the military has fostered the political chaos in order to expand its power.  While it seems like a minor part of the story, it was arguably Chief Justice Bandial’s intervention—done via a suo motu decision, a procedure allowing a chief justice to intervene in a matter without an outside party bringing a case to the court – that epitomizes the conflict. Bandial attempted to short-circuit the conflict, but in bypassing more deliberative and inclusive forms of adjudication, his decision did little to move the governing Pakistani Democratic Movement (PDM) and only set the stage for further escalation of the crisis.   Both Khan’s convention-bucking arc and Bandial’s suo motu move call to mind the actions of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, whose three tumultuous terms as Pakistan’s chief justice between 2005 and 2013 offer a useful frame through which to consider the current tensions. Long a supine institution that provided post-facto legal justifications for undemocratic transitions of power, the Supreme Court underwent a drastic change under Chaudhry, who—like Khan—owed his rise to national power to elite-military establishment. Also like Khan, Chaudhry was able to leverage tangible mass popularity into an escape from establishment control.  Parallels in Pakistan’s recent past  The arc of Chaudhry’s rise to power has parallels with Khan’s. Both men rose to the heights of the Pakistani elite with the active backing of the military elite. In Khan's case, the military tilted the 2018 election in his favor when they saw in him an amenable civilian leader. Before him, Chaudhry had the support of then-President and Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. Once in power, Chaudhry instead became known for bold, public-interest judicial activism, largely carried out through the liberal and controversial use of his own suo motu decisions. In 2007 and 2008, when Musharraf’s political career came to an end after an attempt to force Chaudhry’s removal backfired, Chaudhry was able to mobilize popular and political support to force Musharraf’s successor to reinstate him to the Court. Similarly, Khan cooperated closely with the military for the first few years as prime minister, before a fight over the balance of civilian-military power in the early 2020s led him to openly challenge the military leadership. Khan has continued his criticism since being removed from power in a no-confidence vote on 10 April 2022, a process he has directly accused then-Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa of orchestrating.  The drivers for Chaudhry’s judicial activism—which is commonly referred to by legal scholars as the “judicialization” of politics—were rooted in popular discontent with Musharaff’s “economic liberalization coupled with political illiberalism”, providing a base of popular support for aggressive public interest litigation. But it was also personality-driven: especially towards the end of his term, Chaudhry’s growing number of critics accused him of being driven primarily by self-aggrandizement. To make matters worse, his headline-grabbing efforts to strengthen the judiciary’s power over parliament had the unfortunate consequence of weakening both before the military. Khan, whose 2018 rise to power followed decades of folk hero status, has been dogged by similar allegations of entering politics “out of a misplaced sense of entitlement, searching for a post-retirement purpose in life.”  Populism or power politics?  Whatever both men's motivations, together they represent a point of departure in Pakistani political history, where shifts in the balance of power were rooted in some semblance of popular demand, rather than purely a result of elite-military machinations.   As commentators have extensively documented, Pakistan’s current crisis lacks clear-cut heroes. Despite the judicial focus on Khan’s case, for most Pakistanis the courts remain slow, overburdened, and nonresponsive institutions that neither deliver justice nor check private or executive power. And while Khan has publicly challenged the military establishment more directly than any politician in recent memory, his campaign has become elite brinksmanship in populist clothing as Khan seeks to regain the military’s grudging support, not remove it from politics.   While a military-supported return to power would certainly be good for Khan—just as his far more likely military-assisted removal from the political sphere would benefit the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)—it is only through a removal of the military from politics that Pakistan can address its overlapping crises. As Indonesia’s post-Suharto marginalization of its long-dominant military shows, a united civilian political class is necessary for dislodging the military from politics. This is a long shot, as at the time of writing the military is successfully forcing key PTI leaders out of the party and even the Supreme Court is divided against itself. Despite the upheavals of the last year, the Pakistani elite and military are likely to muddle through. But it is uncertain at what cost to the people of Pakistan.