Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election-related Conflict and Violence

27 – 30 October 2009

A report of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) with support of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Acknowledgments

Thanks to the team who helped conceptualize and organize this event, including Paul Guerin, Rushdi Nackerdien, Sead Alihodzic, Shana Kaiser, Camino Kavanagh, Santiago Villavecuses, Therese Sjöström and Goran Fejic. Further thanks go to all the presenters and report contributors: Ambassador Mustaq Moorad (International IDEA), Ilona Tip (EISA), Manuel Carrillo (IFE), Dr. Luis Jorge Garay (Fundacion Grupo Metodo), Adrian Morrice (UNPPMSU), Siphosami Malunga (UNDP), Lawrence Lachmansingh, Gabrielle Bardall (IFES), Richard Chambers (IFES), Derrick Marco (IDASA), Frances Oke (ECOWAS), R. Balakrishnan (ECI), Ory Okolloh (Ushahidi) and Jeff Fischer (Creative Associates International, Inc.). We would also like to thank the facilitators and workshop participants for the invaluable contributions they made to the workshop. Finally we would like to thank Andrew Mash, who copyedited this report.

This report was edited by Sead Alihodzic (s.alihodzic@idea.int) and Shana Kaiser (s.kaiser@idea.int).
# Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Accra Agenda for Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>F. Clifton White Applied Research Center for Democracy and Elections</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ECF</td>
<td>Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC)</td>
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<td>ECI</td>
<td>Election Commission of India</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
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<td>EMB</td>
<td>Electoral Management Body</td>
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<td>EVER</td>
<td>Election Violence Education and Resolution</td>
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<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy in South Africa</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission (South Africa)</td>
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<td>IFE</td>
<td>Federal Electoral Institute (Instituito Federal Electoral)</td>
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<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
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<td>LEVRA</td>
<td>Lebanese Election Violence Risk Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community Electoral Commissions Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UN DPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>UNPPMSU</td>
<td>United Nations Policy, Planning and Mediation Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>VMT</td>
<td>Vulnerability Mapping Tool</td>
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Summary

Election-related violence causes death and suffering, destroys communities, and cripples local economies and development prospects, harming the credibility of and faith in democratic processes. Recent outbreaks of violence in Iran, Kenya, Moldova, Mongolia and Pakistan, among others, are stark reminders of the destruction it can cause. Academics are building a body of knowledge relating to election-related violence, and numerous election practitioners and assistance providers are working on the development of knowledge resources, practical tools and methodologies to manage and mitigate election-related conflict and violence.

International IDEA’s workshop ‘Towards a Global Framework for Management and Mitigation of Election-related Conflict and Violence’ gathered some of the key global, regional and national organizations and practitioners working in the field of election-related conflict and violence as well as organizations working on election assistance, security, crisis management and mediation issues. The workshop provided an opportunity for peer review of existing methodologies and materials, many of which are not publicly available due to their sensitive and confidential nature.

The presentations given over the first two days highlighted the enormous amount of work currently being undertaken by various organizations working in the field:

- The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) presented its work on election-related conflict and violence mitigation implemented through its development and deployment of Conflict Mediation Panels, Party Liaison Committees and a code of conduct.

- The Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE) of Mexico presented its risk mapping tool, which focuses on risks to electoral processes imposed by external factors such as organized crime and guerrilla groups. The presentation also included IFE’s Mechanisms for Electoral Violence Prevention.

- Fundacion Grupo Metodo (Metodo) presented lessons from the Colombian experience and their applicability to other socio-political contexts. Two emerging constraints to democratic institutions and processes were addressed in this context: state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration.

- The United Nations Policy, Planning and Mediation Support Unit (UN PPMSU) presented a menu of UN options to prevent and resolve violent conflict, including information on various early warning and conflict management methodologies.

- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presented its handbook Election and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming. The publication offers practitioners in the fields of governance and elections ways to
effectively mitigate election-related conflict through proper analysis, planning and programming.

- The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) presented its concept of an Early Warning Tool, designed to enhance users' knowledge of election-related conflict and violence and their ability to detect and prevent impending violence. The tool is envisaged as a highly customizable public good, allowing wide use and full ownership by the user.

- The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) presented its work on the Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project, its main components, success stories and findings and the lessons learned. This was complemented by a presentation on its Lebanese Election Violence Risk Assessment (LEVRA) project, which focused on risk factors, assessment methodologies and lessons learned.

- The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) highlighted the importance of knowledge and information management and outlined a variety of approaches that it has found successful in conflict resolution.

The plenary discussions stressed the need for further cooperation through a variety of means, including the development of a glossary of terms, future exchange - possibly through the ACE Network, the promotion of a collaborative culture and the involvement of key organizations working outside of elections, such as peace and security actors, in order to help provide a more holistic approach to election-related violence.

This report includes information on several tools which were not presented at the workshop but are known by International IDEA to be relevant to the topic of election-related violence. These are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Conflict Prevention Framework, India’s Vulnerability Mapping Tool, the Ushahidi Crisis Information System and Electoral Security Programming by Creative Associates International.
1. Introduction

Elections are a major catalyst for democratic change but have an intrinsically conflictual nature. Elections make deeply rooted social conflicts more visible and thus have great potential for triggering violence. If such violence is ignited by the electoral process, or perceived to have been, the effects may have grave implications for human rights and local economies, and may create an inherent distrust in the credibility of democracy. This is particularly critical in fragile contexts, most notably where violence is protracted or in post-conflict settings.

Although election-related violence is not a new problem, the body of literature which purports to explain this phenomenon is still rather inadequate in addressing the problem from a global perspective. However, in parallel with scholarly work on this topic, the community of election practitioners has made significant strides in researching the phenomenon and developing knowledge resources and methodologies aimed at the management and mitigation of election-related conflict and violence.

International IDEA, as one of the leading global organizations in democracy building, is mandated by its 25 member states to support sustainable democratic change through comparative knowledge resources, assist with reform and influence policies and politics. Its knowledge on elections and conflict-related issues is exemplified by numerous thematic publications.1

Based on more than 12 years of International IDEA’s work on elections, conflict, democracy and security issues; recent outbreaks of electoral violence; and the increased need for targeted assistance in this field, the Institute took the strategic decision to join a global effort focusing on the prevention and mitigation of election-related conflict and violence. This effort has been led by the Electoral Processes Programme at IDEA since 2008. In addition to using the existing wealth of knowledge on elections and conflict produced by International IDEA, the Institute engaged in consultations with partners in the electoral and conflict prevention fields throughout 2009. This included study missions to Mexico and India in an effort to learn about different methodologies developed and implemented in order to address election-related conflict and violence.

International IDEA’s proven ability to create and engage in global partnerships inspired the Institute to organize the first meeting of global practitioners working in the field of election-related conflict and violence. In addition to its ambition to facilitate a peer showcase of different methodologies, International IDEA is particularly interested in

1 Specific publications on this topic include: Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict (1998); Reconciliation after Violent Conflict (2003); Democracy, Conflict and Human Security; Pursing Peace in the 21st century and further readings (2006); and Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook (publication forthcoming). These publications are available for download at <www.idea.int/publications>
realizing the spirit of the Paris Declaration$^2$ and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)$^3$ and to assist with synergizing the work of different organizations in the field.

$^2$ The Paris Declaration is an international agreement by which over 100 ministers, Heads of agencies and other senior officials committed their countries and organizations to continue to increase efforts to harmonize, align and manage aid for results based on a set of monitorable actions and performance indicators.

$^3$ The AA Action was drawn up in 2008 and builds on the commitments made in the Paris Declaration.
2. International IDEA Workshop on Election-Related Conflict and Violence

International IDEA’s workshop, ‘Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election-Related Conflict and Violence’, took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 28–30 October 2009. It brought together more than 30 practitioners from over 20 different organizations.

In line with findings from the existing body of knowledge that ‘electoral competition itself is the cause of violence but that this approach may be insufficient where the electoral process is rather the catalyst for existing conflicts’ and that ‘fair, honest and responsive elections may be victimized by conflict and violence’, International IDEA acknowledges that one way to address the phenomenon of election-related violence is to analyse the factors which are external and internal to electoral processes. The comprehensive listing of major stakeholders and chronological events in electoral processes makes the electoral cycle concept a useful visual aid for conceptualizing and designing tools and methodologies that target election-related violence.

The workshop was structured to distinguish between two groups of factors. Factors which are external to electoral processes, and which therefore exist separately from elections, including ethnic and religious tensions, poverty, the existence of organized crime, regional conflicts, and so on. Conflict and violence that exist in the given social context can, however, spill over into electoral processes and affect election stakeholders, disrupt events, and reduce the legitimacy of results (see figure 1).

Factors that are internal to electoral processes include election stakeholders and events. The high stakes involved in an electoral competition, the fact that the process can easily be influenced and manipulated and the overall complexity of organizing elections mean that these factors have great potential to exacerbate existing conflicts and trigger election-related violence.

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4 See appendix I for the workshop concept note and agenda.
5 See appendix II for a list of participants and their organizations.
6 Ellis A., Electoral Processes and Democracy: A Moving Field (2009);
The main objectives of the workshop were to:

a) Review and share experiences on existing tools and methodologies used to assess and address the risks of violent outbreaks during the electoral cycle, with special emphasis on early warning systems;

b) Identify lessons learned, including successes, challenges and obstacles;

c) Examine the potential value and applicability of the tools and methodologies throughout the electoral cycle and in different contexts;

d) Consider potential synergies between these tools and methodologies (how they could be combined) and how they can potentially be developed into a global framework;

e) Identify and discuss existing policy and guidance frameworks on responding to or preventing election-related violence.

The workshop used presentations, breakout group sessions and plenary discussions. Organizational presentations focused on the tools, methodologies and concepts which have been put in place or are being designed to address election-related conflict and violence. Presentations were followed by facilitated, interactive discussions and/or breakout sessions to make the most of participants’ experiences and knowledge.
3. Institutional Presentations

International IDEA’s workshop was a pioneering event in that it targeted electoral practitioners who have developed, or are developing, methodologies and tools to assess risks and responses to election-related violence. In preparing their workshops, presenters were asked to place emphasis on the following key questions:

- What were the design considerations of the methodology?
- How was the methodology implemented and by whom?
- What were the challenges and the lessons learned?

3.1. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa

Presented by Ilona Tip, Operations Director

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INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE

EISA’s intervention in the area of electoral conflict management commenced as early as 1998 when it designed and developed an electoral conflict management programme in consultation with the Electoral Commissions Forum of the Southern African Development Community Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC-ECF) and facilitated workshops in all the SADC countries.

Building on this experience, EISA designed a conflict management model which, in partnership with the relevant Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), provided for the identification of a panel of independent mediators, trusted and regarded by the electorate and political parties as independent and non-partisan, to assist EMBS in diffusing potential and managing emerging conflict. This model was first implemented in South Africa in partnership with the South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in 1999 and replicated in subsequent South African elections up to the most recent provincial and national elections, which were held in April 2009. This model has also been used in other SADC countries, including Zambia since 2001, Lesotho in 2002 and the referendum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005 and presidential and parliamentary elections there in 2006, for which 3000 mediators were recruited, trained and deployed. These mediators continue to contribute to resolving conflict in the DRC in the post-election period.

EISA’s work in the field of election-related conflict focuses on alternative mechanisms for the resolution of election conflict, such as:

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8 Listed here as per the agenda
- Conflict Mediation Panels: A community-based approach involving political parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) under the coordination of the EMB (see the EISA model applied in South Africa, the DRC, Lesotho and Zambia, figure 2).

- Party Liaison Committees: Committees based on the principles of inclusiveness and transparency for the prevention and resolution of conflict. A committee is currently being used in South Africa and they have been introduced in various forms in other SADC countries. Such committees allow for open dialogue between EMBs and political parties. It is important to note that they do not usurp the role of the EMB but instead open up space for consultation and are called on to publicly condemn electoral violence.


![Figure 2: EISA informal process](image)

In addition to the above-mentioned approaches, EISA also uses other means for pre-empting and resolving election-related conflict:

- Constitution and law making: Devolution of powers (i.e. decentralization or federalism), electoral system engineering and reform, political party regulations, and so on;

- Technical support: to the Independent Electoral Commission and the courts;

- High level political mediation: For instance, through SADC, the African Union (AU), ECOWAS or the international community.
In particular, EISA has based its work on the resolution of election conflict through the establishment of Conflict Management panels. This methodology requires:

1. Establishing partnerships with EMBs (first initiated in South Africa with the partnership formed with the IEC in 1999).


3. Consultation with political parties (usually through the EMB).

This methodology was used extensively during the 2005 referendum and the 2006 elections in the DRC, working through some 3000 mediators deployed on the ground. The mediators were involved in thousands of cases that had the potential to derail the electoral process, for example, addressing cases where voters were prevented from voting, polling agents refused to count votes, there was denial of entry to polling stations or parties were prevented from campaigning.

A key concern in the establishment of the conflict management panels is achieving agreement between all the relevant stakeholders when identifying panellists. Practice shows the importance of collaboration with political parties through party liaison committees as well as with security sector actors, civil society and faith-based organizations. Other concerns include the design of appropriate material, the provision of relevant training, the availability of panellists and coordination of deployment.

The roles undertaken by the panels include:

- Acting as a resource for the EMB;
- Acting as an early warning signal; and
- Engaging in mediation on post-election issues.
EISA’s resources include qualified facilitators, knowledge resources in fields such as law and mediation, and the ability to act as an effective coordination mechanism.

![Diagram](image_url)

**Figure 4: EISA - Lessons Learnt**

See Appendix III for EISA’s analysis of country data on post-election disputes.

### 3.2. Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico

Presented by Manuel Carrillo, Chief of Staff for International Affairs, IFE

#### INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE

The Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico is the EMB responsible for organizing and overseeing federal elections in Mexico. The institute is a non-partisan organization founded on the principles of ameliorating Mexican democracy by encouraging electoral participation among Mexican citizens, promoting peaceful and periodic elections and corroborating the legitimacy of election outcomes.

As a partner of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, IFE spearheaded the campaign to launch the ACE website in Spanish. By promoting ACE as well as contributing research and support, IFE continues to be a significant collaborator on the ACE team.

The Mexican experience provides an understanding of election-related violence in the context of economic polarization, the weakening of public institutions, high crime rates and increasing public security concerns. Because of the context of social turmoil in which
elections take place, Mexicans have put in place strategies to aid the organization of peaceful elections and protect the integrity of electoral processes and their results.

One year before the 2009 elections, organized crime groups attacked the civil society sector with the aim of creating uncertainty and fear. Such incidents led IFE to put in place a general strategy to prevent possible attacks on civilians and protect political actors. The axis of this strategy was the creation of a political-electoral information system to allow IFE to make decisions in order to minimize the risks related to the organization and preparation of the election, and to protect the 77 million potential voters who were due to go to the polls on 5 July 2009.

IFE’s presentation included:

- an outline of its strategic design;
- information on the main elements which guided institutional action; and
- details of the actions taken to minimize risks and dissuade possible attacks on citizens, political parties and the facilities where elections would take place.

IFE’s Mechanisms of Electoral Violence Prevention has two components: an information system and a scenario analysis or ‘Security and Elections Programme’.

**Information system**

The system examines six main variables: drug trafficking, murders, robbery, kidnapping, poverty and electoral complexity. These variables are examined for each state in Mexico and a level of risk is assigned to each variable using colour codes: red for high, yellow for medium and orange for low. The aggregated values for the individual state produce a State Risk Index, which allows topographical risk mapping (see figures 5 and 6).

**Scenario analysis: Security and elections Programme**

This programme brings together a taskforce composed of security sector actors (including the army, the navy, and Public Security organizations), communication and infrastructure agencies (including power supply, telecommunications and roads...
infrastructure), intelligence systems and local government. The scenario analysis programme has three main components:

1. Environment and sanitation: addressing natural disasters, epidemics, and seismic and volcanic threats;
2. Logistics and supply: addressing possible threats to facilities and infrastructure; and

3.3. **Fundación Grupo Método**  
Presented by **Dr. Luis Jorge Garay**

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<tr>
<td>Fundacion Grupo Metodo (Metodo) is a social network of teams of social scientists from around the world. Metodo is a new kind of scientific institution using modern communications tools. The problems of the world do not belong to only one field but transcend sociological, economic, anthropological, biological, aesthetic and technological ambitions. Metodo bases all of its research on applying different areas of human knowledge.</td>
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**Bibliography**

Metodo presented ‘Lessons from the Colombian Experience and its Applicability to Other Socio-political Contexts’. The presentation addressed two main topics:

- Reasons for the use of risk mapping methodologies; and
- The contextual nuances of ‘traditional’ violent conflicts, such as protracted conflicts, the transition to peace, post-conflict environments and new and emerging organized crime.

Two emerging constraints to democratic institutions and processes were addressed: state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration. Both these affect institutions as well as political and electoral processes. State capture and co-opted state reconfiguration can be differentiated, however, by the ways in which each affects democratic institutions. Since state capture and co-opted state reconfiguration are developed through different actions, democratic institutions are affected in different ways. For instance, state capture is mainly developed through bribery while co-opted state reconfiguration is mainly developed through political and electoral agreements between legal and illegal agents. This process, through which political and electoral agreements are established, is defined as instrumental capture of political parties (Garay and De León-Beltrán, 2009).
In this regard, the Social Networks Analysis methodology has valuable potential to determine whether state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration is affecting political and electoral processes. This is possible because the quantitative analysis of social networks allows the classification and quantification of the social relations and agreements established within a state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration process (see figure 7).

![Figure 7: Concentrations of social relations: Criminal organizations affecting political and electoral processes in Mexico and Colombia](image)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Social Relations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political and administrative agreement</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct bribes to obtain information and protection</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials of law enforcing agencies providing information and protection</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements to create private armies</td>
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Figure 7: Concentrations of social relations: Criminal organizations affecting political and electoral processes in Mexico and Colombia

Given the above research, Metodo aims to enrich existing risk mapping models by addressing the following methodological questions:

- How to account for emerging processes that access and reshape the state, political processes and institutions (i.e. Instrumental Capture of Political Institutions)?
- How to measure the extent of their influence?
- How to translate such processes into risk maps?

In this sense, Metodo is currently developing methodologies to enable the use of social network analysis to create political, electoral and crime-related risk maps.

The concept of co-opted state reconfiguration allows the political, electoral and criminal dimensions of a social situation to be analysed in a single conceptual framework. In
addition, social network analysis can identify the risk of an electoral process being affected by state capture or a co-opted state reconfiguration process, and the level at which democratic institutions are being affected by each of these processes can be determined. In this sense, the quantitative analysis of social networks allows an identification of the administrative levels that are being affected. This is possible because the social networks methodology allows for the identification and quantification of those legal and illegal agents that are participating in the state capture or co-opted state reconfiguration process.

3.4. United Nations Policy, Planning and Mediation Support Unit

UN conflict prevention and crisis response options for election-related violence: Overview of methodology and some lessons

Presented by Adrian Morrice, Policy, Planning and Mediation Support Unit

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<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Policy Planning Unit</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DPA Core Mandates:</strong> Monitoring and assessing global political developments; advising the United Nations Secretary-General on actions that could advance the cause of peace; providing support and guidance to UN peace envoys and political and peacebuilding field missions; serving member states through electoral assistance and supporting the Security Council and other UN bodies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DPA:</strong> There are approximately 200 staff at Headquarters, Regional Divisions and the Electoral Assistance Division who provide support to intergovernmental bodies, policy planning and mediation support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DPA Field Missions:</strong> Diverse types of mission, including political missions and peacebuilding offices (e.g. UNMIN, UNAMI, BONUCA, UNSCO, UNSCOL, UNOGBIS, UNPOS, etc.); Regional Offices (e.g. UNOWA, UNRCCA); Investigative Offices (e.g. CICIG) of different duration, size and structure depending on country need and UN body mandates. Also works in many other countries without missions, supporting mediation efforts, good offices, prevention and electoral assistance.</td>
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The UN peace and security architecture, its laws, norms, institutions and global membership has a long history of dealing with the challenge of election-related violence. Addressing this issue is only one reason for the existence and application of this architecture.

The UN Policy, Planning and Mediation Support Unit presented a ‘Menu of UN options to prevent and resolve violent conflict’. Among the prevailing features of the global environment are: an overall reduction in war (in that more wars have ended than new ones begun), approximately 40 per cent of countries return to war within a decade, and UN engagement contributes to assisting countries attain and sustainable peace.

Member state-regulated tools, systems and practices governed by the UN Charter prevent, mediate and seek to resolve interstate and intra-state violent conflicts. Action is generated by the General Assembly and, in particular, the Security Council. In the past 60 years, the UN’s legislative bodies have developed additional capacities and a division of labour of sorts for UN bodies, departments, funds, programmes and agencies to work on their behalf (e.g. the UNDP, Peacebuilding Support Office). In most cases, the responsibility to lead a crisis response is with the Security Council and, delegated by the Secretary-General, the two lead departments - the DPA and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations - ensure a system-wide UN and often international response. In settings where the Security Council is not involved, many of the UN’s crisis response capabilities are still frequently employed.

The UN uses a flexible methodology to be effective in continuing to build international, regional, national and local capacities for conflict prevention and resolution. Elements of this methodology are:

- **Early warning**: an overview of 23 UN system, aid agency, academic/NGO, quantitative and academic/NGO qualitative systems was provided.
- **Conflict prevention**: upstream action can be effective if it is smart and timely. It can be difficult to precisely identify when an action is in response to an already emerging conflict or to prevent new conflict or a relapse into conflict or crisis. All rely on the cooperation of the state. Early prevention may therefore give rise to sovereignty issues. The UN has a menu of tools available in all fields of conflict prevention, for example, political, security, legal, developmental and human rights. These can be deployed either together or separately but, in

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10 See Article 1, The Purposes of the United Nations are to maintain international peace and security.
general, would be engaged in partnership with others. They should form part of a broader effort to address the root causes of the threat of a return to, or new, violence. One specific tool is the UN Framework Team, the aim of which is to prevent pre-election violence.

- Mediation: Similarly, there has been increased attention and investment in professionalizing mediation efforts when a violent conflict has erupted or threatens to erupt. A new mandate to strengthen the UN’s and other organizations’ mediation capacities was provided by the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.¹¹ More recently, ten lessons were identified in the Secretary-General’s report Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities (S/2009/189), including on resolving disputes in a timely manner, managing spoilers and strengthening regional, national and local capacity for conflict resolution. In the context of the risks of electoral violence, all ten of the areas are relevant, and more attention is being paid to engagement during the implementation of peace agreements and their successor negotiations. DPA’s mediation support unit and its standby team of mediation experts provided support to over 19 peace processes in 2009, and it maintains a repository of knowledge on mediation in a library of peace agreements and guidance for mediators on the peacemaker website.¹²

- Peacebuilding: In 2005 a joint Security Council / General Assembly resolution (A/60/180 and S/2005/1645) added three new pieces to the existing peacebuilding architecture: the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office. From these bodies integrated peacebuilding strategies have emerged, which seek to identify the highest priority actions that national and international actors believe must be

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addressed in order to achieve sustainable peace over time (e.g. peace and security, humanitarian and development actions). In 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to review the UN’s collective efforts, reflected in his report Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304).

- Peace operations, peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions: Generally established under Article 29, and mandated by Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has a range of crisis response options.13

Some emerging lessons from the methodology and for election-related violence

- Early action to prevent election-related violence is often more important than early warning.
- Holistic and flexible peacebuilding strategies are needed to provide comprehensive support for a sustainable peace. Furthermore, there is a need for an interdisciplinary approach to preventing electoral violence (see figure 8)
- The UN is increasingly mandated to coordinate an international peacebuilding response or to support national actors to forge their own. Investment is well spent on processes that can shape consensus and generate a shared understanding of a crisis or conflict and its causes, for example, in mediation processes and their implementation and verification mechanisms, Groups of Friends, national and subnational dialogue and facilitation, transitional justice mechanisms (Truth and Reconciliation Commissions), and designing compacts between actors (e.g. the Iraq and Afghanistan Compacts, the Sierra Leone Agenda for Change and the UN Vision).

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13 An outline includes: Blue-helmet multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, e.g. in the DRC (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Timor Leste (UNMIT); Political and peacebuilding missions in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Central African Republic (BONUCA) and Guinea-Bissau (UNOGIBIS), and a potentially emerging type in Nepal (UNMIN); Iraq (UNAMI) and Afghanistan (UNAMA), which are multidimensional political missions with peacekeeping stabilization operations conducted by others; and the Secretary-General’s envoys and smaller political offices, e.g. Myanmar, Middle East; and Regional prevention offices, West Africa (UNOWA) and Central Asia (UNRCCA)
There is a need to design smart electoral and preventive engagements. There have been innovative hybrid technical and political engagements from legitimate international and regional actors in which early electoral assistance is mixed with political support, good offices and preventive diplomacy either when early warning indicators suggest probable violence (e.g. in Bangladesh and the Maldives) or when responding to such violence (e.g. in Kenya). Another avenue is protecting electoral integrity through verification.\textsuperscript{14}

The electoral cycle approach (see figure 9) could be useful if used with other tools from other communities. By itself it is only a generic two-dimensional diagram, but if accompanied by prevention, mediation and security sector planning tools in an interdisciplinary approach, it could aid strategy development to analyse and address electoral conflict factors, and locate electoral assistance within a broader peacebuilding framework.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure9.png}
\caption{An inter-disciplinary approach: Electoral Assistance + Conflict Prevention + Mediation + Security Sector Reform + Rule of Law, etc}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{14} E.g. verification of elections in Timor-Leste \textit{S/RES/1704(2006)} and Cote D’Ivoire through the UN High Representative for Elections (see \textit{S/RES/1603(2005)}).
- There is asymmetric investment in the military and police aspects of peace operations at the expense of softer measures to enhance the environment for credible and legitimate electoral processes, such as civic education, political dialogue and the acceptance of results.

- There is asymmetric attention paid to delivering an electoral process, compared to the responsibility to help national authorities repeat such processes in the future, for example, through capacity building, the use of technology and of transparent and sustainable electoral assistance.

3.5. United Nations Development Programme

INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE

While it is true that elections alone do not equal democracy, the act of freely casting a secret ballot remains an enduring image and feature of democratic life. UNDP is concerned with achieving a balance between supporting the ‘act of voting’ as exemplified by short-term, event-specific election assistance, and supporting the longer-term electoral systems and processes that help to sustain democratic principles throughout societies and their institutions. To this end, UNDP works to promote sustainable and transparent electoral processes and institutions that allow all citizens to elect their representatives freely and hold them accountable for their results.

More specifically, UNDP works with programme countries and partners, both national and international, to help ensure:

- that legal and institutional frameworks are in place that enable free, fair, transparent and sustainable elections at all levels;

- The conduct of voter and civic education on democratic rights and responsibilities;

- that electoral assistance is coordinated; and

- that women’s participation in elections as voters and candidates is increased.

UNDP provided two presentations: (i) Elections and conflict prevention: A guide to analysis, planning and programming; and (ii) Preventing electoral violence.
Elections and conflict prevention: A guide to analysis, planning and programming

Presented by Siphosami Malunga, Democratic Governance Practice Team Leader, UNDP Regional Service Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa

UNDP presented its handbook Election and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming (the Guide) which was published in August 2009. The primary authors are Timothy Sisk (University of Denver) and Chris Spies (a practitioner in the field of conflict management). Other contributors are current and former UN and UNDP elections staff and global elections experts. The Guide is based on practical experience and was written for an audience of practitioners in the fields of governance and elections. The Guide is envisaged as a tool for analysis, planning and programming for the mitigation of electoral violence.

The Guide focuses on elections analysis, planning and programming strategies which can help prevent election-related conflict and violence.

Analysis

The section on analysis identifies indicators and potential causes of electoral violence. The context includes an analysis of process factors, relationship factors, political factors, the media, administrative inadequacies, corruption, and security and policing.

Strategic Planning

The section on strategic planning describes how, with proper planning, conflict prevention strategies can be ‘mainstreamed’ into international election assistance through a coordinated approach to elections, democracy, governance, human rights, gender and poverty reduction.

Another aspect of mainstreaming discussed is the importance of working in a coordinated manner with all the relevant actors dealing with electoral assistance and related issues, including those supporting election-related institutions and groups such as the judiciary, legislatures, the police and civil society.

Programming

The programming section describes and gives examples of types of external assistance that have been effective at mitigating election-related violence. It explains how building social cohesion – a sense of belonging by all groups – can be a critical element of successful programmes to prevent a resort to or the resumption of violence. The section considers how programmes such as voter education, workshops for political parties and training for stakeholders can be used as vehicles for conciliation and conflict prevention.
It outlines the importance of involving and supporting local civil society organizations in their conflict prevention efforts and recognizes that these actors are often better placed to act effectively than the international community. Other types of electoral assistance programming that can be effective in mitigating conflict are also examined, including: (i) reform of constitutional and legal frameworks; (ii) strengthening and building the capacity of EMBs; (iii) providing appropriate training and support for the police or other services involved in election security; (iv) election monitoring, both domestic and international; and (v) election dispute resolution.

Lessons Learned

Section five of the Guide outlines some of the many lessons learned from UNDP’s extensive experience in situations of election-related conflict. These include:

- the need to build trust among key players;
- the importance of developing an electoral system that has broad support among competing parties and candidates;
- the critical role that local ownership and local stakeholders play in successful violence prevention efforts;
- the need to involve a range of key constituencies and centres of influence, including the media, the security services, political parties, civil society leaders and others, in programmes designed to prevent conflict;
- the need to build trust among key players; and
- the importance of developing an electoral system that has broad support among competing parties and candidates.

Preventing Electoral Violence

Presentation by Lawrence Lachmansingh, contributor to Election and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming

This presentation was made in conjunction with the above presentation and focused on practical aspects, lessons learned and a case study on election violence prevention.

Lessons learned in preventing electoral violence

Involving and engaging key constituencies: in programmes to prevent conflict, including the involvement of a range of key constituencies and centres of influence such as the media, the security services, political parties and civil society leaders.

Building trust: Building trust among key players is essential to the prevention of violence.

The role of the electoral system: It is important to develop an electoral system that has broad support among competing parties and candidates.
Local ownership and involvement: Internationally driven processes may harm the prospects for sustainability and effectiveness.

UNDP’s unique role: UNDP often plays a critical role because of its perceived neutrality, coordination capacities, long-term presence and ability to establish key relationships with a variety of stakeholders.

In addition to the above, programmes designed to prevent electoral violence need to take the following into consideration:

1. using ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches;
2. the ‘how’ is as important as the ‘what’;
3. cover pre- and post-election periods.

Reflecting on the Peace Practice Programme Analysis Tool

The arrows in the figure below reflect the findings on the importance of transferring impact among the quadrants. Wherever an organization’s particular project is located on this Matrix (in terms of work targets and levels), it needs to plan mechanisms for transferring project effects or extending efforts into other quadrants. Who else needs to be affected, at what level, in order to produce significant change?

These insights do not suggest that a single agency must necessarily conduct programmes in all quadrants of the Matrix simultaneously. An agency’s programme may evolve over time to move from one quadrant to another. Most programmes do not and cannot do everything at once. In many cases, programmes can remain in one cell and develop opportunities for cooperation and/ or coordination of efforts with other agencies working in different areas in order to magnify impacts. How these connections are best made will, of course, vary from context to context.

Guyana: A case study

1. Elections in 2006: work began in 2002 and is ongoing.

2. Use of conflict transformation methodology
   a. shift paradigms;
   b. promote relationships;
   c. assure ownership.

3. Complement long-term focus with short-term/medium-term initiatives around the election;

4. Long term: dialogue, conflict transformation training, youth/community projects;

5. Short term/medium term: media/party codes of conduct, monitoring, election observation, EMB technical assistance.

3.6. International IDEA
Presented by Sead Alihodzic, Programme Officer, Electoral Processes

INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE

International IDEA is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. IDEA works in the fields of elections, constitution building, political parties, democracy and development, women’s political empowerment and state of democracy assessments. Through these fields, International IDEA provides comparative knowledge resources and assistance to political actors in reforming democratic institutions and processes, and influences democracy building policies. Guided by its mandate and strategy, International IDEA has addressed the democracy-violent conflict nexus, including more specifically election-related violence, in several publications and projects. These include:

- Knowledge resources:
  - Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook (publication forthcoming)
  - Democracy, Conflict and Human Security; Pursing Peace in the 21st century and further readings (2006)
  - Reconciliation after Violent Conflict (2003)

Building on its research and knowledge resources, IDEA is currently in the process of developing new tools to deal with the phenomenon of election-related violence. These include:
  - Early warning and response management
  - Risk mapping

- Policy:
  - Effective electoral assistance
  - Effective political party assistance (currently under development).
International IDEA presented developments on its concept of an early warning tool designed for the mitigation and management of election-related conflict and violence. It is envisaged that the tool could serve multiple purposes, such as providing early warning for election-related violence, building capacities for preventing and mitigating election-related violence and enhancing users’ understanding of relevant trends in order to assist them to make informed choices. It is envisaged that the tool will both stand alone and fit into existing systems used to prevent and mitigate violence during elections. The tool aims to incorporate the following features:

1. A knowledge resource to increase users’ understanding of election-related conflict and violence;
2. An analytical resource to strengthen users’ capacities to gather and analyse relevant data;
3. A customizable menu allowing tool to be tailored to reflect specific country or regional contexts.

Additionally, the tool may be valuable for:

- focusing electoral assistance on critical areas; and
- allowing a post-election analysis of the data collected.

**Knowledge resource**

The knowledge resource component is of primary importance to the tool. The hypothesis posits that electoral stakeholders, events and processes are factors which, individually or in interaction, may trigger election-related violence. For example, using the electoral cycle components, it is possible to extract over 30 factors which may be relevant for analysis (see figure 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Constitution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Electoral System &amp; Boundaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Electoral Management Bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Codes of Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Budgeting, Funding and Financing</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Election Calendar</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Recruitment and Procurement</td>
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<td>9. Logistic and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Training of Election Officials</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Civic and Voter Education</td>
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<td>12. Voter Information</td>
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<td>13. Voter Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Registration of Candidates and Parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Registration of Observers  
16. Domestic Observers  
17. Media Access  
18. Party Liaison  
19. Party Financing  
20. Breaches and Penalties  
21. Campaign Coordination  
22. Pre voting and OCV  
23. Voting  
24. Vote Counting  
25. Tabulation of Results  
26. Complaints and Appeals  
27. Official Results  
28. Audits and Evaluation  
29. Voters lists update  
30. Legal Reform  
31. Institutional Strengthening and Professional Development  
32. Archiving and Research

| Figure 10: Factors in election-related violence internal to electoral processes |

**Electoral Cycle Approach**

Elections are composed of a number of integrated building blocks, with different stakeholders interacting and influencing each other. Electoral components and stakeholders do not stand alone. They are interdependent, and therefore the breakdown of one aspect (e.g. the collapse of a particular system of voter registration) can negatively affect every other, including human and financial resources, the availability of supplies, costs, transport, training and security, and thus the credibility of the election itself. In turn, if an electoral process suffers from a low level of credibility, this is likely to damage the democratization process and block its overall development objectives.

Each factor of the electoral process is described, taking account of a wide spectrum of theoretical and empirical perspectives, in terms of their potential to trigger or contribute to triggering violent conflict. Once this knowledge is established, assessment indicators, data collection and analysis methodologies are developed for each factor. In addition, the knowledge resource component will include a comprehensive range of actions that can be taken to prevent conflict escalation and/or mitigate violence if it occurs.

**Analytical resource**

Given the dynamics of electoral processes and the multiplicity of actors and events within them, it is often difficult to establish a complete picture of developments and trends. This lack of oversight may lead to poorly informed decisions and has the potential to bring turmoil, rather then ensuring a smooth election process. The tool is designed to offer its user the capacity to gather data systematically and translate such data into quantitative indicators that can be plotted using a two-dimensional diagram (see www.aceproject.org)
Figure 11). This option allows a visual identification of critical segments of the process and of the magnitude of a problem, and identifies trends. This feature also allows for the drawing a resultant line, allowing for the proper weighting of the respective variables.

Customizability

The tool’s global applicability is achieved through customization options which will empower the user to design a country-specific model. This model will take into account factors internal and external to the electoral process according to their relevance in a given country context. This fine-tuning will allow for the geographical focus, and take account of the electoral calendar and the weighting of variables (see Figure 12).
In addition, the tool will provide a unique set of election-related data which will enrich research on election-related conflict and violence and assist with focusing electoral assistance on the necessary areas.

3.7. International Foundation for Electoral Systems

**INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE**

IFES is one of the world’s premiere electoral assistance organizations, with more than 20 years of experience in over 100 countries around the world. Through fieldwork, applied research and advocacy, IFES strives to promote citizen participation, transparency and accountability in political life and civil society. IFES helps improve transparency and efficiency in government institutions by building the management capacity, independence and professionalism of public officials so they can better serve their constituents. IFES’ F. Clifton White Applied Research Center for Democracy and Elections (ARC) generates innovative applied research to enhance the practice of democracy building and to bolster the development of democratic and participatory institutions, processes and cultures. Through its research and outreach activities, ARC seeks to bridge the gap between theories of democratic development and the practical realities of democracy building in order to enrich democracy programming.

IFES provided two presentations:

1) The Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project
2) The Lebanese Election Violence Risk Assessment (LEVRA) project

**Election Violence Education and Resolution project**

Presented by Gabrielle Bardall, Research Officer, F. Clifton White Center for Applied Research for Democracy and Governance

IFES initiated the EVER Project in 2003 in order to address the global problem of election-related violence. As of October 2009, the project has been implemented in Bangladesh (Oct. 2006 to Jan. 2007, Aug. 2008 to Jan. 2009); East Timor (May to Sept. 2007); Ghana (Oct. 2004 to Jan. 2005); Guyana (June to Oct. 2006); Aceh, Indonesia (Feb. 2009 to May 2009); Iraq (Aug. 2004 to Apr. 2006); Kyrgyzstan (June to Dec. 2005); Liberia (June to Dec. 2005); Nepal (Jan. to Aug. 2007; Apr. 09 to Oct. 2009); Nigeria (2006 to May 2007); Pakistan (Mar. 2009 to Oct. 2010); Sierra Leone (Jan. to Aug. 2007).
as political parties, EMBs, the police and military authorities to identify, monitor and mitigate election-related violence.

EVER has five components:

1. Conflict mapping: the systematic gathering and assessment of information, and graphical and analytical representations of potential and ongoing conflict in a given area.

2. Conflict monitoring and reporting: IFES forms partnerships with CSOs to train community-based monitors to collect and document information on election-related violence, peace initiatives and tension levels, that is, the potential for violence, in specific geographic areas. Monitors build local relationships to collect data that are then analysed by the EVER team. The team produces regular reports and ‘hot spot’ alerts in combination with calls for action in response to observed patterns of violence or tension.

3. Advising on and supporting mitigation strategies: EVER has the capacity to help target a range of mitigation strategies that make a difference to the rate of election-related violence. EVER has supported local partners in a variety of activities.

   - providing micro-grants for community peace projects;
   - organizing stakeholder workshops to review data and identify conflict and mitigation strategies;
   - advising and educating specific stakeholders on their role in reducing election-related violence;
   - conflict resolution training;
   - sharing other country experiences and best practices in mitigation.

![Picture 13 EVER Monitoring Methodology](image)

4. Training on Conflict Resolution and Rapid Response: as in Sierra Leone where IFES supported training for the Political Party Registration Committee and its District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees on how to identify, facilitate and respond to political disputes.
5. Civil Society Capacity Building and Network Building provides a foundation for the future work of IFES partners in their own countries. Beyond skills to conduct the activities noted above, IFES supports the transfer of skills for the improvement of operational structures, network building, monitoring and evaluation, and data entry and analysis.

Success stories:
- In Iraq and Nigeria, networks that were formed to monitor election-related violence have remained in place between elections and developed a presence as CSOs.
- In Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and Timor-Leste, the EVER monitoring methodology created a foundation for ongoing conflict monitoring or early warning systems.
- In Guyana, the 2006 EVER programme was part of unprecedented civil society pressure against violence in the post-election period, resulting in politicians citing EVER reports and making statements to warn supporters against using violence. The election was the first in over a decade to take place without widespread riots and violence.

EVER findings on timing
The number of incidents increases through the pre-election period as election day approaches.

EVER findings on perpetrators
Political party supporters tend to be involved as perpetrators in a large percentage of incidents of election violence.

Some lessons learned
- Monitoring is mitigation - public exposure can act as a deterrent.
- Political party leaders, especially at the local level, are key partners in reducing violence.
- Reporting objective information is invaluable, and feeds information-based advocacy against violence.
- A community-based approach is empowering.
- Increased information sharing is essential.

Lessons learned for election violence programming
- Election-related violence monitoring and mitigation are process centred and should not be event centred.
- Capacity building is an investment between elections to improve sustainability and the transfer of skills.
- Mitigation such as CSO network support, multi-stakeholder dialogues, public education and conflict monitoring are between-election programmes.

EVER continues to develop tools that can work hand in hand with monitoring in order to systematically identify underlying factors that precipitate election-related violence and conflict. Such tools focus on the role of the election process and the electoral system in exacerbating electoral conflict, conflict mapping to identify key stress points, the role of money in political processes and its relationship to electoral violence, and analyses of mitigation strategies.

The EVER programme’s approach and findings are described in Managing Election Violence: The IFES EVER Program by L. Kammerud.

Lebanese Election Violence Risk Assessment project

Presented by Richard Chambers, Chief of Party, LEVRA project

In 2009, IFES provided technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in order to:

- support the performance of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in its conduct of the 2009 parliamentary elections; and
- prepare a solid foundation for the effective and sustainable transfer of responsibilities to the IEC for the 2010 municipal elections and future elections.

The programme is based on a needs identification process within the MOI, which was undertaken by IFES from January 2008. IFES initiated the LEVRA project to review the security environment for elections.

The objectives of LEVRA were:

- to establish an objective, accurate and ongoing tool for assessing the risk of violence for the June 2009 parliamentary elections;
- to assess, map and track the level of risk in each of the 26 electoral districts in order to identify hot spots;
- to promote the use of risk assessments as an early warning mechanism so that effective preventative measures against violence can be taken;
- to assist the MOI to integrate risk assessment tools into its security planning for elections;
- to reduce the risk of violent incidents and wider conflict during the 2009 elections.

![Diagram: The LEVRA Risk Assessment Cycle](Image)
LEVRA focused on three risk factors for electoral violence in Lebanon: the risk of political violence, the risk of confessional violence and the risk of electoral violence. The risk assessment methodology involved:

- analysing data that can indicate the risk of political, confessional or electoral violence in a district;
- assessing whether data indicate a risk of violence in that district;
- ensuring that assessments are shared with stakeholders;
- assisting stakeholders to take measures to decrease the risk;
- analysing data that indicate any increase or decrease in the risk of violence.

The project has developed risk indicators for each of the three potential types of violence. This has allowed for the creation of a risk matrix for the cross-tabulation of risks in different geographical regions of Lebanon (see Figure 17).

In addition to the snapshot allocation of risk levels, the LEVRA methodology extends to an ongoing assessment that monitors all security incidents and political or electoral developments. Where data analysis indicates an increased risk of violence in a district, the risk assessment is changed to reflect the new circumstance (see Figure 18).

The LEVRA Project has also developed advanced mapping tools for the various indicators and factors and incident maps at the national, regional and constituency levels are produced. These maps plot incidents of violence in a given geographical area, distinguishing between the intensity and impact (high-severity incidents, medium-severity
incidents, low-severity incidents, no material impact). The Electoral Traffic Map identifies the main arterial routes carrying voters, which are known as traffic hot spots.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Picture 18: The LEVRA Risk Assessment Process**

**Uses for assessments**

All analysis was made available in English and Arabic and the risk assessment was placed on a secure website, published and distributed to interested stakeholders. In addition, a link was established between the MOI and Scotland Yard, London, to discuss security planning strategies and the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the MOI Security Plan and Risk Assessment. In line with these strategies, the MOI deployed additional security officers to hot spots and drafted a code of ethics between candidates and political parties, which was endorsed by the President. As a result of these actions, there was a marked decrease in the number of violent incidents.

**Lessons learned**

- LEVRA integrated relevant contextual considerations as well as security incidents to identify appropriate levels of risk.
- The methodology can be used to indicate the risk of violence as well as other risks to electoral credibility, such as fraud, and for infrastructural planning, such as traffic and polling station location.
- The methodology needs more nuance, for example, making connections between ‘increased competition’ and ‘increased risk’, and there is no differentiation between the risk of different types of violence.
- LEVRA acted as the common risk assessment methodology and information source for all the different conflict prevention strategies and many different beneficiaries.

Overall, there is an acknowledgement that risk assessments need to be followed up, among other things, by an integrated implementation of conflict prevention strategies in hot spots, including appropriate security plans, neutral security agencies, trained security officials and a code of ethics.
### INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE

IDASA is an independent public interest organization committed to promoting sustainable democracy based on active citizenship, democratic institutions and social justice. IDASA is a recognized public interest organization in Africa and it maintains international links with many similar organizations through the world movement for democracy.

Active Citizenship: One of IDASA’s main tenets of consolidating democracy involves the education of citizens and encouragement of their participation in democratic processes. Before the advent of democracy in South Africa, IDASA played a critical role in creating mechanisms for people to participate in discussion and debate around the transformation process. This early work included informal bridge-building initiatives involving schools, community organizations, religious bodies and CSOs. IDASA also helped to establish and facilitate a number of more formal pre-democracy structures through which citizens and leaders could participate in decision-making around transition in key areas, including policing and local government. The primary programme through which citizen participation is now promoted is the Community and Citizen Empowerment Programme, which encompasses work on citizen leadership, institutional capacity building and dialogue processes.

IDASA’s organizational presentation highlighted four important dimensions for the management and mitigation of election-related conflict and violence:

1) **Need to Know**

The first dimension of conflict management and mitigation addresses the importance of relevant knowledge. The key ‘need to know points’ include:

- Knowledge of where the conflict is (involves geographical mapping);
- Knowledge of what the conflict is about (requires an analysis of historical causes/trigger);
- Knowledge of who the primary actors are (involves stakeholder mapping action);
- Specific understanding of the conflict and how it specifically relates to the heightened political environment (issue based: election-centric);
- Need to look at multidimensional approaches to dealing with the conflict(s) before they escalate into violence or manage them when they do (see Figure 18);

- Need to know local approaches of peacebuilding groups/ agencies/ communities/ and so on, as well as those of international agencies working in the area;

- Regular updates on events, but remaining vigilant about the full terrain.

![Figure 19: Time function: Addressing the problem at different points in time](image)

2) Changing lenses

The second dimension relates to the notion of ‘changing lenses’, which implies that election practitioners must start looking at the election processes through the lenses of peace practitioners. The failure to recognize how electoral processes affect existing conflicts and increase prospects for violent outbreaks can significantly contribute to violent outcomes.

3) Knowledge of limitations

The third dimension relates to the ‘knowledge of limitations’. The ability to mitigate or manage election-related conflict before it escalates into violence creates the clearly defined parameters within which we function. The challenge is to design a process, in a given heightened political context, that can provide information and introduce response mechanisms that can ensure elections are credible from a peace perspective. From a conflict theory perspective, although still very initial thoughts, there is a need to maintain a level of stability or interventions to stabilize in a peaceful manner an otherwise evolving destructive terrain that can derail the election process.

4) Tool framing

The fourth dimension relates to ‘tool framing’. Electoral competition implies implicit and explicit engagement by political actors in order to gain political space in the electoral process. This competition for political space generates conflicts of interests, which could ultimately be healthy or unhealthy. Electoral competitions may provide opportunities for positive change or assume violent dimensions. Therefore, two things need to be addressed when respective tools are set:
1) The intervention is time bound, limited to a specific issue and if there are lasting effects as a result of these interventions, they are in the first instance unintentional.

2) There is an ever present ethical dilemma: the fine line between undermining the aspirations of the people and consciously or unconsciously providing legitimacy to a flawed and compromised process.

Figure 20 conceptually locates the framing tool within the track two trajectory because it is argued that this track is for dealing with conflict at the non-state level.

Figure 20: IDASA - Different Approaches to Resolve Conflict
Figure 21 outlines a tool for tracking and responding to conflict.

Figure 21: IDASA - Information Flow Chart
4. Other Tools and Methodologies in Managing and Mitigating Election-Related Conflict and Violence

As is noted above, this section outlines tools that were not presented at the workshop but are known to International IDEA and relevant to the topic of election-related violence. This list however is not exhaustive.

4.1. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework: West African States\textsuperscript{17}

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<tr>
<td>The Economic Community of West African States is a regional group of 15 countries, founded in 1975. Its mission is to promote economic integration in ‘all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters...’ . The institutions of ECOWAS are: (i) the Commission; (ii) the Community of Parliament (iii) the Community Court of Justice; and (iv) the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), usually known as the Fund. The ECOWAS Commission and the Fund are the two main institutions designed to implement policies, pursue a number of programmes and carry out development projects in member states. Such projects include intra-community road construction and telecommunications and agricultural, energy and water resources development.</td>
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The ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (the Mechanism) was enacted on 10 December 1999.

ECOWAS has also created various conflict prevention, peace building and resolution mechanisms including the Early Warning System, the Mediation and Security Council, Offices of the Special Representative, the Council of the Wise and Special Mediators. As a whole, these make up the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which serves as a ‘reference for the ECOWAS system and Member States in their efforts to strengthen human security in the region’ (ECPF, p.6).

\textsuperscript{17} This report was written with reference to ‘The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework’, available at <http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf>, and the ECOWAS homepage, see <http://www.comm.ecowas.int>.
The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework includes:

a) A comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategy that enables the ECOWAS system and member states to draw on human and financial resources at the regional (including civil society and the private sector) and international levels in their efforts to creatively transform conflict.

b) A guide for enhancing cohesion and synergy between relevant ECOWAS departments on conflict prevention initiatives in order to maximize outcomes and ensure a more active and operational posture on conflict prevention and sustained post-conflict reconstruction from the ECOWAS system and its member states. Within the ECOWAS Commission, it is the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) that has primary responsibility for operational conflict prevention policy and initiatives. However, the cross-cutting nature of conflict issues means that PAPS has to work in close collaboration with other departments, such as the Human Development and Gender, Communication and Legal departments.

c) A reference for developing process-based cooperation with regional and international stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, African Regional Economic Communities and the AU and UN systems, as well as development partners, on conflict prevention and peacebuilding around concrete interventions. (see the ECPF, p.7)

According to the ECPF, ‘Conflict prevention strategies may distinguish between operational prevention (measures applicable in the face of imminent crisis) and structural prevention (measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not re-occur). The emphasis is not on preventing conflict per se (conflict being a natural consequence of change) but in halting its descent into violence’.

Early warning is among the 14 components of the ECPF. Its objective is to ‘furnish incident and trend reports on peace and security, as well as real-time preventive response options, to ECOWAS policy makers to ensure predictability and facilitate interventions to avert, defuse or creatively transform acute situations of conflict, instability, disruptions and disasters’ (see the ECPF, p.16) It uses four ‘Zonal Bureaux’, located in Banjul (Gambia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Monrovia (Liberia) and Cotonou (Benin), to gather specific conflict-related information. Information surrounding predetermined factors and possible means of prevention within the respective zone is filtered up to the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) located in Abuja, where the President of the Commission sits. In July 2006, the task of translating narratives into empirical evidence became further systematized with the introduction of ECOWARN software.
4.2. Election Commission of India Vulnerability Mapping Tool

**INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE**

India is a socialist, secular, democratic republic and the largest democracy in the world. The modern Indian nation state came into existence on 15 August 1947. Since then, free and fair elections have been held at regular intervals according to the principles enshrined in the constitution, and the electoral laws and system.

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is a permanent Constitutional Body. It was established in accordance with the Indian Constitution on 25 January 1950. The constitution has vested in the Election Commission of India the superintendence, direction and control of the entire process for the conduct of elections to Parliament, the Legislature of every state and the offices of President and Vice-President of India.

In recent years the Election Commission of India has been developing a Vulnerability Mapping Tool (VMT) to give practitioners an indication of where trouble could arise during the electoral process, and in particular which areas might be vulnerable to disruption during election day. The VMT was designed to ensure that, despite all the highly complex socio-economical circumstances and caste-based exclusions, all voters are able to exercise their democratic rights without intimidation and fear. During the implementation process, however, it became evident that the VMT had outgrown its initial ambition of protecting vulnerable populations and become an effective framework for capturing a much wider spectrum of issues which could trigger election-related violence.

In general, the tool allows systematized information sharing between various electoral stakeholders, including the local EMB, the security forces and other actors involved in voting day activities, such as polling station staff. Valuable information is gathered, including the identities of individuals known to the security forces and those who, for various reasons, are suspected of wanting to cause trouble on election day.

Questions addressed by the Police, District Electoral Officers and District Magistrates include:

1. Are there any vulnerable points in the district? If yes:

2. Who are the people associated with causing trouble in the vulnerable districts?

3. What measures should be taken to limit the disturbance?

Immediate steps taken to address the above questions include identifying a local police officer to keep track of those persons identified as potential troublemakers.

Information gathered in relation to these questions and other key issues is compiled on history sheets, which identify trends of disturbance over five to 10 years. In addition, as part of an overall Communications Plan that is integral to the VMT, new information is disseminated to civil and state actors through state control rooms, and the most critical information eventually relayed up to the Chief Election Commissioner. The
Communications Plan includes the sharing of information through a variety of means, such as fax, telephone and the Internet. In areas where such technology does not exist, ‘runners’ are used to bring information from one place to another.

Although the tool primarily focuses on caste issues, it is widely acknowledged that it can be customized to fit other problem areas or conflict points that could erupt on election day. In addition to the VMT, five practices are undertaken in many Indian states to increase the transparency and safety of elections:

1) the use of voter registration cards with photographic identification;
2) the involvement of political parties/candidates in the process to increase confidence in the elections;
3) the establishment of a communication plan throughout the election period;
4) polling station procedures and set-up involve the presence of micro-observers and videography, that is, recording the inside of the polling station at all times; and
5) cooperation with the security forces.

Overall, election practitioners in India agree that the new systematized approach has helped early detection of impending violence between, for example, different communities (neither of which was vulnerable but each of which fanatically support different political options), helped identify those who have repeatedly created incidents during past elections, allowed timely findings on election boycotts, and so on.

The VMT can identify and punish individuals without attracting political criticism or causing turmoil or obstruction. This is linked to the specifics of the Indian legislation but also the transparency of procedures and the actions of the magistrates and the police.

4.3. Ushahidi: Crowdsourcing Crisis Information

Created in response to the violence that broke out during the 2007 elections in Kenya, Ushahidi is a crowdsourcing software that allows for public input through mobile telephone Short Message Service (SMS) text messages and the Internet. Designed to allow interested parties to collect and distribute information, the tool is a manifestation of citizen journalism which allows for highly customizable use and is available to download free of charge. According to Ushahidi, ‘The core engine is built on the premise that gathering crisis information from the general public provides new insights into events happening in near-real time’. Although Ushahidi is primarily used to collect data relating to crisis situations and incidents of violence – both within the electoral process

18 This section was written based on the Ushahidi website <http://www.ushahidi.com>
and in general - its software has also been used to track medicine stocks in several African countries and to monitor global incidents of infection.

As the software is customizable to various contexts and situations, the factors which are taken into account for each setting vary, as determined by the organization or individual administering the customized platform. Detailed instructions guide new administrators through the steps needed to set up the Ushahidi system.

The two examples below illustrate the possible uses of the Ushahidi platform. The first snapshot shows how the platform was customized to track the conflict in the Eastern Congo. The second shows how Aljazeera adapted the platform for its coverage of the war in the Gaza Strip.

Note that the variables used to track each of the conflict areas vary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Congo Conflict</th>
<th>War in Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>Israeli Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Loss</td>
<td>International Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Assault</td>
<td>Air Strikes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
<td>Announcements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Forces</td>
<td>Rocket Attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Looting</td>
<td>Israeli Casualties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Efforts</td>
<td>Palestinian Casualties</td>
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<td>Stats</td>
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<td>Protests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Actions</td>
<td>Twitter Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>Israeli Soldier Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Submitting a report can be done via SMS or the Internet (see Figure 24).

Figure 24: Reporting via sms or internet

Once reports have been submitted, viewers can see the date of submission, location and whether the report has been verified. In addition to adding reports to the website, users are able to receive alerts if a report is submitted within 20 kilometres of their stated location. Those administering the customized Ushahidi platform can decide whether to make information available to the public (some organizations use the tool for internal monitoring processes).

As the team of volunteers primarily works out of Africa, the software has been developed to account for the technical limitations and constraints experienced in their respective countries. This makes the software usable in almost any technological setting, thereby widening its applicability.
4.4 Creative Associates International, Inc.

**INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE**

The Electoral Education and Integrity Programmes of Creative Associates International, Inc. (Creative) address two emerging areas of need in electoral assistance: the forward looking need to develop a new generation of electoral policymakers and practitioners; and the immediate need to prevent and mitigate violence and fraud in the electoral process.

**Electoral education**

This programme provides electoral education to university students to develop a new generation of policymakers and practitioners working in their own country’s EMB or with intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. The programme is operated through a network of universities and institutions called the International Electoral Education Council, and blends experiential learning at EMBs with academic research and normative skills building for university students.

**Electoral integrity**

Creative offers programmes for electoral threat assessment and election security planning with the capacity to organize electoral monitoring and mediation efforts to address potential electoral conflict at the grassroots level. Through its Security Administration for Elections (SAFE) Programme, Creative is developing an Election Security Technical Guidance Handbook, a policy framework and a training module to document challenges and best practices related to electoral conflict prevention, management and mitigation. Creative is also developing programmes supported by its International Electoral Integrity Advisory Council to enhance electoral integrity systems to prevent, detect and mitigate vote fraud and to increase the financial accountability of political stakeholders through vote fraud forensic assessments, legal and regulatory reform, increased internal and external oversight, and enforcement enhancement.

**Electoral security programming**

The USAID Democracy and Governance Office/Elections and Political Processes Division asked Creative develop a Technical Guidance Handbook for democracy and governance (DG) officers on elections and security. This handbook will: (i) document challenges and best practices related to conducting elections in insecure environments, to enhance the technical expertise of USAID DG officers; (ii) identify programming considerations and practical applications for USAID DG officers to use when designing and implementing electoral assistance programmes in insecure environments; and (iii) develop and deliver a set of tools to train the USAID cadre of DG officers on this topic.

Free and fair elections are competitive, outcomes are often unpredictable and confrontation is inherent to the process. Elections may exacerbate conflict rather than
Elections held in an unstable environment may expose the democratic process to manipulation. In countries such as Afghanistan and Sudan, consideration must be given to security issues at each stage of the electoral process, and decisions on the timing, type and level of election must take account of the military, financial and diplomatic resources available to deter worst case spoiler scenarios.

Although academics and development practitioners have been addressing these issues for some years, there is still no clear picture as to when, where, and under what circumstances, elections make matters better or worse in an unstable or insecure environment. In the past ten years, USAID and other donors have become increasingly engaged in elections programming in environments where security sector issues and actors are a key determinant of the outcome of elections. The lessons learned from these experiences, however, are not consistently captured or institutionalized for use in future programming. A more systematic analysis is needed to better understand the impact of the security sector on the electoral process.

The questions that need to be addressed in this analysis include but are not limited to: How do security sector issues relate to the electoral process and its outcome and what preconditions should exist for a free, fair and secure election? What are the appropriate roles and responsibilities of security sector stakeholders and USAID DG officers in a given country context? What are best practices for how these individuals interact and engage with each other in the electoral process? What challenges exist in this relationship? Analysis should include consideration of the electoral environment, election planning, threat analysis and operational needs.

Data and analysis to address these key lines of inquiry will be sought through: (i) a literature review; (ii) semi-structured key informant interviews; (iii) convening a workshop on electoral security to solicit experts’ perspectives; and (iv) conducting three consecutive electoral conflict resolution field assessments. A summary of the data and analysis collected through these methods will be used to prepare the technical handbook. The handbook will guide USAID DG officers and their understanding of how security sector issues relate to the electoral process, the varying roles and responsibilities of security sector actors, and programming considerations in insecure electoral environments.

As part of the handbook, Creative will provide a basic framework, in the form of an appendix or an attached reference sheet or checklist, that identifies key components of an electoral security assessment. This framework for the assessment of electoral security will identify major areas for assessment and a handful of critical questions associated with each. Once completed, the draft framework should enable USAID DG officers to determine the operational security environment for a general election, its component parts and actors, and the key considerations for identifying gaps and weaknesses that might be addressed through international assistance. The draft framework will form the basis for later development of a detailed assessment framework for electoral security.
5. Conclusions and recommendations

The panel discussions examined the possibility of developing a global framework to manage and mitigate election-related violence and conflict. There was broad consensus that rather than a global framework, more achievable objectives to work together towards would be:

- A deeper appreciation and sharing of the global experiences and challenges surrounding elections, conflict and violence beyond that which was discussed at the workshop. Election-related violence cannot be addressed by one community alone, and the burden should not be placed on one or other community – it requires a strategic and interdisciplinary approach;

- A more sober acknowledgement of the limitations of international / regional actions to date in terms of preventing or responding to election-related violence, and a better understanding of where certain strategies have worked;

- A deeper appreciation of the complex set of interactions that exist inside and outside the electoral assistance field between EMBs, political parties, the security forces, governments, international or regional organizations, the media and service providers;

- More mutual understanding, knowledge sharing and coordination among the different communities and other stakeholders working to prevent or respond to election-related violence. The existing ACE electoral knowledge platform could be used as an initial space to continue this dialogue, but equally important is the need to engage other communities that have their own knowledge hubs (DPA Peacemaker; GFN-SSR, etc.).

Key recommendations and suggestions were put forward based on these discussions:

a) Medium and long term

International, regional and national actors should prioritize investment in human capital and political development as part of a broader development and conflict prevention agenda. This should include working in a holistic way with EMBs, political parties, parliaments, security forces, governments, international or regional organizations, CSOs, the media and service providers. While there has been significant international investment in integrated approaches to peacebuilding, democracy building and development in the past five years, this would still require a shift within and between the prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, state-building, democratic governance and development communities because election-related violence is still not being addressed effectively. Therefore, as part of our global efforts to coordinate and integrate holistic conflict prevention, peacebuilding and democracy assistance strategies, we should:

i. Seek to better understand the underlying causes of violence around elections;
ii. Build bridges between, for example, effective electoral, security sector, judiciary, parliamentary and political party assistance, on the one hand; and

iii. Ensure better communication of lessons learning and consensus-building between the different communities of practice, on the other.

b) Short term objectives: 2010

More effective knowledge sharing, coordination and collaboration are needed between the different communities of practice. To this end, recommendations from the seminar highlighted the need for:

Response and analysis

- Determine how to better engage, learn from and influence policymakers (e.g. UN departments, funds programmes and agencies and regional, sub-regional and other multilateral organizations) for more effective assistance to electoral processes, on the one hand, and preventing and responding to election-related violence, on the other. This will require deeper understanding of development cooperation and resource mobilization, and of how to more effectively channel assistance to developing human capital – particularly in terms of leadership for political parties, parliaments, electoral management bodies and security forces as well as how to support the building of more resilient institutions and processes.

- Develop a typology of methods to use to assess, prevent and respond to violent conflict around elections in accordance with different electoral assistance scenarios (protracted conflict and post-conflict environments, transitional societies, emerging democracies, stable democracies, democracies with a high prevalence of organized crime etc.); strengthen existing analytical frameworks and methodologies, such as risk-mapping, early warning systems and illicit network analyses; and make better links between technical, operational, political and security analyses around electoral processes.

- Develop more collaborative approaches to analysing emerging challenges such as ICT and its potential impact on violence-inducing electoral administration and electoral assistance – especially in the delimitation of boundaries, civil/voter registration and media monitoring – as well as on electoral observation and how it can help prevent or mitigate violence; and

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19 For example, use BRIDGE to conduct outreach with other communities to develop integrated face-to-face and distance learning programmes to disseminate existing and future Guides/Handbooks for election-related violence programming. The target groups would be each of the international communities working on election-related violence, as well as EMBs, political parties, parliaments security forces, governments, international/regional organizations, the media and service providers.
how terrorism, organized crime, structural violence and state capture affect electoral processes.

- Determine how to engage the media in a more strategic manner around and between elections in order to address election-related violence.

**Knowledge sharing**

- Build on existing networks as a means of systematizing existing knowledge tools to form one loose network. Although the ACE platform currently has a Focus-on Security, it could be developed further to include an election-related violence dimension, highlighting: a list of issues that can emerge around elections in a given context; the contact details of organizations that are in a position to respond; and a rolling bibliography of analysis, response tools and case studies that already exist in relation to elections and violence. A request could be made, for example, to link and co-post between sites such as ACE, Peacemaker and the GFN-SSR online networks.  

- Share knowledge on where effective risk mapping might have played an important role in preventing/mitigating election-related conflict, for example, in Colombia, Lebanon and Mexico. (There would be no need to share details of the risk maps, but highlighting cases where the process has proved effective could be an opportunity for governments, EMBs or CSOs to share information and approaches with peers, hence the need to bring this type of a workshop to another level and involve relevant ministries, EMBs, security forces, CSOs, and so on.)

- Interact with and educate a wider range of implementers (e.g., EMBs, security services, UN staff, Political Affairs Officers, staff of regional and sub-regional organizations such as the European Commission, staff of the EU member states, staff of other development partners’ organizations, etc.) on different analytical tools and different conflict prevention and response methodologies; ensure a more integrated approach between different implementers during tense electoral processes.

The full document 'IDEA Managing and Mitigating Election-related Conflict and Violence Summary of Conclusions' is available on the International IDEA website.  

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20 www.aceproject.org; www.peacemaker.unlb.org; www.ssronline.org
21 www.idea.int
APPENDIX I: Workshop concept note and agenda

Concept note

“Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election-related Conflict and Violence”

Johannesburg, 28–30 October 2009

Introduction

Elections, while representing an essential feature of representative democracy, are also intrinsically conflict inducing processes; they can render structural issues more visible and consequentially hold great potential for triggering violence. If violence is ignited by the electoral process or perceived to be so, the credibility of democracy can be significantly undermined. This is particularly critical in fragile contexts, notably where violence is protracted or in post-conflict settings since processes such as elections aimed at democratically redistributing power and managing resources can trigger further conflict, lead to instability, and undermine prospects for strengthening democratic institutions and processes.

One way to address the phenomenon of election-related violence is to better understand how exogenous and endogenous factors and situations may lead to violence throughout the electoral cycle. Furthermore, a more coordinated global effort is needed to systematically focus on the causes of election-related violence and to ensure that the design of democratic processes is credible and genuine.

International IDEA is one of the leading global organizations in democracy building mandated by its member states to support sustainable democratic change through comparative knowledge resources, assist reform and influence policies and politics. Through International IDEA’s global reach and regional networks, and its specific expertise in electoral processes and democratic dialogue, the Institute aims to engage in collaboration with organizations working in the area of election-related violent conflict.

One way to address the issue may be through the development of a global framework which combines existing knowledge and practices in preventing, managing and mitigating election-related violence.

In order to initiate and facilitate the development of such a framework and following from initial discussions with counterparts, International IDEA will host a first workshop of experts and practitioners in October.

Overview of International IDEA’s work in the field of elections and conflict

Guided by its mandate and strategy International IDEA has already addressed the democracy-violent conflict nexus, including, more specifically election-related violence, in several publications and projects. These include:
Knowledge resources:
- Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook (publication forthcoming)
- Democracy, Conflict and Human Security; Pursing Peace in the 21st century and further readings (2006)
- Reconciliation after Violent Conflict (2003)

Development of tools:
Building on its research and knowledge resources, IDEA is currently in the process of developing new tools to deal with the phenomenon of election-related violence. These include:
- Early warning and response management
- Risk mapping

Policy:
- Effective Electoral Assistance
- Effective Party Assistance - currently under development

Objectives of the workshop
The workshop will bring together actors working in the fields of elections and conflict. Its objectives will be:

a) to review and share experiences on existing tools and methodologies used to assess and address the risks of violent outbreaks during the electoral cycle, with special emphasis on early warning systems
b) to identify the lessons learned (successes, challenges, obstacles)
c) to examine the potential value and applicability of these tools and methodologies throughout the electoral cycle and their application to different contexts
d) to consider potential synergies between these tools and methodologies (how they could be combined) and how they can potentially be developed into a global framework.
e) to identify and discuss existing policy and guidance frameworks on responding to or preventing election-related violence.

Outputs
- Information gathered from the workshop will initially result in a written report in which topics for further discussion and potential follow-up steps are identified.
- Inter-organizational coordination framework and mechanisms
- Partnerships

Overall expected results
The expected results from the workshop will be:

- A holistic view of the work being done in the field of election-related violence
- The development of a common glossary
- Identification of limitations in the early detection, management of and response to outbreaks of violence within the electoral cycle.
- Identification of potential partnerships/joint projects aimed at combining existing knowledge and practices into a single global knowledge resource/tool for the mitigation of election-related violence
- Development of capacity building/training modules
- Strengthening ongoing cooperation and information sharing among partners through a systematic coordination framework
- Identification of existing policies and ways of influencing policy and practice regarding election-related violence

Methodology

- The workshop will be held in plenary sessions and breakout group sessions
- Presentations will be limited to details of the methodology currently employed by various early warning and risk mapping systems and tools and to the successes and challenges of employing the methodology
- Presentations will be followed by facilitated, interactive discussions and/or breakout sessions to make the most of the experiences and knowledge of participants
- Prior to the workshop, organizations and individuals will be expected to submit a paper (maximum two pages) giving a brief overview of the work they are currently doing with regard to election-related violence
- A summary report including recommendations will be made by a moderator and captured in the final report of the workshop
- The working language will be English

Workshop agenda

Towards a Global Framework for Managing and Mitigating Election-related Conflict and Violence

Johannesburg, 28-30 October 2009

Tuesday, 27 October

Day One

Wednesday, 28 October

08:30 Registration
09:00 Welcoming remarks
   Ambassador Moorad, Regional Director, Africa and the Middle East, International IDEA
09:15 Workshop objectives and key issues
   Rushdi Nackerdien, International IDEA
09:45 Coffee/ Tea
10:15  **Institutional presentations**

Moderator: Santiago Villaveces, International IDEA

Practitioners’ and institutions will present their experiences on using different methodologies and tools to assess risks and responses to election-related violence. Emphasis will be placed on the key questions: What were the design considerations of the methodology? How is the methodology implemented? By whom? What are the challenges? Lessons identified?

10:30 EISA

10:50 Q&A

11:00 Instituto Federal Electoral

11:20 Q&A

11:30 Fundación Grupo Método

11:50 Q&A

12:00 UN Policy, Planning & Mediation Support

12:20 Q&A

12:40 Lunch

14:00  **Workshop one: Factors of electoral conflict and violence external to the electoral cycle**

Participants will join Working Groups to explore factors that are external to the electoral cycle but influence election-related violence. Drawing from the morning’s presentations and personal experiences, the groups will further examine relevant responses. The focus will be on prevention, mitigation and resolution as well as formal and informal stakeholders and processes of conflict management, such as mediation. The analysis should also include a gender-sensitive perspective and take into consideration the concerns of minority groups.

Introduction: Sead Alihodzic

**Group one**

Moderator: Lucien Toulou

Rapporteur: Fanny Chirisa

**Group two**

Moderator: Hiroko Miyamura

Rapporteur: Joe Mavuso
Group three
Moderator: Paul-Simon Handy
Rapporteur: Helen Barnes

Group four
Moderator: Jessica Longwe
Rapporteur: Eddy Kisile Kapula

16:00 Coffee/Tea
16:15 Conclusions from working groups
Presentations by group moderators
Moderator: Peter Aling'o, Institute for Education in Democracy
17:15 Wrap-up and lessons of the day
Rushdi Nackerdien, International IDEA
17:30 End of day one

Day two
Thursday, 29 October

09:00 Welcome
Rushdi Nackerdien, International IDEA
09:10 Institutional presentations - continuation from day one
Moderator: François Grignon, International Crisis Group
09:20 International IDEA
09:40 Q&A
09:50 UNDP
10:20 Q&A
10:30 Coffee/Tea
10:45 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, EVER + LEVRA
11:30 Q&A
11:40 IDASA
12:00 Q&A
12:20 Lunch
Workshop two: Exploring the electoral cycle - Factors of conflict and violence

Participants will join Working Groups to focus on the various phases of the electoral cycle with the aim of examining and identifying key factors within the electoral cycle (i.e. stakeholders, events, activities and processes) which may have potential to create instability and thus trigger violence. Drawing from the previous presentations and personal experiences, the groups will further examine relevant responses, specifically focusing on prevention, mitigation and resolution as well as formal and informal stakeholders and processes (such as mediation). The analysis should also include a gender sensitive perspective and also take into consideration the concerns of minority groups.

Introduction: Shana Kaiser, International IDEA

Group one
Moderator: Meredith Preston-McGhie
Rapporteur: Joram Rukambe

Group two
Moderator: Adrian Morrice
Rapporteur: Therese Sjöström

Group three
Moderator: Angela Muvumba
Rapporteur: Prosper Bani

Group four
Moderator: Damasco Magubal
Rapporteur: Shana Kaiser

15:00 Coffee/Tea

16:00 Conclusions from working groups
Presentations by group moderators
Moderator: Siphosami Malunga, UNDP

17:30 Wrap-up
Lessons of the day
Moderator: Joram Rukambe, International IDEA
Day three

Friday, 30 October

09:00 Opening of plenary session
Rushdi Nackerdien, International IDEA

09:10 Summary of presentations and workshops:
Recap of day one: Patrick Merloe, National Democratic Institute
Recap of day two: Fabio Bargiacchi, EC-UNDP Joint Task Force
Moderator: Camino Kavanagh, International IDEA

10:10 Coffee/Tea

10:30 Towards a global framework
Sead Alihodzic, International IDEA

12:30 Closing remarks
Ambassador Moorad, International IDEA

13:30 Lunch

End day three
### Appendix II - Participants’ List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Contact Info</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
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**APPENDIX III - EISA analysis of country data on post-election disputes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>All decisions of the National Electoral Commission (CNE) on challenges to voting irregularities and counting tabulations are heard by the Constitutional Court, but must be filed within 48 hours of notification of the decision of the CNE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td>Election petitions are heard by the High Court. Petitions must be submitted within 30 days of the announcement of the disputed result. If petitions are withdrawn the costs fall on the petitioner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Teams of mediators are deployed during the election period to resolve disputes. Petitions are heard by the courts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td>The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) appoints a tribunal to hear and rule on complaints. Election petitions against IEC decisions are heard by the High Court. Petitions must be submitted within 30 days of the end of the election period and the petition must be heard within 30 days of lodging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MADAGASCAR</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>Election petitions and complaints are handled by the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC). Appeals against the rulings of the MEC are made to the High Court. Election petitions on the Presidential result must be received by the High Court within 48 hours of polls closing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAURITIUS</td>
<td>In the event of electoral disputes, petitions are heard by a court with at least two judges sitting on the bench. Election petitions must be submitted to the courts within 21 days of the date of the return of results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>Petitions are made to the National Electoral Commission (CNE) within two days of the results being published. Appeals against decisions made by the CNE are made to the Constitutional Council within three days of the decision being published and must be decided within 5 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
<td>Election petitions are heard by the High Court and petitions must be submitted within 30 days of the announcement of the result disputed. The decision of the Court must be rendered with 60 days of the registration of the petition. Appeals may be lodged with the Supreme Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEYCHELLES</td>
<td>In the event of a dispute over the results, the Constitutional Court has authority to hear complaints. Decisions may be appealed in the Seychelles Court of Appeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and its officers are empowered to resolve objections, appeals and code of conduct disputes through conciliation. Election petitions are heard by the courts with the Electoral Court acting as final court of appeal. Parties must submit complaints within 48 hours of the announcement of results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAZILAND</td>
<td>High Court adjudicates petitions regarding elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>Presidential election results are not subject to challenge under the law. Election petitions for parliamentary elections must be presented to the High Court within 14 days of the announcement of results. Resident Magistrates hear cases for local elections if submitted within 30 days of the announcement of results.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>Election petitions are heard by the High Court. Petitions must be lodged within 30 days of the disputed results being declared. The ECZ is empowered to resolve conflicts and disputes through conciliation or mediation and to set up conflict management committees to resolve disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANZIBAR</td>
<td>The constitution prohibits enquiry by the courts into ‘anything done by the Electoral Commission in performance of its functions’. The Electoral Act provides for other petitions to be heard by the High Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>Election Petitions are heard by Electoral Court.</td>
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