

Conclusion

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1. The Changing Agenda

Although this is frequently not acknowledged, it is almost a truism to say that democracy cannot function properly without political parties. As reiterated throughout this *Handbook*, they perform an essential public service – recruiting and training candidates for public office, mobilizing electors, contesting and then winning or losing elections, and forming governments. In the ideal model, parties aggregate interests, develop policy alternatives and generally provide the main link between citizen and government. The functioning of parties – their organization and professionalism, their funding base and sustainability – impacts directly on the effectiveness of the rest of the political system. They are, in turn, a reflection of the particular political culture. Despite their importance, however, political parties have rarely attracted the same kind of public attention and support as the more formal institutions of governance, such as the parliament and the judiciary, or even the less formal components such as civil society and the media.

If in the past there has been a tendency to take political parties for granted, to treat them like NGOs which should rely on their members and well-wishers to support them, more recently – in the older as in the newer democracies – there has been increasing contempt for and general public disillusionment with parties and politicians, impacting in turn on attitudes toward democracy as a whole. One main reason for this has, without doubt, been what is perceived as an excessive intrusion of money into politics. Whether the particular concern is business pressures or crime-related donations, with vote-buying or ever-expanding media campaigns, the public image of parties is increasingly marred by the tarnish of corruption. The issue of party finance is thus now moving onto the political agenda with some urgency in several countries and regions of the world as politicians seek to demonstrate some sensitivity to public concern.

Parties need to generate income, like any other organization, to pay staff and finance running costs. But, given that they have a vocation to win elections and take over the reins of political power, the financial

stakes involved are clearly of a special order. The financing of electoral campaigns becomes an issue in itself. Most countries seek to regulate the income-generating activity of parties, but as this *Handbook* has shown there are tremendous variations, in intent and in effectiveness, related to political culture and context. The various chapters covering different continental trends and political traditions show some commonalities within each group but also quite wide diversity.

According to Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, there are three broad strategic options relating to the regulation of party finance: the **autonomy option**, which emphasizes the freedom and privacy of political parties, minimizing the need for regulation and relying largely on self-regulation and the self-correcting mechanisms of party competition; the **transparency option**, which highlights the disclosure of information on party finance to enable the individual voter to assume her or his responsibilities and prerogatives and make an informed choice on election day; and the **advocacy option**, which foresees a set of detailed regulations on party finance, monitored and enforced by an independent agency. Combinations of the three are possible and indeed desirable. Nassmacher puts forward the **diversified regulation option** which combines “benign neglect, precise regulation, public incentives and occasional sanctions”.

It is clear that no one model of regulation can fit all circumstances. Every country will need to develop its system according to its political values and culture, its political and electoral system, the stage of development of its democracy, its institutional capacity and so on. There will undoubtedly be a mixture of motives and tools. We hope that this *Handbook* can help to shed light on some of these. However, the issue of political finance can scarcely be treated in isolation, since it reflects more broadly on the role and regulation of political parties in general and on the potential for reform and development of the party system as an essential component of sustainable democracy. This conclusion seeks to highlight some of these wider issues.

2. Why Regulate?

Motives for regulating political finance may vary considerably and with them also the focus of the regulations. At least four quite distinct motivations can be identified: preventing abuse; enhancing fair political competition; empowering voters; and strengthening parties as effective democratic actors.

One key reason to legislate is to **prevent abuse and the buying of influence in political parties** by interest groups or wealthy individuals, and so seek to restore public confidence in the political process. This is usually the main objective of the “advocacy option” mentioned above. Indeed, the need for “clean politics” has driven most regulatory initiatives in recent years. Hence the use of bans or limits on donations from particular groups and of various obligations for disclosure and auditing requirements placed on parties and/or donors. Before discussing specific tools, it is worth emphasizing that since probity in politics and public confidence in that probity are the aim, effective and visible enforcement is crucial; lack of enforcement can be profoundly counter-productive. Enforceability – or the capacity to enforce – has two different connotations in this context. The first refers to institutional capacity and the practical feasibility of enforcing political finance regulations without excessive bureaucracy and expense. The second meaning refers to political capacity and the willingness to allow the relevant public authorities to proceed with enforcement, without interference, by monitoring, investigating, judging and if necessary sanctioning irregularities. In certain cases, this may entail a direct challenge to the political establishment and prove to be a most difficult test of the separation of powers between the executive and judiciary.

Similarly, it has to be recognized that the regulation of party finance is only the tip of the iceberg of the problem of combating corruption in political life. Measures to ban corporate contributions to campaign finance and thus indirectly limit the influence of business on government, for instance, should normally go hand in hand with other measures on political corruption, for instance, requiring regular disclosure of assets and registration of the interests of sitting members of Parliament (MPs) (and their families) and party officials. This is especially relevant in those countries where the problem of politicians using their position to extort money from those requiring

protection or seeking favours is greater than the problem of money buying influence with politicians. Rules on parliamentary immunity should be reviewed in this context. Broader measures to secure the transparent management of state resources, limiting the individual official’s powers to take important decisions, especially on public procurement, along with clearer rules on financial control and audit would be relevant and help to reduce some of the obvious “spoils of office” which are at the source of the problem of buying influence.

Another motive for legislation is to contribute to the establishment of a **level playing field of competition between the parties**. Fair competition is a fundamental if implicit principle of multiparty democracy. Legislating on political finance to help equalize the conditions of competition may help to ease the entry of new parties on the political scene or to reduce the pressure on parties to align their policies to those of corporate or other wealthy interest groups. Tools similar to those used against corruption may be applied – for example, bans and limits on certain types or sources of funding – but the purpose is less to eliminate undesirable funding and more to limit the total volume of expenditure by any one party or candidate so as to reduce the disadvantages faced by less wealthy candidates, including specifically women candidates. It then becomes equally important to fix expenditure limits for primary election or equivalent campaigning. The tool more frequently used to equalize competition is direct or indirect public funding, which, if available at an adequate level and combined with bans and ceilings, can make a significant impact on the sustainability of non-business parties. The provision of equal access to the public media is another obvious tool for promoting equality. To make it more effective, it can be combined with a ban on purchasing television time on commercial stations.

A third reason for regulating political finance, usually associated with the “autonomy” and “transparency” options mentioned above, is the **empowerment of voters**, ensuring, usually by means of disclosure rules, that they have the information they need to be able to make an informed choice on election day and relying on the electorate, together with civil society and the media, to provide an effective sanction to encourage good behaviour by parties and candidates. The empowerment argument may be used rhetorically by those who contest the feasibility or desirability of other

forms of party finance regulation. The argument certainly needs careful dissection. Quite apart from the effectiveness of disclosure rules (which are considered below), there is the question of the extent to which voters will indeed use such information, whether the party system offers the voter any real alternatives, and whether the electoral system is sufficiently responsive to shifts in voting trends. Civil society organizations and the media, usually acting in the name of the general public, may well play an important role in the enforcement of party finance laws but are not in themselves accountable to the electorate. They tend to establish their own political agendas and preferences, which do not necessarily give top priority to combating political corruption. This is not to undermine transparency as an objective of political finance regulation, but to contextualize it and point out the importance of broader issues such as the party system and the independence of the media.

A fourth motive for regulation can be to help strengthen and develop political parties, to help them become responsible actors in support of sustainable and effective democracy. This would set the regulation of political finance in the broader context of constitutional and legislative provision on political parties, and indeed the general philosophy on the role of political parties within the political system, including the relationship among party leadership, candidate, party member and citizen. Few countries appear to have developed a coherent strategy of controls and incentives to help shape parties according to prevailing expectations and assumptions. There would nevertheless appear to be considerable scope in this field. Public funding for parties, sometimes justified in the name of equalizing competition (see above), may equally well serve as a tool to promote good practice. To qualify for funds, parties could for instance be required to live up to certain standards of internal party democracy, transparency or practices of inclusiveness (notably gender balance among candidates and officials). It is remarkable that only one country – France – seems to have made the link between public funding and gender targets. It is equally interesting that the linkage established in law has so far been rejected by the French parties themselves. Funds can also take the form of incentives (tax credits or matching grants) to stimulate grass-roots participation and membership, although such measures are feasible only in a limited number of cases. Alternatively, funds

can be targeted exclusively for use in capacity building, for instance in training or policy development. Capacity building is an area where foreign actors such as sister parties in other countries, development agencies or NGOs often take an interest. Many external initiatives bring positive effects, though they may arouse sensitivities about foreign interference. The ideal could therefore be to harness the efforts of external well-wishers behind an official national strategy for the development of political parties, through both funding and regulation (see section 5 below).

3. Tools and Measures: Key Issues

The Matrix on Political Finance Laws and Regulations summarizes the characteristics of the relevant laws in 111 countries around the world. Together with the regional chapters of the *Handbook*, each of the tables gives a good deal of detail on individual provisions, ranging from bans and limits on certain kinds of donations or expenditure through transparency rules to direct and indirect public funding. From an overview, it is notable how many countries have a broad set of rules on political finance but how little satisfaction there appears to be with the impact they have. Many legislators have aimed for the “advocacy option” of a fully regulated system, but enforcement agencies often fall short of being able to monitor implementation and are often quite unequipped to fulfil the immense ambitions of legislators.

Looking at specific measures, many bans and limits are rather theoretical in the sense that they are not necessarily conceived with a view to effective application. Anonymous, foreign, trade union and corporate donations are the types of donation most often excluded, not always effectively. Some exclusions are understandable: it is not clear why entities that do not have voting rights in a particular country should be able to influence its politics in other ways. Nevertheless, if such funding sources are eliminated, parties can become excessively dependent on public funding or on other, often more devious, means to obtain additional support. The “ideal” of parties thriving on the energies and financial support of their committed followers may still figure in the aspirations of some parties, and may still have a basis in reality in some older parties in Europe and in Canada, but this scarcely represents a feasible model for parties in newer

democracies which have not had long years to build up a mass membership tradition before the advent of personality politics. A mixture of public funding and limits on the size of donations is in many cases considered more effective and pragmatic than outright bans, even if it is less equitable than a system based only on public funding.

In some countries, indeed, the initial aim could be simply to legitimize private political finance, to bring it within the realm of law, and to insist first on disclosure and only later build up a consensus among the parties themselves about what might constitute undesirable funding. Hasty, top-down legislation, with an eye to impressing the international community, for instance, rather than changing patterns of political influence at home, is unlikely to have much effect and can also rebound with the electorate. Legislation so directly affecting political life can usually only consolidate an existing **basic political consensus**; it cannot create one. Hence the notion that it is best to engage in cross-party dialogue to encourage the emergence of a broad coalition in favour of cleaner politics. The risk, of course, is that rent-seekers from different parties will join forces in order to legislate to facilitate clientelist linkages rather than limit or expose them. Civil society and the judicial authorities should therefore also be actively involved in the debate on political reform in this area.

Enforcement, as mentioned earlier, is critical. Lack of enforcement is probably more dangerous than lack of rules, since it leads to disenchantment and cynicism toward democracy. Any kind of regulatory framework for political activity presupposes a minimum degree of respect for and capacity to implement the rule of law. The relative solidity of political and judicial institutions in a country must therefore weigh heavily in the design of appropriate political finance rules. The “advocacy option” model of a powerful independent authority to be responsible for monitoring and enforcement may indeed be unrealistic in many societies and a more collaborative approach can be more effective. Just as in the design of rules, so in their enforcement, it may be appropriate to engage the parties or politicians themselves to operate collegially as the enforcement authority (just as they sometimes operate a bipartisan election management authority).

Sometimes political parties can themselves be willing partners in the search for ways of **limiting the “arms race”** of political finance, particularly as regards the

burden of funding electoral campaigns. An obvious tool, and one that is used increasingly in Latin America, is to strictly limit the length of the campaign. Another, as mentioned above, is to limit access to the broadcast media, prohibiting for instance the purchase of television time for political advertising. Regulating media access in this way may be particularly relevant in those countries where party structures are weak and do little local campaigning or where the campaign is entirely personalized, as in presidential systems.

It seems that transparency rather than control is increasingly seen as a key priority in both older and newer democracies. **Disclosure rules** can have some impact as a deterrent but are only effective in certain conditions. In addition to the structural issues raised above, the challenge is to make available information that can be useful to the interested voter or the media, and therefore to focus on naming the bigger donors, and to ensure that information is available in a timely fashion, before elections rather than months after the event. It is taken for granted that active independent media and civil society exist and are ready and able to exploit the information and bring it to the attention of voters. Even when all such conditions are satisfied, there is evidence in more than one chapter in this *Handbook* that in some emerging or unstable democracies the risks of harassment and intimidation of donors to opposition parties, or parties representing minority concerns, are great enough to discourage donations if public disclosure is the price to be paid.

Public funding for political parties is more widespread than commonly realized. The *Matrix* identifies 65 countries as having provisions for direct public funding and 79 as having indirect funding. With a few notable exceptions, the objective is usually to assist in creating a level playing field during election campaigns, rather than to influence the effectiveness or transparency of the parties, although there is some evidence from Latin America – Mexico and Costa Rica in particular – that public funding has indeed contributed to modifying entrenched party systems, facilitated the development of new political forces and generally enhanced political competition. There is now a vivid debate on new legislation – in Chile, for example – on how best to use public funding and how to determine amounts, eligibility, timing and other conditions. Currently, public funding is sometimes, but surprisingly not always, distributed under the condition that the expenditures made with public

funds must be accounted for. It would seem that the debate has yet to move on to a more ambitious level, using public funds to lever other types of good practice by political parties.

The **power of incumbency** is one of the main forces to be reckoned with in seeking to regulate political finance. There are myriad ways in which governments can circumvent rules, use public resources to buy influence, control the media, harass opposition forces and so on. The risk of this happening is high in democracies that are still weak and where government has little respect for the prerogatives of opposition forces. In such cases, it can be argued that effective regulation of political finance is simply not feasible. This does not, however, necessarily diminish the utility of advocacy campaigns for clean politics, which can highlight the different ways in which public finance can either undermine or strengthen pluralist democracy.

4. Regional Trends and Recent Developments

The *Handbook* has shown widely divergent trends in political financing in various regions of the world, reflecting different political systems as well as the varying degrees of maturity of democracy as such. The level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the depth of socio-economic inequality and the distribution of economic power are also of fundamental importance in considering political finance and the opportunities for reform. Within regions, there is diversity but also a trend toward regional-level initiatives which are not insignificant.

Within the Anglo-Saxon orbit, there are marked differences. Even between countries which have candidate- rather than party-based approaches, there are very different philosophies about regulation. The Canadian example emerges as the most balanced and possibly exportable system. Yet it is precisely in Canada that there have been strong pressures to curb the influence of corporate financing. These culminated in a new law that passed the Federal Parliament on 19 June 2003 which now basically prohibits corporations, trade unions and lobby groups from making donations to political parties, allowing them to contribute amounts up to only CAD 1,000 per year to individual candidates or local party associations. To compensate, direct public funding for parties is to be introduced at

the rate of CAD 1,75 per vote received in the previous election, adding to the already generous reimbursement of candidates' electoral expenses (www.parl.gc.ca). Disclosure provisions are also enhanced. Expenditure may rise to CAD 40 million per election year and CAD 23 million in non-election years (Brown 7 June 2003).

In continental Western Europe, the differing traditions between north and south are also very marked, with patterns of regulation reflecting degrees of the perceived danger of "plutocratic funding". Germany would appear to offer the most comprehensive party law and public funding system, but, like Canada, it is set in and designed for a mature political culture where the rule of law exists, where grass-roots membership is traditional and can still be mobilized, and where generous public funding is accepted by taxpayers as a price for democracy.

Despite the radical differences in tradition within Europe, however, it is particularly interesting to note the impact of European integration in the area of political regulation. Under the influence of those countries with a tradition of public funding, the **European Union (EU)'s Treaty of Nice** of 2000 provided for regulations to be established governing political parties at the European level and in particular the rules regarding their funding. In the words of the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, "strong and independent European parties are essential for improving democracy in the European Union". Prompted by the demand for transparency in party financing emanating from the European Court of Audit, as well as the imminence of EU enlargement, there has been a recent flurry of activity, with a draft regulation from the Commission in February 2003 (COM(2003)77: European Commission 19 February 2003) followed by a European Parliament position in June (European Parliament 19 June 2003). Key elements of the Commission's proposal, backed largely by the European Parliament in its position voted on 19 June, foresee public funding being made conditional on evidence that party statutes and activities respect the principles of democracy, human rights and rule of law as laid down in the EU Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Parties must demonstrate a reasonable degree of representativeness across the EU. They must generate at least 25 per cent of their funding through their own efforts (donations, subscriptions etc.). EU public funding, projected at EUR 8,4 million per year, is to be

divided between a flat-rate basic grant and a second component: 15 per cent of the total is to be distributed equally between the qualifying parties, while 85 per cent will be divided on the basis of the number of seats each party has in the European Parliament (European Commission 19 February 2003). Parties must disclose their accounts to the Court of Auditors, specifying donors and donations (exceeding EUR 500 in the latest version). Ceilings on donations (exceeding EUR 12.000 per year according to the Parliament) are to be fixed.

The significance of these developments at the EU level, yet to be confirmed by the Council, is that they may gradually influence the contrasting national political traditions across the enlarged EU and beyond. Reinforcing the trend toward regulation and convergence is the initiative by the **Council of Europe**, whose Committee of Ministers agreed on a recommendation on 8 April 2003 asking all countries to abide by a number of principles on party finance, ranging from transparency in party accounts through restrictions on or prohibitions of sources of funds to public funding of political parties. The document also contains recommendations on enforcement and sanctions (Council of Europe Rec(2003)4). In addition to these recommendations, a manual for national legislators is being developed for the Council of Europe's 45 member states. Good practice in political party financing is also being promoted by influential transnational NGOs such as the Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO) (www.aceeeo.org). It will be interesting to monitor the impact of such normative activity at the European level on the less structured democracies of Eastern Europe. The chapter on developments in the region in this *Handbook* gives few grounds for complacency.

There has also been a burst of interest in political party finance in the Americas. In March 2003, the **Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas** agreed on a far-reaching declaration on political financing (Carter Center 19 March 2003). Worth quoting at some length, these refer to the following six principles:

- “*Fostering stronger representative and accountable political parties.* In their representation and participation functions, political parties need access to adequate resources to function effectively and ethically.

- *Ensuring effective electoral competition.* Parties and candidates must have a fair chance to campaign for their ideas; access to the media and adequate resources is crucial. Unfair incumbency advantages should be addressed and the use of state resources that are not made available to all candidates in the electoral campaign should be prohibited.
- *Promoting political equality and citizen participation.* Citizens, rich or poor, must have equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to support candidates or parties of their choice. Financial contributions are a legitimate form of support. Inequalities related to gender, race, ethnicity or marginalized populations should be compensated. The principle of one-person, one-vote must be preserved.
- *Preserving the integrity of the electoral process through transparency.* Voters need to be empowered to choose as autonomous and informed citizens, free from pressures, intimidation or seduction through economic benefits, and informed about the resources and support for candidates and parties.
- *Enhancing accountability and eliminating corruption.* Elected officeholders should represent their constituents as a whole and be free from financial dependence on a few. Donations should not be used to buy access to politicians or civil servants, personal favors (contracts, tax breaks, etc), or policy favors.
- *Strengthening rule of law and enforcement capacity.* There must be assurances of timely justice and an end to impunity in abuses of political financing. The enforcement of political finance laws and regulations requires the existence of independent oversight authorities and an effective system of sanctions to end impunity”.

Deriving from these principles, the Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas go on to set as objectives and tools that their members states should:

- “*Invest in the democratic character of parties rather than long or negative campaigns.* The pressures of fundraising should be reduced by controlling the factors that escalate campaign costs. Measures

could include limiting spending; shortening campaigns; providing equitable access to the media including free media time to the candidates during prime time; banning or capping paid political advertising; promoting public financing, eliminating inflammatory ads; adopting and enforcing prohibitions against vote-buying.

- *Improve transparency and reduce the influence of money by requiring disclosure of donations and expenditures.* Parties and candidates should be required to publicly disclose itemized donations above certain amounts and their sources, including in-kind contributions, before and after the elections so that future undue influence by the donor could be assessed. Parties and candidates should make public audited reports of itemized expenditures on a regular basis, including in-kind expenses, with all funds flowing through identified bank accounts managed by specified individuals who can be held accountable. Media should be required to disclose standard advertising rates and to report discounts as political donations, and maintain advertising rates that do not exceed the commercial rates used between campaigns. Campaign contributions from foreign sources should be prohibited, with the exception of citizens living abroad, if allowed by national law. Campaigns and candidates should refuse donations from organized crime or drug trafficking.
- *Promote equity, participation and competition.* Mixed funding systems with a substantial public component are recommended. Public funds should be provided as a substitute for or a complement to private donations at all phases of the political and electoral process. Public funding for ongoing party activities and campaigns should be allocated by a mix of proportional rules and flat subsidies to all parties that meet reasonable thresholds. Large individual donations should be limited; small donations that the average citizen can afford should be encouraged, perhaps by offering tax credits; and voluntary media standards for balanced media coverage should be developed.
- *The institutions responsible for enforcement should provide both incentives and sanctions.* Oversight entities, whether electoral management bodies or judicial organs, should be independent, non-

partisan, and equipped with sufficient human and financial resources and authority to enforce the country's laws. Without this, none of the other measures suggested here will be effective.

Enforcement capacity should be developed for effective monitoring, investigating, and prosecuting, and include subpoena powers, whistleblower protection, and access to bank accounts. Sanctions should include remedial actions, fines, criminal prosecution, and denial of office and/or future access to public funding”.

This declaration complements and supports the study being undertaken under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Forum on Political Parties, with International IDEA, focusing on enforcement, disclosure, access to the media and public and private regimes of financing. A broader discussion on the strengthening of political parties is also developing in Latin America. The 19 heads of state attending the 17th Rio Group Summit, held in Peru in May 2003, endorsed a report on greater financial transparency, internal democracy and equal opportunities. A few days later, a special study on Central American political parties was launched by the International Development Bank (IDB), the OAS and IDEA. At the national level, debates are also intense as new legislation takes shape – on political finance in Chile and on party law in Peru, to mention a few examples.

Latin America may offer some cause for optimism about its capacity for political reform, since multiparty democracy is largely stabilized, the private sector is more independent of the state, and civil society is more mobilized to demand change than used to be the case. A very different picture emerges from parts of Africa, not dissimilar from parts of Eastern Europe, where multiparty politics is a recent development and where entrenched parties in government often have few scruples about using state resources for political ends, rarely accepting the need to allow the opposition to compete on equal terms. In differing degrees, business interests dominate and party structures and membership remain very weak. Regulation of party finance is fragmentary and difficult to enforce, and public funding is low or non-existent. Very serious reflection is needed to trace a strategy for the development of political parties in these emerging democracies. However, things are moving at the

continental level, at least. The African Union has been working on an African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. The draft convention was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in July 2003, and member states were encouraged to sign and apply it. It contains provisions for transparency in political party finance, and prohibits the use of funds from illegal or corrupt practices. It also provides for an active role for civil society and the media in the monitoring process (www.africa-union.org). Many individual countries are also considering reforms of a wide variety of political finance laws. Public funding is one of the most heavily debated issues in the region, and in countries like Ghana, South Africa and Uganda political parties and movements are raising their voices to ask for funds from the public purse (Yeboah 6 June 2003; Kaiza 26 June 2003).

There are few formal political finance initiatives on a regional basis in Asia. Party finance laws are diverse and it is difficult to find common trends and developments. Of particular interest is the recent case in India of action by the Supreme Court to enforce accountability of politicians. The key public concern which has given rise to organized advocacy by some leading civil society groups is that politicians are controlled by private “money bags” or criminal elements who also find their way into politics. After a long and intense debate between politicians and civil society, Parliament and the president on the disclosure obligations of politicians, on 13 March 2003 the Supreme Court struck down a major portion of the new Electoral Reforms Act, saying it could not undermine an earlier court judgement in 2002 which had given a direction that the voters had the right to know the criminal antecedents as well as the liabilities and assets of the candidates so as to equip them to vote wisely on election day. The implications of the court’s ruling were succinctly captured by LOK SATTA (People Power), one of the NGOs which helped take the case up to the Supreme Court. Referring to the court verdict, it stated:

This should not be seen as a struggle between the people and the political parties. The parties have a vital and often thankless task to perform in a democracy. Very often they are captive in the hands of political fiefdoms which dominate the electoral scene in a first-past-the-post system. Our parties are

striving hard to sustain our democracy against great odds. They need our full support in this endeavour. Equally, the parties must take this as an opportunity, not a threat. This is a priceless opportunity for our political system to break itself loose from criminal elements, unaccounted and excessive money power, and increasing perception of illegitimacy of the power game (Narayan 13 March 2003).

The link made by LOK SATTA between transparency and clean politics on the one hand and broader political and electoral reform on the other echoes a theme that runs through this Handbook and these conclusions – that the problems of regulating political finance cannot be tackled adequately without a broader consideration of other structural issues affecting the role of political parties. The fight against corruption, and political corruption in particular, can be a useful rallying call for action. Transparency International (TI) maintains pressure at the international level on the issue of political corruption: its first Global Corruption Barometer on public attitudes was published in July 2003. In 33 of 44 countries surveyed, more than 30 per cent of the respondents (over 50 per cent in Argentina and Japan) picked political parties as the first actors to be addressed in the struggle to eliminate corruption. At the national level, however, where TI is also active, the strategies for dealing with the problems in each of the countries surveyed will need to vary considerably, according to the particular characteristics and weaknesses of their political systems (www.transparency.org).

5. Toward a Holistic Approach

There is much scope for further analysis of “what works” in the field of regulating political finance. This *Handbook* has focused on financing for political parties rather than for individual candidates or the activities of sitting MPs. It has looked at national rather than regional or local elections, let alone transnational elections (such as those for the European Parliament). It has also concentrated on the role of public regulation and funding, and has not sought in any way to analyse trends in self-regulation by the parties themselves. Although it may be tempting to dismiss the “autonomy option” as the refuge of those dependent on corporate funding, it may be the case that individual political

parties can set their own standards of clean politics and successfully exploit electoral disillusionment with establishment parties, setting in train a competitive process of party reform. Quoting the Korean example in this context, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats have made an interesting analysis of trends in internal party reform in several Asian countries, showing a range of initiatives by committed reformers (National Democratic Institute, 2001). Most striking is the combination of specific anti-corruption measures (transparency, codes of conduct, disclosure rules, internal monitoring, asset management) and reforms to enhance internal party democracy, notably in the nomination, election and accountability of party leaders. If such a trend is feasible only in a relatively “open” political system, backed up by a lively civil society and pluralist media, it is still an important facet of any strategy for the development of political parties and needs further investigation in other parts of the world.

This experience from Asia serves to highlight some basic questions on strategies for regulating political finance anywhere in the world.

First, **can regulation succeed anywhere if the leading political parties are not themselves committed to establishing higher standards of political behaviour?** Individually, political parties may perceive electoral advantage in professing and demonstrating clean politics, but for regulation to succeed it is usually necessary for political elites to acknowledge that concerted action is required, for instance, in order to revive public support for multiparty politics. Their commitment must go beyond a willingness to legislate and include also a willingness to make legislation work, not least by setting up independent and properly resourced enforcement mechanisms. Legislation may consolidate a political consensus, formalize standards and legitimize expectations but it alone cannot provide a deterrent to misdoing or an end to impunity.

Second, **can the prevention of abuse and the buying of influence be dissociated from questions of internal party management?** Insofar as political parties manage power and influence, as well as finance, in the name of democracy, it can be argued that high standards of transparency and accountability need to be applicable to decision-making and appointments, as well as to fund-raising and financial management. In the fight against political corruption, the trail leads almost

inevitably from the specific problem of finance to the much broader problem of developing more responsible political parties that enshrine the principles of democracy and the rule of law in their party statutes, and apply them in practice in their internal management as in their political platform and campaigning activities. Regulation needs to cover other issues of party management, in addition to matters of finance. This means that the party law needs to be considered in a holistic way, as well as public funding. It would certainly be logical to use public funding in a developmental way and tie it to respect for high standards of management and internal democracy (including affirmative action aimed at underrepresented groups).

Without undermining the case for a regulatory approach to political finance and parties in general, it is clear that there are several other underlying factors which can determine the success of legislative reform. **Continuing public pressure** is a key element. Hence the challenge to maintain the hot wind of electoral expectation and discontent that is blowing parties toward greater transparency and reform. As mentioned above in the discussion of the empowerment of voters, if the parties and the electoral system are unresponsive to shifts in public opinion there will be few incentives for parties to establish new standards. In addition, both the media and civil society need to maintain pressure on political parties to reform, rather than being tempted to dismiss them as incorrigible. NGOs in particular may see themselves as the more reliable voice of public opinion, being able to pressure the executive directly and thereby short-circuiting the elected representatives of the people, but they are neither representative nor accountable. If parties are condemned as irrelevant, democracy will be all the weaker, and politicians that much less honoured and honourable.

A **high degree of political competition**, nurtured by the responsive and open nature of the political system, is thus probably a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for developing a culture of clean party politics. Yet genuine competition is one of the hardest features for new democracies to attain. Government parties tend to dominate, cling to power and abuse directly or indirectly the opportunities incumbency brings, as already mentioned. Some abuses are nowadays picked up and documented by the international community, before elections or in the

course of election observation exercises, so that “pretend democrats” who fail to respect the legitimate rights of opposition parties can be discredited. The larger problem of incumbency will, of course, remain in cases where the spoils of office – regular or irregular – are spread efficiently across diverse elites and constituencies, thus weakening any opposition case for greater transparency, integrity, equity or liberalization. In such situations, calls for legislation on party finance or party transparency need to be set within a more general movement in favour of the rule of law and systems of regulation which protect against abuse and inefficiency.

Political parties cannot be isolated from the political systems in which they operate, and any reform of their finance or organization should be seen in the broader context of the conditions for competition and governance. A holistic approach is all the more important given the tendency for the problems of political corruption and the scandals of political parties in developed democracies to overshadow the major challenges for political parties in emerging democracies. Parties are a vital though often neglected institution of democracy which needs to be nurtured and developed with quite as much care as other institutions such as the parliament, the judiciary and the public administration. Whether considered as part of civil society or in different intermediate positions between citizen and government, parties play a more crucial role than NGOs in the actual functioning of political processes and merit as much concern from the international community. Parties are nevertheless particularly sensitive and vulnerable as objects of concern, because – unlike NGOs – they compete directly for political power. Like NGOs, they have financing needs – for training and start-up, for campaigning and membership drives, but also for basic running costs. Unlike NGOs, which can look for project finance from donors or public authorities, or engage in various income-generating activities, political parties have running costs which cannot reasonably be covered without a major contribution from public funds.

Public funding of political parties, as this *Handbook* has shown, may be a significant and well supervised area of public finance in many established democracies, but it is still relatively unsophisticated as a tool of party support in many newer democracies. There would seem to be scope to develop more efficient frameworks

and conditions for public funding which are conducive to strengthening parties as effective actors in a modern democracy. Leading political parties in newer democracies should themselves be the first to appreciate the need for more conditionality, requiring transparency and internal democracy of the political parties in return for greater public support and hence a more level playing field. Given the austerity budgets of many a new democracy, the major question for the international community will then be how far it will be willing to consider channelling its grant aid or budgetary support through national mechanisms in order to develop political parties. Various models for financing can be designed, drawing on the experience of co-financing “umbrella” funds for NGOs in several developing countries.

These are issues on which there will need to be further public debate, not least with political parties themselves in both established and newer democracies. Civil society organizations, especially those that have benefited considerably from international support to date, should also reflect seriously on the dilemmas of party financing and then on priorities in the use of public funds for democracy. Public funding of parties will not be acceptable to the public at large if parties are considered irretrievably corrupt. The responsibility will probably therefore be on existing parties to demonstrate concern about their ethical standards and the general public’s view of them and to engage in debate with opinion makers in the media, in civil society and in the international community about a new style of politics in which parties can play a more honourable role. In many parts of the developing world, where democracy is still being built and competitive politics are not yet well grounded, the future of political parties is an urgent concern. It is hoped that on this crucial issue, among others, this *Handbook* will contribute to concentrating minds and assisting in the search for new approaches and solutions to the ever-present problem of paying for democracy.

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