3. DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY

Every major urban arena today features cultural minorities, distinct ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, and networks based around identity affiliation. Whether in Cape Town, Jakarta, London, New York, Santiago or Tokyo, an important aspect of modern urban life today is the need to recognize, embrace, and benefit from cultural diversity.

While there are no clear answers for promoting democracy in a diverse setting beset by the problems of ethnic politics, this chapter and the associated case studies illustrate how democracy can be conceived as a system for conflict management. Specifically, it investigates *principles*, *public policy guidelines*, and *practical measures* for promoting social peace, by examining the following questions:

- **What principles should inform local democracy as a tool for conflict management?**
- **How can urban public policy be better conceived and implemented to help manage diversity in deeply-divided urban arenas?**
- **What practical measures can be put in place to help promote local-level peace-building?**

3.1 Ethnically-Charged Disputes

■ *Ethnically charged disputes can arise over a variety of issues from transportation policies to language use to employment opportunities.*

Much of the excitement and creativity of today's metropolitan arenas comes from the synergy generated by the mixing of ideas, art, and culture. At the same time, many urban settings suffer from problems of prejudice, discrimination, racial hatred, and some-

times violent conflict among identity groups. Recent ethnic tensions in Copenhagen, Jakarta, Kaduna (Nigeria), Karachi, Los Angeles, Montreal, Moscow and Paris are only a few examples; many other violent situations never make the global press.

Disputes arise on any number of issues that may affect the safety, cultural security, and livelihood of ethnic groups, whether they live in distinct neighbourhoods or in more mixed settings. Some examples include:

- *Transportation* policies, which affect the ways in which communities are linked together, and with the central business district;
- *Employment* opportunities, and equal access to jobs and benefits such as health insurance;
- *Housing,* access to land, affordable rents, and the quality of public projects for disadvantaged members of society;
- *Language-use* policies, especially in public schools and in public forums such as city council meetings and other open methods of making decisions;
- *Policing* that does not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, race, or religion and security for crime-ridden neighbourhoods;
- *Religious practice*, and public restrictions or promotion of religious beliefs, particularly when these values form the basis of law that affects people of other religions; and
- *Cultural expression*, for example the terms under which a given group can celebrate its culture and traditions, especially in situations where other groups find the expression of group pride threatening to their own.

3.2 Democracy as Conflict Management

■ *Democracy is a set of institutions and practices for conflict management.*

Reconciling traditional concepts of democracy given today's reality of large, multiethnic cities is difficult, and there is no ready set of answers on how this can be achieved. Clearly, chauvinism, discrimination, intimidation, violence, and cultural intolerance are dangers to democracy. Mitigating segregation and fostering inclusion are key functions of democracy.

Democracy and conflict management must go hand in hand. Democracy is in many ways a system of managing social conflicts that arise from community diversity using a set of agreed social rules. In a democracy, disputes arise, are processed, debated and reacted to, rather than being resolved definitively. In short, democracy operates as a conflict management system without recourse to violence. Larry Diamond writes that:

Sustained interethnic moderation and peace follow from the frank recognition of plural identities, legal protection for group and individual rights, devolution of power to various localities and regions, and political institutions that encourage bargaining and accommodation at the centre.

Certainly in some South Asian countries, one of the driving forces for devolution of political power has been the need to promote conflict management in areas where the central authority is perceived as too strong. Decentralization and local autonomy may be a mechanism for conflict management. In their study of decentralization in Asia, Abdul Aziz and David Arnold suggest that in India, for example, "over concentration of power at the centre is frequently cited as a factor contributing to unrest in regions such as Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam. … A similar set of factors underlies Sri Lanka's establishment in 1987 of elected provincial councils, in a move to defuse demands for political autonomy in the island's strife-torn north eastern region."

3.2.1 Aims and Options

Designers of systems of local democracy for managing and promoting inter-group harmony must have a clear understanding of the aims of the systems they are trying to devise. Two broad aims include:

- *Groups sharing urban space.* Is the purpose to give local ethnic groups autonomy over their own affairs and representation at the level of municipal decision-making as a whole? Is the city a mosaic of groups living essentially apart but sharing power and working together in consensus?
- *The city as a melting pot.* Or is the purpose to promote integrated political coalitions, and not to base devolution or decision-making in identity terms? That is, is the city to be seen as a rainbow or mosaic, in which identity is recognized but democracy and political activity is not based along identity lines?

Various options for design of democratic institutions can serve either of these aims.

- *Autonomy.* Autonomy is not a term on which there is a consensus definition, but Yash Ghai's effort at a definition is useful: "Autonomy is a device to allow an ethnic group or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over important affairs of concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which are the common interests of both sections." Forms of autonomy include "symmetrical devolution" in which all units enjoy similar powers, and "asymmetrical devolution", which might provide enhanced powers to a particular neighbourhood or group. An example of asymmetrical devolution is the special administrative arrangements made available to Hong Kong following negotiations between China and the United Kingdom that led to the city's

transfer to Chinese central authority in 1997. Hong Kong enjoys its own political assembly, legal system, revenue authority, and status unique within China.

- *Power sharing: group security.* Power sharing refers to joint or consensus decision-making by all major mobilized factions in society; it is widely viewed as a viable alternative to "winner-take-all" democracy in which the winner at the ballot box alone controls the reins of authority. The *group building-block approach* relies on accommodation by ethnic group leaders at the political centre and guarantees for group autonomy and minority rights. The key institutions are: decentralization to the neighbourhood level (where groups are known to concentrate); minority vetoes on issues of particular importance to them; grand coalition city councils in a parliamentary framework, and proportionality in all spheres of public life (e.g., budgeting and civil service appointments).

  An example of this is the local government system in Brussels, Belgium, in which seats in the legislative assembly are allocated on a linguistic basis and there is a high degree of local decentralization to French or Flemish-speaking neighbourhoods. Direct elections to the newly autonomous Council of the Brussels-Capital region were first held in 1989. Candidates taking part in the Brussels regional elections are presented on separate lists depending on their linguistic affiliation. When they submit their application to contest elections, they state the linguistic group to which they belong; the Brussels regional deputies elected on the French-speaking lists then constitute the French linguistic group and the Brussels regional deputies elected on the Flemish-speaking lists constitute the Flemish linguistic group. The form of local power sharing reflects a broader national commitment in Belgium to representation and autonomy along ethnic group lines.

- *Power sharing: integrative approach.* Power sharing is not a single approach, however, and some suggest that rather than providing guarantees of group security, peace settlements should feature incentives for multi-ethnic co-operation. The integrative approach avoids using ethnic groups as the building blocks of a common society. Rather, it seeks to build multi-ethnic political coalitions (usually political parties), to create incentives for political leaders to be moderate on divisive ethnic themes, and to enhance minority influence in majority decision-making. The elements of an integrative approach include electoral systems that encourage pre-election pacts across ethnic lines, non-ethnic federalism that diffuses points of power, and public policies that promote political allegiances that transcend groups.

  The elections for an elected mayor in London (UK) illustrate how minority voters can help determine the winner in highly diverse settings. In the May 2000

poll, voters had two votes for mayor, one for their first preference and another for a second preference. The victor, politician Ken Livingstone, enhanced his electoral majority through the counting of second-preference votes; analysts widely believe that minority support helped Mr Livingstone gain office in this historic election.

- *Majority rule democracy.* Majority rule democracy is generally not seen as ideal for multi-ethnic cities in which one identity group is a majority or is historically dominant. Ethnic minorities may be consistently outvoted and rarely obtain representation; exclusion breeds frustration, which can lead to violence. Strict majority rule in Jerusalem, and limitation of the franchise to Israeli citizens, has led to considerable alienation by the excluded Palestinian community.

Yet majority democracy (as we note in Chapter Four) can sometimes serve to induce politicians and political parties to include minorities – especially when their votes are needed to win – and majority rule systems should not be ruled out when the demographic and social factors are favourable to building multi-ethnic political coalitions. In mayoral elections in New York City, for example, candidates work hard to court the votes of a wide range of ethnic, racial, and religious groups, and as a result they are generally responsive to these groups' concerns while governing. When coupled with other measures such as sensible housing and home ownership policies, basic protection of individual human rights, and safety, liberal or majority rule democracy may be a more desirable solution than those that are primarily designed to reconcile identity-based social differences through ethnic-group-based representation.

Although there is considerable flexibility in designing systems of local democracy for ethnic conflict management, it is generally agreed that autonomy and group-based power sharing tend to serve the aims of groups sharing urban space. Integrative power sharing and majority rule democracy may help to integrate ethnic groups more freely in political institutions and in civil society.

3.2.2 Approaches to Conflict Handling

Increasingly, conflict specialists are concerned with efforts to build local capacity for consensus-building skills that feature negotiation, mediation, and coalition-building capabilities. This is particularly a focus in big cities with communal tensions and in post-war cities, which face serious problems of reconstruction and reconciliation. There are four major approaches to handling conflict:

- *Conflict prevention.* A healthy system of local democracy, in which all groups feel they have representation and influence in the institutions and policy decisions of governance, helps prevent feelings of alienation and frustration. This helps prevent conflict by giving outlets to grievances and creates opportunities for collab-

orative (rather than conflictual) problem-solving. A well-conceived system of local governance – for example, when elected authorities are in close communication with community-based organizations – also creates a system of monitoring and early warning when identity-based conflicts in a city are about to escalate dangerously.

- *Conflict management.* As a system for bargaining and negotiation, democracy helps manage conflicts among groups, keeping them within the boundaries of political dialogue and debate, and off the streets. The aim of conflict management is keeping disputes within accepted arenas of negotiation and keeping them from escalating into damaging confrontation and violence.
- *Conflict resolution.* Resolution is a process whereby an issue or set of issues is discussed, agreements are made and implemented, and the underlying source or cause of the conflict is removed. Many disputes about diversity – for example, language policies in schools – can be resolved with agreement on a set of rules to guide decision-making. A recent example is the introduction of Albanian-language schooling in Montenegro as a way to defuse local inter-group tensions. As long as the rules are regarded by all people in the community as fair, and no major group seeks to change the rules, the conflict is considered resolved.
- *Conflict transformation.* Some long-standing disputes, such as those described in the case study on Jerusalem, Belfast, and Johannesburg, defy resolution. (See page 82) Similarly, simply managing the problems between key populations in a city does not help resolve the underlying causes of conflict. In these cases, there is the need for conflict transformation. This requires a multi-layered approach, working with political leaders and NGOs – at national or regional levels and directly at the grassroots level – simultaneously. The aim of the conflict transformation approach is to change the underlying structural disparities in society – for example, access to health care – that fuel conflict among identity groups.

Many have argued that international approaches to post-settlement peace-building have focused too often on the national-level elite. Peace-building efforts have proceeded without an integrated strategy that seeks to promote conciliation by "middle-range actors" (such as regional and local party functionaries or militias) and the grassroots. John Paul Lederach, a leading authority in the conflict resolution field, believes that a more integrated strategy of peace-building that explicitly seeks to build peace at multiple levels of society, including and especially at the neglected middle and grassroots tiers and considering short- and long-term goals, is much more effective. He has worked with civil society and grassroots organizations in the Balkans, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Northern Ireland in a bottom-up approach to foster reconciliation in situations of deep-rooted conflict. In Colombia, for exam-

ple, he has been working with a peace-building resource centre known as *Justapaz*, conducting training with all sectors of that society and working with grassroots, middle-level, and senior public and NGO officials in a long-term approach to managing the crises of violence that characterize that country's long-running civil war. The training has emphasized the need to co-ordinate the conflict mitigation efforts at local, regional, and national levels, in support of the national-level peace process between the government and the guerrilla groups.

Working from the ground up is critical to alleviating the underlying causes of conflict among identity groups in urban arenas. John Burton writes: "Decision-making at a community level is likely to focus on human needs as they surface in family, social, and school environments. It is likely to be, therefore, more problem-solving than would be the case at a level at which there is little face-to-face contact between decision-makers and those affected."

In some instances, dealing with community diversity is best done through unofficial means. International and local NGOs are increasingly taking on the task of peace-making, and some would argue that they have a comparative advantage in dealing with conflicts at the local level. Although NGOs clearly have strengths and weaknesses as peacemakers in a changing world, they are increasingly called upon to engage in peace-making in arenas where states and international organizations are simply not up to the task. As international humanitarian relief specialist Andrew Natsios asserts:

> *NGOs carry on their work at the very lowest level of social order, the rural village and city neighbourhood. Their highly participatory system of decision-making and programme management, while time-consuming and laborious, does tend to engage the energy and commitment of the community. This approach to development creates loyalty and trust between NGOs and the communities in which they work, and this can serve an important purpose in conflict resolution.*

One lesson from such experiences is that it is unrealistic to expect that a collaborative problem-solving process will simply make conflict go away. Consensus-oriented approaches are limited by the hard facts and entrenched positions of many situations of deep-rooted conflict. But, when people can work to turn their attention towards the problem instead of turning against their adversaries, practical, consensus-based solutions can be found even in very acrimonious, post-war relationships.

The aims and approaches to handling deep-rooted conflict in urban arenas highlighted here are not mutually exclusive. However, thinking about different disputes in these terms can help determine which strategy is appropriate in a given setting. That is, prior to designing institutions or launching participatory forums, policy-

makers and civic leaders need to have a prior agreement on what the aims of conflict handling strategies should be, and the appropriate fit between aims, institutional design, and principles of public policy.

3.3 Public Policy

■ *Public policy, carefully conceived and implemented, can facilitate and engender social harmony.*

Public policy – the allocation of resources, services, and opportunities – can be an instrument of social exclusion, discrimination and oppression, or it can be designed to facilitate and engender social harmony.

The experiences of conflict management in diverse cities are extensive and broad. Here and in the essays that follow we focus on the work of four experts whose experience and research include many of the most divided cities on the globe. Scott Bollens focuses on the impact of public policies on conflict management in Johannesburg, Jerusalem, and Belfast. Michael Lund describes experiences from around the world with the establishment of local- level peace commissions that seek to prevent, monitor, and manage political violence or serve as forums for reconciliation. Demetrios Papademetriou considers the effect of migrant populations on community decision-making. Finally, Julia Demichelis analyses the phenomenon of half-cities in Bosnia after that country's devastating civil war. These contributions point to the importance of carefully designed political institutions and carefully conceived and implemented public policy.

These studies highlight several common principles for promoting democratic local governance in contexts of deep-rooted conflict and diversity:

- *Inclusion, recognition, and group self-worth.* Do all groups feel that they are perceived and treated as equals, with dignity and respect?
- *Satisfaction of basic human needs.* Are any groups so disadvantaged as to have their basic human needs unmet? How are the poorest and most economically disenfranchised populations in a city integrated into municipal decision-making? How fair is the allocation of resources? In what ways does public policy promote basic human security, especially for vulnerable groups or those who have been historically discriminated against?
- *Practical solutions.* Can practical solutions to seemingly irresolvable disputes be devised? What mechanisms can be introduced to provide ongoing opportunities for dialogue, negotiation, and mediation of disputes involving ethnic, racial, or religious minorities?

- *Trust.* Trust and mutually beneficial relationships among officials, civic leaders, and citizens is critical to promoting harmony in diverse urban environments. What is the quality of leadership on divisive issues? Do political leaders "play the ethnic card" and exacerbate tensions, or do they seek to moderate and mediate tensions among groups?
- *Structure of political and decision-making institutions.* Do the political institutions, by design or by accident, systematically discriminate against any given minority group? Is representation proportional for all identity groups? Is there a spirit of dialogue and compromise among social groups?
- *Interdependencies and common bonds.* Do public policies emphasize what people have in common, such as regional loyalties, a common heritage, or a love of place, rather than what divides them in terms of culture, skin colour, or belief?
- *Taking action.* Are the grievances of disadvantaged groups heard and appreciated? Is concrete action taken to attempt to address these grievances seriously?
- *Minority participation.* Is effective participation of minorities in public life encouraged? Are minorities able to maintain their community, culture, identity, and characteristics?

Translating general principles into practical options is difficult. Each situation is a unique social environment with its own customs, image, problems, and issues. The following case studies provide some examples of how diversity and conflict management have been addressed in various settings. Chapters Four and Five offer choices and instruments for building democracy at the local level, focusing first on elections and then on participatory structures.

Figure 9

The Lund Guidelines: Recommendations for Reconciling Democracy and Diversity

The 1999 Guidelines for Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – drafted for the OSCE by Europe's High Commissioner for National Minorities – provide a well-considered overview of specific public policy recommendations for reconciling democracy and diversity. The "Lund Guidelines", as these are known, provide a more specific menu of measures that should be taken to help promote minority participation in institutions and public policy-making. Some of the main points are excerpted below.

Voting and Elections

The electoral process should facilitate the participation of minorities in the political sphere. States shall guarantee the right of persons belonging

to national minorities to take part in the conduct of public affairs, including through the rights to vote and stand for office without discrimination.

- The regulation of the formation and activity of political parties shall comply with the international law principle of freedom of association. This principle includes the freedom to establish political parties based on communal identities as well as those not identified exclusively with the interests of a specific community.
- The electoral system should facilitate minority representation and influence.
- The geographic boundaries of electoral districts should facilitate the equitable representation of national minorities.

Transparency

- The structures and decision-making processes of regional and local authorities should be made transparent and accessible in order to encourage the participation of minorities.

Advisory and Consultative Bodies

- States should establish advisory or consultative bodies within appropriate institutional frameworks to serve as channels for dialogue between governmental authorities and national minorities. Such bodies might also include special purpose committees for addressing such issues as housing, land, education, language, and culture. The composition of such bodies should reflect their purpose and contribute to more effective communication and advancement of minority interests.
- These bodies should be able to raise issues with decision-makers, prepare recommendations, formulate legislative and other proposals, monitor developments and provide views on proposed governmental decisions that may directly or indirectly affect minorities. Governmental authorities should consult these bodies regularly regarding minority-related legislation and administrative measures in order to contribute to the satisfaction of minority concerns and to the building of confidence. The effective functioning of these bodies will require that they have adequate resources.

Self-Governance

- Effective participation of minorities in public life may call for non-territorial or territorial arrangements of self-governance or a combination thereof. States should devote adequate resources to such arrangements.
- Non-territorial forms of governance are useful for the maintenance and development of the identity and culture of national minorities. The issues most susceptible to regulation by these arrangements include education, culture, use of minority language, religion, and other matters crucial to the identity and way of life of national minorities.

- Taking into account the responsibility of the governmental authorities to set educational standards, minority institutions can determine curricula for teaching of their minority languages, cultures, or both. Minorities can determine and enjoy their own symbols and other forms of cultural expression.
- Functions over which such administrations have successfully assumed primary or significant authority include education, culture, use of minority language, environment, local planning, natural resources, economic development, local policing functions, and housing, health, and other social services.
- Self-governance arrangements should be established by law and generally not be subject to change in the same manner as ordinary legislation. Arrangements for promoting participation of minorities in decision-making may be determined by law or other appropriate means.

Dispute Resolution

- Effective participation of national minorities in public life requires established channels of consultation for the prevention of conflicts and dispute resolution, as well as the possibility of *ad hoc* or alternative mechanisms when necessary. Such methods include:
- judicial resolution of conflicts, such as judicial review of legislation or administrative actions, which requires that the State possess an independent, accessible, and impartial judiciary whose decisions are respected;
- and additional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as
- negotiation,
- fact finding,
- mediation,
- arbitration,
- an ombudsman for national minorities, and
- special commissions, which can serve as focal points and mechanisms for the resolution of grievances about governance issues.

CASE STUDY

ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY
Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannesburg
Scott A. Bollens

This case study explores the role of public policy in contested cities and the impact it has on the magnitude and manifestation of ethno-national conflict. It looks at inter-communal strife in the ethnically polarized cities of Belfast (Northern Ireland), Jerusalem (Israel and the West Bank), and Johannesburg (South Africa). Each city encapsulates deep-rooted cleavages based on competing nationalisms and arguments over state legitimacy; each provides a multi-decade account of urban policy and management in contested bicommunal environments; and each has been engrossed in a transition process tied to progress on a broader political front of peace-making. The case study examines:

- the lessons that city management of ethnic conflict provides;
- the principles of city-building amidst group-based conflict;
- the linkage between local and national peace-building.

Deeply Divided Cities

A disturbing number of cities across the world are susceptible to intense inter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures, including cities such as Algiers, Beirut, Belfast, Brussels, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, New Delhi, Nicosia, and Sarajevo. In some cases (such as Jerusalem and Belfast), cities are the focal point for unresolved nationalist ethnic conflict. In other cases (such as Sarajevo), the management of war-torn urban areas holds the key to sustainable co-existence of warring ethnic groups subsequent to cessation of overt hostilities. Common to many of these cities is that ethnic identity and nationalism combine to create pressures for group rights, autonomy, or territorial separation. These cities can be battlegrounds between "homeland" ethnic groups, each proclaiming the city as their own. The legitimacy of a city's political structures and its rules of decision-making and governance are commonly challenged by ethnic groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power (such as blacks in South Africa) or demand group-based autonomy or independence (such as Palestinians in Jerusalem or the Quebecois in Montreal). Of course, not all ethnically tense cities erupt into violence. In Montreal, for example, tensions were high in 1995 when a referendum for Quebec's independence from Canada was narrowly defeated; although the voting was largely along ethnic lines and the streets filled with protesters, the city did not erupt into violence.

Urban public policies potentially can have substantial impact on ethnic stability or volatility. Such policies include land use planning and regulation, economic development, housing production and allocation, capital facility planning, social service deliv-

ery, community participation, and municipal government organization. These policies can maintain or disrupt territorial claims, they can distribute economic benefits fairly or unfairly, they can provide or discourage access to policy-making and political power, they can protect or erode collective ethnic/cultural rights, and they can stifle or galvanize political urban-based opposition.

Belfast

Background

Belfast encapsulates an overlapping nationalist (Irish/British) and religious (Catholic/Protestant) conflict. Since 1969 it has been a violent city of sectarian warfare. The urban arena is extremely segregated and people tend to live in distinctly segregated communities along the lines of conflict, with the antagonistic groups living close to one another but separate as well. Inter-community hostilities have required the building of 15 "peacelines" – ranging from corrugated iron fences and steel palisade structures, to permanent brick or steel walls, to environmental barriers or buffers. The city of Belfast, like the country of Northern Ireland as a whole, has a majority Protestant population. The 1996 city population of 297,000 was about 54 per cent Protestant and 43 per cent Catholic, although the Catholic percentage has been increasing over the last few decades due to higher birth rates and Protestant migration to adjoining towns.

Religious identities coincide strongly with political and national loyalties. The allegiances of Protestant "Unionists" and "loyalists" are with Britain, which from 1972 to 1999 exercised direct rule over Northern Ireland. Catholic "nationalists" and "republicans", in contrast, consider themselves Irish and commit their personal and political loyalties to the Republic of Ireland in the south. The introduction of British direct rule was brought about due to the instability of the "Troubles" catalyzed by widespread discrimination by the pre-1972 Unionist-controlled Northern Irish government. Direct rule has resulted in an almost complete absence of representative participation and accountability, with the locally elected 51-member Unionist majority Belfast City Council having severely constrained policy-making power.

Urban Policy

The objectives of Belfast urban policy-makers and administrators are:

- to position government's role and image in Belfast as a neutral participant not biased toward either "orange" (Protestant) or "green" (Catholic); and
- to ensure that government policy does not exacerbate sectarian tensions by managing ethnic space in a way that reacts to, and reflects, residents' wishes.

This means, in effect, that policy-makers condone the strict territoriality of the city, one that imposes tight constraints on the growing Catholic population while protecting under-utilized Protestant land. City government has no comprehensive or strategic approach to dealing with sectarian divisions, with the town planning function having largely assigned sectarian issues to policy domains outside its responsibility. The

1987 plan for the Belfast urban area states that, "it is not the purpose of a strategic land use plan to deal with the social, economic, and other aspects involved". It emphasizes instead the "neutral territory" of the central city and its revitalization. Housing allocation administrators have designed a neutral set of criteria intended to immunize them from discrimination claims. Yet, this neutrality has been found to reinforce the residential segregation of religions. Agencies involved in constructing new development or housing projects, in contrast, have learned that they must still work closely with sectarian neighbourhoods that do not conform to the neutral principles. These projects that are still basically sectarian in nature, however, have been *ad hoc* or project-based actions occurring outside a broader strategic framework aimed at progressive ethnic conflict management. In the end, British policy-making in Belfast has helped achieve short-term abstinence from violence, but it appears insufficient in a city of obstructive ethnic territoriality and varied Protestant-Catholic needs.

Jerusalem

Background

Jerusalem is an enigma: it is a highly multi-ethnic and religiously diverse city, unified in theory but separate in practice between the two major population groups. In Jerusalem, Jewish-Muslim religious and Israeli-Palestinian nationalist, tensions intertwine to create a city of "intimate enemies". With a 1996 population of about 603,000, the city is a site of demographic and physical competition between two populations.

The social and political geography of Jerusalem has dramatically changed from a multi-cultural mosaic as the pre-1948 British Mandated Territory, to a two-sided physical partitioning of Jerusalem into Israeli and Jordanian-controlled components during the 1949-1967 period. Since 1967, it has been a contested Israeli-controlled municipality three times the size of the pre-1967 city (due to unilateral and internationally unrecognized annexation) and encompassing formerly-Arab East Jerusalem. The international status of East Jerusalem today remains "occupied territory". Jewish demographic advantage (of approximately three to one) within the Israeli-defined city of today's "Jerusalem" translates into Jewish control of the city council and mayor's office. Arab resistance to participating in municipal elections they deem to be illegitimate solidifies this control. The city of Jerusalem is surrounded on three sides by the Israeli-occupied West Bank, populated by approximately 1.7 million Palestinians and about 150,000 Jews.

Urban Policy

Since 1967, Israeli urban policy-makers and planners have pursued the goals of Israeli control and security through policies that entrench a Jewish majority within the Israeli-defined city. These policies have:

- facilitated the pace and increased the magnitude of Jewish development to assert Jewish demographic strength;

- influenced the location of new Jewish development in annexed areas to create an obstacle to "re-division" of the city;
- restricted Arab growth and development to weaken their claims to a reunified Jerusalem.

Large Jewish communities in strategic locations have been built throughout the annexed municipal area in order to establish a "critical mass" of Jews in the urban region after 1967. Of the approximately 70 square kilometres annexed after the 1967 War, approximately 24 square kilometres (or about 33 per cent) have been expropriated by the Israeli government. The "public purpose" behind such expropriations is the development of Jewish neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods today in "east" Jerusalem are homes to approximately 160,000 Jewish residents. Since 1967, 88 per cent of all housing units built in east Jerusalem have been built for the Jewish population.

Israeli planners have restricted, through planning regulations, the growth of Palestinian communities within Jerusalem. Restrictions take multiple forms such as land expropriation, zoning regulations that constrain Palestinian rights to development, use of road-building to restrict and fragment Palestinian communities, "hidden guidelines" behind Israeli plans which restrict building volume in Palestinian areas, and the intentional absence of plans for Arab areas that obstructs infrastructure provision and community development. As a result, only 11 per cent of annexed east Jerusalem, at most, is vacant land where the Israeli government today allows Palestinian development.

There has been over 30 years of Israeli partisan planning in Jerusalem. Such policy-making, however, appears paradoxically to have produced city-level and regional consequences that now bedevil Israel's own goal of undisputed political control. This partisan planning, over the years, has now proven an obstacle in reaching a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians that can secure Israel's long-term interests in this perhaps most-contested city.

Johannesburg

Background

Johannesburg anchors a geographically disfigured urban region of enormous economic and social contrasts. It is clear that the legacy of apartheid-era city planning will be reflected in the city's demographic geography for many years, if not decades. The metropolitan region contains at least two million people and is approximately 60 per cent black and 31 per cent white. Racially-segregated townships, cities, and informal settlements (shanty towns) characterize modern Johannesburg, even well into the post-apartheid era. The *de facto* segregation is a legacy, directly or indirectly, of Group Areas apartheid legislation enacted in the 1950s. An enormous proportion of basic needs are presently unmet, including housing, land tenure, water, and sanitation facilities. Income distribution is grossly skewed in the province and nationally.

Black Africans inhabit several different "geographies of poverty". The two primary locations are Alexandra and Soweto townships, the latter being an amalgamation of 29 townships south-west of, and spatially disconnected from, Johannesburg. Bricks-and-mortar housing was intentionally underbuilt since urban blacks were considered temporary and unwanted. Hostels were built to shelter workers in industrial and mining activities nearby. The hostels are areas of significant tension politically, ethnically, and physically. Backyard shacks in townships and free-standing shacks on vacant land in townships are characterized by near-inhuman conditions of living, lack of secure tenure, inadequate standards of shelter and sanitation, and lack of social facilities and services.

Urban Policy

In 1995, local and metropolitan government in Johannesburg was restructured to link politically formerly white local authorities with adjacent black townships. Black majorities were subsequently elected to all four local governments and to the Johannesburg metropolitan council. Post-apartheid city-building principles aspire to stitch together the segregated living areas and integrate the disconnected parts and peoples of Johannesburg. On the one hand, policy is directed at alleviating the many short-term, crisis-related needs of the urban fringe poor pertaining to shelter, public health, personal security, and unmet basic needs for water, sanitation, and electricity. On the other hand, policy is seeking to create a compact and functionally integrated city where the poor are located close to central city employment and other urban opportunities. A major challenge for policy-makers in post-apartheid Johannesburg is that they are trying to address distressing levels of unmet human needs amidst market-based urban "normalization" processes – such as "employment suburbanization" (movement of well-paying jobs away from poorer areas into already prosperous suburbs) – that threaten to reinforce apartheid's racial geography.

Amidst societal transformation there is also a critical examination of urban policy practices. Two competing paradigms now exist – one connected to town planning's historical affinity to regulatory control; the other rooted in anti-apartheid community mobilization and linked to a more expansive definition of development. The latter paradigm represents an historic attempt to create a system of social guidance that utilizes the legacy and lessons of social mobilization.

Lessons Learned

The challenges of urban policy-making in Belfast, Jerusalem, and Johannesburg inform policy-makers and planners in other urban regions of the world, both in ideologically-contested cities as well as those near ethnic breaking-point. Some of the lessons and strategies that can be adapted depending on context, include the following:

- *Promote rules of inter-ethnic agreement, rather than winner-take-all politics*. Developing local democracy in highly diverse and conflicted settings requires movement away from majoritarian democratic forms toward the use of rules that require inter-ethnic agreement on common issues and the use of political incen-

tives that inspire cross-group coalition building. Although majority rule may be appropriate in many situations even with changing and volatile ethnic and racial differences, in those cities where tensions are acute and violence is likely forms of consensus-promoting democracy may be appropriate.

- *Cities and urban policies matter amidst broader conflict*. Local policy can moderate, exacerbate, or passively reflect the broader historical conflict. This depends upon the strategies chosen, the spatial, economic, and psychological conditions and contradictions they generate in the landscape, and the organizational and mobilization qualities of the oppositional group. "Partisan" planning exacerbates group-based conflict and, through its production of urban inequality and instability, creates arguments for its continued use. "Neutral" policy-making suspends antagonisms in the short-term, but buys such abstinence from violence at the expense of reconciling competing ethnic visions.
- *"Equity" policy-making is a necessary component of policy-making*. Equity policy-making, which would involve redistributing resources to the often materially disadvantaged "out-group", appears to be a necessary component of urban policy-making in the midst of conflict. Yet there is a likelihood this would prove counterproductive if it occurs outside broader negotiations over sovereignty and political control. "Resolver" policy-making – policies aimed at conflict prevention, management, and resolution – is needed that goes beyond urban symptoms of conflict to address root causes. It should seek to accommodate competing ethnic needs and contribute such urban policy principles to national-level negotiations dealing with sovereignty claims, basic social structures, and power relationships.
- *Neutrality is not necessarily fair in governing contested cities.* Neutrality and colour-blindness in policy, when applied in urban settings of structural inequality, do not produce equitable outcomes. Governments must avoid the comfort of acting as a benign outsider to ethnic conflict. Equality of opportunity is not sufficient when life choices have been constrained by societal expectations and actions. In other cases, seemingly uniform requirements dealing with land ownership or development can have disparate effects across cultures having different values and customs.
- *The goal of urban policy should be accommodation, not assimilation that requires individuals to abandon their cultures or identities*. Urban policy-makers should take stock of ethnicity and colour, not dismiss it or seek to eradicate it. Policy-makers should accommodate the unique needs of each ethnic group. Urban policy strategies should be aimed at "co-existent viability" of ethnic groups having different objective and psychological needs, and should help define the terms of peaceful urban and metropolitan co-existence – in terms of territorial control, public service availability, and preservation of group identity.
- *Carefully manage local citizen participation in contested cities*. Urban policy-makers must find ways to balance intra-group community development and inter-group community relations. Policy should seek to improve and enrich the self-confidence

and identity of deprived ethnic communities without solidifying ghettoization and inter-group separation.

- *Recognize psychological needs of communities*. Policy-makers should incorporate non-technical, psychological aspects of community identity into a planning profession that heretofore has been biased toward objective and rational methods. An ethnic group under perceived threat has psychological as well as objective needs. Conflict will be most evident when one ethnic group is seen as ascending; the other descending. For a threatened urban ethnic group, psychological needs pertaining to viability, group identity, and cultural symbolism can be as important as objective needs pertaining to land, housing, and economic opportunities.
- *Ethnic differences must be expected, recognized, and appreciated*. Policy-makers and planners in contested cities must address the complex spatial, social-psychological, and organizational attributes of potentially antagonistic urban communities. They must be sensitive to the multi-ethnic environments toward which their skills are applied, and to the ways that empowered groups legitimate and extend their power. Specifically, urban policy-making should, in its methods of analysis and decision-making, explicitly account for the importance of ethnic community identity, territoriality, and symbolism embedded in the urban landscape. Training and education of local administrators and officials through professional organizations and cross-community forums should prepare them to deal with the complex issues of city-building amidst ethnic difference.
- *Co-existence, rather than integration per se*. Urban policy-making should both respect ethnic territoriality where it constitutes a healthy source of community identity, and overcome ethnic territorial boundaries where they distort urban functionality and obstruct cross-community relations. Separation in urban settings breeds contempt. Learning of stereotypes is made easier if you do not know the other person. It is harder to demonize someone when you are interacting with them. Gates and boundaries (physical or psychological) in urban areas have two effects: provision of safety; and reinforcement of "the other" as a threat. The goal of policy should not be integration *per se*, but a "porous" society where diversity can co-exist and communities are free to interact, if they choose.
- *Redress economic disadvantages and grievances*. In reconstructing urban regions racked by conflict, there should be clear articulation of the roles of governmental, private, and non-governmental sectors in "normalization" processes. Normalization of urban regions distorted by group conflict should emphasize policies to uplift the previously disadvantaged, and not rely solely on a free economic market that would likely spawn new forms of urban and regional inequality. During urban reconstruction, local officials should be especially attuned to how their approaches and actions affect urban development and they should pursue policies of co-existence, sharing, and normalization of politics in ways that reflect the psychological, emotional, and cultural views of both established and newly relocated city residents, especially immigrant communities.

- *Consider local autonomy as a form of broader power sharing*. Urban policy-making should contribute practical principles that foster co-existent viability and connect these efforts to larger peace and reconstruction efforts. Tangible urban-level efforts and national-level negotiations should constitute inseparable parts of peace-making efforts. Local policies aimed at the basic needs and co-existent viability of competing ethnic groups are capable of contributing the sole authentic source of inter-ethnic accommodation amidst a set of larger diplomatic political agreements that may otherwise be susceptible to ethnic hardening and fraying. Political arrangements such as "two-tier metropolitanism" (partially divided or shared sovereignty) or power-sharing democracy that might emerge can respond to the basic dual needs for sovereignty and political control, but must be reinforced by changes in on-the-ground local policies.
- *Develop urban strategies, in addition to a national peace*. Policy principles and peace agreements inevitably represent agreements at the political level, not that of daily interaction between ethnic groups and individuals. Progressive and ethnically-sensitive urban strategies can be put forth to anchor these formal local agreements over power. A national peace without urban accommodation would be one not rooted in the practical and potentially explosive issues of inter-group and territorial relations.

ESSAY

PEACE COMMISSIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION

Michael Lund

Peace commissions, peace committees, or ethnic conciliation commissions are special structures that are set up at the national, regional, and local levels to informally bring together representatives of formerly conflicting communities to discuss transition issues in the open and address potentially volatile inter-communal problems. By creating neutral forums for open dialogue on lingering issues as well as mechanisms to monitor violent behaviour that may disrupt a peace accord, peace committees aim to discourage violence and actively promote reconciliation. Convening representatives of the government, opposition groups, religious leaders, associations, military, and police as well as unaffiliated community members create opportunities and vehicles for collaborative problem-solving through which government-opposition, majority-minority, or minority-minority conflicts can be addressed.

Thus, peace committees constitute auxiliary and decentralized processes to carry out and reflect the national process of political reconciliation that is taking place. They are one way to build legitimacy for the more permanent structures because they bring stakeholders together and give them a role in moving the peace process forward.

Figure 10

Examples of Peace Commissions

Peace commissions have been used most explicitly in Eastern Europe, South Africa, Sudan, and Nicaragua:

- *Eastern Europe*. Responding to concerns that ethnic tensions in Central and Eastern Europe could threaten European regional security, a US-based NGO, Partners for Democratic Change, launched an initiative in 1992 to develop local ethnic conciliation commissions in towns experiencing significant ethnic tensions. By 1995, six commissions were operating in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
- *South Africa*. In South Africa, the National Peace Accord of September 1991 created dispute resolution commissions, later known as peace committees, at the national, regional, and local levels to assist in investigating and actively combating violence and intimidation that was jeopardizing the transition from apartheid to majority rule. The aim was to create a nation-wide network of peace structures and a dispute resolution system linked with the process of political rapprochement that had begun a year earlier between the ruling National

Party and the ANC with the lifting of a ban on political parties and the release of political prisoners, most notably the ANC leader, Nelson Mandela.

- *Nicaragua*. In 1986, concerned citizens in the rural Nueva Guinea region of Nicaragua began meeting to respond to local violence, resulting in the formation of what are now known as local peace commissions. The National Reconciliation Commission in Nicaragua also moved to establish and support peace commissions at the zonal and local levels, although resources were very scarce. By early 1995, there were over 85 local peace commissions.
- *Sudan*. The 1994 Akobo Peace Conference was an initiative of community elders in southern Sudan to address inter-communal conflict between two sections of the Nuer ethnic group in south-central Sudan. This conference set up mobile peace delegations that included community and church leaders. They were tasked with travelling to fishing holes and cattle camps to explain, monitor, and promote a recent peace agreement. The conference achieved considerable success at managing differences among factions of this ethnic group amidst the broader civil war in Sudan. The agreement may be a model on which further local conflict resolution efforts in Sudan and elsewhere in Africa could be based.

Tasks and Functions

Peace commissions focus on a number of tasks, including:

- *Information gathering*. Investigate incidents of ethnic or religious conflict and allegations of discrimination in employment, housing, education, or public facilities; channel information to the proper authorities; and hold public hearings on community problems that may otherwise result in inter-group tensions or discrimination;
- *Advocacy*. Denounce human rights violations, speak out on behalf of victims, counter exaggeration and rumours, and make non-partisan public statements;
- *Disseminate information*. Disseminate cross-cultural and human rights educational and informational material and develop courses of instruction on human rights;
- *Promote non-violent methods*. Put pressure on groups to use non-violent means in any strikes or demonstration and instruct them in non-violent methods;
- *Moral support*. Offer pastoral support, listening and grieving with victims of violence, and providing a moral presence, especially from those peace commission members who are also religious leaders;
- *Submit recommendations*. Submit reports and make recommendations to local, regional, and national public officials on legislation to assist commission objectives;
- *Help resolve political controversies and disputes*. For example, the South African peace committees dealt with hundreds of disputes throughout the country, includ-

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ing such issues as permission for political marches and rallies; police conduct during marches and rallies; attempts by one political group to prevent another from engaging in political activities; threatened or actual consumer boycotts or refusal to pay for municipal services; and threats to withdraw such services; and

- *Election assistance*.

Organization

Commissions can be created informally and independently by community members, using a bottom-up approach, or they can be set up formally from the national level as part of an accord, using a top-down approach. Depending largely on the level at which they are initiated, these commissions may operate entirely at the local level, as in Eastern Europe; operate locally but have regional co-ordinating bodies, as in Nicaragua; or function actively at the local, regional, and national levels, as in South Africa.

Commission members are not necessarily neutral in their positions on the conflict, but must include representatives from opposing sides, even ex-combatants. To be trusted by the conflicting parties, they need to be widely respected people in their communities who have a history of being active in community affairs, have relationships of trust that cross political boundaries, and possess relevant knowledge and resources for the work of the commission.

Commission members often include lay church leaders or clergy. Commission members and a chairperson may either be appointed or elected, as determined by the local officials creating the commission. The Ethnic Conciliation Commissions in Eastern Europe consist of five to eleven members representing ethnic, religious, and national groups in their communities. Commission members and a chairperson are either appointed or elected for a three-year term as determined by the city creating the commission. Staff may be paid or volunteers.

Figure 11

South Africa's Peace Committees

The tripartite structure of the South African peace committees is probably the most elaborate to be developed thus far. The National Peace Commission (NPC) had approximately 60 members, most of whom were experienced politicians; it included a small secretariat. Its task was to monitor implementation of the National Peace Accord (NPA) and ensure compliance. The National Peace Secretariat (NPS), created in 1991, was permanent and full-time, consisting of seven persons nominated by the members of the NPC, and thus the major political parties; it includes one member from the legal profession, and one representative of the Department of Justice. The role of the NPS was to define the regions covered by the regional committees, and to co-ordinate the Regional and Local Dispute Resolution Commissions (RDRCs

and LDRCs), which later came to be known as Regional and Local Peace Commissions (RPCs and LPCs). Whereas the NPC met only twice before April 1994, the NPS met frequently.

The RPCs included representatives from political organizations, churches, trade unions, industry and business in the region, local and tribal authorities, a wide variety of civil society organizations, and the police and defence forces. Their stated duties included creating and guiding the local peace committees; advising on causes of violence and intimidation in the region; settling disputes by negotiation with the parties concerned; monitoring peace accords and future peace agreements and settling related disputes; informing the NPS of steps taken to prevent violence and intimidation in its region including breaches of agreements; and consulting with authorities in the region to combat or prevent violence and intimidation. RPCs also identify communities where LPCs should be established.

The LPCs' stated duties included creating trust and reconciliation among grassroots community organizations, including security forces; co-operating with the local Justice of the Peace in combating and preventing violence and intimidation; settling disputes causing violence or intimidation by negotiating with the parties concerned; eliminating conditions which may harm peace accords or peaceful relations, and promoting compliance with peace accords; agreeing on rules relating to marches, rallies and gatherings; and liaising with local police and magistrates on matters concerning the prevention of violence at political events. Staff were appointed by the RPCs on a consensus basis. By the 1994 elections, about 260 LPCs had been created. It proved helpful to have at least one professional mediator to serve as a technical assistant.

Peace committees can often augment the work of local police and government in encouraging law and order. In South Africa, UN and other international observers co-ordinated with the peace commissions, attended their meetings, and communicated regularly with political groups across the spectrum, keeping informed of planned events and potential conflicts. In authorizing the deployment of the UN Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) the UN Security Council mandated the observers to strengthen ties with the National Peace Accord structures. UNOMSA officials attended political rallies and demonstrations, RPC and LPC meetings, and NPC meetings and consulted regularly with NPS staff. The international monitors in South Africa have considerably bolstered the peace structures, and their presence has been effective in containing some political violence.

Key Enabling Conditions

Outlined below are some design, implementation, and contextual factors that are important in structuring an effective peace commission.

Design Factors

- Initiation of the committees comes from the affected country itself;
- Support from respected individuals whose skills and personality help keep up the momentum for peace;
- Selection of multi-skilled and flexible staff able to operate in uncertain environments;
- Inclusion of all relevant groups, including those that may ordinarily be marginalized, such as traditional authorities, women, youth, and the displaced;
- Authority to monitor political parties, the security forces, local government, and the media so committees can hold official actors accountable for their actions;
- Local community commitment to the idea and development of a sense of ownership of the committee mechanism.

Implementation Factors

- Financing is ample and prompt;
- Committee proceedings are seen to be consistently following balanced and even-handed procedures;
- Information dissemination to the wider general community is actively pursued by the committees, countering the influence of rumour, disinformation, and suspicion;
- Monitoring and helping to guide and manage political demonstrations, funeral marches, and other public events that otherwise could turn violent are undertaken assertively by the committees;
- Selection of local recipients by outside donors after gaining thorough knowledge of the options, and allocating assistance to needs that are identified by reliable local stakeholders;
- Training in conflict resolution, administration, finance and other necessary skills provided for staff, so that the committees can be sustained on their own beyond the initial phase.

Contextual Factors

- When the parties to the conflict are solidly committed to the political transition and have the capacity to bring along their followers. Where the stakes of political competition are high, such as in the run-up to elections, peace committees may face difficulties because of the continuing incentive of the parties to seek partisan advantage;
- Whether created by central political actors or arising from the grassroots, peace commissions in most cases require official agreement of the conflict parties. Infor-

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mal peace committee efforts do not necessarily require such agreement, but probably require the assent and support of the leading political authorities to be effective;

- Where effective limits have been placed on armed groups, including covert activities such as death squads as well as the official security forces, to keep them from carrying out violence and intimidation. In especially tumultuous areas, some commissions find it difficult to isolate themselves from the tensions and hatreds present;
- If the key groups that are represented have previously developed relationships of trust;
- If the structure of local committees take into account the particular patterns of authority in different communities;
- If civil society institutions can provide the source of community leadership and support.

Challenges and Pitfalls

- *Source of funds*. Commissions depend on funding, and government funding may be needed, at least initially. In Nicaragua, peace commissions had limited access to resources due to lack of ties with the government. But in South Africa, the reliance on government funding led to widespread perceptions that the peace structures were under government control and that manipulation was taking place. To become more visibly independent from the government, as well as to shorten cumbersome procedures required by government financial regulations for handling public funds, it was agreed that the National Peace Secretariat (NPS) would seek independent funding and administer its own funds in accordance with agreed procedures. The South African experience suggests that commission funding ideally should come from a neutral entity, not from the government or other institutions involved in the conflicts. For example, members with church ties might help arrange for funding through church bodies in- and outside the country.
- *Stimulating participation and balance*. It may be difficult to recruit capable and willing prospective members because they will be initially sceptical that a peace accord is viable. Launching a truly representative commission is also often difficult. Parties often insist on preconditions before a commission can meet. Community leaders may be uncertain of the commissions' purposes, power, and prospects, and thus wary of being drawn into co-operation with rival political forces, undercutting their own legitimacy. The range of participation may be limited; women, youth, and church leaders may be unwilling or unable to participate.
- *Security risks*. In some cases, participation puts members' lives in jeopardy. In Natal, South Africa, several peace commissioners have been assassinated.
- *Politicization*. Some argue that peace commissions, which have multi-party-based structures, tend to politicize conflict that may be apolitical. Thus, a local dispute

channelled through a peace commission composed of political leaders may turn a conflict that has little to do with politics into a divisive political issue.

- *Co-optation*. Top-down peace structures can deteriorate into state bureaucracies with little responsiveness to community needs and desires. An evaluation of the South Africa peace structures noted a widespread public perception that they were elitist. To avoid this, some experts recommend forming stronger linkages between the local peace structures and indigenous, grassroots community conflict resolution practices and home-grown organizations.
- *Fragmentation*. The decentralized, bottom-up structure, such as that used in Nicaragua, may result in poor co-ordination between local committees, limiting their ability to learn from one another and keeping them from working in other parts of the country where the services are also needed. Local commissions may require a national or regional entity to co-ordinate actions and facilitate communication among the individual commissions.

Conclusions

Because most peace committee structures are relatively young, much is still being learned about their possibilities as well as their failures or limitations. But in certain conditions, peace commissions clearly have been successful in achieving their most immediate overriding function, which is to contain inter-communal disputes. Because commission members represent the various ethnic, religious, and national groups in their communities and seek to enlist influential and respected members of the communities in which they operate, they can often recognize conflicts as they emerge and respond to them quickly through local informal and effective processes. In South Africa, peace workers have observed that although political violence continued in areas where peace committees were active, the violence would have been much worse without their activities.

Peace committees can also establish safe places and reserve specific times for raising issues that other forums may not address. They can build lines of communication across communal divides, thus serving as a confidence-building measure. They can help to create balance in the effective influence of the differing elements of a community. By setting rules and codes of conduct for venting disputes, they legitimize the notion of peaceful negotiation of differences and give participants experience in multi-party co-operation and tolerance. In the process, participants may be educated and trained in cross-group and cross-cultural collective problem-solving skills and procedures. Finally, they help to promote ethnic, religious, and national harmony and encourage understanding regarding cultural differences.

Peace committees should not be seen as permanent substitutes for the regular institutions of a government. As interim para-governmental mechanisms to help manage tensions, they are not intended to displace formal institutions of government such as the police, judicial system, local councils, and parliaments. Although peace committees may transform themselves into continuing organizations, the popular support

garnered through peace committees needs to be increasingly channelled into the more institutionalized forms of conflict resolution of the state that can give a regular political voice to the broad rank and file adult population, such as regular elections and legislatures. Thus in South Africa, the government elected in April 1994 ended its funding of the peace committees because of the view that the institutions of the multi-party state with its political parties and national assembly, would be better able to represent the views and interests of all citizens.

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E S S A Y

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND CITIES

Demetrios G. Papademetriou

International migration today touches the lives of more people and looms larger in the politics and economics of more states than ever before. In fact, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, almost no country is immune from the impact of international migration. Migration and the mobility of peoples are as old as mankind; at times such population flows have been crucial to human progress. Yet migration is still usually viewed as a problem and cities today seem to be only marginally better at managing it effectively than those in the past. And remarkably, the duration and depth of a society's engagement with immigration does not seem to inoculate it against excessive reactions to immigration.

One of the most urgent challenges most societies face in the years ahead is identifying a set of coherent responses to one of international migration's most important dimensions: its effect on receiving societies' cities and their residents – natives and immigrants. In this regard, what follows is an outline of important questions that cities that are hosts to large numbers of international immigrants must address if they are to remain successful in the decades ahead. Understanding the interactive effects of international migration and devising appropriate responses to them, is an essential element of managing the issues well.

Managing Multi-ethnic Cities

Immigration contributes to and impacts on a number of important issues, perhaps most critically on the following:

- labour markets and economic participation;
- housing and physical space; and
- societal "cohesion" and political participation.

Together, these issue areas help shape immigrant integration and determine whether a city's long-term experience with immigration will be positive or troubled.

Labour market and economic participation issues. The importance of these issues cannot be over-emphasized not only for their role in successfully incorporating immigrants economically but, perhaps even more critically, for their effect in shaping the host public's view of immigrants. Immigrants can be considered as net contributors to and creators of additional public assets, rather than as net consumers of such assets – that is, as economic and social resources rather than as economic and social liabilities.

Many immigrants bring with them significant amounts of both human and physical capital, contribute to business and job creation, and often play significant roles in the

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revitalization of city neighbourhoods. Evidence from cities such as Amsterdam, Melbourne, or New York attest to the positive effects the energy of immigrants can bring to reviving the economic life and renewing the physical infrastructure of cities with large immigrant concentrations. The ability of local governments to promote and facilitate such revitalization can lead to big differences in outcomes. Among the most promising initiatives are:

- reducing some of the barriers to entrepreneurship;
- making more systematic efforts to recognize the credentials of immigrants;
- making more systematic efforts to re-certify immigrants with technical and professional qualifications;
- encouraging immigrant communities to use their often unique forms of "social capital" to advance themselves economically – although always within the host society's legal norms;
- assisting newcomers qualify for start-up business loans; and
- assisting newcomers qualify for housing mortgages.

Australia, Canada, The Netherlands, and the United States seem to be ahead of other immigrant-receiving societies in different aspects of these issues (two areas in which the US public and private sectors have been particularly creative and effective are qualification assistance for start-up business loans and housing mortgages).

Labour market competition and adverse job opportunity and wage effects directly and intensely affect a society's marginalized groups such as immigrants. These issues, as well as the related issue of immigrants' contributions to the "informal" and "underground" economy, need to be understood much better and treated sensitively.

For example, in many cities throughout the United States, such as Los Angeles (California), Chicago (Illinois), and Miami (Florida), disputes have arisen over the impact of illegal immigrants from Mexico and Central and South America on jobs in the manufacturing, tourism, and construction industries. These cities have recently been working with the US and Mexican governments, particularly, to normalize the work situation of illegal immigrants who have been in the US for many years (and whose children have become citizens) and to create a programme in which those seeking work can come to the United States legally. These cities have also re-oriented their social welfare programmes to meet the health, education, and safety needs of illegal immigrants by taking a pragmatic approach that recognizes the indispensability of these people to the labour pool.

While analytically these issues pose a challenge, in public policy terms the elements of an answer can be found in two types of initiative. Firstly, making education and training programmes truly accessible (rather than just available), for all who need them. In this regard, there are few shining examples, although some countries, such as The Netherlands and Canada, seem to be doing better than others. Secondly,

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developing labour market and related rules that, at a minimum, reduce significantly incentives for employers to break them. Some employers clearly employ immigrants with little regard to their legal status because most immigrants are willing to work for lower wages and accept inferior working conditions. And when the employment is off-the-books, an avenue that allows employers to avoid paying their social taxes, the immigrants' illegal status can be an "advantage". None of the measures employed so far by receiving societies – almost all of which focus on penalizing employers for employing unauthorized workers – have been successful. Hence there is a need for re-examination. The effort to recast the dominant thinking in this regard has already begun in the United States – where, as of early 2000, the union movement and its allies have begun to focus on the conditions of work, rather that the immigration status of the job occupant, and on targeting employers who refuse to play by fundamental labour-market rules.

Spatial concentration. Physical segregation and spatial concentration are among the most challenging issues that arise from large-scale immigration. The development of immigrant enclaves typically affects the ability of immigrants to become socially and economically integrated; frequent characterization of these enclaves as "ghettos" further affects how host populations perceive immigrants.

A better understanding of the causes and effects of concentration is essential if policies that advance the well-being of cities and their residents are to be developed and pursued with some expectation of success. Is spatial concentration the result of voluntary preferences by immigrant groups who opt to organize themselves in enclaves so as to combat their marginalization, protect themselves socially and culturally, and advance economically by using ethnic resources (including "social capital") to maximum advantage? Or is it the precursor and predictor of such social pathologies as marginalization, troubled inter-group relations, "disaffiliation", and fragmentation? Furthermore, how does spatial concentration affect the pattern of immigrant interactions with the broader host population as well as with other ethnic and marginalized groups?

Looking at the issue from a different perspective, is spatial concentration the result of exclusionary policies and the effect of public and private discriminatory practices by the host society (the result of unequal access to housing, jobs, social goods and resources, and so on)? Or is it a rational process that uses ethnic solidarity as a transition belt to eventual broader societal integration? For example, in London there are both highly integrated neighbourhoods with a vibrant mosaic of peoples as well as certain parts of the city that are relatively homogenous areas mostly inhabited by migrant peoples of the same culture. London has sought to foster a sense of tolerance in diverse communities and cultural identity for those areas more clearly identified with a single group. In one programme, grants are offered to community groups that reflect a particular immigrant culture, fostering their language, music, art, theatre, and other traditions.

Understanding these issues better can lead to public policies that facilitate turning spatial concentration into an asset while at the same time trying to address the liabilities of concentration. Programmes involving sustained improvements to an area's social and physical infrastructure have had some success in Quebec and some Northern European countries. Programmes involving the gradual privatization of public (social) housing have had some success in the US. Of course, vastly different philosophical traditions with regard to public housing (and, more generally, social issues) between North America and much of Europe, have so far restricted the opportunities for transatlantic learning.

Social cohesion is linked to political participation. Failing to work towards (or making progress towards achieving) the integration of newcomers misses an opportunity to benefit from immigration as fully as possible. Furthermore, there is the risk of creating different classes of membership in societies and, eventually, adversely affecting societal cohesion. Tolerance, inclusion, equality, effective inter-group relations, hope, and cohesion, are not abstractions – they are indispensable elements of successful multi-ethnic cities and societies.

One question that must be answered in all instances is how public institutions – public schools, bureaucracies, public service delivery agencies, police and judicial systems, political parties – can promote inclusion (and reject exclusion) more effectively? As advanced industrial societies are beginning to "rediscover" their private sector institutions another set of questions seems to be gaining in importance. Specifically, what roles do (and can) private institutions – such as unions, individual employers and their associations, banking institutions, churches and other social assistance agencies, foundations, and self-help and mutual-aid organizations – play in offering the necessary mediation and conflict prevention/resolution services?

The inevitable other side to social inclusion and tolerance is social exclusion. Exclusion spans issues of physical segregation, social and cultural discrimination, marginalization, and the absence of adequate or meaningful, or reductions in, economic opportunities. Interest in promoting inclusion should come as much from the fact that immigration entails a process of social, economic, and cultural growth for immigrants as from the realization that it does so also for their hosts. Combating social exclusion (and the racism and discrimination that typically accompany it) is a priority for all societies. In this last regard, offering the local franchise to EU citizens and efforts by the EU Commission to devise and enshrine anti-racist and anti-discriminatory instruments are worth watching closely. So are the efforts by a handful of EU member states to grant the local franchise to long-term legal residents, regardless of nationality.

Debates in national capitals and, more interestingly, actions by a number of US cities to guarantee equal access to all types of services are similarly important to follow. Ultimately, it may be that trying to learn from and emulate Canada's strict adherence to non-discrimination and inclusion in both public and most private conduct may be the most worthwhile effort for immigrant-receiving cities to explore.

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Conclusions: Engagement with Immigrants

Cities are undeniably the "ground zero" of immigration policies – the place where immigration and integration policies meet. It is in cities that competition for often scarce resources occurs (from housing and social goods, to jobs, education, and political power). They are also the real laboratories for testing different models of living together successfully as members of a community with shared purposes and goals that emphasize the "we" more than the "I" or "they." Consequently, it is important to strengthen the capacity of cities for performing this critical (and, in many ways, very traditional) role.

The search for solutions that work must engage all stakeholders, from government and social institutions to the smallest grassroots organizations. What should bind them together is a common interest in working together, both in devising and helping implement policies that assist with the integration of newcomers and in evaluating such policies and adapting them accordingly. Without an abiding and continuous commitment to policies that help different groups come closer together in pursuit of a common project, some cities will find that they will be pulled apart.

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CASE STUDY

PEACE-BUILDING IN BOSNIA'S ETHNICALLY DIVIDED CITIES
The Case of Gornji Vakuf
Julia Demichelis

In early 1993 a small Bosnian town of 25,000 Bosniac, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb residents erupted into flames from barrel bombs and sniper fire. For almost two years neighbours who had shared each other's culture, worked and schooled together, and jointly pursued a variety of recreations, turned on each other and killed each other's families, livestock and livelihoods, as well as their own community life. They dug tunnels and went out mostly at night. The remarkable capacity for conflict of Gornji Vakuf residents and their "armies" resulted in the most destroyed town in central Bosnia, as assessed by international engineers. Reconstructing the town's newly-divided reality – with most people on the opposite side of the cease-fire line to where they started – was beyond the scope of skilled technicians who brought material aid.

This case study looks at how two groups of outsiders arrived in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, as its peacetime identity became to be known, to create a dynamic process whereby those who had destroyed could rebuild more than just structures through a process of social reconstruction. In defiance of the Dayton Accords, the political town remained divided by the main ethno-national political parties, which maintain their power through separatism. However, civilian families and leaders relate openly across the divide in non-violent ways, demonstrating the limits of formal mediation and internationally-driven political solutions.

The Municipal Rehabilitation Programme

Early in 1995 USAID started an experiment to expand the role of disaster-relief NGOs. The aim was to rebuild structures for joint-ethnic use in politically-divided towns, while encouraging local politicians to adhere to the new laws of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, created by a pact brokered by the US government. This work plan instructed NGOs to negotiate with local-level politicians to agree to joint-use structures when their national-level leaders were unwilling to do the same. At the time, USAID underestimated the resolve of most Bosnian politicians to follow their own separatist party politics. However, the local political leaders did agree to collaborate with each other across political divides, agreeing to maintain their own jurisdictions but also engaging in "Balkan barter" ("enemies" frequently traded with each other throughout the war, though not in front of international observers).

In Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, the two "mayors" refused to permit the United Methodist Committee for Relief (UMCOR) – the NGO with which USAID had contracted – to distribute aid for four months while townspeople watched the cement and sand imported for their houses get ruined in NGO-rented local warehouse yards. The townspeo-

ple discovered that international humanitarians and donors could be as easily manipulated as they themselves were by the politicians who had forced them to fight. The two "mayors" continued to reject USAID's US$ 2 million offer to rebuild houses, schools, and infrastructure as long as the offer entailed any joint-ethnic ventures. USAID failed to persuade other donors working in Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje to join its new "embargo" against the community. It was difficult for USAID to learn that its stated social and political reconciliation goals actually contradicted each other. And it was institutionally painful to discover a new methodology to try to achieve both these goals in this highly visible, devastated community.

Start with Immediate Stakeholders

In August 1995 the author, an employee of UMCOR, arrived to assess the project's feasibility and to find new ways to implement this dual-directed project. The rapid community assessment that gave rise to the project had not revealed the complex issues members of a split community faced as they watched each other across the division line. Nor had it understood the untapped capacity of the townspeople themselves to find ways to assist UMCOR to achieve USAID's objectives in their community. Simply, the townspeople had been ignored while self-appointed politicians were empowered by USAID to identify what needed to be done after the war. The townspeople themselves had many ideas, and they were willing to take risks. But no foreigner had even asked them whether or not, and under what conditions, they would want to return to their homes or to rebuild their community.

Having been told by their elected representatives to kill, or be killed by, their own neighbours (and having done so with such fear that they destroyed their town, breaking through three UN cease fire lines), civilians of Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje trusted few people around them to tell them what to do next. They survived two alpine winters without heat or electricity. They survived sniper-fire when they sought food and water outside their tunnels. And they survived mine explosions from devices laid indiscriminately throughout the town when they had to address other needs, such as getting medical assistance. When the fighting and destruction were finally halted by a row of white UN tanks down the centre street, dividing the townspeople according to an agreement reached between their nationalist politicians; then it was only the townspeople, not outsiders, who could reflect upon what they had done to each other, contextualize their experiences within their history, and project some kind of a future for their community.

Only the people who had transformed themselves from neighbours to enemies could develop appropriate mechanisms to recondition their lives toward a peaceful future. They needed the support, not the directions, of neutral outsiders. Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje residents were particularly unimpressed with foreigners who arrived with money and comforts for themselves, and with lots of advice about how to recover from a situation they had not experienced themselves.

Conducting a preliminary survey of community attitudes, and assessing the feasibility of any joint-ethnic community reconstruction, required a team going to old and

young survivors wherever they were and listening to whatever they wanted to discuss. For three months, prior to identifying what programmes might be possible, the author and UMCOR staff alongside a locally resident peace-building organization, UN Office of Volunteers, used a survey methodology that included: informal house visits, billiard games, cooking meals, chopping firewood, and otherwise working alongside the community on both "sides" of town.

Establish Credibility and Develop Partnerships

For these three months, while no joint-ethnic humanitarian aid was permitted by the "mayors", newly resident NGO and international organization (IO) staff – worked to:

- open doors and minds;
- learn the area's history and peoples' perceptions thereof;
- share information with townspeople on both sides of the divide the townspeople themselves could not communicate across;
- assess needs and capacities;
- provide information about international humanitarian aid systems and its players; and most of all
- establish credibility of the foreign individuals who had a vision to pursue community peace-building work that would require a significant amount of trust on everyone's part.

It is essential for post-conflict participants to get to know these foreigners who try to help them; developing a person-to-person relationship in this post-conflict arena requires a human effort beyond upholding a project-to-project responsibility in an ordinary community development effort.

After two months of intensive individual and family meetings, NGO and IO staff, who exchanged information without breaking their confidentiality, accepted the idea of holding a public, joint-ethnic group meeting in a place selected by the community leaders themselves. Townspeople could not cross the dividing line, so a badly damaged building sitting on the line in the centre of town was chosen as the venue. (Ironically, this building was where the war started, the first shot fired.) While UMCOR staff hoped this event could lead to a first joint-ethnic project idea, it was structured freely so that no one would feel any pressure to decide anything, and whatever townspeople wanted to say would be acceptable and respected. The NGO staff had translated all USAID programme instructions into the local language.

The meeting began with hugs and joyful tears. The atmosphere was charged with the emotions of seeing former neighbours for the first time in years, including those the townspeople knew had killed their families. The townspeople advised UMCOR staff to focus on helping people and not playing politics. They agreed to meet again and again to talk with each other, alternating venues on each side of town, as long as UMCOR would officially conduct these meetings. UMCOR staff committed to do

whatever was necessary to continue and to channel information upwards in order to reprogram the investment targeted for this politically-divided community. UMCOR staff welcomed each “mayor” to send a representative to collect their own information, to then better represent their constituency. This unexpected transparency and partnership created a productive relationship with the UMCOR staff when the “mayors” later requested municipal authority training themselves.

Community Strategy

Within a month, and while Dayton was being drafted to draw new political lines throughout their country, the vibrant joint-ethnic Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje group decided that a youth centre for children would get them off the streets and mined ground that permeated the town’s centre, and allow them a space outside the political control of the “mayors” who forced them to go to ethnically-separate schools. The United Nations of Vienna volunteers worked with modestly-financed local staff, training them in non-violent teaching methods. Children were invited to identify courses they wished to take, and had to show their parents’ permission in order to attend. They chose computers, photography, art, English, dance, and other topics for which the the UN of Vienna recruited skilled international volunteers who also spoke the local language. In partnership, the UMCOR financed some of the “hardware” for this project. Meanwhile, USAID changed its programming direction, and invested in a larger, mono-ethnic house and school reconstruction programme that overshadowed its multi-ethnic reconciliation attempt of the previous year.

UMCOR implemented both projects, which signalled insincerity about reconciliation to the “mayors” and the townspeople. What did the UMCOR really stand for? What would be the dominant programming strategy? Only a thorough translation of US Congressional testimony explained the transition by USAID, whose officials soon had to come to Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje to speak with the townspeople themselves. USAID reversed some “joint-ethnic micro-project decisions” in order to support its new “mono-ethnic return plan”. The people of Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje said, “We will not use our children as experiments of the Federation – they have already suffered enough.” So, the townspeople worked intensively with UMCOR staff on the ground to determine (within a new US political framework) whether they wished to use their USAID programme funds. And then, to decide how to use the funds. They all continued to work with the constant IO, UN of Vienna, which was growing in reputation, as the joint-ethnic programmes were getting underway.

Community Organization

The Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje Youth Centre was conceived as a product of user programming and management, which has evolved in the direction and at the pace the townspeople could handle. No pre-set objectives were established, no strict criteria were given to teachers or students within which to work and learn. The programmes, as well as the building repair and interior design, were all done on-site by the townspeople – with their own expertise and ideas – as opposed to by foreign engineers and conflict resolution experts with experience from another place.

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The technical resources (cameras, development materials, computers, and so on) were procured jointly and gradually, and as the townspeople learned to manage them, additional proposals were co-written by the UN of Vienna staff and townspeople to procure further resources. The Youth Centre successfully expanded to become a Cultural Centre in a bigger premise across the street. Adults from both sides joined to attend a host of evening events and entertainment, while they still worked separately in mono-ethnic firms.

Meanwhile, in another "reconciliation" project, the well-funded UMCOR spurred numerous arguments in a joint women's group by giving them an "introductory" US$ 10,000 for knitting supplies, as soon as the group formed. The Catholic and Muslim women, all of whom had business or knitting experience, had not yet organized themselves in this new group, nor had they identified how they wanted to work, or exactly what use they would put any income to (or how they would manage and share it). A quick and easy sum dropped onto their books caused fighting for three months, when UMCOR had to appeal to United Nations of Vienna to resolve, and then visibly bowed out of the "reconciliation" effort. Eventually, a local-NGO business plan was made and the women's group strategy has succeeded in linking with other groups in broader women's issue forums to improve the quality of their post-conflict community lives.

Toward Sustainability

Two years later, UMCOR used up its projects' budget and exited when its principal donors lost interest in large-scale rehabilitation in the still-politically-divided community. It left 14 houses incomplete, only the external shell of the huge central library repaired, and a partially-repaired four-storey apartment building uninhabitable due to failed political negotiations. Based in Sarajevo, the NGO's management then looked at the new financing for Republika Srpska, which was easier to get than continuing the complicated process of dealing with the long-misunderstood political issues of a divided community. The NGO ordered all its staff to exit Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje and transferred them to new projects.

The NGO's locally-based Bosnian staff, having partnered well with the still-resourceful IO, transferred themselves to become volunteers or local employees of the town-owned reconciliation programmes. The UN of Vienna management continued to gradually hand over to community members each component of proposal/grant writing, donor relations, financial reporting, and programme management of their joint-ethnic programmes. The UN of Vienna finished the 14 houses through its own joint-ethnic construction programme, with its own donors and partners. One by one, as agreed upon with the community members, the UN of Vienna reduced its international volunteer staff, who had been absorbed into an UNDP umbrella-like programme, for complete local ownership. Thus, each community-identified programme incorporated and registered itself as a legal NGO in Bosnia, eventually linking themselves as a "family" of civil society organizations, and continue to manage themselves within the global peace-building community.

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Lessons Learned

- *Use participatory programming in all sectors of post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation work*. Strengthen community-minded civil society leaders, not the nationalist-oriented political leaders of the conflict. International agencies and NGOs that work through only official government (i.e., political) channels to design programmes and to direct investments continue to reinforce the physical divisions and dependencies created by these politicians during the war. Organizations that work directly with communities and professionals (i.e., doctors) to assess needs and to target participants have been able to reunite segregated ethnic groups or work with minority ethnic groups successfully. These agencies continue to strengthen multi-ethnic and democratic relations in Bosnia through community-building with the empowered participants.
- *Empower community leaders to create their own solutions*. The only way to prevent the re-emergence of conflict is to support local and national leaders to build up new institutions, those that reflect their cultural values and capacities, from a solid democratic base. With this in mind it is more effective to work outside the main political parties, through transparent partnerships within a community. The "ethnic cleansing" and expulsions in the Bosnian conflict, as well as the initial election exercises thereafter, have strengthened the nationalist-separatists' power. Foreign interveners must realize that each community has its own leaders who must be included in the design and implementation of sustainable-reconstruction and ethnic-reconciliation programmes in order to defeat Bosnia's entrenched political separatism.
- *Help the whole community to improve conditions*. Aiding only ethnic minorities or refugees increases local tensions among those that stayed to defend their neighbourhoods. The key to a peaceful Bosnia is the re-establishment of community life that emphasizes co-existence in a stable region. This approach assumes that refugees and displaced persons will return to their communities, when basic conditions such as security, jobs and education exist. Supplying only reconstruction materials or helping only one ethnic group does not help the community as a whole; rather, it fragments it.
- *Direct humanitarian resources through private sector channels, where possible, in a conscious strategy to reintegrate resource use, management, and ownership*. Promoting investment in small-scale, privately-owned businesses has resulted in successful multi-ethnic, cross-entity relationships, and thus in "independent" sources of power to influence post-conflict Bosnian politics. Tile-making machines, hand tools for craftsmen, clothing manufacturing, furniture repair, small dairy and agribusiness equipment, and the construction of cross-border infrastructure have brought people together in a country where minority-ethnic returns remain the exception (despite figures rising in 2000). This approach to peaceful, economic sustainability is ignored when aid/investment has been distributed through

programmes under contract to Bosnia's large publicly-owned agencies or firms, which, re-staffed along ethnic lines, have proven unproductive. Regardless of the particular Bosnian institutions engaged in reconstruction, *accountability* – making sure funds are used for the purposes intended – is imperative.

- *Reduce the commercialization and symbols of the international community at the local level*. Community redevelopment and democracy-building efforts call for different kinds of advertising and promotional campaigns than short-term emergency relief work. Pervasive symbols of foreign organizations in Bosnian villages are not desirable and do not contribute to the goals of community ownership and participation, key elements of redevelopment. Organizational logos should be minimized because of the violence-inciting role that various signs and symbols have played in the conflict's demarcation of territory. While nationalist propaganda continues to bombard people with separatist sentiments and laws to protect minorities remain politically unendorsed, self-congratulatory advertising by foreign players continues to emphasize the presence of and dependence on foreign actors, over five years after a multi-party peace agreement was signed. Such advertising trivializes the real purpose of these programmes – to help families and communities re-establish themselves; and it reduces the space for multi-ethnic community-inspired messages to encourage people to reconcile in the face of protracted, nearly institutionalized, separation.
- *Create a consistent donor strategy and a practical set of co-ordination principles to accomplish it*. Only a consistent post-conflict rehabilitation strategy among Bosnia's donors will avoid confusion and often renewed conflict among residents, NGO workers and officials in the same municipality trying to comply with different donor conditions. In Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, European donors did not require multi-ethnic use of central urban apartments or other housing in order to fund repairs, nor did different US government agencies require multi-ethnic use of schools or other facilities. However, one USAID project required extensive demonstration of "multi-ethnic reconciliation value" and property ownership of apartments before the donor would consent to fund repair activities. The lone multi-ethnic programme in town had very little political leverage when the other projects could simply repair the buildings with no reconciliation requirements imposed on the politicians. Significant community-level resources and time have been wasted during the past five years to sort through incompatible and inconsistent aid-conditionality stipulations.
- *Strengthen the public sector – particularly at the canton level – to establish operative partnerships with civil society*. Training new civil society leaders can be threatening to new Bosnian government officials, who often lack the skills and training to perform their own jobs. The canton remains the most important level for public sector training because it regulates key areas: regional education, cultural activities, land use, and other policies that are integral to Bosnia's reconstruction and reconciliation. Canton offices are key public buffers between the grassroots-

focused constituency who may be inclined towards accommodation and national-minded politicians who are constrained from cooperating. Building strategic partnerships between the public and multi-ethnic private sectors will also improve the quality of community redevelopment and democracy building more than simply adding resources or providing straightforward technical assistance to the public sector alone. Introducing incentives for better public management in the face of policies of favouritism, as was accomplished with the inter-entity customs bureau, would also help to build a peaceful and democratic government of the divided communities of Bosnia.

Conclusions

Since the 1995 Dayton Agreement, Bosnian civil society has proven the illegitimacy of ethnic separatism as a pre-requisite to peace. The Bosnian private sector continues to profit through multi-ethnic, inter-entity relations beyond the reaches of nationalist political parties. In the first quarter of 2000, the rate of minority-ethnic return was four-fold than in the same period in 1999, which was a similar multiple increase over 1998. Even in the "extreme" areas of Republika Srpska, persons who are determined to rebuild their communities in a spirit of co-existence are doing so.

As Bosnian citizens gain economic strength to support and provide security for their families, their interest in participating in a broader democracy increases. Hence, major economic restructuring of the Bosnian economy – with privatization as a central theme – remains critical to democracy building. In short, the deliberate participation by Bosniacs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs alike, to pursue a strategy of peaceful and productive interdependence has sent a constant signal to donors on how to shape new electoral processes, enhance new systems of governance, and generate new investments in economic ventures – i.e., with a sustainable, multi-ethnic strategy. With rigorously reshaped public sector investment, Bosnia may become a viable member of our global democratic society, healed from the violence of the civil war.

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