Interactive Overview of combinations of Electoral Systems and Quota Types
This table shows the suitability of different combinations of electoral systems and quota types. Use the buttons and checkboxes to control for which combinations explaining text should be visible.
This is an interactive version of the original table included in the International IDEA publication Designing for Equality - Best fit, medium fit and non-favourable combinations of electoral systems and gender quotas, available in English, Armenian, Nepali and Spanish.
GREEN = Best-fit combinations
YELLOW = Medium-fit combinations
RED = Non-favourable combinations
List Proportional Representation with small districts (List PR)
List Proportional Representation with large districts (List PR)
List PR systems give incentives for women to be nominated and thereby increase the likelihood of women being elected through a variety of different ways. Women can be nominated together with men so that incumbent men are not challenged specifically; most votes go towards giving the party another seat, which means that it is important for the party to campaign outside its own group of defined voters; parties are many and close to each other in terms of policy, meaning that parties that are not perceived as being ‘fair’ to women risk losing voters and so on. The larger the districts and the larger the party magnitudes, the higher the likelihood of women being elected.
List PR systems give incentives for women to be nominated and thereby increase the likelihood of women being elected through a variety of different ways. Women can be nominated together with men so that incumbent men are not challenged specifically; most votes go towards giving the party another seat, which means that it is important for the party to campaign outside its own group of defined voters; parties are many and close to each other, meaning that parties that are not perceived as being “fair” to women risk losing voters; and so on. The larger the districts and the larger the party magnitudes, the higher the likelihood of women being elected.
Does not come with any specific incentives to elect women. Incumbents are usually men and since only one person can be elected from the party, the party will be likely to go with the most broadly accepted candidate (which is usually a man - especially if he is the incumbent).
Does not come with any specific incentives to elect women. Incumbents are usually men and since only one person can be elected from the party, the party will be likely to go with the most broadly accepted candidate (which is usually a man - especially if he is the incumbent).
The List PR part of the system has incentives to nominate and elect women, but the second element will often have no such incentives - with only medium effects on the election of women as the result.
The List PR part of the system has incentives to nominate and elect women, but the second element will often have no such incentives - with only medium effects on the election of women as the result.
Does not come with any specific incentives to elect women.
A very uncommon system, which has the incentives to work fairly well (as a balanced list could be made without specifically denying the incumbent man the possibility to be nominated). It does not, however, have all the List PR incentives, such as clear incentives to campaign for votes outside the party’s core voters, or many parties in parliament with only slight differences between them, making voter volatility a salient issue for the parties.
Does not come with any specific incentives to elect women. Incumbents are usually men and since only one person can be elected from the party, the party will be likely to go with the most broadly accepted candidate (which is usually a man - especially if he is the incumbent).
Does not come with any specific incentives to elect women.
A very uncommon system, which has the incentives to work fairly well, as a balanced list of candidates could be made without specifically denying the incumbent man the possibility to be nominated. It does not, however, have all the List PR incentives, such as clear incentives to campaign for votes outside the party’s core voters, or many parties in parliament with only slight differences between them, making voter volatility a salient issue for the parties.
Possible, but only with open lists. If lists are closed, there would be no best loser as no candidate-centred votes would be cast. Will work unless there are not enough women candidates on the lists.
Possible, but only with open lists. If lists are closed, there would be no best loser as no candidate-centred votes would be cast. Will work unless there are not enough women candidates on the lists.
Not possible since only one person is elected from each district.
Not possible since TRS almost always use single-member districts.
Possible only for the List PR part of the system (if - as is most often the case - the district element is FPTP) and only if the lists are open.
Possible only for the List PR part of the system (if - as is most often the case - the district element is FPTP) and only if the lists are open.
Possible (used in Mauritius and Palestine for underrepresented groups, although not women). Will work unless there are not enough women candidates. Gives parties incentives to field women candidates in order not to lose any seats to competing parties. (Example: Jordan)
Not possible when lists are closed (which is almost always the case). If lists were open, the quota would work in much the same way as under Open List PR systems.
Not possible since only one person is elected from each district.
Possible by the same logic as Block Vote, LV and SNTV. When all but the number of reserved seats have been filled in each district - if no woman has been elected - the highest polling women are elected.
Possible by the same logic as BV, LV, SNTV and STV. But only in multi-member districts (MMDs).
Increases the likelihood of women being elected, but not as much as in large districts or under rank-order rules. In countries with a population largely unwilling to vote for women, open lists (compared to closed lists) will limit the effect of the quota, while in countries with a population willing to vote for women candidates, open lists can work in favour of the women candidates. (Examples: Peru and Paraguay)
Increases significantly the likelihood of women being elected, especially with large party magnitudes as even women placed quite low on the lists tend to get elected. (Example: Macedonia)
Not possible within districts since only one candidate from each party usually stands in each district. If more than one candidate were to stand because of a quota on the number of nominated candidates, it would be against the party’s interest to nominate a strong second candidate as that risks splitting the votes between the two, and the party may instead nominate a weak and unknown woman in order to maximize the support for candidate number one. Possible only between districts (on a national or regional level) e.g. by stipulating that women will be fielded in a certain number of districts. Not to be confused with the ‘women only’ tier. This runs the risk that parties who are not eager to nominate women will only nominate them in districts where the seat is likely to be won by a competing party anyway. (Example: Nepal, 1999 elections)
Not possible since only one candidate from each party usually stands in each district. If more than one candidate were to run because of a quota on the number of nominated candidates, it would be against the party’s interest to nominate a strong second candidate as that risks splitting the votes between the two, and the party may instead nominate a weak and unknown woman in order to maximize the support for candidate number one.
Possible for the List PR part of the system. For the single-member district (SMD) part of the system please see the FPTP cell on this row. The effectiveness will be affected by lists being open or closed and by the party magnitude. (Examples: Armenia, 5% quota in 2003 elections, and Republic of Korea)
Possible for the List PR part of the system. For the SMD part of the system please see the FPTP cell on this row. The effectiveness will be affected by lists being open or closed and by the party magnitude.
This is possible in theory, but difficult, especially if many independent candidates stand. Block Vote is likely to work better than SNTV and LV as voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled and those who are loyal to one party will cast all their votes for that party - including the women candidates.
Is guaranteed to work since the whole list is elected if it receives the highest number of votes. Independent candidates (who could lessen the effect of the quota) are not likely to stand to any great extent as their chances of winning are minimal. (Examples: Cameroon, voluntary party quota adopted by the two largest parties, and Djibouti)
Not possible within districts since only one candidate from each party usually stands in each district. Possible only between districts (on a national or regional level) e.g. by stipulating that women will be fielded in a certain number of districts. Not to be confused with the ‘women only’ tier. This runs the risk that parties who are not eager to nominate women will only nominate them in districts where the seat is likely to be won by a competing party anyway.
This is possible in theory, but difficult, especially if many independent candidates stand. Even without independent candidates, there are no guarantees that any women will be elected.
Is possible and is likely to have a medium effect as voters will mark their preferences.
Guaranteed to work when lists are closed. If lists are open, the order can change, thus undermining the predetermined ranking. Likely to be slightly less effective in List PR systems with small districts than in List PR systems with large districts as party magnitude is likely to be smaller and more men (who are usually top ranked) are likely to be elected even under zipper quotas. (Examples: Dominican Republic and Ecuador)
Guaranteed to work when lists are closed. If lists are open, the order can change, thus undermining the predetermined ranking. Likely to be slightly less effective in List PR systems with small districts than in List PR systems with large districts as party magnitude is likely to be smaller and more men (who are usually top-ranked) are likely to be elected even under zipper quotas. (Examples: Costa Rica, Argentina, Belgium, Portugal and Iraq, 2005 elections)
Not possible since ranking cannot be determined beforehand.
Not possible since ranking cannot be determined beforehand.
Possible for the List PR part of the system. For the SMD part of the system please see the FPTP cell on this row. The effectiveness will be affected by lists being open or closed and by the party magnitude. (Example: Palestinie)
Possible for the List PR part of the system. For the SMD part of the system please see the FPTP cell on this row. The effectiveness will be affected by lists being open or closed and by the party magnitude. (Examples: Bolivia, constituent assembly election 2006, and Mexico)
Not possible since ranking cannot be determined beforehand.
Is guaranteed to work just as well as without rankorder rules as the whole list is elected if it receives the highest number of votes.
Not possible since ranking cannot be determined beforehand.
Not possible if it is candidate-centred. Ranking is determined by voters.
Not possible since ranking cannot be determined beforehand.
