

Part 4

From assessment
to reform: influencing
the democratic process

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Part 1 of the Guide introduced the main purpose and structure of the democracy assessment framework. Part 2 provided the full assessment framework, complete with the search questions, what to look for, generalized sources, and national, regional and international standards of good practice. Part 3 reflected many of the experiences of applying the framework in a variety of different country contexts, covering large and small states, federal and unitary systems, old and new democracies, and advanced industrial and less-developed societies. These different experiences have shown that the framework works, that it is flexible and adaptable to the contextual specificities of a wide range of countries, that it has contributed to public debate and raised awareness, and that it has allowed for the expression of popular understanding and elite consensus, and in many cases the identification of reform priorities and ways in which to monitor the achievement of democratic progress. It has also shown that, despite the existence of a common framework of assessment, democracy itself has many ‘different stories’, whether in its foundation and development or its response to the unending challenges. The effectiveness of the assessment framework as illustrated in Part 3 provides a significant test of its value.

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This final part of the guide builds on the link between the assessment process, assessment outputs, and the development of a democratic reform agenda. One of the main purposes of individual country assessments by in-country assessors has always been to make a contribution to the democratization process itself. The comparative experiences of applying the framework suggest that there are *different potential audiences* for the product of a democracy assessment and that there are *long-term and short-term effects* of an assessment, each of which can be linked to developing strategies for reform.

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Over the years, the different audiences for democracy assessments have included citizens and domestic stakeholders in the private and

public sector, as well as international stakeholders from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, primarily but not exclusively in the donor community. Many of these stakeholders have been actively involved in the assessment, while others have been exposed to the final outputs through large public events, official speeches, media interviews, book launches and ongoing consultative processes. The long-term and short-term effects have included such milestone achievements as contributing to the public debate about or discourse on democracy; enriching civic education within and outside the academic world; developing consensus around a reform agenda; and influencing specific reforms and/or reform agents, as well as evaluating the effectiveness of such reforms.

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These achievements have varied across the range of countries. Perhaps one of the most significant examples of the link between democracy assessment and democratic reform is illustrated in the case of Mongolia, where the government enacted a Ninth Millennium Development Goal which specifies a set of targets for upholding all human rights found in the Universal Declaration, to uphold and inculcate democratic principles and values, and to combat corruption. In Mongolia all major stakeholders took part in various aspects of the assessment, while the key elements of the National Plan of Action have begun to be institutionalized through additional support from the international community. In contrast to other contexts, where the democracy assessment is one of many voices in the national debate, in Mongolia it was the *only* voice in the debate. But this voice was given its fullest expression, where all forms of critical reflection about the nature and quality of Mongolian democracy were given space and received widespread national and international attention.

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In similar fashion, the Dutch assessment was government-led. The final report was disseminated through a variety of strategies to reach as wide an audience as possible. The final report was sent to 250 NGOs, government bodies, journalists and the queen, who used one of the eight topics from the report in her Christmas speech. In addition, major public debates were held on the eight topics, including freedom of speech, the structure of government, the media, and citizenship. A final large conference was held with ministers present, who outlined significant steps for the future. The new Dutch Government (in 2007) set out three broad reforms in the light of the assessment, including a ‘charter for responsible citizenship’, technical changes to the constitution, and a pledge to reduce the complexity of government processes more generally.

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In the light of these specific examples, this part of the guide addresses ways in which to think about an assessment as an effective means to communicate a particular story about democracy that has been forged through a process of national consensus. This story ought to be communicated to as diverse and broad an audience as possible and should lead to the formulation of concrete proposals for democratic reform that draw on the findings of the assessment in ways that are based on local ownership of the reform agenda. It is clear from the experiences of applying the assessment framework that assessment teams have moved beyond the set of search questions and have used the framework as a useful tool for critical reflection within the country that is being assessed. A domestic team of assessors and stakeholders based in the country of the assessment provides the empirical basis for answering the questions while reflecting on the democratic achievements and deficits for the period being assessed, *as well as identifying the obstacles to democratic reform that may exist*. In this way, the assessment is crucial for celebrating democratic achievements while revealing critical gaps in the lived democratic experience of the country and obstacles in need of attention through proposals for reform to move the democratic agenda forward.

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Achievements and challenges

[164] The original set of pilot studies in Bangladesh, El Salvador, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand, Peru and South Korea provided important lessons for how the framework can be applied to old, new and restored democracies and how common comparative inferences could be drawn from their assessment experiences. The original studies showed that there are a number of notable democratic achievements that can be made early during a period of transition and consolidation, and similar achievements have been evident in the subsequent country assessments detailed in Part 3. The assessments have shown that it has been relatively easy to:

- ▶ obtain a broadly agreed constitution with a bill of rights;
- ▶ establish some sort of office of ombudsmen and/or a public defender;
- ▶ hold free elections and establish universal suffrage;
- ▶ support the revival of local government; and
- ▶ ensure the protection of basic freedoms such as party association, press, speech and assembly.

It has been more difficult to establish:

- ▶ the effective inclusion of minorities and women's participation;
- ▶ equal access to justice and protection of the right to life;
- ▶ meaningful intra-party democracy;
- ▶ control of executives;
- ▶ a reduction in private influence and private interests in the public sphere; and
- ▶ a significant role for opposition parties

and in many ways these remain precarious.

[165] While this is not an exhaustive list of the challenges faced by these countries (for further challenges, see Table 4.1), the main gaps identified between early constitutional and institutional achievements, on the one hand, and longer-term problems that erode the democratic quality of life, on the other hand, are consonant with popular commentaries on and critical analysis of democratic underachievement beyond the countries that have undergone the kind of assessments outlined in this guide (see e.g. Diamond 1999; Zakaria 2003; O'Donnell et al. 2004; Carothers 2007a).

[166] These popular commentaries are critical about two key things: (a) an overemphasis on elections (the 'electoral fallacy') at the cost of exam-

ining other key dimensions of democracy and (b) the false logic of democratic ‘sequencing’ (see Rustow 1970; Carothers 2007a). While elections are important and feature prominently in the assessment framework, the many other dimensions of the framework show that elections are but one facet of the democratic experience, where questions of rights, inclusion, the media and political parties, among other things, must sit alongside the holding of regular elections. Democratic sequencing sees the development of democracy as a set of necessary steps in which the state and the rule of law are stabilized *before* democracy is introduced fully. A recent critique of this sequential approach (Carothers 2007a, 2007b; see also Fukuyama 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Berman 2007) cautions against the sequential logic to the process of democratization and argues that democracies and the democrats that inhabit them are best placed to bring about democratic reform and that their efforts to do so often *precede* rather than *follow* any interventions from the international community, and even in those instances where this is not the case, the power of outside intervention in democracy promotion is overrated.

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This view is largely compatible with the types of lesson that have been learned by applying the assessment framework across such a diverse set of countries, which – unlike the various debates on democratic sequencing – has included established democracies, as well as new and restored democracies. The new democrats of Mongolia forged a competitive electoral system in which real alternation of power has taken place, and where all major stakeholders have become engaged in state reform and strengthening the rule of law. In the Netherlands, popular rejection of the EU constitution and two prominent political assassinations initiated an assessment that revealed the need to revisit issues of Dutch citizenship and the complexity of government itself in representing the needs and democratic aspirations of the population. In South Asia, the State of Democracy project sought to locate democracy in the context of that region of the world in order to discover what South Asians think about democracy and how they have adapted its very idea. The project showed that across the region democratic ‘preconditions’ (Karl 1990) are not necessary for the installation of democracy and that democracy has not yet been able to address questions of poverty.

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These different examples suggest that the framework, in addition to being equally applicable to such a diverse range of country contexts, is equally useful in generating concrete proposals for democratic reform, the success of which relies heavily on the agents of the assessment and their ability to provide the broad conditions of ownership for key stake-

holders who have the capacity and opportunity to drive the reform process. In terms of the assessment framework and within IDEA's general orientation towards democracy as an ongoing and evolving process, it is expected that democracy is not an 'all or nothing affair', so that certain features may be better developed than others, and the assessment of the quality of democracy necessarily requires a multidimensional approach that can provide a more nuanced and contextually-specific 'performance profile'. Moreover, the assessment framework lends itself well to the identification of possible explanations for the gaps between achievements and remaining challenges, which in turn can lead to the formulation of a democratic reform agenda.

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Context, influence, audience and outputs

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The potential for initiating, implementing and sustaining significant democratic reforms, however, must be seen as a function of four larger factors that need to be taken into consideration. The four factors are:

- ▶ the contexts in which the assessments were carried out;
- ▶ the types of influence that the assessment made possible;
- ▶ the audience to which the assessment was directed; and
- ▶ the types of output that were produced.

These factors can act alone or in combination to affect the type of democratic reform possible, both in the short term and in the longer term.

Context

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Across the experiences, the context of the assessment varied greatly across the main *agent* of the assessment (government, civil society or an academic institution), the relative *openness of the political process to reform*, and the relative *voice the assessment had* in the public domain and popular political discourse. Differences across these contextual

features of each assessment will have (and have had) an impact on the degree to which democratic reform is possible and on the character of the assessment itself. Government endorsement adds official legitimacy to the exercise but may affect perceptions of its independence and validity. Openness to reform means that the assessment proposals will be better received and the reform process itself will be easier to initiate, implement and maintain. In similar fashion, if an assessment achieves a dominant position in public discourse on the state of democracy and the need for reforms then it will necessarily feed more readily into a reform agenda based on the findings of the assessment.

The main agent of the assessment

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The original model for democracy assessment was based on the experience of Democratic Audit in the UK. Research for the three main volumes in which the findings were first published was carried out at the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, with significant additional input from academics from other UK universities (e.g. University College London, Oxford University, and the London School of Economics). This model was used in the first eight pilot studies, which were conducted through collaboration between International IDEA and an academic institution in each country, with desk studies prepared by academics based at the University of Leeds. The Australian Democratic Audit and the Philippine Democracy Assessment – based, respectively, at the Australian National University and the National College of Public Administration and Governance at the University of the Philippines – also follow this model. The UK, Australian and Philippine examples are ongoing sets of activities and produce a variety of different outputs (see below), while the other examples outlined in Part 3 have so far been single projects, with varying degrees of follow-up activity and/or institutional reform initiatives.

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As Part 3 demonstrates, considerable variation exists in the subsequent assessments that have been carried out, ranging from government-led to civil society-led. In Mongolia and the Netherlands, the government was the main agent for the assessment. In the Mongolian case, civil society, the media and the academic world had a greater role throughout the assessment than they did in the Netherlands. In Mongolia the academic sector provided the core empirical research on the development of democratic governance indicators (with desk studies prepared by the University of Essex) and civil society engaged in producing a civil society index (with assistance from Civicus). The two major international conferences held in Ulaanbaatar included representatives from the government, the parliament and civil society

(which also included representatives from the media). In contrast, in the Netherlands, the Interior Ministry was largely responsible for conducting the assessment, the results of which were then disseminated through the main debates about and the distribution of the final report, which received media coverage and responses from NGOs and other civil society organizations. In both cases, having the government as the main agent of the assessment has led to reform proposals, the reform agenda being arguably more extensive in the case of Mongolia given the many challenges that country faces, having emerged from a prolonged period of communist rule.

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The democracy assessment in Latvia was carried out by the Latvia Commission of Strategic Analysis and the University of Latvia. The commission was established in April 2004 under the auspices of the president and comprises well-known Latvian scholars. Thus the Latvian project falls somewhere in between the primarily government-led examples of Mongolia and the Netherlands, where government sponsorship has added legitimacy to the enterprise compared to those carried out by civil society organizations, think tanks and academic institutions.

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The assessments in ‘the two Irelands’, South Asia and Bosnia were primarily led by non-governmental agents. The Democratic Audit of Ireland has been carried out by a think tank, TASC. The South Asian project was coordinated by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), an autonomous social science research institution based in New Delhi. The Bosnian assessment was sponsored by the Open Society Forum and carried out by an independent research team. In each of these cases, substantial reports have been published leading to varying degrees of media coverage and responsiveness from the general public, while in Bosnia the assessment led to the establishment of a website – ‘The Pulse of Democracy’ – as a tool for disseminating further the results of the assessment and increasing awareness of ongoing democratic challenges.

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Quite apart from identifying the main agent for the assessment, however, there is the additional issue, particularly in deeply divided societies, surrounding the ideological or political affiliation of the agent, the composition of the assessment team, and the representativeness of the team. Clearly, an assessment team should be broadly based and inclusive of all major stakeholders and different sets of interests. As is outlined in Part 1, a team that is too narrow or one that is unbalanced or biased in some way can affect the legitimacy of the assessment and ultimately the possibility for reform. The institutionalization of

reform is a long process, which involves creating broad consensus among key political actors, as well as developing the supportive political culture that is needed if democracy is to last in the case of new or restored democracies and to deepen in the more established democracies. As Juris Rozenvalds observed after completing the Latvian assessment, ‘there is no democracy without democrats’. Although many observers have made the same observation, this comment captures Rustow’s (1970) notion of ‘democratic habituation’, which can take a generation or two to become deeply embedded into the political culture of a new democracy.

The relative openness of the political process

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The second contextual factor that will have an impact on the degree to which an assessment can lead to substantive reform is the relative openness of the political process. Assessments have been carried out for very different reasons at very different times in the political development and evolution of the individual countries that have been assessed. For the more established democracies, the impulse to carry out an assessment is often associated with some sort of crisis of governability, popular dissatisfaction or disquiet about the political status quo, or some sort of ‘trigger’ event, such as a significant change in government, a critical election, or some other significant disruption. These events offer significant political opportunities for the democratic reform agenda to begin to form and an assessment or democratic ‘stocktaking’ provides a useful means to initiate the reform process.

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As Part 3 has shown, in the three established democracies of the UK, the ‘two’ Irelands and the Netherlands, significant events led to a new demand for assessment of and critical reflection on the quality of democracy. In the UK, Democratic Audit has framed its work between the latter years of the Thatcher era – the background against which *Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain* (Weir and Beetham 1998) and *The Three Pillars of Liberty* (Klug, Starmer and Weir 1996) are set – and the electoral success and dominance of New Labour – the context for the third book, *Democracy Under Blair* (Beetham, Byrne, Ngan and Weir 2002). The Dutch assessment was a response to growing questions about the national culture in the light of the proposed EU constitution and about national citizenship after two high-profile killings. For Australia, the Democratic Audit used the moment of the centenary celebrations to launch a long-term investigation into Australian democracy. For the two Irelands, the peace process and ongoing Stormont talks served as a catalyst (and bot-

tleneck) to the parallel democracy assessments completed in 2007 under the rubric *Power to the People?* (Hughes, Clancy, Harris and Beetham 2007; and Wilford, Wilson and Claussen 2007).

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For the new democracies, the moment of transition from authoritarian rule has been an important milestone and many of the assessments have been carried out after some time has passed since the transition. The Mongolians combined a reflective look at their democracy since the transition in the early 1990s with their role as chair of the Fifth International Conference on New and Restored Democracies. The Philippines continues to work on sections of the assessment framework as and when funding becomes available, but the impulse for the assessment has come from the Marcos era and the continued political upheaval. For Latvia, the negotiations on accession to the EU brought a variety of reforms mandated by the Copenhagen Criteria and provided the opportunity for a democracy assessment. For Bosnia, international donor interest in assessing achievements in democratization ten years after the war prompted the assessment, which had three main objectives: (a) the identification of the strengths and weaknesses of current democratic practices, (b) the identification of priorities for reform, and (c) to provoke public debate on the effectiveness of democracy in practice. The South Asian assessment combined the long-term experience with democracy in India with the more recent experiences in the region, most notably the popular rejection of monarchical rule and the call for democracy in Nepal.

Openness to reform means that the assessment proposals will be better received and the reform process itself easier to initiate, implement and maintain.

Public space

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The next contextual factor that affects the probability of an assessment leading to significant reform involves the relative public presence the assessment achieves. In advanced industrial democracies there are 'multiple points of entry' – a plurality of social groups, different interests, bases of political support, and civil society organizations, as well as large print media outlets, television and radio stations, wide penetration of the Internet, academic commentary, and other forms of opinion-shaping activities and outlets. In contrast, new democra-

cies in transitional economies or less-developed countries will tend to have concentrated media outlets or media monopolies, fewer academic specialists, less active or underdeveloped civil society organizations, and in many cases concentrated areas of political power and deep patron–client networks, which on their own or in combination can limit the degree to which a democracy assessment will lead to reform. The relative voice that an assessment achieves may therefore be a function of the combination between the main agent of the assessment and the public space in which it is operating.

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Such a combination thus creates a trade-off for any country contemplating a democracy assessment. On the one hand, government-led assessments may have more formal voice, but they need to be careful to ensure that they are representative, valid and legitimate exercises that include broad representation of key stakeholders. On the other hand, society-led or academic assessments achieve a certain autonomy, independence and validity, but may well have to compete for control of the public space in communicating their work and will need to achieve some consensus with government actors in order to bring about a reform process. In Mongolia, the government-led assessment occupied most of the public space and was the main voice for democratic reform, while in the Netherlands the Interior Ministry needed to mobilize the national media and hold public debates on the main findings of the assessment. Assessments in transitional or less-developed countries may also want to attract international attention in order to gain some form of externally validated voice to bring about democratic reform, which leads to more general questions about the types of audience for which assessments are being carried out.

Types of audience, output and impact

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As this discussion indicates, there are many potential audiences for a democracy assessment, which will necessarily vary according to the purpose of the assessment, the conditions under which it was carried out, the agents that undertook it and the type of political conditions prevailing at the time it was completed. These audiences include national stakeholders within government and in political, civil and economic society. But they may well include audiences outside the country, including other countries wishing to carry out their own assessments and the international donor community, which has increasingly emphasized a link between the quality of governance, economic growth and poverty reduction. Part 3 has shown how the different assessment experiences produced a variety of significant outputs, including book-length reports, national conferences and debates, media

events, short reports on parts of the framework or specific issue areas, policy analysis, new data sets with individual and aggregate level indicators, advocacy documents, and proposals for and the enactment of new legislation, such as the Charter for Responsible Citizenship in the Netherlands and Mongolia's enacting of the Ninth Millennium Development Goal.

The audiences for a democracy assessment may include national stakeholders, within government and in political, civil and economic society, and audiences outside the country, including other countries wishing to carry out their own assessments and the international donor community.

[182] The overall combination of the purpose, agent, context, audience and outputs of any assessment is linked to its potential impact. Assessments can have direct influence on policy makers and other political elites – as in the cases of the Netherlands, Mongolia and Latvia, and to a lesser extent in Ireland and the UK. Assessments can also strengthen constituencies, NGOs and civil society organizations that can mobilize and add pressure for democratic reform. Many assessments can have a longer-term cultural impact through raising awareness and becoming mainstreamed through educational curricula at secondary school level, as well as within the university system.

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Areas for reform

[183] These different dimensions of the assessment process (agent, context, openness of the political process, audiences, outputs and impact) create different opportunities and areas for democratic reform. We categorize these areas into three main types: (a) institutional reform, (b) resource-based reform, and (c) long-term cultural shifts. It is important that these are not seen in any way as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary and as forming a holistic approach to improving the quality of democracy in the medium-to-long term. The

reforms suggested here by no means offer a panacea for democracy's ills across all political contexts, but they are linked to the framework as key areas of reform that will help a country realize more fully the two principles that lie at the heart of the framework.

Institutional reforms

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It is clear from the assessments that have been carried out that significant institutional reform is essential to improving the quality of democracy. These reforms are based on enhancing vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms in ways that prohibit the centralization of power or prevent power and decision making being exercised without real oversight. Across different institutional arrangements (e.g. unitary and federal systems, presidential and parliamentary systems, and proportional and majoritarian systems), the assessment experiences have shown that it is important that institutional mechanisms are in place for maintaining independent forms of representation and accountability. (The Dutch assessment has led to calls for the establishment of a Directorate General for Governance and Democracy.) Institutional oversight requires real power backed with constitutional or statutory authority to oversee and control actions of government that can have a deleterious impact on human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. For example, popular institutional solutions include the establishment of national human rights institutions, electoral commissions, anti-corruption bodies and ombudsman offices, as well as more traditional legislative and judicial powers of oversight that have evolved over long periods of time in the more established democracies. For transitional societies there is an additional demand for institutional solutions that confront authori-

Popular institutional reforms include the establishment of national human rights institutions, electoral commissions, anti-corruption bodies and ombudsman offices, and more traditional legislative and judicial powers of oversight. For transitional societies there is an additional demand for institutional solutions that confront authoritarian legacies, the military 'reserve domains' of power and the use of emergency powers within national constitutions. There should also be institutional solutions to enhance the participation and inclusion of all groups, including minority groups and women.

tarian legacies (at a formal and legal level and at a cultural and practical level), the so-called military ‘reserve domains’ of power (e.g. in Bangladesh and Pakistan), and the use of emergency powers within national constitutions. Moreover, there should also be institutional solutions to enhance the participation and inclusion of all groups, including minority groups and women.

Resource-based reforms

[185] The framework includes consideration of economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights. The assessment experiences have shown that political and legal equality must be complemented by the means for realizing social equality: the persistence of social and economic inequality constrains the ability of large numbers of people to take part in the public affairs of the country. The fulfilment of economic and social rights is often criticized for placing a heavy burden on the fiscal capacity of governments, but programmes that enhance the protection of civil and political rights also entail such a burden. All rights depend in some degree on tax revenues and government spending. Interestingly, one of the ‘inconvenient truths’ of the South Asian study was that there is a broad perception among mass publics that democracy has not yet been able to reduce poverty. The South Asia report argues: ‘South Asia needs to evolve an alternative approach to thinking about democratic reforms. This approach would respond to the promise of democracy. ... It [needs] to prioritise the challenge of accommodating minority interests and aspirations, ... re-invigorat[e] politics ... [through] a radical re-working of political institutions and the state’ (Lokniti 2008: 152–3).

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Long-term cultural shifts

[186] As is alluded to above, in order for democracy to become ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5), there is a longer-term need for the kind of reforms that promote and develop a broader political

culture that is supportive of democracy. The Bosnian and Latvian assessment experiences made this point very clearly, and in many ways showed that new and restored democracies face a somewhat harder challenge in this regard. The Pulse of Democracy website set up by the OSF in Bosnia was a parallel and initially unrelated way of raising awareness of developing democracy. For Latvia, Juris Rozenvalds is sanguine about the cultural impact of the assessment: ‘this country is democratic because they have [a] critical report of themselves...’.

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In Bangladesh, one of the original pilot studies and part of the South Asia study had to work against a background of ongoing military interventions in the political sphere which the public in general backed, which suggests a weak attachment at best to democracy and democratic principles. The South Asia assessment argues that ‘an affirmation of democracy does not lead to the negation of authoritarian alternatives, so support for democracy is thin’ (Lokniti 2008: 12–13).

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In the Netherlands, the government has sought to formulate an interconnected package of measures to guarantee, reinforce and – where necessary – renew democracy, together with the results of the Citizen’s Forum (Burgerforum) and the National Convention (Nationale Conventie), among other initiatives. On 5 October 2006 the National Convention made proposals for the establishment of a national political system that could contribute to the restoration of confidence between the citizen and politics and also serve as a constitution for the 21st century. In Australia, many of the audit outputs form part of the curricula for university students. As Marian Sawyer observes, ‘students cut their teeth on *our* assessments of Australian political practices when learning about Australian politics’.

There is a longer-term need for the kind of reforms that promote and develop a broader political culture that is supportive of democracy. The institutionalization of reform is a long process, which involves creating broad consensus among key political actors, as well as developing the supportive political culture that is needed. The new and restored democracies face a somewhat harder challenge in this regard.

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All in all, it is clear that institutional, resource-based and cultural reforms demand varying degrees of attention and time, and a wide range

of different actors in order to build a broader, deeper and better democratic future. This guide has made it clear throughout that democracy assessment must be comprehensive, inclusive and forward-looking in ways that draw on the democratic achievements, are grounded in the many different contexts in which democracy flourishes, and require the support of all citizens within the country that has been assessed. Democracy assessment engages all levels of society as well as key international actors in an effort to build and strengthen democratic institutions, democratic society and democratic culture in ways that reflect the needs of the population governed within the democracy itself. In this way, democracy is not exported or imported, but supported.

Table 4.1. Typical achievements and challenges drawn from the pilot studies

Section of framework	Achievements	Challenges
1. Citizenship, law and rights		
1.1. Nationhood and citizenship	Democratic constitution established	Broadly based inclusion of all sectors of society Elimination of authoritarian legacies
1.2. Rule of law and access to justice	De facto separation of judiciary from executive	Access to justice for all Inefficient processing of cases Criminal elements and corruption
1.3. Civil and political rights	Bill of rights Office of ombudsman, public defender, or equivalent	National emergency rights derogations Low public regard for police Poor conditions of detention Violence against women
1.4. Economic and social rights	Government focused on economic development Shift in international community to poverty reduction and debt relief	Limited fiscal capacity of states to guarantee basic rights Increasing gap between rich and poor Liberalization without regulation

Section of framework	Achievements	Challenges
2. Representative and accountable government		
2.1. Free and fair elections	Competitive elections Establishment of independent electoral commissions Improved and inclusive voter registration Voters exercise their electoral rights	Official and unofficial electoral harassment and intimidation Unequal access for parties to the media Possible vulnerability of constituency-based electoral systems Socially unrepresentative electoral candidates
2.2. The democratic role of political parties	Freedom for parties to form, recruit and campaign	Fragmentation of party representation Personal party politics Limited internal party democracy Party finance problems
2.3. Effective and responsive government	Realistic threat of removal for most governments Some legislative oversight of executive Citizen redress possible Some independent media	Executive dominance Pork-barrel politics Reporting delays Limited role for opposition parties Weak freedom of information legislation
2.4. The democratic effectiveness of parliament ^a		
2.5. Civilian control of the military and police	Clear procedures for civilian control of military Public service reforms	Removing military from previous zones of conflict Strengthening the accountability of the security services to parliament Ensuring the police serve the whole community Making services more socially representative
2.6. Integrity in public life ^b	Establishment of an anti-corruption commission Increased reporting of corruption from civil society and the general public	Addressing rent-seeking behaviour and culture Strengthening anti-corruption bodies

Section of framework	Achievements	Challenges
3. Civil society and popular participation		
3.1. The media in a democratic society	Free independent print media Relaxing state media monopoly	Continued government control of the media Private media monopoly Official and unofficial harassment of journalists Trivialization of media content
3.2. Political participation	Active civil society organizations (CSOs) Effective role for CSOs Encouragement for self-help	Donor dependency of CSOs Lack of CSO accountability Low participation of women
Government responsiveness ^c	Adoption of consultative mechanisms	Preferential access for the wealthy Sense of powerlessness among general public
3.3. Decentralization	Revival of elected local government Greater responsiveness to local citizens Cooperation with local partners for delivery of services	Inadequate and unequal resource base at local level Lack of trained personnel Limited fiscal decentralization
4. Democracy beyond the state^d		
4.1. External influences on the country's democracy	Incorporation of international treaties into domestic legislation	Subordination to international financial institutions Unequal representation of countries from the global South in international organizations Chronic border disputes
4.2. The country's democratic impact abroad	Support for UN peacekeeping missions Generosity towards refugees	
<p><i>Source:</i> Adapted from International IDEA, <i>The State of Democracy: Democracy Assessments in Eight Nations Around the World</i> (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 100–103.</p> <p>^a This element was not in the original framework.</p> <p>^b In the original framework, this item was entitled 'Minimising Corruption'.</p> <p>^c This item has been consolidated into a different section of the new framework.</p> <p>^d In the original framework, this item appeared as a single question.</p>		